Ammar Gul

03345064202

Multi-dimensional US-China Relations: Rivalry,

Competition and Cooperation.
 According to U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, US relations with
China are multifaceted, comprising elements of cooperation,
competition, and systemic rivalry.
 Multi-dimensional US-China Relations:
 Adversarial dimension of Sino-US Relations:
 China poses the “most serious long-term challenge to the international
order: US Secretary of State Antony Blinken.
1. US-China Trade War:
 It’s now clear to U.S. officials that China, once
considered a possible economic and political ally, has
become an emerging threat to national security, U.S.
companies and American workers, Commerce
Secretary Gina Raimondo.
 China-U.S. trade fell by 14.5% in the first half of the
year 2023: China’s ambassador to the U.S., Xie Feng.
 Decoupling of economies: Trump imposed 360 billion
tariffs on Chinese goods.
 Xie claimed that average U.S. tariffs on Chinese
products were 19%, while the Chinese tariffs on U.S.
goods averaged 7.3%.
 Trump and Biden imposed tariffs on Chinese goods
and China retaliated in the same manner.
 Biden’s “de-risking” Strategy: intends to narrowly
tailor restrictions to prevent China’s military
advancement and protect U.S. national security
 New Executive Order 2023: declaring a national
emergency to deal with the threat of advancement by
 countries like China “in sensitive technologies and
products critical to the military, intelligence,
surveillance, or cyber-enabled capabilities”.
 The US treasury secretary to prohibit or restrict
certain US investments in Chinese entities in three
sectors: semiconductors and microelectronics,
quantum information technologies, and certain
artificial intelligence systems.
2. The US-China Tec War:
 China banned Face book, Google, Apple and You tube
to operate in China.
 US CHIPS and Science Act 2022: Designed to boost US
competitiveness, innovation, and national security.
The law aims to catalyze investments in domestic
semiconductor manufacturing capacity.
 The act invests $280 billion to bolster US
semiconductor capacity, catalyze R&D, and create
regional high-tech hubs and a bigger, more inclusive
STEM workforce.
 US-China Chips war: US is concerned that China is
using chips to advance its military technology, Xi’s
vision of “world class” military by 2049,
Semiconductors., Semiconductors are used to
produce hypersonic missiles, and using artificial
intelligence (AI) for a range of applications, including
electronic warfare.
 US banned China’s access to US-origin
semiconductors and their related products.
 US sanctioned Chinese largest chip maker:
Semiconductor Manufacturing International
Cooperation.
 US have banned the sale and import of new
communications equipment from five Chinese
companies, including Huawei and ZTE, amid concerns
over national security.
  In March 2023, when Japan and
the Netherlands announced that they were also
adopting new export controls on advanced
semiconductor manufacturing equipment. Combined,
the U.S., Japan, and the Netherlands provide roughly
90% of all the equipment that is used in computer
chip factories worldwide.
 China’s anti-trust authority has effectively
blocked any and all corporate mergers involving a
U.S. semiconductor company that operates in
Chinese markets.
 China initiated a cyber security review of Micron, the
leading U.S. producer of memory chips. In late May,
China’s regulators banned purchases of Micron chips
in China’s critical infrastructure sector.
3. Geopolitical and geostrategic rivalry between US and China:
 China is the biggest threat to the US interests and
security: National Intelligence Report.
 China Containment Policy.
 China-Russia no limit strategic partnership
 AUKUS, QUAD, I2U2etc.
 China-Iran Strategic Partnership.
 IMEC versus BRI in Middle East.
 China-US rivalry in Indo-Pacific
 BRICS, SCO, NATO, Partners in Blue Pacific
 Indo-Pacific Economic Framework versus
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.

4. US-China Strategic Divergence on Taiwan, Hong Kong and Tibet.

5. Authoritarian versus democratic political order of the world:
 According to the US Director of National Intelligence,
China poses the greatest threat to democracy and
freedom world-wide since World War 2.
6. Chinese model of Multilateralism and US model of Unipolarism:
 GDI, GSI and GCI.
 7. De-dollarization and the rise of Petroyuan.
 Competitive Mode of US-China Relations:
1. Strategic competition of building infrastructural corridors:
 BRI versus B3W.
 IMEC, I2U2 etc.
 Chinese Participation in the Greater Eurasian
Partnership.
2. Technological Competition between US and China:
 Competition in Generative Artificial Intelligence:
OpenAI ChatGPT.
 Chinsese AI Development Plan calling for Chinese AI
to be the world’s undisputed leader by 2030.
 Competition in communication networks: Huwaei
launched 5G later T- Mobile Launched 5G across the
US.
 Technological competition in modernizing military:
Xi’s vision of a "world-class" military power, capable
of "fighting and winning wars" by 2049.
3. US-China Competition in Cyberspace:
 Eternal Blue VS Dubbed Daxin
4. US-China Competition in outer Space:
 Tiangong Space Station vs NASA’s International Space
Station.
 Beidou satellite navigation system vs Global
Positioning System.
 Chinese anti-satellite Missile SC-19 ASAT vs US anti-
satellite missile RIM-161-Standard Missile-3.
 Cooperative Phase of US-China Relations:
1. To Mitigate Global Conflicts:
 Israel-Palestine Issue.
 Kashmir Issue
 Yemen Civil War
 Civil Wars in Horn of Africa.
2. Global Cooperation to Counter-Terrorism:
 IS-k, AL-Qeada, ETIM, TTP etc.
3. Global Cooperation to Counter Global Warming:
4. Global Cooperation on Natural Disasters.
5. Global Cooperation on Nuclear Proliferation.
6. Global Cooperation on developing health, educational and
innovative infrastructure
P
 Positive developments between US and
o
China
s in recent times:
i
t • Bali Meeting between Biden and Xi in
i 2022:
v
 Nov 14 (Reuters) - U.S. President
e Joe Biden and Chinese leader Xi
d Jinping held their first in-person talks
e since 2017 on the sidelines of the
v G20 summit in Bali, Indonesia
e  Biden reiterated that the U.S. one-
l China policy with regard to Taiwan,
o the self-governed island claimed by
p Beijing, had not changed.
m  Biden had raised objections to
e China's "coercive and increasingly
n aggressive actions toward Taiwan,"
t which he said undermined peace and
stability across the Taiwan Strait and
P
in the broader region, and
o jeopardized global prosperity.
s
i  Xi too was explicit about Taiwan,
calling it the "first red line" that must
t not be crossed in China-U.S.
i relations.
v
e
 Opening of communication channels:
The White House said Biden and Xi
agreed to "deepen constructive
efforts" to address issues such as
climate change, health and food
security.

 Biden and Xi "underscored their

opposition to the use or threat of use
of nuclear weapons in Ukraine".

 Referring to U.S. sanctions on

Chinese firms, Xi said China
opposed politicizing and weaponizing
 e hnology.
c
o
 On North Korea, Biden said he made
it clear to Xi that China had an
n
obligation to make sure North Korea
o
did not resume nuclear testing,
m
although it was difficult to determine
i
if Xi had that influence.
c
 Antony Blinken’s visit to China 2023:
a
n
•
d The top U.S. diplomat and Xi both stressed the
t importance of having a more stable relationship, as
r any conflict between the world's two largest
a economies would create global disruption.
d
• Core issues: Taiwan, Ukraine war,
e
t
i
Sanctions of Chinese companies.
 China-US e
summit held on November 15 2023
s
in San Francisco:
a
• sw They established the "San Francisco vision"
e oriented toward the future, providing direction
l and outlining a blueprint for the healthy, stable,
l and sustainable development of China-US
a
relations.
s
• e The two sides reached consensus on more than
x 20 issues in areas such as politics, diplomacy,
c
cultural exchanges, global governance, and
h
a military security on the basis of mutual respect,
n equality and mutual benefit.
• g China is ready to be a partner and friend of the
e
s US. XI
• i “For two large countries like China and the
n
United States, turning their back on each
s
c other is not an option,” Xi said in his
i opening remarks. “Planet Earth is big
e enough for the two countries to succeed.”
n
• c “We have to ensure that competition does
e not veer into conflict,” Biden said at the start
a of the summit. “Critical global challenges we
n
face, from climate change to
d
t counternarcotics to artificial intelligence,
e demand our joint efforts.
Conclusion.
c