Turnout in developed and developing countries: Are the two turnout functions different or

the same?

Abstract

In the literature on political participation, there is no baseline model of electoral turnout. Rather,

various studies (e.g. Blais 2006, Franklin 1999, 2004, Geys 2006, Remmer 2009), which employ

different sample sizes, time periods, cases, and operationalizations of relevant independent

variables, produce contradictory results. To shed light on these diverse findings, I evaluate

whether different levels of development trigger different turnout functions. My results indicate

that highly developed countries have higher levels of citizen participation in elections, and even

more importantly, they illustrate that the turnout function in high income and low/medium

income countries is quite dissimilar. The GDP per capita, compulsory voting and decisive

elections have a different impact in the two universes of cases. This implies that there are two

distinct turnout functions between developed and developing nations.

Keywords: Turnout, developed countries, developing countries

1
Introduction

Elections are instruments of democracy. Probably more so than any other feature (e.g. political

rights and human rights), competitive, free and fair elections demonstrate a nation-state’s

commitment to democracy (Huntington 1984; Schumpeter 1976). Through elections, citizens can

choose and oust policymakers and impact political outcomes. High voter participation gives

legitimacy to those in power; it increases the authority of the democratic system as a whole and

leads to less violence and instability (Franklin 2004; Powell 1986). In contrast, the presence of

large amounts of citizens, who do not fulfill their civic duty and do not cast ballots, is a sign of

apathy toward the democratic system (Dettrey and Schwindt-Bayer 2009). This apathy can give

momentum to extremist forces (e.g. radical rightist or leftist groups) that might try to undermine

the democratic consensus in a given nation (Minkenberg and Perrinau 2007). In addition, low

voter turnout decreases the representiveness of a political system because those cohorts of the

population that do not turn out are most likely also not represented. This further implies that their

preferences are not considered in the political debate (Verba 1996).

The repercussions of turnout for the health and well functioning of a democracy have

triggered a large body of literature in both American Politics (e.g. Patterson and Caldeira 1983;

Rosenstone and Hanson 1993) and Comparative Politics (e.g. Geys 2006; Wattenberg 2002).

These studies link turnout to institutional variables, such as compulsory voting laws or the

electoral system type, party system characteristics (e.g. the number of parties that win seats),

socio-economic variables like the GDP per capita, and contextual factors (e.g. the decisiveness of

the electoral race). However, despite the fact that many studies (e.g. Blais 2006, Blais and

Dobrzynska 1998) point toward the importance of institutions in explaining and predicting macro

2
level trends in political participation, there is no baseline model of voter turnout that works

regardless of time and space.

Why do studies focusing on one particular context (e.g. one region) or on one particular

time frame (e.g. a cross sectional analysis of one year) provide sometimes different results

pertaining to the relative and absolute importance of institutional, socio-economic, and

contextual factors? One reason might lie in countries’ various developmental levels. In the

aggregate, citizens in rather less developed countries are less educated, have lower material

security, and might embrace different goals and beliefs than citizens in rich or highly developed

countries. It is highly possible that these variations in wealth, education, and cultural values lead

to different dynamics affecting turnout.

Equipped with a dataset that covers turnout rates, as well as 8 theoretically informed co-

variates for all parliamentary elections in all countries that have held legislative elections

between January 1970 and December 2010 for which data are available, I compare whether

developed countries have, in fact, a different turnout function than less developed states. In

conducting this study, I have two goals. First, and more practically, I want to disentangle

whether the indicators that drive turnout are similar or dissimilar across various levels of

development. Second, and more methodologically, I aim to evaluate whether it is advantageous

to build turnout models by pooling across all space and time periods, or whether subdividing our

universe of cases produces more accurate models.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section two situates this study within the broad turnout

literature and offers some descriptive statistics on turnout in the developed and developing

world. In the third part, I introduce the dataset used for this study and present the predictor

variables that undergird the analysis. Section four focuses on the statistical procedures employed

3
for the panel data analysis. In the penultimate part, I explain the results of the article. In addition

to the tendency of wealthy nations to have higher levels of citizen participation at the electoral

booth, I find that the impact of various independent variables (e.g. compulsory voting and

decisiveness) on turnout differs between high income and low/ medium states. Finally, I

summarize the main results of the article and provide some future avenues for research.

Existing studies on turnout

Powell’s (1986) contribution has laid the groundwork for the comparative study of macro-level

turnout. Focusing on 20 industrialized nations between 1960 and 1980, Powell finds three

institutional variables – compulsory voting, a proportional electoral system, and more registered

citizens – to be positively related to turnout. Subsequent studies by Jackman (1987) and Jackman

and Miller (1995), which also focus on western industrialized countries, mostly confirm the

above mentioned institutionalized factor, but add that close races and unicameral systems entice

people to cast their ballots at the electoral booth, as well. Blais and Dobrzynska (1998) are the

first two scholars, who broaden their analysis beyond wealthy industrialized nations. Focusing on

324 elections in democracies around the globe between 1972 and 1995, they report turnout to be

highest in small, densely-populated countries, in which the national lower house election is

decisive and close, as well as held under PR with relatively few parties, where voting is

compulsory and the minimum voting age is 21.

Since Blais and Dobrzynsk’s (1998) study, a host of macro-level analyses have attempted

to determine the factors that drive macro level turnout. Some of these studies have taken a global

perspective (e.g. Pintor and Gratschew and Sullivan 2002; Endersby and Krieckhaus 2008).

Others have endorsed a regional point of view by focusing on, for example, Eastern Europe

(Kostadinova 2003), South East Asia (Tayler 1996) and more traditionally on western

4
industrialized countries (Franklin 2000; 2004). Across the board, these cross-national studies

find rather solid evidence that compulsory voting is a primary determinant for high turnout.

However, besides the rather intuitive conclusion that forcing the population to vote will increase

participation at elections, there is no consensus on the relative and absolute salience of other

institutional, social, and contextual variables. For example, debates center around whether

turnout is higher in list proportional systems than in majoritarian systems or mixed electoral

system types (e.g. Ladner and Millner (1999), Norris (2004), Siaroff and Merer (2002),1 or

whether the decisiveness and competiveness of the electoral race boost turnout (Kuenzi and

Lambright 2007).2

The distinct findings that characterize turnout studies conducted in different parts of the

world with different subsamples of countries entertain the possibility that election dynamics are

embedded in their specific economic and environment. It might well be the case that

development by itself might shape the economic and social environment in which voting occurs.

For example, classical sociological approaches (e.g. Verba and Nie 1972; Wolfinger and

Rosenstone 1980) suggest that turnout should increase as a country modernizes. This theory sees

higher levels of education and wealth to be positively correlated with more support for

democracy. These engrained democratic values should then lead to higher levels of political

1
The majority view (e.g. Selb 2009) claims that PR systems are designed to ensure that all votes count, which
guarantees competitiveness of the districts. This, in turn, should entice people of all ideologies and preferences to
turn out. The counter perspective (e.g. Blais and Aarts 2006; Brockington 2004) argues that larger party systems,
which are often a direct result of PR, actually reduce turnout, which implies that the composition of the government
is determined by bargaining elites rather than the actual electoral result (Karp and Banducci and Bowler 2008;
Powell 2000).
2
A classical rational choice argument (e.g. Downs 1957) would suggest that elections with higher stakes might
render the electoral process worth investing for potential voters. This would imply that those elections that
simultaneously fill all positions of legislative and executive power should boost turnout. The same should apply to
competitive elections – contests where the gap between winner and runner up is marginal. While there is little
debate about the theoretical foundations of this argument, there seems to be a discrepancy between theory and
empirics as a substantial amount of empirical evidence (Kostadinova 2003; Kittelson and Anderson 2009; Tavits
2009a) finds both the decisiveness and closeness of the electoral race to be unrelated to turnout.

5
participation both at the polls and through unconventional forms (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba

2001).

Conversely, value change theorists (e.g. Inglehart (1990; 1997) argue that the

abovementioned rationale is only valid for developing countries. According to Inglehart (1997)

the dynamics linking a country’s material wealth and its citizens’ propensity to cast their ballot

in elections are different in wealthy industrialized nations. According to his value change

approach or post-materialist thesis, economic development in wealthy countries is accompanied

by social and cultural change, which causes an intergenerational shift in values from material

“survival” values to post-material “quality of life” values. In such a post-materialist world,

citizens “are more likely to demand participation in making major decisions, not just a voice of

selecting the decision-makers…mass politics are increasingly apt to be elite-challenging rather

than elite directed…” (Inglehart 1992: 6). Implicit in this argument is that the change from

material goals to self-realization values might encourage people to abandon the polls and search

other more non-conventional forms of participation.

If these two rationales hold, electoral participation should actually increase with

development and the maturation of democracy in less affluent countries. However, in affluent

countries the aforementioned post-materialist turn is likely to decrease conventional forms of

political engagement. While these two theoretical arguments constitute two solid pillars in the

political participation literature, scholars have failed to test the potentially different dynamics of

the variable development on turnout. Rather most studies include in their models, the variable

GDP per capita as a proxy for development, either in its raw form or in the log transformation.

However, these two ways of operationalizing the variable material wealth do not take into

consideration that the sign of the variable might actually switch at a certain developmental level.

6
Theoretically, this could explain why most studies (e.g. Kuenzi and Lambright 2007, Lehoucq

and Wall 2004) find no impact of the variable development on turnout. It might also be the case

that the positive impact development has in rather low income nations countries and the negative

influence the variable has in high income nations countries cancel each other out, rendering the

non-effect spurious.

Some rather straightforward empirical evidence entertains the possibility that the turnout

function might actually differ between affluent and less affluent countries. First, I find turnout to

be lower in less developed countries than in developed countries. From the period between

January 1970 and December 2010, turnout rates in 771 elections in medium or low developed

countries averaged 69.1 percent, whereas the mean participation rate in 371 elections in highly

developed countries during the same time period stood at 77.7 percent.3 An independent samples

T-test indicates that this difference in means is statistically different (the t-value is 8.59 and the

significance level >.001). This argument falls in line with recent evidence. For instance, Karp

and Banducci (2007) claim that compared to rich countries, citizens in poorer states are less

likely to be contacted by parties and candidates and are consequently less likely to be engaged in

the political process

In addition to the higher numbers of citizens, who turn out on Election Day in more

prosperous countries, development appears to have a different impact in the two subsets of

countries. Graph 1 illustrates the impact of the log transformed GDP per capita variable on

turnout for either developed or developing countries. We see that there is a negative relationship

for all countries, whose GDP per capita exceeds 12,196 US dollars and a flat line for those states,

which are deemed ‘developing’ by the World Bank.

3
Following the recommendation of the World Bank, I define a country as high developed if it had a GDP per capita
of 12,196 or higher in 2010 and as low/medium developed country if the nation’s GDP per capita was below 12,196.
.

7
Graph 1: The Relationship between the log GDP per capita and turnout in developed

(figure 1) and developing countries (figure 2)

100

100
80

80
60

60
40

40
20

20

8 9 10 11 12 4 6 8 10
lngdp lngdp
turnout Fitted values turnout Fitted values

The distinct empirical relationships between material wealth and citizens’ participation in

the two subsets of countries imply that there might be distinct dynamics at stake when it comes

to explaining and predicting turnout. For example, in less affluent societies, which frequently

tend to be more traditional, voting might take place along ethnic and/ or religious lines, as well

as through clientelistic networks, whereas in rather wealthy (and supposedly post-materialist)

nations, these networks should lose influence and more citizens are likely to have increased

access to different sources of information. All of these factors might alter the turnout dynamics

based on different levels of development. In addition, the impact the material wealth of a country

has on turnout might also interact with other factors in the turnout function or might change it

altogether. For example, compulsory voting might have a stronger impact in developed

8
countries, because poor countries might not have the means and logistics to track down the

people who failed to vote. Consequently, these countries might not be able to effectively punish

non-voters. In the following sections, I evaluate in a multivariate framework whether and, if so,

to what degree development impacts turnout and interacts with other independent variables in the

turnout function. To do so, I present the multivariate dataset, the statistical procedures, and the

results, respectively.

The dataset and the variables

To gain some robust evidence on whether the same factors affect turnout differently in developed

and developing countries, this study draws on the largest possible dataset, namely all legislative

elections between January 1970 and December 2010. The dataset contains more than 1,140

observations from more than 160 countries for which data were available. There are

approximately 200 observations with missing data on any of the independent variables discussed

in the paper. The cases for which I could not collect data (on all indicators) include some of the

smaller states, such as the Pacific Islands (e.g. Marshall Islands, Federated Micronesia) or small

African, Asian, or Latin American states such as, Guinea, Palau or Tuvalu. Contrary to many

other studies (e.g. Franklin 2004), this dataset also does not over-represent developed or Western

countries.4 In line with the empirical distribution of developed and developing countries, less

than 33 percent of the data actually come from high-income states.

Following most of the literature on electoral turnout (Blais 2006; Blais, Massicotte and

Dobrzynska 2004; Geys 2006; Franklin 2004; and Renner 2009), this study includes the

dependent variable, turnout, and eight controls commonly found in previous studies on turnout.

These controls are organized into three categories specifically institutional, socio-economic, and

4
.The dataset, which was collected with the help of three undergraduate research assistants, can be obtained from the
author upon request.

9
contextual factors and are tested in four models: (1) a pooled model; (2) an interactive model in

which I interact a dummy variable for development with all other covariates in the turnout

function; (3) a model that only includes developed countries; and (4) a model featuring merely

developing countries.

The Dependent Variable:

Turnout, the dependent variable, is measured in the standard way as the percentage of registered
5
voters that cast their ballot in the national legislative elections of their country.

Institutional Factors:

Three variables are included in the model as institutional factors: compulsory voting laws, the

electoral system type, and the decisiveness of the election. For the first variable, compulsory

voting, I follow the literature and hypothesize that in countries where voters are required to cast

their ballot by law, political participation should be higher than in countries where no such laws

exist (Gray and Caul 2000; Franklin 2004). Due to the fact that there is wide variation in the

enforcement of these statutes, I only code a country as having compulsory voting laws where

credible sanctions against non-compliance are in place. In the analyses, all countries with

enforced compulsory voting laws are coded one, while all other countries are coded zero. 6

The electoral system type is the second institutional factor, which is included in this

analysis. Because the number of votes a party receives roughly translates into the number of

seats, I expect to see a positive relationship between PR and higher turnout. To capture the three

main existing electoral system types, I distinguish between PR (including mixed member

5
We collected turnout data from the following four websites: the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
(IDEA) http://www.idea.int/vt/country_view.cfm?CountryCode=PW
Adam Carr’s election archive (http://psephos.adam-carr.net/), the Inter Parliamentary Union (IPU) praline database
on national parliaments: http://www.ipu.org/parline/. We also looked at the parliamentary site of each country to
find additional data points, if we could not find the information on elections on the above mentioned websites.
6
Data were collected from the International Institute on Democracy and Electoral Assistance.
http://www.idea.int/vt/compulsory_voting.cfm

10
proportional (MMP)), mixed member systems, and plurality/majority systems and then create

two dummy variables. First, I code all PR systems one and all other systems zero.7 Second, I

code all mixed systems one and the two remaining systems zero. As a third factor, I include the

decisiveness of the electoral race into the equation. Because of their greater importance, I

hypothesize that high stakes elections should increase turnout (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998). As a

measure of decisiveness, I use two proxy variables. First, I label any election as decisive (coded

1), if all executive and legislative seats are filled simultaneously. For example, all countries with

parliamentary systems (e.g. Germany or Spain), as well as presidential systems (e.g. Venezuela),

in which the parliamentary and presidential election occur on the same day, fit this category.

Second, I call an election indecisive (coded 0), if part of the legislature and executive are chosen

at different elections on different days. For example, the French President is selected at a

different day than are the deputies of the National Assembly. Consequently, France’s legislative

elections are coded as less decisive or zero.8 In addition, I include a dummy variable for

unicameralism (coded 1). Contrary to bicameral systems, the legislature in a unicameral system

does not have to share legislative powers with an upper house, which renders the lower house

parliamentary election more decisive.9

Socioeconomic Factors:

The model also controls for the two socioeconomic factors, the wealth of a state and country

size. While the exact mechanisms connecting these two factors on voter turnout are currently in

7
Data for the electoral system type of a country were collected from the Inter Parliamentary Union:
http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/mod-electoral.asp. To track down possible changes in the electoral system type, I used
the following IDEA publication: Reynolds’ Andrew, Ben Reilly and Andrew Ellis 2005. Electoral System Design:
The New International IDEA Handbook. Stockholm: International IDEA
8
Data were retrieved from the IFES Election Guide: http://www.electionguide.org/country.php?ID=29. Any
legislative election is coded one if it is held at the same time as a presidential election or if there is no presidential
election.

11
dispute (see Blais 2006; Dettrey Schmidt Bayer 2009), both variables are included in the model.

As discussed in section two of this article the variable material wealth might have a different

impact in the two subsets of countries; developed and developing states. In this analysis, national

wealth is measured as per capita income and country size is measured by the overall

population.10 Both variables are transformed in their natural log.

Contextual Factors

The first contextual factor that I include into the equation is the competitiveness of the electoral

race. Races, where the expected margin of success between two contenders or parties is small,

should not only trigger more campaign activity and media attention, but ought to also increase

the likelihood that an individual’s vote counts; all of which should increase the prospectus for

higher turnout (Fauvelle-Aymar and Abel 2006). The closeness variable measures the vote

difference between the winning party and the runner up party. 11 Penultimately, I add a control

variable for regime type and expect to see a positive relationship between a democratic form of

government and turnout. A democracy allows citizens to choose their representatives and

influence the policy direction of their country; two factors that should increase turnout

(Kostinova and Power 2007). To classify different regime types, I follow the standard typology

and differentiate between democracies, hybrid regimes, and autocracies.12 (Autocracies are

coded one, anocracies or hybrid regimes two and democracies three).

10
The GDP per capita data come from the UN: http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=GDP+per+capita&d=SNAAMA&f
=grID%3a101%3bcurrID%3aUSD%3bpcFlag%3a1. The variable population measures the number of people living
in a country. Data were retrieved from the United Nations Statistical Division 2010. “Population and Vital Statistics
Report.” http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/vitstats/default.htm . Missing data were collected from
the “CIA World Factbook 2011.” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
11
Data for the variable come from the Institute on Development and Electoral Assistance
(http://www.idea.int/vt/country_view.cfm?CountryCode=PW), the Adam Carr’s Election Archive
http://psephos.adam-carr.net) and IPU database (http://www.ipu.org/parline) as well as the national parliamentary
websites of the respective country. For Africa I have also retrieved data from the African Elections Database.
http://africanelections.tripod.com/index.html.
12
Data on regime type were retrieved from the Polity IV database:

12
Statistical Procedures

To test whether the turnout function differs in developed and developing nations, I run four

regression models with all of the above-mentioned independent variables and with turnout as the

dependent variable. The first model is the pooled model and contains all data. In model two, I

compare whether or not the turnout function is similar or dissimilar for developed countries with

a GDP per capita of $12,196 or more and all other countries, which the World Bank deems

developing because their GDP per capita has not yet reached the bar of $ 12,196. To this end, I

create a dummy variable for development and code developed countries one and developing

countries zero. In a second step, I interact this dummy variable with all of the other elements in

the regression model. Any independent variable has a different impact in developed countries as

compared to developing countries, if the respective interaction term is statistically significant.

For the two samples, this entails that if many interaction terms display a statistically significant

result then the two turnout functions are different. In contrast, if none or few of these interactions

display some variation, then it is safe to conclude that the turnout function is very similar

between developed and developing countries. In this case pooling across all observations is a

viable option. To confirm the results of the interactive model and to illustrate the different

dynamics that are at stake in the two different subsamples, I add two separate models which

merely feature developed and developing countries, respectively.

The equation for the first model is as follows:

Turnout = β0 + β1 D_ Compulsory Voting + β2 D_PR + β3 D_Mixed + β4 Decisiveness + β5

D_Unicameralism + β6 Log GDP per capita + β7 Log Population Size + β8 Election

Competitiveness + β9 Regime Type + β10 Development + ε.

http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm

13
 To ensure some proper modeling procedure of the pooled time series data, several tests

must be undertaken. First, I test the order of integration of the dependent variable. A Fisher Test

illustrates that the dependent variable in all three models is stationary, which signifies that I can

continue the analysis at the unit level (Maddala and Wu 1999). In a second step, I test for two

further violations of the classical linear regression model, namely autocorrelation and

heteroscedasticity. A Durbin’s ‘m’ test reveals serial correlation in the disturbance term for all

regressions (Kmenta 1990: 330). To eliminate this first order serial correlation in all models, I

employ a first order autoregressive model (the Prais Winston transformation). Finally, I detect

the presence of heteroscedasticity with the help of the White Test, which indicates that the null

hypotheses that the variance across all observations is similar or homoscedastic must be rejected

for all the four equations (White 1980). To eliminate heteroscedasticty, I proceed with robust

Huber-White standard errors, which I cluster per country.

Results13

The results (see table 1) confirm the descriptive statistics of two distinct turnout functions

between developed and developing countries. First, model 1 indicates that development by itself

leads to higher turnout; the first equation predicts that developed countries have approximately

12 points higher citizens’ participation at elections than developing countries, if we hold all other

variables constant. However, the models also indicate that while in both low and medium

developed countries, the variable’s impact is basically nil, the indicator has a strong negative

impact in developed countries. The interactive model predicts that in wealthy nations a 1-unit

increase in the log of the GDP per capita leads to a 4-point decrease in turnout. In particular, this

latter finding indicates that Inglehart’s value change approach or post-modernization theory

13
To make sure that the results are not driven by all compulsories that have compulsory voting laws, I run the same
equations excluding all countries where voting is mandatory. These equations (not reported) confirm equations 1 to
4.

14
might be correct. It seems that if rich countries continue to increase their wealth, some citizens in

search of post-materialist and self-realization values (e.g. gender equalities and the protection of

the environment) might abandon the electoral booth and possibly engage in more direct forms of

political action, such as boycotts and demonstrations (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). However,

future studies analyzing the link between a country’s material wealth and peoples’ level of

unconventional political participation could seek to validate or invalidate this hypothesis.

Second, and equally importantly, there are fundamental differences in the two turnout

functions. The interactive model indicates that compulsory voting and decisive elections have a

significantly different impact in the two universes of cases. Pertaining to the first of these three

indicators – compulsory voting – the interactive term indicates that the influence of mandatory

voting requirements is stronger in developed countries. In fact, the interactive model predicts that

turnout is between 6 and 7 points higher in developed countries that render voting mandatory as

compared to developing countries with the same stipulation. Model 3 and 4 confirm this finding.

While compulsory voting laws increase turnout rates by approximately 9.6 points in developing

countries, the variable’s impact jumps to more than 15 percentage points for developed

countries. Even more pronounced the impact of the indicator decisiveness triples in developed

countries. In those countries, where the GDP per capita is below $ 12,196, decisive elections lead

to a mere 2-percentage point increase in citizens’ electoral participation. This increase is not

statistically significant. However, scheduling decisive elections in wealthy nations triggers a 9-

percentage point jump in turnout. This result implies that rational calculations on the side of the

voters are visible in developed nations.

15
Table 1: Regression results for national turnout

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Pooled Model Interactive Developed States Developing

Model States

Compulsory Voting 12.13*** (1.12) 9.74*** (1.78) 16.26*** (1.10) 9.81*** (1.78)

D_PR 2.75*** (1.05) 2.80*** (1.55) 2.86** (1.29) 2.92*** (1.55)

D_Mixed -2.91* (1.69) -4.03 (2.51) -1.03 (2.49) -3.96 (2.51)

D_Decisiveness 5.11*** (1.17) 2.34** (1.55) 12.01*** (1.63) 2.29 (1.54)

D_Unicameralism -2.65 *** (.98) 3.20** (1.48) 2.03 (1.39) 3.24** (1.48)

Log GDP per capita -1.25** (.54) -.08 (.69) -4.35*** (.75) -.12 (.69)

Log Population -1.35*** (.19) -1.26*** (.31) -1.21*** (.26) -1.29 (.31)

D_Closeness .05 (.04) .06 (.04) -.07 (.06) .06 (.04)

Regime Type -2.06* (1.09) -2.00* (1.18) -3.28* (1.62) -2.03* (1.18)

D_Development 12.14*** (1.45) 46.03*** (12.90)

Interact_Development_Compulsary 6.60*** (2.10)

Interact_Dvelopment_PR .24 (2.02)

Interact_Development_Decisiveness 9.53*** (2.25)

Internact_Development_Unicameralism -1.15 (2.02)

Interact_Development_GDP -4.16*** (1.03)

Interact_Development_Population .03 (.40)

Interact_Development_Closeness -.12 (.08)

Interact_Development Regime Type -1.21 (2.06)

Constant 95.94*** (5.87) 87.62*** (8.15) 135.63*** (9.87) 88.33*** (8.13)

Rsquared .35 .37 .67 .21

Root MSE 10.7 10.7 5.9 11.7

N 928 928 353 575

Standard errors in parentheses, *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01 (two tailed)

16
 The two distinct models, equations 3 and 4, not only confirm the diverse results from

equations 1 and 2, they also highlight that the 8 theoretically informed covariates, which I have

chosen for this article, explain turnout considerably well in the developed world. Model 3 has an

Rsquared of .67, a figure that is more than three times as high as that of model 4. In addition, the

average error between predicted and real value is half the size in the developed sample. This

implies that model 3 allows for a rather precise explanation and prediction of turnout within its

sample. However, the same cannot be said for developing nations. In fact, the poor model fit in

equation 4 hints that there might be additional variables that explain and predict turnout in

countries with a GDP per capita of 12,196 or below. For instance, it is likely that clientelism,

vote buying, and corruption are more pronounced in less developed countries (e.g. Kuenzi and

Lambrecht 2007; Reynolds 1999)

More generally, this study confirms some of the well-established propositions in the

turnout literature, while disconfirming others. On the one hand, proportional representation,

unicameralism and a small population size boost turnout in both developed and developing

countries. On the other hand, close elections do not enhance turnout as some rational choice

models would predict. In addition, and rather surprisingly, this study does not find democracies

to have higher turnout than other regime types. This might stem from the fact that some

autocracies (e.g. communist states) “unofficially” force their populations to go vote or rig turnout

numbers. For example, the former communist states of the Warsaw Bloc before 1990 (e.g.

Poland or Bulgaria) or current autocracies, such as Cuba and Laos, have officially reported

turnout figures that surpass 95 percent, It is likely that these cases somewhat drive the results of

the variable regime type. To the possible, future studies should evaluate the degree to which

17
turnout figures are inflated in these countries. Having “more valid numbers” on these autocracies

would allow us to build more accurate turnout models. .

Conclusion

Supported by some descriptive statistics (such as different turnout levels between the developed

and developing world and by a sound theoretical argument, modernization theory), I find some

empirical evidence that development has a distinct impact in the developed and developing

world. While nation states, whose GDP surpasses $12,196, have more citizens turning out on

Election Day, I also find that as wealthy countries become even wealthier turnout declines. Such

a relationship between increases in material wealth and turnout does not exist for developing

countries. My results also indicate that compulsory voting and decisive elections have a strong

distinct impact in the two subsamples. This latter finding can provide an explanation as to why

previous analyses (e.g. Franklin 2004, Selb 2009) that have focused on different samples of

countries from different regions have sometimes produced contradictory findings.

More broadly, the results of this study indicate that researchers should be more modest in

reporting their results. This applies even more so, if we consider that many current studies omit

relevant variables (e.g. a theoretical sound measure of decisiveness in the case of Tavits (2009a;

2009b) or employ suboptimal statistical techniques (e.g. not controlling for and, when necessary

accounting for, possible violations of the general OLS regression such as autocorrelation and

heteroscedasticity in the case of Pacek, Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2009). However, even if

researchers are more theoretically sound and methodologically rigorous, different results may

occur in different subsamples, which suggest that a more finely grained subdivision of countries

in empirical large N research might lead to more finely grained results.

18
Appendix 1: Average Turnout of all countries that are included in this analysis

Country # of Elections Average Turnout Standard Deviation

Afghanistan 3 51.8 17.1
Albania 7 72.2 21.3
Algeria 4 51.6 13.4
Andorra 5 80 2.7
Angola 2 89.1 3.2
Antigua 6 70.2 12.6
Argentina 15 79.7 5.3
Armenia 4 55.2 3.5
Australia 16 94.9 0.7
Austria 11 84.1 7.6
Azerbaijan 4 58.7 22.4
Bahamas 7 90.3 1.4
Bahrain 2 62.5 13.4
Bangladesh 6 63 15.7
Barbados 9 67.6 9.8
Belarus 4 71.1 15.4
Belgium 13 92.5 2
Belize 6 77.9 6.4
Benin 5 62.4 10.1
Bhutan 1 79.4
Bolivia 9 77.7 10.8
Botswana 8 67.4 16.5
Brazil 10 80.5 4.8
Bulgaria 11 81 18.2
Burkina Faso 6 48 12.3
Burundi 2 84.3 10
Cambodia 6 85.4 9.2
Cameroon 7 88.9 15.2
Canada 12 69.2 6.1
Cape Verde 6 67.5 10.6
Central African Republic 3 63.5 11.9
Chad 3 52.3 3.8
Chile 7 88 4.1
Colombia 12 43.6 7.9
Costa Rica 10 77.2 6.6
Cote d`Ivoire 3 32.3 0.6
Croatia 6 67.9 6.1
Cuba 3 98.6 0.8

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Cyprus 8 89.6 6.5
Czech Republic 5 67.1 7.8
Denmark 14 86.1 1.9
Djibouti 6 67.8 19.7
Dominicana 2 58.4 1.2
Dominican Republic 9 59.7 10.9
East Timor 2 86.8 8.8
Ecuador 11 69.2 9.2
Egypt 5 42.8 8.7
El Salvador 11 52.4 15.3
Equatorial Guinea 3 86.1 16.2
Estonia 5 66.1 11
Ethopia 2 86.3 5.2
Fiji Islands 5 65.9 25
Finland 11 72.3 5.9
France 9 70.9 8.4
Gabon 1 95.6
Gambia 7 66.5 15.2
Georgia 6 64.7 7.4
Germany 11 82.7 6.5
Ghana 6 57.4 21.6
Greece 12 78.1 4.2
Grenada 7 67.8 11
Guatemala 8 49.3 14.3
Guinea 2 66.9 7.2
Guinea-Bissau 4 70.3 17.2
Guyana 6 84.4 9.1
Haiti 4 42.4 15.2
Honduras 9 69 13.3
Hungary 10 77.8 16.6
Iceland 12 87.8 2.5
India 11 58.4 3
Indonesia 9 87.2 10.3
Iran 3 75.7 24.1
Iraq 4 80.1 13.2
Ireland 11 70.8 5
Israel 11 74.9 6.6
Italy 11 87.2 4.6
Jamaica 7 71.4 11.8
Japan 14 67.9 5.1
Jordan 5 60.2 13.3
Kazakhstan 5 67.5 7.9
Kenya 6 61.1 7.9

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Kiribati 3 75.8 8.3
Kuwait 3 85.6 6
Kyrgystan 5 62.7 7.8
Laos 4 89.6 19.8
Latvia 6 71.9 10.4
Lesotho 4 65.2 11
Liberia 2 82.8 8.8
Liechstenstein 10 90.5 4.4
Lithuania 5 53.2 15.7
Luxembourg 8 88.1 2.3
Madagascar 3 62.7 4.5
Malawi 1 80.2
Malaysia 8 72.5 2.5
Maldives 5 74.3 4.3
Mali 3 28.8 6.5
Mauritius 7 84.6 4.5
Mexico 14 58.9 9.1
Moldova 5 64.9 6.2
Monaco 4 75.6 3.3
Mongolia 1 81.8
Montenegro 2 69.1 4.1
Morrocco 7 63.6 16.8
Mozambique 4 59.2 23.4
Myanmar 2 74.9 3.3
Namibia 3 74.6 11.1
Nepal 5 67.1 12
The Netherlands 12 81 4.5
New Zealand 13 84.3 5.4
Nicaragua 7 74.7 6.3
Niger 4 38 5.2
Nigeria 3 42.3 6
Norway 10 79.5 3.4
Oman 1 62.7
Pakistan 8 44.8 6.3
Panama 4 74.7 1.9
Papua New Guinea 5 66.5 11.4
Paraguay 10 77.7 14.8
Peru 4 82.7 4.1
The Phillipines 10 74.5 12.3
Poland 6 47.4 5.2
Portugal 12 72.1 9.8
Romania 4 59.3 15.6
Russia 5 59.1 6.4

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Rwanda 6 96.1 3.2
Saint Kitts and Nevis 6 67 6.1
Saint Lucia 8 62.5 4.7
Saint Vincent and Grenadines 8 69.7 8.6
Samoa 3 82.3 4.2
San Marino 7 77.3 3.6
Sao Tome 5 65.3 8.8
Senegal 7 51.1 12.7
Serbia 3 60.2 1.4
Seychelles 7 80.8 13.1
Sierra Leone 3 73.1 11.7
Singapore 10 94.6 1.2
Slovakia 5 68.7 12.1
Slovenia 5 70.7 10
Solomon Islands 7 60.9 5.4
South Africa 4 82.5 6.4
South Korea 6 62.5 10.7
Spain 9 73.9 4.5
Sri Lanka 8 75.7 9.9
Sudan 2 57.6 3.3
Suriname 4 70.3 7.3
Swaziland 1 60.4
Sweden 12 86.9 4.1
Switzerland 9 46.7 3.1
Tajikistan 4 90.3 4.4
Thailand 15 59.5 10.5
Togo 5 79 14
Tonga 7 59.1 14.8
Trinidad and Tobago 10 64.1 4.7
Trukey 7 82.9 7.5
Uganda 4 70.7 10.8
Ukraine 5 68.6 4.6
United Kingdom 10 71.2 6.9
USA 20 61.2 12.8
Uruquay 5 90.3 1.3
Vanatu 8 70.7 6.6
Venezuela 8 69.2 23.8
Yemen 3 75.6 14.5
Zambia 8 57.9 16.8
Zimbabwe 5 50.2 43.2

22
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