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GR No. 234660

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31\epnlJlir of the l)bilippines

$,Upretne <!Court
jfl!lnuiln

SECOND DIVISION

SPOUSES MAGDALINO G.R. No. 234660


GABUN AND CAROL GABUN,
NORA A. LOPEZ, AND
MARCELINO ALFONSO, Present:
Petitioners,
LEONEN,* Aeling ChiefJustice,
- versus - LAZARO-J AVIER,**
Worlcing Chairperson
LOPEZ, M.
WINSTON CLARK STOLK,
LOPEZ, J ., and
SR..

/___7
KHO, JR., JJ.
Respondent.

I_..-;-;
P• 1UI ated: ,,,
JD~ 16 202s/1 ~4)t

X------------------------------------------------ ·--------------·------ -? -----------\][)'_ ------------X


DEC I SION

KHO, JR., J.:

Before the Court is a Petition fo r Review on Certiorari 1 under R uie 45


of the R ul es of Co urt fil ed by petitione rs Spouses Magda lino Gabun and Carol
G abun (Sps. Gabun), Nora A . Lopez (Nora), and Marcelino A lfonso
(Marcelino; collective ly, petitioners), assa iling the Reso lutions dated August
23 , 2017:2 and October 9, 20 l 73 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA -G .R. SP

/\cting Chief Justice p::r Special IJrckr No. ·-~'>89 d,it-:d Jun e ·2..1, 2023 .
·• Working Chai1 per~on p<.:r Spt:<:i:li O rder N () _:? Ill):, dated Ju11C' '.2G, 2023 .
Darf'd Octob•~r 2<>, 2() 17, ro//o pp. 3- 52.
/cf. at 54--63 . Pe11ncd by ,\ ssnc;alt-: .lt, q i,:.- Cc:lia C. l.ibrea-Leagogt) and u )r11.:urrcd in hy Assoc iate
Ju<;ticcs M arin Elisa S<:'mpio 0iy and l'?.blito .'\. Perez •,)!"the Special Seventh Division, CA , Man ila.
/cl. ill I 03 - I 0--l. Pen1ied b:i, 1\s<;ocialc Ju~l ice Cel ia C. L ih1l',i·-L t!ag,1gl> and co ncurred in by Assoc iate
.:uslic<.:, Maria Ui!>a '.,en•pio O i>· and Pc1blito / \. i'er,;,-_c>f" 1l·1c Formt:r Special Sevcmh D iv ision, C /\ ,
Manila.

fp.
Decision
' G.R. No. 234660

No. I 51 807, which dismissed the Petition for Certiorari 4 of the Decision5
dated April 22, 20 14 and the Orders dated November 4, 2014,6 December 7
and I I, 20 I 4,7 August 26, 201 6/1 and J\,1ay 19, 2017 9 of the Regional Trial
Court of O longapo City, Branch 73 (RTC) in SP Proc. Case No. 123-0-2007-
- a habeas corpus case involvi ng a 111inor-for being time-barred.

The Facts

Respondent Winston Clark Stolk, Sr. (respondent) filed a Verified


Petition for Habeas Corpus 10 against petitioners, praying for absol ute and
permanent custody over his minor son, Winston C lark Daen Stolk, Jr.
(Winston). Respondent claimed that he and Winston' s mother, Catherine
A lfo nso Daen (Catherine), lived together as husband and wife for more than
fo ur years in Flo ri da, United States of America (US A) but without the benefit
of marriage. In the early part of 2007, Catherine returned to the Philippines to
give birth. However, Catherine di ed a few hours after giving birth to Winston
on July 22, 2007, leaving the latter in the care of petitioners, particularly Nora
and Marcelino, who appear to be Winston' s actual c ustodians and collateral
grandparents, being the sibling of Winston's biological grandparents.
Respondent asserted that petitioners knew that he would be coming to the
Philippines to take care of everything, including the custody of Winston, but
when he arrived, petitioners prohibited him from seeing his child. Further,
respondent claimed that W inston 's birth cert ificate indicated him (respondent)
as the latter's father. 11

During the proceedings, the tri al coutt issued an order allowing the
conduct of DNA 12 testing of Winston at the sole expense of respondent. The
result of the DNA test, conducted at St. Luke's Medical Center, showed a
99.9997% probability of paternity of respondent. This was confirmed by the
testimony of the speciali st, Dr. Raymundo W. Lo, who conducted the test and
prepared the parentage report. Thereafter, the case was submitted for decision
after respondent formally offered hi s evidence and petitioners' comment
thereto was noted.'3

Dated July 26, 20 17; id. al 105- 145.


Id. at 262 --266. Penned by Presiding Judge Norman \I. Pamintuan of 13ranch 73. Regional Trial Court,
O longapo C ity.
Id. at 2 12- 2 i 6.
Id. at 204- 205 and 206 -208, respectively.
Id. al 169-i 70. Penned by Assisring .fudge Jose fvhirie A. Quimboy.
Id. at 146-- 147. Penned by Ae l ing Presid ing Judge Ma. Cristina J. Mendoza-Pizarro.
10
Nol. attached lo tht rollo, sec: id. al 2(,2.
II /cl. at 262--263.
1
~ Rel~rred to as" Deo.n •riho,111t!eic Acid:·
11
Rn/lo, p. 264.
,,
Decision .) G.R. No. 234660

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision 1•1 dated A pril 22, 2014, the RTC granted the petition and
consequently, awarded the c ustody over Winston to respond ent. 15 T he RTC
he ld that based on the records of the case, pa1ticularly the DNA test result,
parentage re po rt, and the birth certifi cate issued by the Offi ce of the C iv il
Registrar of O longapo C ity, respondent sufficie ntly establ ished his rig ht of
custody and parenta l authority over hi s minor son, Winston. In this regard, the
RTC d id not ascribe any significance that respondent is a divorcee and was
deported from t he USA for his dismissed case, opining that under A rti cles 2 12
and 213 1<' of the Family Code, 17 parental authority and custody over his son,
W inston, belongs to respondent. 18

Petitione rs thereafter fi led a Motion for Reconsideration 19 and later, a


Motion fo r Leave of Cou,t to File and Admi ssion of Supplemental Motion fo r
Reconsiderati on 20 arguing, among others, that: (a) Articles 2 14 and 216,2 1 not
A rtic les 2 12 and 2 13 of the Famil y Code apply in this case, since respondent
and Catherine were not ma rried; (b) respondent is not fi t to assume parental
authority because he is a conv icted felon and based on news information, he
has serious issues with the authorities in his home co untry, Suriname; (c)
W inston's choice to remain with the m (petitioners) must be respected; and (d)
a case study sho uld be conducted by th e Department of Social Wei fare and
Development (DS WD) to determine who can best provide the most suitable
physical, emotional, spiritual, psychological, and educational environment for
the holistic development of Winston, as provided under A.M . No. 03-04-04-

11
Id. at 262- 266.
1
' Id at '.265- 266.
11
• T hese prov isions read:

A rt. '.2 12. In case or absence or death or either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising
parental authority . T he remarriage o f the surv iv ing parent shall not affect the parental authori ty over
the chi ldren, unless the court appoints another person to be the guc1rdian or the person or property
or the children.

A rt. 2 13. In case or separation o f" the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by th e parent
designated by the Courl. T he Court shal I take into account all relevant considerations, especially the
choice o f the child over seven years o f age, unless the pc1rent chosen is un fit.
17
Execu ti w Order No. 209, s. 1987 (July 6, 1987).
IX Rollo, pp. 264- 26 5.
19
Id. al 2 17- 220.
w Id. at 22 1- 222.
1
~ These prov isions prov ide:

A rt. 2 14. In cast.: o f death, absence or unsuitabi lity or the parents, substitute parenta l authority
shall be exercised by the surv iv ing grandparent. In case severa l survive, th e one designated by the
court. taking into accoun t thi: sam e consideration ment ioned in the preceding art icle, shal l exercise
the authori ty.

/\rl. 2 16. In defau lt or paren ts or a j udicia lly appointed guard ian. the fol lowing person shall
exercise substitute parental authority over the chi ld in the order indicated:
( I ) T he surv iv ing grandparent, as prov ided in A rt. '.2 14;
(2 ) The oldest brothcr or sister, over twenty -onc years or age, unless un fo or disqual i fied; and
(3) The ch ild 's actual custodian, over twe nry -one years or age, unh.:ss unfit or disqual ified.

W henever the appointrnent or a judicial guard ian over the properl y of the chi ld becomes
nccessary . th e :mme ordl'r or prererence shall be observed. (349a. 35 1a, 354a)
Decision 4 G.R. No. 234660

22
SC or the "Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in
Relation to C ustody of Minors" (Ru le on Custody of Minors).23 The RTC
denied the fo regoing motions in an Order dated November 4, 20 14.

Determined, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal 24 by registered mail on


November 24, 2014, but was dismissed in an Order dated December 7, 2014
for nonpayment of docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary
period, as prov ided under Rule 41 , Section 13 25 of the Rules of Court. 26

Subsequently, in an Order dated December 11 , 2014, the RTC declared


that the Decision dated A pril 22, 20 14 had already attained fi nality on
November 28, 20 14 after the dismissal of petitioners' appeal. 27

Undeterred, petitioners fil ed a Motion for Reconsideration 28 to the


Order dated December 7, 2014, praying for the approval of their Notice of
Appeal. Thereafter, petitioners filed a Manifestation 29 dated October 27,
2015, reiterating their arguments, and praying for the follow ing: (i) lift the
bench warrant of arrest issued on November 27, 2014; (ii) order a case study
by the DSWD of Winston and the parties; and (iii) in the alternative, set aside
the Orders dated December 7 and 11 , 20 14. Add itionally, petitioners pointed
out that, contrary to what is required by the Rules of Court, copy of the
November 4, 2014 Order was served by the sheriff on November 14, 20 14 to
Nora, and not to their counsel, who officially rece ived copy of said order only
on December 3, 2014. 30 As such, petitioners actually had until December 5,
2014 to file the Notice of Appeal, or 48 hours from their counsel's receipt of
the copy of the November 4, 2014 O rder. Consequently, their appeal and
payment of docket and other lawful fees were made within the reglernentary
. d:'·
peno ' I

In an Order dated A ugust 26, 20 16, the RTC declared that the dismissal
of petitioners ' Notice of Appeal has become immutab le or unalterable as no
legal remedy was availed of before the trial couti or the Supreme Court.32
Petitioners therea fter moved for reconsideration, 33 but was denied in an

22
Which took effect on May I 'i, 2003 following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation not
later than April 30. 2003 .
"·' See petitioners' Supplemental Moti,Jn for Reu,nsideration; rollo, pp. 224-243.
2
-1 Id. at 209- 2 1 I .
25
Section 13. Dismissal u(appeal. - Prior to the lra11s111 ittal of the original record or the record on appeal
to the appellate court, rhe trial court may 1110111 propio or on motion dismiss the appeal for having been
taken oul of time. ( I 4a)
2
" Rollo, p. 20:'i.
27
Id. at 207.
28
Not attaclwd l o the rullo.
2
'J Ro/In, pp. 179- 202.
:w Id. at 180-- 18 :.
1
-' Id at 200.
J2 Id. at 170.
33
Id. at 148- 167.
Decision 5 G.R. No. 234660

O rder34 dated May 19, 20 17 fo r lack or merit, it being a second motion for
reconsideration, w hich can no longer be enteiiained .35

Dissatisfi ed w ith the fo regoing ru lings, petitioners filed a Petition for


Certiorari under R ul e 65 of the Rul es of Court before the CA, praying for,
among others: (a) to grant their prnyer for iss uance of a temporary restraini ng
order; (b) to dec lare as nu ll and void the Apri l 22, 2014 Decision and set aside
the O rders dated May 19, 2017 and December 7 and 11 , 2014; (c) to recall the
Writ of Habeas Corpus36 dated April 22, 20 14; in the interim, (d) to issue an
order d irecting the conduct of a case study by the DSWD over W inston and
the parties; (e) to issue a hold departure order fo r Winston and serve a copy
thereof to the Bureau oflmm igration; if) to lift and recall the warrants of arrest
issued against the m; and (g) to grant them custody over Winston .·17

The CA Ruling

In a Resol ution38 dated A ugust 23, 2017, the CA dismissed the Petition
fo r Certiorari before it fo r being timc-barred. 39 It held that under R ule 4 1,
Section 1 of the Rul es of Court, an order disallowing or d ismissing an appeal
may be assa iled o nly v ia a certiorari petition under Rule 65 filed not later than
60 days from notice of the j udgment, order, or resolution. Here, the CA
o bserved that petit ioners received the copy of the RTC's August 26, 20 16
O rd er on March 9, 20 17. Since petitioners' certiorari petition was filed only
on July 28, 20 17, the 60-day reglementary period had clearly already expired.
In this regard, the CA highlighted that the "60-day period shall be reckoned
from the tri al court's deni al of (the) fi rst motion for recons iderati on . . ." 40 and
not from the denial of their second motion for reconsideration- in the May
19, 20 17 Order- which did not toll the running of Lhe reglementary period.
As such, the outright dismissai of rheir certiorari petition is warranted under
the c ircumstances.4 1

Fu11her, the CA fo und that the RTC's Apri l 22, 2014 Decision has long
becorne fin a l and executory, conside ring th at petitio ners paid the docket and
0ther lawful fees only on November 27, 2014 desp ite filing the ir Notice of
Appeal on November 24, 20 14. Accord ing to the CA, case law ho lds that the
appellant s hall pay the t1-.11l amount of the appellate court' s docket an d other
lawful fees w ithin the pe riod for taking an appeal, fa iling in which the trial
court may, mntu proprio o r 011 motio n, dismiss the appeal, as the RTC had
correctly dl,ne so in this case. In this respect, the CA noted that under Section
3, R ule 41 of the Ru les of Court, appea ls in habeas cnrpus cases sha ll be made

31
• Id. al 146-- 147 .
15
Id. a l 14 7.
;c, Id. at 267. Issued by O !C-l'ourl Interpreter Ill Lvclyn A. Tee.
17
/d.a i 139.
8
' Id. at 54- 63 .
·,,, lei. a l 62.
10
• Id. al 58.
1
·• /d.at 56- 58.
Decision 6 G.R. No. 234660

within 48 hours from notice of the decision. Since petitioners received a copy
of the November 4, 2014 Order on November 14, 2014, petitioners' appeal
was clearly filed out of time. In any event, the CA ruled that petitioners'
failure to immediately assail the dismissal of their Notice of Appeal before it
(CA) rendered such dismissal immutable. 42

Undeterred, petitioners moved for reconsideration,'1:l but was denied in


a Resolution dated October 9, 2017. Hence, this petition. 44

The Issue Before the Court

The issue before the Court is whether the CA committed reversible


error in d ismissing petitioners' Petition for Certiorari on technicalities.

Petitioners argue that the CA gravely erred in upholding the RTC's


dismissal of their appeal, and altogether, dismissing their certiorari petition
on procedural grounds. fn this regard, they highlight the grave abuse of
discretion committed by the RTC when it considered valid the service of the
November 4, 2014 Order to petitioner Nora on November 14, 2019, instead
of serving the same to their counsel of record as required under the Ru les of
Court. Since the ir counsel of record received a copy of the November 4, 2014
Order only on December 3, 20 I 4,45 they submit that they actually had until
December 5, 2014 to file the Notice of Appeal. Consequently, the filing of
their Notice of Appeal on November 24, 2014 and the payment of the docket
and other lawful fees on November 27, 2014 were clearly both made within
the reglementary period. Given the substantive issues raised in this case, they
pray that any procedural lapses which they may have committed, if there be
any, be excused in the interest of justice.~ 6

On the merits, petitioners maintain that the RTC manifestly disregarded


the evidence, which clearly show that respondent had legal issues with both
the American and Surinamese authorities and was in fact a convicted felon
when he pleaded guilty for the charge of unlawful transport of firearms. They
insist that these facts should have constrained the RTC to order the conduct
of a case study by the DSWD, pursuant to Sections 8 and 14 of the Rule on
Custody of Minors and Article 213 of the Fami ly Code, which commands that
the best interest of the child shall be given paramount consideration. For these
reasons, petitioners contend that a hold departure order should be issued. 47

1
•~ Id. at 58- 60.
43
Id. at 64- 78.
-1-1 Id. at 3--52.
15
• See Certifi,;ation issued by th e Phi lippine Postal Corporation, ()uezon City Central Post Office, stating
that ·'per avui!ohle I ecol"(/ 0/thi.1· O/lh:e. Registaed I.el/er No. 2179 recorded os 2779 which was mailed
011 t"vovemher .?7, 201 -1 at U/011gap11 ('it,· f' o s! c;fi!r.:e und addre.1·.iwl tu [petitioners' counsel/ ... was
delivered 011 Dece11mer OJ, 20 I../ . .. " Id. at i n .
i(, Id at 20- 28 .
•,; Id. at 28 - 34 .
Decision 7 G.R. No. 234660

Additionally, petitioners contend that Articles 211 and 212 of the


Fami ly Code do not apply in this case, since respondent and Catherine were
never married. Assuming that A rti cle 2 12 applies to unwed parents, they posit
that it nevertheless presupposes a situation wherein both parents are actually
exercising parental authority over the minor. Here, respondent never exercised
parental authority over Winston since the former was out of the country from
the latter's birth. Besides, A1iicle 176 of the Fam ily Code states that
illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of the mother and,
in case of her death, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the
surv1v111g g randparents, petitioners in this case, pursuant to Article 214
thereof.'18

Finally, pet1t1oners highlight that Winston categorically stated his


preference in his letter4 ') to the RTC to remain with them and his refusal to be
with respondent whom he (Winston) barely knows and who lives in a foreign
country. Since Winston is already seven years of age, they assert that his
preference should be respected; otherwise, Winston 's emotional and
psychological well-being can be adversely affected. 50

In his Comment, 51 respondent mainly argues that the issues raised by


petitioners have been clearly and intelligently resolved by the CA. Petitioners
were g iven full opportunity to be heard and the decision of the RTC had long
become fina l and executory. In any event, the findings of fact by the RTC
awarding custody of Winston to respondent was made in the best discretion
-')
of the trial court.)_

In their Reply, 53 petitioners essentially reiterate their arguments,


additionally arguing that the life and future of Winston and the merits of the
case justify the relaxation of the rule on the immutability of final judgments.
They also highlight the core issue in this case, wh ich is the future and well-
being of Winston. 54

Meanwhile, in a Resolution 55 dated November 22, 2017, the Court


granted petitioners' prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order and
hold departure order preventing Winston from leaving the country .56

.rn Id. at 34- 38.


19
' Id. at 249--250.
0
-' IJ. al 38- -D .
51
le/. at 325- 342.
52
Id at 33 1- 334.
51
Id. at 3:i8- 388.
:\,I Id.
5
' Id. at :282- 283 . S1gn~ci by Di v ision Cier~: nl Court Fdgar 0. Arichda.
;r, Id. at 282.
Decis ion 8 G.R. No . 234660

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Prefatorily, it must be stressed that only questions of law may be raised


in a Petition for Review on Certiorari. T hi s Court is not a trier of facts and as
such, the lower co urts' factual findings are generally binding upon it. 57
Nevertheless, the rule adm its of several exceptions, such as :

( 1) Whe n the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely o n


speculatio n, surmises o r conjectures; (2) When the inference made is
rmmifestly mish1ken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave
abuse of discretion ; (4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) When the fi nd ings or fact arc conllicting;
(6) Whe n the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appe llant and appellee; (7) T he findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary
to those or the tria l court; (8) When the fi ndings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When
the facts set forlh in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply
brie fs are not di sputed by the respondents; and ( 10) T he find ing of fact of
the Court or A ppeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
is contradicted by the evidence on reco rcl. ~8 (Emphasis supplied)

Here, pet1t1oners essentially posit that the CA g ravely erred in


dismissing their Petition for Certiorari on technical it ies despite the obvious,
grievous legal and factual e rrors committed by the RTC-an issue that raises
both questions of fact and law that are generally not proper in a Rule 45
petition. However, when, as in this case, the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; the judgment is based on misapprehension of
facts; the findings of fact are conclusio ns without citation of specific evidence
on wh ich they are based; or where there is a grave abuse of discretion, the
Court w ill not hesi tate to review the facts to have a proper determination of
the case.

O n this score, the Court e mphasizes that what is ultimately at stake here
is the custody over W inston and as such, the paramount consideration must
be his best interest. Notably, even prio r to the adoption of the Family Code,
Article 363 of the Civil Code 59 expressly mandated that in all questions
relating to the care, custody, ed ucation, and property of the children, the
latter's welfa re is paramount. The R ule on C ustody of l\,1inors reiterated this
mandate as it explicitly stales that ·' [iln awarding custody, the court shall
consider the best interests of the m:r.or and shall give paramount consideration
to [their] malerial and moral welfare. The best interests of the minor refer

17
• C./1-/ 1•
D c v el op1111ml C u r 1 1 o r aticJ1I \ 1 l11iu d o . r
37(1 Phi:. ! 93, 213 (2020) Per .I. Leoncn. Third Division].
'
8
Id. at 2 13- 7. 14, citation 0111it ted .~lso SeC' G .R. No. 21!3646, June n, 2022 [ Per j_
R.?r.11h!ic "· Kik u chi,

Hernando, first D ivision I ~hllps://c li brnr, .jud: c in,) ' .gov.ph/thebook;;hcl f/s howdocs/ I /68394> .
S'! Rerubli c Ad No. j8(,, r ntit il-d ··A, ·1 ro 0RD I\ IN AND I NST!TUTI' Till : C'!VII. COLJI.: OF Ti ll:
J\c

Pl 111.ll'l'IN!;S," appro•.'cd on June.: ! 8. I 1:H <) _


Decision () G.R. No. 234660

to the totality of the circumstances and conditions as a re most congenial


to the survival, protection, and feelings of security of the minor
encouraging to ltheirl physical, psychological and emotional
development. It also means the least detrimental available alternative for
safeguarding the growth a nd development of the minor."60

For these reasons, and under the attendant circumstances of this case, it
behooves the Court to set aside technicali ties to ach ieve substantial justice. To
recall, the RTC dismissed petitioners' Notice of Appeal for nonpayment
of the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period. 6 1 T he
CA, on the other hand, dismissed petitioners' certiorari petition for being
filed out of time. It also essentially upheld the RTC's dismissal of
petitioners' appeal on the ground that the RTC's April 22, 2014 Decision
has long become final and executory and thus, immutable for their failure
to timely pay the docket and other lawful fees. 62

Under the doctrine of parens patriae, the State, as the sovereign, has
the inherent ri ght and duty to minimi ze the risk of hann to those w ho, because
of the ir minority, are yet unable to take care of themselves fully. 63 As the
subsequent discussions will show, the Collli finds that the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion in d ismiss ing petitioners ' Notice .2.f Appeal. Also,
the CA committed revers ible error in fai ling to relax the application of
procedural rules in the interest of justice. Veri ly, the fund amental policy of
the State, as embod ied in the Constitution, in promoting and protecting the
welfare of c hildren, as we ll as the grav ity of the issues in vo lved in this case,
cal ls for the Court's exercise of its equity jurisdiction.

I.

The Rules of Court provide for a 15-


day period of appeal in custody and
habeas corpus cases involving
minors, not 48 hours

At the o utset, the Cou rt notes that in dismissing petitioners' Notice of


Appeal for failure to pay the docket and other lawful fees within the
reglementary period, the RTC ostens ibly re lied on Ru le 41, Section 3 of the
Rules of Cou1t that provides for a 48-hour period from notice of the decision
within which to file an appeal in habeas corpus cases. S imilarly, the CA

w See S.:cl ion 14 uf' the Rtile 011 Cuslociy of Minors. See ,:lso /I fas hute i·. Reluci n, 837 Phil. 5 ! 5, 533--534
(2018) I Per .I. J>erlas -13crnabe, Second D ivisiwi I (Ernphasi:; suprliecl. citation ornillcd).
''
1
Rollo, r - 205.
12
' Id. at % - 58.
<,., See !Jr,x:..,111 \I. l'<'ople. G .R. N1•. '.".:J,J ) (I _ Arri I 28, :202 1 JPer .I. .I. l.opa, Th ird Divisiori]
<htlps:llel i [,rary .jud ic:ary .~o•; .p!i/ ihcbookshc! J:'sl:owdocs/ : /0 73 8 anJ So111aha11 ng 111gu l'rogresibung
Kabataan (.'>l',-IR/,;) v. Qu..:.:011C//y, 1;15 Ph ii . 1067. 1101 (}lll7) (Pcr.l. Perlas-Bernabe, En /Jane].
Decision 10 G.R. No. 234660

evidently re lied on the same provision as it concluded that petitioners' appeal


was clearly filed out of time. Rule 41, Section 3, as amended by A.M. No. 19-
10-20-SC/><1 reads:

Section 3. fffiocl o( ordinwy uppeu!; appeal in habeas corpus


cases. - T he app1.!al shall he tc:1ken wi thin fifteen (15) days from notice of
the judgment or final order appea led from. Where a record on appeal is
req uired, the appellant shall fi le a noticc> or appeal and a record on appeal
w ithin thirty (30) clays from noti ce of the judgment or final order. However,
[an! appeal in habeas corpus cases shall be taken within forty -eight (48)
hours from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from .
. . . . (Emphasis supplied)

The Court disagrees.

It must be underscored that the petition for issuance of a writ of habeas


co,pus fi led by respondent ultimately prayed for absolute and permanent
~ustody over his m inor son, Winston . Case law provides that in custody cases
involv ing 111 in o rs, a petition for writ of habeas corpus is prosecuted essentially
for the purpose of determin ing the right of custody over a chi ld. 65 In Reyes v.
Elquiero, 66 the Court, through Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, clarified
that a petition for issuance of a w rit of habeas corpus that seeks the rightful
custody over m inors is a special form of habeas corpus proceedings, which is
governed by the provisions of the Ru le on Custody of Minors. Under Section
19 thereot~ an aggrieved party may appeal the decision with in 15 days from
notice of the denia l of the motion for reconsideration or new trial, viz:

Section 19. Appeal. - No appeal from the decision shall be allowed


unless the appellant has fil ed a mo1it)n for reconsideration uf new trial
vv ithin fift~cn days from notice of j udgment.

An aggrieved party ma} appeal from the decision by filing a


Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of the denial of the
motion for reconsideration or new trial and serving a copy thereof on the
adve.-se parties. (Emphasis suppl ied)

Followi ng Section 19 of the Ru le on Custody of Minors, petitioners in


this case had 15 days from notice of the denia l of their motion for
re~onsideration from the RTC's April 22, 20 14 Decision within which to file
an appeal.

Moreover, it bears noting that the 48-hour appeal period in habeas


corpus cases under Rule 41, Section ::; of the Rul es of Court was introduced
by A.M. No. 0 l - l-03-SC,<i 7 w hich took effect on July 15, 200 l. In contrast,

01
• Entitled --20 I 9 /\Ml :NDM I :NTS TO Tl II' 1997 R1'I.I :\ cIF c,v,1 . f>RI )\ ·u)l IRI ., ( rvlay I , 2020).
5
" Reyes" l:.:lq11ie1·0, 8~ I Phil. 66, 19 !'.W2U) I P~r J. G:ierlan, Third Division 1-
,,,. Id.
17
' Entitled ·' RI-: /\11111:N l )Ml'~IT TO St .CT:<)N 3, IWLI: 4 I ()I Tl II ' I '.1 117 !l.l 11.! ·s 0 1' l"!YII . l'IWCUJURI:."
Decision 11 G.R. No. 234660

the Ru le on C ustody of Minors took effect on May 15, 2003. As the later
enactment, the Ru le on C ustody of Minors should be deemed to have
effectively amended A.M . No. 01-1-03-SC with respect to the period of
appeal in habeas corpus cases in vo lvi ng minors in view of their evident
inconsistency.

T hus, the 15-day appea l period provided under Section 19 of the Rule
on C ustody of Mino rs should be deemed to have effectively amended the 48-
hour appeal peri od provided under R ule 41 , Section 3 of the Rules of Court
s uch that when the subiect of a petition for habeas corpus are minors. the
Rule on Custody of Minors shall primarily apply, while the Rules of Court
shall have s uppletorv application.

Service of the RTC's November 4,


2014 Order on one of the petitioners
is invalid

In relation to the foregoing, it bears highlighting that under Rule 13,


Section 2 68 of the Ru les ofCou1i, if any party has appeared by counsel, service
upon the m shal l be made upon their counsel unl ess service upon the party
themselves is ordered by the court. Case law settles that notice or service made
upon a pa11y who is represented by counsel is not notice in law and is thus, a
nu ll ity. 69 While this rule admits of exceptions, such as when the court or
tribunal orders service upon the party or when the technical defect is waived, 70

r,x Section 2. Fili1•g ancl st:rl'ice, DeJilwd. • Fi l ing is the act of presenting the pleading or other paper to
the clerk of court.

Service is the :icl or providing a party w ith a copy of the pleading or paper concerned. If any party
has appeared hy counsel, service upon him sha ll be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless
service upon th e party himself is ordered by the court. Where one counsel appears for several parties,
he shall only be en titlt:d to one copy of a11y paper served upon him by the opposite ~ide. (Emphasis
supplied)

Note thm following lhc 20 19 A mendments 10 the 1997 Rules or Civil Procedure. Ruic I 3, Section 2 now
reads:

Section 2. Fil ing a11d l sl<::rvicc, dcCncd. - Piling is the act or subm itting the pleading or other paper to
the court.

Service is tli1.• ft<: I ur p1 llViding a party w nh a copy of the plead ing rJr any other court submission. If
a party has appeared by counsel, service upon such partv shall be made upon his or her counsel,
unless service upon the party and tht: party's counsel is ord ered by the court. Where one counsel
appenrs for several par1i e:;, such counsel shal l on l_v be entit led to one copy of any paper served by the
opposite side.

Where several counsels appear for 0111c: par1:1, such party ::,ha ll be entitled to only one copy or any
pl1c:ading or paper to be served upon !he leau r;.:>~:nsel I!' one is designated, or upon any one of them 1r
there is no dcsigna1ion ofa lead coun~:::l. (::'..i) (Emphasis su µplied)
M 1/eirs 11/lk11ia111i11 1\ /e11d11::a v. C.lf. 587 JJ11il. 280,287 (2tl08) jPer .l. Tin ga, Second Division); PN/J v.
c'.-1, 3 16 Phil. J7 ! ( 19<)5) !Per J. Davide. .:r .. l~n U,111cl: and T11111 Wi11g 7~,/.. v. Makusiar, 403 Phil. 39 1
(2001 ) I Per J. Quisumhing. Second Division].
70 I l eirs r~{ B11niw11i11 1 1emlo:o 11. ( ·.,! , fd.; !'N B 1·. CA . J 16 Phil. 37 1, id.: and Tc.1111 Wing Tak v. Makasiar,
id
Deci sion 12 G.R. No. 234660

none of these exceptions are shown to have existed in this case.

To recal l, the November 4, 2014 Order of the RTC was served on one
of the petitione rs, and not on petiti0ners' counsel of record . Significantly,
petitioners have consistently argued that their counsel of record officially
received copy of the said O rder on ly on December 3, 2014. Thus, following
Ru le 13, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 19 of the Rule
on Custody of Minors, petitioners in fact had until December l 8, 20 I 4 within
which to fi le the ir Notice of Appeal and pay the fu ll amount of the docket and
other lawfu l fees . As shown herein, petit ioners duly complied with both the
fil ing of the Notice of Appeal on November 24, 2014 anrl payment of the
appe llate docket and other lawful fees on November 27, 2014, and thus
petit ioners' appeal was made we ll within the reglementary period.

Even if we consider that the copy of the RTC's Order denying the
motion for reconsideration from the April 22, 2014 Decision was validly
served on one of the petitioners on November 14, 2014, they had until
November 29, 2014 w ithin which to appeal. Since petitioners filed their
Notice of Appeal on November 24, 2014, the same was clearly filed well
within the reglementary period.

IL

Petitioners timeiy paid the appellate


court docket and other lawful fees;
hence, the RTC committed a
jurisdictional error in dismissing
their Notice of Appeal

In addition to providing to the 15-day reglementary period within which


to appeal under Section 19 of the Rule on Custody of Minors, Rule 41, Section
4 of the Ru les of Court supplementarily provides that the full amount of the
appe llate court docket and other lawful fees shall be paid within the period for
taking an appeal, viz:

SECTION 4. Appel/w,.; court docket and other law/id .fees. -


\Vithin the period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to th•::
clerk of the court which rendered the j udgment or final order appealed from,
the full amount of the }lppellatc court docket and other lawful foes.
Proof or payment of said {°('es shal l be transmitted to the appellate court
together with the origimd recoi-d 01 the record on appeai. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

According ly, pursuant to d~ 8 foregoing procedurni mandates, the Notice


of Appeal and the ful l payment of the amount of the docket and other lawful
Decision 13 G .R. No. 234660

fees must be made w ithin the 15-day appeal period, failing in which may
warrant the dismissal of the appeal under Section 13 of Rule 41:

SECTION 13. Dismissal <!/'appeal. - Prior to the transmittal of the


origina l record or the record on appeal to the appellate court, the trial court
may motu propio or on motion dismiss the appeal for having been taken
out of time or for nonpayment of the docket and other lawful fees within
the rcglemcntary period. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Case law explains that' a party 's appeal by Notice of Appeal is perfected
as to them upon the fi li ng of ihe same in due time, together w ith the payment
of dock.et and other lawful fees, which should likewise be paid within the
prescribed period. 71 Both requirements are mandatory and jurisdictional and
a party's fail ure to perfect the appeal in the manner and within the period fixed
by law render the judgment final and executory .n

This notwithstanding, it must be recogni zed that there is nothing in the


Rules that require the payment of the docket and other lawful fees at the same
time of th e filin g of the notice of appeal. In fact, the filing of the notice of
appeal and the payment of the dock.et and other lawful fees are covered by
separate provisions, each of which only require compl iance thereof within the
appeal period.

Moreover, the Court finds it relevant to highlight the use of the


conjunctive word "or" in Rule 4 1, Section 13 of the Rules ofCou1t. To the
Court's mind, this use of the word "or" not only demonstrates the intent to
provide for alternative grounds for dismi ssing an appeal. More pertinently, it
reveals the intent to treat the filing of the appeal and payment of dock.et fees
as separate and d istinct requirements for perfecting an appeal, which must be
complied with within the appea l period. Accordingly, regardless of whether
the filing and payment occurred concurrently or successively, the appeal is
perfected so long as both requirements are duly complied with within the
appeal period.

In this case, as earlier noted, copy of the RTC ' s November 4, 20 I 4


Order (which denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration from the April
22, 2014 Decision) was served on one of the petitioners on November 14,
2014. Assuming such service was val id, petitioners had until November 29,
2014 within wh ich to fi le the Notice of Appeal and pay the full amount of the
docket and other lawful fees pursuant to Section 19 of the Rule on Custody of
Minors and Ru le 4 I, Sec Lion 3 of the Ru les of Cou1i.

71
Vi/la111or l'. CA. 478 Phil. 7:28 ('.2004 ) lPcr J. Ca:lejo, S r .. s~cond f)i;,ision·I and Spo11.,e.1· lei.! and Huang

l .und lh111k <!/the l' hili11,n11w,·. 78 1 Phi I. 2-13 '.2.'i I (20 l 6) Wer J. Pcrlas-8ernabc, First Divis ion ] .
11 •
72
Sl!I! l 1 illa111or 1·. C.11, id.
Decision 14 G.R. No. 234660

Since petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal on November 24, 2014


a nd paid the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful
fees on November 27, 2014, or well within the I 5-day reglementary period,
petitioners c learly perfected the ir appeal in the manner and w ith in the period
fixed by the fo regoing Ru les. Accordingly, the RTC committed grave
jurisdictional e rror when it d ismissed petitioners' appea l for fai lure to pay the
requ ired fees w ith in the appea l period. To emphasize, there is nothing in the
Rules that req ui re the simu lta neous payment of the appellate court fees and
fi ling of the Notice of Appeal to perfect an appeal. So long as both the filing
and payment requ irements are d uly complied w ith within the appeal period,
the appeal must be deemed perfected even if the docket and other lawfu l fees
were paid days alter the notice of appeal was filed, as in this case.

Ill.

Under Rule 4 I, Section 173 of the Rules of Court, an order d isallowing


or dis m issing an appea l may be assailed via a petition for certiorari which,
under Rul e 65, Sectio n 4 7•1 of the same Rules, shall be filed within 60 days
from notice of the j udgment, order, or resolution . In this case, petitioners
received a copy of the RTC's A ugust 26, 20 16 O rder, w hich denied their
motion for recons ideratio n from the RTC's Order dismissing their Notice of
Appeal on March 9,2017. S ince petitio ners ti led the ir certiorari petition only
on July 28, 2017, the 60-day reglementary period under Rule 65, Section 4
had manifestly ex pired resulting in the d ismissal of said petition for being
fi led out of time and rendering the assai led O rder final and executory.

While the CA may have correctly determi ned that the Petition for
Certiorari was filed o ut o r time, its grave lega l error arises from the fact that
it fa iled to recognize the g rave jurisdictiona l errors that attended the RTC's
d ismissal of petit ioner's Notice of Appeal for failure to t imely pay the
appe llate co urt docket and other lawfu l fees . If on ly to underscore th is relevant
po int, th ere is nothing in the Rules that req uire the simu ltaneous pay ment of

71
- It pertinently provides:

SECTI ON I. S11hiecl o/appual. - An appeal may be tak en l'rom a judgment or linal order that
completely disposes of the case, or o f'a part icular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be
appealablc.

No appeal may be taken from:

(d) An order disallowing or dism issing an appeal:

In all th e above instances where the judgment or fi nal order is not appealable. the aggrieved
pa rty nrny file an appropriate special civil action under R ule 65. (11) (Emphasis supplied)
7
·' 11 pert inent ly reads:

SECT ION 4. IVl,e11 (//Id wher e petitio11ji/er/. -- T he petition shall be filed not later than sixty
(60) days fro m notice of the judgment, order or reso lution. In case a motion for reconsideration
or new tria l is timely Ii led, whether such moti on is req uired or not. the sixty (60) day per iod shall
be counted from noti ce of the denial of said mot ion. (Emphasis supplied)
Decision 15 U.R. No. 234660

the appellate court fees and fi li ng of the notice of appeal in order that the
appeal is perfected. So long as both the filing and payment requirements are
duly complied with w ithin the appea l period, the appeal must be deemed
perfected even iC th e docket and other lawful fees were paid days after the
notice of appeal was filed. T hus, whether counted from November 14, 2014,
i.e., the serv ice of the November 4, 20 14 O rder on one of the petitioners, or
from December 3, 2014, i.e., receipt by petitioners' counsel of the November
4, 2014 O rder, petitioners' appea l was duly perfected w ithin the 15-day
reglementary period fo r appeal.

On th is score, it bears stressing that in all questions relating to the


care, custody, education, and property of the children, the latter's welfare
is paramount. Considering the weight of the iss ues and interests involved in
this case, it behooved the CA to relax procedural rul es especially in s ituations
where, as in this case, grave jurisdictiona l errors attended the assailed rulings
of the RTC. Grave abuse of discretion has been defined as a "capricious or
whims ical exercise of judg ment that is patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of pos itive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enj oi ned by
law." 75 Case law provides that grave abuse of discretion exists when an act is:
( i) done contrary to the Constitution, the law, or jurisprudence; or (2)
executed wh imsically, capricio us ly or arbitrarily, o ut o f mal ice, ill will , or
pe rsonal bias. 76 The RTC's actions manifestly violated legal and procedural
edicts in such arhitrary and capri cious disregard of Winston's best interest.

It is settled that rules of procedure should be so cons trued as to give


effect rather than defeat the ir essence. 77 C learl y, the best interest of the minor
W inston in this case justified libera li ty in the interpretati on of the Rules to
achieve substantial justice, wh ich the CA equall y erroneously ignored.

Special circumstances exist that


warranted exception from the Rule
on immutability of judgments

Moreover, w hile it is settled that once a judgment attains finality, it


becomes immutable and unalte rabl e, and thus, may no longer be modified in
any respect, even by the highest Court of the land, 78 this Rul e adm its of
exceptions. Certainly, the Court recogni zes the significance of this doctrine,
grounded as it is on the fu11Jaml:ntal principle of public policy and so und
practice that, at the ri sk of occasional error, the judg ment of courts and the

75
Cruz v. l'eop/e, 8 i 2 Ph ii. 166, I 7:1 (~li ! ~• ) it'cr J. Leo;icn, Secord Division]: c1tatio11s omitted. Sec also
Utohal M edic11I C.·11/er c,/'l.ug111w. l11c:. ,'. l?,1.,., :,1'," e111.,· l111ema1io11u!. l11c·., G. R. Nn. 2JO 112. May 11 ,
202 1 l Per .I . Caguioa. ,~·, , /1mu:I •'ht1ps:111:li!:-r::rv._:11cliciary.gov.p11/tht'l1ookslv~it·ts1towdocs/l/67423> and
Nt'n 1·. Of/ic-.! oj'1l1c U111hu,l.rnw11. 88,: Phil. 188. 250 (2020) I Pcr J. J. Reyes. Jr., E11 l1a11,·l
71
' Ot·,m111,1 v /:nrh11w.:. 798 Ph i l. ?..'27, 294 l 20 i11) Ll'•~r .I. Pcralln, /-, •7 Un11c] .
77
Spouses IJ11c1u!f/t;r 1•. C l. 400 l'hi!. .195 (2LIOU) fP::r J. Kaµunan , rirs: Di'v isio nJ.
7
x I
Den-cw ACF 811.1 Line., ,,. , Ing. 8.',() l'iiil. 778, '7S6 (.2(i 19) P,tr .I. ,.~ag11i\1H. Second f)i visiu11 ! and !lei rs of'
M11ura .<:o 1· UN111.w·a. 566 Plu!. , ,n, : 1(:7 ,::::uOl\!; Per J. Nach:m:, Tlii:·u D ivision I-
Decision 16 G .R. No. 234660

award of quas i-judic ial agencies must become fin al on some definite date
fixed by law. 79

Nonetheless, substantial justi ce may warrant relaxation of this rigid rule


in matters involving: (i) matters o f life, liberty, honor, or property; (ii) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances; (iii) the merits of the
case; (iv) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault o r negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of the ru les; (v) a lack of any showing that the
review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; or (vi) the other party will
°
not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. 8 Case law has also re laxed the
application of the doctrine in situations invo lving: correction of clerical errors,
or the so-cal led nunc pro tune entries which cause no prej udice to any party;
void judg ments; and whe never circumstances transpire after the finality of the
decision which render its execution unjust and inequitable. 81 Verily, when
extraordinarv circumstances exist, the Court has the inherent power and
discretion to set aside technicalities in the exercise of its equ ity jurisdiction
and amend, modify, or reconsider a fina l judgment when necessary to full y
serve the demands of substantial _justice. 82

Applying the foregoing principles, the Court fi nds that the


existence of special or compelling circumstances, such as the grave
jurisdictional error committed by the RTC, the merits of this case, and a
lack of showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory,
including the lack of showing that respondent will be prejudiced thereby,
merited a relaxation of the rule on immutability of judgments. These
reasons should have compelled the CA to relax procedural niceties. Lest it be
forgotten , the rul es of procedure ought not to be applied in a very ri gid,
techn ical sense, for th ey have been adopted to help secure--- not override--
substantial justice.83

IV.

Article 176, 214, and 216 of the


Family Code apply in this case

In add ition to the foregoing, the Court likewise finds that the RTC
committed such grav~ and arb itrary legal error in rely ing on the provisions of

71
' Heirs o(!vf111:ra So v. Ohlio.1·c,1. i d :11 ,lQS a1:d D,,vuo ACF nus U1,es v. //n,I!. id. at 786.
8
°
st
Crisnl, .Jr. v. C'OA. G.R. No. 23576'1. Septt·, nlwr 14,202 ! l'l'er J. RO$mio, J:'11 Bum:].
Heirs u//vlu11ra Su 1·. Uh/iosca, 566 Phil. 397. 403 (2008) I Per J. Nachurn, Third Division l :i11d S.:curilies
and EYdwnp,e Cc1111111ission v. College As.rnri1nce Nu11 Philippines. Inc., 883 Ph ii 13'1, 165 (2020) [Per
J. Lconen., Th ird Division j.
82
Crisol. .Jr. v. CCA, G.R. No. 23576-;, i:;q:: tL·mlJL:r 14, :.:021 I Per .I . Rosario, /:,"n !Jane] nnd Neirs oj'Mauru
So ,,. Oh/in.1·cc1, id
~; Mashate ,•. Re/11ciu, 837 Phi l. 5 15, ::2."i :20 1g) I l'ci .I. P•~~la5-l1c1w1bc. s~cond Div ision].
Decision 17 G.R. No. 234660

A rticl es 212 and 2 13 of the F.-irni ly Code in award ing respondent custody over
W inston.

The right of custody accorded lo parents spri ng from the exercise of


parental authority. Pc1rental authority, or patriapotestas in Rom an Law, is the
juridical institution whereby parents rig htfully assum e control and protection
of the ir unemanc ipated chil d ren to the extent req uired by the latter's needs. It
is a m ass of rig hts and o bligations which the law g rants to parents for the
purpose of the children 's physical preservation a nd development, as we ll as
the cul tivation or the ir inte llect and the ed ucati on of their heart and senses.84

As a rul e, the father and the mother sha ll jo intly exercise parental
authority ove r the persons of their common children . However, with respect
to illegitimate c hildren, Article 1768s of the Family Code explicitly grants
the sole parental a uthority to the mother, nohvithstanding the father's
recognition of the c hild. 86 ln the exercise of that authority, mothers are
consequently entitl ed to keep the ir illegitimate children in their company, and
the Court w ill not depri ve them o f custody, absent any imperative cause
showing the mothe r's unfitness to exercise such authority and care. 87

In case of the death, absence, or unsuitability of the parents or the


mother in the case of illegitima te children, substitute parental authority
shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent pursuant to Article 2 14 of
the Family Code, or to the specii-ied persons in th e o rder provided under
A.rti1.:le 2 16 the reof T hese provisions read:

Article 2 14. In case of death, :-1bsencc or unsuitability of the


parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the
sm-viving grandparent. In case several surv ive, the one designated by the
court, taking into account the same consideration mentioned in the
preceding article, shall exercise the authority .

A rticle 2 16. In default of parents or a judicially appointed


guardian, the following person shall exercise substitute parental
authority over the child in the order indicated:

( I ) 't'he surviving grandparent, :-,s provided in Art. 214;

(2) T he oldest brother ._:ir sister, over twenty-one years or age, unl ess
unfit or disquali fa:d; and

81
• Santos. Sr. v. s,,o,,se~ fJed:,1, ::; 12 Phi I. <182 ( I CJ9~,) I Per .1 R•)nH~r0, Third D iv is ion I.
85
/\rt. 176. I l!cg i1 im:11•! chiidrcn shall u~c the :;urnw~H: :111d sh'.111 l'e unde;- the parcnt::tl au thority or their
rnothcr, and shall be entitled lo supp,,n ;n c,11·,forn1ity with this Code. The legitimc o f each illegiti mate
child shall co11sis1 or one-hall· o f thi:: •·~giiimc of a legiti:nate child. Except for this modilicmion, all t,ther
provision:; in 1he Ci vi l Code govcrni11!~ suc.:.::;sir-11111 right, shal l 1-..~111ain in fore..:. (~87a)
8
" Mashale v. /?e/11cio. 837 Ph il. 51:',, 52: (211 18) jPc~r .1. Perlas- Bcrnab•~ Second Div ision] ; Recio 1•.
Ti·oci110 , 8~U Phil. --130. 44<1(20 17) I P\!r Curi,rn1. E11 iluncl. S<!e also Ma11111gdi11g v. l3<"r.1·m11i1w, G.R. Nu.
252476, March 18. 202 1 IFirs! Div1~i111 1 !.
87
tvfasbme "· Reludo. id
Decision 18 G.R. No. 234660

(3) The child's actua! cust"odian, over twenty-one years of age,


unless unfit or disqualified.

Whenever the appoinlrnenl or a judicial guardian over the property


or the chi Id becomes necessary, the same order of preference shat I be
observed. (Emphasis suppli ed)

Notably, as the foregoing prov1s1ons read, it would appear that


substitute parental authority is granted to the grandparents or the specified
persons only in case of death, absence, or unsuitability of both parents. Thus,
in situations where only one parent dies, is absent, or found unsuitable,
Articles 214 and 216 would find no application.

1t must be clarified, however, that the foregoing interpretation finds


application on ly in situations where the father and mother jointly exercise
parental authority over the persons of their common children as provided
under Article 211 of the Family Code. Where, however, the parental authority
is granted solely to the mother as in the case of illegitimate children, the
substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the grandparents or the
specified persons as provided under Article 214 and 216 of the Family Code,
in case of the mother's death, absence, or unsuitability. Indeed, to read
otherwise would effectively permit circumvention of the legislative intent to
grant sole parental authority to the mother with respect to their illegitimate
children.

Nonetheless, the foregoing clarification should not be understood to


disqualify the father of illegitimate children automatically and absolute ly from
exercising substitute parental authority in case of the death, absence, or
unsuitability of the mother. Indeed, case law 88 in fact recognized that the
father of an illegitimate child may exercise substitute parental authority and
be given custody in situations where he is the "child's actual custodian," as
provided under Article 216 of the Family Code.

Ultimately, in a ll questions involving the care and custody ofrninors, it


is axiomatic that their welfare and well-being is always the pctramount
consideration. 89 For this reason, Section 14 of the Rule on Custody of Minors
enumerated factors that must be considered in determining the issues of
custody. These include: the child's !llatcrial and moral welfare, health, and
safety; the nature and fregd1ency of c<>ntact with both parents; habitual use
of alcohol, dangerous drugs, _QLL.~L,i_i_;ited substances; the most suitabl~
physical, emotional, spirittrnl, psychological, and educational
environment for tht holistic development and growth of the minor; and
the preference of ~he minor 9.Y.~L..§y..}'..Y.LL..Y_~rs 9-f age and of suffici.9n.!
discernment, unles:, the parent cho:-;en is unfit. Section 14 reads in full:

xx Santos. Sr. v. ,'-,'pouses Bedia, ·;i2 hii. 48? ( 109) ) (Per .i . R<.nner'-'· 'lhird Divisionj and Tonog v.
Dagumwl. 427 Phil. I (2002) I Per J. Uc Leon . .Ir.. Second Divi:;ion;.
81
' Mash,,re v. Re/u<'io. 837 Phil. 5 15 535 121} i g) [f'-::r .I. l'erlr:s-i:{e1w1be, Sec.;ond. Division].
Decision 19 G.R. No. 23 4660

Section 14. Foe/on- tn consider in determininK custody. - In


awarding custodv, the ,_.~, !.1rt slrnll l·onsider the best interests of the
minor and sh all give paramom1t consideration to his material and
moral welfare . T he best inten.:st.s of the minm refer 10 the totalit y of the
circumstances and conditions as urc most congenial to the survi val,
protection, ::me! reelings o f security of the minl)r encouraging to hi s physical ,
psychological and emotional development. It also means the least
detrimental available alternative for safeguardir,g the growth and
devel opment or the minor.

The court shall also consider the follow ing:

(a) A ny exlraj udici al agreement w hich the parties may have bound
themselves l o comply wi th respecting the rights of the minor to maintain
di rect contact ,..,·ith the non cus1od i2l parent on a regular basis, except
when there is an ex isting threat or d~nger or physical, mental, sexual or
emot ional violence which e11dangers tile safely and best interests of the
rrnnor;

(b) The desire and abil ity ol' one pan.:11l to foster an open anct loving
relationsl1i p het¼een the minor and the other parent;

(c) The health, safety and welfare of the minor;

(d) Any hi story of child or spousal abuse by the person seek ing custody
or who has had any fili al relationship w ith the minor. including anyone
courting the parent;

(e) The nature and frequency of contact with both parents;

(, I) Habitual use of alcohol, dangerous drugs or regulated


substances;

(g) Marital misconduct;

(h) The most suitable physical, emotional, spiritual, psychological


and educationaJ environment for the holistic development and
gro·wth of the minor; and

(i) The preference of the minor ove1· :-even years of ~gc and of
sufficient discernment, unless the par·ent chosen is unfit. (F.mphasis
suppl ied)

Additionally, to effectively and thoroughly facilitate the Court's


determination of circumstances and cond itions thnt may affect the best interest
of the minor, Section 8 of th~ Ru le- ,rn C ustody of Minors a uthorize courts to
vrder the conduct of a case S [Ud y, v iz:

Sectioi1 8. c·ase study: d 11~v o(.wc;ia/ H-'or ker . - l Ji:,,)n the lil i11g ol' the
vcri l!ed answer or the cxpira~ion ot' the period to li le it, tht: court me!)' order
a soc ial wo rk.er lo rnakc__c: _c:.-1:;c_ study _o t' Lhc mi ne,r and_t11c...12artics and_ .L.!.
submit a report and recor.-in1ciJ9_ ~•,j_,,w_~ _t_h<;_coLu:_l at !cast three days before
th,: sched1tlecl prc-1rial. (Lindc!·scorn1g surrlied)
Decision 20 G.R. No. 234660

In this regard: it bears pointing out that while Section 8 of Rule on


Custody of Minors uses the word "!1v1y" with respect to the conduct of a case
study, and thus, subject to the discretion of the trial courts, the same must be
exercised w ith the best interest of the minor always in mind. Thus, courts do
not have unbridled discretion to dispense with the conduct of a case study
especially when facts and circu1 nstances are presented that may prove
detrimental for the safeguarding of the minor's growth and development. To
the Court's mind, Sections 8 and 14 of the Rule on C ustody of Minors were
incorporated to additionally arm the courts with the appropriate guidelines and
tools to asce11ain, with more or less sufficient definiteness, the most congenial
situation for the survival, protection, and fee lings of security of minors
encouraging to their physical, psychological , and emotional development.

In th is case, it is undisputed that Catherine was not married to


respondent. Thus, the sole parental authority, including custody, over her
iliegitimate son> W inston, resided with her pursuant to Article 176 of the
Family Code. Upon Catherine's death, the collateral grandparents of Winston
took actual custody of the latter and exercised parental authority over him
pursuant to Articles 2 14 and 216 of the same Code.

To be sure, the grant of substitute parental authority that mcludes


custody to petitioners under A11icles 2 14 and 216 of the Family Code is not
final and absolute. As with support, the determination of who wil l exercise
substitute parental authority and custody over a minor is nm :final and
irrevocable. 90 It may be subject to the proper determination of a court of
competent jurisdiction, taking into consideration, among othas, the
parameters enumerated in Section 14 of the Rule on Custody of Minors, and
the various measures provided unde r existing laws and rules, such as the
conduct of a case study, in order to effectively and thoroughly facilitate the
determination of the most suitable environment for the we llbeing and safety
of the minor.

Here, there is undeniably an apparent dearth of supporting reasons in


the trial court's ruling with respect to the existence of such facts,
circumstances, a nd conditions that is most congenial for W inston 's survival,
protection, and fee lings of security encouraging lo his physical,
psychological, and emotional development. Indeed, the RTC ruling failed to
consider such factors enumerated in Section 14 of the Rule on Custody of
M inors as the "health, safety and welfare of [Winston]," the " habitual use of
alcohol, dangerous drugs or regulated substanc~s," the '"most suitable
physical, emotional, spiritual, psychological and educational environment for
[Winston 's] holistic development and growth," and "Winston' s preference,"
including any circumstances that m<1y be detrimental t0 Winston's growth and
development, in resolv ing to award custody to respo:1de::1r.

•io See ,\4,111i11gr/ing v. ill'rsall)inu, G.R. No. 2.'i?.4H,, M,1 rrh 18, 1(P I lFirst Divisionj.
Decisio n 21 G.R. No. 234660

In th e Court' s view, the RTC::-. overreliance on the evidence of


respondent's parentage in awarding custody over Winston constituted grave
jurisdictional error or such whim sical , capricious, and arbitrary exercise of
discretion. Not only does this ruling violate the express legal provision
granting parental authority to the mother w ith respect to illegitimate children
and in case of her death, to the persons specifi cally authorized to exercise
substitute parental authority. More importantly, such error effectively
amounted to an abandonment of its legal and 111oral duty to rule in the best
interest of the minor. It bears reemphasizing that the law and the Rules
mandate that the best interest of the minor must be the primordial
consideration in the determination of who should rightfully exercise custody
and parental authority.

V.

A ll told, the Court finds that the RTC committed grave <1.buse of
discretion in awarding respondent custody over Winston based solely on
parentage. Consegvently, the CA committed reversible error in dism issing
outright the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioners from the said RTC
ruling on procedural grounds. For these reasons, the Court deems it proper
to remand the case to the court a quo for the resolution of the case with
dispatch, taking into consideration, among others, the factors and
measures provided under the Rule on Custody of Minors.

A word of caution. The fo regoing pronouncement should not be


interpreted to imply a preference toward petitioners relative to the custody of
the m inor, Winston, nor should it be taken to mean as a
statement against respondent's fi tn ess to have custody over his son. It shall
be only understood that, for the present and until appropriately ,mu finaily
adjudged, the custody over Winston pendcnte lite mny not be properly
awarded to respondent.

FOR THESE REASONS, the Court resolves to PARTIALLY


GRANT the instant Petition. The assailed Resolutions dated August 23, 7017
and October 9, 20 17 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 151807 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. T he case is herehy REMANDED to
th e court of orig in for the proper determination of the party with the rightful
custody, considering the best interests of the rn inor, with DISPATCH.

SO ORDERED.
22 G.R. No. 234660

WE CONCUR:

AM/4~RO-JAVIER
f;.,_ssoc iak J ustice
Working Chairperson

JHOSE~OPEZ
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article V I 11, Section 13 of the Constitution and the Division


C hairperson 's Attestation, I certify that the conclus ions in the above Decis ion
had been reached in consu ltation before the case was ass igned to the w ri ter of
the opinion o f the Court's Division.

Acting Ch ief Justice

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