Update on the ICAO work

programme on Conflict Zones

and way forward
ICAO AVSEC2018
Global Aviation Security Symposium

Kas E. Beumkes, Senior Safety Expert ANB/ICAO

Montréal, 26 November 2018

 ICAO Conflict Zone Work Programme

Involved ICAO provisions

5 Annexes
6 Manuals (Docs)
1 Circular *)
*) Circ 330  Doc 10088

13 maart 2018 2
 Involved ICAO publications
ANNEXES
Annex 6 – Operation of Aircraft, Part I – International Commercial Air Transport – Aeroplanes
Annex 11 – Air Traffic Services
Annex 13 – Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation
Annex 15 – Aeronautical Information Services
Annex 17 – Security

GUIDANCE MATERIAL
Doc 9554, Manual concerning Safety Measures Relating to Military Activities Potentially Hazardous to Civil
Aircraft Operations
Doc 9756, Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation, Part I
Doc 9859, Safety Management Manual
Doc 9962, Manual on Accident and Incident Investigation Policies and Procedures
Doc 9971, Manual on Collaborative Air Traffic Flow Management
Doc 10084, Risk Assessment Manual on Civil Aircraft Operations over or near Conflict Zones
Doc 10088, Manual on Civil/Military Cooperation in Air Traffic Management *)
*) replaces Circular 330
 TIMELINE 2018 - 2020
Improvement of related ICAO provisions

ANNEXES
2018 2019 2020
AN 6: State Letter
AN 13: review ANC
6, 13, 11, 15, 17 AN 11 and 15: ANC approved State Letters Adoption Council
ICAO ANNEXEN AN 17: published

DOCs
2018 2019 2020
9554, 9756 Part I: started
9962, 10088: ongoing ICAO Secretariat Published
DOCs 9859, 9971, 10084: published
 Results

IMPROVEMENTS Annex 17 - Security

Published (2017)  to adjust NCASP elements:
Expanding existing State requirement to constantly
review, besides the level, also the nature of the threat
to civil aviation in its territory and the airspace above

New requirement (Nov 2018): the appropriate

authority to establish and implement procedures to
share, as appropriate, relevant information with
operators, ANSPs or other entities concerned in a
practical, timely manner to assist them to conduct
security risk assessments relating to their operations
5
 Results

ONGOING IMPROVEMENTS
Risk assessment and sharing information – Air Traffic Services
New requirements (2020)
• ATS ensures to conduct a risk
assessment of airspace concerned for
hazardous activities to civil aircraft and
take mitigating actions when necessary

• conflict zone is a reportable hazard for

civil aviation in NOTAM, include nature,
Annex 11 Annex 15 extent of threat, and consequences
6
 Results

PUBLISHED & ONGOING IMPROVEMENTS

ATS Contingency and Civil - Military Coordination
2018 2020 2018
Improved guidance: 2018 - 2020
• Coordination and contingency
improvements during conflicts

• Responsibilities of parties

• Establish joint high-level policy

body for oversight
Doc 9971 Doc 9554 Circ 330  New Manual (Doc 10088)
7
 Results

ONGOING IMPROVEMENTS
Annex 6 – Operation of Aircraft, Part I
New requirement (2020)
• Operator ensures to conduct before the
flight a risk assessment for the entire flight
plan route, including alternates, and when
necessary to take mitigating actions

• Note with reference to new Risk Assessment

Manual for Civil Aircraft Operations Over or
Near Conflict Zones (Doc 10084)
8
 New Risk Assessment Manual for States
and airspace users – Conflict Zones

PUBLISHED IMPROVEMENTS
Doc 10084 – Risk Assessment Manual for Civil
Aircraft Operations Over or Near Conflict Zones
1st Edition (2016): Conflict zones defined and advice to
States and operators about risks of overflying conflict zones
2nd (non-restricted) Edition (2018):
• Improved ICAO framework and procedures
• Responsibilities of all stakeholders
• Consolidated source material for risk assessments
• Risk information sharing mechanisms
• Guidance what to do with threat and risk information
• Best practices

9
 2nd Edition Doc 10084

So, what’s new?

 2nd Edition Doc 10084
Roles parties concerned

State that manages the airspace

Primarily relevant Annex 17 provisions
 Establish and implement procedures for risk assessment
mechanisms to share information own territory and airspace
above it

Also some Annex 11 and 15 provisions

 Geographical area of CZ and contingency plans
 Promulgation of information
 2nd Edition Doc 10084
Roles parties concerned

Aircraft Operator
Primarily Annex 6 provisions

 Not to commence the flight before appropriate risk

assessment of the entire route, incl. en-route alternates,
and if necessary, take mitigating actions for a safe and
secure flight
 2nd Edition Doc 10084
Roles parties concerned

Air Navigation Service Provider

Primarily Annex 11 provisions

 Development and promulgate contingency planning

 Perform risk assessment for activities potentially
hazardous for civil aircraft and if necessary take
mitigating actions
 Civil – Military ATS coordination
 2nd Edition Doc 10084
Roles parties concerned

State of the Operator

Primarily Annex 17 provisions

 Assure protection and safety of passengers, crew,

ground personnel and general public safeguarding
acts of unlawful interference
 Establish an organization and structure to ensure the
safety, regularity and efficiency of flights
 2nd Edition Doc 10084
Roles parties concerned

ICAO
Based on Annex 11 provisions

 When necessary, initiate and coordinate appropriate

contingency actions with stakeholders involved

Practice example with industry

 ICAO – IATA Contingency Coordination Team (CCT)

(airspace avoidance in ICAO Middle East and North Africa region)
 2nd Edition Doc 10084
Risk Assessment Cycle

Risk
Assessment
Cycle
 2nd Edition Doc 10084
Risk Assessment Cycle

1. Collection of Relevant Information

2. Threat Analyses
3. Security Risk Assessment
4. Mitigating Actions
5. Hazard Identification
6. Unintended Consequences of Security RA Mitigating Actions
7. Safety Risk Assessment
8. Mitigating Actions – Functional Systems
9. Unintended Consequences of Safety RA Mitigating Actions
10. Acceptable Risk Level
 Integrated Risk Management

Mitigating actions – Functional Systems

• Operations
• Safety
• Security ICAO
• Environment
• Maintenance
• Quality
NOT LIMITED
• Finance
 2nd Edition Doc 10084
Security and Safety Risks

Flight
Operations

Security Risk Safety Risk

Intentional acts to Exposure to
disrupt the system unintentional events
and consequences
interrupting the system
 Example Risk Assessment
Conflict Zones 1

Flight
Operations

Security Risk Assessment

Potential SAM threat

Mitigating Action
Rerouting
 Example Risk Assessment
Conflict Zones 1

Flight
Operations

Security Risk Assessment Safety Risk Assessment

Potential SAM threat Separation CIV/MIL traffic

Mitigating Action
Rerouting
 Example Risk Assessment
Conflict Zones 1

Flight
Operations

Security Risk Assessment Safety Risk Assessment

Potential SAM threat Separation CIV/MIL traffic

Unintended Consequential
Mitigating Action Safety Risk
Rerouting Fuel/drift down/alternate
 Example Risk Assessment
Conflict Zones 1

Flight
Operations

Security Risk Assessment Safety Risk Assessment

Potential SAM threat Separation CIV/MIL traffic

Unintended Consequential
Mitigating Action Safety Risk
Rerouting Fuel/drift down/alternate
 Example Risk Assessment
Conflict Zones 2

Overflying CZ: aircraft A330 (approx 300 POB)

Example assumptions

• In the case of a potential SAM attack, the only mitigation

action available is likely to be avoidance of the affected
airspace

• For explanatory purposes of the risk assessment process a

potential attack with MANPADS is given below FL320
 Example Risk Assessment
Conflict Zones 2

Overflying CZ: aircraft A330 (approx 300 POB)

1. Collection of relevant information
CZ: conflict between non-state armed groups and government
No indications that the non-state groups possess medium or long range
SAMs with a greater range than MANPADS

2. Threat analysis
Q: Does it involve Intention and Capability?
A: Both YES for MANPADS

Q: Can the information be verified?

A: Security info, public info; e.g. NOTAMs potential risk airspace below
FL320 (Note: variation in NOTAMs depending source)

Q: Does the treat exist? A: YES

 Example Risk Assessment
Conflict Zones 2

Overflying CZ: aircraft A330 (approx. 300 POB)

3. Security Risk Assessment (SeRA)
Q: Threat (Intent + Capability)  Consequence  Vulnerability  Risk
A: (T) Yes + Yes  (C) High  (V) High  (R) High (below FL320)

4. Security risk mitigating actions

A: NOT necessary for flights above FL320

5. Hazard Identification
Q: What is the operational exposure to unintended consequences of the conflict zone?
A: (1) Drift down (N-1) ceiling FL250 or (2) emergency decent (decompression) to FL100 or
higher e.g. MSA (FL140) with mountainous terrain
 Example Risk Assessment
Conflict Zones 2

Overflying CZ: aircraft A330 (approx. 300 POB)

6. Unintended Consequences of SeRA Mitigating Actions

A: NO actions necessary above FL320

7. Safety Risk Assessment (SaRA)

A: Likelyhood N-1 or emergency decent is LOW 
 Consequences and Vulnerability are HIGH  SaRA is HIGH

8. Mitigating Actions – Functional Systems (Security/Safety/Operations)

A: (1) Drift down ceiling FL250 or below: e.g. contact Mil ATC for traffic
separation or divert outside FIR
(2) Emergency decent: rerouting for ETOPS ERA and/or divert outside FIR
 Example Risk Assessment
Conflict Zones 2

Overflying CZ: aircraft A330 (approx. 300 POB)

9. Unintended consequences of SaRA mitigating actions

A: More trip fuel necessary for possible risk of diversion/rerouting
 recalculate trip fuel/alternate/MTOM/payload

10. Acceptable Risk Level – defined with oversight authority

A: Acceptable when outcomes all steps within operational limits
and as low as possible
Introduction 2nd Edition Doc 10084

IATA Safety and

Flight OPS Conference
 18 April 2018, Montréal

IATA AVSEC World Conference

 1 October 2018, Athens

ICAO AVSEC2018 Symposium

 26 November 2018, Montréal
 2nd Edition Doc 10084 - IMPLEMENTATION
Inventory – State type of guidance

Differences between the guidance provided by States

to airspace users in the risk assessment process
Inventory type of mechanisms
in the ICAO Regions
Example 1: No or limited guidance

• Focus on national/domestic security

• No advise about foreign CZ
• Operator depends on own Security
Department or outsource risk assessment
Example 2: Information provided by authorities

• Provide with threat-related info

• No advise where to fly
• Operator able to make risk assessment based
on more consolidated data
Experience of information sharing
in the Netherlands
• No State regulation or advise for operators regarding
airspace beyond State territory and/or FIR
• Operators make their own risk assessment and decide
where (not) to fly
• Agreement: State authorities to exchange non-public
information, as far as available

35
(Voluntary) Agreement State – operators
Relevant Ministries (like):
operators • Transport
• Justice/Security
AGREEMENT

• Foreign Affairs
voluntary basis

Security
agencies • Home Affairs
• Defense

Scheduled / ad hoc meetings or bilateral

contacts when needed

Information from States AND operators

36
Example 3: Recommendations by authorities

• Provide with threat-related info and risk

assessment
• Advise where (not) to fly
• Operator includes this in its own risk
assessment
Example 4: Regulation by authorities

• Provide with threat-related info or risk

assessment and advise where (not) to fly
• Advise: low – high risk / fly – not fly
(restrictions)
• Operator own risk assessment (pending)
 Implementation Challenges

Some key challenges for cooperation and sharing info

COOPERATION SHARING INFORMATION
1. Confidential (voluntary) 1. Exchange based on trust and
cooperation (legal) arrangements
2. Involvement (military) 2. Security clearances for
persons and channels
security services
3. Need for adequate
3. Create a structure - national, information service (SWIM)
regional/international with
the stakeholders

39
 Takeaway – Doc 10084

Differences between the guidance provided by States

to airspace users in the risk assessment process
THANK YOU