Metaphor in International Relation

Metaphors in International Relations Theory
Michael P. Marks
ISBN: 9780230339187
DOI: 10.1057/9780230339187
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10.1057/9780230339187 - Metaphors in International Relations Theory, Michael P. Marks

Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to The Chinese University of Hong Kong - PalgraveConnect - 2016-03-09
Metaphors in International
Relations Theory
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Also by Michael P. Marks
The Formation of European Policy in Post-Franco Spain: The Role of Ideas,

Interests and Knowledge
The Prison as Metaphor: Re-Imagining International Relations
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Metaphors in International Relations
Theory
Michael P. Marks
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METAPHORS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY
Copyright © Michael P. Marks, 2011.
All rights reserved.
First published in 2011 by
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ISBN: 978–0–230–11321–3
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
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Marks, Michael P.
Metaphors in international relations theory / Michael P. Marks.
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ISBN 978–0–230–11321–3 (hardback)
1. International relations—Language. 2. Language and
international relations. I. Title.
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For Brenda
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C o n t e n ts
Acknowledgments ix
1 Introduction 1
2 Thoughts on Metaphor 9
3 The Metaphorical Context of International Relations 29
4 Contributions of Metaphors to International Relations

Theory 57
5 Metaphors of Power 81
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6 Metaphors of International Security 107
7 Game Theory Metaphors 137
8 Metaphors and Changing Conceptions of International

Relations 161
9 Conclusion 183
Notes 199
Bibliography 231
Index 257

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Ac k n ow l e d g m e n ts
Most of the inspiration for this book came from experiences in
the classroom teaching students at Willamette University. Given the
abstract nature of international relations in theory and practice, both
my students and I have found that difficult concepts can be made intel-
ligible through the use of metaphorical imagery. However, metaphors
can serve to both clarify and confound, and thus a critical analysis of
the metaphors that scholars use to frame the study of international
relations can yield insights beyond that which those metaphors were
originally intended to convey. Hence, my greatest intellectual debt
is not to established scholars of international relations, but to the
budding scholars who, in their role as undergraduates at Willamette,
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engaged me in a philosophical investigation of metaphors. This book
would not be possible if it were not for their intellectual curiosity that
made me think deeply about the phenomena examined in this book.

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Chapter 1
Introduction
T his is a book about discourse, specifically, scholarly discourse in the

study of international relations. The purpose of the book is to analyze
the language of metaphor in international relations (IR) theory. In his
book on the balance of power (and the metaphors, myths, and models
thereof), Richard Little (2007, 30) observes that “the general impor-
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tance of metaphors until very recently has simply not been taken on
board in International Relations.” While metaphors have been ever
present in the study of international relations (as the bibliography of
this book can attest), little explicit or sustained attention has been paid
to their role.1 With the advent of the “linguistic turn” in international
relations theory, however, the need to tackle the language of metaphor
is evident.
As will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 2, metaphors are
more than mere rhetorical devices. Recent scholarship in the field of
cognitive linguistics reveals that metaphors are essential to human
thought and communication. Metaphors evoke images of what is
known and provoke new understandings of topics under investiga-
tion. In academic inquiry the role of metaphors is multiform: they
can define a problem, delineate the scope of analysis, and suggest
hypotheses for testing theoretical propositions.2 One of the ironies
of international relations theory is that while the language of inter-
national relations can sound technical and arcane to the untrained
ear, the words IR scholars use to describe world affairs are highly
metaphorical. They speak and write of “anarchy,” “systems,” “struc-
tures,” “balances of power,” and “levels of analysis,” to name just a
few of the foundational metaphors of international relations theory,
not to mention the more specific metaphorical terms found in areas

2 M e t a p h o r s i n I n t e r n at i o n a l R e l at i o n s T h e o r y
such as international security, international political economy, strate-

gic interaction, and game theory. In short, throughout international
relations literature, what is studied is expressed in metaphorical terms.
Scope of the Book
This is not a book about how politicians and policymakers use
metaphors for the purposes of framing issues and formulating poli-
cies in the area of international affairs. That is a subject that has been
addressed capably by other scholars (see, e.g., Beer and De Landtsheer
2004).3 While not the central focus of this book, it is worth not-
ing that the lessons scholars derive from the way political leaders
use metaphors to frame foreign policy issues also are useful in dis-
secting the metaphors scholars themselves use in the course of their
investigations.4 Ironically, scholars of international relations are often
convinced that metaphors are safer in their hands than in the hands
of politicians. As this book will show, scholars who study international
relations have found metaphors to be indispensable in the construc-
tion of explanatory theories. Although scholars have been adept at
investigating the discursive practices of foreign policy officials, they
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have been less inclined to turn the lens on themselves to interrogate
the metaphors they use to analyze international affairs. In many if not
most cases, the deployment of these metaphors borders on the cav-
alier. And, as this volume will demonstrate, metaphors that are used
haphazardly in fashioning international relations theories can lead to
analyses that are less than fruitful.
Yet, perhaps because scholars can be casual in their use of
metaphors, they do not hesitate to criticize policymakers who delib-
erately use metaphors in formulating foreign policy. For example,
many of the chapters in the book Metaphorical World Politics (Beer
and De Landtsheer 2004) are quick to highlight what the authors
see as the pernicious use of metaphors by politicians in devising and
implementing government policy in the area of international affairs.
Richard Gregg (2004, 67–68), for instance, discusses how American
politicians invoked metaphors of disease (e.g., the “cancer” of com-
munism) during the Red Scare. Likewise, Robert Ivie (2004, 78–82)
refers to metaphors involving a “civilizing” motivation that American
leaders utilized when trying to convince people of the need to spread
democracy around the world. In both these cases, the authors cast a
suspicious eye on political officials who use metaphors for the pur-
pose of buttressing morally suspect foreign policies. Yet, a similar
scrutiny is rarely applied to scholars of international relations who

Introduction 3
use metaphors to support their favored theories to explain the world.

Michael Shapiro (1989b, 13) observes that critical analysis of politi-
cal discourse employs an “insurrectional textuality” to “denaturalize
familiar realities,” and in the same volume, James Der Derian (1989)
calls for an interrogation of the “present knowledge of international
relations.” Given the broad range of metaphors found in international
relations theory it would be a daunting if not an impossible task to
compile a list and offer a detailed analysis of all of them.5 Instead,
the purpose of this book is to critically interrogate the major defining
metaphors of international relations theory to expose the often uncon-
scious deployment of a scholarly discourse that privileges certain sets
of understandings over others.
In addition, it should be pointed out that this book is about
metaphors in international relations theory; it does not pretend to
develop a theory of metaphors or to directly engage with theoretical
debates about the role of metaphors in thought and communication.
Given the vast literature on metaphors, it would be beyond the scope
of this book to enter into the debate over metaphor theory. As will
be discussed in the next chapter, modern research on metaphors
stresses the cognitive aspects of metaphoric communication, and thus
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that general perspective will form the basis of this book’s approach
to analyzing metaphors in international relations theory. However,
within the general school of cognitive linguistics there are multiple
approaches to analyzing the role of metaphors in how humans perceive
of and communicate their experiences. Evaluation of the nuances, rel-
ative merits, and theoretical implications of these approaches will have
to be left out of the ambit of this study, although, when relevant,
insights from metaphor research will be brought to bear.
Constructing Knowledge in International

Relations Theory
It is increasingly apparent that what is known about international rela-
tions is not so much a universally shared agreement about objective
realities but rather a reflection of dominant ways of knowing that
frame issues and debates not to mention the empirical bases of inter-
national affairs. The Constructivist paradigm is probably the most
prominent and most explicit school of thought in its acknowledg-
ment that the empirical bases of world affairs can be conceptualized
theoretically such that different visions of reality can be constructed.
However, it is not the only approach in the study of international
relations that advances claims about the discursive framing by which

the facts of international relations are conceived. As Jim George

(1994) asserts, all of the major theoretical perspectives in IR advance
a discursive project that sets out what is conceivable in the study of
international relations.
Metaphors are just one set of discursive tools with which the fac-
tual bases of international relations can be represented in the theories
that are used to conceptualize world affairs. As John Agnew (2007,
138) observes, knowledge about any subject (but for Agnew’s pur-
pose as well as ours, knowledge about international relations) can be
defined as “explanatory schemes, frames of reference, crucial sets of
assumptions, narrative traditions, and theories.” Agnew (ibid.) fur-
ther states that a “great deal of interpretive projection is the result of
the imposition of intellectual/political hegemonies from some places
onto others.” Thus, whether they are metaphors or any of the other
means for constructing knowledge available to scholars, what is known
at any given time or in any given place about international relations is
reflective of how knowledge about a subject is formulated.
One of the main theses of this book is that metaphors in inter-
national relations theory do far more than simply supply evocative
imagery to explanatory frameworks. Instead, a major contention of
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this study is that the generally accepted paradigms that are used to
analyze international relations are built on metaphorical imagery that
provides the very theoretical propositions these paradigms use to
hypothesize and make predictions about international affairs.6 It is
now generally agreed that metaphors play an integral role in human
cognition. Most, if not all, human thought is metaphorical in the sense
that humans use metaphors to recognize patterns and relationships
among concrete and conceptual categories. Language reflects the
inclination of humans to use metaphors in understanding the world,
and thus both everyday language and the vocabulary of theoretical
reasoning alike are built on the metaphorical images that people use to
recognize similarities and differences in what they encounter in both
the old and the new. Metaphors in theory of any sort can be casual,
for example, the image of a metaphorical “big bang” that physicists
employ to visualize the origins of the “universe” (itself a metaphor),
or integral, for example, the metaphor of economic “cycles” on which
entire schools of thought are devoted in the field of economics.
In international relations theory, the ontological assumptions and
epistemological methods of the various paradigmatic approaches
are suffused with metaphors. For example, Vincent Pouliot (2007,
362) observes that the structuro-functionalist approach to the study
of international relations is distinguished by its “talk of systems,

Introduction 5
equilibriums, and structures,” each of which is a metaphorical image

that constructs what is knowable using this approach. By the same
token, Pouliot (362) points out that the contending Constructivist
approach “has its own dialect full of social constructions, norms,
and identities,” which are also metaphorical in nature. Some of these
metaphors are obvious, while others, due to either their repeated use
or mundane quality, go largely unnoticed and undetected by schol-
ars in the field. Metaphors in IR theory used deliberately to generate
hypotheses can eventually become reified to the extent that they lose
their heuristic nature, while metaphors used casually often are not
investigated with regard to their validity for giving insight into the
subject matter at hand.
Throughout the course of this book readers will discover that the
vast majority of the terms cataloguing, defining, and naming theories,
concepts, and analytical tools pertaining to the study of interna-
tional relations are metaphorical in nature. The reader may then be
prompted to ask, if that is the case, what is not a metaphor in inter-
national relations theory and, if the answer is very little to nothing,
what is the point of highlighting what could then be thought of as
unavoidable elements in the scholarly discipline at hand? As the next
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chapter will explain, it is a fact that no realm of human cognition is
devoid of metaphorical imagery, including every academic discipline.
It is because of this that the choice, conscious or not, of metaphors
that aid in any theoretical process has consequences for what empiri-
cal topics are studied, what assumptions underlie these inquiries, and
what theoretical propositions are put to the test. Since no sustained
attention has been paid to this endeavor in the past, it is helpful to
undertake an examination of metaphors in IR theory to see what
impact they have had in the field.
To give the reader a sense of how metaphors operate in inter-
national relations theory it is useful to start with an example that
demonstrates the ubiquity of metaphor in IR thought. International
relations are said to be governed by certain “structures.” “Struc-
ture” is a term that typically implies physical qualities. Thus, initially,
“structure” was simply a way to suggest certain metaphorical physical
constraints on states and other international actors. Today, however,
it is used literally as a descriptor for that which defines world affairs.
Continual use of a metaphorical term in any context tends to give what
once was a metaphor the appearance of being literally true. Regardless
of the intentions of scholars, and leaving entirely aside the question
of whether or not there is an objective reality that people agree on, as
long as individuals have a choice in what language to use to describe

something, the language that eventually is chosen is both inevitably

metaphorical and influences the way concepts in international relations
theory are framed.
Why Metaphors Matter
Many of the metaphors that have been devised by scholars to frame
the study of international relations are self-consciously seen as con-
trivances that help observers make inferences about how international
relations works. For example, in introductory international relations
classes college students are frequently taught to think of the world
metaphorically as a “billiard table” with states imagined as metaphor-
ical “balls.”7 These billiards images ostensibly introduce students to
the basic elements of traditional international relations theory. States
are thought of metaphorically as “hard-shelled and impenetrable ter-
ritorially sovereign states” (Opello and Rosow 1999, 226), and are
said to have “interests [that] are defined exogenously” in a “process
[that] is characterized by intergovernmental bargaining and unlimited
state interest” (Sjursen 2001, n.p.).8 In the billiard ball model there
are no “good” states or “bad” states (Mearsheimer 1994–1995, 48),
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and “[o]nly the hard exteriors touch, and heavier or faster moving
ones push others out of the way” (Burton 1972, 28). There are other
metaphorical contrivances for the milieu of international relations as
well. For example, the “billiard ball” metaphor can be compared to
the similar-sounding, albeit theoretically opposed, “ ‘egg-box’ con-
ception of international society” whereby “the sovereign states are the
eggs, the box is international society and the purpose of the box is to
‘separate and cushion, not to act’ ” (Wheeler 1996, 126).9
The “web” or “cobweb” model challenges the billiard ball image
of states as hard-shelled actors by promoting the vision of an inter-
national society in which relations among a variety of global actors
resemble the intertwined threads of a web-like matrix (Burton 1972,
35–45). Sometimes it seems as if the billiard ball image of inter-
national relations is the target for every other metaphor that chal-
lenges the theoretical implications of the billiard ball model. In their
2007 article—“Billiard Balls or Snowflakes?”—for example, Benjamin
Fordham and Victor Asal (2007, 48) suggest that major powers be
seen less as hard-shelled impenetrable objects and more like metaphor-
ical “snowflakes” “with many potentially relevant internal character-
istics.” Other metaphors include the “burning house” vision of the
international system and the “forest” image of an international system
comprising homogenous states pictured metaphorically as “trees.”10

Introduction 7
In recent years scholars have become rather creative in contriving

metaphors to capture what they see as the nature of the milieu that
constitutes the world of international relations. Robert Kaplan (1994,
75), for example, suggests the metaphor of a “hologram” to describe
what he sees as the multifaceted nature of international relations.
Examining the role of metaphors that frame the context of interna-
tional relations is not a purely academic exercise. There are real-world
implications for foreign policymaking of these metaphors as well.
During her keynote address at the Citizen Diplomacy Summit in
2005, former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright made the
following metaphorical observation that reflected her view of foreign
policy:
As you may have seen, there are also many other surveys showing that inter-
national support for US foreign policy is at the lowest level since the Vietnam
War. The main complaint is that we don’t take the interests of other coun-
tries into account and that we are too quick to use military force. How do
we explain these perceptions? What can we do to change them? I thought
about this and decided that it helps to compare foreign policy to a game of
pool. Everybody always talks about foreign policy as a game of chess, but
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that doesn’t work for me because chess is a very deliberate and slow game
where you take a lot of time to make decisions. I’ve always thought that a
pool table makes more sense because when one ball is hit it smacks into others,
and each of them caroms around and hits some more, just like our policy mak-
ers that start out in one direction, but end up going in six. Everything that
happens has an effect on everything else, all of which leads us to a lot of
unintended consequences. In this case it’s the invasion of Iraq that has rear-
ranged the balls on the table . . . The worst days in fact may well lie ahead—but
we can help the situation overall by going back to that pool table and start-
ing some balls moving in a different direction. (Albright 2005a, 23 emphasis
added)
The Realist metaphorical imagery of these statements is unmistakable

and could be recognized by any first-year student in a college intro-
ductory international relations class. Albright was speaking not as an
academic but as a former senior policymaker in the U.S. foreign policy
establishment. However, she was speaking not as a politician trying to
frame an issue or gain popular support, but rather as a policymaker
schooled in the theories of international relations.
Madeleine Albright was one of the major architects of U.S. foreign
policy during the administration of President Bill Clinton. Scholars
can argue about the motivations of Albright and others in the U.S.
foreign policy establishment at that time, but what emerges from the

former Secretary of State’s 2005 observations is that her own think-

ing about the world has been shaped by the theoretical conclusions
that follow from the billiard ball metaphor so closely associated with
Realist theory. One can presume that Secretary Albright had given a
good deal of thought to the way she imagines the nature of inter-
national relations and that her pool table reference was not just an
off-the-cuff remark.11 Rather, we can reasonably infer that the actions
taken by the Clinton administration were a direct reflection of the the-
oretical lens Madeleine Albright carried with her as Secretary of State.
Armed with clues found in Albright’s billiards ball comments, scholars
who had puzzled over the motivations of the framers of U.S. foreign
policy during the Clinton administration now have a better ability to
understand the theoretical roots of this policy.
The conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is that metaphors
that frame the context of international relations are not solely part
of a purely theoretical endeavor. What constitutes the field of inquiry
that falls under the rubric of international relations depends on what
metaphorical perspectives shape the field. In light of this observa-
tion, this book adopts a critical perspective in analyzing the central
metaphors in international relations. The term “critical” often is
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associated with approaches in international relations that reveal rela-
tionships of power among international actors that are concealed by
traditional theoretical perspectives. This book takes a different pos-
ture, directing its attention not at international actors but at theories
of international relations themselves. While it is true that many critical
IR scholars have as their immediate target what they see as deficien-
cies in existing theoretical frameworks, for many of them the ultimate
aim is to direct attention at how international affairs are constructed in
ways that are not revealed by traditional theoretical approaches. In this
book I am less critical of the subject matter of international relations
inquiry than I am of the nature of international relations theory used
to study it. I neither know nor suspect that there is something about
international relations that is not revealed to IR scholars via traditional
theoretical perspectives, including critical ones. Rather, I assume that
how international relations is revealed reflects scholars’ own concep-
tual impressions that they experience through metaphors and convey
to others through metaphorical expression. My purpose in this book
is to critically examine metaphorical expression in international rela-
tions to see what that reveals about the theoretical propositions that
characterize diverse scholarly traditions.

Chapter 2
Th o u g h ts o n M e ta p h o r
What Are Metaphors?

M etaphors are among the most studied elements of language. 1
Philosophers and linguists have been fascinated by the way metaphors

reveal similarities in dissimilar realms. Aristotle defined a good
metaphor as one that “implies an intuitive perception of the similar-
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ity in dissimilarities” (quoted in Harries 1978b, 73). Samuel Johnson
described metaphor as a linguistic formulation that “gives you two
ideas for one” (quoted in Sapir 1977, 9). Most people are familiar with
metaphors in their use in fiction and poetry. However, metaphors do
more than enliven literary expression. Because they highlight similari-
ties in the dissimilar, metaphors are the key to intellectual discovery.2
Any number of scholars over the years have highlighted the util-
ity of metaphors for understanding. Philip Wheelwright (1962, 170)
writes that with metaphor “the fresh context may be regarded as an
angle of vision, a perspective, through which reality can be held in a
certain way, a unique way, not entirely commensurate with any other
way.” Paul Ricoeur (1977, 232) opines: “Broadly speaking, metaphor-
ical truth concerns the application of predicates or of properties to
something by a sort of transference, as for example, the applica-
tion of predicates borrowed from the domain of sound to something
coloured.” Don Swanson (1978, 163) contends that a “metaphor is a
peremptory invitation to discovery. What is discoverable are the vari-
ous allusive ties, or common attributes, between the metaphor and the
underlying truth to which it points.” For Nelson Goodman (1978,
175), metaphor “participates fully in the progress of knowledge: in
replacing some stale ‘natural’ kinds with novel categories, in contriv-
ing facts, in revising theory, and in bringing us new worlds.” Wolf

Paprotté and René Dirven (1985, vii) write that metaphor “is recog-
nized as one of the deepest and most persisting phenomena of theory
building and thinking.”
Clearly metaphors have piqued the curiosity of philosophers and
scholars for centuries, and with good reason. It is now understood that
basic human cognition involves conceptualizing the world metaphor-
ically. This is reflected in linguistic communication, which translates
metaphorical thinking into metaphorical expression. Thus, according
to Roland Bleiker (2000, 228), “all forms of thought are metaphor-
ical in nature. They cannot be anything else, for language itself is
a series of metaphors through which we make sense of the world
that surrounds us. And since we need language not only to com-
municate, but also to form our opinions of social phenomena, we
inevitably think, live and criticize through a series of metaphors . . . ”
The pervasiveness of metaphors in thought and words is so com-
monplace that people typically do not take note of the metaphorical
origins of everyday expressions. For example, any number of body
parts serve as metaphors for conceptualizing other physical forms—
from “head of a pin,” to “street shoulder,” to “heart of the city,” to
“foot of a bed.” By drawing on what is ordinary in two familiar realms
produced.3
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and positioning them in an unfamiliar way, new understandings are
Traditional Views of Metaphors

Metaphors are among the most studied and analyzed linguistic devices
in the history of human communication.4 The American Heritage
Dictionary (1134) defines metaphor as “a figure of speech in which a
word or phrase that ordinarily designates one thing is used to desig-
nate another, thus making an implicit comparison.”5 A metaphor is a
form of analogy but it is a specific type of analogy. Analogy uses direct
comparison to deliberately draw attention to a “similarity in some
respects between things that are otherwise dissimilar” (American Her-
itage Dictionary, 66). Hence, a typical analogy would be “the rope
was coiled up like a snake.” Ropes and snakes are dissimilar objects,
but the commonality of shapes they can take can be highlighted in
analogical form. The unique quality of metaphors is that they convey
meaning via analogy by incorporating indirect comparison. Metaphors
trigger a mental association between two things that is not imme-
diately apparent through overt comparison by explicit analogy. For
instance, using the example of a snake, one could say metaphorically
that “John is a snake.” The metaphor of “snake” attributes a unique

Th o u g h ts o n M e ta p h o r 11
quality to the person of John to create a new understanding about

John’s nature. What advances the expansion of knowledge is precisely
the (metaphorical) bridge metaphors make between two seemingly
dissimilar realms.
Hayden White (1978, 91) opines: “metaphor does not image the
thing it seeks to characterize, it gives directions for finding the set of
images that are intended to be associated with that thing. It func-
tions as a symbol, rather than as a sign” (emphasis in the original).
Following White, since language is inherently symbolic, many schol-
ars have opined that virtually all language is metaphorical in the sense
that like a mathematical equation, the role of metaphors emphasizes
the association between one side of the equation and the other.6 Or,
to put it another way, both mathematics and language are symbolic.
Hence, the symbol “four” is a metaphor for “two plus two”; people
understand that just as “two plus two” constitutes the sum of “one
plus one plus one plus one,” “four” substitutes for the latter in its
representation of the former.7 The claim that the names of numbers
are inherently metaphorical has recently been backed up by research
conducted by a team of British scholars, who have discovered that
children in societies that use languages that possess no words for
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numbers are still able to count (Butterworth et al. 2008). The work
of these researchers indicates that numeracy and literacy are distinct
mental activities with the linguistic function of the brain providing
metaphors to represent the way the brain understands numerical quan-
tities. In other words, if the British researchers are right, humans do
not necessarily need words in order to count, but when they do use
words to express numbers, those words are inherently metaphorical.8
In the same way that the words for numbers serve as metaphorical
representations of numerical quantities, other basic aspects of human
existence typically are represented metaphorically, just as the core ele-
ments of existence serve as metaphors for other things. The human
body and its parts, for example, provide metaphorical representations
of everyday things. For example, to say that a pin has a “head” is
to metaphorically represent the metaphorical “equation” one might
make between the part of the body that rests on the torso and the
part of the pin that sticks out at the top. Likewise, people speak of the
“leg” of a table, the “foot” of a bed, the “shoulder” of a highway, or
the “heart” of the matter. The person who comes up with ideas for a
large organization often is referred to metaphorically as the “brains”
of the operation. Human communication is so replete with these types
of everyday metaphors that most people simply take it for granted that
they are speaking with imagery to convey basic ideas.

That all language is metaphorical is a claim that has been widely

accepted by linguists and other scholars. As Mark Turner (1987, 17)
points out, even the following definition of “metaphor” is metaphori-
cal: “A metaphor, in general, provides a way of seeing one conceptual
domain in terms of another conceptual domain.” Since “cognition
and vision are different, though related, domains of existence” (ibid.),
to say that metaphors allow a way of “seeing” one domain in terms
of another is to employ metaphorical language as part of a definition
of metaphor. As previously noted, metaphors in Western languages
have been an object of interest since the time of Aristotle. Yet, while
Aristotle’s observations on metaphor provide the foundation for most
subsequent philosophy on the topic, scholars now recognize that
Aristotle did not go far enough. Metaphors convey similarities by sub-
stituting one thing for another. But this substitution process does not
merely express equality as the math illustration implies. Rather (and,
frankly, this is true for math as well), the substitution of one con-
cept for another by means of metaphor creates new understandings
and advances cognitive comprehension.9 As J. David Sapir (1977, 32)
puts it: “The metaphoric process is not a simple game of substitution,
but rather a creative game where the pregnant interplay of two dis-
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parate terms provides insight that, although it might at times be trivial
can also be profound and revealing of important and deep cultural
understandings.” Similarly, Turner (1987, 19) writes: “In fact it is not
from Aristotle’s metaphor that interesting metaphors derive. Creative
metaphors call for conceptual revision. They require us to conceive
the ontology of a thing. They entail the attribution of new salient
properties, and thus create similarity” (emphasis in the original).
Traditional views of metaphors have given way to cognitive lin-
guistics and the notion that metaphors are a ubiquitous way in which
the brain works. As the brain interprets sensory input, it catalogs
it according to common patterns. Metaphors provide shortcuts for
cross-referencing the items stored in the brain’s cataloging system.10
They provide a series of connections that allow the brain to understand
new information in the context of previously encountered phenom-
ena. Even before modern advances in cognitive sciences, philosophers
of metaphors have intuitively grasped this concept. As I. A. Richards
observed in 1936, metaphor is “fundamentally a borrowing between
intercourse of thoughts, a transaction between contexts” (Richards
1936, 94, emphasis in the original).11 Metaphors thus permit the brain
to make sense of new concepts that share something in common with
information that is already understood.12

Cognitive Linguistics and Current Research on

Metaphors
Current research on metaphors is dominated by the contribu-
tions of cognitive linguistics.13 The cognitive linguist Mark Johnson
(1981, 4) summarizes traditional views on metaphors in this way:
“[P]hilosophers’ thinking on the subject” of metaphor is that “a
metaphor is an elliptical simile useful for stylistic, rhetorical, and
didactic purposes, but which can be translated into a literal para-
phrase without any loss of cognitive content.” This traditional view of
metaphors increasingly has given way to a new vision based on cogni-
tive linguistics that sees in metaphors a more fundamental role in the
processes of human thought. As George Lakoff (1993, 203) points
out, whereas in the traditional view the “term ‘metaphorical expres-
sion’ refers to a linguistic expression (a word, phrase, or sentence)
that is the surface realization of . . . a cross-domain mapping,” in the
contemporary theory of metaphor, metaphor “has come to mean ‘a
cross-domain mapping in the conceptual system’ ” itself. That is to say,
metaphor is how humans think, not only how they express themselves
in language.14
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Many of the current debates over the role of metaphors center
on the contributions of the aforementioned Lakoff and Johnson.
Lakoff and Johnson’s thesis is that metaphors are part of an
ongoing process in which humans interact with the physical envi-
ronment. Lakoff and Johnson refer to their theory as an “expe-
rientialist” approach, also known as the “conceptual theory” of
metaphors. Humans make sense of the world metaphorically when
the patterns experienced in one domain are structured through lan-
guage to provide meaning to another domain (Lakoff and Johnson
1980b, 230).15 Lakoff and Johnson elaborate the experientialist the-
ory of metaphors in their work on the mind – body connection
in human cognition. They have coined the term the “embodied
mind,” which refers to human learning as a function of its bio-
logical bases, especially the neural functioning of the body and the
brain:
[The] findings of cognitive science are profoundly disquieting in two respects.

First, they tell us that human reasoning is a form of animal reason, a reason
inextricably tied to our bodies and the peculiarities of our brains. Second,
these results tell us that our bodies, brains, and interactions with our environ-
ment provide the mostly unconscious basis for our everyday metaphysics, that
is, our sense of what is real. (Lakoff and Johnson 1999, 17)

In Lakoff and Johnson’s thesis all thinking is experienced physically.

For example, the mental process of categorization is in fact a physi-
cal activity. Lakoff and Johnson further state: “Categorization is thus
not a purely intellectual matter, occurring after the fact of experience.
Rather, the formation and use of categories is the stuff of experience”
(ibid., 19). Since metaphors are inextricably linked to physical expe-
riences, they resonate with and confirm those experiences and convey
them to others.16
Lakoff and Johnson assert that the reason metaphors resonate with
people and can be communicated is because they are encountered
physically. Drawing on his work with Lakoff, Johnson (1987, 209)
further incorporates the human body into metaphor analysis:
Understanding is an event—it is not merely a body of beliefs (though it

includes our beliefs). It is the means by which we have a shared, relatively
intelligible world. The basic epistemological finding of this “experientialist”
(cognitive semantics) approach is that knowledge must be understood in
terms of structures of embodied understanding, as an interaction of a human
organism with its environment (which includes its language, cultural tradi-
tions, values, institutions, and the history of its social community) (emphasis
in the original).17
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In many ways what Lakoff and Johnson argue about metaphors
builds on previous philosophical treatises on the role of metaphors
in language and knowledge but does so in a way that acknowledges
advances in the study of cognitive reasoning.
Although Lakoff and Johnson bring a modern sensibility and
scientific tools to the study of metaphors, their conclusions echo
earlier observations.18 Notably, they update the theory of metaphor
as promulgated by Friedrich Nietzsche.19 Although Nietzsche
approached metaphors from a different philosophical tradition, his
thesis anticipates the theories of metaphors of contemporary scholars.
In Nietzsche’s view, metaphors create for humans their knowledge
of the world around them.20 Additionally, Nietzsche sees metaphors
as transformative, since they alter humans’ conception of them-
selves and their surroundings on a continual basis. Like Lakoff and
Johnson, Nietzsche sees man as a creature that thinks metaphorically
by nature.21 Even more significant for current scholarship on the sub-
ject, Nietzsche identifies the source of metaphorical thinking in the
cognitive and neurological functions of the body and the mind.22
Thus, Nietzsche “radicalizes the notion of metaphor to encompass
nearly all human culture and cognition” (Murphy 2001, 22). As is

true for contemporary theorists of metaphor, Nietzsche maintains that

all human knowledge is a reflection of metaphorical thought: “For
Nietzsche to claim that there is ‘no real knowing apart from metaphor’
is ultimately to claim that all truth is a human creation” (Cantor 1982,
78). In many ways, then, traditional views on metaphor, stretching
from Aristotle through Nietzsche to cognitive linguists such as George
Lakoff and Mark Johnson, are of one piece; they reflect what at first
was an intuition, later a philosophical perspective, and most recently a
cognitive science, all of which acknowledge metaphors as essential to
human thought. The current science of metaphors, though based on
contemporary views of humans’ relationship to their own thoughts,
continues a long tradition of understanding metaphor as an essential
feature of understanding itself.
Metaphors, Literal Expression, and “Reality”

What is the relationship between metaphors and “reality?” Is there
some objective, discernible reality that is obscured or distorted by
metaphors, or as one scholar who read a preliminary draft of a por-
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tion of this book asks, is it “metaphors all the way down?” (a question
that itself is a metaphor given the figurative sense of what is meant by
“down”). To put it another way, is there some way of conveying ideas
substantively that does not make use of metaphors, and if not, does
that imply that all reality is metaphorical? The answer given by George
Lakoff and other cognitive linguists to the question of metaphors’
relationship to “reality” acknowledges a “reality existing independent
of human beings” but also accepts “constraints on our conceptual sys-
tems due to the nature of that reality” (Lakoff 1987, 266). In Lakoff
and Johnson’s “experiential realism” or “experientialism,” humans’
grasp of reality is tied to what Lakoff (ibid., 267) calls “conceptual
bodily experiences.” Metaphors are integral to this process:
The social reality defined by a culture affects its conception of physical real-
ity. What is real for an individual as a member of a culture is a product both
of his social reality and the way in which that shapes his experience of the
physical world. Since much of our social reality is understood in metaphorical
terms, and since our conception of the physical world is partly metaphori-
cal, metaphor plays a very significant role in determining what is real for us.
(Lakoff and Johnson 1980b, 146)
What Lakoff and Johnson are concerned with is the way that humans
understand the world. For metaphysicists hoping to answer the

question about whether there is an “objective” reality, Lakoff and

Johnson reject the view of an “objective” reality, arguing instead that
in terms of human cognition, reality is conceptualized as metaphors.23
That is, they argue that all human thought is metaphorical regardless of
whether there is a physical reality that can be “objectively” perceived
or not. Lakoff and Johnson’s view on this has been accepted by other
scholars of cognitive linguistics. Eve Sweetser (1990, 1–2), for exam-
ple, writes: “the observed regularities are natural and readily motivated
within a cognitively based theory which takes not the objective ‘real
world,’ but human perception and understanding of the world to be
the basis for the structure of human language.” Similar sentiments are
expressed by Karsten Harries (1978a, 173), who opines that “reality
and language are so intimately joined that the rift that separates the
two . . . is covered up,” and David Cooper (1986, 211), who observes
that “the truth of metaphor, far from deriving in all cases from literal
truth, will help determine what the literal truth is.”24 For scholars of
metaphor, then, the matter of metaphor’s relationship to “reality” is a
false question. Furthermore, for scholars of international relations, it is
worth keeping in mind, as Jim George (1994, 11) argues, that “reality
is never a complete, entirely coherent ‘thing,’ accessible to univer-
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salized, essentialist, or totalized understandings of it.” Thus, for the
study of both metaphors and international relations alike, the effort
to arrive at an understanding of “reality” is a metaphysical project not
relevant to the task at hand.
The question, then, is not if the empirical subject matter of interna-
tional relations is one of “reality” versus metaphors—a false choice that
was posed by some readers of an early draft of this project (but which
some readers may still want resolved). The more important issue is
determining the extent to which communicative discourses among
scholars of international relations employ varying degrees of literal
versus metaphorical language as a means of conveying human under-
standing about the world. All language is metaphorical and literal at
the same time, but to varying degrees of both. By “literal” I mean
as the dictionary defines it—“being in accordance with, conforming
to, or upholding the exact or primary meaning of a word or words”
(American Heritage Dictionary, 1050). That is to say, literal com-
munication uses words that convey precisely that which is intended
in the words themselves. This can be contrasted with metaphorical
communication, which may convey primary meaning but also evokes
the secondary meaning of the source domain of the metaphorical
construction.25

Literal and metaphorical are not, however, absolute categories.

They exist along a spectrum such that while all language may be
metaphorical, in certain respects and in certain contexts it may pos-
sess more literal than metaphorical qualities.26 Thus, for example,
David Rumelhart (1979, 88–89) shows that the statement “John is
a cold person” could be taken literally to mean that John’s tempera-
ture is cold to the touch or metaphorically in the sense that John is
a remote and aloof person. Lakoff and Turner (1989, 57) observe:
“To the extent that a concept is understood and structured on its own
terms—without making use of structure imported from a completely
different conceptual domain—we may say that it is not metaphori-
cal. The word ‘extent’ was chosen with care. A given concept may be
metaphorically understood and structured in some respects but not in
others.”27 That is to say, Lakoff and Turner (134) reject the thesis that
“every aspect of every concept is completely understood via metaphor”
(emphasis added) since certain concepts can be expressed in literal
terms. Instead, they observe that there are “some concepts that are
not completely understood via metaphor to serve as source domains”;
one can use literal terms to describe them inasmuch as they can be
“understood on their own terms” (ibid., 135).
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In sum, the metaphysical question of “reality” versus that which
is imagined is not the point of investigating metaphors in endeav-
ors such as international relations theory. Literal and metaphorical
expression both convey “reality.” When people speak of having their
“heart broken” it is irrelevant whether or not this is “really” hap-
pening since only the person making the statement can judge his or
her own feelings. Physiologically speaking, one’s heart is not liter-
ally broken, a fact that is patently obvious to anyone who has even
the most rudimentary understanding of human physiology. Yet, to
the person whose heart “really” is broken, the metaphor of a bro-
ken heart is useful, even essential, since, as Black (1979, 41) writes,
metaphors “generate insight about ‘how things are’ in reality” and, in
this case, the metaphor of a broken heart gives insight into a person’s
experience of what really happened to him or her. The expression
is a metaphor meant to convey the physical experience of roman-
tic rejection. According to cognitive linguists, all physical experiences
(like the physical experience of romantic rejection) are metaphorically
expressed in thought.28 To use a different romance-related metaphor,
Lakoff (1993, 208) points out that “what constitutes the LOVE
IS A JOURNEY metaphor is not any particular word or expression. It is
the ontological mapping across conceptual domains, from the source

domain of journeys to the target domain of love. The metaphor is

not just a matter of language, but of thought and reason” (small
capital letters in the original). Language flows from thought, and
therefore it is only the degree to which one is describing a primary
or secondary meaning that communication is based on metaphorical
representations as opposed to literal expression.
Metaphors and “Problems”

Regardless of the philosophical tradition used to arrive at a con-
clusion about metaphors, virtually all scholars agree that metaphors
make the world intelligible to people by providing a mental referent
by which information is categorized by the brain and understood.
Leaving aside the question of whether there is an objective “real-
ity” that is either elucidated or obscured by metaphors, humans
communicate what they perceive as reality through metaphorical rep-
resentation. However, when we speak of the way humans agree about
the nature of the world via metaphorical communication, we should
understand that this agreement often includes that which humans
find problematic about the world. Since metaphors are not literal
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representations of prior observations, they inherently alter humans’
impressions of their physical and social surroundings. As Max Black
(1962, 44–45) points out: “metaphor selects, emphasizes, suppresses,
and organizes features of the principal subject by implying statements
about it that normally apply to the subsidiary subject” (emphasis
added).
The fact that metaphors select, emphasize, suppress, or organize
thoughts means that in communicating a concept from one person to
another metaphorical language reflects the experiences of the commu-
nicator in ways that indicate that which the speaker finds relevant. For
example, in order to convey that something is difficult, people might
use a metaphor and say it is a “thorny” issue. Obviously, thorns are
something that people like to avoid because to get pricked by a thorn
is painful. Thus, to say something is “thorny” is to say that it causes
pain when it is confronted. Yet, what exactly constitutes pain is not
necessarily something on which people are in agreement. For exam-
ple, when it comes to deciding whether a 16-year-old child should
have a car many parents would say that it is an easy decision—16-year-
olds should not have their own car because teenagers are irresponsible.
There are some parents, however, who might agonize, painfully, over
whether to allow their 16-year-old children to have a car. On the one
hand, if children have their own cars they can drive themselves to

their part-time job, thus relieving their parents of that chore. On the
other hand, allowing a 16-year-old to have a car adds to the house-
hold expense and also creates temptations for the teen to use the
automobile for something other than driving to work. For these par-
ents, the decision about buying their teen a car is a “thorny” one.
If enough parents discuss the question of allowing their children to
have a car as a “thorny” problem, even those parents who initially were
resolute that their children should not have their own car might rec-
ognize that this is not such an easy question to resolve. The “thorny”
metaphor can be so evocative in framing a “problem” of teens, cars,
and responsibility that generations of parents have been forced to
confront it.
This is not to say that metaphors alone can create problems where
there were none before. Rather, the point is that metaphors frame
problems and make them relevant. This has been observed in matters
pertaining to society as well as in academic inquiry itself. For exam-
ple, Alessandro Lanteri and Altuğ Yalçintaş (2006, 14) argue that
the language of economics includes numerous metaphors that insti-
tutionalize what is expected in economic behavior but also exclude
possibilities from the study of economics: “The economic vocabulary,
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that is the set of metaphors and figures of speech about the econ-
omy and society, does the same as institutions. Institutions enable
and constrain individual action in many ways. They create mean-
ing and meaningless. They draw the borderline between what’s in
and what’s out. They attribute relevance to one discussion and not
another” (emphasis in the original). Scholars who use metaphors in
economics or in any academic discipline for that matter are not being
“deceptive” or concealing “reality” with a cloak of linguistic circum-
locutions. Rather, as linguists have established, it is now understood
that language and linguistic devices, such as metaphors, give meaning
and context to what is known.
Metaphors also can create impressions about what is not a “prob-
lem” in need of a solution. Many of the metaphors that are found
in academic inquiry are euphemisms that by either accident or design
minimize the importance or significance of a concept or issue. For
example, Carol Cohn observes that many of the metaphors used
to describe warfare, and in particular, nuclear warfare and deter-
rence, are euphemisms that mask the bland realities of war with
weapons of mass destruction. Euphemistic metaphors such as “coun-
terforce exchanges,” “minimum deterrent posture,” and “counter-
value attacks” (Cohn 1987, 690–691) can make nuclear strategy seem
less like a problem than a mundane aspect of foreign policy practice.

Although much of the language Cohn describes is the purview of pol-

icymakers and practitioners in the defense community, the metaphors
used within this community are taken up by scholars who study deter-
rence and war. This can have the effect of framing security studies in
such a way that what might be seen as the “problems” of mass death
induced by nuclear war are minimized in terms of their theoretical
significance.
Policymakers also use metaphors in framing policy solutions to
political problems.29 Like the “problems” themselves, the metaphors
that suggest “solutions” to policy problems often can be cast in a
simplified light designed to garner the greatest amount of support.30
Donald Schön (1979, 255) sums up this phenomenon: “Problem
settings are mediated, I believe, by the ‘stories’ people tell about trou-
blesome situations—stories in which they describe what is wrong and
what needs fixing. When we examine the problem-setting stories told
by the analysts and practitioners of social policy, it becomes apparent
that the framing of problems often depends upon metaphors underly-
ing the stories which generate problem setting and set the directions
of problem solving.” Metaphors provide a strategy for policymakers
to make certain problems seem relevant and to suggest ways through
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which they can be solved. Schön (264) continues: “Each story con-
structs its view of social reality through a complementary process of
naming and framing. Things are selected for attention and named in
such a way as to fit the frame constructed for the situation” (emphasis
in the original). Schön’s “generative theory” of metaphor is supported
with examples of social and public policy by other authors in the same
volume (see Reddy 1979, Sternberg, Tourangeau, and Nigro 1979).
Whether it is the politics of urban renewal or different metaphorical
frames for casting the “problem” posed by Soviet missiles in Cuba,
metaphors in public policy can direct the attention of policymakers
and the public alike to issues that, now framed as such, must be
“solved.”
Metaphors in Academic Inquiry

Because metaphors generate new ways of thinking about things, their
use in academic inquiry is pervasive. Metaphors help frame research
in fields ranging from physics to economics to civil engineering, for
example, in the study of traffic patterns.31 As Richard Brown (1976,
172) puts it simply: “by transferring the ideas and associations of one
system or level of discourse to another, metaphor allows each sys-
tem to be perceived anew from the viewpoint of the other.”32 Thus,

even political philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes (1962, 34), who

deemed metaphors one of the “abuses of language,” have resorted to
them as theorizing required.33 What reality signifies or means is sub-
ject to debate and, in that sense, scholars can use metaphors to try and
make one interpretation of reality appear to be the only legitimate way
of understanding objective truths (which was perhaps one of Hobbes’
fears).
Hobbes notwithstanding (or perhaps because Hobbes freely makes
use of metaphors despite his condemnation of them), metaphors
figure prominently in academic inquiry. One of the most influential
treatments on the utility of metaphors in academic inquiry is Max
Black’s 1962 volume, Models and Metaphors, wherein he lays out a
view of science in which metaphors, as linguistic models, are indispens-
able in translating observations into theoretical models. Black writes
that the process of uncovering new knowledge involves more than
the traditional view of metaphors, or what he calls the “substitution
view,” offers. In the substitution view “the focus of a metaphor, the
word or expression having a distinctively metaphorical use within a
literal frame, is used to communicate a meaning that might have been
expressed literally” (Black 1962, 32).
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Contrasted with the “substitution view” is what Black calls the
“comparison view.” This view of metaphors comes into play, for exam-
ple, in the elaboration of scientific models “when there can be no
question as yet of the precision of scientific statement. Metaphorical
statement is not a substitute for a formal comparison or any other
kind of literal statement, but has its own distinctive capacities and
achievements” (ibid., 37). While the comparison view of metaphors
admits a more useful role for metaphors in gaining insight, more use-
ful still is what Black calls the “interaction view.” In the interaction
view metaphors not only allude to new knowledge but provide a basis
for conceptualizing it such that “the principal subject is ‘seen through’
the metaphorical expression—or, if we prefer, that the principal sub-
ject is ‘projected upon’ the field of the subsidiary subject” (ibid., 41).
Metaphors in the interaction view are, in short, heuristic devices that
are used in creating models to study unknown terrains using what can
be learned from thinking about them in novel ways. As David Cooper
(1986, 145) summarizes: “for Black, in short, metaphor is an essen-
tial tool at the embryonic stage of theory, and is therefore sustained
by whatever sustains theorizing about the world and ourselves.”34
Black’s observations about metaphors in science have been echoed
in subsequent works on the subject. For example, Richard Boyd
(1979, 358) writes: “the use of metaphor is one of the many devices

available to the scientific community to accomplish the task of accom-

modation of language to the causal structure of the world” (emphasis in
the original).35 More to the point, Boyd (364) argues that “theory-
constitutive” metaphors routinely suggest what empirical research
makes sense in light of the similarities evident in the metaphor and
its target domain: “Precisely because theory-constitutive metaphors
are invitations to future research, and because that research is aimed
at uncovering the theoretically important similarities between the pri-
mary and secondary subjects of the metaphors, the explication of
these similarities and analogies is the routine business of scientific
researchers, rather than of some specialized body of commentators.”
A generation after Max Black first alerted scholars to the role
that metaphors can play as models in creating models to guide
research, Theodore Brown took an even closer look into the ways
that metaphors frame scientific inquiry. Brown’s thesis is summed up
as follows:
Scientists understand nature largely in terms of metaphorical concepts, based

on embodied understandings of how nature works. These embodied under-
standings derive from very basic and pervasive interactions with the physical
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world. They are tacit and largely common to all humans. The scientist also
understands complex systems in nature in terms of conceptual frameworks
derived from experiential gestalts, ways of organizing experience into a struc-
tured form . . . The models and theories that scientists use to explain their
observations are metaphorical constructs. (Brown 2003, 11–12)
Brown is unambiguous in his assertion that metaphors are essen-

tial to scientific inquiry from beginning to end. For Brown (15),
metaphor “lies at the very heart of what we think of as creative
science: the interactive coupling between model, theory, and obser-
vation that characterizes the formulation and testing of hypotheses
and theories. None of [what scientists do] occur without the use of
metaphor.” Building on Lakoff and Johnson’s experientialist theory
of metaphors, Brown maintains that conceptual metaphors, in par-
ticular, are integral to humans’ understanding of causation. Brown
(51–52) argues that just as all humans rely on conceptual metaphors
to make sense of the world, scientists also undertake their investiga-
tions influenced by the metaphors embodied in their own experiences:
“Scientists apply the same tools of embodied reasoning in carving
out their scientific work that they use in other dimensions of their
lives . . . Independently of the issues of experimental control, accuracy,
and precision, scientists’ understanding of scientific results, expressed

in hypotheses, models, and theories, are thoroughly embedded in

unconscious cognitive processes and conceptual metaphor.”
For Brown, then, visualizations, models, hypotheses, and theo-
ries are all metaphorical and metaphors are present in every step of
the scientific process.36 Among those scientific concepts or principles
Brown identifies as metaphorical in their conceptualization are atoms,
molecules, protein folding, and cells.37 One need look no further
than the “hardest” of all “hard” sciences—physics—to find exam-
ples of metaphors that contribute to the theoretical process. David
Brookes (2003) details a series of physical properties that are routinely
represented metaphorically in the study of physics, including heat
“flows,” electron “orbitals,” and energy “wells.” Brookes explains that
once physicists have encoded abstract concepts with metaphorical lan-
guage, they can use the metaphorical codes as the building blocks for
hypothetico-deductive reasoning (Brookes 2003, n.p.).38
In recent years, scholars in the social sciences have followed the
lead of scholars in the philosophy of science in thinking about how
metaphors aid in elaborating theories and models. Among social sci-
entists, scholars of international relations have become more explicit
in their attention to metaphors in the course of academic inquiry.
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Richard Little (2007, 23) observes that “metaphors have the ability
to transform the meaning of an established concept and . . . also play
an essential role in comprehending aspects of the world that are new
or that we do not understand.”39 Little points out that within aca-
demic inquiry there is a debate between positivists and postpositivists
regarding the role of metaphors in the formulation of theory. For posi-
tivists, metaphors are closely linked to models. “This literature focuses
on the positive role that metaphors can play in the scientific process.
Black (1979, 31), for example, comes to the conclusion that ‘Every
metaphor is the tip of a submerged model.’ The task of the theorist
then becomes to expose and test this model” (Little 2007, 55).40 Lit-
tle (57) cites Martin Landau (1972), who asserts that since metaphors
and analogies are always evident in political science models, “all sig-
nificant metaphors must be made fully explicit and their implications
spelled out and subjected to close empirical investigation.”
It should be noted that metaphors also direct academic research in
ways that depend on what metaphor is chosen to elucidate any given
topic. Old metaphors, under certain conditions, can limit thinking,
while new ones open up novel ways of seeing the world.41 Michael
McCoy (2000, 42) observes that “metaphors highlight certain fea-
tures and suppress others . . . By highlighting and masking experiences,
metaphors give concepts new meanings.” Lakoff and Johnson (1980b,

145) expand on this: “New metaphors have the power to create a new
reality. If a new metaphor enters the conceptual system that we base
our actions on, it will alter that conceptual system and the percep-
tions and actions that the system gives rise to. Much cultural change
arises from the introduction of new metaphorical concepts and the loss
of old ones.” Nicholas Onuf (1989, 156) puts a finer point on this:
“Metaphors are representational, yet they misrepresent. They always
want us to construe something in doubt as partaking of the reality
of something that we are confident about.” Thus, when Black main-
tains that metaphors are indispensable to the formulation of theories,
the theories that result reflect precisely those metaphors while exclud-
ing possibilities that might arise had a different set of metaphors been
chosen.
For these reasons and others, Richard Little suggests that a more
promising approach to metaphors may lie in postpositivist strategies
of inquiry. In the postpositivist perspective, “metaphors are not just
a route to the formation of new models, they are also an integral
element of the world under investigation” (Little 2007, 65). More
to the point, once a metaphor becomes integral to how the world
is investigated, it can assume the role of myth, that is, an “erro-
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neous view” that nonetheless “is systematically and widely adhered
to” (ibid., 69). Little (72) investigates this process with specific ref-
erence to the metaphor of the balance of power, which, he asserts,
has assumed the status of myth with implications for how the con-
cept is then understood: “Metaphors are acknowledged to be very
significant myth-making tools because they can help render complex
situations intelligible.” The irony, according to Little, is that the bal-
ance of power myth spawns “counter-myths” in the form or rival
theories that themselves are grounded in metaphorical images offering
distinct visions of how the world works. Myths and counter-myths,
both grounded in metaphors, help define the contours of academic
communities, and in many ways academic disciplines are discernible
by the metaphors that unite, and divide, disciplinary communities.42
The ubiquity of metaphors notwithstanding, in contemporary
political science theory in general, and in international relations the-
ory in particular, explicit attention to the epistemological functions of
metaphors has been sporadic. In a 1979 article in the American Polit-
ical Science Review, Eugene Miller analyzed the use of metaphors in
political science theory. Miller identified three approaches adopted by
scholars to use metaphors in political science analysis. First, in what
Miller (1979, 158–160) calls the “verificationist view,” metaphors are
useful only to the extent that they are verified by empirical facts.

Metaphors are not entirely useless in this view, but their use is lim-
ited only to that which refers to empirical observation. Second, Miller
(160–162) describes the “constitutivist view,” in which metaphors are
constitutive of what people know about the world. In this view, under-
standing politics is inextricably tied up with metaphors, and indeed is
impossible without them. Miller (162–165) refers to a third approach
to the use of metaphors in politics as the “manifestationist view.” This
is a middle-ground approach, which affords metaphors an important
role in rendering politics intelligible but insists that the steps by which
metaphors do this be spelled out, not merely accepted as a natural
outgrowth of language, as is the case with the constitutivist view.43
The main difference between the constitutivist and manifestationist
views, according to Miller (167), is that the latter allows for testing of
a metaphor’s accuracy in representing the political world: “We test a
political metaphor by determining if the political thing is like the non-
political thing in the way that the metaphor intends. Since metaphors
always involve an element of falsehood, a political metaphor cannot be
falsified by extending it beyond the intended likeness.” Miller’s man-
ifestationist approach is probably the most common in international
relations theory, comprising a whole host of metaphors that are used
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for heuristic purposes, but, unlike the verificationist approach, do not
require formal empirical testing. Among the more obvious metaphors
that have been applied within the manifestationist approach are the
“balance of power,” images of the international system as an economic
“market,” and international “regimes.”
The problem with Miller’s insights is that his article appears to have
been lost to the ages, and today few scholars are self-conscious about
their use of metaphors in international relations theory. With regard to
the three methodological perspectives that Miller outlined in his 1979
article, many scholars go back and forth among these approaches fre-
quently without much awareness that they are doing so. Thus, the
verificationist, constitutivist, and manifestationist approaches, while
existent in international relations theory, are not part of the method-
ological considerations of most international relations scholars. This
is perhaps not surprising. As Raymond Gibbs (1999, 36) writes:
“My belief is that no single theory of metaphor presently available
will account for all of the different kinds of metaphor, nor perhaps
will any one theory be able to do so in the future.” Therefore, while
Miller’s typology is a useful starting point, it is necessary to probe
more deeply into the countless ways that metaphors are used in inter-
national relations theory since scholars themselves do not appear to
make conscious decisions about how metaphors affect their work.

Metaphors and Narrative in International

Relations Theory
While metaphors are ubiquitous in international relations theory, con-
scious attention to them is scant, Miller’s 1979 work that creates an
explicit typology of metaphor in political science notwithstanding.
The question arises, why is self-awareness of metaphor’s role so fre-
quently lacking when metaphor is so common in IR scholarship? One
of the conclusions of this book is that metaphors are not appreciated
for their heuristic function in a way that is common in the physical
and natural sciences as discussed earlier. Instead, metaphors represent
part of the narratives that typify theoretical approaches to international
relations.44 Quite simply, as a social science, international relations
depends on narrative to provide a framework for analysis in which
theory generation and hypothesis testing take place. Narrative struc-
ture, in which metaphors play a major role, provides the direction that
IR research takes.
In his seminal work, Donald Polkinghorne (1988, 13) defines
narrative as “the fundamental scheme for linking individual human
actions and events into interrelated aspects of an understandable com-
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posite.” Like metaphors, which are a component of narrative, narrative
is a cognitive function in human thought: “It is the scheme that dis-
plays purpose and direction in human affairs and makes individual lives
comprehensible as wholes” (ibid., 18).45 In Polkinghorne’s formula-
tion, “narrative” is synonymous with “story,” but this is not to say that
narratives in scholarly inquiry are fictions. Rather, narrative can serve
an explanatory function. As Polkinghorne (21) writes: “The narrative
explanation . . . answers [a categorical question] by configuring a set
of events into a storylike causal nexus . . . It accepts complex sets of
events, including reflective decisions, and explains an event by tracing
its intrinsic relations to other events and locating it in its historical
context. Thus, narratives exhibit an explanation instead of demon-
strating it” (emphasis in the original). Furthermore, as Mark Johnson
(1993, 158) adds, “metaphors carry explicit narrative structure within
them, insofar as they are spelled out narratively.” More to the point,
“cognitive models, metaphors, frames, and narratives [provide] the
overarching ordering that transforms mere sequences of atomic events
into significant human actions and projects that have meaning and
moral import” (ibid., 165). In the social sciences, including interna-
tional relations, the standard for Johnson’s criterion is met. Metaphors
in IR tell a narrative story and present an explanatory framework for
analysis.46

Does this, then, mean that metaphorical narratives in interna-

tional relations undermine the social science basis of IR, particu-
larly as highlighted in recent works emphasizing scientific realism?
Polkinghorne would say yes, inasmuch as narrative explanation and
logico-mathematical reasoning employ distinct forms of explanatory
logic. In the latter, the “power of explanation by laws comes from its
capacity to abstract events from particular contexts and discover rela-
tionships that hold among all the instances belonging to a category,
irrespective of the spatial and temporal context . . . But explanation by
means of narrative is contextually related and is therefore different in
form from formal scientific explanation” (Polkinghorne 1988, 21).
However, if one looks carefully at this passage, there is room for rec-
onciling the logico-mathematical and narrative forms of explanation.
Polkinghorne (ibid.) observes that in scientific reasoning, relation-
ships can be discerned among “all instances belonging to a category”
(emphasis added). I would argue that identification of a category—
including in the physical and natural sciences—is contingent on the
metaphors that define that category, and those metaphors represent a
narrative explanation involving delineation of the context under inves-
tigation. In this sense, narrative is prior to scientific explanation with
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metaphor integral to the narrative process. Social science can proceed
once the metaphorical narrative identifying a category is spelled out.47
In the course of this book, explicit attention will be given to
how metaphors figure in the narratives that constitute the categories
of international relations. While most IR scholars have employed
metaphors to one extent or another, in many cases they have done so
without either much thought, attention to the distinctions highlighted
by Miller, or attention to the implications of the metaphors that
inform their inquiry. These past lapses cannot be rectified, but a review
of how metaphors figure in IR theory is nonetheless necessary. As will
be seen, virtually all of the foundational concepts in international
relations theory are based on metaphorical images. The implications
of this are profound, yet to date not fully examined. The purpose
of the rest of the book is to identify the key roles metaphors play
in international relations theory to highlight their pervasive influence
on the field.

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Chapter 3
Th e M e ta p h o r i c a l C o n t e x t
o f I n t e r n at i o n a l R e l at i o n s
A s discussed in the previous chapter, cognitive linguists have estab-

lished that metaphors are integral to human thought and communica-
tion. Virtually all cognition involves conceptual mappings, and most
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linguistic expression to one extent or another employs metaphorical
expression. This is no less true in the study of international relations
than it is in any other area of linguistic communication. Some of
these metaphorical expressions are used deliberately for the purpose of
theory generation or to elucidate the contextual parameters of inter-
national relations. Others are used unselfconsciously much as they are
in what Jack Donnelly (2009, 49) calls “ordinary-language” commu-
nication. Whatever the purpose, metaphors in international relations
theory have an appreciable impact on how international relations is
studied and analyzed. They provide a materiality to what are often
abstract ideas; they are part of what Jim George (1994, x) identifies as
a larger discursive project in the study of international relations that
has established “the boundaries of legitimate and relevant theory and
research” in the field of IR.
In the metaphorical narrative that scholars of international relations
construct, it is not surprising that among the first considerations is the
setting, context, milieu, or “location” in which international relations
takes place. What is meant by this is not the physical setting of inter-
national relations that can be readily identified empirically in terms
of geographic location. However, since even geography cannot ade-
quately capture certain aspects of international relations, for example,
the abstract institutional “places” in which diplomacy or international

cooperation occurs, scholars rely on metaphorical abstractions to con-

ceptualize the context of international affairs. To tell this narrative, IR
scholars have privileged aspects of international relations by enshrin-
ing them in defining metaphorical frames. Metaphorically speaking,
the narrative starts with an emptiness called “anarchy” that provides a
building space for “systems” and “structures” occupied by “states”
seen as “individuals.” States also house “domestic” politics, while
anarchy permits the creation of “societies” and “communities.” This
metaphorical architecture of international relations constitutes the
contextual narrative of the field.
Anarchy
Richard Ashley (1988) famously asserted that anarchy represents
the central problematique of international relations, the core puzzle
around which much, if not all, of the logic of IR theory revolves.1
The irony is that what is taken as a given is an elaborate metaphorical
construction. At its core, anarchy—as it is most commonly viewed in
international relations theory—is a reified version of Hobbes’ concep-
tualization of primitive man living in a metaphorical “state of nature.”
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In his well-known allusion to pre-social humans, Hobbes hypoth-
esized an existence that was marked by competition and prone to
hostility and violence.2 Since Hobbes was opposed to using metaphor,
he sought to avoid it by resorting to reification. He exchanged the
metaphorical “state of nature” for the “fact” of “anarchy,” further
reifying the metaphor of the Leviathan, taking the state as a corporeal
body to be literally true (Chilton 1996, 16–19, 82ff.). The Hobbesian
hold on thinking about anarchy is hard for scholars to shake. For
example, Neorealists have tried to formulate a theory of international
relations that does not depend on a Hobbesian conception of a state
of nature. Neorealism’s structural thesis attributes states’ actions to
the shape of the international system, not to human nature. In The-
ory of International Politics, for instance, Kenneth Waltz (1979) goes
to pains to assert that assumptions of human nature are not at the
core of his Neorealist deductions. However, as a number of schol-
ars have pointed out (see, e.g., Brooks 1997), Waltz inadvertently
brings the metaphor of human nature into his structural theory of
international politics by attributing to states the same primal inclina-
tions that Hobbes ascribes to humans in the state of nature.3 Once
set in motion, Hobbes’ state of nature cum anarchy metaphor has
shaped how international relations is viewed, including, for example,
Hedley Bull’s ironically titled book, The Anarchical Society (1977).

I n t e r n at i o n a l R e l at i o n s 31
Even scholars who posit the possibility of overcoming anarchy are con-
strained by their acceptance of the “anarchy” problem. This is true, for
example, of Andrew Mason (2000, 202–208), who theorizes about
the possibility of a global community, but who nonetheless concedes
that this community emerges within the “international system as a
state of nature” (emphasis added).4
Aside from the state of nature image of anarchy, other treatments
of anarchy rely no less on metaphorical imagery. Among the many
metaphors of anarchy is the conceptualization of anarchy as a “void,”
that is, something to be filled up. Among scholars who adopt this view
is Alexander Wendt, who argues metaphorically that anarchy “as such
is an empty vessel and has no intrinsic logic; anarchies only acquire
logics as a function of the structure of what we put inside them”
(Wendt 1999, 249, emphasis in the original). It is this “empty ves-
sel” metaphor of anarchy that famously leads Wendt (1992, 391) to
his thesis that “anarchy is what states make of it.”
One could argue that the “state of nature” and “void” images of
anarchy represent very different metaphorical concepts, thus open-
ing up a debate over how to imagine anarchy as the basic context in
which international relations exists. The fact remains, however, that
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whether imagined as state of nature or void, anarchy is taken as a
presumed fact of international relations that provides the logic for vir-
tually all subsequent theorizing in the field. Any academic discipline
must have an ontological logic, usually based on a set of empirical
observations. In international relations, by contrast, the ontological
basis for establishing the field’s central problematique is a metaphor,
interpreted by authors in a variety of ways. The absence of a world
government is an empirical fact; representing the terms of interna-
tional governance as an anarchic “state of nature” or even a “void”
is a contestable metaphorical expression of a theoretical abstraction
expressed as a fact.
The irony is that while anarchy has been a, if not the, central
metaphor in modern international relations theory, the meaning of
the term has changed over the historical course of the discipline.
The dictionary gives several definitions for “anarchy”—ranging from
“absence of any form of political authority” to “political disorder and
confusion” to “absence of any cohesive principle, such as a common
standard or purpose” (American Heritage Dictionary, 66). These are
three quite distinct definitions, all of which find expression at one time
or another as a way for conceptualizing international relations. In the
early years of the modern discipline of international relations, which
Brian Schmidt roughly identifies as the 1850s to around 1900, the

main theoretical focus was on defining a field of international rela-

tions in the context of the state. Having its origins in Staatswissenschaft
(the science of the state), international relations grew out of academic
efforts to situate international law, nationalism, and imperialism in
the context of state politics (Schmidt 1998, chapter 2). As Schmidt
(76) observes: “The ontology of international relations, the charac-
ter of international law, the possibility of a world state, the extent to
which there was international organization and cooperation were all
determined with respect to the theory of the state.”
As the field progressed into the early twentieth century, among
the consequences of the centrality of the state in early international
relations theory was the debate over international law relative to con-
ditions of presumed anarchy. Among the participants in this debate
were proponents of juristic theory, who argued that “states occupied a
position similar to that of individuals living in a state of nature” (ibid.,
79). These scholars were thus pessimistic about the prospects for inter-
national law inasmuch as individuals in a state of nature live in a world
of metaphorical anarchy. Opposed to the members of the juristic the-
ory camp were international lawyers and proponents of international
law. “It was no so much that international lawyers dismissed the claim
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that the international realm was characterized by the existence of anar-
chy as that they rejected many of the consequences that juristic theory
attributed to politics in the absence of central authority” (ibid., 80).
Still other scholars saw anarchy as something that could be reformed in
the context of a “world federation or society of states” (ibid.). In this
formulation states are less like individuals in a state of nature as they
are members of a political community, albeit one without a formal
system of governance. As a metaphor, then, anarchy had different
implications for international lawyers. Rather than a state of nature,
these individuals accepted anarchy as “merely” the lack of a central
authority. Disagreements over the attributes and functions of the state
relative to individuals and politics thus fueled differing images of the
anarchy metaphor.
In addition to theoretical debates, Schmidt points out that onto-
logical questions about the scope of international relations also con-
tributed to different conceptions of what qualifies as anarchy in the
development of international relations as a field of inquiry. Specifi-
cally, from the emergence of international relations as a field to World
War I and beyond, distinctions were made between the “civilized”
world and regions of the world placed under colonial rule. How anar-
chy was conceptualized in international relations theory within these
distinctions reflected different metaphorical conceptions of anarchy.

As Schmidt (125) observes, “most political scientists believed that

the colonized regions—the ‘dark’ places, the ‘uncivilized,’ the ‘back-
ward’ or ‘barbaric’ areas of the world—did not belong to the society
of states.” Thus, a “different set of discursive criteria from that used to
explain the interactions of ‘civilized’ states were formulated by political
scientists to discuss the issues that pertained to these ‘other’ regions
of the world” (ibid.). The metaphors of anarchy as they applied to
the colonized world were very different from those used in the con-
text of “civilized” states: “Rather than anarchy signifying the absence
of a global authority structure, the meaning of anarchy in this con-
text was to denote internal lawlessness and chaos resulting from the
lack of a domestic sovereign” (ibid., 126). A different set of theoret-
ical tools were thus deemed appropriate to develop explanations for
international relations in the colonized world as opposed to the West,
and these theoretical tools, which yielded different explanations, were
premised on the different metaphorical images that were applied to
the concept of “anarchy.” For example, some scholars devoted their
attention to the study of colonial administration and world govern-
ment as a way of resolving problems of anarchy as manifest in the
colonial world. Anarchy was a “common point of departure” but
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implied different ways of construing the concept when applied to
“backward” regions of the world (ibid., 148–149).
Schmidt explains that in the interwar years conceptions of anarchy
shifted as a reaction to theories of the causes and nature of World
War I. In particular, the metaphor of anarchy as a “state of nature”
was advanced as a basis for thinking about the nature of anarchy
in world affairs. Schmidt refers to the works of James Bryce among
others who had turned their attention to the politics of interna-
tional relations as a reaction to the war. Schmidt (159) quotes Bryce
(1922, 3), who opined that “although in civilized countries every indi-
vidual man is now under law and not in a State of Nature towards
his fellow men, every political community, whatever its form, be it
republican or monarchical, is in a State of Nature towards every
other community . . . ” This view of anarchy figured into theories of
World War I that were advanced by Bryce’s contemporaries. Anar-
chy as a metaphorical state of nature accounted for the motives of
states that resulted in mutual mistrust and war. Among these scholars
was G. Lowes Dickinson, who, Schmidt (161–162) explains, promul-
gated a theory of international relations that sounds similar to what
eventually developed as Neorealist theory in the latter half of the twen-
tieth century. In the aptly titled works The European Anarchy (1916)
and International Anarchy (1926), Dickinson “argued that it was

the mutual suspicions of other states’ actions and intentions, which

inevitably arose in international anarchy, that characterized the behav-
ior of states from the time of Machiavelli to the outbreak of World
War I” (Schmidt 161). Prefiguring the development of Neorealism,
Bryce and Dickinson found a way to identify in international anarchy
structural causes for conflict that at once rejected assumptions about
human nature but also incorporated metaphors of men in a state of
nature as way to explain war in light of assumptions about states’
motivations.
Schmidt’s history of the discipline of international relations ends
with how the field developed up to the end of World War II. Although
anarchy remained a central feature of the discipline from its origins
to the end of World War II, as Schmidt observes, the meanings of
anarchy varied as the field evolved. As Schmidt (231) writes, “the
concept of anarchy is more a function of internal disciplinary debate
than a self-referential empirical fact of the external world.” Although
Schmidt does not explicitly address the metaphorical qualities of anar-
chy, it is clear from his historical analysis that as a discursive feature
of scholarly inquiry, anarchy is a linguistic reflection of scholars’ inter-
pretations of the world, that is to say, a metaphorical image. Offering
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a take on Wendt (1992), Schmidt (232) writes, “the disciplinary his-
tory of international relations reveals that anarchy is . . . largely what
political scientists made of it.” As discussed in Chapter 2, metaphors
are reflective of human experiences as expressed in thought and con-
veyed in language. Scholars who seek to explain international relations
also have personal experiences with it. While “anarchy” represents a
common point of reference for scholars, how they think about what
is deemed “anarchy” represents varied experiences that are registered
cognitively as metaphors and communicated as such. Hence, the per-
sistence of the term “anarchy” in international relations is not in
itself theoretically significant. Rather, how anarchy has been under-
stood metaphorically and how the metaphorical narrative of anarchy
has varied within the field is what ultimately is instructive to students
of international relations theory.
System and Structure

System
In addition to the image of anarchy as characteristic of international
relations, scholars also refer frequently to a metaphorical international
“system.” “System” is a term for which there is no universal agreement

on its definition in international relations theory. To give just two

examples of well-known scholars who use the term “system” promi-
nently but with different meanings: for Hedley Bull (1977, 9–10) a
“system of states (or international system) is formed when two or more
states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact
on one another’s decisions, to cause them to behave . . . as parts of a
whole” (emphasis in the original), while for Kenneth Waltz (1979,
79) “a system is composed of a structure and of interacting units.”
Both of these definitions are manifestly distinct from Martin Wight’s
(1977, 22ff.) treatment of “system,” which revises nineteenth-century
definitions of the term that include cultural aspects of “systematic”
relations.5 Morton Kaplan identifies not one, but “six distinct inter-
national systems—or, with possibly greater accuracy, six states of
equilibrium of one ultrastable international system” (Kaplan 1957,
21).6 Lacking any clear definition or unambiguous empirical measure
of what the term means, “system” in international relations theory can
only be an abstraction that is used in a variety of metaphorical senses
to give meaning to that abstraction.7
There is also a metaphorical aspect in the way scholars choose
to refer to the international system as opposed to an international
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system.8 It makes a difference for theorizing if that “whole” in Bull’s
case or that “structure and . . . interacting units” in Waltz’s case con-
stitute the entirety of what is thought of as international relations or
merely part of it. If it is the latter, the question arises, is the rest com-
posed of other systems or something else, and if something else, what
makes up that? This is where the metaphorical aspect of terms such
as “system” becomes important. “System,” as variously defined as it
is, is a term that delineates a particular aspect of international rela-
tions relative to something else. While scholars frequently refer to the
international system, the definitions of system supplied by Bull and
Waltz, and other scholars as well, allow for the existence of one or
more international systems as well as other realms that are thought of
as something else. In other words, the context of international rela-
tions is not something that is discernible a priori but must be given a
name, and that name is “system.”9
Furthermore, what is meant by scholars who define system in differ-
ing ways is by no means unambiguously clear to observers. “System”
is an abstract quality that needs to be named, and in most cases, it is
named metaphorically. Once that metaphorical naming takes place,
the hypotheses that derive from the name that the abstract qual-
ity is given dictate what observations are made and what theoretical
propositions are advanced. Hence, within Bull’s definition of system

one might hypothesize that when states cease to have an impact on

each other, or when that impact changes, a system can cease to exist
or change in qualitative ways. In contrast, by Waltz’s definition if
the structure or the qualities of states within an international system
change, systemic change can take place. If verified by the evidence,
these hypotheses lead to very different theories of international rela-
tions as should be obvious to anyone who has read the works of Bull
and Waltz and their theoretical adherents. Thus, the metaphors used
by Bull, Waltz, and other scholars to define the context of interna-
tional relations are inextricably linked to the theoretical propositions
they derive.
One way, then, to treat “system” as a metaphor is to leave it
ambiguous and imprecise. This would allow any number of hypotheses
to be derived about systemic theory, depending on which metaphori-
cal image provides assumptions about the international behavior that
is to be explained.10 One could posit a simple definition of “system,” as
Neil Harrison (2006, 2) does when devising a theory of complex sys-
tems: “A system is a portion of the universe within a defined boundary,
outside of which lies an environment.” However, as Harrison (ibid.)
notes, what lies inside and outside a system is in many ways an arbi-
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trary distinction, and thus usually “the definition of the boundary is
a convenience used to assist human analysis” (emphasis added). Thus,
one cannot help but arrive at the sense that “system” is inevitably
metaphorical, allowing each scholar to determine its analytical and
theoretical use. Leaving the term undefined, then, also leaves it up
to each scholar to determine its meaning in generating theories of
international relations. To do this, however, often requires additional
metaphors that in part constitute the features a system, in particular
the metaphor of “structure.”
Structure
There seems to be a consensus among scholars of international rela-
tions that metaphorical systems comprise metaphorical structures and
that the nature of the former depends on the shape of the latter.
Barry Buzan (1993, 331), for example, writes that “for a system to
exist requires the existence of units, among which significant inter-
action takes place and that are arranged or structured according to
some ordering principle” (emphasis added). However, as is true for
“system” there seems to be no consensus, apart from the relative
agreement that “systems” are made up of “structures,” regarding how
“structure” is to be defined. In fact, as Colin Wight (2006, 122)

writes, “without the ability to put structure under a metaphorical

microscope and say ‘look, that’s what structure is’, . . . it follows that
a range of approaches to structure may very well be valid; indeed
perhaps even necessary.” Not surprisingly, then, one can find in the lit-
erature any number of definitions, and there would be little use listing
them all.
Since Alexander Wendt argues that the metaphorical international
“system” comprises a metaphorical “structure,” his discussion of
structure is as good a place to begin as any. In his 1999 Social Theory
of International Politics, Wendt devotes two chapters to the topic. For
Wendt, structure involves two metaphorical levels: micro-structure
and macro-structure, “where micro-structures refer to structures of
interaction and macro-structures refer to what I’ll call structures of
multiply realizable outcomes” (Wendt 1999, 143). While “micro-”
and “macro-” are Greek prefixes indicating size (micro = small,
macro = large), Wendt (147) is careful to point out that in his for-
mulation “the terms ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ imply nothing about the
size of actors or the proximity of their interaction.” To put it another
way, Wendt (148) uses the terms metaphorically to refer to types
of interactions. Specifically, micro-structures refer to “relationships
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between a system’s parts,” while macro-structures refer to relation-
ships involving the qualities of the system itself. Wendt (156) then
hypothesizes that “the tighter the sub-system control, the more sen-
sitive the macro-structure will be to changes at lower levels.” Leaving
aside the imprecise nature of ancillary metaphors such as “tight” and
“sensitive” as well the inclusion of spatial relationships (“lower levels”)
in the conception of “system,”11 Wendt’s hypothesis is instructive in
that it highlights the vague nature of “micro-” and “macro-” struc-
ture for advancing theoretical propositions. As Wendt (156) states,
“different systemic IR theories usefully might be seen as offering dif-
ferent answers to the question of how multiply realizable tendencies
like balancing and power politics are under anarchy.” In other words,
leaving metaphorical meanings of “structure” unclear highlights the
broad range of outcomes that are possible in social contexts. It is not
by accident that Wendt (189) points out that the “concept of structure
in international politics means different things to different people.”
Wendt’s conceptualization of structure is formulated in large part
as a reaction to the way structure is elaborated by Kenneth Waltz
in Theory of International Politics. For Waltz (1979, 88) “structural
questions are questions about the arrangement of the parts of a sys-
tem.” More specifically, “international structures are defined in terms
of the primary political units of an era, be they city states, empires,

or nations. Structures emerge from the coexistence of states” (ibid.,

91).12 International structure comprises the character of the units con-
stituting that structure and the distribution of capabilities among them
(ibid., 93–99). In short, systems encompass structures and structures
comprise differentiated units characterized in terms of their func-
tions and the distribution of capabilities among them. As a metaphor,
“structure” in Waltz’s theory imagines a physical space with parts
arranged in that space. Those parts interact with each other depending
on their functions and their capabilities. Furthermore, as parts in the
system interact with each other, they do so in ways that presumably
are both constrained by the structure in which the parts are arranged
and endowed with the ability to alter the arrangement of those parts
if not the shape of the structure itself.
Since its inception, Waltz’s conceptualization of structure has
inspired both adherents and critics. Among critics, Audie Klotz and
Cecelia Lynch (2006, 356) point out that “Constructivists define
‘structure’ as institutionalized—but not immutable—patterns of social
order that reflect historical context.” The three key metaphorical
images in this definition are “institution,” “pattern,” and “order.”
Ironically, in some ways, this definition retains elements of Waltz’s
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conception of structure. For example, as a metaphor “order” implies
a similar image of spatial arrangement that is explicit in Waltz’s for-
mulation, an irony in the sense that much Constructivist theory is
formulated as a critical response to Waltz. There are subtle differences
as well, for example, Klotz and Lynch’s inclusion of the metaphor
of “patterns” in social order, which implies a repeating quality to
what is observed in that social order, compared with Waltz, who
makes no explicit allusion to repeating qualities of structure. The
most notable point of departure in Klotz and Lynch’s definition
with Waltz’s formulation is the metaphor of “institutionalization.”
On the one hand, the American Heritage Dictionary (936) gives
as one definition of “institutionalize” “to make part of a structured
and usually well-established system,” which would appear to be quite
consistent with Waltz’s conception of structure as something exist-
ing and persisting within a system. However, what Constructivists
such as Klotz and Lynch more likely have in mind is a reflexive
formation of the verb “institute,” which means “to establish, orga-
nize, and set in operation” (ibid., 936). In other words, in Klotz and
Lynch’s Constructivist conception of structure, agency is involved in
metaphorically setting structure in motion. This is significant in the
sense that Klotz and Lynch set forth their definition of structure as
part of an essay designed to resolve certain aspects of the so-called

agent – structure debate, discussed separately in this book (see

Chapter 4).
Obviously, Klotz and Lynch are not the only exponents of a
Constructivist view of structure. Within Constructivism, and within
individual Constructivists’ theoretical formulations, conceptions of
structure differ. For example, in his “new Constructivist theory” of
international society, Christian Reus-Smit (1997) identifies as the basis
for international society what he variously terms “normative struc-
tures,” “generic structural elements,” and “constitutional structures.”
While the content of structures in Reus-Smit’s theory differs greatly
from how structures are envisioned in distinctly rival theories such
as Neorealism, the metaphorical imagery is remarkably similar to the
extent that parts of his definition of structure are borrowed verbatim
from Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics, namely, con-
stitutional structures are “structures” because they “limit and mold
agents and agencies and point them in ways that tend toward a com-
mon quality of outcomes even though the efforts and aims of agents
and agencies vary” (Waltz 1979, 74, quoted in Reus-Smit 1997, 566
as part of Reus-Smit’s effort to define “constitutional structures”).
Even for Constructivists such as Reus-Smit, then, the metaphor
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of “structure” as a physically constraining aspect of international
relations is essential to developing a theory of IR.
We can see, then, that many of the elaborations, modifications,
and critiques of Waltz’s conception of structure are as metaphori-
cal as his original formulation. A noteworthy example of this is Jack
Donnelly’s 2009 contribution, which seeks to address gaps in what
Donnelly sees as Waltz’s overly parsimonious conception of the term.
According to Donnelly (2009, 49), Waltz includes in his treatment
of structure a “triad of ordering principles, functional differentiation,
and distribution of capabilities,” yet underspecifies how these three
elements are expressed. Specifically, for ordering principles Waltz sees
only anarchy and hierarchy, while for functional differentiation he
only differentiates the role of governments vis-à-vis international and
national (domestic) politics (ibid., 51). To correct this, Donnelly sug-
gests elaborating the definition of structure in ways that extend the
metaphorical qualities of the term.
Donnelly’s main metaphorical add-ons to Waltz’s conception of
structure are mostly spatial. Specifically, Donnelly suggests relying on
“vertical” and “horizontal” differentiation of units as ways of ordering
the actors that constitute the structure of the international system.13
Donnelly also highlights “segmentation” of units to distinguish them
within this structure. Donnelly’s (55) first spatial metaphor, “vertical”

differentiation, “establishes positions that are super- and subordinate

or coordinate. Vertical differentiation is a matter of rank,” which
Donnelly cites from the Oxford English Dictionary as defined in terms
of “relative position or status.” As the term “vertical” implies, differ-
entiation of this sort is imagined metaphorically in terms of the space
above or below one unit relative to one or more other units (units
may also be located on the same lateral plane in a vertically ordered
space). Within the vertical space imagined by Donnelly units can
be arranged in certain specific ways described as “unranked orders,”
“singly-ranked orders,” and “multiply-ranked orders” or “heterar-
chies” (ibid., 58–69). Each of these arrangements is represented in
Donnelly’s article via graphic images using arrows and shapes to
represent units and their spatial relationship to each other.
As is true for other metaphorical images, what Donnelly describes
as vertical differentiation can be imagined in other metaphorical ways
or in terms that are more literally descriptive instead of metaphori-
cally imagined. In other words, whereas the concept of differentiation
among units in terms of capabilities is essential for specifying what
is meant by diversity of relationships among international actors, the
visual cues of vertical space (with the graphic arrows and multiple
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shapes) are optional to the theoretical formulation. For example,
Donnelly (55) conceives of vertical differentiation in terms of “rank,”
which itself, in the political sense, is “principally a function of authority
and (materials) coercive capabilities.” Thus, units in the international
system could be described, as Donnelly notes, qualitatively or mea-
sured quantitatively in terms of indicators of their ability to use
material or ideational resources to influence the actions of others. The
need to represent these relationships with the spatial metaphor ver-
ticality is purely optional, although it does contribute the ability to
conceive of certain categories of inter-unit relationships, such as those
Donnelly describes.
Donnelly (71) devotes considerably less space to a discussion of
“horizontal differentiation,” which describes differences among units
primarily on the basis of their behavior or function. Added to the spa-
tial metaphor of a “horizontal” plane, Donnelly includes the metaphor
of “segmentation,” suggesting the visual image of something akin to a
row of beads strung together in a straight lateral line. Finally, Donnelly
(73) includes “unit differentiation” in his formulation of structure,
which “determines the entities that are ranked and to which functions
are allocated.” Horizontal and unit differentiation are given less atten-
tion in Donnelly’s conception of structure inasmuch as his priority is

to provide a counterpoint to the focus on anarchy, replacing the con-

cept of anarchy with a typology that “emphasizes the regular and
central fact of ranking in international systems” (ibid., 50).
Donnelly’s prioritizing of the vertical metaphor within his image of
structure over the horizontal one is not without its theoretical conse-
quences. Donnelly (80–81) hopes that his typology will permit gen-
eralization, in particular as an aid to Constructivists, many of whom
have harbored suspicion of notions of international structure because
of its association with “structural” Realism. Donnelly readily accepts
that his model is less parsimonious than the Neorealist conception of
structure, yet the primary emphasis is on vertical differentiation as a
means of focusing attention on the varying distribution of capabilities
among units in the international system. While horizontal differenti-
ation prompts theorizing that sees outcomes in terms of the different
functions of units, vertical differentiation prioritizes the distribution
of capabilities as the primary axis of variation on which outcomes
are based. This distinction between functions and capabilities may be
essential to a full accounting of what constitutes “structure” in the
international system; however, the spatial metaphors of “verticality”
and “horizontality” have the potential to affect theorizing by requir-
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ing that one metaphorical axis take priority over the other, which
would not be the case had some other metaphorical image been used
to conceptualize what constitutes “structure.”
There is a larger issue here. The need to characterize international
actors vertically and horizontally positioned relative to one another
is a consequence of imagining structure metaphorically as, or in, a
physical space. The “vertical” and “horizontal” metaphors also rein-
force theorizing about relationships of authority among international
actors, specifically the concept of hierarchy, which is said to be dif-
ferentiated from anarchy by means of the metaphorical positioning
(primarily) of states. For example, Wendt (1999, 13) argues that “in
the contemporary international system political authority is organized
formally in a bifurcated fashion: vertically within states (‘hierarchy’),
horizontally between (‘anarchy’)” (emphasis added). Wendt’s obser-
vation is echoed and amplified by David Lake (2009, 9), who, in his
attempt at a definitive theory of hierarchy in international relations,
defines “hierarchy” with metaphors of vertically spatial relationships
in mind: “Hierarchy is defined by the extent of the authority exercised
by the ruler over the ruled” (emphasis added). As Lake notes, this def-
inition of hierarchy, which relies on a metaphorical vertical situation
of actors, one over another, is supported by previous conceptions of

the term.14 Nicholas Onuf and Frank Klink (1989, 160), for exam-
ple, define hierarchy in Weberian terms in which bureaucratic offices
“form the typical pattern of super- and subordination, but always in
ranks such that each office is both subordinate to the one(s) above it
and superordinate to the ones below” (emphasis added). Similarly, Ian
Clark (1989, 2) defines hierarchy as “a political arrangement charac-
terized by stratification in which, like the angels, there are orders of
power and glory and society is classified in successfully subordinate
grades” (emphasis added). Drawing on these previous characteriza-
tions, Lake metaphorically depicts hierarchy in spatial terms. This
spatial imagery is reinforced by the cover of Lake’s book, which shows
a picture of a loose pyramid of small stones with one large stone (rep-
resenting political authority situated “over” the smaller stones) resting
on top of the pile.
When it comes to concepts such as hierarchy, then, international
relations theory often is less about (e.g., geographic) spatial relation-
ships among states and other international actors and more about
metaphorically imagined spatial relationships on a conceptual plane.
There is a certain logic to this approach. Obviously, the territory occu-
pied by some international actors (e.g., states) is physical in nature, but
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for other international actors (e.g., nongovernmental organizations,
liberation movements, multinational corporations) physicality is not a
primary or even necessary condition for playing a role in international
affairs. And yet, the spatial metaphors of structure typically presented
by scholars prioritize physicality as a theoretical category that then dic-
tates the emphasis received in empirical research. This does not mean
that actors that do not occupy a clearly defined physical space are not
considered relevant in the study of international relations, but it is per-
haps worth noting that for many years only those actors that occupied
physical space—states—received the overwhelming amount of atten-
tion by IR scholars.15 Hence, as a substitute for theory that begins
with empirical observations, metaphors of physical spatiality often pri-
oritize state actors since these are the actors most closely associated
with the occupation of physical space.
At this point it could be argued that the review of structure offered
earlier in this chapter is incredibly limited and ignores entire swaths
of philosophical and theoretical approaches. My response is twofold.
First, the purpose of this discussion has not been to review structural
theory in all its manifestations as that would be far beyond the scope of
this project. Second, to the extent that these types of review have been
conducted, I would argue that, for all the variations in structural the-
ory, they point out a factor that unites these approaches. Specifically,

running throughout structural theory is a view of structure that treats

it metaphorically as set of physical properties involving spatial orga-
nization and arrangement. To illustrate this I turn to Colin Wight,
who, unlike me, has conducted an exhaustive review of structure in its
various theoretical traditions. Upon completing his review, and while
acknowledging fundamental ontological differences among the com-
peting schools of structural thought, Wight nonetheless concludes
that there are elements of all these schools that allow them to be
commonly viewed, if not necessarily theoretically reconciled. Wight’s
(2006, 175) solution is “to see structure in relational terms” such that
“these relations might be understood as relations linking together,
not social positions and roles, but the various planes of social activ-
ity” (emphasis added). Wight (ibid.) continues, “structure, then, binds
the various planes of the social world together” (emphasis added).
My purpose in italicizing certain words in these two quoted passages is
to underscore the metaphorical qualities of structure that Wight sug-
gests may apply to the various competing perspectives on the topic.
Structure in social relations (including international relations) is seen
metaphorically as most people think of it as applied to its physical
manifestations in such things as buildings, bridges, machines, furni-
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ture, and the like. Wight’s own vocabulary of “links” and “planes”
suggests structures some readers may remember creating with child-
hood pastimes such as Erector sets and Tinker Toys. It is a view of
the unobservable with the aid of a metaphor associated with physical
construction.
What structure is not, then, is a description of the geographic
arrangement of actors and units in what is referred to as interna-
tional relations. It is a metaphor for what Wight (122) identifies as
“something that can never be brought into the realm of the observ-
able.” Wight (218) later makes a distinction between “structure”
and “structuratum,” in which the former is defined as “the relations
between the parts, or components, of a structuratum,” and the latter
is defined as “the parts (elements, components, relata) whose relations
constitute the structure in the first sense of the word . . . Thus states,
for example, can be considered as structurata that are structured in
various ways . . . Structure, then, refers to the relations between the
constituent elements that make up a structuratum.”16 Metaphorically,
this is a meaningless distinction inasmuch as both “structure” and
“structuratum” rely on an application of linguistic representations
of the conceptual mappings that come with experiences with spa-
tial organization and arrangement.17 What is known metaphorically
as “structure” is an abstraction as are the relations within structured

entities.18 Both structures and relations within structured entities rep-

resent an idea of the context in which actors and units interact and
the nature of their interactions. It can be conceived, but only with the
aid of metaphorical images. As it presently stands, those metaphorical
images are ones of physical organization and arrangement, as different
and varied as the many schools of thought with which “structure” is
conceived may be.
Metaphors that Delineate the Meaning and Scope

of the State
Integral to the context of international relations are metaphors that
delineate the meaning and scope of the state. The term “state” has at
least two metaphorical meanings that have an impact on how inter-
national relations is studied. The word “state” comes to the English
language from the Latin word status, which itself comes from the
Indo-European root sta-, meaning “to stand” (American Heritage
Dictionary, 1756, 3236). The English word “state” has a variety
of meanings. However, as applied to the abstraction referred to as
“the state,” it is a metaphorical construction that, as stated (no pun
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intended), has two meanings. First, “the state” metaphorically is a
transient condition, as in something can be described in terms of its
current “state” of being. Second, “the state” metaphorically can be
identified as a function of its legitimate “state” of being, that is to
say its “status.”19 The analytical implications of these metaphors for
international relations theory are at once subtle and profound.
First, as one body of recent scholarship asserts, the state is in fact
a transient condition of political authority as it is expressed in world
affairs. There were political entities that engaged in international rela-
tions before the state came into existence and presumably there will be
those that follow. The state, then, is only a temporary “state.” Second,
and in a related sense, the state’s legitimacy is derived in part, both
practically and in the eyes of scholars of international relations, because
of its “status” or state of being expressed as such. Although it sounds
absurd to suggest it, the implications for both international actors and
scholars of international relations of calling “states” something else,
say, “corporations,” are potentially far-reaching in terms of action and
theoretical prediction. It is not so far-fetched to think that states could
be called something such as “corporations” given the prevalence of
the metaphor of corporeal bodies in the study of politics.20 It is fair to
surmise that theories of international relations that were predicated
on the metaphor of legitimate international actors as “corporate”

bodies of politics may very well yield very different theoretical pre-
dictions than theories based on the metaphor of international actors
as “states.”
Although recent theories of international relations include non-
state actors in the range of relevant units in the study of international
relations, in traditional schools of thought the sole or primary territo-
rial actors enjoying sovereignty are states. Etymologically speaking,
the word “territory” is itself a metaphor, deriving as it does from
the Latin terra meaning earth (American Heritage Dictionary, 1854).
More interestingly, there is also evidence that suggests that the Latin
terra is itself derived metaphorically from the earlier Latin terrēre,
meaning “to frighten” (Oxford English Dictionary). This leads to the
notion that what is meant by “territory” is in fact metaphorically a site
from which people are frightened off. As William Connolly (1995,
xxii) points out, “territory” and “terrorize” thus share the same root
metaphor and therefore, in a linguistic and indeed also historical sense,
the modern notion of a territory is a “land occupied and bounded
by violence.”21 Borders, too, can be conceptualized metaphorically,
for example, in the way John Williams (2003, 39) describes them as
“fences between neighbours.”22
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The image of states as distinctly bounded entities has been aided
by the common practice of depicting states metaphorically as “con-
tainers” sealed off, as they are, from the purportedly anarchic nature
of international relations and sealing in what is supposed to be the
ordered life under the authority of the state. The metaphorical image
of the state as a container extends back to the Hobbesian tradition in
the study of international relations, in which domestic political order
is enclosed within metaphorical, and in some cases literal, walls.23 Paul
Chilton (1996, 87) describes the container metaphor as follows:
The CONTAINER schema metaphorizes a number of organizing concepts in

Hobbes’s text. Men are hypothesized as being “in a state of nature,” “entering
into society” and “entering into a contract.” The complementary concept is
“containing,” or “keeping in.” Hobbes repeatedly mentions the necessity of
a sovereign power to “keep in awe” its subjects, who are, after all, men whose
fundamental nature is movement out of their own space into that of others.
Men need to be “contained.” (Small capital letters in the original)
As for what the state “contains,” a variety of functions have been

posited. For example, Peter Taylor (1994) has suggested that the state
often serves as a “power container,” a “wealth container,” a “cul-
tural container,” and a “social container.” Perhaps most importantly,

the container metaphor has provided a basis for conceptualizing the

sovereignty of the state, since countries, like individuals, are imagined
as entities that retain physical integrity distinct from other states.24
What is “contained” within these states, then, also becomes of inter-
est metaphorically, that is, the metaphorical realm of “domestic”
politics.
The metaphorical qualities of the term “domestic politics” are fairly
obvious. The English word “domestic” derives from the Latin domes-
ticus, which has its origin in the Latin root domus, meaning “house.”
Thus, to make something domestic (or to domesticate, in the sense
of taming an animal) is to bring it into the house. To refer to the
“domestic” politics of a country is to rely on a metaphor for family and
household affairs.25 What is typically referred to as “domestic politics”
also is known, especially in European political and academic parlance,
as “home affairs,” which is an even more explicit metaphor in which
the politics of a country is envisioned as what transpires within each
country’s “home.”
The notion that “domestic” politics should constitute a country’s
“home” or “household” affairs is an illustration of the metaphori-
cal ways in which scholars and policymakers alike have relied in part
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on language to establish a separation between the ostensible safety
of politics in that realm governed by the state and the presumed
danger of the allegedly ungovernable realm that constitutes interna-
tional relations. As explained elsewhere in this book (see Chapter 4),
the separation of different areas of political activities into so-called
metaphorical levels of analysis is a powerful way of delineating what
qualifies as one type of politics protected from another. Specifically,
domestic politics is envisioned as a realm of relative safety and calm
as contrasted with the “anarchy” of international relations. There
are any number of ways of conveying this concept. Spatially divided
“levels of analysis” is one. The “container” metaphor of the state is
another, as are other linguistic means for establishing an “inside” and
an “outside” of the state (Walker 1993).
Metaphorical “levels of analysis” and the container metaphor for
the state as well as other tropes for distinguishing an “inside” and an
“outside” of the state are pervasive as well as foundational elements
in the contemporary study of international relations. When scholars
speak of the origin of interests they refer to the “domestic politics”
of countries. There are, of course, any number of ways of making the
point that the interests of states are derived not from systemic factors
or external attributes but from the preferences articulated by actors
within the state as well as the principles, ideologies, and rules that

give shape and substance to governance in that area which is main-

tained by the state. One could refer to “internal” politics, “state”
politics,” or “national” politics. These are all metaphors themselves,
so whichever phrase is chosen will have an influence on theory just
as all metaphors do. What the implications are for theory is this: as is
true for the metaphorical “levels of analysis,” the “container” image
of the state, and Walker’s conception of “inside” and “outside,” the
“domestic politics” metaphor cordons off a zone of safety that can
be contrasted with the dangers of a seemingly “anarchic” international
system. The metaphorical “domestic” nature of state politics is espe-
cially noteworthy since people tend to associate domesticity with the
calm, tamed tranquility as well as sanctity of the home. “Domestic”
politics thus reinforces the notion that politics and interests within the
state enjoy a kind of legitimacy that comes from association with the
safety of one’s home.
The State as Individual

The metaphor of the state as individual is a common one in inter-
national relations theory.26 For some scholars it has, in fact, taken on
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literal meaning. However, as it is used in international relations theory
it is also a reified metaphor, that is, one that attributes real qualities
based on metaphorical imagery to something over which scholars dis-
agree with regard to its empirical veracity. Colin Wight, for one, is
disturbed that scholars apparently are undecided about whether the
state is an actor or is composed of them. He highlights this when he
quotes a passage from a prominent scholar of international relations,
who, in the course of a single sentence, sees states as the relevant actors
in world affairs at one time and the leaders of those states at another.
Wight (2006, 178) comments wryly that “it is a curious form of sci-
ence that admits to such theoretical slippage.” I would argue it is not
so curious at all when scholars of international relations disagree about
whether the state as an actor is a metaphor or not. The question, then,
is how does one make a distinction between the state seen metaphor-
ically as an actor, an individual, or a person and the state seen as a
literal fact?27
Alexander Wendt provides one answer in his essay “The State as
Person in International Theory.”28 Wendt (2004, 291) maintains that
“state persons are real in at least one important sense: they are ‘inten-
tional’ or purposive actors” and “since intentionality is the primary
quality of persons that scholars today typically attribute to states, this
argument effectively justifies current IR practice.”29 For Wendt, the

intentional actions of states represent a physicality that is consistent

with the concept of a person who acts on the basis of a unity of pur-
pose. Therefore, states do not possess an “as if” quality (“as if” they
were individuals), but really are individual actors as their intentional
actions demonstrate.
It is still possible to object, however, that the intentional actions
of states follow only after internal deliberations occur within the state
and despite the fact that there may be internal dissent within the state
about any given action. In these circumstances metaphorical refer-
ences to the state as an individual can obscure what may very well
be important factual considerations in explaining why the state acted
as it did. It is here that careful choices in terminology can tell the
whole story using both metaphorical and literal terms. Let us take, for
example, the negative vote by the French electorate on the proposed
European Union (EU) constitution in 2005. On the one hand, as it
mattered for the ratification of the constitution, it would be fair to say
that the “no” vote effectively scuttled the document. In this sense, as
implied for the progress of European integration, France the “individ-
ual state” ruined chances for adoption of the constitution. Thus, for
those who theorize about the construction of a European union, what
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matters is that a single state, acting individually, can alter the course
of European integration.30 France as an individual effectively rejected
the proposed EU constitution and, using Wendt’s logic, there is no
theoretical danger in saying as much.
On the other hand, clearly there was dissent within France on the
matter of the EU constitution. Most policymakers endorsed ratifica-
tion and “the government” (literally an actor in Wendt’s formulation)
campaigned for a “yes” vote among the French people. In this sense,
to tell the entire story, one would have to be careful to explain that the
rejection by France-the-individual-actor was the product of a vote by
the people of France, each of whom cast an individual vote. Literally
speaking, the voters of France rejected the constitution. Yet, the voters
of France constitute a metaphorical unity that, once its intentions are
given a physical manifestation, that is, the rejection of the constitution,
takes on a literal quality as a single French “no” vote.
Wendt’s thesis, however, appears to be a minority view. For cog-
nitive linguist George Lakoff (1993, 243) it is fairly obvious that
“A STATE IS A PERSON is one of the major metaphors underlying for-
eign policy concepts. Thus, there are ‘friendly’ states, ‘hostile’ states,
and so forth. Health for a state is economic health and strength is
military strength” (small capital letters in the original). Lakoff’s view

is shared by most scholars of international relations. According to

Peter Lomas (2005, 351), one of the problems with Wendt’s asser-
tion that the state is literally an individual is that he conflates “two
ontological ways of thinking. There is a conceptual difference between
anthropomorphism (the identification of a non-human entity as a
human one) and personification (the identification of a human entity
as an individual).” Lomas attributes this error to Wendt’s theoreti-
cal need to discount the multiplicity of contending interests within
the state in the foreign policy realm. What Lomas might add is
that the metaphor of the state as an individual invites this confla-
tion since, once imagined metaphorically as an individual, it is easy to
attribute to the state the qualities associated with individual humans.
Furthermore, the conflation of the state with individuals denies the
independent role of the state. As Colin Wight (2004, 280) argues in a
response to Wendt, “To assign personhood to the state is to neglect,
not only the role of human agency, but also to occlude the power
inscribed in the state as a structure.” In response, Wendt (2005, 357)
maintains that scholars and journalists, among other people (including
Lomas himself, Wendt speculates), routinely speak and write of states
as individuals, pointing to references in widely read publications such
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as The New York Times. However, just because people routinely rely on
reified metaphors in their everyday discourse it does not eliminate the
fact that they are metaphors. Metaphors of convenience are metaphors
nonetheless. People know that when they stop someone from doing
something they are not literally “cutting him off at the pass” (since
very rarely do people actually use mountain passes anymore just to
get something done), but they use the expression anyway, intuitively
understanding it is a metaphor. The editors of The New York Times and
Peter Lomas know that states are not individuals, but for the purposes
of convenience the metaphor is useful since it would be much easier
to simply write “France” instead of “French foreign policymakers.”
Wendt’s answer to this is that since multiple perspectives of corpo-
rate entities such as states often produce actions reflective of collective
intentionality, treating the state (or other corporate entities such as
graduate school admissions committees) as an individual allows for
predictions about state behavior without denying the existence of dis-
sent within the state (Wendt 2005, 358).31 However, the question is
not whether the state really is an individual but whether the language
used to describe the state is located at one end or the other of the lit-
eral - metaphorical spectrum. Literal language helps discern the extent
of dissent that may nonetheless result in singular state action. Thus,

for example, an article in The New York Times (to take a publication
mentioned by Wendt) might use literal language to say something
along the lines of “yesterday the French president authorized a veto
of a pending United Nations Security Council resolution,” which
hints at the source of a potentially controversial decision, whereas
the more metaphorical “yesterday France vetoed a United Nations
Security Council resolution” imputes to the French state a una-
nimity of cognition that may or may not be supported by the
facts.
As I have argued previously in this book (see Chapter 2), the ques-
tion is not “reality” versus things made up, but literal or metaphorical
ways of conveying complex concepts and principles. In offering a cri-
tique of Wendt, Iver Neumann concludes that Wendt most certainly
is dealing in the realm of metaphor. Specifically, Neumann (2004,
260–264) casts Wendt as a Durkheimian, relying on metaphors of
reification, organicism, normality, and evolutionism to impute qual-
ities to the state. For Neumann, these metaphors have appreciable
implications for theory, for example, privileging entities over relations.
Thus, Wendt wittingly or unwittingly makes theoretical distinctions by
privileging one set of metaphors over another. Neumann (266) sug-
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gests that Wendt’s analysis might be more useful if he emphasized
metaphors of language over organic metaphors.
Mika Luoma-aho raises the stakes even higher, arguing that the
attribution of personhood to the state elevates the study of interna-
tional relations to the status of religion. As Luoma-aho (2009, 296)
observes, the embodiment of political authority in corporeal entities
is rooted in antiquity: “We know that bodily figurations have been
employed in political discourse since the Ancients, though they are
likely to have a much richer history than we can tell.” Although
the body as a representation of political authority is pervasive in
Western thought, Luoma-aho traces its progress from Christian theol-
ogy through twentieth-century theories of the state. She sees modern
IR theory in all its guises premised on the image of the state metaphor-
ically conceived of in bodily terms: “IR is a disciplinary tradition that
conserves the life and the body of the state—as long as it does not
come up with something else to conserve and justify, that is. If we give
up the embodied and personified state, no longer take it as a given, we
flush out everything or nearly everything we (thought we) knew about
international relations. The stakes are high” (ibid., 301). Among the
high stakes of metaphorically personifying the state is the reliance on
further metaphors to conceptualize the social context in which the
metaphorical state resides. If the state is conceived of metaphorically

as an individual, then it must be embedded in some metaphorical

societal realm. The next section examines the implications of this
move.
International Society and International
Community
Not to be confused with cooperation or harmony, the “society”
metaphor conveys the assumption that relations among international
actors can be thought of in a similar fashion as one would theorize
using the tools of sociology about other identifiable groups of individ-
uals. International “community,” on the other hand, implies a sense of
common purpose and not simply any society that can be distinguished
from others. It is worthwhile to discuss each of these concepts in turn.
International Society
Most treatments of international society involve a metaphorical trans-
ference from societies as understood as comprising individual human
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beings to relations among a variety of international actors that may
or may not be limited to states. A “society” typically is understood
as “a group of human beings broadly distinguished from other groups
by mutual interests, participation in characteristic relationships, shared
institutions, and a common culture” (American Heritage Dictionary,
1711). The English word has its roots in the Latin socius or “com-
panion,” which itself derives from the Indo-European sek, meaning
“to follow” (ibid., 1711, 2123).32 In the most narrow sense, then,
“international society” is metaphorical. It is the application of observa-
tions about relations among individuals who share common interests
to groups of states and other actors, the relations among which call to
mind that which sociologists have observed among discrete individu-
als. Evan Luard (1990, 1) acknowledges this when he writes: “If we
define society in a sufficiently narrow way—to mean a compact, closely
integrated community, comparable to the primitive societies mainly
studied by social anthropologists, or even the social structure of a vil-
lage or small town in industrial countries today—then international
society could not qualify.” This is not to say that one cannot theorize
about international relations as a form of society, as Luard himself and
other scholars of international relations do; it is only to observe that as
a conceptual element in international relations theory “international
society” has metaphorical roots.33

In the lexicon of international relations theory, the metaphor of

international “society” is counterposed to other metaphorical con-
ceptions of how world relations are to be conceived. One notable
distinction that is made is between international “society” and interna-
tional “system,” a distinction made by Hedley Bull and Adam Watson
(1984, 1) who define international society as “a group of states (or,
more generally, a group of independent political communities) which
not merely form a system, in the sense that the behaviour of each is a
necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have estab-
lished a dialogue and consent to common rules and institutions for
the conduct of their relations and recognise their common interest in
maintaining these arrangements.” This is a distinction supported by
Barry Buzan (1993, 331) who adds that Bull and Watson’s definition
“avoids the confusion that exists between system (as interacting parts)
and society (as self-conscious and in part self-regulating,” such that
“system is logically the more basic, and prior, idea: an international
system can exist without a society, but the converse is not true.”34
Leaving aside for the moment the qualities of the international sys-
tem and international society (topics discussed at considerable length
within the literature on these concepts and for the most part beyond
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the scope of this discussion), from a linguistic point of view the dis-
tinction between “system” and “society” reflect distinct metaphorical
images in which a “system” is viewed as a context and a “society” as
the content of that contextual surrounding.35
That “society” is meant to be taken metaphorically and not liter-
ally is indicated in part by the fact that there is disagreement about
how societies are formed. Buzan (1993, 333) identifies two views,
the “gemeinschaft understanding [which] sees society as organic and
traditional, involving bonds of common sentiment, experience, and
identity,” and the “gesellschaft understanding [which] sees society as
being contractual and constructed rather than sentimental and tra-
ditional.” Both formulations take as the base concept a society of
individuals which is then used as a basis for conceptualizing interna-
tional relations. “International society” is not readily identifiable in an
unambiguous way, but is conceptualized with the aid of sociological
theories of society about which there is theoretical disagreement.
Additionally, international society is recognizable as a metaphor
in the sense that it is contrasted with world society. Recalling the
formulation of “world society” proffered by John Burton (1972),36
Barry Buzan (1993, 336–337) makes the distinction as such: “ ‘Inter-
national society’ . . . is about the nature of relations among states (or
whatever political units compose the international system), and ‘world

society,’ which takes individuals, nonstate organizations and ultimately

the global population as a whole as the focus of global societal iden-
tities and arrangements.” In other words, for Buzan “world society,”
comprised as it is of individuals, could be construed literally as a society
in the same way, for example, one could refer literally to a professional
society made up of individual practitioners of that profession, while
“international society” is a metaphor, that is to say, a visualization of
societies of individuals applied as an organizing principle to relations
among corporate entities such as states and other political units. This
is a very different definition of “world society” than the one offered by
Albert and Brock metaphorically as a “multilayered network.” These
authors “see the network as a metaphor for the reciprocal interpene-
tration of territorially and functionally defined spaces, and for a mixing
of interstate and transstate patterns of interaction” (Albert and Brock
1996, 94). Hence, while Buzan’s definition implies that world society
may be a literal expression of global relationships among individu-
als, for Albert and Brock world society “cannot be defined as a clear
reference point from today’s perspective” in part because it is a hypo-
thetical state of being, and in part because it is a metaphorical and not
a literal conceptualization of evolving patterns of relationships among
a variety of actors.37
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Disagreements aside, as a metaphor “society” has been key con-
cept in theorizing about the nature of international relations. In The
Anarchical Society Hedley Bull (1977, 13) defines international soci-
ety as follows: “A society of states (or international society) exists when
a group of states, conscious of common interests and common val-
ues, form a society in the sense that they conceive of themselves to be
bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another,
and share in the working of common institutions” (emphasis in the
original).38 If “society” is understood literally to mean a group of indi-
vidual human beings, then applied to international relations the term
is used metaphorically to impute to states the same goals of individual
humans and to infuse in states the assumption that their aims are the
same as mankind to which states are put into service. Among those
aims are the creation of a metaphorical international “community.”
International Community
As distinguished from societies, communities in international relations
are understood to comprise actors with a common purpose. David
Ellis (2009, 5) makes clear the distinction between an international
society and an international community:

The existence of an international society based on common interests and val-

ues is something quite different than a community of morals, ethics, and
common identities indicative of an international community. The distinction
is important because a societal impact on states is different than a communal
impact on states. In addition, an international society is an ontological precur-
sor for the eventual development of an international community. (Emphasis
added)
For Ellis, an international society makes no implication about a com-

mon purpose whereas an international community does. Furthermore,
Ellis (9–10) makes a distinction between an international commu-
nity and the international community. The former represents merely
a group of states whereas the latter represents a “unitary actor”:
“In its most simplistic form, the international community represents
the collective moral and ethical opinions of states” (Ellis 10, emphasis
added). Ellis’ definition of international community is similar to others
found in the literature, for example, the definition offered by Albert
and Brock (1996, 94) who view international community “as a com-
munity based on law and solidarity, the functionality of which depends
upon the strength of its members’ sense of belonging together.”
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Ironically, the dictionary definition of “community” associates the
term no more with a common interest or purpose than the word
“society.”39 Clearly, the term international “community” is metaphor-
ical as illustrated in several ways. First, as Ellis concedes, the term can
be used generically in the form of an international community which
is merely any group of actors with a common purpose or specifically
as the international community as a clearly defined set of actors with
some degree of recognition that they speak with a single authorita-
tive voice (Ellis 2009, 9–10). Second, “an,” or “the,” international
community could comprise any type of actors or it could be lim-
ited exclusively to states. As Ellis (5) points out, a “central debate
within [the English School] has been whether states or individuals
should be the primary referent to international society,” including
international communities. Third, with regard to the international
community, there is no agreement among scholars as to who or what
constitutes it (ibid., 9–13).40
Whereas the debate over what constitutes an or the international
community is ongoing it is clear that the term “community” used in
the debate is metaphorical, that is, designed to bring meaning and
understanding from one domain and apply it to another so as to
provide analytical insight. However, inasmuch as the source domain—
communities of individual humans—is itself multifaceted containing

multiple meanings, the target domain—international relations—is

similarly imbued with multiple senses of what the term means and
what theoretical propositions it therefore suggests. An international
community can have a common purpose or simply be synonymous
with an international society which is understood only as a group of
actors with a shared culture (which could be conflictual in nature).
It can include various kinds of actors or it can be comprised solely
of states. The international community may exist but who or what
comprises it is unclear. Since the same statements could be made of
communities made up of individual humans, it is not surprising that,
as a metaphor, the term “community” adds little clarity and much
room for interpretation in the study of international relations.
One thing that seems to be in agreement is that there is no
agreement on what constitutes international society or international
community. As the Forum on Global Society in a 2009 issue of
International Political Sociology demonstrates, what constitutes “inter-
national,” “world,” or “global” society and how it should be studied is
in dispute (see especially the contributions by Albert 2009, Bartelson
2009, Hindess 2009, Kessler 2009, and Thomas 2009). Perhaps some
of the confusion would go away if scholars came to this agreement:
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No matter what an or the international world, or global society is,
scholars think about it and communicate about it metaphorically.
Moreover, at a certain point, these terms become metaphors for each
other, for example, as Albert and Brock (1996, 95) posit in the future
“states will behave like businesses, businesses like state, communities
like societies . . . , and societies like communities” (with “like” indicat-
ing a metaphorical similarity in the qualities of one domain applied to
another). For all their disagreements and confusion about the nature
of international, world, or global society, few scholars believe that it
represents a starting point for theorizing about society as it is under-
stood to be created among individual human beings. Rather, they are
metaphorical terms that represent the setting in which metaphorical
states-as-individuals meet.
Reflections on Metaphors that Describe the

Context of International Relations
Aside from the obvious empirical (largely geographic) contextual
aspects of international relations, IR scholars need to conceptualize
a setting, location, context, milieu, or place in which international
relations occurs. This place has been constructed using a combina-
tion of images, beginning with the emptiness of anarchy that is filled

with architectural “systems” and “structures,” peopled by states as

“individuals” and “domestic” politics, and constituted by “societies”
and “communities” of these actors. Spatial metaphors predominate,
in large part because they help conceptualize the geographic space
of world affairs. Temporal metaphors figure in IR theory, as the
next chapter’s discussion of “evolution” demonstrates. But as a start-
ing point, it is not surprising that efforts to conceptualize global
interactions rely on metaphorical images of physical space.
One of the main aspects of the “anarchy,” “system,” “structure,”
“state-as-individual,” “domestic politics,” “international society,” and
“international community” metaphors is that many if not most schol-
ars have in fact stopped thinking of them as metaphors and take them
as a literal expressions of the world of international relations. Interna-
tional relations is for the most part characterized by scholars as one of
“anarchy” which is itself a “system” but also possesses changing “sys-
temic” attributes understood in terms of their “structure.” Among
these systemic structures are a distinction between international and
“domestic” politics, the former of which possesses qualities of an inter-
national “society” and/or “community.” These features establish an
identifiable place in which the narrative explanations of international
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relations can be elaborated. What needs to be filled in is the plot,
which is the subject of the next chapter.

Chapter 4
C o n t r i bu t i o n s o f M e ta p h o r s
t o I n t e r n at i o n a l R e l at i o n s
Theory
I n the narrative of international relations theory, the first part

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involves establishing the metaphorical setting of the tale. The previous
chapter elaborated those metaphors that are integral to delineat-
ing the spatial context in which international relations takes place.
It also highlighted the main actors peopling the story, which in
mainstream IR thought are imagined metaphorically as states-as-
individuals. Metaphors also play an essential role in the development
of many of the theoretical assumptions that are central to the field.
That is to say, in the narrative of international relations, they estab-
lish the plot. This chapter explores the metaphorical bases of some
of the most significant theoretical themes in IR. The chapter is not
exhaustive in uncovering every metaphor that underpins international
relations theory, but rather, focuses on the ones that have the greatest
presence in the field and have had the most durable impact on how
international relations has been theorized.
The main elements of the plot of IR include the way actors
are situated relative to each other, which dictates relationships and
the constraints placed on them. The “levels of analysis” metaphor
imagines actors occupying an existential space of danger within the
metaphorical setting of anarchy (explored in the previous chapter).
In this dangerous metaphorical realm (level) of anarchy, actors’ pur-
poses are spelled out in a metaphorical relationship between “agent”
and “structure.” How the plot unfolds is then a subject of theoretical

debate, in recent years waged by means of the metaphors associated

with rigid images of system and structure in the Realist tradition
and more dynamic conceptions represented in the various theories of
metaphorical “evolutionary” change. Finally, metaphorical evolution-
ary change nonetheless coexists somewhat uneasily with metaphors
of how international relations is “constructed.” How these debates
are resolved have important bearings on the narrative course of
international relations theory.
The Levels of Analysis Metaphor

One of the main roles metaphors perform in international relations
theory (or any theory, for that matter) is that they define what is wor-
thy of study and how scholars should go about studying it. In their
most basic function, metaphors define the field of inquiry. For exam-
ple, the field of physics is defined by the metaphorical term “physics,”
which implies that what is being studied are the “physical” properties
of the universe, despite the fact that, literally speaking, some of the
forces that are studied in the field of physics, such as energy, do not
have physical properties (they only have properties that are metaphor-
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ically “physical”). In the area of international relations the metaphor
that virtually defines what constitutes the field is “levels of analysis.”
Specifically, the levels of analysis metaphor identifies an area of political
and economic activity that resides at a distinct level of human interac-
tions, that is, the level of international interactions, a level of activity
that is apart from other levels of interactions.
In his seminal 1961 article, J. David Singer lays out the ways in
which separate levels of analysis in the study of international rela-
tions can be conceptualized. Singer (1961, 77) begins by pointing
out that “in any area of scholarly inquiry, there are always several ways
in which the phenomena under study may be sorted and arranged for
the purposes of systemic analysis. Whether in the physical or social
sciences, the observer may choose to focus upon the parts or upon
the whole, upon the components or upon the system.” This seems to
be a rather straightforward statement about delineating the scope of
academic inquiry in any field since, as Singer (ibid.) observes, when
talking about choices between parts and wholes one finds examples
such as “the flowers or the garden, the rocks or the quarry, the trees
or the forest, the houses or the neighborhood, the cars or the traf-
fic jam, the delinquents or the gang, the legislators or the legislative,
and so on.” However, when it comes to labeling parts and wholes in
international relations, Singer departs from the languages of “parts”

C o n t r i bu t i o n s o f M e ta p h o r s 59
and “wholes” and instead chooses a metaphor, that is, spatially sep-
arated and vertically arranged “levels” of analysis. For Singer (78),
the parts and wholes of international relations reflect a vertical sep-
aration of political activity: “We have, in our texts and elsewhere,
roamed up and down the ladder of organizational complexity with
remarkable abandon, focusing upon the total system, international
organizations, regions, coalitions, extra-national associations, nations,
domestic pressure groups, social classes, elites, and individuals as the
needs of the moment required” (emphasis added). Singer’s project is
to focus scholars’ minds on a clearer view of these areas of activity by
metaphorically locating them on vertically arranged planes. With this
system of classification Singer codified a view of international relations
that cordoned off what are in effect interrelated areas of activity and
treated them as analytically separated realms.
It is important to point out, as William Moul (1973), Nuri Yurdisev
(1993), and Colin Wight (2006) have, that what is meant by “levels
of analysis” is how one goes about studying a given phenomenon, not
what is being studied. This is a distinction that Singer overlooked:
“Singer confuses the level-of-analysis with the unit-of-analysis . . . The
unit-of-analysis refers to the object of inquiry; the level-of-analysis to
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how to explain the aspect of the object under consideration” (Wight
2006, 103). From the perspective of metaphors levels-of-analysis ver-
sus units of analysis is an important distinction. In focusing on the level
of analysis, spatial metaphors suggest that how to explain international
relations is to divide it up into analytically distinct realms.1 As Nicholas
Onuf (1998b, 205) suggests, in a levels perspective, “the observer’s
angle of vision and focus change.”2 Specifically, in this vision and
focus, the relationships among units of analysis are thus made to
appear separated by artificial divides imposed by a spatially delineated
set of planes. The level of analysis metaphor is indeed a metaphor in
that relations among what are deemed international actors are not
literally located on a physical plane that can be readily identified as
such. So, to be specific, the levels of analysis is a spatial metaphor that
uses the imagery of vertical spatial separation—or, to look at it another
way, “framed spaces” with “horizontally oriented . . . lines parallel with
top and bottom,” as Onuf (ibid.) puts it—to imagine the abstract
realm into which certain types of interactions can be placed for the
purposes of defining the subject matter under investigation.
The level of analysis metaphor has profound implications for how
the realm of international relations is studied. How many levels of
analysis is a question prompted by the metaphor itself. Scholars have
identified any number of levels of analysis from two (Singer 1961,

Wolfers 1962) to three (Waltz 1959) to four (Jervis 1976) to five

(Rosenau 1966).3 Nicholas Onuf (1998b, 196) wryly observes, “there
would seem to be as many levels, or as few, as scholars consensually
agree.” Without the metaphor of “levels of analysis” there would be
no need to debate how many separate spheres of political activity are
at stake in theorizing about international relations. In fact, despite the
disagreement on the exact number of levels of analysis, the main effect
of the level of analysis metaphor is that it delineates distinct realms of
political activity. More to the point, regardless of how many levels
are imagined, the main distinction established by Singer continues to
define the two main areas of political activity, specifically, the so-called
systemic and subsystemic levels of theorizing.
Interestingly enough, when systemic theorists discuss what is meant
by the international “system,” they do not necessarily mean the total-
ity of political activities that have an impact on international relations,
but rather, only those activities that are confined to the systemic
“level” of analysis. Thus, for example, when Singer (1961, 80) says
that the systemic level “is the most comprehensive of the levels avail-
able, encompassing the totality of interactions which take place within
the system and its environment,” he concedes that “totality” is only of
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activity at the systemic level, not the entirety of political actions that
have an impact on international relations. The tendency to equate the
systematic level of analysis with the totality of international relations is
abetted by secondary metaphors that leave subsystemic actors opaque:
“By eschewing any empirical concern with the domestic and internal
variations within the separate nations, the systemic-oriented approach
tends to produce a sort of ‘black box’ or ‘billiard ball’ concept of
national actors” (ibid., 81, emphasis added).4
Alexander Wendt (1999, 13–14) also adopts a systemic approach
premised on recognition of the institution of sovereignty that keeps
the state separate from the international system. Wendt writes of
metaphorically “bracketing” the state level so as to focus on the effects
of systemic-level variables. Wendt’s notion of a metaphorical “bracket-
ing” of the state level is a reformulation of Singer’s “levels of analysis”
problem, which relies on a mathematical metaphor in the sense that
mathematicians “bracket” parts of an equation that are kept constant.
It is essentially a metaphor for “I assume this part of the equation does
not change.” That is to say, it is a theoretical assertion that interna-
tional relations is constituted by physical and ideational elements at the
level of the international system. However, instead of “levels of anal-
ysis,” information is metaphorically “bracketed,” whereby that which
is not part of the metaphorical equation is left out of the calculation
of what brings about outcomes in international relations.

Of course, the whole notion of systemic and subsystemic politics

being “separate” from each other is not an empirical observation but
rather a metaphorical image that is made possible only by virtue of the
levels of analysis metaphor, which creates the impression that there
are spatially separated areas of political activity.5 All political activity
is to some extent interrelated, so the notion that there are realms or
“levels” of politics is a metaphorical fiction that is embraced by most
theories of international relations. To a certain extent this would seem
to be a logical extension of theorizing at the systemic level in which
the main systemic actors are conceived of as states. But it also means
that political activity that does not take place within the specified lev-
els is excluded from the theoretical process. Thus, for example, the
actions of individuals, that is, the so-called private acts of people, are
not included in state-level theorizing. The negative repercussions of
this omission for the study of international relations have been docu-
mented by feminist scholars, such as Cynthia Enloe (1989), who point
out that by eliminating the acts of everyday individuals in international
relations, scholars fail to characterize the causes and consequences of
international relations in full.
There have been some efforts to metaphorically “bridge” the divide
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between systemic and subsystemic politics created by the levels of anal-
ysis metaphor, most notably through the invention of so-called two-
level games (discussed at greater length in Chapter 7).6 In addition
to the aforementioned metaphorical “bridges” between levels, efforts
have be made to overcome the metaphorical separation of levels of
analysis by, for example, talking metaphorically “about different kinds
of interpenetrated contexts” (Patomäki 1996, 108, emphasis added).7
The spatial separation of domestic political actors then is largely a
function of the internal biases of scholars of international relations and
not an objective set of observations about different types of political
actors and political relations. The existence of separate levels of politics
is not a “fact,” but rather a perspective of culturally situated observers
(McCoy 2000, 189).8 The role of the levels of analysis metaphor is
to create areas of political activity that are conceived of as spatially
and analytically separated, thus making it difficult to truly imagine a
process of international relations that is conceived of as a whole.
One of the effects of this metaphorical division is to establish a
normative as well as a theoretical claim about the nature of inter-
national politics relative to those areas of political activity such as
domestic politics that are characterized as qualitatively distinct from
the ostensibly anarchic world of international relations. While the
levels of analysis metaphor often implies a vertical separation of
realms of activity, R. B. J. Walker (1993) has suggested that the

metaphorical language of international relations theory also connotes

a metaphorical “inside - outside” division between the “international”
and “domestic” domains of political activity and that this division is
key in defining legitimate areas of scholarly inquiry. Walker’s point
is well taken. In Walker’s analysis, the division between the inside
of the state and the outside is just one example of how the author-
ity of the state is asserted as unproblematic. The levels of analysis
metaphor contributes to a view whereby the state appears as if it is
the sole guarantor of citizens’ security. As Walker (1993, 174) writes:
“The outside is alien and strange, mysterious or threatening, a realm
in which to be brave against adversity or patient enough to tame
those whose life is not only elsewhere but also back then. Knowing
the other outside, it is possible to affirm identities inside. Know-
ing identities inside, it is possible to imagine the absences outside.”9
As I have elaborated elsewhere (Marks 2004), situating political activ-
ity within hermetically sealed “levels” fosters a view of politics in which
what is “inside,” to use Walker’s term, is protected from the dangers
that lurk “outside” at other levels of activity.10 Metaphorical thinking
that sees the world in terms of spatially separated realms encourages
a view that protects certain levels from the dangers that reside in
others.
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Critiques of the levels of analysis metaphor themselves often rely
on metaphors as a means of reframing the theoretical context of
international relations. One such metaphor comes from the field of
geography (and the related interdisciplinary field of political geogra-
phy), namely, the notion of “scales.” Scale theory in geography has
gained relevance in recent years through the works of scholars such
as Neil Brenner (1998), Sally Marston (2000), Neil Smith (2003),
and Andrew Jonas (2006). In its conventional use, scale in geography
has three senses—cartographic scale, analysis scale, and phenomenon
scale—of which non-geographers likely are only familiar with the first,
which “refers to the depicted size of a feature on a map relative to
its actual size in the world” (Montello 2001, 13501). Analysis scale
and phenomenon scale are somewhat more esoteric: “Analysis scale
includes the size of the units in which phenomena are measured and
the size of the units into which measurements are aggregated for data
analysis and mapping . . . Phenomenon scale refers to the size at which
geographic structures exist and over which geographic processes oper-
ate in the world” (ibid., 13502, 13503). In their traditional use within
geography these three aspects of scale are relatively noncontrover-
sial and simply provide bases on which geographers can reproduce
the size and scope of geographic features and processes that are then
submitted to data analysis.

In recent years, however, a critical perspective has been brought

to the study of geographic scale. Scales are seen less as naturally
occurring geographic features and processes but more as the prod-
uct of social construction. As Brenner (1998, 460) contends, “spatial
scales can no longer be conceived of as pregiven or natural areas of
social interaction, but are increasingly viewed as historical products—
at once socially constructed and politically contested.” Furthermore,
scales give rise to “scalar processes,” that is to say, “the processes of
interaction between those physical and social organizations constitu-
tive of both their organizational identity and the function of global
politics” (Sjoberg 2008, 479). As Sjoberg (481) explains, the geo-
graphic scale approach is one that can be offered as an alternative
to levels of analysis in the study of international relations in that it
does not rely on metaphorical stratification of political interaction:
“While IR sees stair-like, artificially distinct levels-of-analysis, geogra-
phers call on their experience with interlinked, continuous properties
of human social relations to produce unbroken, intersubjective scales
of actor relationships” (emphasis in the original). Or, to put it another
way, rather than relying on a metaphorical unidimensional up - down
spacing of political activity within vertically organized levels of analy-
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sis, scalar processes “are many, and combine to describe evolutionary
co-constitution of physical, economic, and social worlds” (ibid., 480).
The scales metaphor is a promising alternative to the confining
levels of analysis metaphor, which constrains the range of interac-
tions that can be imagined because of the limited spatial contours
of the model. Since the scales image involves only a metaphor of
size as opposed to spatial relationships, it can be used to imagine a
broader range of social, political, economic, and cultural interactions.
One should not lose sight of the fact, however, that like most else in
the study of international relations “scales” is inherently a metaphori-
cal concept. The word “scale” itself is a metaphor derived from the
Latin scālae or “ladder” (American Heritage Dictionary, 1609).11
In its use in geography “scale” refers to size, whether in the carto-
graphic, analysis, or phenomenon sense. Thus, as applied to politics
and international relations “scale” is used metaphorically to impute
a spatial sense to things that are not necessarily physically manifested
in any way that could be measured in terms of size. Hence, although
scales are perhaps or even probably a better way than levels of analy-
sis to imagine the context in which international relations takes place,
the metaphor itself has its own implications. Among these implica-
tions is that international relations encompasses more than what is
typically included in traditional IR scholarship. This presents certain
theoretical dangers such as a difficulty in creating empirical categories

that are analytically distinct and by which causation can be discerned.

An expanding interdisciplinarity (e.g., to expand into distinct disci-
plinary fields such as geography) is also a potential pitfall of a scales
metaphor that is over-encompassing in its scope.
Another way out of the theoretical and empirical conundrums
presented by metaphorical levels of analysis is presented by histor-
ical sociology. For example, George Lawson (2006) has suggested
that contemporary international relations can be analyzed via micro-,
macro-, and meso-level explanations.12 Rather than a spatial metaphor,
however, the “levels” in Lawson’s approach represent metaphors of
size as implied by the Greek prefixes “micro-” (small), “macro-”
(large), and “meso-” (intermediate; middle). For Lawson (398–402),
micro-level foundations represent not individual actors at a lower
“level” of politics, but rather, processes involving the formation of
preferences and their translation into social action. Macro-level foun-
dations are those involving transformations of global social, economic,
and political processes (ibid., 403–410). Finally, meso-level founda-
tions entail evolution of social institutions understood as “sets of
common understandings, rules, and practices operating in a particular
issue area” (ibid., 414). Rather than associating international relations
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with locations of political, economic, and social activity, Lawson’s his-
torical sociological approach relies on metaphors suggesting the size of
the processes involved, that is, whether they involve discrete decisions
and actions (micro-), large-scale forces (macro-), or medium-sized
arrangements (meso-). The historical sociological approach suggested
by Lawson emphasizes the fact that all processes involved in inter-
national relations, which are differentiated by their form and not
their location, take place on a global scale. It allows for studying
international relations as a conceptual whole comprising a variety of
interactions and processes. The utility of such an approach obviously
can be questioned, but what is clear is that switching from a spatial
“levels of analysis” metaphor to a metaphor premised on size of social
processes reorients the type of research that is conducted and the sorts
of evidence that are relevant to testing theoretical propositions.
The “Agent – Structure” Debate as a Metaphorical

Frame
In addition to the concept of “structure” discussed in the previous
chapter, another theoretical argument about the defining elements
of international relations that is debated in part on the basis of its
metaphorical framing is the so-called agent – structure problem. The

literature on the agent – structure problem is too vast to summarize

in this space, and in many ways is not necessary to the discussion at
hand. Furthermore, as Colin Wight (2006) elaborates at length, in
many ways IR scholars do not agree on what constitutes the agent –
structure “problem,” that is, whether it is an issue of ontology, episte-
mology, or methodology. Rather, because the agent – structure debate
has already been explored deeply on both philosophical and theo-
retical levels (e.g., by the very same Wight 2006, as well as others),
instead of reengaging the debate on those levels, the issue at stake
here is the invoking of “agent” and “structure” as metaphors for what
is being problematized in the debate and how these metaphors frame
that debate whether ontologically, epistemologically, or methodologi-
cally. In many ways what unites the competing perspectives about the
relationship between agents and structure is the common usage of
what are metaphorical terms.
Given the vast literature on the agent – structure debate one could
begin this discussion with any number of works on the topic. A good
place to start is with one of the seminal pieces by which the problem
was introduced to international relations theory. Among those essays
that ushered in the agent – structure debate is Alexander Wendt’s
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appropriately titled essay, “The Agent – Structure Problem in Inter-
national Relations Theory.”13 What is immediately of note is that
Wendt accepts that “agent” and “structure” are not the only choices
of terms that could be employed to frame the problem under inves-
tigation. According to Wendt (1987, 338–339), in other academic
disciplines different sets of terminology, including “ ‘parts – whole,’
‘actor – system,’ and ‘micro – macro’ problems all reflect the same
meta-theoretical imperative—the need to adopt, for the purpose of
explaining social behavior, some conceptualization of the ontological
and explanatory relationship between social actors or agents (in this
case, states) and societal structures (in this case, the international
system).”14
Three interesting points arise in Wendt’s choice of the metaphors
of “agent” and “structure” over the other terms (“parts – whole,”
“actor – system,” “micro – macro”) he says are available. First, as
Wendt himself admits (339, fn. 6), the literature on states treats them
as both agents and structures depending on the theoretical perspective
employed. Second, Wendt’s formulation contains a mixed metaphor
in that it equates societal “structure” with the international “system.”
As we have seen before (see Chapter 3), much international relations
theory treats “system” and “structure” as unique, albeit interact-
ing and interrelated, analytical concepts, so merging them as Wendt

does combines two theoretical categories that can be and have been
conceived of metaphorically as distinct ontological phenomena.
Third, Wendt is not entirely clear about why he chooses the
metaphorical “agent – structure” terminology over the other for-
mulations available in the theoretical literature from other academic
disciplines. Wendt (338) writes: “The absence of a single, imme-
diately compelling conception of the agent – structure relation has
spawned a variety of conceptualizations of the relationship across the
social sciences, each reflecting the particular philosophical and practi-
cal commitments of its parent theoretical discourse.” Wendt (ibid.)
then adds parenthetically, “(My own adoption of the language of
‘agents’ and ‘structures,’ therefore, is not theory-neutral).” What is
curious is that Wendt does not elaborate on the theoretical choices
that lead him to adopt the language of “agents” and “structures”
over the other options available (i.e., the ones he lists—“parts –
whole,” “actor – system,” “micro – macro”). If the choice of “agent –
structure” is not theory-neutral, then what theory is being engaged?
On this Wendt is strangely silent.
This is no small point. There is no definitive or optimal word with
which to describe the actors that constitute international relations
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and the context in which they interact. As we have seen, metaphors
are instrumental in leading scholars to the models they rely on to
conceptualize abstract phenomena and the assumptions, hypotheses,
and theoretical propositions they suggest about the subject matter
that is the object of their study (see Brown 2003). In the study of
international relations how one refers to the actors involved and the
context in which they interact is therefore not an insignificant mat-
ter. Wendt, for whatever reason, has chosen “agent” and “structure”
over other terms available. Furthermore, for Wendt “agent” means
“state.” On this Wendt is not necessarily alone. At certain junctures
in the study of international relations actors have been labeled sim-
ply as “states” since it has been thought that these were the only
relevant actors in world affairs. More recently, many scholars would
maintain that relevant actors comprise a wide variety of state and
non-state entities, including, but not limited to, governments and
government agencies, international organizations, nongovernmental
organizations, multinational corporations, supranational institutions,
and individuals. Throughout this book I frequently refer to interna-
tional “actors,” which I readily admit is a metaphor, although I try to
use this term in a very limited sense as entities that interact with other
actors or exercise actions, without making any assumptions about what
motivates those actions or arriving at any conclusions about what

those actions imply about the nature of international relations. Thus,

while no less a metaphor than the “agent – structure” debate, the
option of referring to the “actor – structure” debate is available to
scholars.
Indeed, Walter Carlsnaes (1992, 246) treats “actor” and “agent”
as synonyms in the agent – structure debate. However, I would argue
that there is a subtle difference that is worth exploring. As opposed
to “actor,” “agent” as a metaphor implies more assumptions about
the nature of those entities that are involved with their surrounding
environment (the metaphorical “structure”). Chiefly, “agent” implies
a purposefulness of will. When one speaks of “agency” one is referring
to a self-consciousness of being and intent. Dictionary definitions of
“agency” include its synonymous nature with “instrumentality” (see,
e.g., American Heritage Dictionary, 33).15 In fact, what makes the
“agent – structure” a debate at all is that scholars have seen the neces-
sity of making an analytical distinction between the organic nature of a
surrounding structure and the purposeful acts of agents in making this
structure. The debate over the relationship between agent and struc-
ture is precisely that scholars disagree over whether structure can be
analytically distinguished from the agency of actors that populate that
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structure. It is thus fascinating that the debate is built on metaphorical
imagery that, perhaps, has created a debate where there might not be
one if alternative terms were used.
Moreover, there is no universal agreement among scholars that
international actors even have the self-consciousness of being and
action that the metaphor of “agency” implies. For example, in her
feminist retelling of international relations, Cynthia Enloe (1989)
has argued that many of the actors that participate in international
relations often are unaware of their participation or the effects that
international relations has on them. For Enloe there is no linear set of
actions that has a one-way effect from “agent” to “structure” or back,
but rather a whole that is constituted by actors (of which corporate
actors, such as states, may be one), their actions, and the environment
that is made of, influenced by, and has an impact on their being and
actions.
Enloe is onto something here. One of the major problems with
the “agent” half of the agent – structure debate is that it requires a
philosophical reflection on agency that could be avoided if some other
metaphorical term were chosen. This is not to suggest that the state
as one, the dominant, or even the sole actor in international relations
be ruled out, thus avoiding the prospect that international relations
as a subject of inquiry disappears, for as Colin Wight (2006, 177)

observes, “without a notion of the ‘state-as-agent’ the distinction

between political theory and international theory collapses.” It also
does not suggest that reflecting on the nature of agency, as Wight
does, is not a worthwhile endeavor (it is). Rather, inasmuch as Wight
(179) points out that there is a distinction between “persons” and
“agents,” to the extent that states are not persons (a position Wight
readily asserts), dispensing with the metaphor of state agency permits
analysis of what states do as opposed to what purposes they pursue.16
Given that the purposes of agency are discerned from actions, elim-
inating the metaphor of state agency also avoids the dilemma of
drawing inferences about intent from state behavior, a tricky business
if there ever was one. The outcomes of states as actors are relatively
easy to see; divining the intents of states as agents is a much harder
thing to do. Unpacking the state to identify the individuals and cor-
porate actors (including those that form and act on a transnational
basis) permits for an identification of interests—formed wittingly or
unwittingly as Enloe argues frequently is the case—better than taking
the metaphor of agency, state or otherwise, as a starting point.17
As for “structure,” the way it brings to mind a metaphorical
physical edifice is especially interesting given the increasing attention
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to ideational elements in the constitution of international relations.
“Agents,” whether they are individual humans or corporate entities
such as states or international organizations, interact with words and
ideas differently than they do with physical structures. People may
speak metaphorically about “hitting a brick wall” when communi-
cating with a stubborn, obstinate, or uncommunicative individual,
or when confronting an idea that causes them consternation, or
when they have writer’s block, or when they run afoul of some
societal institution or convention. But these are all different things,
expressed metaphorically, than literally hitting a brick wall. Physical
structure constrains and has an impact on individuals in an apprecia-
bly different way than do the constellation of ideas and institutions
that are expressed metaphorically in international relations theory as
“structure.”
Defining the debate as one between agent and “structure” thus
privileges the physical and material aspects of international relations,
which, ironically, do not figure singularly in IR theory as they once
did. Ideational elements inhere within the very minds of agents and
therefore analytically cannot ever really be divorced from agency in
the same way that physical structure can be, at least for analyti-
cal purposes. While some postmodern scholars may argue that even
the material bases of reality are given through ideas, it is easier to

think about material structures as distinct from the products of minds

than it is ideational elements. Agency from a metaphorical point of
view makes possible the ideational environment in which individu-
als interact; structure from a metaphorical perspective contains and
restrains individuals. The “agent – structure” debate, then, is a debate
because it is metaphorically set up to be one. It juxtaposes purposeful
will and physical constraints and then asks how these two forces can
be resolved.
The resolution of the debate is a function of the metaphorical way
the debate is presented. The metaphors of agency and structure set up
the plot lines in the narratives told about international relations. The
protagonists are willful actors making decisions in the context of mate-
rial constraints. International relations presented in this way challenges
scholars to discern the sources of actors’ interests and intents and to
further define the constraining environment in which events unfold.
Rather than the “chicken-or-egg” problem with which the agent –
structure debate commonly is associated, the relationship between
actors and their surroundings is understood better as an ongoing nar-
rative of choices and consequences that drive the story forward. What
motivates and results from those choices involves change that itself
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involves further metaphorical imagery as the next section shows.
Evolutionary Metaphors in International

Relations Theory
The dynamics of change in international relations lend themselves to
metaphorical formulations, and in recent years the favored metaphor-
ical image with which scholars have framed change is the metaphor
of biological evolution. George Modelski and Kazimierz Poznanski
(1996, 316) summarize this renewed emphasis on explaining change
in international relations as follows: “The shift from mechanics to
biology . . . involves moving from statics to dynamics.” Specifically,
biological evolution involves similar processes that are hypothesized
to take place in social settings in general and international relations
in particular: “Biological and social systems are both subject to evolu-
tionary processes and for that reason share certain similarities. They
are complex systems that exhibit selection pressures, and coopera-
tive and synergistic features; and in their transformations they employ
information and thrive on innovation” (ibid.).
It should be clear that what Modelski and Poznanski propose is
using biological evolution as a metaphor since evolution and change
are not the same thing. Change is a generic concept that merely

involves any process of “altering,” “modifying,” or “replacing one

thing for another” (American Heritage Dictionary, 319). A person
can change the hand towels in his or her guest bathroom and that
does not represent a process of “evolution.” By contrast, evolution is
a specific process of change involving “a gradual process” or “grad-
ual development” (American Heritage Dictionary, 636). In biology
(the realm that provides a basis for a metaphor of change in inter-
national relations), evolution is “the theory that groups of organisms
change with passage of time, mainly as a result of natural selection,
so that descendants differ morphologically and physiologically from
their ancestors” (American Heritage Dictionary, 636). Thus, when
referring to “evolution,” scholars such as Modelski and Poznanski
are suggesting that change in international relations can be thought
of metaphorically as a specific type of change involving not just the
replacing of actors and relationships with other ones but a process of
selection that is inherent in social relationships similar to that which
occurs among biological units.18 This metaphor has gained currency
either implicitly or explicitly among a large number of scholars of
With regard to explicit manifestations of the evolution metaphor,
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Modelski and Poznanski’s propositions are elaborated in a 1996
special issue of International Studies Quarterly that their essay intro-
duced. Modelski (1996, 321) himself, for example, proposes that
among the aspects of international relations that evolve are the “insti-
tutions of world politics” by which is meant “constitutive and widely
accepted arrangements in respect to war and peace, nation-states,
alliances, and international organization, and to global leadership and
international law” as well as the “rise and decline of world powers.”
Unlike biological evolution, however, evolution in international rela-
tions is a conscious effort effected by “a learning process, of which the
key operators are variation (innovation), cooperation, selection, and
reinforcement” (ibid., 331).19 What is interesting about this is that
in biological evolution natural selection is not a product of conscious
effort. Adaptations that permit a species to exist are passed down to
successive generations, while maladaptive and disadvantageous muta-
tions can lead to species extinction. The only measure of “success”
in biological evolution is that advantageous changes are passed on to
succeeding generations. In Modelski’s metaphorical image of evolu-
tion in international relations, by contrast, variation is not “natural”
but the product of “learning” involving “cooperation, selection, and
reinforcement,” which, if not necessarily conscious, then at the very
least are deliberate.

One can note, as Andrew Farkas (1996, 343) does, that delibera-
tion need not be rational in the sense it is understood in rational choice
theory: “Evolutionary models show how a collective actor, such as a
state, can appear to behave rationally, even if the individuals who com-
prise that actor are not rational themselves.” The evolution here is still
metaphorical inasmuch as biological organisms are neither assumed to
be rational nor deliberate in their actions. That is to say, an organism
may deliberately choose some action, for example, selecting food or
even electing a mate for procreation, but there is no conscious deci-
sion or effort to procreate for the purposes of producing offspring
with certain qualities. In other words, there is no decision among
biological organisms to evolve. On the other hand, although ratio-
nality may not be involved, foreign policy actors can make conscious
and/or deliberate decisions to bring about change (or stasis, as the
case may be). Thus, as Farkas (359) writes, the “evolutionary model
demonstrates how a group of nonrational actors can behave as if it
were a unitary, expected-utility maximizer.” Metaphorical “evolution”
here is not spontaneous but the product of decisions, as individually
nonrational as they may be.
The current popularity of the evolution metaphor is illustrated
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in the way it is found in a variety of theoretical perspectives that
cross paradigmatic boundaries. For example, one notable application
of evolution as an extended metaphor in international relations is
Ann Florini’s discussion of changes in international norms. Florini
conceptualizes norms in a way similar to “genes.” Changed norms
are metaphorically seen as “genetic inheritance,” and selection of
norms as “the reproductive mechanism.” Florini’s model contains
three elements: “First, genes and norms have similar functions as the
instructional units directing the behavior of their respective organ-
isms . . . Second, genes and norms are both transmitted from one indi-
vidual to another through similar processes of inheritance . . . Third,
norms, like genes, are ‘contested’—that is, they are in competition
with other norms that carry incompatible instructions” (Florini 1996,
367, emphasis in the original). Florini (370) embeds her evolutionary
model of norms within a larger metaphorical image of the interna-
tional system as a biological system divided into different levels of
social (as opposed to biological) life: “Natural selection can be ana-
lyzed as working at the level of the gene (norm), the whole organism
(state), or the entire population of organisms (system).” As with other
treatments of change in international relations using an evolution
metaphor, however, evolutionary IR theory focusing on norms dif-
fers from biological evolution by imputing to actors the ability to

consciously bring about change. Thus, in Florini’s formulation the

behavior of international actors as shaped by norms (metaphorically
seen as genes) takes place not because of exogenous environmen-
tal shocks but by “nonrandom changes in the behavior of existing
states—that is, by rewarding the behaviors that express certain norms
and penalizing other behaviors” (ibid., 371).20 Genetic evolution is
thus not so much a model for normative change as it is a metaphor
for it.
Political units, too, are said to be subject to the kinds of pro-
cesses of natural selection Florini describes for norms. As Alexander
Wendt (1999, 321) writes: “Natural selection is not about a war of
all against all, but about differential reproductive success. This can
be used to explain the evolution of a species (states vs. city-states),
or of traits (identities and interests) within a species, but the mech-
anism is the same, the reproductive success of organisms.” Wendt’s
formulation adds yet another level to the evolution metaphor, that
of successive generations in a social and political context. In biologi-
cal evolution, when members of a species reproduce they bring forth
corporeally distinct entities. Hence, there is both a temporal as well
as a material aspect to biological evolution. Literally speaking, states,
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city-states, identities, and interests do not re-“produce” themselves in
the sense that they do not produce new corporate entities. Metaphor-
ically, however, Wendt’s conception of evolution conceives of a state
in time T and a state in time T+1 as corporeally distinct entities. This
has an influence on whatever theoretical propositions emanate from
this metaphor since political entities in the future will be theorized as
occupying a distinct material space and not just a new temporal space.
This is not to say that Wendt or others actually believe that political
entities literally reproduce themselves as physically distinct offspring,
yet the metaphor creates that presumption for the purposes of theoriz-
ing about political evolution whether that is intended or not. Perhaps
this is why in Wendt’s formulation of anarchy qualitatively takes dif-
ferent forms; it is something that can change gradually, but it also
can be reproduced as a separate material entity through processes of
evolutionary natural selection.21
The evolution metaphor also has been applied to specific areas
of international relations. One prominent example is international
cooperation as elaborated in Robert Axelrod’s celebrated Evolution
of Cooperation (1984). Axelrod’s work is noteworthy for several rea-
sons. First, Axelrod uses “evolution” as a bidirectional metaphor,
working from biological processes to social behavior and then back
again. Like other scholars of international relations who borrow the

concept of evolution from biology, Axelrod postulates that human

interactions can be imagined using the vocabulary of natural selec-
tion. For example, in discussing strategies of cooperation that are
resistant to noncooperative behavior Axelrod (1984, 56) frames these
strategies in biological terms: “The biological motivation for this
approach is based on the payoffs in terms of fitness (survival and
number of offspring).” Axelrod then moves in the other direction,
applying “evolution” of cooperation in human settings to biolog-
ical processes. In Chapter 5 of Evolution of Cooperation Axelrod
(with William D. Hamilton) discusses how evolution among bio-
logical organisms can be imagined in terms of human cooperation.
Since human cooperation itself is explored with the aid of biologi-
cal evolution as a metaphor, biological evolution imagined as human
cooperation thus renders human cooperation itself as a metaphor.
As Axelrod discusses, “cooperation” among biological organisms does
not require that such organisms possess a brain. For example, bacte-
ria are capable of what Axelrod (18) deems “cooperation.” Human
change, engineered via deliberate acts of cooperation and labeled
“evolution” is then used metaphorically to explain the behaviors of
biological units.
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A second notable aspect of Axelrod’s treatment of the evolution
metaphor is the mixing of metaphors that are employed to maximize
the effect of the imagery involved. Some of these mixed metaphors
combine biological processes with what are typically associated with
human actions. For example, in his discussion of cooperation strate-
gies that are stable, Axelrod (56) refers to noncooperative strategies
that “invade” a population. Whether or not “invasive” strategies are
the product of choice or randomness is not entirely clear, although
these “invasive” strategies are depicted with metaphors that at once
suggest human qualities (“newcomers”) and random biological pro-
cesses (“mutants”) (ibid.). Furthermore, Axelrod’s project is pre-
sented in the context of game theory with special attention to the
social scenario of the metaphorical “Prisoner’s Dilemma,” which will
be discussed at greater length in Chapter 7.
The final notable aspect of Axelrod’s use of “evolution” as a
metaphor is the choice of such a term when more literal expressions
are available that convey the same principles. The title of Chapter 3
of Evolution of Cooperation employs such a literal term, namely, “The
Chronology of Cooperation.” As discussed previously, a literal term
can be distinguished from a metaphorical one inasmuch as the former
upholds the “exact or primary meaning of a word” while the latter
entails “one thing conceived of as representing another” (American

Heritage Dictionary, 1050, 1134). While all language is in some form

or another literal and metaphorical, words and expressions fall along a
spectrum of being more or less one or the other. Compared with “evo-
lution,” “chronology” is a more literal term meaning the “sequence”
or “arrangement of events in time” (American Heritage Dictionary,
342). By “chronology” of cooperation Axelrod means the events that
lead from decision to cooperation. This a straightforward descrip-
tion that would not likely confuse the average reader. By contrast,
the “evolution” of cooperation employs a metaphor that conjures up
biological processes that may or may not correspond to strategic inter-
action among conscious human agents (just as human cooperation
as a metaphor may or may not accurately depict biological change).
Hence, it is interesting from a theoretical point of view that Axelrod
builds his theory on a metaphor at the same time that he uses the
simple language of chronology to lay out the processes by which
cooperation is produced.
“Evolution” Versus “Construction”

An interesting aspect of the evolution metaphor in international rela-
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tions theory is its coincidence with the increasing influence of the
Constructivist paradigm. While both perspectives have enjoyed ris-
ing popularity in recent years, their approaches to theorizing change
employ very distinct metaphorical frames. Specifically, the evolu-
tionary metaphor involves the sort of biological imagery that has
dominated modern international relations theory while the Construc-
tivist approach, which entails metaphors of “construction,” recalls
the mechanistic metaphors that were the provenance of interna-
tional relations theory from the advent of the Renaissance through
to the beginnings of the nineteenth century (see Chapter 8). What
is particularly ironic is that many Constructivists employ evolutionary
metaphors leading to a depiction of international relations that relies
to some extent on mixed metaphorical frames.
At first blush this might seem like a trivial matter. Mixed metaphors
are common in everyday communication and few people are confused
when they encounter them. When someone says “John was sink-
ing in quicksand but then kicked the ball through the goal posts”
most listeners would get the point of what was intended (some-
one named John experienced some difficulty but then achieved his
objective) despite the mixed metaphorical images. However, as was
discussed in Chapter 2 (see especially Brown 2003), metaphors in aca-
demic inquiry have a subtle yet appreciable impact on the creation

of scientific models and the formulation of theories. For example,

imagining genetic structures metaphorically as strings of proteins
assembled into chromosome strands allows researchers to hypothesize
the course of mutations depending on where proteins are metaphor-
ically “located” along those strands. In Constructivist approaches to
change in international relations we see a combination of metaphors
of “evolution” and “construction.”
The name of the Constructivist paradigm itself contains a
metaphor, specifically, the metaphor of “construction.” For Con-
structivists international relations are actively “constructed” by actors
in an ongoing fashion, including how the international “system” is
made up of metaphorical “structures.” Where Constructivism dif-
fers with other major paradigms, in particular Neorealism, is that
whereas “Neorealists think [structure] is made only of a distribu-
tion of material capabilities . . . Constructivists think it is also made
of social relationships” (Wendt 1995, 73, emphasis added). I have
emphasized the word “made” in the quoted passage from Wendt to
indicate that, for Constructivists, what matters in explaining inter-
national relations is how metaphorical structures are metaphorically
“made” or, as Constructivists put it, “constructed.”22 Literally speak-
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ing, to “construct” something is to “form by assembling or combining
parts; build; to create (an argument or a sentence, for example) by sys-
tematically arranging ideas or terms” (American Heritage Dictionary,
404–405). Furthermore, the metaphorical “construction materials”
Constructivists conceive of as being used by actors include non-
material resources such as ideas, principles, rules, meanings, norms,
identities, and roles.
It did not have to be this way. If not for the awkwardness of
the term, what is known today as Constructivism could bear, for
some, the moniker of “Constitutivism.” Nicholas Onuf (1989, 36),
who in many ways is associated with some of the earliest writings
on what has become known as “Constructivism,” writes as follows:
“In the beginning was the deed. I call this position constructivism.
In simplest terms, people and societies construct, or constitute, each
other. Inasmuch as I take the terms ‘construct’ and ‘constitute’ to be
synonymous, I could just as well call the position their use reflects
constitutivism but for the evident awkwardness of the term” (empha-
sis in the original). What started as linguistic convenience, however,
both reveals and encourages a metaphorical envisioning of interna-
tional relations as constructed, or made, of that which it constitutes.
It is perhaps not an accident, then, that the title of Onuf’s book from
which the quote is excerpted is World of Our Making (bold text

added for emphasis). Constructivism is a paradigm that studies how

international relations is metaphorically constructed, or made.23
In theorizing about international relations evolutionary metaphors
suggest different sets of hypotheses about change than do mechanistic
metaphors with an emphasis on images of “construction.” Basic evolu-
tionary theory posits that external or environmental shocks can cause
genetic mutations in an organism. If these mutations provide advan-
tages to a species they will be passed on to successive generations and
become dominant genetic traits. If they are disadvantageous adapta-
tions they will harm those members of the species that carry them and
will be passed on to successive generations with such lack of frequency
that they become either recessive or nonexistent. (If the mutations
are neither advantageous nor disadvantageous, such as the color of
the coat of some mammals, they will occur with random frequency
in subsequent generations depending on mating patterns.) As we
have seen, hypotheses about change in international relations that
are prompted by evolutionary metaphors posit change that is brought
about by environmental shifts and spread to the extent that it allows
international actors to thrive relative to material and/or ideational
constraints including but not limited to the actions of other actors
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and institutions in the realm of world affairs. This is the explicit model
employed in Ann Florini’s theory of international norms previously
discussed.
A very different theory of international change is suggested by the
metaphorical imagery of “construction” that is deployed by some of
the same Constructivists who advance evolutionary models of change.
Change involving a machine or other mechanical structure occurs
quite differently than it does through processes of biological evolu-
tion. If we imagine a machine made up of many parts, if one were to
change one or more of the parts any number of things could happen.
One possibility is the machine could break or stop working. However,
it could also continue to work but with different functions and/or
different outputs. For example, a machine that manufactures some-
thing along an assembly line could be made to produce something
different with the change of a few parts (e.g., a sheet metal machine
could stamp out a car door instead of a piece of metal roofing with
a change in the stamping die). Furthermore, to use the language of
Constructivist scholars of international relations, a machine is “con-
stituted” by its part and could be reconstituted by constructing those
parts in different ways. Or, to use yet more Constructivist language,
a house could be constructed using a variety of house “frames,” and
it is those frames that give shape to the house. Changing the size or

shape of the frame produces a differently shaped house. These types

of change are quite distinct from evolutionary change.
The mixed evolution/construction metaphor is found in a vari-
ety of Constructivist writings. Although Constructivism’s nominal
foundation is the construction metaphor, the evolution metaphor
has found its way into Constructivist thought highlighting the fact
that, for Constructivists, much of the discourse of rival theories
of international relations ignores processes of change. For example,
Alexander Wendt employs metaphorical images of evolution when
he writes of “natural selection” and the way in which social interac-
tion brings about units that adapt to changing material circumstances
(Wendt 1999, 318–326). In ways, Wendt’s evolutionary metaphors
are extensions of the core construction metaphors of the Construc-
tivist paradigm in that, unlike the self-propelling qualities of biological
evolution, the evolution that Wendt sees in international relations
depends on the agency of actors, just as political agents play an active
role “constructing” international relations.
When these metaphorical images of construction are applied to
theories of change in international relations they produce theories of
change that rest on hypotheses and propositions that are very different
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from the ones that follow from a metaphorical language of evolution.
For example, the discourse that constitutes the socially constructed
reality of international relations presents policy options to decision
makers and policymakers. One could hypothesize that minor changes
in that discourse perhaps do not wholly reconstitute policymakers’
reality, but it can “produce” (much as a machine produces something)
different policy options that are appropriate (using the language of
the logic of appropriateness) under the circumstances. Similarly, one
could hypothesize that large-scale changes in discourse, including the
introduction of new frames of reference by which policymakers’ reality
is constructed, can reconstitute the realm of possibilities that policy-
makers refer to when considering what constitutes legitimate actors in
international relations, relevant institutions, and possible means for
interacting with others and with institutional environments. These
changes do not “evolve” by means of adaptation but rather are pro-
duced by a changed construction of what is seen as relevant reality.
Again, the irony is that these dual metaphorical languages of evolu-
tion and construction exist side-by-side in contemporary international
relations theory and bring about an eclectic set of theories of change
that mix together two distinct traditions of biological and mechanistic
imagery that have existed with varying degrees of influence over the
course of the study of international relations.

To sum up this section, evolutionary metaphors in international

relations theory in many respects reflect the state of the art in the
progression of IR thought. As will be discussed in Chapter 8, chang-
ing conceptions of international relations have involved metaphorical
perspectives that alternate between mechanistic and biological images
of the world. Much as these mechanistic and biological metaphors
framed inquiry in earlier times, in contemporary international rela-
tions theory change is conceptualized using metaphors of evolutionary
processes. Interestingly enough, the present focus on evolutionary
change incorporates earlier mechanistic and biological metaphors in
subtle yet potentially profound ways. The shift from mechanistic
to biological metaphors represented a fundamental transformation
in international relations theory whereby relations among interna-
tional actors were theorized in organic rather than man-made terms.
Mechanistic metaphors imagined a world made by conscious forces
with a purposeful will. Biological metaphors, by contrast, imagined
a world of organic forces. From an epistemological standpoint, the
dominance of biological metaphors coincided with the rise of scien-
tific and quasi-scientific approaches to the study of the social world.
Human relations, including those reflected in international relations,
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are seen to be amenable to rational inquiry using the scientific method.
It would appear that the current popularity of evolutionary models
would represent the culmination of this trend.
However, the concomitant rise of constructionist paradigms—most
notably, the Constructivist paradigm in IR—indicates an ironic res-
urrection of mechanistic metaphors that posit a man-made world
of international relations. Understanding man-made social realities
involves an interpretivist epistemology at odds with scientific posi-
tivism that for the most part has ruled the day in modern IR thought.
That some Constructivists have presented themselves as scientific real-
ists indicates the tension that comes with the mixed metaphorical
juxtaposition of evolutionary metaphors within a paradigm overlaid
with mechanistic metaphorical imagery. The current trend in IR
theory, then, involves in part an epistemological debate in which
metaphors of evolutionary change will determine the outcome.
Theoretical Narratives
In arguing that theoretical perspectives and choices represent the nar-
rative plot by which the story of international relations is told, it
should be noted that the concept of narrative itself is metaphorical.
Quite obviously, the study of international relations is an analytical

affair, not a literary one. Donald Polkinghorne (1988, 21) makes

a distinction between narrative explanation and logico-mathematical
reasoning, the latter of which relies on finding law-like or patterned
relationships among a class of phenomena. Theories of international
relations for the most part stress causal explanation, as the theories
discussed in this chapter amply illustrate. But they also depend on
a prior identification of what is important to be explained. “In the
narrative schema for organizing information, an event is understood
to have been explained when its role and significance in relation to
a human project is identified” (Polkinghorne 21, emphasis added).
Causal explanations of international relations have a significance when
they account for what has been laid out in a prior narrative structure.
What metaphors do in this process is distinguish one concept of
international relations from another so that the process of identify-
ing causal explanations can be undertaken. The main paradigms in
the study of international relations reflect metaphorical conceptions
of the actors and environments, that is, the plot, of world affairs. This
is part of what differentiates one paradigm from another. If all that
were required for the social science practice of identifying variables and
cause-and-effect relationships was an empirical accounting of events,
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there would be few if any paradigmatic debates in IR. However, as is
true in the physical and natural sciences, metaphors frame and delin-
eate competing theoretical perspectives. Physicists and chemists tell
stories of what matters just as scholars of international relations do.
This chapter has shown how metaphorical narratives of international
relations define theoretical debates and the conclusions that are drawn
from them.

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Chapter 5
M e ta p h o r s o f Pow e r
P revious chapters have unraveled the essential ingredients of the

metaphorical narrative of international relations, including the setting
for the narrative, the main actors involved, and the general plot. How-
ever, before any story can fully unfold, the author and the audience of
the story alike must know what the story is “about.” One could say
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that the story of international relations is “about” international rela-
tions, but this is an obvious circularity and is tantamount to saying
that the novel War and Peace is about war and peace. That would be
a facile observation at its most extreme, since it fails to highlight what
the novel really is “about,” that is, Tolstoy’s examination of the exis-
tential struggles of Russian aristocratic society in the face of political
upheaval. Likewise, from the perspective of IR scholars, international
relations is not simply a chronicling of facts pertaining to political and
economic relations among states and other actors, but it is “about”
larger matters of human affairs. In particular, many scholars of inter-
national relations would say that their the chief (although not sole)
concern is offering a narrative explanation “about” the nature and
functions of something called “power” and, in particular, how it is
metaphorically conceived.
Despite the centrality of power to the narrative of international
relations, the term “power” in international relations theory is highly
problematic from an analytical point of view. The word “power” is
defined in the dictionary quite simply as “the ability or capacity to
perform or act effectively” or “strength or force exerted or capable
of being exerted” and comes from the Latin potēre or potis, meaning
“to be able” (American Heritage Dictionary, 1420). This definition
seems relatively straightforward and most people use the term casually

in this sense. However, things are actually more complicated than this.
For example, there is not necessarily universally agreed among scholars
that power need imply acting “effectively” as the dictionary definition
supplies nor that power is synonymous with “strength” or what can
be “exerted” in terms of “force.” Rather, most scholars would agree
that power is “fungible,” can take many forms, and cannot be reduced
to or equated with “strength” or what might be qualified or measured
as “force.” In addition, the ingredients and qualities of power are not
known a priori, but rather, often are observed empirically, and theo-
ries of power frequently are derived ex post facto. Since power therefore
is theorized only very difficultly, scholars often resort to metaphorical
frameworks with which to describe power and its effects. What fol-
lows is an examination of the metaphors of power in international
relations including how power is conceptualized in its various forms
and functions.
The Balance of Power Metaphor

The metaphor of the, or a, balance of power is one of the most preva-
lent images in all of international relations theory. While the balance
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of power concept is also rooted in myth and model, Richard Little
(2007, 21) notes without ambiguity that “the balance of power is a
metaphorical expression.” Little (29) continues that because a large
number of scholars have adopted “a negative or ornamental view of
metaphors,” he sees a need to critically examine the concept and thus
devotes an entire book to exploring the balance of power as metaphor-
ical image. The purpose of the discussion in this chapter thus is not
to duplicate Little’s considerable and valuable efforts. Rather, what is
aimed for in this section is to elaborate some key points made by Little
and others and to situate the balance of power metaphor in the larger
context of conceptions of power and the use of metaphors in the study
of international relations in general.
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the first appearance
of the concept of the “balance of power” (defined as “such an
adjustment of power among sovereign states that no single state
is in a position to interfere with the independence of the rest;
international equilibrium”) in the English language dates to 1677,
specifically in a quote from Andrew Yarranton, who in England’s
Improvement by Sea and Land referred to “the Ballance of Europe.”
The idea of a balance of power as articulated in other languages is
much older and its conceptualization in metaphorical terms can be
traced back to the Renaissance, most notably, according to Matthew

M e ta p h o r s o f Pow e r 83
Anderson, the writings of Francesco Barbaro who first used the expres-
sion in 1439 with reference to the machinations of the Italian city
states.1
Harald Kleinschmidt (2000, 117) elaborates this history, noting
that “already late in the fifteenth century, conceptions of the balance
among rulers were expressed in binary dichotomies.” The political
import of the balance of power metaphor is chronicled by Moorhead
Wright and later Michael Sheehan, who note that in 1598 the Italian
Renaissance jurist Alberto Gentili employed the metaphor of atoms
and molecules in his praise of Lorenzo de Medici’s manipulation of
the balance of power:
The maintenance of union among the atoms is dependent upon their equal
distribution; and on the fact that one molecule is not surpassed in any respect
by another . . . That it is which was the constant care of Lorenzo de Medici,
that wise man, friend of peace and father of peace, namely that the balance
of power should be maintained among the princes of Italy. This he believed
would give peace to Italy as indeed it did so long as he lived and preserved that
condition of affairs. (Alberto Gentili, De Jure Belli Libri Tres [1598], quoted
in Wright 1975, 13; Sheehan 1996, 32)
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As Sheehan (33) points out, the scientific metaphors brought to bear
on the balance of power metaphor in the Renaissance nonetheless did
not make clear if the balance of power was a naturally occurring phe-
nomenon or something prescribed for and engineered by statesmen
and diplomats as a way to manipulate international relations.2
By the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the balance of power
was increasingly conceptualized with metaphors of machines and
other mechanical objects or astronomical features such as the orbits
and movements of planets around stars. Kleinschmidt (2000, 117)
writes that the scales model “was superseded in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries by the machine model, for which an early
record has been preserved in the political works of Francis Bacon
(1561–1626).”3 Bacon brought his balance of power model to bear
specifically on relations between England and its rivals during the
course of the Thirty Years War (1618–1648), the end of which Bacon
would not see in his lifetime. “Bacon’s arguments overlapped neatly
with the mechanistic convictions of Comenius and Descartes because
his model of the balance of power was the machine, and they reflected
contemporary conceptualizations of the international system” (ibid.,
122). The eventual influence of this machine metaphor on theories
of international relations was that relations among states was seen to

some extent as self-regulating and not subject to the whims of political

rulers: “According to this concept, the system was a system of ‘states’
and formed the fixed outward frame for its member units. The poli-
ties forming this ‘European state system’ were thus tied together like
parts of a machine. They represented a well-ordered, static and hierar-
chically arrayed assembly of units which was credited with the ability
to repair itself” (ibid.).
That the balance of power metaphor has been expressed in nat-
uralistic and mechanistic terms is not surprising. As Alfred Vagts
observed in 1948, the “balance” metaphor is pervasive in any number
of fields of inquiry. Vagts’ observation is instructive and worthwhile
to reproduce at length:
As soon as a dichotomy is stated in any field of thought, political or otherwise,

among the western peoples today, the harmonization formula of “balance”
is promptly raised. Whenever expenditure is overshooting income, the call
for balanced budgets follows. Economists speak of a balance of supply and
demand, the upsetting of which, with resultant depression or inflation, is
awaited with some eagerness by Soviet economists. Other sciences demand
a balanced diet, where there is enough to eat and to choose from, a glan-
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dular balance, a balance of age groups in a nation, a balance in nature which
seems disturbed if not enough or too many of one species of animals are killed
off. According to some of its outstanding practitioners, medical science in the
West was for some time misled in the diagnosis of disease by the discovery of
bacteria which gave “temporary support to the fallacious causality principle”
and thus “vastly retarded progress in scientific medical thinking,” although
it is now found that for the true diagnosis “the imbalance, the organismic
disequilibrium is the real thing” to study. (Vagts 1948, 83)4
Vagts (84) continues that when political metaphors involving “bal-

ance” are used loosely enough (e.g., in discussions of a “balanced”
defense) they can create much confusion as to what actually con-
stitutes a “balance.” As Vagts (87–88) astutely points out in a way
that perhaps indicates an intuitive comprehension of metaphors later
spelled out by cognitive linguists, “the language of politics is rarely as
unequivocal as other terminologies, reminding us of the ‘unlawlike’
nature of the social sciences. Political language is formed by the con-
fluence terms from various other fields—ethics, the arts, philosophy,
religion, the sciences, techniques of various kinds . . . It was the world-
openness of the Renaissance that made political metaphors so strongly
mixed and so ambiguous, perhaps intentionally so.” Since the idea
of “balance” was already broadly accepted “in many another field of

thought and activity” it fit in easily with Renaissance views of political

affairs (ibid., 89).
As far as the prescriptive implications of the balance of power
metaphors, one of the ironies of its use in Renaissance times was that,
unlike its association in contemporary times with theories of “power
politics,” it was associated more with individuals who advocated diplo-
macy over war. As Vagts (100–101) writes, “the aristocratic groups
which accepted the balance image were essentially those preferring
diplomacy to warmaking. Though not averse to wars, they were will-
ing and able to conclude peace, to compromise and to harmonize,
with the help of this very concept, the balance of power.” Thus, as
ambiguous as the concept may have been, its function as a metaphor
was to prioritize certain options over others according to how the
concept was experienced and imagined in the mind and expressed in
words.
In his historical review of the balance of power concept Richard Lit-
tle expands on the “scales” metaphor and its importance to the notion
of the balance of power. Little traces the balance-as-scales metaphor
to biblical times and the Book of Daniel. Just as scales impartially
measure weights, as a metaphor they can also measure impartiality
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and, by extension, justice (Little 2007, 45). However, as applied to
the concept of power the balance-as-scales metaphor is more ambigu-
ous, perhaps because impartiality of power is much harder to achieve
than impartiality of weights. Referring to the nineteenth-century
lithographs of Honoré Daumier depicting the European balance of
power, Little (45–46) writes: “Daumier’s images, for example, asso-
ciate the balance of power with danger and precariousness. These
are unequivocally terms that critics have frequently linked to the
international balance of power, but they are certainly not terms that
necessarily come to mind when the term is called upon colloquially.
As a consequence, they leave the meaning of the term underde-
termined.” Because the scales metaphor is underdetermined, Little
(46–47) argues it has become a “generic image,” one which “tells
us less about the power possessed by the participants as agents and
more about how the power possessed by the members of the system
defines the structure of the social setting” (ibid., 47). Furthermore,
the scales image as a generic metaphor “discourages us from think-
ing that power is hierarchical, monopolized or concentrated in one
location. But it also indicates that power is fluid rather than fixed and
that the power possessed by the actors in the system has to be con-
stantly recalibrated” (ibid., 48). Little (49) asserts that the theoretical
implications of this view are to transform international relations theory

“from an agency-based to a structural-based conception of power,”

a move that Little argues is rarely contested. Eventually, according
to Little, the scales metaphor, which favors an adversarial image of
politics, takes take on the status of myth, eclipsing other metaphorical
images (e.g., metaphors of balance associated with the human body)
that offer a more associational conception of political relations (ibid.,
66–73).
This myth status of an adversarial image of the balance of power
accounts for its influence on modern theories of international rela-
tions, in particular, Realism. With the advent of modern Realist
theory, the historical origins of the balance of power metaphor find
an updated narrative. The adversarial nature of politics that Renais-
sance rulers sought to mitigate through manipulation of alliances finds
expression in mid-twentieth-century international relations theory,
which seeks to explain the nature of alliance behavior. While Lorenzo
de Medici might have been doing what came to him naturally, Realist
scholars of the post – World War II era sought to use the metaphor
of balancing behavior to account for actual observed changes in the
alliance pattern of states. The bulk of Little’s book is focused on how
the balance of power is treated in the works of four contemporary
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authors, three of whom are Realists—Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth
Waltz, and John Mearsheimer (the fourth is Hedley Bull). Of these
three Realists, Morgenthau’s work offers the most vivid metaphorical
images involving the balance of power and therefore merits particular
attention. In the discussion that follows, I refrain from reproducing
Little’s analysis of Morgenthau and instead present my own interpre-
tation of Morgenthau’s work with an emphasis on its metaphorical
aspects.
Morgenthau begins his discussion of the balance of power in Poli-
tics Among Nations with a tacit acknowledgment of the metaphorical
nature of the concept. Observing that the term “balance” is syn-
onymous with “equilibrium,” Morgenthau (1985, 187–188) points
out that the notion of balance “is commonly employed in many
sciences—physics, biology, economics, sociology, and political sci-
ence. It signifies stability within a system composed of a number
of autonomous forces.” Morgenthau illustrates this concept with
metaphorical reference to the human body. He imagines the human
body in state of equilibrium, or at least designed to seek equi-
librium when internal or external forces disrupt the status quo:
“While the human body changes in the process of growth, the equi-
librium persists as long as the changes occurring in the different

organs of the body do not disturb the body’s stability” (ibid., 188).
Morgenthau claims that this same principle is involved in theoriz-
ing in other disciplines such as economics, and thus the body-as-
equilibrium metaphor takes on a universal quality for his application
of the metaphor to the balance of power concept in international
relations.
While Morgenthau relies mainly on a biological metaphor to derive
lessons about the international balance of power, he also employs spa-
tial metaphors to illustrate the relationship among states in the balance
of power. Through a series of illustrations, Morgenthau (194–195)
depicts states in the form of two-dimensional circles, the relation-
ships among which are denoted by a series of arrows indicating the
motion and trajectory of these circles. The circles (labeled as letters of
the alphabet) are of various sizes and are shaded. The different sizes
of the circles indicate their relative power in relation to one another.
This spatial image is similar to the oft-cited “billiard ball” metaphor
that is frequently employed in discussions of balances of power. This
spatial aspect of Morgenthau’s metaphorical conceptualization of the
balance of power is not fully reconciled with the biological human
body metaphor that precedes it.
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Scholars have not been shy about using mixed metaphors in their
conceptualization of international relations, and Morgenthau is not
an exception. To his biological and spatial metaphors of the balance
of power he adds a mechanical one, the metaphor of the balance of
power as a set of scales. The first sentence of Chapter 12 of Politics
Among Nations reads: “The balancing process can be carried on either
by diminishing the weight of the heavier scale or by increasing the
weight of the lighter one” (ibid., 198).5 Morgenthau (213) writes:
“To use the metaphor of the balance, the system may consist of two
scales, in each of which are to be found the nation or nations identified
with the same policy of the status quo or of imperialism.” Morgenthau
then supplements this image with the concept of the “holder” of the
balance of power:
The system may, however, consist of two scales plus a third element, the
“holder” of the balance or the “balancer.” The balancer is not permanently
identified with the policies of either nation or group of nations. Its only
objective within the system is the maintenance of the balance, regardless of
the concrete policies the balance will serve. In consequence, the holder of
the balance will throw its weight at one time in this scale, at another time
in the other scale, guided only by one consideration—the relative position of

the scales. Thus it will put its weight always in the scale that seems to be higher
than the other because it is lighter. (ibid., 213–214)
Morgenthau states that the options available to the holder of the
balance are clear only after the fact, that is, after the scales begin to
fall out of balance. Why the scales lose balance, and why the bal-
ancer prefers stability over advantage (as is the preference of the actors
causing the scales to tip) are questions left unanswered. In the scales
metaphor, the weights do not place themselves in one side of the
scale or the other. Someone made a decision to move the weights
around, and someone else (the metaphorical holder of the balance)
responds. Which is which is only clear after the fact; their motivations
are irrelevant, and thus cannot be explained.
Morgenthau explicitly acknowledges the theoretical limitations of
the balance of power metaphor and its ex post facto nature.6 He states
that a country’s power is constituted by such tangible qualities as “ter-
ritory, population, and armaments” (ibid., 223). But he also assigns
significance to less easily quantifiable elements: “National character
and, above all, national morale and the quality of government, espe-
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cially in the conduct of foreign affairs, are the most important, but also
the most elusive, components of national power” (ibid., 224). Thus,
ex post facto examination of these qualities is the only option avail-
able: “Rational calculation of the relative strength of several nations
which is the very lifeblood of the balance of power, becomes a series
of guesses the correctness of which can be ascertained only in retro-
spect” (ibid., emphasis added). Here Morgenthau concedes to (in the
section heading in which this passage appears) “the uncertainty of the
balance of power” (ibid., 223), and thus the limited predictive abilities
of the concept.
The balance of power metaphor is so pervasive in theories of inter-
national relations that it figures in most major theoretical paradigms.
Its pervasiveness is so extensive that even theorists hostile to Realist
theory tend to have accepted that a metaphorical balance of power
is an essential, if not necessarily influential, feature of international
relations.7 Furthermore, the “balance” metaphor need not necessarily
be limited to a balance of power. In his prognostication about interna-
tional relations in a post–Cold War world, Samuel Huntington (1996)
postulates a “balance of civilizations” in which cultural influence
and interactions as well as traditional conceptions of power deter-
mine relations among states, while Kai He (2008, 492) introduces
the metaphorical concept of “institutional balancing” that involves

states countering “pressures or threats through initiating, utilizing,

and dominating multilateral institutions.”8
“Balancing” Versus “Bandwagoning”
In addition to other forms of balancing (e.g., balance of civilization
and institutional balancing), the “balance of power” metaphor has
given rise to additional metaphors that either refine or modify what
is meant by a metaphorical “balance.” One notable example of this is
the metaphorical concept of “bandwagoning,” which has been posed
as the opposite of “balancing” in the realm of power. The metaphori-
cal “balancing” versus “bandwagoning” contrast has been popularized
by Stephen Walt (1987) although the pedigree of these terms is much
older and can be traced back to Quincy Wright’s monumental work
A Study of War (1942).9 In Volume II of that tome Wright introduces
the metaphor of “bandwagoning” as well as several other metaphorical
terms that he applies to the behavior of third states when confronted
with a bipolar power rivalry. Wright’s metaphorical typology of alliance
behavior is summed up colorfully with a series of metaphors in a
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lengthy passage:
The policies of third states confronted by violent controversy may be classified

as those of isolationist neutrality, prudent preparedness, balance of power, and
collective security. The isolationist neutrals scatter from the conflict like a flock
of chickens attacked by a hawk. The prudent preparers appease the powerful
aggressor in order to divert his attention or to profit by his conquest, like
the jackal following the tiger. The balancers of power spontaneously help the
weaker like a band of apes assisting one of their number in danger. The adher-
ents to collective security collaborate in a prepared plan against aggression as
in human societies enforcing law. (Wright 1942, 1258)
These four policies—“isolationist neutrality,” “prudent preparedness,”

“balance of power,” and “collective security”—are then associated
in a footnote (n. 52) with four sentiments labeled respectively
“neutral,” “bandwagon,” “underdog,” and “juristic.” In short, the
“bandwagon” sentiment for Wright translates into the policy either
of “appeasement in order to divert [the aggressor’s] attention” or
“profit” by following the aggressor like a metaphorical “jackal fol-
lowing the tiger” (Wright, 1258 above). Hence, in its first appear-
ance in the literature the “bandwagoning” metaphor is not a policy
but a “sentiment” that then translates either into a “policy” of
appeasement or collaboration. As a guide for theoretical analysis,

then, the bandwagoning metaphor in Wright is open-ended in its

predictions.
The next reference to “bandwagoning” in the literature is a brief
and passing one. In Discord and Collaboration Arnold Wolfers (1962,
124) writes that there “are instances . . . in which the ‘automatic’
reaction fails to materialize. Some weak countries seek safety by get-
ting on the bandwagon of an ascending power, hoping somehow to
escape complete subjugation once their powerful ‘friend’ has gained
supremacy.” Of Wright’s two policies associated with the sentiment of
bandwagoning—appeasement and profit—Wolfers’ formulation of the
concept is not exactly either, or perhaps it is something in between.
Wolfers appears to use the term “getting on the bandwagon” as it is
commonly associated with the Oxford English Dictionary definition,
“to join in what seems likely to be a successful enterprise, to strive to
join the winning side,” but without necessarily making any assump-
tions about motivation or “sentiment” as spelled out in Wright’s 1942
categorization. In any case, since Wolfer’s use of the term is fleeting it
is not a major component of his theoretical propositions about alliance
behavior.
The “bandwagoning” metaphor makes its next appearance in
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Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics (1979). Waltz, who
erroneously credits Stephen Van Evera with coining the term (Wright
beat him to the punch by 37 years), adds a new twist to the term
by juxtaposing it as the opposite of “balancing.” Waltz compares
bandwagoning and balancing behavior internationally with politi-
cal candidates in domestic partisan contests. Within political parties
“bandwagoning” takes place as “losing candidates throw in their lots
with the winner” (Waltz 1979, 126). In a general election, “balanc-
ing” behavior dominates since smaller parties want to keep one party
from becoming too strong. Translated into international relations
“bandwagoning is sensible behavior where gains are possible even for
the losers and where losing does not place their security in jeopardy”
while “balancing is sensible behavior where the victory of one coali-
tion over another leaves weaker members of the winning coalition at
the mercy of the stronger ones” (ibid.). Two things are worth noting
here. First, Waltz reduces alliance behavior from Wright’s typology
of four policies—“isolationist neutrality,” “prudent preparedness,”
“balance of power,” and “collective security”—associated with four
respective sentiments—“neutral,” “bandwagon,” “underdog,” and
“juristic”—to two policies, “bandwagoning” and “balancing,” thus
losing the nuances inherent in Wright’s cataloging of state disposi-
tions. Second, while Wright draws on metaphorical imagery of animal

behavior (e.g., chickens fleeing hawks, jackals scavenging, apes coming

to each other’s assistance), Waltz relies on the metaphor of the behav-
ior of political parties and candidates to make inferences about the
actions of states. In any case, Waltz’s discussion of “bandwagoning” is
brief and thus awaits a fuller elaboration to flesh out the intricacies of
the metaphorical concept.
Inspired by Waltz, Stephen Walt devotes a large portion of his 1987
book The Origins of Alliances to the juxtaposition of the metaphori-
cal behavior of “balancing” and “bandwagoning.” Walt (1987, 17)
begins by defining his terms: “Balancing is defined as allying with
others against the prevailing threat; bandwagoning refers to align-
ment with the source of danger” (emphasis in the original). The first
thing worth noting here is that Walt takes liberty with the metaphor
of getting on the bandwagon, which, as indicated, is defined by the
Oxford English Dictionary as joining “in what seems likely to be a
successful enterprise, to strive to join the winning side.” That is to
say, one might presume that by aligning with the source of danger
one is either assuming or hoping that side will “likely . . . be a suc-
cessful enterprise,” but there is no guarantee of that, nor does the
OED definition presume that the “winning side” is a source of dan-
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ger to anyone or anything. Instead, although inspired by Waltz’s use
of these terms, Walt’s aim is to challenge Waltz’s assertion that bal-
ancing and bandwagoning occur in the context of power, but rather,
in the face of threat.10 Thus, Walt constructs a modified version of
“balancing” and “bandwagoning” that, although relying on the same
metaphors as Waltz, generates a different set of hypotheses regarding
the patterns of alliance formation. “Balancing” and “bandwagoning”
are loose enough metaphorical terms that they can suit Waltz’s and
Walt’s purposes equally well, but leave scholars free to accept either
or these two meanings for the purposes of making predictions about
the alliance behavior of states. This imprecision gives other scholars an
opportunity to use these terms as they see fit.
Given the historical ambiguity regarding the meanings and theo-
retical implications of the bandwagoning metaphor, there has been
room in recent years to expand the discussion by modifying and
adding to existing metaphorical conceptualizations of the term.11
A good example of this is Randall Schweller’s free ranging 1994 essay,
“Bandwagoning for Profit,” which adds still more layers to the band-
wagon metaphor. To begin, Schweller uses metaphors to illustrate the
bandwagon metaphor itself, specifically, the metaphors of machines:
“The bandwagoning image of international politics pictures the global
order as a complex machine of wheels within wheels. In this highly

interconnected world, small local disruptions quickly grow into large

disturbances as their effects cascade and reverberate throughout the
system. In contrast, the balancing image sees a world composed of
many discrete, self-regulating balance-of-power systems” (Schweller
1994, 72, n. 2).
Qualitatively, Schweller (73) equates bandwagoning with the sen-
timent that “nothing succeeds like success.” Unlike Waltz and Walt,
who see balancing and bandwagoning as opposite strategies toward
the same goal of security (for Waltz they are opposite strategies in the
face of power, for Walt their opposition is in terms of threat), Schweller
(74) sees different strategies toward that end: “In practice . . . states
have very different reasons to choose balancing or bandwagoning.
The aim of balancing is self-preservation and the protection of values
already possessed, while the goal of bandwagoning is usually self-
extension: to obtain values coveted. Simply put, balancing is driven
by the desire to avoid losses; bandwagoning by the opportunity for
gain.” Oddly enough, Schweller (75) claims that he adopts “a dif-
ferent definition of bandwagoning,” which he says, “accords with
common usage of the term” despite lack of common usage. Schweller
(81) asserts that “conventional usage” (as opposed to what he calls
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“common usage” on Schweller, 75) “defines a bandwagon as a can-
didate, side, or movement that attracts adherents or amasses power
by its momentum.” Yet what is meant by “momentum” and how it
has an effect on actors can mean any number of things as Schweller
then indicates by giving distinct examples of the bandwagon principle:
“The phrase ‘to climb aboard the bandwagon’ implies following a cur-
rent or fashionable trend or joining the side that appears likely to win.
Bandwagoning may be freely chosen, or it can be the result of resig-
nation to an inexorable force” (Schweller 81, emphasis added). That
bandwagoning can mean this or that and can be the result of one or
another force illustrates that, as a metaphor, the term is suggestive,
not definitive in its implications.
Imprecision in the bandwagoning metaphor has not been useful in
fostering scholarly activity as illustrated by a somewhat testy exchange
in a forum in the December 1997 issue of the American Political Sci-
ence Review in which several authors (including Schweller) spar over
the meaning of the term “bandwagoning” as a trope for investigat-
ing international alliances (see Schweller 1997, Vasquez 1997, Waltz
1997). In all of these debates (which at times rise to the level of argu-
ment) there is little reflection on the appropriateness of bandwagoning
as a metaphor in imagining alliance behavior nor is there really an crit-
ical examination of what the metaphor implies. In their debates over

bandwagoning, scholars seem to have forgotten states do not literally

bandwagon—least of all in the way the term is defined by the Oxford
English Dictionary; they made the term up. It is a metaphor. Many
scholars have lost sight of this, treating “bandwagoning” literally and
devising metaphors for it. Thus, for example, in search of some way
to make bandwagoning intelligible to the reader, Schweller (1994,
92–98) compares the metaphor of bandwagoning—which he treats as
a literal expression of international alliances—to metaphors of “balls
rolling down an incline,” “positive feedback,” “piling on,” “infec-
tion,” and “falling dominoes,” which he then likens to a metaphorical
“chain reaction.” Furthermore, to “clarify” the situation, Schweller
(100–104) adds additional metaphors of states as animals in the form
of “lions,” “lambs,” “jackals,” and “wolves” lest the reader be want-
ing for metaphorical images with which to conceptualize metaphorical
“balancing” and “bandwagoning” behavior.
Although Schweller may be the most obvious example, scholars
who utilize the “bandwagoning” metaphor have built up a literature
that follows in the tradition of the “balance” metaphor against which
it has been juxtaposed. Bandwagoning has become an activity that is
literally what it is and can be illustrated to the reader with metaphors
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that might otherwise be taken as literal expressions of alliances had the
equation been made the other way. Obviously scholars have proposed
hypotheses and theoretical propositions to predict what the metaphor
of “bandwagoning” is intended to represent. However, like the bal-
ance of power metaphor itself, bandwagoning has at once been reified
and left imprecise. It is a term that means many things and is taken
as a literal expression of international alliance behavior if only scholars
can agree on what it is.
Metaphors of Power “Distribution” and “Polarity”

Power is a tricky concept in international relations, as it is in politics,
society, and physics. It is an abstraction that represents capabilities (or
stored energy in physics), but it also includes the concrete manifes-
tation of those capabilities. The question then arises of how best to
describe where power is, in what quantities, forms, and amounts. One
set of terminology for this is a metaphorical “distribution” of power.
At first blush, this term may sound as close to a literal description as
one can get. However, literal expressions tend to be precise. For exam-
ple, the expression “a highway interchange at which two highways,
one crossing over the other, have a series of entrance and exit ramps
resembling the outline of a four-leaf clover and enabling vehicles to

proceed in either direction on either highway” (American Heritage

Dictionary) is a more precise and therefore more literal way of saying
something than is the metaphorical expression “cloverleaf.” The more
precise and literal the way of saying something the fewer ways there
are of rendering and interpreting it. By contrast, metaphors tend to
be evocative by way of their lack of precision. Unlike literal terms that
are precise and unique, one indication that a term is metaphorical is if
it has many synonyms.
There are numerous synonyms for the word “distribute” (the root
for “distribution”) including “allot,” “dispense,” “portion,” “dish
out,” “dole out,” “mete out,” “parcel out,” “share out,” “shell out,”
“extend,” “spread,” “circulate,” “diffuse,” “disperse,” and “dissem-
inate.” One could therefore talk of a metaphorical “allotment of
power,” “apportionment of power,” “diffusion of power,” or “dis-
persion of power,” among other ways of rendering this concept. This
is not meant to imply that “distribution of power” is a misleading
way of talking about power in international relations or that other
terms are better. Rather, the point is that by virtue of its simplicity and
lack of precision “distribution of power” is not a literal description of
how and where power resides in international relations but instead a
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metaphorical image, a simplifying expression of the concept. As such,
like all metaphors, it suggests certain things that even closely related
metaphorical terms such as “allotment of power” or “dispersion of
power” might not.
Metaphorically, power is said to “distributed” among any number
of “poles.” Defined in the dictionary, “pole” has several related mean-
ings, many of which involve two locations, each at the opposite ends
of an axis:
pole: 1. Either extremity of an axis through a sphere. 2. Geography. Either

of the regions contiguous to the extremities of the earth’s rotational axis.
3. Physics. A magnetic pole. 4. Either of the two oppositely charged terminals,
as in an electric cell or battery. 5. Astronomy. A celestial pole. 6. Biology. a.
Either extremity of the main axis of a nucleus, a cell, or an organism. b. Either
end of the spindle formed in a cell mitosis. c. The point on a nerve cell where
a process originates. 7. Either of two antithetical ideas, propensities, forces,
or positions. 8. A fixed point of reference. 9. Mathematics. The origin in
a polar coordinate system; the vertex of a polar angle. (American Heritage
Dictionary, 1400)12
Of these nine definitions, slightly more than half specify that poles are
located at either of the two ends of an axis separating what is located at
the end of those extremities. In comparison, in international relations

theory discussions of metaphorical poles almost always indicate the

potential for the existence of multiple polar locations. For example,
David Wilkinson (1999, 142) identifies several polar configurations
“ordered as to increasing centralization”: “nonpolarity, multipolarity,
tripolarity, bipolarity, nonhegemonic unipolarity, hegemony, and uni-
versal state/universal empire.” Wilkinson’s typology, while perhaps
not universally accepted, contains the polar arrangements most com-
monly found in theories of international relations, specifically, the
three polar schemes of multipolarity, bipolarity, and unipolarity. Thus,
while oppositional polar extremity at two ends of an axis dominates
the definition of “pole,” in international relations theory “pole” is
used more often metaphorically with reference to images borrowed
from physics, biology, and mathematics.
Included in this metaphorical imagery is an unmistakable spatial
component, with power situated metaphorically at poles located in
time and space. Obviously, metaphorical polar “location” is not the
same thing as geographic location of international political actors. For
example, during the Cold War the “bipolar” distribution of power
between “East” and “West” did not overlap perfectly with the geo-
graphic location of the states that were included in these blocs.13
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A simple geographic description of international relations would have
little use for metaphorically conceived of polar locations. What the
“poles” metaphor does then is serve as a way of imagining spatial
relationships of power that supercede geography in conceptualizing
relationships among actors. In this sense, it is an overtly theoretical
concept that privileges certain causal propositions over others. Hence,
the focus on the “bipolar” relationship that was said to characterize
the Cold War corresponds in many ways to the dominant definition of
“pole” involving oppositional locations at the extreme ends of an axis.
The ability of metaphors to suggest theoretical propositions is
illustrated with the metaphor of “unipolarity,” which, unlike its coun-
terparts “multipolarity” and “bipolarity,” has an alternate term in the
lexicon of international relations theory that is more literal in its form.
That alternate term is “hegemony.” “Hegemony” is not a term that is
used with great frequency by the average speaker of the English lan-
guage. Although “unipolarity” isn’t either, its structure—formed as it
is by two root words of Latin and Greek origin—renders its meaning
fairly easy to figure out to anyone with a rudimentary understanding
of “uni-” and “pole” as core elements of languages with Latin and
Greek roots.14 “Hegemony,” on the other hand, is a fairly special-
ized and arcane term, which makes it more literal than metaphorical
in nature.15 Its meaning, “the predominant influence of one state

over others” derives from the Greek hēgeisthai, “to lead” (American
Heritage Dictionary, 838). This meaning, which involves notions of
influence and leadership, suggests certain theoretical propositions and
causal mechanisms for relationships among international actors com-
pared with “unipolar,” which implies only a spatial location of power
at a single node.
Why then regarding “unipolarity” and “hegemony” the choice of
one versus another? For many scholars the terms are in fact synony-
mous with little difference of meaning between the two.16 For others,
however, the linguistic and metaphorical meanings of the two words
do offer the possibility for distinct theoretical propositions. For exam-
ple, David Wilkinson (1999, 143) suggests that one can conceive of
“unipolarity without hegemony,” which he defines as “a configuration
where the preponderant capability of a single state is not matched
by a predominant influence” (emphasis added). In this formulation
unipolarity connotes the metaphorical image of power possessed in a
single location but makes a distinction between that and the much
more abstract idea of “influence” as conveyed by the more literal
meanings contained in the word “hegemony.” The theoretical util-
ity of this distinction is then to have two separate sets of propositions,
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one about the distribution of capabilities (metaphorically expressed
such as it is) and the relative role of influence or leadership defined
in whatever ways can be usefully measured. Both elements pose the-
oretical challenges, one associated with translating a metaphor into a
theoretically useful category, the other associated with identifying a
concept in a reasonably falsifiable and non-tautological way.
“Hard” and “Soft” Power

With any discussion of power comes some explicit or implicit address-
ing of how power can be defined and how it operates in the realm
of international relations. In recent years one of the more common
assessments of power has been in terms of “hard” and “soft” power.
Whatever power may be, and however it may be measured, “hard”
and “soft” are metaphorical ways of articulating the qualities of power
as force, which is the physical property associated with power. The
Oxford English Dictionary identifies over twenty meanings for the
word “hard” in the word’s use as an adjective. The definitions for
hard range from “consistency of matter,” to “not easy to wear out or
cause to give way,” to “capable of great physical endurance and exer-
tion,” to “firm, steadfast, unyielding,” and “severe, rigorous, violent”
among the many meanings of the term (Oxford English Dictionary).

As applied to power in the realm of international security, then, the

metaphorical expression “hard” is meant to convey an intangible qual-
ity that can find expression in concrete form. It also implies that force
is being exerted with an intent to use the potential of harm to convince
an international actor to behave in a certain way.
The word “soft” is equally as multi-meaning as “hard” in its use in
the English language with over 30 definitions as an adjective listed in
the Oxford English Dictionary, including “characterized by ease and
quiet enjoyment,” “causing or involving little or no discomfort, hard-
ship, or suffering,” “involving little or no exertion or effort,” “not
loud, harsh, or rough,” and “gentle, gradual” (Oxford English Dictio-
nary). As applied to power in the realm of international security, then,
the metaphorical expression “soft” is meant to convey an intangible
quality that can find expression in concrete form. It also implies that
influence is being exerted in an indirect way with an intent to use
the potency of persuasion, as opposed to the potential to do harm, to
convince an international actor to behave in a certain way.
The terms “hard power” and “soft power” were coined by Joseph
Nye in a 1990 article “Soft Power” in the journal Foreign Policy.17 Nye
(1990b, 166) defines these terms in the context of a discussion of the
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changing nature of power in international affairs:
A state may achieve the outcomes it prefers in world politics because other
states want to follow it or have agreed to a situation that produces such
effects. In this sense, it is just as important to set the agenda and structure
the situations in world politics as to get others to change in particular cases.
This second aspect of power—which occurs when one country gets another
country to want what it wants—might be called co-optive or soft power in
contrast with the hard or command power of ordering others to do what it
wants. (emphasis in the original)
Among the items of note in this passage is that both “soft” and “hard”
power as metaphors can be substituted with other terms. Specifically,
Nye equates “soft” power with what he calls “co-optive” power while
“hard” power is made synonymous with what Nye labels “command”
power. That “soft power” and “hard power” have entered the lexi-
con of international relations terminology as opposed to “co-optive
power” and “command power” is a testament to both Nye’s abil-
ity to turn a phrase that has appeal among scholars and the nature
of evocative metaphors (such as “soft” and “hard”), which appeal to
the imagination as opposed to somewhat more technical phraseology

such as that embodied in terms such as “co-optive” and “command”

power.18
While “hard power” is as metaphorical as “soft power,” it is the
latter that has received more attention from scholars than the former
(and serves as the title of Nye’s 1990 Foreign Policy piece) and there-
fore there is more of interest to take from the metaphor than there
is in the “hard power” trope.19 As noted, in Nye’s formulation “soft
power” is equated with what he calls “co-optive power.” Since the
two terms are treated synonymously, presumably either term would
suit Nye’s purpose of analyzing changes in state influence in the post –
Cold War world. “Co-optive power,” however, is of more restricted
use since it implies only a limited range of state influence, namely, the
ability of states to co-opt other states to adopt the same or similar pol-
icy preferences (in the sense that one of the definitions of “co-opt”
in the dictionary is to “win over,” which is likely what Nye means).
By contrast, “soft power” relies on metaphorical imagery associated
with the nature of something “soft.” That “soft power” is a metaphor
is borne out by the fact that the term encompasses foreign policy
strategies that go beyond mere “co-option.” Among the “soft power
resources” states have at their disposal are “cultural attraction, ide-
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ology, and international institutions” (Nye 1990b, 167). Traditional
definitions of “power” largely entail those things such as “population,
territory, natural resources, economic size, military forces, and polit-
ical stability” that are included in Nye’s definition of “hard power”
(ibid., 154).
“Soft power,” by contrast, is not a subset of power, but rather,
a metaphor for other things, specifically, cultural attraction, ideology,
and international institutions. Rather than expanding the definition of
power in a way that would make “hard” and “soft” power compara-
ble categories of a single concept (power), Nye uses “soft power” as
a metaphor to refer to new sorts of influence that in some cases sup-
plement and in other instances replace traditional aspects of power.20
To further illustrate that “soft power” is a metaphorical expression
denoting certain aspects of state influence typically not included in
traditional definitions of power, Nye refers to metaphorical “spheres”
of activity in which “soft power resources” can be used where
“hard power” instruments are either inapplicable or non-fungible.
Among these spheres are international trade, economics, environmen-
tal management, prosecution of transborder criminal activities, and
prevention of the spread of diseases (ibid., 158–159, 164).
While there is nothing inherently wrong with modifying a con-
cept such as power with metaphorical qualifiers such as “hard” and

“soft,” Nye’s discussion makes clear that what the terms “hard power”
and “soft power” entail are two analytically distinct categories of for-
eign policy resources. As Nye admits, “hard power” and “soft power”
involve different types of state action. “Hard power” entails one state
“ordering” another what to do while “soft power” involves persua-
sion, or what Nye (166) describes occurring “when one country
gets another country to want what it wants” (emphasis in the orig-
inal). This is the distinction Nye makes between “co-opting” and
“commanding” and which is a useful distinction to retain. Analytical
categories, of course, can be difficult to discern. For example, scholars
of terrorism have long debated whether terrorism should be consid-
ered a type of war, a variety of crime, or a separate category of its
own. So a case could be made that “power” is a broad enough con-
cept to be divided into “hard” and soft” varieties. Whether power can
be seen as comprising these subtypes or if they are best kept analyt-
ically distinct as “co-option” or “command,” the “hard” and “soft”
labels are unmistakably metaphorical in their application in foreign
policy analysis. Furthermore, once the “soft” metaphor was coined, it
was not long before it was combined with another metaphor in the
study of international relations, the metaphorical “balance of power,”
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to create an entirely new category of international behavior, “soft
balancing,” which T. V. Paul (2004, 3) defines as involving “tacit bal-
ancing short of formal alliances,” occurring “when states generally
develop ententes or limited security understandings with one another
to balance a potentially threatening state or a rising power.”21
This is not to say that the metaphors of “hard” and “soft” power
needlessly add metaphorical thinking to conceptualizations of power
that are otherwise straightforward in their meaning. Even “strong”
and “weak” to describe states are to some extent metaphorical con-
cepts. Both “strong” and “weak” are defined by the Oxford English
Dictionary as embodying physical or material qualities. “Strong” is
defined primarily as “physically powerful” while “weak” is defined as
applied “of a material thing: Pliant, flexible, readily bending” (Oxford
English Dictionary). States and other international actors are only
metaphorically strong or weak inasmuch as scholars typically include
more than physical or material qualities when they make reference to
the strength or weakness of these actors. Hence, when it comes to
power, the use of metaphors to conceptualize the concept is perhaps
inevitable.
What then are the implications for “hard” and “soft” powers as
metaphors? Typically people associate “hard” with things that are
harsh and unyielding. It is not surprising that a common aphorism

to illustrate being in a predicament is the metaphorical dilemma of

being caught between a rock and a hard place. This is not a very com-
fortable place to be. Presumably an international actor that is on the
receiving end of “hard” power is thought to be in a predicament that
it would rather avoid. So the implication of using “hard” to mean
military power is that there is some suffering associated with being on
the receiving end of said hard power. Yet is that always the way it is?
On many occasions military instruments are used to liberate individu-
als from oppression. For example, states can use military intervention
to disrupt a civil war, remove an oppressive regime from office, or
protect civilian populations in various peacekeeping operations. While
small numbers of people such as dictators or warlords might resent
the use of military intervention, larger groups of civilians benefit from
these types of actions. To them the power that was involved in alle-
viating their suffering was not metaphorically “hard” but rather more
benign in its metaphorical sensations.
Likewise, scholars use the metaphor of “soft” power to imply that
the means involved are more gentle and yielding in their application.
Scholars likely would favor the use of “soft” power instruments such
as foreign aid, economic assistance, and cultural exchanges to bring
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about desired ends. Yet just how “soft” are these means? Foreign aid
often comes with metaphorical strings attached designed to foster cer-
tain objectives possessed by those who provide such aid. Economic
assistance also frequently is tied to requirements for governments and
actors receiving this aid to make painful economic adjustments. Cul-
tural influence also could be associated either with ulterior (often
economic) motives or have the unintended consequence of obliterat-
ing local customs. These often unnoticed yet very real implications of
“soft” power can be shielded from scholars’ eyes because the metaphor
of “soft” relegates them to the margins when the outcomes of the
application of soft power are examined.
More to the point, as Janice Mattern has suggested, the linguis-
tic construction of attraction in world politics, often metaphorically
framed as “soft” power, represents force nonetheless. Thus, in prac-
tice, linguistic acts of coercion that are presented as soft power are
merely a continuation of hard power in verbal form: “Where attrac-
tion rests upon coercion the logic of a distinction between soft and
hard forms of power becomes unsustainable. Certainly the form of
coercion (and ‘hard’ power) to which attraction (and ‘soft’ power) is
indebted is sociolinguistic rather than physical, but it is coercive never-
theless. In this way, soft power is not so soft after all” (Mattern 2005,
587). Just as policy makers have slyly used words of attraction to mask

coercive actions, scholars of international relations have relied on a

linguistic frame—the metaphor of “soft” power—to make analytical
distinctions that are belied by empirical evidence.
All of this begs the question, instead of using metaphors such as
“hard power” and “soft power,” why not simply theorize about the
use of military influence (that which is referred to as “hard power”)
on the one hand and the use of influence involving economic, diplo-
matic, and cultural means (among other things) (that which is referred
to as “soft power”) on the other? This would make it clear that what
is meant is certain types of influence that could be specified and
measured (even if only crudely) rather than influence that is merely
evocative of vague tactile sensations (i.e., hard and soft). Obviously
scholars who examine “hard” and “soft” power aim to do exactly that
and include the metaphors of hard and soft in their theoretical arse-
nal in the same way as do other scholars of international relations
as well as scholars in other academic disciplines. So, the suggestion
here as is true for the rest of this book is simply to understand how
metaphors such as hard and soft have repercussions for what hypo-
thetical propositions are posed and what analytical conclusions are
drawn.
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“Great Powers” versus “Superpowers”
Power as a metaphorical concept also leads to the invention of
metaphorical actors. For decades prior to the Cold War the standard
term to describe states or empires that wielded large amounts of influ-
ence was “Great Powers.” According to some sources, the modern
use of the term “Great Powers” finds its origin in a letter sent by the
British diplomat Lord Castlereagh in 1815 commenting on the delib-
erations of the Congress of Vienna (Webster 1921, 308), although
the Oxford English Dictionary gives the year 1735 as the first time
the term was used in print in English in A Dissertation Upon Parties
by Henry Bolingbroke (1735, 11).22 In his comments, Bolingbroke
refers to the efforts of the “great Powers” of Europe to entangle Great
Britain in endeavors potentially harmful to the latter’s interests. What
is interesting here is that Bolingbroke refers to “Great” Britain, a name
the nature of which is not in dispute, with the “other” great powers
of Europe. Obviously, “Great Britain” is a proper name while in the
term “great Powers” the word “great” is used as an adjective (along
with the modifier “other”) as a descriptive term. The name “Great
Britain” originates with attempts made to unite England and Scotland
around the time of Henry VIII and Edward VI and was solidified

during the rein of James I who, in 1604, was named “King of Great
Britain” (Oxford English Dictionary). “Great Powers,” by contrast,
indicates Bolingbroke’s effort to identify those countries in Europe
that, through the possession of a certain amount of influence, are capa-
ble of exerting force as “great Powers” in a way that poses problems
for Great Britain.
The word “great” is Germanic in origin, giving rise to the Old
English grēat, meaning “thick, coarse” (American Heritage Dictio-
nary, 792), which gave rise to more modern uses meaning large or
big. A “Great Power” is thus a state that is thought of metaphorically
as “big.” As applied to Great Britain, however, the word “great” might
be more aptly understood as the adjective “greater,” which refers to
a city or other political unit and its outlying areas (e.g., “the greater
Chicago metropolitan area”). Thus, the political intent of referring to
James I as the King of “Great” Britain was to imply that England
ruled over Scotland and all the other territories in its dominion.
Metaphorically speaking, the term “Great Power” is meant to sug-
gest that certain countries were able to exert influence regionally and
over others. Thus, perhaps what Bolingbroke intended in his use of
the term was to warn that “Great” Britain already had achieved con-
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trol over those areas in which it had interests and would be damaged
by entangling itself with “great” powers that had regional interests
that butted up against those of greater Britain. A double metaphor is
thus employed with an expanded “greater” power (Great Britain) jux-
taposed with “large” or “big” states in the form of the other European
Great Powers.
The term “superpower,” of course, is of much more recent pedi-
gree than “Great Power.” The Oxford English Dictionary finds the
first written use of this expression in a 1930 article in The Economist
although the phrase did not come into use to describe what eventually
would be identified as the United States and the Soviet Union until
William Fox used the term in the title of his 1944 book The Super-
Powers.23 Metaphorically, the prefix “super-” comes to the English
language from the Latin super, meaning “over” or “above” (American
Heritage Dictionary, 1801). This provides the context for Fox’s defi-
nition of “super-power,” which he applied to world powers that have
interests in more than one theater of conflict (Fox 1944, 20). That
is to say, the interests of the “super-powers” extend metaphorically
“over” or “above” just one geographic region. Seen in this way,
the term “superpower” as it has come to be used is fundamentally
metaphorical since it takes a spatial concept and applies it to the defin-
ing characteristics of certain states. Indeed, many states have interests

that extend beyond a single theater and yet do not qualify as “super-
powers.” The metaphorical concept of “super” powers (with interests
over or above geographic regions) is more commonly associated with
the weapons characteristics of particular states, specifically, those that
extend a metaphorical nuclear “umbrella.”
A question that might be asked is why the metaphorical term
“Great Power” was jettisoned in the nuclear age for the substitute
metaphor of “superpower.” Perhaps, as linguists argue, Fox’s purpose
in The Super-Powers was to employ a metaphor for the purpose of
generating new meaning(s). After all, it was the Great Power system
that many scholars argued either led directly to the two world wars or
caused these wars on the basis of its failure. In either case, the world
wars were seen as a rupture with the past and thus the term “Great
Power” could not appropriately be applied to whatever form of influ-
ential states took their place. As noted, “Great Power” as a metaphor
derives from the meaning of large or big. By contrast, the metaphorical
significance of the term “superpower” lies in the spatial sense of pre-
siding over or above something. “Large” or “big” states had proven
ineffectual at maintaining order and stability in world affairs, so per-
haps that role would now have to lie in states that could extend their
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influence “over” or “above” others through the use of ballistic missile
delivery systems. Fox’s goal in establishing a new nomenclature has
worked, and today scholars associate Great Powers with one system of
international relations and diplomacy while they associate superpowers
with a qualitatively distinct international system.
Critical Reexaminations of Power and What

International Relations is “About”
What is meant by “power” in international relations theory has been
debated by legions of scholars. Given the centrality of power in
many theories of international relations, one would think that the
constituent elements of power would be unambiguous, or at least
unambiguously apparent to scholars who make such determinations.
As most scholars of international relations know, however, scholars of
IR neither agree on a universal definition of power, nor on what mea-
surable components constitute any one instance of power. There is not
sufficient space in this book to explore all of these perspectives nor is
it necessary for analyzing how the term operates metaphorically in IR
theory. Rather, certain critical analyses of power are notable for their
reframing of power as a metaphor in theoretical discussions. One such
noteworthy reformulation of power is offered by Michael Barnett and

Raymond Duvall in their 2005 article “Power in International Poli-

tics.” In their essay Barnett and Duvall (2005, 39) define power as
follows: “Power is the production, in and through social relations, of
effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their circum-
stances and fate.” What is intriguing about this definition is the use
of the word “production” to define the operations of power. In many
if not most treatments in international relations theory, definitions of
power follow the dictionary in terms of defining power in the form of
measurable attributes characterized by strength or force. For Barnett
and Duvall, power is not one or more set of attributes but a process,
that is, “production.” This is interesting from a metaphorical point
of view. “Production” is a noun relating to the act of “producing”
with the verb “produce” defined as “to bring forth; yield; to create by
physical or mental effort; to manufacture; to cause to occur or exist”
(American Heritage Dictionary, 1445). Metaphorically speaking, for
Barnett and Duvall power implies not a thing that causes something
to occur but the act of causation itself.
This is a rather large departure from traditional formulations of
power and one that has significant theoretical consequences. When
power is wielded as a thing attention is focused on the qualities and
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attributes of that thing. Traditional notions of power, conceived of
metaphorically as strength or force, focus the attention of scholars
on what qualifies as strength or force. For example, traditional con-
ceptions prompt debates over whether power should include things
such as geography, economic output, size of a country’s popula-
tion, et cetera, and how these things should be measured. In Barnett
and Duvall’s formulation power is more a process than an object.
Hence, examination is focused on aspects of that process. For exam-
ple, Barnett and Duvall (47–49) argue that the effects of power can
be to varying degrees direct or diffuse. “Direct” and “diffuse” them-
selves are spatial metaphors that emphasize the scope of the productive
qualities of power as opposed to the metaphorical quantities of power
that follow from treating power as strength or force. Traditional con-
ceptions of power as metaphorical strength or force also imply an
instrumental causality by which actors wielding power can affect the
actions of actors that are the objects of that power. By contrast,
Barnett and Duvall’s metaphorical formulation of power as a process
of production allows for both instrumental causality and constitutive
causation, in which actors are produced by power as opposed to being
affected by it. Finally, power as metaphorical strength or force suggests
purposeful agency by those wielding power while Barnett and Duvall’s
treatment of power as a productive process does not imply (although

it does not necessarily exclude) agents’ volition in how power carries

out its effects.
While obviously not a universally agreed upon nor definitive state-
ment on critical reexaminations of power, Barnett and Duvall’s treat-
ment of power is instructive for how power can be reconceptualized
by recasting its metaphorical framing. Conceived of metaphorically as
a “thing,” power in traditional approaches is theorized as something
that can be quantified and measured. This poses problems for how to
quantify and measure what is in essence an abstract concept, which
then often leads to theories of power that are ex post facto and non-
falsifiable in nature. Power seen metaphorically as a thing also spawns
secondary metaphors to describe power, such as those that see power
metaphorically as “hard” or “soft.” By contrast, Barnett and Duvall’s
treatment of power as a process, while no less metaphorical (and there-
fore subject to the same analytical problems that all theories based on
metaphors face), emphasizes the practice of international relations of
which power is one component. Through process tracing power can
then be situated within a range of actions that constitute international
relations.
This opens up possibilities for theorizing international relations
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and, as hinted at in the introduction to this chapter, for narratives
about what international relations is “about.” Before the stories of
international relations can be told, there must be something at stake.
Traditionally, the greatest interest in international relations has been
directed at “power” as the primary force that motivates states and
other international actors. However, given the multiple ways in which
power can be constructed, metaphors are essential to give the con-
cept shape. The malleability of the concept of power and the multiple
metaphorical ways in which it can be conceived provide an oppor-
tunity to reframe the central concerns of international relations and
thus change the stakes of the game. “Power” can still serve as the
defining feature of relations among international actors, but changing
the metaphors by which power is imagined can alter notions of what
international relations is “about.”

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Chapter 6
M e t a p h o r s o f I n t e r n at i o n a l
Security
T he previous chapter highlights the central issue defining what

international relations is “about.” In the narrative of world affairs,
the story is about “power” as it is metaphorically conceived. Once
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this central concern is established, metaphors continue in the narra-
tive of how issues of “power” translate into efforts to protect, acquire,
and expand power, namely, policies of international security. Here too,
metaphors are integral to the story. By international “security,” gener-
ally speaking, what scholars of international relations mean are the
causes and nature of armed conflict as well as the promotion and
maintenance of peace. In his book Security Metaphors, Paul Chilton
observes that metaphors inevitably frame “international security” in
the sense that “security” is etymologically rooted in the word “secure”
or, more to the point, “to secure.” In and of itself armed conflict is
merely a state in which countries can find themselves. To attach the
concept of being “secure” is to denote an undesirable quality to war.
War may very well be undesirable under certain conditions, but it can
also be desirable if it eradicates an even worse situation (e.g., injustice).
The term international “security” thus carries with it a normative
judgment in the study of international affairs.1 As Chilton (1996,
77, n. 25) notes: “the etymology of secure and security only par-
tially accounts for the current semantics of the terms. The English
words . . . derive from the Latin words se (without) and cura (care,
concern or anxiety) . . . The psychological meaning ‘without anxiety’
is only part of the present conceptual cluster, and all meanings have
a positive valuation” (italics in the original). As a political tool, then,

Chilton argues that the metaphor of international security is often

given a positive value, something that states can have more or less
of (with more obviously being preferable). Whether or not scholars
accede to this logic is a matter of debate, but the acceptance of the
term in academic discourse indicates to a certain extent that schol-
ars share with political leaders the notion that security involves the
desirable quality of being “secure.”2
In short, the concept of international security encapsulates
metaphorical images of safety, stability, and maintenance of the
container-like integrity of the state. Theories of international security
are premised on these metaphorical images. They take the contained
state as a major assumption and hypothesize foreign policy strate-
gies of states aimed at defending the secure state at a minimum and
enhancing safety and stability through military strategies. Additional
metaphors are deployed both by state leaders to advance security as
well as by scholars attempting to theorize and explain state action.
“High” and “Low” Politics

One of the most frequently invoked metaphors in the study of inter-
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national security is the spatial metaphor of “high” and “low” politics,
with “high” politics typically referring to matters of security and
defense and “low” politics” largely applying to the remaining areas of
international relations but with an emphasis on economics and trade.
“High” and “low” are metaphorical ways of imagining a wide range
of interactions as well as the abstract concepts of security and eco-
nomics they represent. International security could be referred to in
any number of metaphorical ways and international economics could
be imagined with any number of metaphorical images, yet for what-
ever reason “high” and “low” have stuck. The question then arises,
what do these spatial metaphors mean for theorizing in this realm?
The most straightforward answer to this question is that by imagining
international security as “high” politics and international economics as
“low” politics scholars create the implicit assumption that the former
is “above” the latter in terms of importance.3 This implicit assump-
tion of significance is elaborated and made explicit by scholars who
theorize about how international actors give priority to their security
before preoccupying themselves with economic matters.
The main complicating element of this formulation is the way that
these metaphors construct the dubious assumption that international
actors give priority to matters of international security over interna-
tional economics. This assumption, like all theoretical assumptions,

M e t a p h o r s o f I n t e r n at i o n a l S e c u r i t y 109
then becomes the basis for proposing hypotheses, conducting experi-

ments, and deriving theoretical propositions about international polit-
ical economy. The metaphorical backseat that economics takes to
security creates the sort of “problem” that must be “solved” that
is found in many other areas of international relations theory when
metaphors construct assumptions about something that is problem-
atic for international actors. Scholars devote a great deal of time and
energy trying to figure out how and why international actors can
devote more resources to pursuits that make productive use of eco-
nomic resources and do not perpetuate a situation in which military
security exhausts the economic resources that actors have at their dis-
posal. The “high” and “low” politics metaphors create the set of
assumptions around which conclusions about actors’ priorities are
derived.
To avoid these complications one would have to imagine alternate
possibilities for international security and economics that differ from
the metaphors of “high” and “low” politics. In many respects this
is an easier endeavor than finding alternate metaphors in many other
areas of international relations theory. The reason for this is that which
is represented metaphorically by “high” and “low” politics can be
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said quite easily and in a straightforward fashion by simply using the
terms “international security” and “international economics.” Many
concepts that are discussed metaphorically in international relations
theory are done so because to represent these concepts one must do
so in rather detailed and verbose language. For example, what is meant
metaphorically by the “structure” of the international system is a series
of forces and influences that, if stated literally, would require several
sentences or even paragraphs to outline. It is far easier to use the
metaphorical term of “structure.” It is simply a matter of convenience
and linguistic efficiency.
“High” and “low” politics, by contrast, do not add much in the
way to linguistic economy that “international security” and “interna-
tional economics” already possess. In this particular instance there is
not much value added to using metaphors such as “high” and “low”
politics than the evocative imagery they suggest. However, in this case,
that evocative imagery also suggests certain assumptions about inter-
national relations that are dubious from the start. The advantage of
using the more literal and straightforward terms “international secu-
rity” and “international economics” is that they succinctly capture that
which is intended without adding much theoretical baggage that can
lead scholars to derive theoretical propositions that may very well be
misleading if not wrong.

Of Allies and Other Related Metaphorical Terms

Among those strategies of state security are efforts to cultivate and fos-
ter alliances, satellites, proxies, and patron–client state relationships.
This opens up interesting questions about the metaphorical origins,
nature, and use of these terms. There are, of course, any number of
ways of defining and describing relations between and among states
that one or more of these states find beneficial. However, since the
concept of a relationship of any kind is inherently abstract (although
the benefits that accrue from that relationship may be tangible)
metaphors almost inevitably are required to put those relationships in
context. For example, it might be tempting to offer a simple definition
of a relationship between two states in which both find benefits as a
“friendly” one, yet obviously “friendly” in this context is a metaphor
inasmuch as it borrows the concept of friendship from the interper-
sonal realm and grafts it onto the world of geopolitics. What follows
below is a consideration of some terms that have been applied in the
context of international security with an eye toward uncovering their
metaphorical origins, nature, and significance.
The history of the word “allies” is an interesting one and gives
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insight into its metaphorical usage in the practice and study of inter-
national relations. The modern English verb “ally” (from which the
noun is derived) is rooted in the Latin word alligāre, which means “to
bind to” (American Heritage Dictionary, 50). It is interesting to note
that this is the same Latin root from which the word “alloy” emerged
as well as “league,” “rely,” and “oblige.”4 The etymology of these
latter words is fascinating inasmuch as an “alliance” often is under-
stood as a “league” of states in which states “rely” on each other for
mutual defense and are “obliged” to aid each other militarily in times
of attack. That each of these terms is derived from the Latin word
meaning “to bind to” gives insight into the metaphorical meanings of
these concepts. The words “ally” and “alliance” have been around, of
course, for hundreds of years in the English language to define rela-
tionships between states, so there is no suggestion being made here
that these words themselves dictate how states engaged in alliances
will act toward each other. Rather, what is of note is the metaphorical
roots of these terms and how they focus the mind on what expecta-
tions not only states have of each other but what predictions scholars
make when alliances come into play.
Alliances in modern international relations are understood to be
binding institutions in which members of the alliance have an obli-
gation to provide mutual defense for each other. For this reason,

states rely on each other in an alliance as a form of interdependence.

What expectations states in an alliance have to each other flows from
the meanings they associate with the language of alliances. As Lakoff
and Johnson (1980a, 1980b) assert (and as has been accepted by
most scholars of metaphors), metaphors generate expectations since
they are seen by individuals as providing meanings to situations in
need of clarification. Metaphors are a reflection of the way the brain
works, which is to make cognitive connections among categories and
patterns. As metaphors, then, the terms “ally” and “alliance” cre-
ate powerful expectations among states engaged in an alliance that
the binding quality of the organization has tangible implications. For
scholars too, the metaphorical language of alliances is not just a lin-
guistic convenience but a basis on which hypotheses are posed and
theoretical predictions are made. Thus, a whole literature on the study
of alliances is part of the canon of the study of international relations,
and the binding quality of alliances is an integral part of that literature.
One of the more vivid metaphorical illustrations of the “bind-
ing” aspect of alliances is the image of “chain gangs” advanced in
an essay by Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder. In their 1990 arti-
cle Christensen and Snyder suggest that alliances can have the effect
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of binding states to each other as if they were inmates bound to each
other on a metaphorical chain gang.5 They argue that in some cases
countries can be drawn into war because of these binding alliances
much in the way that a group of prisoners chained to others might get
pulled into a predicament not of their own making:
In multipolarity, the approximate equality of alliance partners leads to a high

degree of security interdependence within an alliance. Given the anarchic
setting and this relative equality, each state feels its own security integrally
intertwined with the security of its alliance partners. As a result, any nation
that marches to war inexorably drags its alliance partners with it. No state can
restrain a reckless ally by threatening to sit out the conflict, since the demise
of its reckless ally would decisively cripple its own security. (Christensen and
Snyder 1990, 140)
While this metaphor is provocative to say the least, it reinforces

the inadvertent implications that the term “alliances” already carries
because of its own metaphorical roots in the Latin word for “to
bind to.” It also raises any number of questions about metaphors
chosen in the study of international security. For example, why is it
more apt to illustrate the concept of linked actors with chain gang
workers than it is with, say, mountain climbers or railway cars linked

together to form a train? Prisoners on chain gangs are bound to each

other by fetters that virtually trap them, thereby rendering them help-
less to each others’ actions. Yet military allies are led by individuals
who, despite “binding” treaties, possess the ability to choose whether
to wage war or not. This choice is not reflected in the chain gang
metaphor. So to some extent the authors of the metaphor have created
a problem where before it there was none. In addition, in choosing
the chain gang metaphor, Christensen and Snyder imply that states
are motivated in a similar fashion as criminal individuals. If the notion
of linked actors were illustrated with mountain climbers or railway
cars, for instance, one would not attribute sinister motives to those
actors. However, by choosing the metaphor of the chain gang, the
authors imply, whether consciously or not, that states are as malevo-
lently motivated as hardened criminals sentenced to hard labor. Since
states are implied by the metaphor to share the same motives as chain
gang convicts, the range of actions they are hypothesized to undertake
will tend to be limited to those that are mistrustful or conflictual in
nature. If Christensen and Snyder had chosen the mountain climber
metaphor instead, perhaps their hypotheses about ally behavior would
have focused more on cooperative actions than on conflictual ones.
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However, by examining the etymology of the word “ally” in its Latin
roots, it become understandable that in subsequent metaphorical ren-
derings alliances are seen as a creature of the “binding” properties that
also suggest a loss of choice and the element of “obligation.”
Related to alliance metaphors are the metaphors that exist in the
realm of influence and dependence in international security that is, sit-
uations in which countries recognized with a large amount of power
have allies of lesser power in their alliance system. These latter coun-
tries often are referred to metaphorically as “satellite states.” As is true
for any metaphor, often there are other terms that could be employed
to convey the same meaning. So often questions about why a par-
ticular metaphor is chosen yield interesting observations about the
linguistic impact of the chosen metaphor. In the case of the rela-
tionship that is captured with the metaphor of “satellite states,” any
number of other terms might have been brought to bear on this con-
cept. Thus, for example, so-called satellite states might have been
referred to as “outlying states,” states in the “orbit” of other coun-
tries, or “captive” countries (the latter of these terms is suggested as
a synonym for satellite states in Roget’s Thesaurus, 87).6 No doubt
during the Cold War and the space age the term “satellite state”
seemed perfectly apt as a metaphor to convey the meaning of a state
in another state’s orbit given the ubiquity of language that related to

the emergent field of space exploration. Countries deemed “satellite

state” might even enjoy a privileged status since many of them enjoyed
the protection afforded by the metaphorical nuclear “umbrella.”
Similarly situated to “satellite” states are metaphorical “proxy”
states. It might be tempting to refer to countries in a subordinate posi-
tion to others using this term, especially where larger global conflicts
are concerned. The American Heritage Dictionary (1459) defines
“proxy” in a seemingly straightforward way as a “person authorized to
act for another; an agent or a substitute.” This would seem to apply in
an uncomplicated fashion to states often referred to as “proxies” since
they substitute for larger states in regional disputes (e.g., in the case
of “proxy” states acting on behalf of the superpowers during the Cold
War). However, upon closer examination, as applied to international
relations the term “proxy” is typically used in a metaphorical sense.
That is to say, many of the states involved in so-called proxy conflicts
often had disputes with each other that were entirely independent of
whatever use the superpowers might have had for these states in terms
of their own interests. To take just one example, Ethiopia and Somalia
had long-standing border disputes that predated the Cold War. It is
entirely possible that these two countries would have engaged in
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armed conflict with each other with or without the presence of the
Cold War superpowers. Indeed, the influence of the United States
and the Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa might actually have had
the effect of dampening what might have otherwise turned into a pro-
tracted shooting war. This is entirely speculation, of course. But the
point here is that what is depicted as a “proxy conflict” is in fact a lin-
guistic expression for a preexisting dispute in which the superpowers
had an interest. Of course, there were many conflicts waged during
the Cold War in which the regional participants were in fact acting as
substitutes for what might otherwise have been a direct confrontation
between the United States and the Soviet Union. The linguistic econ-
omy of using a catch-all metaphorical term such as “proxy,” however,
complicates the process of discerning empirically which conflicts truly
were a function exclusively of the Cold War and which were incorpo-
rated into the Cold War but had an inherent existence independent of
the larger Cold War dispute.
Relationships of influence and dependence are also found in the
terminology of “patron” and “client” states. The metaphorical roots
of the phrase “patron–client” state relations are fairly obvious. The
English word “patron” comes directly from the well-known Latin
root pater meaning “father” (American Heritage Dictionary, 1328).
“Client” is a bit less obvious, deriving from the Latin cliēns meaning

“dependent” or “follower” (ibid., 356).7 We have here, then, the

metaphorical roots of the concept of state dependency in the area
of security, namely, a relationship that is imagined between a paternal
parent and his dependent. This is a powerful image when grafted onto
international security. The concept of patronage in politics in many
ways is designed to build on the notion of an unequal relationship
of power between one actor in a paternal position and another actor
who is dependent on the benefits that accrue from subordinating him
or herself to the patron. In international relations, patron states are
imagined as having some sort of leverage over client states, the latter of
which have a limited range of options. What is typically lost in this pic-
ture are the instruments of influence that seemingly subordinate client
states have in their relationship with so-called patron states. Unlike
the relationship between father and child, relations between sovereign
states reflect a range of tools that both sides bring to the table to
advance their own interests. Even in the most unequal relationships,
neither side has either all the influence or is completely subservient.
The metaphor of patron and client, however, imputes a singular direc-
tion of influence in the relationship thus obscuring the nuances that
can often exist.
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Another interesting image of security relationships is evident in the
“sphere of influence” metaphor, which is noteworthy for its use of
a spatial metaphor, of which there are many in international rela-
tions theory. In this case, the spatial metaphor in question utilizes
geometry as an image in its harnessing of the visual cue of spheres.
Spherical objects typically are globular in shape in which “all points
[of the sphere] are equidistant from a fixed point” (American Her-
itage Dictionary, 1734). When thinking of a sphere people tend to
associate the limits of the sphere extending to the edges of a circular
shaped arc. This image makes a certain amount of sense in the nuclear
age in which the notion of superpowers’ spheres of influence were
defined by the range of intercontinental ballistic missiles that could
deliver nuclear warheads to a fixed range commonly mapped out in
a circular manner on maps of the world. Thus, the “sphere of influ-
ence” metaphor carries with it the connotation of nuclear weapons
strategy. While this is the image suggested by the metaphor, the real-
ity of the Cold War was that the influence of superpower over ally
states reflected political boundaries drawn on the map that were decid-
edly not circular in pattern. Rather, they would reflect the ragged
lines of demarcation on which state boundaries are laid out. While it
never escaped politicians or scholars alike that “spheres of interest” are
metaphorical representations of political relationships, the metaphor is

nonetheless notable for the way that it focuses the mind on identifiable
and clearly delineated geometric if not geographic lines of interna-
tional alliance patterns in the nuclear age. What to call international
relations during the nuclear age also recalls a metaphor, in this case
the double metaphor of the Cold War.
The Cold War Double Metaphor
Although this book is focused on metaphors in international rela-
tions theory as opposed to metaphors in applied foreign policy, some
foreign policy metaphors have so worked their way into general dis-
course and have become reified to such a degree that they constitute
the basic vocabulary of international relations theory. Such is the
case with the term “Cold War,” which is in fact a double metaphor
since both elements in the metaphor—“Cold” and “War”—represent
metaphorical images. The term “cold war” was popularized by U.S.
presidential advisor Bernard Baruch in April 1947 in a speech to the
South Carolina legislature, although according to the Oxford English
Dictionary the phrase had appeared first in 1945 in an essay by George
Orwell, and the Spanish expression la guerra fría (the cold war)
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appeared in the thirteenth century to describe the uneasy coexistence
between Christendom and the Islamic world.8 Baruch intended the
term to serve as a rhetorical device in the emerging Western effort to
confront the presumed expansionary tendencies of the Soviet Union.9
Like its metaphorical cousins “Iron Curtain” (popularized but not
originated by Winston Churchill) and “containment” (a term associ-
ated with the writings of George Kennan) “cold war” as a linguistic
construction was embraced in the policy world as a succinct means of
summing up the nature of studied yet subdued hostility that existed
between the West and the Soviet-led communist world. Like other
metaphors used by politicians to support their policy actions, the “cold
war” image might very well had been relegated to political rhetoric.
Instead, the term was embraced by those who reported on and ana-
lyzed foreign policy in the post–World War II era including academic
scholars. This is not to say that if academics had chosen not to use
the metaphor it would have fallen into disuse, but rather, as a framing
device for imagining the abstractions of postwar international relations
the term “cold war” has become as much a part of academic discourse
as it is a creature of the political realm.
The “cold” element in the “Cold War” metaphor is interesting in
the sense that it represents a rare but obvious use of the metaphor
of temperature in international relations theory. As a contrast to

“cold wars,” occasionally armed conflicts are referred to as “hot” wars,

although in many ways that term has no meaning except to draw a
distinction between wars in which actual military force is used and
“the Cold War” in which direct military confrontation between the
West and the communist world was limited to indirect conflicts and
never escalated to an engagement between the United States and its
NATO allies and the Soviet Union and its allies in the Warsaw Pact.
While the term “hot war” is occasionally found to indicate a contrast
with the “Cold War,” it is not common in the theoretical literature.
Before the Cold War it likely never would occur to military theorists
that a distinction would have to be drawn between “cold” and “hot”
wars. For most scholars of military affairs the point at which hostil-
ities rose to the level of war was a definitional issue largely resolved
by Clausewitz in On War. Clausewitz famously declared war to be
an extension of politics by other means. While politics is practiced on
a continuum at one point of which is war, Clausewitz is clear that
war is a thing-in-itself, comprising organized armed force brought
to bear by one political entity against another. The uniqueness of
war is described by Clausewitz in terms of war’s internal dynamics,
comprising identifiable combatants using organized military force for
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a political objective. Clausewitz made no distinction between “hot”
and “cold” wars. On the contrary, what contemporary scholars might
describe as a “cold” war was for Clausewitz just one of the political
steps states might take on their way to unambiguously declared war
with no qualifications as to its metaphorical temperature.
The “war” half of “Cold War” is also metaphorical in that the
events that comprised the Cold War were not literally acts of war as
the term “war” typically is conceived. Clausewitz (1968, 101) defines
“war” as “an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to
fulfil our will.” The events of the Cold War do not meet this defi-
nition unless the term “violence” itself is understood metaphorically.
In fact, the word “war” often is used metaphorically although this
might necessarily be obvious from the intent of those who utter the
term. In recent years phrases such as the “war on poverty,” the “war
on cancer,” the “war on drugs,” and the “war against terrorism” have
entered the vernacular.10 As Philip Eubanks (2000) explains in his
book-length essay, an entire vocabulary of commerce revolves around
the metaphor of “Trade is War” (e.g., the expressions “trade war” and
“economic warfare” are metaphorical). In policy areas, when politi-
cians speak of the “war on poverty,” for example, they obviously do
not mean attacking an enemy with organized military force with the
aim to achieve a political end. Rather, they are using the word “war”

as a rhetorical device (a metaphor) to emphasize the degree of the

seriousness by which an issue or problem is being addressed. Franke
Wilmer (2003, 221) writes: “War increasingly appears as a metaphor
for policies aimed at solving social problems by ‘defeating’ them, such
as the ‘War on Poverty,’ or the ‘War on Drugs.’ More recently, a lit-
eral war has been waged on a conceptual non-state actor, ‘terrorism.’
Wars on poverty and drugs may be understood as metaphors for using
government resources to ‘defeat’ a problem through public policy,
or to make the problem go away entirely.” Most people are aware,
of course, that there is a difference between military war fought for
political purposes and “wars” waged against a medical scourge such as
cancer, and in many ways the word “war” is a “dead metaphor” in its
nonmilitary sense in that it has taken on a new meaning as any large
organized effort against a perceived ill. Like other reified metaphors
“war,” as applied in the nonmilitary sense, means something different
than its source domain and people are not necessarily confused that
the “war on drugs,” for example is waged in a similar fashion than a
military conflict such as, say, World War I.
Still, the metaphorical use of war and its traditional use in a mili-
tary context can create interesting juxtapositions that reveal how the
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metaphorical remnants of the word “war” are still in evidence in non-
military uses. For instance, in the aforementioned “war on drugs,”
there is in fact a political element in the motivations for said war, and
the war has been fought in many countries using military personnel
and weapons. The “war on terrorism” (as popularized by politicians
in the United States) is especially ironic since scholars frequently make
a distinction between the application of force that is commonly asso-
ciated with wars and that which is typically employed using terrorist
tactics. In recent years scholars have endeavored to define terrorism
in ways that make it a meaningful category in the study of violent
conflict. Part of this effort has included a debate on whether terror-
ism qualifies as a form of crime, a variant of military engagement, or
a category unique to itself. Scholars have not reached agreement on
this matter. However, the phrase “war on terrorism” would seem to
suggest that proponents of this way of framing the issue see war either
metaphorically (as in the war on poverty or the war on cancer) or as
a form of exercising force that is engaged in a conflict with a different
type of strategy that brings force to bear in that conflict.11 In any case,
to the extent that words have meaning, the phrase “war on terrorism”
is crafted in such a way to emphasize that the conflict has risen to such
a level that terms of mere political debate and diplomacy no longer
apply.12

On the basis of this discussion the meaning of the term “cold war”
takes on new life. For many scholars (see, e.g., Gaddis 1987) one of
the most remarkable and ironic aspects of the Cold War was its relative
peace and stability. What these scholars are referring to is the lack of
direct military engagement between the United States and its allies in
the West and the Soviet Union and its allies in the East despite the
decades of heated rhetoric between the two sides. Yet most informed
people are aware that during the course of the Cold War military con-
frontations took place and proxy wars were waged by allies of the
superpowers in various places around the world, and wars of liberation
against colonial powers took place on an ongoing basis from the end
of World War II to the end of the Cold War. More than a small num-
ber of these proxy wars and wars of colonial liberation were in many
ways a function of the Cold War and would not have occurred in the
time, manner, and place that they did if it were not for the Cold War,
if they would have happened at all. Thus, one reason scholars marvel
at the relative tranquility of the Cold War is that, as a metaphor, the
phrase “cold war” focused scholarly minds on the absence of conflict
that occurred during the period from 1945 to 1991 rather than on
the ongoing military conflicts that took place in European colonies as
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well as those regions in which the superpowers supported local allies.
This is not to say that scholars who analyze the lack of direct military
engagement between the United States and the Soviet Union (and
their respective NATO and Warsaw Pact allies) are either ignorant
of other wars fought during the Cold War period or seek to mini-
mize them. Rather, the observation being made here is that the phrase
“cold war” prompts certain questions about stability and leaves as sec-
ondary other questions about regional hostilities that then shape the
scholarly agenda.13 If metaphors have the impact that linguists assert
that they do, then another way of referring to the 1945–1991 period
might have spurred scholars to ask questions in different ways and
pursue their research agendas in different directions.
Another question that arises with the end of the Cold War is
whether the metaphor of “the” Cold War is the same thing as the
metaphor of “a” cold war. As discussed, “the” Cold War is a dou-
ble metaphor that is meant to capture the nature of the relationship
that prevailed from 1945 to 1991 between the Western and Eastern
military alliances. That relationship was metaphorically “cold” in that
it did not escalate into an armed conflict and it was metaphorically
a “war” inasmuch as it did not qualify literally as such in the sense
that war has been understood since Clausewitz. With the end of
“the” Cold War scholars have speculated on what will follow in world

politics. One possibility is presented by Samuel Huntington (1996,

207), who postulates that included in possible future post–Cold War
scenarios is a metaphorical “cold peace.” Among other possible future
scenarios are any number of metaphorical “cold wars” (lowercase, plu-
ral). In this usage “the” Cold War has taken on a literal sense as the
actual state of affairs that prevailed during the period 1945–1991.
That is to say, it has become a reified metaphor in that people asso-
ciate “the” Cold War as a literal truth. Once the term has achieved
the status of literal truth it can be put to use itself as a metaphor for
something else. So a military confrontation that has not escalated into
a direct armed conflict can be said to be, metaphorically, “a” cold war.
As a metaphor, “cold war” (not capitalized) has the potential to
pose the same sorts of analytical problems as any other metaphor.
With regard to the metaphor of “a” cold war, the most likely analytical
pitfall is that naming a conflict a “cold war” will create a “problem”
that scholars have to “solve.” Any number of post–Cold War con-
flicts have been or could be problematized as “cold wars” by virtue
of calling them as much. For example, the relationship between polit-
ical Islam and the West has been described by some observers as a
new “cold war.”14 Any number of regional dyadic rivalries such as the
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one between India and Pakistan could also be described metaphori-
cally as “cold wars.” In these sorts of disputes there could be a range
of disagreements that are soluble. And yet this might be obscured
if the larger dispute is defined metaphorically as a “cold war” since
“the” Cold War, that is, that which serves as a metaphor for the dis-
pute in question and therefore provides a pattern or template against
which the dispute is measured, imputes to the dispute at hand an
overall insoluble situation. As a metaphor, “cold war” implies a singu-
larly coherent state-to-state standoff that may or may not accurately
describe the situation at hand. The metaphor of “cold war” can also
reify a conflict that in many ways has not been formally acknowledged
in the way “the” Cold War was. Hence scholars can inadvertently lin-
guistically create a situation that heretofore had not risen to the level
that the term “cold war” implies.
The “World’s Policeman” Metaphor in

International Security
As Paul Chilton and George Lakoff observe, law-and-order metaphors
are common tropes in the rhetoric of foreign policymakers. Among
the best known of these law-and-order metaphors is the concept of
states acting in a “police” capacity to enforce order. Chilton and

Lakoff (1995, 42) write, “President Roosevelt and his advisors imag-
ined that after World War II international society would be patrolled
by ‘four policemen’, the United States, Britain, Russia and China (the
‘Big Four’).”15 Since Roosevelt floated the idea of states working in
a police capacity in maintaining international stability more references
to the United States alone as the “world’s policeman” have been made
than can be cited here. Any country can assign to itself the “world’s
policeman” role, and thus the “policeman” metaphor is not necessarily
limited to the United States. In recent years, however, it has been most
closely associated with the U.S. role in the world.16 Variants on the
“world’s policeman” metaphor include the “cowboy” and “sheriff”
motifs as found, for example, in Jennifer Sterling-Folker’s article “The
Emperor Wore Cowboy Boots” in which she refers to the United
States as the “sheriff on the prowl at high noon” (Sterling-Folker
2008, 326).
Once the “world’s policeman” metaphor was set in place it has
become fodder for theorizing about the nature of international
“policing.” The former American diplomat Richard Haass (1997, 6)
makes a distinction between the concepts of the United States as a
“policeman” and a “sheriff” as follows:
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It is important to distinguish between the United States as sheriff and the
United States as policeman. The latter would suggest a greater degree of
authority, a greater capacity to act alone, and a greater need to act consis-
tently than is being advocated here. By contrast, a sheriff must understand
his lack of clear authority in many instances, his need to work with others,
and, above all, the need to be discriminating in where and how he engages.
(Emphasis in the original)
Clearly Haass is using these terms as very loose metaphors inasmuch

as for all intents and purposes in American law enforcement there is no
difference between a policeman and a sheriff aside from the jurisdic-
tions in which they operate. In many if not most states in the United
States the office of Sheriff (including sheriffs and sheriff’s deputies)
acts as a police force in unincorporated portions of counties in which
municipal police departments either do not exist or have no jurisdic-
tion. In these areas, the sheriff’s department is the police with all the
authority, capacity, and need to act consistent with municipal police.
Haass, who was born in Brooklyn, New York and likely has spent much
of his life in large cities and with little experience in rural areas (where
sheriffs and sheriff’s deputies are common law enforcement person-
nel), relies on a metaphor of sheriff that is straight out of Hollywood

westerns. His image of the United States as sheriff conjures up carica-

tured visions of a lone lawman on the western frontier: “The notion
of the United States as sheriff is one derived more from necessity than
desirability. It would be much less demanding on Americans if it were
not necessary for the sheriff to saddle up with any frequency” (Haass
6, emphasis added).17 Haass is both a practitioner of foreign policy as
well as a scholar who has held positions at the Brookings Institution
and the Council on Foreign Relations. The influence he and others
like him continue to exert on foreign policy from their think tank
perches illustrates the hold that metaphors hatched in an academic set-
ting can have on the policymaking world leading to what Paul Chilton
and George Lakoff (1995) refer to as “foreign policy by metaphor.”
In this case, the metaphor is a fanciful image of frontier sheriffs wor-
thy of Gunsmoke’s Marshall Matt Dillon and motion picture wild west
matinees.
The point here is that, absent universally agreed upon definitions of
international order, metaphors such as “world’s policeman” serve as
convenient frameworks around which theories of international secu-
rity are built. As such, they invite interpretations that often reveal as
much about the authors of these metaphors as the concepts they are
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meant to elucidate. In the case of the “world’s policeman” metaphor,
there is a tendency among scholars and policymakers alike to imbue
the metaphor with their preferences for international security as well
as their theoretical propositions. Policymakers who wish to see the
United States (or any other country, for that matter) as the “world’s
policeman” deploy the metaphor in a way that sees international “law
and order” at stake. For scholars skeptical of the United States’ role as
the “world’s policeman,” the metaphor is an example of how a coun-
try take it upon itself to establish certain rules of the game. What the
metaphor ultimately means, then, is a matter of how it is employed for
the purposes of setting forth theoretical propositions about the nature
of international security itself.
“Failed” States and State “Death”

Among the factors that either contribute to international security or
are brought about by it is the phenomenon of “failed” states. As a
metaphor, state “failure” brings to mind a sense of helplessness and
loss. When an airplane’s engine fails, especially on a single-engine
aircraft, the consequences can be dire. For scholars, academics, and
university faculty the term “failure” evokes those students who have
exhibited a complete an utter inability to cope with college studies.

Applied to international security, then, the metaphor of “failed” states

has a particularly alarming and ominous ring. What do scholars mean
when they talk about “failed” states? Interestingly, no universally
accepted definition is to be found in the literature on the topic. Gerald
Helman and Steven Ratner (1992–1993, 3) define a “failed state” as
one that is “utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the
international community.” The Fund for Peace employs a measure
including twelve indicators to arrive at a Failed State Index.18 Robert
Rotberg (2003) writes that “failed states are tense, deeply conflicted,
dangerous, and contested bitterly by warring factions.” For Noam
Chomsky (2006, 1–2), among the traits of failed states is “their inabil-
ity or unwillingness to protect their citizens from violence and perhaps
even destruction.” “State failure,” a term used synonymously with
“failed states,” is seen by Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff, and
Ramesh Thakur (2005, 2) as “a continuum of circumstances afflicting
states with weak institutions.” These are among the many definitional
treatments of the subject in question. In some cases the concept is con-
sidered self-explanatory to the extent that no definition of the term is
given.19
Despite the lack of a universally accepted definition of “failed
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states,” until recently the metaphor of state “failure” in international
security has been notable for its lack of nuance. The metaphor of
“failed” states utilizes imagery of utter and complete loss of gov-
ernmental authority that is rarely found in international relations nor
necessarily intended by scholars who use the term.20 Among the dif-
ficulties with the state failure metaphor is that “failure” implies an
absoluteness while what is meant by scholars instead exists along a
spectrum. It is ironic that most scholars of international relations are
teachers of the subject who assign grades on student assignments. The
grade of “F” typically stands for “failure” and is a statement that a stu-
dent did not fulfill the requirements of an assignment or course. It is a
final adjudication and terminal judgment that, once assigned, usually
is not alterable. By contrast, nonfailing grades range from “A+” to
“D−” and represent a spectrum of levels of performance. Ironically
this spectrum is more useful as a metaphor for state performance since
few states “fail” in the absolute sense the same way a failing grade
implies. So what are deemed metaphorically as “failed” states actually
are perhaps better described as a range of states that, while perhaps
compromised in terms of political legitimacy, governing authority, and
territorial integrity still retain a level of sovereignty, legitimacy, author-
ity, and political control that defies the absoluteness that the “failed
state” metaphor imputes to them. Nonetheless, the invocation of a

situation of state “failure” is appealing to scholars because of the

supposed threat to international security these countries pose.
The concern about failed states stems in part from the belief that
failed states pose an inherent threat to international security. A con-
trary view to the belief that failed states are necessarily dangerous to
international security is presented by Justin Logan and Christopher
Preble (2006, 5–6) who point out that threats emanate not from state
failure but from conditions that merely correlate with them: “The dan-
gers that can arise from failed states are not the product of state failure
itself; threats are the result of other conditions, such as the presence of
terrorist cells or other malign actors within a failed state. It is not the
‘failure’ that threatens.” Furthermore, Logan and Preble argue that
the attention paid to the dangers presented by failed states is based on
the premise that state sovereignty, which neglects alternate forms of
political authority, is an outdated concept and that “failed” states can
be fixed by various forms of nation building. Logan and Preble reject
this premise, arguing instead that the problem is not that the state
has “failed” in an absolute sense but that international security can
be sufficiently safeguarded by countries defending themselves against
the dangers that are posed by states that harbor security threats (e.g.,
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terrorist cells). For Logan and Preble, the metaphor of state “failure”
paints too broad a picture of what are really specific security threats.
One could disagree with Logan and Preble’s criticism of theories
of alternate forms of sovereignty and still agree with them that state
failure is not necessarily an inherent threat to international security.
That is, if one accepts (as Logan and Preble do not) that sovereignty
is an outdated construct, one could still say that failed states are not
necessarily a security threat if they represent the “success” of alternate
forms of political authority that are capable of providing security, mili-
tary or otherwise. The metaphor of “failed” states implies an existence
that is undesirable (who likes to fail at anything?), but why can’t polit-
ical authority not constituting itself as state sovereignty be something
other than “failing” at being a state? Perhaps “failed” states succeed
as some other sort of non-state actor equally capable of providing
security. Like many metaphors, the metaphor of “failure” masks what
might otherwise not be seen as an inherent problem that needs to be
solved.21
As a positive sign, some scholars who study “failed” states at least
are aware of the shortcomings of the metaphor. In fact, there now
seems to be agreement among scholars that the concept of state fail-
ure is imprecise and poorly defined. Stewart Patrick (2007, 646), for
example, observes that among the shortcomings of the concept of the

“failed state” are “the absence of clear criteria to define ‘failure’; a

cavalier tendency to apply this single label to a heterogeneous group
of countries; and inattention to the specific histories, trajectories, and
regimes of the countries so designated.” Promisingly, Patrick suggests
that if the term “failed states” is to remain in common parlance, at
least it should be situated within measures of relative state strength and
weakness “rather than reflecting a binary, either/or condition” (ibid.,
648). Likewise, Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff, and Ramesh
Thakur (2005) place state failure along a continuum, and Robert
Rotberg (2004) places countries within a range of “strong,” “weak,”
“failing,” “failed,” and “collapsed” states. It should be noted that
“strength” and “weakness” are themselves problematic metaphors
when applied to international relations and only become more so
when made part of a mixed metaphor with state “failure.”22
Further along the “failure” spectrum one finds the metaphor of
state “death,” which Tanisha Fazal (2007, 17) defines as “the formal
loss of control over foreign policy to another state.” Before proceed-
ing, it should be obvious that what is meant by state “death” is not
literally death as one would associate it with a living organism. States
themselves are abstractions that only “live” metaphorically. What is
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meant by state “death” then is more nuanced than the metaphor-
ical image state “death” brings to mind. Indeed, the metaphor of
state death could apply to any number of statuses involving both
political autonomy as well as various conceptions of de facto or de
jure sovereignty. For example, Dustin Ellis Howes (2003) argues that
(using the title of his article) “when states choose to die” they are
not necessarily ceasing to exist, but rather, forfeiting some of their
autonomy on certain matters in return for benefits they receive from
membership in cooperative international institutions.
Like “failed” states, state “death” implies a complete state of being
that does not accurately reflect what scholars mean when they talk
about countries that have been compromised in terms of their territo-
rial integrity or political legitimacy. To clarify the term, Fazal (2007,
17) writes that “state death” is synonymous with “exit from the inter-
national system,” a term that employs a different metaphor—“exit”
as opposed to “death”—which could imply different hypotheses and
theoretical propositions. “Exiting” a space but continuing to exist
presupposes a different set of assumptions about existence than does
“death” or dying. Fazal uses both terms metaphorically to draw atten-
tion to qualities of the state in international relations, yet a closer
examination of the theoretical implications of these distinct metaphors
would be useful. Moreover, Fazal (ibid.) concedes that “state death

could also be defined in a number of other ways” and that the term
“has referred to internal state collapse or failure, a regime change, con-
quest, or division.” Ultimately, however, for Fazal (ibid.) state death
means “loss of sovereignty to another state,” which, as noted, need
not necessarily imply a complete end of the state’s existence since loss
of sovereignty could be temporary, incomplete, or the product of for-
eign occupation (welcome or not) that may usurp the authority of
government while leaving the state intact. Indeed, part of Fazal’s dis-
cussion of state death includes a categorization of case studies, those
included in her analysis and those left out, which make distinctions
among states that have “died” and those that do not qualify under the
definition she has set forth (see Fazal, 20–25). As Fazal notes, decid-
ing which cases to include in the category of state death is not always
unambiguously clear.
“Violence” as a Metaphor
Inherent in international security is the real or potential violence
that states and other international actors do to one another. Yet as
a concept, violence has been used in some contexts in a metaphorical
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sense.23 “Violence,” of course, is as an abstract concept as are many
of the categories in the study of international relations. The dictionary
gives several definitions for the word “violence” not all of which imply
physical force. However, as is true for many words, the secondary and
tertiary definitions of a word can seen as metaphors stemming from its
primary meanings. Thus, for example, among the ancillary meanings
of the words for various human body parts (e.g., “head,” “hand,”
“heart,” “foot”) are metaphors based on the primary meanings of
these words (e.g., “head of the class,” “the hand of a textile,” “heart
of the matter,” “foot of a bed”). The same is true for definitions of
the word “violence.” The American Heritage Dictionary (1994) gives
as its primary definition for “violence” the following: “Physical force
exerted for the purpose of violating, damaging, or abusing.” Subse-
quent definitions extend into metaphorical applications of the primary
meaning, e.g., “abusive or unjust exercise of power; abuse or injury to
meaning, content, or intent: do violence to a text; vehemence of feeling
or expression; fervor” (ibid.).
These types of metaphors of violence find their way into the study
of international relations. Two of the more common expressions that
embody the metaphor of violence are “structural violence” and “eco-
nomic violence.” By “structural violence” scholars typically mean a
series of injustices that are perpetrated against individuals that result

in these individuals suffering a diminished quality of life. As Johan

Galtung (1969) originally envisioned the concept, “structural vio-
lence” is institutionalized violence.24 It can be institutionalized, for
example, in government institutions and policies that create disad-
vantages for individuals on the basis of, among other things, race,
gender, sexual orientation, or membership in a particular clan, tribe,
ethnic group or otherwise historically marginalized community or
group. By “economic violence” what is meant is the systematic impov-
erishment of an individual or group of individuals as a result of the
ownership, control, or distribution of economic resources and/or eco-
nomic policy that has a prolonged, chronic, or systematic negative
effect on an individual or group of individuals.
Unlike physical violence in a political context, structural and eco-
nomic violence do not have to be perpetrated with willful or purpose-
ful volition to persist. This is one sense in which the term “violence”
used in these contexts is metaphorical as compared to how the word
“violence” is used to refer to the physical application of force (usu-
ally in a military or armed conflict context). Structural and economic
violence are also metaphorical in the sense that the damage or harm
inflicted by them is systematic and in that sense not inflicted via indi-
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vidual, discrete instances of the application of force. A person could
live his or her entire life as a victim of structural or economic vio-
lence and not be able to distinguish one “act of violence” from
another precisely because the harm that is caused by these circum-
stances is ongoing, chronic, persistent, and systematic. This contrasts
with physical violence, which is almost always recognizable as one
or more instances of applied physical force. Hence, “structural” and
“economic” violence are metaphorical expressions that are designed
to describe damage and harm to individuals by employing the term
“violence” that is associated with a related concept—the physical
application of damaging physical force—but yet is still analytically dis-
tinct from that which is being explained, that is, the ongoing harm or
damage brought about by political injustice and the maldistribution
of economic resources.
There are theoretical as well as policy implications of making ana-
lytical distinctions between physical violence on the one hand and
political injustice and economic poverty on the other.25 As discussed,
physical violence is recognizable as one or more discrete instances of
applied force. The causes of violence can then be analyzed in terms
of how a specific constellation of variables can combine to result
in violent force. Ending physical violence involves resolving those
issues that, when left unresolved, result in the application of force.

By contrast, political injustice and economic poverty are ongoing,

systemic phenomena that are the result of institutionalized practices.
While one would use certain tools of inquiry to isolate the variables
that lead to physical violence, one would use a separate set of analyti-
cal tools to dissect the institutions that enshrine injustice and poverty
as integral elements to the constitution of a political and social sys-
tem. Solving injustice and poverty thus require more fundamental
changes to the constitution of a society than what may be required to
stem physical violence. When “violence” is used metaphorically these
analytical distinctions can be lost.
“Hawks” and “Doves”

Although the Oxford English Dictionary traces the metaphor “hawk,”
meaning “one who preys on others, a rapacious person, a sharper or
cheat,” as far back as the year 1548, the modern usage in politics as
“a person who advocates a hard-line or warlike policy” finds its first
use in print—along with the metaphor “dove” meaning “a person
who advocates negotiations as a means of terminating or preventing
a military conflict”—only as recently as 1962 in the context of the
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Cuban Missile Crisis.26 Since that time the metaphors “hawk” and
“dove” have been used so many times in so many types of publica-
tions and public speeches that it would be impossible to chronicle
them all.
As is true for many metaphors, “hawk” and “dove” have taken on
literal meaning in international relations. One such example I came
across (although by no means the only one nor even the most
egregious) is an article that constructed a model of international coop-
eration in which the main actors involved in negotiations come from
either “hawkish” or “dovish” political parties. The article concludes
that under certain conditions of trust and costly conflict, “while dovish
leaders are better at eliciting cooperation in the short run, mutual
cooperation is most likely to endure if it was initiated by a hawk”
(Schultz 2005, 1). The terms “hawk” and “dove” are never defined in
the article, although hawkish behavior is measured by “a greater will-
ingness to engage in noncooperative or conflictual policies” (ibid., 7).
Since “willingness” can only be determined on an ex post facto basis
(since the will to be noncooperative or conflictual is inferred from
noncooperative or conflictual behavior), measures of hawkishness
or dovishness are not falsifiable and the terms “hawk” and “dove”
become somewhat tautological since being a hawk is the same thing
as a measure of hawkishness and likewise for doves.27

Furthermore, the relatively recent vintage of the “hawk” and

“dove” metaphors as enshrined in international relations is indicative
of their entirely arbitrary nature and the fact that any other animal
metaphor, chosen just as arbitrarily, has the potential to influence the
theoretical propositions that are made about state behavior especially
in the area of international security. One could argue that the “dove”
metaphor is not entirely arbitrary inasmuch as it evokes the dove
depicted in Genesis 8:11, which, returning to Noah with an olive leaf
in its beak, symbolizes to Noah that god has ended the flood allowing
peace to rein. As for “hawk,” as mentioned above, the Oxford English
Dictionary indicates that the first known use of the term to mean
“one who preys on others” was in found in writing in the year 1548,
long before it was associated with an aggressive stance on foreign
policy. Moreover, hawks are not the only birds of prey, nor are they
the only birds of prey used metaphorically to describe human behav-
ior. Among other bird metaphors for aggressive or preying human
behavior are buzzards and vultures, metaphorical terms that differ,
even if only subtly, from characteristics associated metaphorically with
hawks.28 Additionally, one need not restrict oneself to birds in imagin-
ing the preferences and behaviors of those who practice international
relations.
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The entire rest of this chapter could be taken up with an elabora-
tion of hypotheses about international security derived from animal
metaphors applied to states and other international actors. Since space
does not permit that, just off the top of my head I have come up with
a non-exhaustive list of common animal metaphors and the qualities
associated with them: baboon (brutish), badger (disposed to pester
persistently), busy/eager beaver (earnest; hard worker), fox (cunning;
sly), lone wolf (disposed to acting alone), owl (wise), snake (duplici-
tous), slug (slow), vulture (possessing qualities of a scavenger), and
worker bee (disposed to follow orders as part of a group).29 And,
indeed, occasionally animal metaphors aside from “hawk” and “dove”
do appear in the literature, for example, in Randall Schweller’s 1994
article investigating metaphorical “balancing” and “bandwagoning”
behavior that mixes its metaphors with references also to state behav-
ior likened to metaphorical “lions,” “lambs,” “jackals,” and “wolves”
(Schweller 1994, especially 100–104).30 Still, that these other animal
metaphors typically are not routinely used to theorize about interna-
tional security neither means that they should nor does it mean that
the “hawk” and “dove” metaphors are somehow flawed. Rather, the
point is that, once attached to states and other international actors,
metaphors such as “hawk” and “dove” have a tendency to fix scholars’

minds on a certain set of characteristics that are then use to gener-

ate hypotheses about the international behavior of states and other
international actors.
That is to say, often it is the metaphor itself that comes to define cer-
tain foreign policy preferences, and then it is these metaphors, rather
than some empirical observation of foreign policymaking, that gener-
ates hypotheses about international relations. The journalists in 1962
who wanted to describe the preferences of members of the Kennedy
administration in the face of the Cuban missile situation chose animal
metaphors that starkly convey a warlike or peace-oriented orientations.
“Hawk” and “dove” fit that bill, but in their subsequent and ritual-
ized use in formulating theories of international relations they create a
stark dichotomy between those favoring war and those favoring peace.
Obviously the choices facing foreign policymakers are rarely that pro-
nounced, at which point the hawk – dove dichotomy becomes more
important in influencing analyses of case studies than the empirical
evidence itself. The “hawk” and “dove” monikers also oversimplify
policy nuances, as Mark Lawrence (2009) points out in his review
of Nicholas Thompson’s dual biography of Paul Nitze and George
Kennan, The Hawk and the Dove (2009) in which Lawrence writes
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that these terms (Nitze is the hawk and Kennan is the dove) blur both
the similarities and differences between the two foreign policy icons
that are the subject of Thompson’s book.31 “Hawk” and “dove,” like
many reified terms, are taken as a priori categories rather than the
metaphors as which they started out.
“Pariah” and “Rogue” States; “Predators”

and “Parasites”
As the discussion of “hawks” and “doves” above illustrates, when
it comes to classifying actors in international relations, metaphorical
terms come in handy, even if they are not necessarily applied con-
sistently. Among other metaphorical monikers that can be applied
to actors (typically states) behaving beyond the bounds of inter-
nationally accepted behavior are “pariah” and “rogue” states. That
both political actors and scholars of international relations alike do
not agree on what states fall into these categories is a clear indica-
tion of their metaphorical nature. Among “pariah” states are obvious
candidates such as Iraq, Libya, and Sudan, the subjects of a book
about international sanctions and politics in the Middle East (Niblock
2001). Countries such as these acquire their “pariah” status by vio-
lating international norms and undertaking actions that, according to

other states, put international stability at risk. Earlier in the twenti-

eth century “pariah” states included those that exhibited “provocative
policies and territorial ambitions” such as “Soviet Russia, Fascist Italy,
Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany” (Bederman 2002, 122).
What qualifies as a pariah state, however, is not clear. Depending on
one’s definition, pariah state status can be earned by different coun-
tries for different reasons, including the mere existence of the state and
not necessarily any one or more set of actions. For example, among
the members of what Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi (1988, 209) calls the
“pariah club” are Israel, South Africa during the Apartheid era, and
Taiwan. In making these categorizations, Beit-Hallahmi relies on the
definition of “pariah states” devised by Stephen Meyer (1984, 55),
that is, “countries that for one reason or another have been shunned
by their regional neighbors, if not by the international community
in general.” For Meyer (ibid.), the criteria for qualifying as a pariah
state are “if by five years after achieving independence it did not have
diplomatic relations with at least ten percent of its regional neighbors
and belong to at least one regional alliance/organization.”32 For other
authors, what qualifies as a “pariah state” is situational, for example,
relative to the potential risks that flow if these states were to acquire
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nuclear weapons (see Harkavy 1973; 1977). Other definitions and
other examples of pariah states can be found in the literature revealing
that what is meant by the term is far from universally agreed upon by
scholars and practitioners of international relations alike.
What is clear from this lack of clarity is that the concept of “pariah
states” is metaphorical as is, ironically, the origin and meaning of
the word “pariah” itself. The English word “pariah” comes from the
Indian subcontinent, specifically, the Tamil word paraiyan meaning
“hereditary drummer” referring to a member of groups of individ-
uals who fell into “untouchable” castes (Oxford English Dictionary).
Defined as “outcast,” the term thus is doubly metaphorical, grounded
in the meaning of those who were members of “out castes” as well as
those who have been “cast out” of society. “Pariah states” thus can be
seen metaphorically as outcasts from international affairs, that is, coun-
tries that are taboo or practice taboo behaviors within the accepted
norms of international relations. Because of the metaphorical quality
of the term, what qualifies as taboo is subject to interpretation, lead-
ing to the plethora of definitions of what constitutes a pariah state and
disagreement among scholars regarding which countries fall into this
classification of states.
Although the terms “pariah state” and “rogue state” often are used
synonymously in the IR literature, the metaphorical connotations of

the two expressions offer different ways of seeing the conceptual issues
they are meant to highlight. The definition of “rogue,” in fact, is quite
distinct from “pariah.” A “rogue” is, according to the Oxford English
Dictionary a “dishonest, unprincipled person; a rascal.” If “pariahs”
are outcasts (in some cases simply on the basis of how other states
view them and how they are politically constituted), then “rogues”
are states that act in intentionally destructive or irresponsible ways
that purposefully undermine other countries’ security, international
norms, or regional or international stability in general. In some cases
countries included in this classification are the same that are placed in
the “pariah state” category. Thus, for example, in his study of post–
Cold War U.S. foreign policy, Robert Litwak (2000) sees Iraq (prior
to the U.S. military operation in 2003), Iran, and North Korea as
“rogue states” posing challenges to American security because of the
mischief they practice in regional and global affairs.33 Not surprisingly,
an author with a very different view of world affairs, Noam Chomsky
(2000), places that very same United States in the “rogues’ gallery”
of states that exert force for their own gain.
Of course what qualifies as an international norm, what actors
make and sustain them, and among what actors they are generally
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accepted will determine which states abide or do not abide by those
norms. In the United States, “General Colin Powell, then Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, manufactured the ‘Rogue Doctrine’ as
the basic template for US military strategy in the post–Cold War
era” (Klare 2000, 46). Nonetheless, “the precise membership of the
club of [rogue] states,” and “what they threatened to do to be
made part of it . . . have evolved from administration to administra-
tion” (Lennon and Eiss 2004, vii). Thomas Henriksen (2001) traces
“rogue” actors back to the Gauls, Visigoths, and Vandals menacing
the Roman Empire and observes that what qualifies as a “rogue”
changes with historical circumstances. Ultimately, one cannot help but
arrive at the conclusion that what qualifies as a rogue is in the eye of
the beholder.34
A more original metaphorical formulation for international actors
“behaving badly” is Oded Löwenheim’s imagery of “predators”
and “parasites,” or what he otherwise calls “persistent agents of
transnational harm.” From the Barbary pirates to groups adopting
strategies of terror in the twenty-first century, actors threatening Great
Power authority have been a constant feature on the international
scene. “Predators” use force to gain advantage over Great Powers
while “parasites” abuse “the institutions of violence and Great Power
authority and feed . . . on them” (Löwenheim 2007, 64). Like “pariah”

and “rogue” states, “predators” and “parasites” provide powerful

metaphorical imagery to highlight dangerous nature of international
security and the safety of other international actors that is at stake.
As we have seen, however, which actors fall into these categories is
subject to debate.
“Guns versus Butter”
Although the origins of the term are unclear, it would appear that the
expression “guns versus butter” originated around the time of World
War I when national policymakers in the United States in particular
articulated an image to express the economic tradeoffs that were nec-
essary during war time. As security metaphors go, the implications
of the linguistic formulation of “guns versus butter” are probably
more profound for policymakers than for scholars of international rela-
tions. The imagery of “guns versus butter” is potentially very potent
for domestic policy debates over the budgetary realities of devoting
funds to either national defense or domestic economic welfare. So as a
rhetorical device the guns versus butter metaphor can have appreciable
effects for national politics.
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For scholars of international security the guns versus butter
metaphor perhaps is not significant for persuasive purposes as it is
in national policymaking, but it does pose some analytical problems.
Specifically, the metaphor vastly oversimplifies the debate over bud-
getary allocations and sets up a false dichotomy between national
defense spending and spending on domestic economic welfare.35 The
“guns” half of the metaphor implies that the economics of national
defense involves only spending on goods and services that have a mil-
itary application. How could “guns” mean anything other than guns?
Yet obviously a great deal of military industries have civilian and/or
nonmilitary applications, or at the very least utilize or lead to innova-
tions that have civilian uses. To take just one rather striking example
of how “guns” can actually also imply “butter,” the foodstuff Spam
was invented in the United States in 1937 and found widespread
use during World War II in military rations but obviously also could
feed civilian populations. Spam is a perfect example of not guns ver-
sus butter but guns equals butter so long as we understand “butter”
metaphorically to mean food (in this case, Spam).
The “butter” part of the metaphor also is somewhat misleading
inasmuch as it implies that spending on domestic economic welfare
necessarily takes something away from national defense. Even the most
pure of Realist scholars would agree that what is meant by power in

international relations is a fungible commodity. Power includes not

only military resources but also the size and health of a country’s
economy as well as the size and health of a country’s population.
Indeed, no less than Napoleon contended that “an army marches
on its stomach” and the same can be said for the entire population
of a country. Few would disagree that a powerful country is one
with a well-fed and nourished civilian population. Hence, spending
on metaphorical “butter” can strengthen the power of that which is
purchased through spending on guns, metaphorically or literally. The
“guns versus butter” metaphor is hardly the most significant for how
international security is studied, but it serves as a good example of how
even the seemingly most innocuous metaphor can have theoretical and
analytical implications.
The Narratives of Security: Metaphors

of Insecurity and Order
Efforts to conceptualize international security in metaphorical terms
demonstrate an ongoing process of finding images that express shift-
ing senses of what constitutes security and what threatens it. For
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Samuel Huntington (1996), international security can be expressed
metaphorically as “world order.” In one of his most noteworthy state-
ments on international security Huntington contrasted this order with
a metaphorical “clash,” in particular, a “clash” of civilizations. Here
“clash” serves as a metaphor for what Huntington sees as the conflict-
ual, oppositional, and confrontational stances taken by civilizations,
one or more against others.36 To further the metaphor, Huntington
argues that “clash” of civilizations is characterized by metaphorical
“fault line” conflicts. This tectonic metaphorical imagery is echoed by
Michael Brecher (2008) who depicts aspects of international security
in terms of “international political earthquakes.”37
While Huntington and Brecher opt for tectonic metaphors of “fault
lines” and “earthquakes,” James Rosenau (1990, 7) prefers climato-
logical ones, choosing to describe “postinternational politics” in the
metaphorical language of “turbulence” (the passage below is from
Rosenau’s metaphorically titled Turbulence in World Politics) and
other forms of inclement weather:
Doubtless every era seems chaotic to the people who live through it, and the
last decades of the twentieth century are no exception. It is as if Spaceship
Earth daily encounters squalls, downdrafts, and wind shears as it careens into
changing and uncharted realms of experience. Sometimes the turbulence is

furiously evident as thunderclouds of war gathering or the lightening of a

crisis streaks across the global sky; but often the turbulence is of a clear-air
kind, the havoc it wreaks unrecognized until after its challenges have been
met or its damage done.38
Like Huntington and Brecher, Rosenau seeks to find an appropriate
metaphorical language with which to make the changing nature of
international security intelligible to readers. Rosenau is aware, how-
ever, that metaphorical imagery can only go so far in the formulation
of a theory of changing international conditions.39 The post–Cold
War world, or “postinternational” world as Rosenau calls it, comprises
or will comprise actors, issues, resources, and relationships that are
different from that which preceded them. Metaphors can aid in con-
ceptualizing these changes, but they cannot specify them. As Rosenau
(7–8) writes:
While equating the turbulence of world affairs to stormy weather captures

well the current human condition, its use here as a metaphor may divert from
my larger purpose. The goal in identifying a hitherto unimaginable scheme
is to facilitate empirical explanation rather than to provide poetic expression.
What is needed is a conception of turbulence that denotes the tensions and
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changes that ensue when the structures and processes that normally sustain
world politics are unsettled and appear to be undergoing rearrangement.
Rosenau’s book is, then, devoted to laying out a theory of interna-

tional politics that specifies analytically that which is captured with the
metaphorical image of “turbulence.”40 As a metaphor for the post–
Cold War world this may in fact be particularly apt, yet as Rosenau
points out, the metaphor cannot substitute for a specification of how
changes in the number and types of international actors have an effect
on the overall order of international politics.
One point of agreement among Huntington, Brecher, and Rosenau
is that “clashes,” “political earthquakes,” and “turbulence” can be
contrasted with what presumably is clearly discernible, that is, inter-
national “order.” Hedley Bull (1977, 8) defines international order
as “a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals
of the society of states, or international society.”41 In this formulation
international order is either an intervening variable or a means to an
end depending on what is meant by “sustains” in Bull’s definition.42
By contrast, Bull (20) defines “world order” as “those patterns or
dispositions of human activity that sustain the elementary or primary
goals of social life among mankind as a whole.” In other words, as
Bull (ibid.) makes the distinction, “international order is order among

states” while world order is order among men. Both concepts refer
to “order” metaphorically inasmuch as the literal usage of the term is
simply a “condition of logical or comprehensible arrangement among
the separate elements of a group” (American Heritage Dictionary,
1273).43
Bull’s metaphorical use of “order” is meant to convey the desir-
ability of that which it brings about. As indicated, the literal sense
of the word “order” is simply an arrangement of separate elements
within a group. In Bull’s formulation, order is neither a neutral state
of affairs nor an end in itself, but rather something in service to inter-
national society, which itself is in service to mankind. The goals of
international society for Bull are fourfold: “Preservation of the sys-
tem and society of states . . . Maintaining the independence or external
sovereignty of individual states . . . The goal of peace . . . Limitation of
violence resulting in death or bodily harm” (Bull, 16–19). Further-
more, world order “is morally prior to international order” because
“order among mankind as a whole is something wider than order
among states” (ibid., 22, emphasis added). As Nicholas Onuf (1989,
155) reminds us, however, this term is metaphorical as well: “ ‘Order’
is not a strict, literal representation of the condition of the universe
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as apprehended by human beings who, after all, observe a great deal
of instability and disarrangement in what they are capable of appre-
hending . . . ‘Order’ is a metaphor, a figure of speech, a disguise. It is
constituted by performative speech and constitutes propositional con-
tent for such speech. One asserts that ‘order’ stands for, or counts as,
the way the world is, can be, should be, will be.”44
And so, in many ways, the invocation of “order” takes us back to
the beginning of what constitutes what is metaphorically referred to
as international “security.” Both terms project an image of safety and
logical arrangement that is only imperfectly achieved and therefore
only subjectively perceived in the realm that is known as international
relations. The metaphorical narratives of security are thus inextricably
tied up with the metaphorical narrative of order. Absent the conditions
that would render security and order measurably present, the terms
are used as metaphors for what one can imagine in other realms but in
international relations is merely a construct that imperfectly replicates
what is perceived elsewhere in the human experience.

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Chapter 7
G a m e Th e o ry M e ta p h o r s
T he area of international relations theory that is most characterized

by overt metaphorical imagery is that of game theory. Although the
imagery of game theory would suggest that the games were out-
growths of metaphorical thinking, the origins of game theory actually
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are to be found in the area of mathematics.1 The metaphors that pop-
ulate game theory models—images such as prisoners’ dilemmas, stag
hunts, and games of chicken—are outgrowths of numerical problems.2
In numerical analysis, the metaphorical stories associated with the var-
ious games, rooted as they are in mathematical problems, serve largely
an illustrative purpose. However, as games have come to serve as the
core of social science analyses in fields such as international relations,
the metaphors contained within them have taken on a life of their
own. In the narrative of international relations theory, the metaphors
of game theory are perhaps the most obvious stories of all.
Game theory metaphors are numerous. They include images of
schoolyard fights, retail competitions, driving rules, radio frequency
selections, prisoners’ dilemmas, stag hunts, and hot rod standoffs,
among others.3 Each of these metaphors encapsulates and tells a story
that presents a problem to be solved. While the plot lines suggested
by other metaphors in international relations can be oblique, the
metaphors of game theory present obvious story arcs complete with
characters, points of tension, and plot resolutions. It is the metaphori-
cal assumptions that inform the stories of game theory that dictate the
conclusions that are often drawn. The following discussions of promi-
nent game theoretical scenarios in international relations illustrate this
point.

Prisoner’s Dilemma
Among game theoretic scenarios the Prisoner’s Dilemma game is
examined perhaps the most often in international relations theory.4
Interestingly, the Prisoner’s Dilemma seems to be based as much on
what scholars imagine is the nature of relationships among prisoners
as it is on the lived experiences of prisoners themselves. The implica-
tions of international relations theory are not insignificant inasmuch
as the imagined nature of prisoner relationships is used to make pre-
dictions about international affairs. Notably, prisoner relationships are
presumed to be based on mistrust. Many game theorists then go on to
accept without question the proposition that this presumption of mis-
trust among prisoners is replicated in the situation among states.5 Yet
the validity of the Prisoner’s Dilemma situation is hardly ever critically
examined.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma model was formulated at the RAND Cor-
poration in 1950 by researchers Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher
(see Flood 1952a; 1952b). Flood and Dresher did not initiate their
studies with observations of social relations between two prisoners.
Rather, they were interested in the mathematical problem of why
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actors would choose self-defeating strategies when higher payoffs are
available through cooperation (Poundstone 1992, 106). The problem
lies in the payoff structure, which dictates that each actor chooses a
strategy that maximizes payoffs depending on the other actor’s moves.
Therefore, it is logical for each actor to choose an optimizing strategy,
even though the result of both actors pursuing this strategy will make
them worse off in the end. In this sense, the dilemma is purely one
of numerical payoffs and requires no metaphor to envision the prob-
lem nor solve it. It was only later that fellow RAND researcher Albert
Tucker made the model more vibrant by weaving the arbitrary story
of two prisoners to provide a narrative structure for the puzzle.6 The
model therefore could have been illustrated with any reasonably enter-
taining tale of actors facing choices within a fixed payoff structure and
a rank ordering of preferences.
The genesis of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game shines a new light
on an analysis of international relations metaphors. As game theorists
point out, the strategic interaction of the Prisoner’s Dilemma does not
necessitate the assumptions about human nature and narrowly con-
strued self-interest that are inherent in conceptions of how prisoners
would react to the situation in which they are placed in the familiar
scenario of the game (Campbell 1985, 10). In fact, game theory in
general is not meant to be a perfect model of the lived experiences
of humans. Rather, it is an experimental science in which its students

G a m e Th e o ry M e ta p h o r s 139
are encouraged to use their imagination in conceptualizing situations

of strategic choice (Gintis 2000, xxiv–xxviii). Thus, the irony of much
of the scholarship surrounding Prisoner’s Dilemma is that extensive
research has gone into solving the game, rather than using the model
as a metaphor with which to understand analogous realms of human
interaction.
It is important to note then that Prisoner’s Dilemma is not really a
game based on actual prisoner interactions. In actuality, it is a mathe-
matical model of choice among various options in which the logic of
the situation requires strategies that maximize gains among differing
levels of rewards. The problem could involve actions taken by any sen-
tient being capable of the most rudimentary ability to choose among a
variety of options. Robert Axelrod (1984, 95) demonstrates as much,
comparing the actors in Prisoner’s Dilemma to bacteria.7 Axelrod and
others see the problem intrinsic in Prisoner’s Dilemma as almost a
natural occurrence whenever living organisms are engaged in strate-
gic choice.8 This is all fine and well; but conclusions such as these flow
from the mathematical problem in question, not the metaphor of pris-
oners that has been attached to that problem. It is the assumption of
motives on the part of the prisoners that poses analytical problems,
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and it is that which should be subjected to critical examination.
This is not the same thing as saying that Prisoner’s Dilemma
is designed in such a way to make the discovery of cooperation
impossible. For Liberal theorists Prisoner’s Dilemma is a device to
demonstrate strategies of cooperation. For example, when the game
is played on an iterated basis, when cooperative strategies are rein-
forced, when information is made transparent or more plentiful, or
when actors value their reputation, cooperation can be fostered.9
Additionally, the Prisoner’s Dilemma has been used to explain the exis-
tence of international regimes, which are said to facilitate cooperation,
and presents perhaps the richest solution to the structural constraints
that govern the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Krasner 1983a; 1983b, Keohane
1984, Stein 1990). Yet all these solutions to the Prisoner’s Dilemma
leave the dilemma of cooperation intact. They accept the assumption
that states can be likened to prisoners, each of which is a self-
interested actor operating under conditions of anarchy. They do this
despite evidence that the Prisoner’s Dilemma game does not accu-
rately depict the world of international relations, let alone the real
world of prisoners in confinement.10 Game theorists are thus inclined
to see cooperation within the constraints of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game as always contingent, with actors never having the opportu-
nity to escape the parameters built into the game’s foundational
story.

For many political scientists game theory appears to validate the

proposition that mistrust among prisoners is replicated in the situa-
tion among states. However, as others have observed, game theory has
limitations.11 Among these limitations is the imperfect way in which
Prisoner’s Dilemma models international relations. Another drawback
of game theory is its inability to completely capture the imperfec-
tions of human rationality.12 Strangely enough, some theorists, such
as Robert Axelrod, eliminate the requirement that human agency be a
part of the Prisoner’s Dilemma model, arguing instead that the prin-
ciples of the game can apply equally to cognitive and noncogitative
organisms. This denial of human agency renders the human element in
the Prisoner’s Dilemma metaphor moot and begs the question of why
the metaphor is needed in the first place if its qualities are unneces-
sary for theorizing about strategic choice. In other words, quite a few
game theorists seem unconcerned about the experiential bases of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma model.13 The Prisoner’s Dilemma model assumes
that prisoners are inherently disinclined toward cooperation, given the
nature of their confinement despite the fact that real-life observations
of prisoners would tend to suggest otherwise.
The problem of leaving the experiential bases of the Prisoner’s
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Dilemma metaphor unexamined is that the mathematical model that
is the genesis of the game is allowed to impute motives on the part
of prisoners instead of letting the experiences of prisoners open up
new possibilities for understanding the choices that humans make.
So instead of the prisoner metaphor serving as the impetus for the-
orizing in a seemingly unrelated realm, scholars try simply to solve the
Prisoner’s Dilemma abstracting it from any real-life context.14 More-
over, the metaphor of criminal mistrust in the model generates its
own metaphors that are then taken as assumed features of different
realms of human interaction. This is the case even when game theorists
endeavor to find cooperative solutions to the dilemma. For instance,
in his discussion of the communities of cooperation produced by iter-
ated play using the “tit for tat” strategy in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game, Robert Axelrod (1984, 56) employs a metaphorical language
that is decidedly warlike in its imagery: “A new strategy is said to
invade a native strategy if the newcomer gets a higher score with a
native than a native gets with another native. Since natives are vir-
tually the entire population, the concept of invasion is equivalent to
the single mutant individual being able to do better than the popu-
lation average” (emphasis in the original).15 Ironically, what started
as a metaphor for differential preferences takes on a life of its own
and is seen as a real-life situation involving detained criminal suspects,

which then is reified into a theory of enemy invasion. This is a good

illustration of the process whereby metaphors generate meaning by
making problems out of seemingly innocuous observations of the
human experience.
Because the Prisoner’s Dilemma begins with assumptions of con-
flicting interests in the context of strategic choice it creates for
scholars the need to solve the “problem” of international cooperation.
As Anatol Rapoport and Albert Chammah (1965, 25) put it: “Pris-
oner’s Dilemma is, by definition, a noncooperative game” (emphasis
added). Even if one were to try and build a non – zero sum element
into Prisoner’s Dilemma and similar games, one would find that the
zero sum aspects are difficult to eliminate from the framework of game
theory.16 So while there are critics who find fault in the assumptions
of Prisoner’s Dilemma—such as the inability of prisoners to cooper-
ate ahead of time or communicate with each other in order to outwit
the police—these critics nonetheless maintain that, short of redefining
the parameters of the model, one must work within the payoff struc-
ture inherent in the game. The effort then becomes to find “solutions”
to the “problem” of Prisoner’s Dilemma rather than to rework the
parameters of the game so as to eliminate its flawed constraints.
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The Prisoner’s Dilemma approach is not without its critics.
Hayward Alker (1996), for example, points out that the stories used
in game theory to illustrate mathematical problems frequently reflect
theorists’ own view of the world, not necessarily universally agreed
upon dilemmas. This is perhaps no more true than in the case of
the Prisoner’s Dilemma.17 Although the Prisoner’s Dilemma can be
interpreted in several ways, the standard interpretation is based on
an assumption that prisoners are inherently averse to cooperation in
light of the constrained situation in which their choices are made.
So it is not surprising that theorists are reluctant to consider alter-
native ways of approaching the Prisoner’s Dilemma game other than
ones that present limited solutions to the assumed inherent problem.
As Roger Hurwitz (1989, 119–121, 128–130) observes, storytellers
who embrace collectivist norms are more likely to portray prisoners
as devoted to each other than storytellers who come from more indi-
vidualistic traditions. Without some larger experiential context for a
game like Prisoner’s Dilemma, solutions are contingent on whatever
assumptions about problems game theorists bring with them to the
“game-solving” process.
If Alker is right and the problem of cooperation is one that has
been invented by the stories told by scholars and others, why then
would social scientists choose models such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma

to frame their analyses of politics and international affairs? William

Poundstone opines that game theory reflects the prejudices of the-
orists and perhaps there is not much that can be done about that.
Poundstone (1992, 170) writes: “Game theory is a kaleidoscope that
can only reflect the value system of those who apply it. If game
theoretic prescriptions sometimes seem Machiavellian, it is generally
because the value systems of those who applied the game theory are
Machiavellian.” Metaphors such as the one in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
play a generative role in theory creation. Language constructs mean-
ings, and in turn realities and the practical problems that emerge
within those realities. Once realities and their attendant problems
are constructed they provide a window into the linguistic founda-
tions of social relations. But when scholars attempt to reconstruct
those realities through such devices as game theory they can do so in
ways that are divorced from the socially constructed realities in which
people actually live. Game theorists who apply Prisoner’s Dilemma
to international relations perhaps unwittingly end up using the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma metaphor to generate a harsher vision of world affairs
than really exists. The irony of Prisoner’s Dilemma, then, is that what
started as a simple mathematical puzzle has become a metaphor for
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almost every type of social interaction, with the exception perhaps of
the experiences of real prisoners themselves.18 The failure to disen-
tangle the mathematical roots of game theory, the metaphors used to
represent mathematical games, and the real experiences of people who
“play” these games, is a problem that is endemic to game theory.19
Game theorists who focus on the Prisoner’s Dilemma may forget that
their “model” was, or should be, an extension of the metaphor that
provides much of its imagery, not a thing unto itself.
Observation reveals that in the real world prisoners do not act
according to the predictions engendered by Prisoner’s Dilemma
games. James Der Derian describes an episode that confirms this.
For a period Der Derian taught convicts world politics course at
Gardner State Prison. At one point the students were learning about
theories of international cooperation and decided to stage their own
classroom Prisoner’s Dilemma exercise. Defying the logic of stan-
dard Prisoner’s Dilemma simulations, the real-life prisoners in Der
Derian’s class found that their fellow inmates interpreted the game
from the perspective of norms established among inmate communi-
ties: “They explained how traditional codes of silence, pre-scripted
stories, and other intersubjective rituals of honor—all specific to
their prison society—defied generalization into timeless, reductionist,
instrumentalist, (i.e., rationalist) principles. In other words, situated,

constructed identities, rather than permanent, unitary interests were

at work” (Der Derian 1998, 117). In a chapter in another book
(Marks 2004, Chapter Four) I build on Der Derian’s findings. The
chapter demonstrates that a reexamination of the prison metaphor
ultimately undermines the assumption of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
model, and suggests that a frame of reference that takes into account
the experiences of real-life prisoners offers a way to imagine commu-
nities in which cooperation is possible.20 Since metaphors construct
perceptions of reality, a metaphor of the prison that builds on pris-
oners’ construction of their own domain provides a new way of
conceptualizing international relations in the real world.
Stag Hunt
In the words of Brian Skyrms (2004, 1), “the Stag Hunt is a story
that became a game.” Specifically, as many scholars of international
relations know, the game theoretic model Stag Hunt began as a hypo-
thetical scenario postulated by the political philosopher Jean Jacques
Rousseau. “The story is briefly told by Rousseau, in A Discourse on
Inequality: ‘If it was a matter of hunting a deer, everyone well realized
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that he must remain faithful to his post; but if a hare happened to pass
within reach of one of them, we could not doubt that he would have
gone off in pursuit of it without scruple’ ” (ibid.). As Skyrms points
out, Rousseau’s stag hunt parable is a story of a social contract. How-
ever, the principles illustrated by the story can manifest themselves in
other situational scenarios. Skyrms (2) observes that “David Hume
also has the Stag Hunt. His most famous illustration of a convention
has the structure of a two-person stag hunt game: ‘Two men who pull
at the oars of a boat, do it by agreement of a convention, tho’ they
have never given promises to each other.’ ”21 Hume revisits this theme
as a story of two neighbors who own a meadow in common, each of
whom waits for the other to drain it (ibid.).
As Skyrms (3) points out, in game theoretic terms Prisoner’s
Dilemma and Stag Hunt are different games as defined in terms of
their utility structures and strategic payoffs: “In prisoner’s dilemma,
there is a conflict between individual rationality and mutual benefit.
In stag hunt, what is rational for one player to choose depends on his
beliefs about what the other will choose. Both stag hunting and hare
hunting are Nash equilibria.” The more interesting contrast between
the two games, however, may have to do with their metaphorical qual-
ities. Skyrms (2) hits on something when he observes that the “stag
hunt does not have the same melodramatic quality as the prisoner’s

dilemma” (emphasis added). What is lacking in the tale of the pris-

oner’s dilemma is the shadow of the future, which transforms the dire
situation of suspects faced with a one-time scenario of potential mis-
trust into an ongoing social contract between mutually dependent
individuals: “The shadow of the future has not solved the prob-
lem of cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma; it has transformed it
into the problem of cooperation in the stag hunt” (ibid., 6, empha-
sis added). Changing the situational aspects of strategic interaction
changes the reward structure of the game. In other words, what deter-
mines individuals’ interpretation of cooperation problems resides in
the metaphorical expression of what is at stake.
For Skyrms, the stag hunt is a metaphorical expression of the social
contract, or, as Skyrms (9) puts it, “the whole problem of adopting
or modifying the social contract for mutual benefit can be seen as a
stag hunt.” The state of nature, illustrated by both actors hunting
hares, is an equilibrium, but the social contract, illustrated by both
actors cooperating to hunt a stag, is also an equilibrium, as laid out
in the payoff structure of the game. The metaphor of cooperation
in a state of nature finds expression in the stag hunt parable. By con-
trast, the “melodramatic” quality of the prisoner’s dilemma, as Skyrms
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(108) puts it, tells a different story where, “by definition, Defect is
the best response to any strategy encountered.” No social contract is
envisioned in the prisoner’s dilemma model, reflecting a metaphorical
expression of perpetual noncooperation: “If two people cooperate in
prisoner’s dilemma, each is choosing less rather than more” (ibid., 3).
If one wants to convey through metaphor the lack of incentive for
cooperation, prisoner’s dilemma is the situation that applies. How-
ever, if one needs a metaphor for the social contract, then according
to Skyrms, stag hunt is the story to tell.
Scholars of international relations have used the stag hunt
metaphor to convey these themes. For Kenneth Waltz, the social con-
tract, illustrated by cooperative interactions in the stag hunt scenario,
applies only to the governed realm of domestic politics since the anar-
chic structure of the international system allows only for actors to
find equilibrium at mutual defection in the form of going their own
way. This “self-help” image of functionally similar states produced
by international anarchy is predicated on Waltz’s (1959, 169–170)
assumption of rationality leading to actors’ self-interest:
If we examine the requirements of rational action, we find that even an exam-

ple as simple as the stag hunt we have to assume that the reason of each leads
to an identical definition of interest, that each will draw the same conclusion
as to the methods appropriate to meet the original situation, that all will agree

instantly on the action required by any chance incidents that raise the ques-
tion of altering the original plan, and that each can rely completely on the
steadfastness of purpose of all the others.
As Michael Williams contends, however, Waltz misinterprets
Rousseau’s intentions in laying out the stag hunt logic. Like Skyrms,
Williams argues that the hare-hunting strategy of actors represents
a response to variable gains that predates the social contract. Coun-
tering Waltz, Williams (2005, 66) maintains that the “parable which
Waltz represents as exemplifying Rousseau’s contribution to an under-
standing of the objective nature of international politics is represen-
tative, for Rousseau, of reason in the early stages of the corruption
which would culminate in contemporary society.” Of course, Waltz
would argue precisely that absent the existence of a governed society
Rousseau’s depiction of the stag hunt in its early stages serves as an apt
model for international relations where states exist in anarchy without
societal rules to govern their behavior.
From a metaphorical standpoint herein lies the rub. It is not
whether international relations represents an anarchy or a society, but
what qualities of international relations are conjured up by schol-
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ars’ individual readings of the stag hunt story. Obviously, what the
stag hunt means for understanding international relations is indeter-
minate since Waltz and Williams (and others, for that matter) draw
their own conclusions about what qualities and interests to attribute
to states based on their interpretation of the stag hunt parable. Indeed,
an entirely different interpretation of the stag hunt metaphor is told
from a gendered perspective. Rebecca Grant argues that the stag hunt
need not make assumptions about the conflictual nature of man,
especially when human nature is viewed in something other than
masculine terms. Grant retells the stag hunt story in which the pur-
suit of a hare by one hunter does not represent a “defection” that
causes insecurity among other hunters, but instead is seen as a reflec-
tion of the commitments the hunter has to feed his family (Grant
1991, 15).22 A gendered perspective understands the stag hunt, or
better yet, the “hare hunt,” as a metaphor for the nurturing of
the family, not an opportunity to undermine fellow human beings.
A metaphor that implies conflict to one observer implies cooperation
to another.
In sum, there is no reading of the stag hunt that is “correct.” There
are only metaphorical expressions of impressions of the prospects
for cooperation when variable rewards are in play. As Skyrms points
out, both stag hunting and hare hunting are Nash equilibria, and
thus which strategy scholars predict actors will pursue depends on

their interpretation of humans’ interests. In this sense, theories of

international relations premised on the stag hunt metaphor could be
articulated with or without it. As a metaphor the stag hunt is both
indicative of scholars’ prior beliefs about the nature of international
relations and a device to suggest hypotheses for predicting behavior.
Chicken
Among the best explications of chicken as a metaphor is the one
offered by Thomas Schelling in Arms and Influence. Schelling (1966,
116) lays out the contours of the chicken story succinctly: “This is
described as a game in which two teen-age motorists head for each
other on a highway—usually late at night, with their gangs and girl-
friends looking on—to see which of the two will swerve aside. The
one who does is then called ‘chicken.’ ” However, among Schelling’s
observation is that, when applied to the study of international rela-
tions, the chicken metaphor can be expanded beyond the scenario of
teenagers in their hot-rods on a deserted highway at night:
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“Chicken” is not just a game played by delinquent teen-agers with their hot-
rods in southern California; it is a universal form of adversary engagement.
It is played not only in the Berlin air corridor but by Negroes [sic] who want
to get their children into schools and by whites who want to keep them out;
by rivals at a meeting who both raise their voices, each hoping the other will
yield the floor to avoid embarrassment; as well as by drivers of both sexes and
all ages at all times of day. Children played it before their were old enough to
drive and before automobiles were invented. (Ibid., 116–117)
In an abstract sense, the game of chicken is recorded in various

forms in ancient history. Schelling finds the first instance of chicken in
ancient Troy when Antilochos would not yield the road to Menelaos
as they approached each other on horse-drawn chariots.
Chief among Schelling’s deterrence metaphors that are inspired by
the Chicken game is his depiction of “brinkmanship,” a word that
immediately evokes the metaphorical image of threat Schelling seeks
to convey. Brinkmanship “means exploiting the danger that some-
body may inadvertently go over the brink, dragging the other with
him” (ibid., 99). Schelling does not stop there, however, and revels
in the possibilities of threat that are possible at the metaphorical brink
of danger: “Any attempt to intimidate or to deter the other climber
depends on the threat of slipping or stumbling. With loose ground,
gusty winds, and a propensity toward dizziness, there is some danger

when a climber approaches the edge; one can credibly threaten to fall
off accidentally by standing near the brink” (ibid., emphasis in the
original). To drive home his point, Schelling supplements the climber
metaphor with other images of brinkmanship. Individuals can, for
example, metaphorically “rock the boat” and threaten to tip it over
to get other occupants of the boat to row (ibid., 91). States can “lay
a trip-wire, one that is plainly visible, that cannot be stumbled upon,
and that is manifestly connected to the machinery of war” (ibid., 99).
Schelling (100) also likens deterrence to navigating among arthritics
at a cocktail party or playing a game of chess.
What all of these metaphors evoke is the sense of danger that
Schelling associates with deterrence failure. Deterrence can be used
to keep individuals from committing any type of act. For example, an
individual can attempt to deter his or her spouse or partner from stop-
ping for a drink on the way home from work by threatening not to
have dinner waiting on the table. Moreover, the repercussions of both
the deterrent threat and the failure of deterrence can be dire, but also
mundane. In the aforementioned example, the withholding of dinner
will not result in the starvation of the spouse or partner in question,
nor will stopping for a drink on the way home from work (in the event
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the deterrent threat does not have the desired effect) result in much
beyond irritation for the aggrieved partner (assuming it only occurs
on a limited basis). Schelling’s choice of metaphors that evoke images
of grave danger, metaphors such as falling off the brink of a cliff or
setting off a trip-wire, lead to a theory of deterrence in which the
context of deterrence is one of life and death. That issues involving
deterrence are always or even frequently ones of life and death is an
empirical question, one that most likely yields answers that put such an
assertion in doubt. For the purposes of theorizing about deterrence,
however, Schelling’s metaphorical images frame the concept in ways
that lead to conclusions that limit the scope of analysis only to those
matters that revolve around imminent and dire threat.
As many of these examples show, and as Schelling concedes, the
parameters of Chicken are not identical from one scenario to the next.
For example, in the classic story of teenagers in hot-rods the encounter
is a one-time affair. However, in other situations, for example, drivers
challenging each other in everyday driving circumstances, the “game”
is of an iterated nature. As Schelling (118) notes, “if you can get a
reputation for being reckless, demanding, or unreliable—and appar-
ently hot-rods, taxis, and cars with ‘driving school’ license plates
sometimes enjoy this advantage—you may find concessions made to
you.” Furthermore, in an extended footnote, Schelling (118–119,

note 7) observes that three motivational structures can be engaged in

Chicken, one involving “test cases,” one involving situations in which
something is put at stake, and one where actors are at risk of losing
something in dispute. Chicken can also involve situations in which
potential rivals have the option to withdraw (ibid., 119–120). Thus,
like other games in the game theory arsenal, the contours of Chicken
are far from unambiguous.
Part of the ambiguity of Chicken are the attitudes attributed to
those who play it. In a trenchant critique of nuclear strategy, Bertrand
Russell (2001 [1959], 15) compares chicken as it is played by “youth-
ful degenerates” and by “eminent statesmen.” As played in the former
scenario, that is, “by irresponsible boys, this game is considered deca-
dent and immoral.” In the latter scenario, by contrast, “it is thought
on both sides that the statesmen on one side are displaying a high
degree of wisdom and courage, and only the statesmen on the other
side are reprehensible.” At least, that is how practitioners of foreign
policy in nuclear-equipped states see it. Russell (ibid.) is unconvinced:
“This, of course, is absurd. Both are to be blamed for playing such
an incredibly dangerous game.” What Russell does is impute motives
to actors that reflect his own interpretation of the chicken metaphor.
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But what Russell overlooks is precisely what matters for metaphorical
interpretation, that is, what a metaphor means depends on the experi-
ential context of those conceive it. In the Chicken game, in particular,
experience is an important factor in one’s conceptual mapping of the
scenario in play. When honor and shame are involved with games of
potential dire harm, the mathematical values attached to each of these
ethical values depends on one’s experiences in life where “games” of
this nature are played.
The key to both understanding and winning the Chicken game is
trying to fathom someone else’s motivations. As William Poundstone
(1992, 199) writes, “the player of chicken has a big stake in guessing
what the other player is going to do.” Teenagers playing a game of
chicken have to figure out how their opponents value their lives rela-
tive to their reputation and honor. Foreign policymakers and leaders,
who in their minds are playing metaphorical game of chicken when
practicing nuclear deterrence, have to figure out if their opponents
think the game can be won. Scholars studying nuclear deterrence
strategy have to draw on their own experiences to reconstruct the
calculations of foreign policymakers and leaders. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, scholars have to decide if Chicken is a metaphor for nuclear
deterrence strategy, or if nuclear deterrence strategy is a metaphor for
Chicken. If it is the former, then scholars must correctly calculate the

values politicians attach to military defeat relative to the advantage

they gain from facing another state down. Scholarship on the game of
Chicken then should focus on attaching the correct values to each of
the options available. If it is the latter, then Chicken becomes less a
model and more an ex post facto description of historical facts. If this is
the case, then as a metaphor Chicken becomes part of the storytelling
of international relations as opposed to a true heuristic device.
“Two-Level” Games
In addition to the games that constitute game theory itself is the
metaphor of “two-level” games.23 That the term “two-level games”
is a metaphor is not in dispute. In introducing the concept, Putnam
(1993, 436) names one of the sections of the essay “Two-Level
Games: A Metaphor for Domestic – International Interactions.”24
Putnam explicitly creates the metaphor of “two-level games” to gen-
erate a model of interactions between domestic and international
political actors but acknowledges that a metaphor is not a theory and
that his metaphor is a starting point, not the conclusion.
Taking Putnam’s lead, the logic of two-level games is spelled out
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straightforwardly by scholars such as those in the edited volume
Double-Edged Diplomacy (1993), which raises the interesting ques-
tion, why refer to the phenomenon as “two-level games” as opposed
to the metaphor contained in the book’s title, namely, “double-edged
diplomacy”? Both “two-level games” and “double-edged diplomacy”
are metaphors, so why is one metaphor better than the other as the
title of the book versus the working metaphor around which the the-
ory is built? The answer to this question is found in the introductory
chapter to the book written by Andrew Moravcsik. Moravcsik sug-
gests that the theory of two-level games is different in three ways
from earlier theories that seek to explain the convergence of inter-
national and domestic politics: “First, it is a theory of international
bargaining . . . The second departure from previous theory concerns
the emphasis on the statesman as the central strategic actor . . . The
third and most distinctive departure from previous theory is that
the statesman’s strategies reflect a simultaneous ‘double-edged,’ cal-
culation of constraints and opportunities on both the domestic and
international boards” (Moravcsik 1993, 16–17). In other words, the
essential aspect of the metaphor from the perspective of framing the
theoretical debate is not the “two-level” element but the element of
“games.” In fact, the “two-level” metaphor is seemingly interchange-
able with the “double-edged” metaphor, and the latter is listed as an

integral feature of the former. “Two-level” and “double-edged” are

meant simply to highlight the way in which two types of interactions
are involved involving two types of actors. Theoretically speaking,
then, these parts of the metaphor provide little in terms of the heuristic
utility of the “two-level game” metaphor.
What is theoretically utile, then, is the “game” portion of the
metaphor. What is meant by two-level games is not merely diplo-
macy in a broad sense engaged in with interlocutors in the realms
of international and domestic politics, but a metaphorical “game” in
which payoffs from strategic interaction are at stake. As Moravcsik
(23) points out, as a metaphor the emphasis of two-level games is
viewing “the relationship between domestic and international poli-
tics through the eyes of the statesman.” It is interesting to note that
among the definitions of “diplomacy” is “tact and skill in dealing with
people” (American Heritage Dictionary, 526), which carries a dif-
ferent connotation than “game,” which often implies clear winners
and losers in a competitive exercise. Games are played by individuals,
hence the significance of the metaphor for highlighting this aspect of
the model; the statesman metaphorically is playing a “game” complete
with a metaphorical “win-set” (Moravscik, 23).
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True to the notion of metaphors as means to generate theory,
the chapter authors in Double-Edged Diplomacy used the metaphor
of two-level games to arrive at a theory of international and domes-
tic bargaining. As Moravcsik (24) points out, the volume’s “authors
were . . . encouraged to educe from the case studies their own theoreti-
cal and conceptual insights into the dynamics of successful and unsuc-
cessful domestic/international negotiations.” Indeed, the authors did
arrive at a set of common hypotheses and theoretical propositions
that were guided by the initial definition of the problem as one of
metaphorical “two-level games.” This is not surprising. As we have
seen previously, metaphors often delineate what is interesting, what
is worth studying, and what “problems” need to be “solved.” The
authors of the chapters of Double-Edged Diplomacy were seemingly
given free rein to arrive at hypotheses and theoretical propositions,
but the scope of hypotheses and theoretical propositions that would
be conceivable was framed by the definition of the problem as a
metaphorical “two-level game” as opposed to some other metaphor
that would determine the issues and questions involved.25
Leaving aside the fact that theories of two-level games are just as
likely to fall into the same traps as single-level games but multiplied by
two (since the metaphorical bases of the games are reproduced at two
levels instead of one), the irony of two-level games is that whereas

their purpose is to span the division between the international and

domestic “levels of analysis” in the study of international relations,
by creating a divide between two levels of game playing they end
up reinforcing the division they were designed to bridge. As Michael
McCoy (2000, 189) has observed, the presumed existence of sepa-
rate levels of politics is not an fact, but rather a function of culturally
situated observers.26 Two-level games as a metaphorical construction
suggests that politics take place in analytically and empirically distinct
realms. As has been suggested elsewhere (see, e.g., Luke 1991, Walker
1993, Rosenau 1997, Campbell 1998, Weldes, Laffey, Gusterson, and
Duvall 1999, Manning 2000, Marks 2004), part of the implication of
levels of political activity is the assertion that distinct political realms
insulate areas of order from those characterized by “danger.” The two-
level metaphor reinforces the conception that foreign policymakers
are involved in an elaborate “game” to defend state interests against
“outside” influences from “above” and “below.” At the level “above”
states lie threats of international security. At the level “below” states
lie threats from interests that would seek to alter state behavior. The
“two-level” metaphorical image, then, reflects the ongoing assertion
within IR theory that international relations is an affair of states, neatly
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contained within their borders, protecting state interests from what
Walker (1993) would deem dangers on the “outside, or what two-
level game language would cast as influences residing at levels “above”
and “below.”
Cautionary Notes on the Use of Game Theory

Metaphors in International Relations Theory
While metaphors are often only subtly applied in other areas of
international relations, game theory metaphors often are applied
in an overt fashion. It is therefore useful to examine the unique
difficulties that can arise with these types of overt metaphorical con-
structions. In the first place, as Duncan Snidal reminds us, game
theory metaphors are not the same thing as theories of games. The
metaphorical stories embodied in most games do not specify the the-
oretical propositions that derive from the games. “We do not improve
a metaphor simply by translating it into a game matrix. Glib asser-
tions that ‘Issue X is Prisoner’s Dilemma,’ or that the ‘Cuban Missile
Crisis was a game of chicken,’ efficiently convey a metaphor, but do
not make the metaphor more plausible or take much advantage of the
power of game theory . . . Real rigor requires tightening the correspon-
dence between the metaphor and the issue at hand” (Snidal 1986, 30).

Hence, in order for a game theoretic metaphor to be fruitful for the

purposes of theory it must be translated first into an analogy in which
there is correspondence between the metaphor and the issues of inter-
national relations under investigation and then into a model whereby
some causal logic implied in the metaphor is stated as a hypothe-
sis that can be tested by examination of strategic interaction using
real world cases (ibid., 31–34).27 Only then can game theory serve
as a means to make predictions about how actors will interact under
conditions that were suggested by a metaphor and then transformed
by an analogy into a model that simulates real cases of international
relations. As Snidal (36) states, game metaphors are useful “to illu-
minate and clarify international issues” but for game theory to be
more useful scholars need to “tighten up correspondences between
empirical situations and game models, and separate assumptions from
predictions.”
Aside from not properly distinguishing between metaphor and the-
ory, the use of metaphors in game theory can lead to other difficulties.
Like games in general, the games of game theory involve rules that
impose constraints on choice (Fierke 2002, 339–340). Furthermore,
the metaphors of game theory can be made to seem as if they con-
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stitute the reality of a situation rather than merely abstract linguistic
representations of actual circumstances. R. B. J. Walker maintains that
game theory reduces serious matters of peace and war to the effi-
cient language of econometrics and “strategic choice,” thus diverting
scholars’ attention from the matters of life and death that are at stake
(Walker 1990, 8). This is not surprising inasmuch as most game theo-
retic metaphors are adjuncts to the mathematical models from which
they emanate.
Additionally, game theory metaphors are prone to reification.
By providing a linguistic shorthand they replace the mathematical
problems they were intended to illustrate and, instead, serve as a prob-
lem in their own right. They also generate their own jargon that is
more the stuff of insider lingo than it is of theoretical innovation. The
following passage is a good example of how game theory jargon often
overshadows the metaphors on which the games are based: “Just as
stag hunt easily degenerates into prisoners’ dilemma in the absence of
a sovereign authority, so too prisoners’ dilemma can easily degenerate
into the game of deadlock, in which conflict is preferred to mutual
cooperation” (Snyder and Jervis 1999, 22). The authors of this pas-
sage gloss over the dilemmas of cooperation purportedly captured by
game theoretic metaphors and fixate on simplified means for sum-
marizing complex issues. After all, the principle of mutual aid that is

illustrated by the stag hunt metaphor does not literally “degenerate”

into the quality of mutual mistrust illustrated in Prisoner’s Dilemma
any more than hunters in search of a stag literally transform into two
criminal suspects detained in precinct headquarters.
Among the errors that scholars can commit when applying game
theory metaphors is applying them to inappropriate circumstances
given the purpose for which the metaphor was created. For example,
the metaphor of brinkmanship found in the Chicken game typically
has been associated with crisis situations where the threat of total
annihilation is imminent. Applying the Chicken game imagery, in
which crisis and immediacy are important aspects of the metaphor, to
noncrisis situations or to circumstances in which threats are not imme-
diate may thus be a misleading use of that metaphor. In one of the
more widely used introductory college texts on international relations,
for example, Joshua Goldstein and Jon Pevehouse (2006, 304) liken
international trade negotiations to the metaphorical situation modeled
in the Chicken game. The problem with doing this is that the con-
cepts modeled with the Chicken game metaphor may translate poorly
to situations of trade negotiations where the time frame for decision
making and the consequences of failed negotiations are not as dire as
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those implied by the chicken image. In games of chicken, joint deci-
sions to defect can result in mutual annihilation by the participants.
In trade negotiations, by contrast, even the most spectacularly failed
trade talks do not lead to the same disastrous outcomes that result in
the types of situations, e.g., nuclear deterrence, that are modeled by
the Chicken game.
The problem is not simply that a metaphor may be inappropri-
ately applied, but that subsequent theorizing based on that inapt
application then leads scholars to dubious predictions based on that
metaphor. In the case of the Chicken game metaphor applied to trade
negotiations, although the reality of trade talks is that they tend to
take place over an extended period and rarely if ever do failed trade
talks result in the same sort of disaster that failed nuclear deterrence
would, the dire outcomes imagined by the chicken metaphor can
falsely lead scholars to make predictions about the imagined disas-
trous results of failed trade talks. In the Goldstein and Pevehouse text
noted previously, students just being introduced to the basic concepts
of international relations may labor under the mistaken impression
that trade negotiations have the same immediacy that nuclear deter-
rence does. No doubt the 24 hour news media have contributed
to this false impression since every diplomatic snag between coun-
tries is treated as if it were a life-or-death situation. The purpose

of metaphors in international relations theory is to provide useful

imagery with which to make sense of abstract concepts such as trade.
When a metaphor implying immediacy is inaptly applied to a situation
that does not require it, the bad theoretical habits that are abetted by
non-scholarly sources such as the news media can be reinforced with
negative consequences for students attempting to learn about difficult
ideas.
The Chicken game highlights another problem of metaphors in
game theory, that is, oversimplification. Game theory typically holds
that the game of Chicken models the limited choices confronted by
states, especially in all-or-nothing situations like the ones faced by
states engaged in nuclear deterrence. With both “cars” (states) rushing
headlong toward each other in a game of nerves (a metaphor for the
drive for nuclear supremacy among nuclear states) and the assumption
of self-preservation, the options available to players in the game are
limited only to nuclear victory (military security), utter political defeat
(military vulnerability that leads to foreign policy impotence), or
mutual annihilation (mutually assured destruction—MAD), assuming
a uniformity of interests.
The irony is that the real-life game of chicken engaged in by
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teenagers itself rarely ends with the three stark outcomes in the theo-
retical situation modeled by game theory. Rather, usually there exists a
multiplicity of choices and outcomes. Teens playing chicken with their
cars can choose any number of options, including making choices to
collaborate to save their reputations, finding other ways to prove their
manhood (e.g., fist fights, drinking games, etc.), teaming up against a
common enemy or scapegoat, etc. All of these options add dynamics
that are not modeled in the simplistic game theoretic scenario. Even if
the real-life game is played to its logical conclusion, the outcomes can
be less than total victory or defeat for either side (head-on automobile
collisions need not necessarily end in death). The starkness of options
and outcomes of the game theoretic Chicken simply is not warranted
given the complexity of the real-life game of the same name. The sim-
plified metaphor that is part and parcel of game theoretic Chicken is
thus revealed as misleading in its analytical conclusions.
Game theory is at once the epitome of the scientific method and at
the same time its antithesis. From a scientific point of view, game the-
ory represents a form of modeling of social situations just as models
are used to pose hypotheses about physical and natural phenomena.
For example, if aeronautical engineers want to understand the move-
ment of air over a prototype wing they can build a wind tunnel and
see how air generated by a fan flows over a model of the wing. Or,

biologists might model the transmission of genetic traits through suc-

cessive generations in a long-lived species by selecting for that trait in
a species with a much shorter life span (e.g., the ubiquitous fruit fly
in laboratory experiments). And, of course, chemists model the struc-
ture of molecules metaphorically through the use of shapes and spatial
relationships, as any student who has purchased a set of colored and
shapes blocks and rods for a college chemistry class can attest. Game
theory, like the models used in the physical and natural sciences mod-
els behavior in a social setting by simulating that behavior on a smaller
scale.28
On the antiscientific front, game theory stands out for the contrived
and artificial nature of its models. Instead of using physical models
or experiments as is common in the physical and natural sciences (or
even experimental social sciences including economics, political sci-
ence, and sociology), game theory relies on storytelling and fiction.
For all the strides made in computer simulations and game theory
tournaments running programs playing Prisoner’s Dilemma strategies
against each other (see, e.g., Axelrod 1984), game theory as applied
to the study of international relations is noteworthy for its reliance
on stories that not only embellish the mathematical problems posed
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in game theoretic scenarios but actually suggest if not constitute the
problems themselves. That is to say, the essence of game theory is
to discover solutions to problems in which the pursuit of a maximum
numerical return leads to suboptimal returns because these returns are
contingent on decisions made by others. Mathematicians can devise
computer programs to avoid strategies that yield lower returns, which
is why, in its unadorned form, game theory is pure mathematical
science.
There are also instances of ambiguity in metaphorical terms invoked
in game theory. For example, it has been argued that cooperation
problems modeled in game theory can be ameliorated by “trans-
parency” in a game theoretic scenario. “Transparency” is obviously
a metaphor, but what exactly does it imply? The American Heritage
Dictionary (1903) actually offers several definitions of “transparent,”
any one or more of which could be what is meant by scholars when
they use the term. Among those definitions are “capable of transmit-
ting light so that objects or images can be seen as if there were no
intervening material [as a synonym with “clear”]; easily seen through
or detected; obvious; free from guile; candid or open.” Any of these
definitions could be what is meant by the metaphor “transparent” as it
is applied to institutions such as international regimes that help actors
overcome game theoretic dilemmas.29 Regimes could allow states

and other international actors to see “clearly” on an issue; regimes

could make the actions of regime members easily detected or obvi-
ous; regimes could represent political institutions that are candid or
“open.” But as Alexandru Grigorescu (2003, especially 646–648) has
pointed out, it is precisely the broad range of political phenomena
that have been analyzed using the concept of transparency that has
rendered the metaphor so ambiguous in its meaning. For Grigorescu,
what the metaphor of transparency implies for the study of interna-
tional relations is unclear when the exact meaning of the metaphor is
not clearly defined.
Finally, it is perhaps with not too much curiosity that a branch of
international relations theory is metaphorically referred to in a way
that almost seems to trivialize what are presumably serious aspects of
world affairs such as war and diplomacy. Although game theory is
not restricted to the study of international relations (it is also used
regularly in the study of economics, mathematics, and other fields),
as applied to international relations the metaphor of “game” theory
takes on ironic qualities. The word “game” is defined as an “activ-
ity providing entertainment or amusement; a pastime. A competitive
activity or sport in which players contend with each other according
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to a set of rules” (American Heritage Dictionary, 744).30 This is not
necessarily to say that game theorists reduce international relations to
nothing more than the subject of amusement, but the theoretical exer-
cise itself is metaphorically likened to a pastime or competitive sport
and scenarios that are meant to model international relations, among
other things, are linguistically imagined as “games.”31 This need not
be, of course (as is true for any metaphorical allusion). Von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1944, 1), the founders of game theory, explain that
their aim is to provide tools for the “application of the mathemati-
cal theory of ‘games of strategy,’ ” and game theory is also referred
to as comprising theories of “strategic interaction,” which, not with-
out its own connotations, implies something far different than that
it is a theory of “games.” Neither may be better than the other, but
their implications for how international relations is imagined are far
different from each other.
Aside from having a more literal quality, “strategic interaction”
implies more of a tone of gravitas than “game” theory. “Strategy,” as
the dictionary defines the word, describes something that is “impor-
tant or essential in relation to a plan of action” (American Heritage
Dictionary, 1775). While games can involve competition, the linguis-
tic connotation of the term is light-hearted, at least in comparison
with questions of “strategy.” Neither term is “correct” as a way to

conceptualize international relations, but their meanings are poten-

tially quite distinct in terms of what they imply and the theoretical
propositions they suggest. Game theory is a staple of international
relations theory and likely will stay that way. How the metaphors of
game theory are construed can have a powerful impact on game theo-
retic propositions, and thus it is worthwhile to subject these metaphors
to analytical interrogation to see how they influence the theoretical
process.
Taking Heed of Cautions: Games Without Stories

As the previous section illustrates, when dilemmas of human inter-
action are told as metaphorical stories, as opposed to mathematical
problems, analytical problems can arise. One “solution” to the prob-
lems so posed is to frame issues of strategic interaction in new ways
that minimize the influence metaphors have on creating the debate.
Two examples are the “Red – Black” game and the game theory –
inspired television program Friend or Foe.
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The “Red – Black” Game
What dilemmas of human interaction, as opposed to mathematical
problems, are posed by game theory is determined by the stories that
constitute game theory in a social science setting. A quintessential
example of metaphors creating problems is the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
The essential problem of the Prisoner’s Dilemma as applied to social
interactions is one of cooperation. Yet the numerical problem told
through the story of Prisoner’s Dilemma can be presented in any num-
ber of ways. This is illustrated by the fact that some social scientist
investigators use the payoff structure of the game to discern human
motivations rather than assume them by having subjects play the game
not as Prisoner’s Dilemma but as the game of “Red – Black.”
Quite simply, “Red – Black” works like this: subjects are told that
they are going to play a game in which each player can choose between
Red or Black without communicating to the other their choice. If both
players choose Red they each receive a score of three. If one player
chooses Red while the other chooses Black, the player who chooses
Red receives a score of one while the player who chooses Black receives
a payout of four. The scores are reversed if the first player chooses
Black while the second player chooses Red. If both players choose
Black they each receive a score of two. The payoff structure can be
summarized thus: Red – Red (3 – 3), Red – Black (1 – 4), Black – Red

(4 – 1), Black – Black (2 – 2). Each player is told that the goal is to
maximize the total score after playing the game over a series of iter-
ations. What the players are not told is to whom the score accrues,
each player individually or both players collectively. In this way no
assumptions are made about the narrowness of self-interest. Rather,
the purpose is to figure out if players will construe “total score” as
the amount each player receives individually or the overall amount
the players have accrued combined. If the players understand “total
score” to mean their individual payouts they will choose Black more
often than Red, but if they understand “total score” to mean the com-
bined score for both players they will choose Red more often than
Black. This is because the total score for both players combined is
optimized when they both choose Red (3 + 3=6), whereas if individ-
ual payouts are desired each player will hope to maximize his or her
own score by choosing Black (4) if the other chooses Red (1). Obvi-
ously the latter pattern yields a lower combined score (4 + 1=5) than
Red – Red, so which color each player chooses depends on how and
what they understand “total score” to mean (payouts on a combined
or individual basis).
Played in this fashion, the puzzle posed by what is typically referred
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to as “Prisoner’s Dilemma” becomes one of a numerical problem
rather than a dilemma of cooperation. However, when the mathe-
matical puzzle is adorned with the story of prisoners with a dilemma,
assumptions are built into the situation and the game becomes one of
cooperation. In this sense, the game is no longer a matrix model for
understanding choices for optimizing returns and instead becomes
one of assumptions about human nature for which the numerical
structure of the game is simply the device for testing those assump-
tions. The science of mathematics is replaced by a study of human
motivations.
“Friend or Foe”
Another illustration of a game of strategic interaction that can be stud-
ied without a metaphorical back story is the television game show
Friend or Foe which aired on the Game Show Network (GSN) for two
seasons starting in 2002. Friend or Foe explicitly employed game the-
ory in the format of the program. On each episode six contestants vied
for a cash prize by answering a series of trivia questions. At the begin-
ning of each show the contestants, who were previously unknown to
each other, would form pairs for the purpose of the competition.32 The
pairs would then be placed in separate “isolation booths” where they

would answer trivia questions. Each member of the pair would have
to agree with the other as to the right answer to each of the questions.
Right answers to each question yielded a monetary reward. At the
end of the first round the pair that had answered the fewest number
of questions correctly would proceed to the “Trust Box” where they
would then face a strategic choice, the results of which would deter-
mine the division of the prize money won in the first round. At the
trust box each contestant could choose “Friend” or “Foe” by selecting
a button in the box that the other contestant could not see. If both
contestants chose “Friend” the money would be split equally between
them. If one contestant chose “Friend” while the other chose “Foe”
the contestant selecting “Foe” would win all of the money while the
contestant choosing “Friend” would get nothing. If both contestants
chose “Foe” neither won anything. The payoff structure can be sum-
marized thus: Friend – Friend (50%–50%), Friend – Foe (0%–100%),
Foe – Friend (100%–0%), Foe – Foe (0%–0%). Play continued to a
second round where the pair with the fewest correct answers was elim-
inated and sent to the Trust Box to compete for the accumulated
prize money in the same manner as the first pair, and to a final round
wherein the winning pair is given a chance to win additional money in
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a bonus round before making its way to the Trust Box to compete for
their share of the prize money.33
As the payoff structure for Friend or Foe illustrates, the game was
a modification of the Prisoner’s Dilemma wherein each player calcu-
lated the benefit of mutual cooperation relative to the costs of being
left with nothing in the event the other player defected. The main dif-
ference, and key to the entertainment value of the program, was that in
the event one player would be suspected of defection, the other player
would have to decide if he or she wanted to sabotage the winnings of
the presumed defector by also choosing to play “Foe.” In other words,
assuming one contestant goes home with nothing in the case of the
other defecting, the calculation of the contestant’s partner involved
asking him or herself whether if it would be better that at least one
contestant won some money, or that he or she not be “suckered” even
if neither contestant won any money. Since the costs of mutual defec-
tion are the same as single defection, the zero-sum nature of the game
is higher than in the classical Prisoner’s Dilemma and supplemented
by a negative-sum aspect as well.
The other obvious difference between Friend or Foe and Prisoner’s
Dilemma is that the former does not require a metaphorical story to
illustrate the dilemma of strategic choice that is presented to play-
ers. The monetary rewards are sufficiently spelled out in the payoff

structure and neither player needs to be reminded that friendly coop-

eration yields more prize money than rivalry resulting in defection.
One could argue that the terms “friend” and “foe” are metaphor-
ical representations of cooperation and defection. This is no doubt
linguistically true. But what is significant is that “friend” and “foe”
are not part of a metaphorical story of cooperation and defection but
rather an experiential context in which the contestants interact and
which makes no assumptions about nor imputes any motives to the
players aside from their desire to win money. Indeed, the essential
features of the television program would remain unchanged even if
it had a different name, no name at all, or if it was called The TV
Show in Which Contestants Answer Trivia Questions and Then Deter-
mine Who Wins Certain Amounts of Money by Either Choosing to Share
the Money or Trying to Win it All By Making Such a Selection Without
the Other Contestant Knowing Which Choice Was Being Made. Unlike
other games such as Prisoner’s Dilemma, Stag Hunt, and Chicken,
the absence of a metaphorical back story changes nothing about the
decisional dynamics of Friend or Foe in the same way the name itself
(metaphorical as the terms “friend” and “foe” may be) alters nothing
about those dynamics of strategic choice.
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The examples of Red – Black and Friend or Foe show how problems
of numerical payoffs can be told without the elaborate narrative struc-
ture of most of the scenarios that constitute game theory. This is not
to say that narrative stories are inappropriate for modeling problems
encountered in the study of international relations, but as the earlier
section of this chapter highlights, there are any number of analyti-
cal difficulties that crop up in game theoretic stories that complicate
scholarly inquiry. Game theory stories often reify or even create prob-
lems of cooperation that are as much a function of the framing role
of those narratives as they are objective characteristics of international
relations. Attentiveness to that fact is a first step in exercising caution
to avoid the analytical pitfalls that game theory presents.

Chapter 8
M e ta p h o r s a n d C h a n g i n g
C o n c e p t i o n s o f I n t e r n at i o n a l
R e l at i o n s
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M etaphorical images of international relations are as old as the
study of international relations itself. Given the abstract nature of the
concepts that comprise international relations, it is logical to assume
that theorists would rely on metaphors to make sense of the abstrac-
tions of the field just as scholars do in virtually every other academic
discipline. By the same token, since metaphors are part of the narrative
of international relations, it is not surprising that this narrative story
has changed over time and continues to do so. No historical review of
international relations explicitly focused on the role of metaphors in
the discipline has been written. However, close readings of overviews
of the field reveal that metaphors are integral to the study of interna-
tional relations as it has progressed through time. This chapter offers a
broad summary of changing metaphorical conceptions in the narrative
of international relations. It reviews general trends in how interna-
tional relations has been imagined metaphorically and highlights the
way that metaphors continue to shape how concepts are framed. One
of the main conclusions of the chapter is that how scholars conceive
of international relations metaphorically reflects larger shifts in how
politics and society are organized. The metaphors used by scholars
to imagine international relations serve as indicators for how political
leaders and society in general understand the world.

Harald Kleinschmidt’s History of International

Relations
The best historical review of metaphors in international relations is
embedded in Harald Kleinschmidt’s brilliant and thorough, though
much overlooked 2000 book, The Nemesis of Power: A History of
International Relations Theories.1 Although the book is not explic-
itly designed to provide an overview of metaphors in the study of
international relations, the ubiquity of metaphors in the field creates a
situation in which Kleinschmidt’s history of theories of international
relations is inevitably also a history of the metaphors that perme-
ate the discipline. Because Kleinschmidt’s book provides the most
comprehensive overview of the evolution of implied metaphors in
international relations theory, the first part of this chapter adheres very
closely to his carefully laid out progression of metaphorical images.
According to Kleinschmidt, many of the first metaphors in interna-
tional relations helped scholars visualize the world. These metaphors
were spatial in nature and took as their point of departure the rudi-
mentary maps of the world created by European theologians and
cartographers. Initially, the world was understood to comprise sev-
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eral bodies of water and areas of land that were nonetheless part of a
unified entity under god’s domain:
The standard occidental medieval world map, the mappamundi of Latin

sources, was drawn on models of antiquity and presented the world as a tri-
continental spherical land mass. The land mass was encircled by a narrow strip
of water into which a large number of islands were interspersed. The land mass
was commonly referred to as the ecumene . . . The religious connotation of this
world picture was made explicit in the many maps that presented the ecumene
above or below symbols or figures of the divine world, usually a figure of the
trinity or angels or both. (Kleinschmidt 2000, 21–22)2
It is worth noting that maps are metaphorical in nature, that is, they
are not literal reproductions of physical reality, but rather are represen-
tations of geographic features highlighting similarities between that
which is experienced through human contact with the physical world
and the seemingly unlike medium of two-dimensional illustration.
In medieval maps, geographic features were understood metaphori-
cally as occupying a space relative to the divine forces of the universe.
In other words, the unity of the world as indicated in medieval maps
must be understood as simply a metaphor with which to understand
man’s place relative to the larger world governed by the divine.

M e ta p h o r s a n d C h a n g i n g C o n c e p t i o n s 163
These metaphorical images of the world led to theories of interna-

tional relations that stressed what Kleinschmidt (21) calls “universal-
ism”: “As a theory of international relations, religious universalism in
the early Middle Ages was informed by a specific concept of space,
which drew on the Bible, depicting the world as round as well as
permeable and rendering existing administrative boundaries as sec-
ondary.” Specifically, relations among groups in the Middle Ages
were governed by political rule vested in the early institutions of the
Christian church and its immediate antecedents: “In other words,
universalism, be it associated with the Roman Empire or with the
Christian Church, was bound to continue to be defined in the terms
which were set by the world picture that had been transmitted in the
Roman Empire and displayed the ecumene as the permeable domain
of universal rule” (ibid., 36). In this sense, contemporary scholars
would scarcely recognize relations under the system of universalism
as international in origin. Yet to the extent that medieval observers
and practitioners of political affairs understood the world, interactions
among rulers represented the division of authority and its geographic
locations in the metaphorical terms of universalism depicted within
biblical texts and their graphic manifestations including maps.
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One of the qualities of metaphors is that when they are used fre-
quently they can take on a literal quality and they lose their ability to
generate new understandings of that which they initially brought to
light. When this happens, new metaphors emerge as heuristic devices
to supplant the old metaphors that no longer fulfill this role. This was
the case in the case of the spatial metaphors that gave rise to medieval
theories of universalism in the study of international relations. Specifi-
cally, when humans began to experience a physical world of continents
and bodies of water that could be explored at length (as opposed to
the metaphorical images of geography inherent in the Latin mappa-
mundi), new metaphors of international relations emerged that led to
new theories to replace the old theories of universalism. Kleinschmidt
(80) writes: “Univeralism could no longer be confined to a world pic-
ture which described the world as a spherical tricontinental land mass.
Instead, it had to be tied to a picture of the world as the globe where
land and water were interspersed in the complicated way that happens
to be the case” (emphasis added). In short, in the medieval era humans
experienced the world close at hand and represented it metaphorically
in maps that implied a closeness of humans to both the physical world
and to the institutions of society and government. This metaphorical
map of the world supported the universalist view of international rela-
tions. This was supplanted by a pluralistic view of the world supported

by metaphors capturing the new experiences of physical contact with

the world brought about by advances in geographic exploration. Inte-
gral to this were new forms of political organization that would set the
stage for a new understanding of how political activity was organized
across geographic lines.
Kleinschmidt (51) observes that by the fourteenth century new
images of human relations began to have an impact on the way schol-
ars theorized about international relations. Specifically, metaphorical
images of the world depicted in maps were replaced by a new
metaphor, that is, the metaphor of the social contract, which was
carried over from urban politics to international relations. The social
contract as a metaphor displaced universalism as a theory of world
affairs. These are the beginnings of what contemporary scholars
would recognize as theories of international relations among dis-
tinct geographically defined groups. The metaphor of universalism, as
depicted graphically in medieval maps, privileged a politics of “interna-
tional relations” under the domain of a centralized political authority.
By contrast, the metaphor of contractualism highlighted and empha-
sized the legitimacy of secular actors, thus paving the way for a
vision of international relations that acknowledged the sovereignty
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of secular rulers. This evolution was prompted by new metaphorical
images of the world that informed scholars’ understanding of how to
explain that world. Eventually what would come to replace the spatial
metaphors of the past were metaphorical images based on machines
and man.
As Kleinschmidt (114) observes, by the seventeenth century the-
orists became convinced “that the maintenance of stability was a
positive value in its own right . . . This conviction was in turn rooted
in a tendency to compare living beings and indeed the whole inani-
mate world with technical devices, mainly the sophisticated machines
(automata) which became fashionable in the course of the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries as the then most recent technological
innovation.” Jernej Pikalo (2008, 49) echoes Kleinschmidt’s thesis,
observing during the time frame in question “metaphors of mechan-
ical motion, particularly clockwork mechanisms, became appropriate
for a time when people were literally set in motion due to political
and social transformations.” The mechanical metaphors that scholars
relied on formed the bases for radical shifts in the theories they used
to explain politics in general and international relations in particular.
Perhaps the most notable of theories to emanate from mechanistic
metaphors is the theory of the balance of power, explored at greater
length in Chapter 5.

One of the main impacts of the machine metaphor on theories of

international relations was that it suggested that relations among states
were, or at least should be, part of a self-regulating system, not subject
to the ambitions of capricious rulers. Among the commentators who
articulated this perspective was Jonathan Swift. While Swift accepted
the metaphor of the balance of power, he “avoided the use of the
scales model because he focused on the distribution of power among
many actors simultaneously engaged in a contest for primacy within
the system of European territorial polities. Swift argued the position
that the maintenance of the balance among all actors in the system was
the first condition of stability in the system and should therefore have
priority over the partial interests of the involved rulers and their dynas-
ties” (Kleinschmidt 2000, 124). It is worth noting here that like many
scholars of international relations prior to the contemporary period,
Swift not only sought to explain outcomes but also to advocate for
certain positions. Theorists of the present day typically seek scholarly
neutrality, yet as the example of Swift demonstrates, the metaphors on
which one relies for explanation also leads one to prefer certain out-
comes over others since metaphors fundamentally shape how humans
see the world.
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As discussed earlier in this book, one of the ways that metaphors
operate on the human mind is by constructing individuals’ realities.
Thus, while metaphors are integral to creating new understandings,
they can also reinforce perceptions of reality. In the case of machine
metaphors of international relations, Kleinschmidt (125–126) explains
that once these metaphors enshrined theories of international relations
that envisioned restraint by capricious rulers, evidence of the lasting
nature of the balance of power was sought in history: “Not unlike
political theorists in general, several international theorists went to
great efforts to collect evidence for what they believed to have been
the Greek origin of the balance of power, although they agreed that
the words and the term had not then been in use . . . In other words,
they must have assumed that the use of evidence from sources of antiq-
uity in the eighteenth century was possible without interruptions and
fundamental changes.” Here we see how metaphors can truly serve as
the basis for enduring theories of international relations, as opposed to
mere illustrative analogies that highlight the similarities between two
or more cases of international affairs.
While theories of international relations are properly seen as expla-
nations of such relations, throughout history they have served as the
basis for prescriptive approaches as well. This is no less true for the bal-
ance of power theory, which emanated from mechanistic metaphors.

Inasmuch as scholars and rulers alike wanted the “machine” of inter-

national relations to operate smoothly, it made sense to counsel
balances of power that kept the machine working efficiently and in
balance. As Kleinschmidt (2000, 128–129) observes: “The logic of
the eighteenth-century mechanistic balance-of-power theory was that
it induced governments to follow the same standards, conventions
as well as norms and act uniformly. If all rulers did the same at the
same time, abiding by the same rulers, making their intentions known
and controlling themselves as well as each other, the balance would
work and everyone would benefit.” What started out as a metaphor
for international relations turned into a full-blown theory that pur-
ported to explain relations among international actors and thereby
also suggest the actions they should take assuming they all shared the
same perceptions about the world and valued common outcomes.
The mechanistic metaphors that framed the study of international
relations would eventually fall out of favor. What took their place were
visions of world affairs that Kleinschmidt groups together under the
rubric of “Biologism.”3 Biological metaphors took as their point of
departure the physical conditions of humans. These metaphors took a
number of guises: “New words coming in use at the beginning of the
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nineteenth century betray a concept of the international system that
differed from that of the eighteenth century. Among the newly current
phrases were ‘community of states’, ‘world state system’, ‘general con-
cert’, ‘cultural family’, ‘society of nations’ and ‘monarchy of nations’ ”
(ibid., 153). These terms focused on relations among humans. How-
ever, as Kleinschmidt explains, it was the biological nature of humans
that provided among the most durable and enduring metaphors used
to explain international relations.4
Among the areas in which biological metaphors would have an
impact on theories of international relations was the aforementioned
balance of power model. As Kleinschmidt explains, one of the seminal
events that gave credence to biological metaphors in the conception of
the balance of power was the French Revolution. The old mechanistic
metaphors that supported balance of power theory predicted stabil-
ity in political affairs (since machines were seen as self-regulating and
orderly entities). By contrast, biological metaphors suggested dynamic
change, something the French Revolution certainly implied for inter-
national relations. Kleinschmidt (154) cites the German philosopher
Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) in this regard: “In Fichte’s
description, the mechanistic balance of power turned into a chimera,
something that idle or scrupulous propagandists strove for or argued
with in order to defend sinister and, in any case, immoral goals. The

balance of power was against nature and nonsensical, and its pursuit at
the hands of a ruler was ludicrous at best.” The practical implications
for understandings of international relations from the new biological
image of the balance of power were felt at the Congress of Vienna after
the Napoleonic wars. Scholars and rulers alike recognized that states
were not constrained by the presumed self-regulating elements of a
machine-like balance of power, and thus allowances had to be made
in both the theory and practice of international relations for dynamic
forces that disrupted prevailing systems of stability.
Nationalism also was given a boost by biological metaphors. Again,
the French Revolution served as a turning point, forcing scholars to
reexamine the images they used to conceptualize political entities.
Specifically, the terms “state” and “nation” were associated with the
presumed living nature of polities; that is, states and nations were seen
as living “ ‘organisms’ made up from sets of institutions of government
for the ruled” (ibid., 161). Consequently, “theorists concluded from
these terminological changes that states and nations were ‘organisms’
that needed to be compatible. The boundaries of ‘states’ were to be
identical with the ‘living spaces’ of the nations and, if nations desired
revisions of the boundaries of their states, governments were expected
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to fulfil these desires” (ibid., 162). Thus, what contemporary schol-
ars might take as relatively straightforward in terms of the creation of
nation-states actually was the product of shifting metaphorical imagery
that led to new theories of political organization.
Conceptions of the international system also began to flow from
the metaphors of biologism. Whereas mechanistic metaphors induced
scholars to think of international relations as a large machine, bio-
logical metaphors led more logically to notions of the world as
constituted by groupings of biological agents, specifically, humans.
Of course, one way to conceive of human groupings is as societies,
and thus new theories frequently centered on theories of international
society. Kleinschmidt (165) cites one scholar, Johann Battista Fallati
(1809–1855): “In Fallati’s metaphorical language, world society was
the widest possible extension of the biologistic model of the human
body.” Kleinschmidt (168) sums up the transformation of theories
of international relations that took place during the French Revolu-
tion as follows: “Once again, international theories did not change
autonomously but as part and parcel of a more fundamental change
in perceptions of and attitudes to the world . . . As a standard model,
the static, well-ordered, smoothly operating and self-equilibrating
machine gave way to the dynamic, integrating, conflict-absorbing and
tension-provoking living organism represented as the human body.”

According to Kleinschmidt, all modern theories of international

relations to the present day have their origins in biologism and the
metaphors that underlie it: “No single European or North American
international theory is on record which has called into question or
sought to refute the concept of the international system as an over-
arching organic entity in its own right and as larger than the sum of
its parts” (ibid., 171). Specifically, Kleinschmidt identifies two broad
traditions that have embodied biologism from the nineteenth cen-
tury to the contemporary period. The first, Realism, is well known
to present day scholars. The other Kleinschmidt refers to is function-
alism, which includes Liberalism, but also other schools of thought.
Thus, while contemporary Realism would seem to differ radically from
functionalist theories of liberal social theory and liberal institutional-
ism, according to Kleinschmidt, all of these theoretical traditions have
their roots in biological metaphorical imagery. Where Realism differed
from the Liberal schools of thought was in the assumptions it made
about human nature, and hence the motivations of states. Whereas
Liberals trusted that states would see advantages to abiding by inter-
national rules and institutions to keep the peace, Realists asserted that
it was wiser to assume that states would rely on their own resources
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for security and therefore it was preferable to give states the ability to
exercise rational decision making than to rely on global organization
(ibid., 196–197).
From a practical point of view, the assumptions of Realism, com-
bined with its grounding in biological metaphors, suggested the types
of policies that Realists thought were preferable if the goal was peace
among states. Specifically, since states were presumed to be like indi-
viduals in terms of their desire to act in self defense, and since the
international system was anarchic, it was logical to deduce that states
would benefit more from a lack of the type of international insti-
tutions favored by functionalist Liberals rather than their presence:
“As war could not be removed from the world through human efforts
because living beings seemed to share a ‘natural’ inclination to it, it
made no sense to rely on international organization as a means to
promote peace. Instead, eternal vigilance and ascertainable readiness
to use military force were recommended as the best deterrents against
war.” (Ibid., 207). Thus we can see that the implications of Realist the-
ory, as is the case for other theories of international relations, follow
logically from the metaphors that inform it.
While Kleinschmidt maintains that biological metaphors continue
to this day to frame theories of international relations, they are not
monolithic. Contemporary international relations theory is imagined

with a host of original, innovative, and colorful metaphors that range

across theoretical and paradigmatic perspectives. Indeed, with the
advent of so-called globalization, there is a sort of renaissance within
international relations theory of efforts to think up new metaphorical
ways to envision the world. The next section offers a non-exhaustive
peek at some of the most original metaphors to emerge in recent years
and how they shape thinking about international relations.
Of “Worlds,” “Webs,” “Holograms,” “Ladders,”

“Mobius Strips,” “Fragmegration,” “Distant
Proximities,” and “Black Spots”
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the metaphorical narrative
of international relations is an ongoing and dynamic one. Scholars of
international politics are constantly searching for new ways of concep-
tualizing the metaphorical space of international relations as the story
of international relations continues to be told. This is no less true for
contemporary scholars of IR as it was for scholars in earlier times. This
section reviews some of the most notable efforts by contemporary
experts to metaphorically conceptualize international relations.
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A good place to start is James Rosenau who alone has suggested
no fewer than a half dozen metaphorical images with which to visual-
ize international interactions. One of Rosenau’s most notable efforts
has been to describe the reconstitution of international relations
metaphorically as “The Two Worlds of World Politics” (emphasis
added). In this chapter subtitle from Rosenau’s 1990 book Turbulence
in World Politics (the chapter’s main title is “Studying Structures”)
the word “world,” which in its normal use has attained a literal and
unremarkable status as a synonym for the planet earth, is turned into
a metaphor by which world politics is imagined as consisting of two
metaphorical “worlds.”5 The term “world,” of course, is widely used
as a metaphor. Many areas of activity are referred to metaphorically as
a “world” of one thing or another (e.g., “a world of possibilities,”
“ABC’s Wide World of Sports,” the retail establishment Mattress
World, etc.).6 Since metaphors often serve a generative function of
creating new ways of understanding, in this usage to call something
a “world” is to create the new knowledge that a particular set of
actions, now grouped together, constitute a self-contained realm—
a world—having its own rules, actors, identities, relationships, and
expectations.7 It is not for nothing that the online fantasy game World
of Warcraft has so immersed its players in the environment in which
the game takes place that many players have experienced difficulty

distinguishing the world of the World of Warcraft from the quotidian

world in which they otherwise live.
It is no accident, then, that the practical effect of Rosenau’s label of
two “worlds” of world politics is to create the impression that inter-
national relations is now constructed not of one world but of two.
The metaphor is ingeniously crafted to generate a new understand-
ing about how international relations is constructed in the post–Cold
War era. Scholars typically use the word “world” synonymously with
“international” such that they use the expressions “international pol-
itics,” “world politics,” “international affairs,” and “world affairs,”
interchangeably.8 In the customary usage, there is only one set of
“international” politics (although there may be regional politics) just
as there is only one “world.” The metaphor of “two worlds,” however,
generates new meanings such that the old world of one world is now
understood as comprising literally two worlds. It is not surprising that
approaches such as Rosenau’s use metaphors to participate in replicat-
ing through language the reconstruction of international politics from
one world to two.
It is worth noting two things in this discussion. First, some scholars
would argue that Rosenau does not go far enough in identifying two
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worlds of world politics and that, in fact, in the post–Cold War era
international politics has been fractured so much that there are multi-
ple “worlds” in which “world” politics takes place. Second, Rosenau
could have chosen a different terminology to express the notion that
international politics in the post–Cold War era no longer represents a
single set of realities in terms of overarching rules, identities, behav-
iors, etc. Rosenau could have chosen a different metaphor, say, two
“realms” of world politics, or he could have chosen more literal
language to assert that world politics now takes place governed by
(at least) two sets of expectations that replace the one set of expecta-
tions that governed the previous era of international relations (i.e., the
state-centric period). Whether Rosenau was being deliberate with the
goal of using a metaphor to emphasize the reconstruction of interna-
tional politics or simply was employing a well-crafted turn of a phrase
to play on the notion of “world” politics, the net effect is the same,
that is, to metaphorically generate a new understanding of the parame-
ters of international politics as international politics itself changes into
something new.
In addition to the “two worlds” metaphor Rosenau developed
in Turbulence in World Politics (the title of which also constitutes
a metaphor, discussed at greater length in Chapter 6 of this book),
Rosenau posited a series of more complicated images in his 2003

book Distant Proximities. One of Rosenau’s metaphors suggests an

alternative to a more established metaphorical image in the study of
international relations, namely, the classic “levels of analysis” image by
which different variables thought to influence international relations
are “located” metaphorically in a succession of horizontal spaces.9
Rosenau’s suggested alternative is the similarly imagined “governance
ladder.”10 Like “levels of analysis” the “governance ladder” separates
variables influencing international relations into horizontal spaces,
however Rosenau’s metaphor envisions a greater degree of fluidity
in terms of what issues are governed at various levels and how they
are governed by the institutions of governance that both influence
international politics and are influenced by it:
The governance ladder focuses on the movement of issues up and down the
various rungs as they arrest the attention of officials and publics, thereby
becoming governance issues. Issues that first generate widespread awareness at
local levels get onto the ladder at the bottom rungs, while those that originate
at the global level occupy the top rungs, just as those that get onto political
agendas at the national level perch on the middle rungs. Some issues remain
on the same rung throughout; some start at the bottom and move to the top;
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and some start at the top and percolate down. (Rosenau 2003, 395)
It should also be clear here that Rosenau is not necessarily talking

about levels that serve as rubrics for theory construction. That is to
say, it is not as if there are some theories that operate at the systemic
level of analysis and others that operate at the domestic level of analysis
as is formulated in the levels of analysis metaphor. Rather, Rosenau’s
governance ladder metaphor is designed to alert scholars that issues
can be governed by a variety of governmental actors and thus what
is needed is a single theoretical framework that captures the fluidity of
issue-governance as issues move “up” and “down” the ladder among
different levels of governance.11
Rosenau takes this governance ladder metaphor further by suggest-
ing that the dynamics of globalization have made it nearly impossible
to say that governance takes place at any one fixed “level” of political
activity. To capture this concept Rosenau suggests a mixed metaphor
combining the image of a mobius strip with that of a web to form
what he calls the “mobius-web of governance”:
Mobius-web governance is rooted in the impetus to employ rule systems that

steer issues through both hierarchical and networked interactions across levels
of aggregation that may encompass all the diverse collectivities and individuals
who participate in the processes of governance. These interactions constitute

a hybrid structure in which the dynamics of governance are so intricate and

overlapping among the several levels as to form a singular, weblike process
that, like a mobius, neither begins nor culminates at any level or at any point
in time. (Ibid., 396–397)12
Whereas the levels of analysis metaphor posits that there are rival the-
oretical paradigms that offer competing explanations for international
relations on the basis of variables that are fixed at distinct horizon-
tally layered spaces, Rosenau’s mobius-web metaphor suggests that by
acknowledging that governance encompasses actors and issues resid-
ing at a host of places in which political authority is exercised, one
can construct an overarching theoretical framework that takes into
account the interrelated nature of international politics in a globalized
world.
Rosenau’s thesis about varying metaphorical locations of political
authority is part of his larger theory of globalization. For Rosenau,
globalization consists of both the concentration of political author-
ity in supranational institutions and the disaggregation of political
authority through interdependence, a process Rosenau refers to as
“fragmegration” (ibid., 11). As the term implies, “fragmegration”
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is a metaphorical amalgamation of the words “fragmentation” and
“integration,” the former referring to the disaggregation of political
authority brought about through processes of global interdependence
and the latter referring to the concentration of political authority in
supranational institutions such as the EU that are as much a part
of globalization as the fragmenting processes that they accompany.
Rosenau’s “fragmegration” formulation provides an image that helps
scholars who are so inclined to visualize the complex construction
of world affairs that is not captured by traditional metaphors such
as the “billiard ball” and “container” metaphors for the state that
fail to capture the growing heterogeneity in actors and venues that
constitute international interactions. “Fragmegration” also serves as a
synonym for the metaphorical title of Rosenau’s book, in which “Dis-
tant Proximities” entail the spatial distances implied in globalization
and the spatial proximity that is implied by localization as integration
and fragmentation proceed apace.
The history of metaphors that see international relations in ways
that are more complex than “levels of analysis” stretches back to at
least the 1970s. A notable example of metaphors that challenges state-
focused images of international relations is contained in the title of
Richard Mansbach, Yale Ferguson, and Donald Lampert’s 1976 book
The Web of World Politics. The metaphorical “web” in the book’s

title refers to the interlinked relationships among a variety of “global

actors” that supplement traditional state actors in world politics. As a
visual cue to reinforce the “web” metaphor, the cover of Mansbach,
Ferguson, and Lampert’s book is illustrated with a picture of a globe
overlaid with a spider web with the names of six different types
of global actors situated within the web. The “web” metaphor is
designed to highlight how these six types of actors interact across
a network of relations that intersect with each other in ways that
are not imagined by traditional views that see states as the sole
or primary actors that are sealed off from each other as visual-
ized by metaphors depicting states as “individuals” or “containers.”
Mansbach, Ferguson, and Lampert’s “web” metaphor is prescient for
the way it suggested a new way of conceptualizing an interdependent
international relations many years before contemporary approaches
such as Constructivism offered theoretical tools for doing this.
Similarly, Robert Kaplan (1994, 75) suggests the metaphor of a
“hologram” to reflect the shifting loyalties and nodes of political
authority that characterize the post–Cold War world:
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In this hologram would be the overlapping sentiments of group and other
identities atop the merely two-dimensional color markings of city-states and
the remaining nations, themselves confused in places by shadowy tenta-
cles, hovering overhead, indicating the power of drug cartels, mafias, and
private security agencies. Instead of borders, there would be moving “cen-
ters” of power, as in the Middle Ages. Many of these layers would be in
motion . . . Henceforth the map of the world will never be static. This future
map—in a sense, the “Last Map”—will be an ever-mutating representation of
chaos.
Kaplan’s hologram metaphor is an interesting one because its com-

plexity does not easily conjure up ready-made images that imply
preexisting beliefs about the nature of international relations. Other
graphic concepts such as “billiard balls” and “webs” that have been
offered up as metaphors for international relations evoke images that
are familiar. While most people have seen holograms and have a sense
of what they are, they would be hard-pressed to describe them in
simple terms. For the record, a hologram is a “pattern produced on
a photosensitive medium that has been exposed by holography and
then photographically developed,” while holography is defined as a
“method of producing a three-dimensional image of an object by
recording on a photographic plate or film the pattern of interference
formed by a split laser beam and then illuminating the pattern either

with a laser or with ordinary light” (American Heritage Dictionary,

863). In many ways the difficulty of defining a hologram in all its
complexity parallels the difficulty Kaplan intends to convey in under-
standing the complexity of a post–Cold War world in which one- and
two-dimensional metaphorical “maps” do not adequately depict the
changing nature of international relations.
Certain miscellaneous concepts in international relations also have
been captured metaphorically. For example, in recent years scholars
have searched for ways of describing ungovernable regions that fail to
rise to the level of states. Since many theories of international relations
deem states as the main actors in international affairs, those actors or
parts of the world in which statehood is either not achieved or is less
than complete need to be defined in some fashion. As is common in
most other areas of international relations, metaphors serve a role in
giving a name to this category of actors. One group of scholars has
chosen to refer to para-states or quasi-states as metaphorical “Black
Spots.” According to Bartosz Stanislawski (2008, 366):
Black Spots represent territories in which and from which both transnational
organized crime (TOC) and terrorism operate, often becoming criminal-
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terrorist entities . . . Black Spots may be compared to the astronomical notion
of black holes in the universe—we know they exist, but they are difficult or
impossible to see. Black Spots are places in the shadows of global attention,
located off the beaten track, not covered by the mainstream media, and usually
below the radar of security agencies. They are the forgotten islands of inter-
national disorder and most of their inhabitants usually prefer them to remain
as such.13
Among the interesting aspects of this passage is the inclusion of addi-

tional metaphors to give substance to the base metaphor of “Black
Spots.” These “Black Spots” are located “in the shadows.” They are
“off the beaten track” and “below the radar” of other international
actors. They are metaphorical “islands” in the sea of international
relations. In addition, Stanislawski (369) cites King (2001) who
describes a similar phenomenon of parts of the world that escape
media attention as metaphorical “informational black holes.”
The presence of numerous metaphors in this passage indicates,
among other things, that the “Black Spots” metaphor itself is a new
one and does not necessarily immediately conjure up in the reader a
sense of what concepts in international relations are captured by the
image. To some extent, as a new metaphor designed to give mean-
ing to a new phenomenon in international relations the metaphor

itself is in need of clarification until it becomes part of the standard

discourse of international relations theory. Additionally, the “Black
Spots” metaphor also gives rise to related metaphors that refine the
concept of ungovernable regions that lie outside international efforts
to provide the trappings of statehood. David Crane (2008, 391) refers
to “dark corners” which “form when the international community
is distracted, looking elsewhere to solve a crisis.” There is consistency
with the “Black Spots” metaphor here inasmuch as both “Black Spots”
and “dark corners” imply a spatial image in which certain parts of the
world are figuratively out of sight of international attention. Obvi-
ously, in an age of satellite technology and highly developed forms of
surveillance no part of the world is literally unseen by international
observers, so the purpose of the “Black Spots” and “dark corners”
metaphors is to emphasize how the issues that characterize these parts
of the world are ones that either escape the attention of the world
community, are not of pressing concern to it, or represent matters
over which international actors are relatively powerless. There is an
ironic quality to the “dark corners” metaphor as well in that the
focus of Crane’s article in which he develops this metaphor is West
Africa which is part of a continent which at times in the past was
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referred to derisively as “the dark continent.” This latter metaphor
conveyed the idea that Africa was somewhat opaque and unintelli-
gible to outsiders, but there was a racial quality to the metaphor
as well.
When it comes to the abstraction that is international relations
there is no one set of metaphorical images that “best” captures
the nature of actors, identities, norms, practices, or behaviors that
constitute that which scholars of international relations study. Further-
more, the very conceptualization of international relations by means
of metaphorical images is as much part of how international rela-
tions is constructed as are the meanings that actors themselves use to
construct the intersubjective realities in which what constitutes inter-
national relations takes place. For example, in the classic telling of
international relations from the perspective of Realism international
relations is constructed of metaphorical hard-shelled container-like
states. This is not a new observation as other chapters in this book
document. Realists, however, typically use these types of metaphors
merely to help visualize what they see as relatively unchanging and
objective qualities of the international system.
The efforts of scholars such as those reviewed in this section, on
the other hand, explicitly use metaphors as a way to suggest multi-
ple ways in which international relations can be conceptualized and

how it changes over time. This is to illustrate the fact that the stuff of
international relations is neither fixed nor objective, but rather, highly
abstract in terms of the multiple meanings that can be attached to the
material world. Traditionally minded scholars such as Realists obvi-
ously recognize the existence of non-state actors such as nongovern-
mental organizations and multinational corporations but these actors
are not built into the international system as autonomous actors from
the Realist point of view because they are not constructed as such via
means such as metaphorical imagery. Scholars who construct interna-
tional relations as comprising relevant non-state actors, such as those
who use the Constructivist approach, favor metaphors that empha-
size the variety of non-state actors that exist in the world today. The
metaphors discussed in this section—metaphors that include “webs,”
“holograms,” “ladders,” “Mobius-webs,” “fragmegration,” “distant
proximities,” and “black spots”—are not simply mental images of
world politics but also widen the definition of international relations
by suggesting that it is constituted of something more than merely
state-to-state relations. Thus, whether the authors who advance these
metaphors are explicitly Constructivists or not, their contributions
are consistent with novel ways of conceptualizing and theorizing
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Medieval Politics as a Metaphor for International

Relations
Among the ways in which contemporary international relations can
be imagined is with the aid of a metaphor that in some ways takes IR
scholarship back to the earliest period in which international relations
was conceptualized according to Kleinschmidt’s history of the field,
namely, the metaphor of medieval politics. The medieval metaphor
is often thought to be an apt image for current developments in
international relations because it provides a framework for studying
a post–Cold War world in which the identities of actors and politi-
cal spaces are in question. As Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach
(2004, 78) observe, “the similarity between medieval Europe and
the world that is emerging today makes it fashionable to suggest
that we are experiencing a sort of ‘new medievalism.’ ”14 “New” or
“neomedievalism” (as some scholars refer to it) recalls a period of his-
tory in which boundaries and identities were more fluid than they
allegedly have been in the modern state system. As Mathias Albert and
Lothar Brock (1996, 72) write, “the feudal system of medieval Europe

was founded not on a territorial but on a functional partition of polit-

ical space.” This characterization is shared by John Agnew (1994, 60)
who opines: “In medieval Europe there were few fixed boundaries
between different political authorities. Regional networks of kinship
and interpersonal affiliation left little scope for fixed territorial limits.
Violence was widespread not because state borders were clearly estab-
lished but because of frequent switches in political allegiance across
fuzzy boundaries.” Given changes brought about by the end of the
Cold War (e.g., European integration, globalization, and increased
flows from person to person, regardless of state boundaries) politics in
medieval times seems to be an apt metaphor current circumstances.15
Ole Wæver has taken this concept and suggested a visual metaphor
to give it shape. Wæver’s vision (1997, 64) proposes political author-
ity exercised in concentric circles rather than the traditional image
of political spaces that is visualized in the form of cartographic
maps. Wæver’s new metaphor (61) extends the historical timeline
of neomedievalism to the era of empires. In Wæver’s view, invio-
lable state borders that contain the state offer an obsolete vision,
especially in an integrated Europe. Furthermore, the extension of
authority from European institutions to the European citizenry makes
authority.
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it harder for states to justify their existence as the sole locus of political
The neomedieval metaphor and Wæver’s metaphor of empires

are relevant in theoretical discussions of globalization.16 While the
processes of “globalization” are subject to debate, the picture that
is emerging is of a world with fragmented authority and overlap-
ping political allegiances.17 As political authority becomes diffused
among a variety of state and non-state actors, the processes of glob-
alization have the potential to render much of the discourse of
the traditional state obsolete.18 Other types of actors, whether they
are nongovernmental organizations, religions, multinational corpo-
rations, labor unions, consumer groups, or any of the other myriad
groupings that create loyalties and exercise some type of authority
(political or not) could erode the authority of the state and thus its
primacy in the study of international relations.19
In sum, neomedievalism serves as a metaphor for changing
post–Cold War possibilities in the realm of international relations.
With the advent of globalization and economic integration prevail-
ing models that emphasize the state as the primary actor in world
affairs are thought to be misleading in terms of their propositions.
Neomedievalism serves as an apt metaphor for a world populated by

a variety of non-state actors exercising a range of varied functions and

roles. As Torbjørn L. Knutsen (1997, 286) observes:
If scenarios such as these are useful, it is not because they depict a new, post-
Westphalian reality. Rather, they are useful because they are metaphors that
help us make sense out of a period of postmodern turbulence . . . Treated as
metaphors, old visions and ideas may be turned and twisted until they pro-
duce new perspectives, unexpected visions novel concepts, appropriate terms,
innovative syntheses and other tools of theory-building which help us capture
the rough outlines of post-modern international relations.
Like other metaphors in the study of international relations, neo-

medievalism provides a framework for hypothesizing the nature of
interactions among units. The popularity of this metaphor stems in
part from its emphasis on change in international affairs, in particu-
lar, widespread change from a state-centric system to one in which
non-state actors increasingly play a salient role.
Alternative Metaphorical Narratives
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of “International Relations”
One thing that is apparent in an examination of metaphors in interna-
tional relations theory is that there is by no means agreement about
what metaphorical narrative best tells the story of international rela-
tions. Furthermore, changing conceptions beg the question about the
metaphor of “international relations” itself.20 Although “international
relations” could be considered a literal expression, it is a metaphor
nonetheless and as such suggests certain conclusions that might nec-
essarily be suggested either by alternate metaphors or by other literal
terms. The American Heritage Dictionary defines “relations” as “the
mutual dealings or connections of persons, groups, or nations in
social, business, or diplomatic matters; sexual intercourse.”21 Among
the synonyms for “relations” that could be used in the word’s stead
to describe dealings among international actors are “interactions,”
“affairs,” “dealings,” “matters,” “concerns,” “proceedings,” goings
on,” and “life.” Any of these words would suggest subtle differences
in the way that the practice of international “relations” currently is
understood.
There is nothing even inevitable in the “international” part of
the “international relations” equation as other terms, some of them
metaphorical, could substitute as a perspective within which the sub-
ject matter of “IR” is studied. As a way of framing the subject matter of

“international relations,” for example, Jon Burton (1972, 21) prefers

“world society”: “If we employ the term ‘world society’ instead of
‘international relations’, if we approach our study in this global way
instead of the more traditional ‘national’ way, we will tend to have a
wider focus, to ask questions that are more fundamental and impor-
tant to civilization, and to be able to assess better the relevance of our
own national behaviour to the wider world environment.” Similarly
and more recently, Anna Agathangelou and L. H. M. Ling (2004;
2009) have suggested the rubric of what they call “Worldism,” which
rests on a metaphorical image of the authors’ borrowing of Gandhi’s
vision of an “oceanic circle” that implies a connectedness among
humans.22 This imagery is designed to make the study of “interna-
tional relations” more inclusive by dissolving notions of sovereignty,
making hierarchy obsolescent, relativizing normality, replacing legit-
imacy with engagement, and reframing power (Agathangelou and
Ling 2004, 42–44; 2009, chapters 5, 9). The authors’ project is an
ambitious one and may prove daunting for most scholars. However,
it does illustrate the possibilities for reconceptualizing the study of
international relations by bringing alternative metaphors to bear on
the field.
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Another alternative to “international relations” is Richard
Mansbach, Yale Ferguson, and Donald Lampert’s notion of IR framed
as a “complex conglomerate system.” Unlike “international relations,”
which tends to focus on states, the “complex conglomerate system”
comprises six types of “global actors,” which interact with each other
as they perform a series of “global tasks” not readily imagined by
traditional theories of international relations.23 What emerges is a
qualitatively different picture of relations constituted by a greater
range of exchanges than that which is pictured by the term “interna-
tional relations”: “The principle feature of the complex conglomerate
system is the formation of situationally-specific alignments of differ-
ent types of actors using a variety of means to achieve complementary
objectives” (Mansbach, Ferguson, and Lampert 1976, 42). Since the
complexity of what the authors imagine is not adequately captured
by the phrase “international relations,” “complex conglomerate sys-
tem” presents an image that is more multifaceted and therefore more
accurate in terms of reproducing the reality of what constitutes world
affairs.
Mansbach, Ferguson, and Lampert’s suggestion for reimaging what
is typically referred to as “international relations” is an intriguing
one for many reasons, not least of which is the alternate metaphors
it puts forth. Indeed, “complex conglomerate system” comprises

three metaphors: “complex,” “conglomerate,” and “system.” Inas-

much as “system” is already used in discussions of “international
relations” and has been analyzed previously Chapter 3 of this book
we can lay it aside at this point to focus on the other two words.
“Complex” as an adjective is defined by the American Heritage Dic-
tionary (386) as “consisting of interconnected or interwoven parts,
composite; composed of two or more units; involved or intricate,
as in structure; complicated.” In addition to the synonymous and
metaphorical “interwoven” contained in this definition, the dictionary
goes on to list as synonyms for “complex” the words “complicated,”
“intricate,” “involved,” “tangled,” and “knotty.” What is interesting
here from a metaphorical perspective is the contrast between what
is implied by “complex” and the implications of “international rela-
tions” as ways of imagining the phenomena in question. “Relations”
as a metaphor conjures up a sort of linear exchange between two
actors. Individuals “relate” with each other in forms consisting of
conversations, commercial transactions, sexual union, and the like.
By contrast, “complex” systems are marked by a metaphorical inter-
weaving of exchanges that create a metaphorical “web” such as
the one in the title of the book in which the “complex conglomer-
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ate system” moniker is suggested (The Web of World Politics: Nonstate
Actors in the Global System). In settling on the “complex” theme
the authors provide a metaphorical foundation for their theoretical
propositions that posit expanded types of interactions not suggested
by “international relations.” That Mansbach, Ferguson, and Lampert
chose to use the word “complex” as opposed to one of its synonyms
(“complicated,” “intricate,” “involved,” “tangled,” “knotty”) sug-
gests theoretical propositions that might have differed subtly given
the subtle nuances each of these words suggest.
“Conglomerate” is an interesting metaphor since technical-
sounding terms not normally used in everyday language typically
tend toward the literal end of the literal – metaphorical spectrum.
As defined by the American Heritage Dictionary (397), “conglomer-
ate” means “gathered into a mass; clustered,” and as used in geology
“made up of loosely cemented heterogeneous material.” When com-
bined with “complex,” “complex conglomerate system” suggests a
bit of a mixed metaphor since “complex” imagines the units involved
as “interwoven” or “tangled” while “conglomerate” presents the
image of a “gathered cluster” or elements “cemented” into a mass
(the Latin origin of “conglomerate,” conglomerāre, contains the term
glomerāre meaning “to wind into a ball”). With “system” defined
as a “group of interacting, interrelated, or interdependent elements

forming a complex whole” (American Heritage Dictionary, 1823),

what emerges from “complex conglomerate system” is in fact several
mixed metaphors that connote something more multifaceted (to use a
geometric metaphor) than what is suggested by “international rela-
tions” which implies fewer (metaphorical) dimensions with which
to make propositions about the interactions of actors around the
world. This may or may not have been the expressed intent of the
authors, but inasmuch as the metaphors in the expression correspond
to the model itself there is a synergy that emerges between the phrase
“complex conglomerate system” and the theory that emanates from it.
The point here is not to say that “international relations” as a
metaphor is inappropriate as a way of framing academic debate nor
that some other set of metaphors is better. Rather, the purpose of this
discussion is to highlight how metaphors in many ways frame what
is important to study and how it is to be studied. Metaphors have
been prevalent throughout the history of international relations and
along the way have determined through their framing what is wor-
thy of debate. The story of this historical progression of metaphors in
international relations theory tells much about the role that metaphors
play. In medieval times international relations was imagined with the
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aid of metaphors that envisioned a unity of the world. Ironically, the
metaphors of “neomedievalism” in contemporary IR theory empha-
size the variety of actors that comprise the world. In the intervening
period international relations has been imagined metaphorically in
mechanistic and biological terms and with the metaphor of “interna-
tional relations” itself. Metaphors both reflect prevailing conceptions
of the world and frame the study of it. Changing metaphorical concep-
tions of international relations then are important to understanding
the prevailing state of theorizing about the world.

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Chapter 9
Conclusion
The Pervasiveness of Metaphors in International

Relations Theory
A lthough the role of metaphors in international relations theory (or
any theoretical project, for that matter) is not always readily obvious,
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metaphors are among the primary elements in narrative explanations
for international relations. To see this we can take the example of
John Hobson’s (1902) famous metaphorical characterization of the
“economic taproots of imperialism.” As anyone who has weeded a
garden knows, to completely eliminate a pesky weed one needs to pull
it out by the roots. Hobson means to imply by way of the “taproot”
metaphor that capitalism (the metaphorical taproot of imperialism)
has to be completely eradicated if imperialism is to end. When one
thinks of the roots of a plant or tree the image that comes to mind
is one in which the vegetation that emerges from those roots is inti-
mately related to those roots. The type of roots (i.e., what species of
plant is genetically encoded in those roots) will determine the species
of plant that will emerge above ground. The roots of a tomato plant
can no more give rise to an elm tree than the roots of an elm tree can
lead a tomato plant to emerge. When Hobson says that capitalism is
the taproot of imperialism, he is offering a narrative explanation of an
aspect of international relations in which metaphors play a central role.
This points to a larger issue. The frequent, and in most cases
unconscious, use of the metaphor of “root(s)” to mean “causes” sug-
gests theoretical conclusions that are rarely actively intended. As the
example from Hobson demonstrates, referring to something as the
“root” of something else implies a deterministic view of outcomes.

No amount of tampering with the roots of a plant will change the

species of that plant unless the root is pulled up entirely from the
ground and the plant dies. To speak of an outcome “rooted” in a
source is to theorize that the source fully determines the outcome.
We can contrast this with the far less metaphorical terminology of
“causes.” Most scholars would agree that causation entails variation,
not determinism. Outcomes that are caused by sources can be altered
and varied when the causal sources are themselves varied.
Of course, most scholars use the terms interchangeably and would
argue (in most cases rightly) that they have no intent to imply or sug-
gest determinism when they innocently talk of the “roots” of some
dependent variable. Doubtless this is the case and in no way do I mean
to suggest that there is some deliberate effort to overstate the nature of
determination when scholars use the metaphorical language of “roots”
to mean “cause.” Indeed, when scholars go back and forth between
the terms “roots” and “causes” (and other words, for that matter),
they do so for the purposes of writing lively prose. My point sim-
ply is that metaphorical language has the ability to shape scholarship
and give it meanings in subtle and unintended ways, and that is what
makes attentiveness to this fact something that scholars may like to be
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attentive to in their work.
The realization that metaphors are ubiquitous in international rela-
tions theory is helpful in reconciling the competing theoretical schools
of thought that often divide the discipline. International relations as a
field of study at various stages in its development has been divided into
any number of competing factions that have differed in their onto-
logical, epistemological, and methodological priorities. At present,
according to Nuno Monteiro and Keven Ruby in their succinct and
focused dissection, international relations theory is split into three
broad approaches, which the authors label as Instrumentalism, Social
Constructivism, and Scientific Realism. Instrumentalism encompasses
long-standing paradigms such as Realism and Liberalism (and their
variants) that adopt a positivist framework for inquiry, emphasizing
an empiricist epistemology that determines the range of ontological
subjects capable of being investigated using available tools of obser-
vation (Monteiro and Ruby 2009, 33). Social Constructivism (which
encompasses the paradigm of the same name) adopts an anti-positivist
framework for inquiry, emphasizing an interpretivist epistemology
that is intertwined with the ontology of socially constituted phenom-
ena that is capable of being investigated through reconstructing the
social world (ibid.). Scientific Realism, which represents an effort to
rethink many of the paradigms in the study of international relations,

Conclusion 185
adopts a postpositivist framework for inquiry, emphasizing a represen-

tationalist epistemology that is determined by the ontological universe
of all mind-independent phenomena capable of being investigated
using observation and inference to the best explanation (ibid.).1
Monteiro and Ruby point out that all three of these strategies are
in some way flawed, at least if the goal is to set forth through a philos-
ophy of science the ideal way to establish scientific foundations for the
field of international relations. Furthermore, as long as each of these
strategies succeeds in yielding useful results for understanding inter-
national relations, there is no need for one strategy to prevail over
others. The authors further add that by keeping the dialogue among
these approaches open there is room for further refinement of the
tools scholars use to explore the field.
I would add another observation that highlights basic similari-
ties in all three of the current frameworks for inquiry detailed by
Monteiro and Ruby: regardless of the ontological, epistemological, or
methodological elements in Instrumentalism, Social Constructivism,
and Scientific Realism, all three of them at some point in the theoriz-
ing process use the language of metaphors to determine the nature
of what is being investigated, frame questions, make assumptions,
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pose hypotheses about causation and/or constitution, delineate the
scope and criteria for empirical research, and formulate theoretical
propositions.2 As Willie Henderson (1994, 359) points out (with ref-
erence to metaphors in economics), “the choice of metaphor will
influence the way in which the analysis develops in language terms
and the relationship between metaphor and narrative is continuously
reinforced.” Metaphors are inevitable elements in all forms of human
communication, and this is no less true for international relations
than it is for any other field of academic inquiry. In addition, as
David Patrick Houghton (2009) observes, metaphorical communica-
tion is one way that ideas spread throughout the academic and policy
communities in international relations. In fact, the one thing that uni-
ties all three of the perspectives outlined by Monteiro and Ruby is
the inevitability of metaphors in the language of those perspectives.
So in addition to philosophical awareness as part of a “prudent atti-
tude towards philosophical foundations” (Monteiro and Ruby, 40),
awareness of metaphors in the language of international relations
scholarship is essential to making that scholarship useful in terms
of explaining outcomes and guiding other scholars toward equally
fruitful research. After all, as Markus Kornprobst (2009) observes,
international relations is a “rhetorical discipline” in which scholars
communicate with each other in both dialogue and debate. To the

extent that they can find common ground by, for example, engaging
in a communal interrogation of the metaphors they use to frame the
study of IR the more common ground can be found.
Metaphors as Part of the International Relations
Canon
Metaphors define the study of international relations much the way
seminal texts do. Farah Godrej has suggested that there are cer-
tain books or “canonical texts”—works that constitute the canon
in Western civilization (or in any civilization, for that matter)—
that establish the foundation for the fundamental meanings and
understandings that shape cultures and societies. In essence, Godrej
(2004, 5) suggests a social constructionist analysis of the canon, in
which “we can accept the view that the cannon is, in some sense,
a construction of our making” (emphasis in the original). In many
ways, the role Godrej attributes to canonical texts in constituting a
field of knowledge can also be assigned to metaphors. In interna-
tional relations theory, metaphors in a sense constitute the “canon”
of intellectual thought; they provide the meanings by which scholars
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construct the field. In reviewing the five qualities Godrej identifies in
canonical texts, we can find examples of metaphors in international
relations theory that fulfill much the same roles.
Godrej’s first criterion for a text to be considered canonical is that it
“illuminate[s] a key concern or dilemma . . . about how . . . lives should
be lived and political communities organized” (ibid., 5). A good
example of a metaphor in international relations theory that mim-
ics this quality is the metaphor of “levels of analysis.” This metaphor
meets Godrej’s criterion in that it represents a concern or dilemma and
it corresponds to how scholars think communities of political actors
are organized. With regard to the former, scholars of international
relations see it as a dilemma that the international system occupies an
“anarchic” level of analysis that does not correspond to the hierarchi-
cal rules of politics that govern “lower” levels of analysis (principally,
the “unit,” “domestic,” or “state” level of analysis). Scholars have cre-
ated means for “bridging” the levels of analysis, for example, with
so-called two-level games. With regard to the latter, scholars of inter-
national relations maintain that political communities are organized
into separate spheres at each level of analysis (e.g., the international
system, domestic political communities).
Second, Godrej (5) posits that canonical texts illuminate concerns
or dilemmas “in some profound, intellectually complex and often

Conclusion 187
rather original manner.” As applied to metaphors in international

relations theory, an example of this can be found in the metaphor
of “evolution” as a way of conceptualizing change. Dynamism as
framed by this metaphorical construction is intellectually complex in
that it represents a fundamental set of understandings about the rela-
tionship between actors and their social environment over time. The
metaphorical image posed by “evolution” has become so embedded
in international relations theory that it has taken on a canonical status.
Godrej’s third aspect of canonical texts is that these texts have
enduring qualities. A good example of this as it applies to metaphors in
international relations theory is the metaphor of the balance of power.
The balance of power metaphor has endured for so long in thinking
about international relations that its first appearance in the literature
long predates contemporary international relations theory. Although
in contemporary international relations theory the balance of power
metaphor is most closely associated with the Realist school of thought,
the metaphor is so firmly in place in the field that few scholars can
avoid confronting it, even those scholars who work in paradigms that
challenge the core assumptions of the Realist school.
Godrej (6) next claims that texts that constitute a canon “repre-
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sent, in some way, the major traditions of thought within the Western
world” (emphasis in the original). Metaphors in international relations
theory do not represent the entirety of Western thinking, but they
do mimic the role of canonical texts in IR theory in that they repre-
sent the major traditions in the field and they make it easy to identify
specific traditions within international relations theory. An example
of a metaphor that is associated with a specific theoretical tradition
is “structure.” As applied to international relations, the concept of
“structure” is metaphorical inasmuch as that which is conceptual-
ized with the concept lacks the physical qualities typically associated
with structures in their material form and therefore is only metaphori-
cal structural in nature. Structural theories of international relations
constitute specific analytical approaches to the field. For instance,
Neorealism is often referred to as “structural” Realism to distinguish it
from classical Realist analyses of international relations. One can easily
identify works written in the Neorealist tradition by their invoking of
structural metaphors with which they conceptualize world affairs. Like
canonical texts, metaphors such as the “structure” metaphor define
traditions of international relations thinking.
Fifth, Godrej (7) points out that despite their enduring nature,
canonical texts are contested. Likewise, although metaphors in
international relations theory frequently serve to frame the field in

enduring ways, they too are contested in terms of their fundamen-

tal claims. Perhaps the most fundamental metaphor in contemporary
international relations theory is the metaphor of “anarchy” in the
international system. International relations does not literally take
place without order or rules, but in the eyes of most scholars of
international relations the absence of an international government
has rendered world affairs metaphorically lacking ordered governance.
However, as widely accepted as the “anarchy” metaphor would seem
to be, it is contested. In particular, a growing number of theorists
working within the Constructivist paradigm have argued either that
the international system is not anarchic at all or that the notion of
anarchy must be modified to take account of the social rules that gov-
ern the actions of international actors. As Alexander Wendt (1992)
has famously stated, “anarchy is what states make of it.”
What the foregoing demonstrates is that, like works that consti-
tute the canon of civilizational thought, metaphors in international
relations theory fundamentally frame inquiry in the field in all of
its aspects. Metaphors do not merely “dress up” international rela-
tions theory with interesting but ultimately trivial allusions to related
realms, but rather they play an essential role in generating assump-
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tions, prompting hypotheses, framing theories, and suggesting areas
for empirical research. Like canonical texts, metaphors constitute the
very field of international relations and make possible the abstract
analyses and empirical investigations that take place within it.
The Unintentional Quality of Metaphors

in International Relations Theory
None of this should necessarily be taken to mean that all schol-
ars of international relations or any other discipline intentionally use
metaphors to get across some point or to steer theorizing in one
direction or another (although obviously some do). In the major-
ity of cases in which metaphors are used reflexively (as opposed to
deliberately with such devices, for example, as the “billiard ball”
metaphor of the international system), there is no conscious effort
among scholars to have the metaphors say anything deliberate about
the theoretical conclusions that should be drawn. But this is not to
say that the metaphors do not have this effect. Rather, as with the
“roots” metaphor discussed earlier, metaphorical prose can uninten-
tionally frame theoretical discussions in one way or another. Cognitive
linguists have established that metaphors are essential to human cogni-
tion and provide the frameworks by which virtually everything humans

Conclusion 189
experience is known. This is no less true in academic inquiry as it is in

everyday life.
In many respects the influence of metaphors in international rela-
tions theory is analogous to the perspectives journalists bring with
them to the reporting of the news. In his much misunderstood
book, Bias, Bernard Goldberg (2002) chronicles the way that jour-
nalists’ understanding of the world influences their reporting. It is
not that journalists, editors, and broadcasters sit around rubbing their
hands together thinking of ways to purposefully distort the news,
but rather, their internalized understandings of the world create a
finite set of possibilities that necessarily excludes that which is not
included in what they see as objective reality. A similar process operates
with metaphors in international relations theory (and virtually every
other academic discipline). Metaphorical representations construct the
reality from which assumptions are drawn, hypotheses are posed, the-
oretical propositions are derived, and experiments are undertaken.3 If,
as many international relations scholars have come to accept, the world
is socially constructed, it is not a far leap to conclude that the world
of academic inquiry is socially constructed as well. Metaphors are one
of the main mechanisms by which that social construction takes place.
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Furthermore, just as journalists tend to see the world in a similar
fashion as those with whom they congregate (metaphorical birds of a
feather), the socially constructed theoretical world of scholars comes
to be that way in part because of the shared nature of their expe-
rience. It almost goes without saying that for aspects of the human
experience to be socially constructed, there must be a society that
does the constructing. Those who constitute a society and share a
communal experience come to define what is perceived as the reality
around them. The metaphors that gain credence in the construction
of international relations theory do so because they are shared among
scholars. Someone could propose a new metaphor for the purpose
of imagining some aspect of international relations (e.g., the “billiard
ball” metaphor that is now so common in international relations the-
ory) or an author could use specific metaphorical language reflexively
to describe some quality of international relations (e.g., the metaphor
of “soft” power), but if these linguistic terms are unintelligible to their
peers they will not gain currency in the field. The state of theorizing
at any given moment in the field of international relations is a direct
reflection of the metaphorical language that is shared among scholars
at that time.
Scholars also ought to be careful about strained metaphors or try-
ing to fit a metaphor to empirical circumstances instead of the other

way around. Such is the case, for example, with John Hulsman and
Wess Mitchell’s (2009) effort to liken post–Cold War U.S. foreign
policy to the story line of the motion picture The Godfather. Although
inevitable similarities exist between the choices of a nuclear super-
power and an organized crime syndicate both facing changes in the
environment in which they operate, Hulsman and Mitchell’s attempt
to map out exact correspondences between elements in the fictional
Corleone family and schools of thought in American diplomatic circles
tries too hard to construct an analogy between these two realms when
in fact a suggestive metaphor might have better made the case. Such
is the unintentional quality of metaphors in international relations
theory.
What Does It All Mean?

What a review of international relations shows is the persistence
of metaphors in IR theory. This is not solely due to the fact that
human thought and communication invariably involve metaphorical
imagery, although this is undoubtedly true for international rela-
tions as it is for any field of inquiry. There is also a deeper issue
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involved here: although some scholars of international relations have
looked to the tools of scientific realism to inject rigor into theoret-
ical analysis, there needs to be an acknowledgment that even in the
physical and natural sciences such rigor does not exclude reliance
on metaphorical frames of reference. International relations largely
comprises abstract concepts and practices. These abstract concepts
and practices are not capable of being directly observed, and hence,
metaphors are necessary for translating existential impressions into
analytical categories.
Metaphors are part of the narrative of international relations. As is
true in the physical and natural sciences, they frame the assumptions
and propositions of international relations theories. In the present
period, organic and evolutionary metaphors predominate. The impli-
cations of this are not insignificant. As Iver Neumann (2004, 265)
astutely points out, the organic and evolutionary metaphors that cur-
rently prevail in IR theory have real implications for the field: “Every
set of metaphors is an enabling and constraining prerequisite for think-
ing. It will therefore itself be an influence on where thinking goes.”
The fact that organic metaphors have been used in IR theory, where
there is an emphasis on scientific modes of inquiry, is not accidental.
During the era in which mechanistic metaphors predominated in the
study of international relations, scholars of international affairs—who

Conclusion 191
often served as advisers to statesmen and kings—thought that affairs

among states could be made since international relations itself was
constructed, much as a machine. The theories, policies, and prac-
tices of international relations all rested on mechanistic metaphorical
premises that invited active involvement on the part of scholars and
advisers who saw their theories as adjuncts to statecraft. In the mod-
ern era, in which biological and organic metaphors predominate in the
study of international relations, scholars of international affairs—many
of whom advocate for a detached objectivism—hold that affairs among
international actors are organically occurring phenomena, much as
biological organisms are. The theories, policies, and practices of inter-
national relations rest on biological metaphorical premises that lead
scholars to see their theories as objective explanations with limited
bases for involvement in statecraft.
The debate between those scholars who accept the abstract nature
of international relations and those that believe it can be subjected to
scientific investigation is a long one that has been amply chronicled,
especially within the context of the behavioral revolution. As Nicolas
Guilhot points out, early Realists sided against scientific methods.
These Realists “resented the methodological imperialism of the behav-
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ioral revolution. They saw the promise of an empirical science of
politics as an illusion: for them, politics was not entirely rational
and could not be comprehended by scientific rationalism” (Guilhot
2008, 282). It makes sense, then, that much of the theorizing con-
ducted by these early Realists drew on metaphorical imagery with
a long history in the effort to conceptualize international relations.
Hans Morgenthau’s treatment of the “balance of power,” for example,
updates and refines a metaphor that can be traced back for centuries.
What is more interesting and more telling, however, is the tena-
ciousness of metaphors in international relations theory even after the
supposed triumph of more scientific approaches to the study of IR
after the defeat of the early Realist movement.4 In fact, the irony
of the triumph of Neorealism and other scientific approaches to the
study of international relations is, try as scholars might, they cannot
eliminate metaphors as a means for coming up with assumptions and
theoretical propositions about international affairs. For example, as
Stephen Brooks (1997, 447–450) points out, although Neorealists,
such as Kenneth Waltz, seek to eliminate assumptions about human
nature in their scientific perspective on international politics, these
assumptions find their way into Neorealist theory. Specifically, states
are assumed to be concerned with security and insecurity because they
are wary and anxious by nature (ibid., 449).5 Human nature is used

here metaphorically inasmuch as states are not literally humans, but

rather, are merely assumed to have similar motives.
This reliance on metaphors of human nature extends even to the
scientific realism of Alexander Wendt’s social theory of international
politics. For Wendt (1999, 51), scientific realism rests on three fun-
damental principles: “1. the world is independent of the mind and
language of individuals; 2. mature scientific theories typically refer
to this world, 3. even when it is not directly observable.” It is the
first and last of these principles that are relevant for a discussion of
metaphors. As regards observables, Wendt points out that all scien-
tific endeavors from physics to political science encounter empirical
realities that, despite the lack of tools to observe them directly, are
no less empirically real. The question, then, is how to conceptual-
ize empirical realities that are not directly observable. Wendt’s answer
is that metaphors can be involved: “In the realist view, the theorist
baptizes an unobservable phenomenon by proposing a description
of its properties and some hypotheses about how these relate to
observable effects. Essentially, when dealing with unobservables the
realist—in natural as much as social science—is combining a causal
with a description theory of reference. This baptizing often occurs
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through metaphors” (ibid., 63, emphasis added). This engages the first
of Wendt’s three principles, a mind-independent world. Since that
which is observed is framed metaphorically, the language of metaphors
is essential for making sense of the world.6 That Wendt acknowledges
the role of metaphor in scientific realism as a basis for his social the-
ory of international politics is significant inasmuch as it represents
continuity in the historical evolution of the study of international
relations.
What is perhaps more interesting is what metaphors Wendt selects
to assist in uncovering the unobservable elements in international rela-
tions. In particular, when it comes to the interests of actors, specifically
states, Wendt makes reference to the same metaphorical construction
as previous generations of realists, namely, “human nature.” However,
he does this in a way that conceals its metaphorical aspect. Specifically,
Wendt (1999, 115) argues that the “material force constituting inter-
ests is human nature” (emphasis added). Rather than treating human
nature as a metaphor for interests, Wendt argues that human nature
is a material force constitutive of interests. Thus, instead of treating
human nature metaphorically in order to gain insight into the unob-
servable nature of states’ interests, Wendt, like Morgenthau and Waltz
before him, reifies the metaphor of human nature into the essential
material qualities of states.

Conclusion 193
In fact, as cognitive linguists tell us, “human nature” is a series

of thoughts and dispositions through which the material world is
experienced metaphorically. Human nature is itself an unobservable
that can only be measured through inference. Rather than engage
in an infinite regression from one metaphor to another, scholars
have chosen to infer intent from the behavior of international actors
(principally states) and arrive at assumptions of human nature that
are in that instance metaphors for scholars’ own prior beliefs. Thus,
the common thread running through much of international relations
theory is a debate not over international relations but over human
nature. If, as cognitive linguists assert, all thought is metaphorical,
and since metaphorical thought is how human experience is expressed,
the history of international relations as a discipline is the history of
how scholars of international relations conceive of human nature and
impute these conceptions to states and other international actors. The
use of human nature as a metaphor is therefore not only a consistent
theme in international relations theory but also an indicator of evolv-
ing human experiences and their manifestation in word and thought.
In the end, one cannot divorce the assumptions underlying interna-
tional relations from the underlying experiences of the scholars who
study it.
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Perhaps one of the most controversial implications of an investi-
gation into the role of metaphors in international relations theory is
that, because metaphors are integral to human thought and communi-
cation, scholars of IR (or any other discipline, for that matter) cannot
help but impute their own impressions about international relations
into the study of the field. As an examination of metaphors in IR the-
ory shows, for every metaphor that is in use there are other metaphors
that either offer a competing perspective or potentially can take its
place. In one sense, there is nothing inherently more useful in one
metaphor versus another. The choice of which metaphor to use is on
one level an arbitrary one as long as the metaphor leads to useful
theoretical insights.7
However, inasmuch as no one metaphor is inherently better than
another, the question arises, is the choice of metaphor truly arbitrary
or does it reflect some other dynamic perhaps involving explicit or
implicit deliberation on the part of scholars who make such a choice?
There is reason to think that in fact the answer is that which metaphors
get used in international relations theory (as is true for other aca-
demic disciplines) is a product of, if not active deliberation, then at the
very least a certain degree of conceptual mapping by scholars them-
selves. The metaphors a person uses is indicative of how and what

that person thinks. So, while international relations theory (and the-
ory in other academic disciplines, for that matter) may to a degree
be value-neutral, it is not “thought-neutral” (and it may very well not
be value-neutral as well).8 Quite simply, it is naive to think that aca-
demics are not influenced by their own experiences when metaphors
in theory and research come into play. As Trevor Barnes (1996, 158)
observes, “metaphors do not just suddenly emerge but are a response
to the context in which academics live and work.” James Rosenau
(1990, 33) goes even further, arguing that “science is not so much a
value-free enterprise as a value-explicit one. It requires observers to be
clear about their presence in the research, to acknowledge biases and
idiosyncratic perspectives that may skew their interpretations.”9
To say that metaphors in scholarly inquiry reflect the thoughts and
experiences of scholars is to assert something that has long been one of
the issues at the core of debates over international relations theory in
particular and social science in general. The ability to leave one’s own
preferences and biases at the doorstep of academic inquiry has been
a hallmark of social science rigor. But is it ever really possible? Some
scholars would say no. It could be (and has been) said that the inter-
est scholars show in studying something is reflective of the thoughts
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scholars have about it, and even scholars’ preferences that flow from
such thoughts. Hedley Bull (1977, xii), for example, has said as much
in his efforts to study international order: “If I did not think of order
in world politics as a desirable objective, I should not have thought
it worthwhile to attempt [the] study of it” (emphasis added). Bull’s
thoughts about international order are based in metaphor, and thus it
is the nature of Bull’s metaphorical thinking that leads him to under-
stand what is desirable and thereby worthy of study. What this book
has shown is that the metaphorical expressions of Bull, and virtually
all IR scholars, reveal the underlying metaphors that reflect how these
scholars comprehend the world. It bears repeating, scholarship may
be a value-neutral, but it is not thought-neutral.
Since metaphors are reflective of how scholars think, and since
metaphors are integral to how scholars think about the subjects they
study, one cannot avoid the conclusion that scholars’ prior thoughts
inevitably enter into how they undertake the study of international
relations. This is a proposition accepted by philosophers of science
(and the physical and natural sciences at that), let alone social sci-
entists. As Theodore Brown (2003, 12) contends: “The models and
theories that scientists use to explain their observations are metaphor-
ical constructs. To understand how science works and to account for
its success, we have no need for the proposition that scientists have

Conclusion 195
unmediated access to the world ‘as it really is.’ We have no grounds for
believing that there exist objective, mind-independent truths awaiting
discovery. Rather, statements we regard as truths about the world are
the product of human reasoning.”10 This principle can be applied to
words useful in scientific inquiry but which have no meaning apart
from those that humans ascribe to them for the purposes of engaging
in science. Max Black (1990, 72), for example, writes that the “term
‘gene’ has its place within a man-made theory, in whose absence it
would have no intelligible use.” At the very least, while there may be
mind-independent information, there is no mind-independent way of
thinking about it.
Thinking about information involves thinking about the language
of international relations theory. In a very positive contribution,
K. M. Fierke (2003, 80) suggests that “it would be useful to look
more closely at some of the ways language analysis is implicitly or
explicitly involved in IR practice.” This way, IR scholars can be made
“aware of the importance of greater clarity about the relationship
between scholarly concepts and the language of [their] subjects of
analysis” (ibid., 78).11
It would be impossible to create, much less communicate, theories
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of international relations without a collection of shared discursive cate-
gories, and among these most certainly are the metaphors that express
the stories IR scholars tell about the world.
As trite, obvious, and clichéd as it might sound, words and
thoughts have meanings and consequences. When humans thought
that the world was flat their understanding of that world was shaped
on that perception. Thinking about the world in a metaphorical way
as a flat object led to theories about what was possible within that
flat world. Just as objects can only move in certain directions on a
flat plane, for example, it was thought that the possibilities for human
movement and organization were limited by the flat nature of the
earth. More importantly, what humans perceived as possible—in terms
of faith, religion, and politics—was predicated on the implications of
thinking of the world as a metaphorically flat object. The possibilities
for heavenly salvation depended on how humans were thought to be
physically situated to the divine. By the same token, the possibilities
for political authority depended on how humans were thought to be
physically situated to each other. That the earth was not really flat was
irrelevant. What mattered was what was experienced of the earth, how
those experiences were expressed metaphorically as thoughts, and how
those metaphorical thoughts were conveyed from human to human in
metaphorical communication.

By the same token, experiences with a spherical earth also are man-
ifest metaphorically in human cognition and are conveyed metaphori-
cally through human language. The way people encounter a spherical
object registers in thought in far different ways than experiences with
objects that are flat. From a political standpoint, the possibilities for
locating political authority are multiplied with the expansion of phys-
ical properties and with changed sensations of physical space. For
example, as anyone who has ever unraveled the elastic band encas-
ing the core of a golf ball knows, one can set out in one direction on a
globe and move forward without end seemingly infinitely. As humans’
physical experiences with a spherical earth expressed themselves as
metaphors of seemingly infinite space, the possibilities for infinite
political organization would be a logical extension of those metaphors
expressed in thoughts and words.12 Even more to the point, when
humans achieved the ability to experience a spherical earth as some-
thing suspended in space (via air and space travel) the metaphorical
expressions of those experiences as conveyed in language opened up
still more new ways of conceptualizing possible and potential forms of
political organization.
To make this point even more pointedly, experiencing a spherical
DEMO
world as flat has still more implications for how metaphors can shape
human interaction. This is highlighted in Thomas Friedman’s 2006
ironically, yet insightfully and instructively, titled book, The World is
Flat. The premise of Friedman’s book (which is graced with an iron-
ically appropriate cover depicting the visual metaphor of the earth
occupying one side of a flat coin) is that a metaphorical “flattening”
of the world is occurring through globalization and greater economic,
political, and cultural interconnectedness.13 Globalization, of course,
is a much-studied phenomenon that can be addressed from any num-
ber of angles.14 What makes Friedman’s book stand out is perhaps
not so much his arguments—which, after all, have been made in one
form or another by other authors who have chronicled globalization—
but the singularly provocative message of the metaphor that forms
the book’s title. That humans know that the world is spherical is less
important than that they experience it and think of it metaphorically
as flat. As they convey those thoughts, steeped in metaphor as they
are, theories about what is politically possible are inevitably shaped
by the metaphors that give rise to them. In many ways, then, Reza
Aslan (2009, 52) is right when he offers “with apologies to Thomas
Friedman, the world is not flat. It is our minds that have flattened.
Globalization has not only altered the way we view the world. It has
changed the way we view ourselves” (emphasis in the original). Hence,

Conclusion 197
to say that the world today is flat is not to say that today’s flat earth is
the same as the flat earth of 600 years ago. The experiences of flatness
today are in their own way distinct from those of the past. But they
are experiences nonetheless, expressed in thought as metaphors and
conveyed in words that reflect those metaphorical thoughts. Words
have meanings for explaining what happens and predicting what is
possible.
The fact that metaphors influence how scholars undertake their
analyses is not an indictment or an incrimination of those scholars
who strive for scientific rigor. In many ways the influence of metaphors
provides a consolation for those scholars who otherwise do not see a
way to reconcile the material world with how they think about it.15 It is
worth keeping in mind that all scientists, from chemistry to physics,
are humans who think metaphorically. In fact, within the physical and
natural sciences the process of naming concepts is highly metaphorical
and often celebrated as such. Scientists such as physicists delight in
playful metaphorical terms such as “string theory” and “black holes”
to identify highly complex, and in many cases unobservable, phenom-
ena. This does not reflect “bias” or “lack of objectivity” as much as it
does an admission that so-called mind-independent reality can only be
DEMO
known by using the (metaphorical) mind. The solution is not to try
and eliminate metaphor from cognition but to embrace its inevitabil-
ity and acknowledge its role in human thought, including in academic
scholarship. In this regard Donald McCloskey (1985, 75) refers to
Jacob Bronowski (1965, 36), who so eloquently opined, “the symbol
and the metaphor are as necessary to science as to poetry.”16 This book
does not suggest that metaphors be eliminated from international rela-
tions theory but that they be actively interrogated. As McCloskey (81)
rightly avers, “unexamined metaphor is a substitute for thinking—
which is a recommendation to examine the metaphors, not to attempt
the impossible by banishing them.” Once the presence of metaphors is
acknowledged, their utility can only be enhanced by paying attention
to their role in the theoretical process.
Metaphors come and go in international relations theory. Some are
proposed but, for whatever reason, never catch on as narratives for
formulating propositions about world affairs. The first step toward
making metaphors useful in the study of international relations is to
be aware of the larger role that language plays in the field of IR itself.
While recent years have witnessed a “linguistic turn” in the study of
international relations, this “turn” has for the most part been in the
direction of studying the discourse of practitioners of foreign policy
and world affairs. For the linguistic turn to be complete, IR scholars

need to metaphorically “turn” their attention to themselves and to the

language of their craft. This volume represents what one hopes will be
just the first effort to critically examine the language of international
relations, in particular the language of metaphors in international
relations theory.
DEMO

N ot e s
Chapter 1
1. I began to pursue this topic in Chapter 3 of my previous book,
The Prison as Metaphor: Re-Imagining International Relations (Marks
2004). A number of the metaphors that have been used in interna-
tional relations theory are also summarized in Chilton and Lakoff
(1995). The discipline of international relations itself also has been
conceptualized through metaphors (see Agathangelou and Ling
2004, 2009, especially chapter 3). For a brief review of metaphors
in political science in general, see Miller (1979), Lunt (2005).
2. On the role of metaphors in scientific inquiry, see Brown (2003).
3. For worthwhile expositions of metaphors in foreign policy analy-
sis, see Andrews (1979), Milliken (1996), Slingerland, Blanchard,
DEMO
and Boyd-Judson (2007), and Flanik (2009) as well as the exten-
sive works of Robert Ivie (see, e.g., Ivie 1980, 1982, 1986, 1987,
1989, 1997, 1999, 2002, 2004). Although not specifically focused
on metaphors, the emphasis of the chapters in James Der Derian and
Michael Shapiro’s International/Intertextual Relations (1989) high-
lights the role of discourse in the practice of international relations,
much of which is metaphorical in nature.
4. I am aware, as Paul Chilton (1996, 4) observes, that any number of
scholars of international relations have taken on policymaking roles in
government administrations. Keeping this in mind, at a certain point
it is necessary to delineate the scope of an academic inquiry such as the
one undertaken here, and thus for the purpose of maintaining focus
the primary emphasis in this book will be on metaphors used by schol-
ars and academics to devise theories of international relations, keeping
in mind Chilton’s note of caution that the line between theory and
practice is not always clearly drawn. For analyses of metaphors used
in the discourse and rhetoric of politics and foreign policy see, for
example, Edelman (1971), Chilton and Ilyin (1993), Thornborrow
(1993), Shimko (1994), Medhurst (1997), Mutimer (1997), Musolff
(2001, 2004), Charteris-Black (2005, 2009), Hirschbein (2005),
Carver and Pikalo (2008), Paparone (2008).
5. Among the colorful images that have been introduced to frame
issues in international relations are the metaphors of “spectators
at a crowded horse race” to depict states (Wolfers 1962, 14–19),

200 N ot e s
“seduction” to describe regional integration (McSweeney 1999, 170),

and “sandpiles” to imagine the size of wars (Cederman 2003). Inter-
national relations also has been imagined with the aid of science fiction
and motion picture metaphors (see Weber 2001, Weldes 2003). These
metaphors and others are omnipresent in international relations the-
ory, and for that reason alone it would be beyond the ability of one
scholar working alone to track down, list, and analyze all of them.
6. The focus of this book is on metaphors in international relations the-
ory as it is formulated in the English language. Aside from the practical
reasons for limiting the study in this way there is a theoretical point
to be made, namely, the linguistic aspects of any theoretical endeavor,
including the use of metaphors, frame and delineate how theory is
developed. In the policy realm it has been noted that metaphors in
different languages actually can be translated to mean the same thing
but nonetheless are subject to competing political interpretations. See,
for example, the discussions of metaphors in the framing of European
integration in Musolff (1996) and Schäffner (1996).
7. The “billiard ball” metaphor to describe power politics was first
advanced by Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan. See Terence Ball’s (1975,
215ff.) discussion of the Hobbesian metaphor. For additional expli-
cations of the billiard ball metaphor, see also Wolfers (1962, 19),
Burton (1972, 28–32), Mearsheimer (1994–1995, 48), Deibert
8.
9. DEMO
(1997, 167–169).
See also Roggeveen (2001, especially 30).
See also Vincent (1986, 123). For the egg-box metaphor, see Jackson
(1990, 267).
10. In addition to the international system being seen as a “burning
house,” the state itself is often seen metaphorically as a “house.” See
Chilton and Lakoff (1995, 53–55). On the “forest” metaphor, see
Singer (1961), Holsti (1985), Kubálková, Onuf, and Kowert (1998).
The “jungle” metaphor, connoting anarchy, is another common
metaphorical motif in structural theories of international relations.
On the jungle metaphor, see Hoffman (1981, 35).
11. At an October 2005 panel discussion at Columbia University, Albright
resurrected her comments from her September keynote speech in
Iowa: “And while there are a lot of people who talk about diplomacy
as a game of chess, I have discounted that a long time ago, because
chess is a slow game with two people. Life is more like a pool table
where there are lots of different balls and different people come and
they take a cue stick and one ball hits another” (Albright 2005b, 32).
Chapter 2
1. The review of metaphors offered here focuses primarily on studies in
the Western tradition. For a comparison of metaphors in Eastern and
Western philosophy, see Punter (2007, Chapter 2).

N ot e s 201
2. For discussions of metaphors in intellectual discovery see, for exam-

ple, Booth (1978, 55), Tourangeau (1982, 18), Dirven (1985, 98),
Newmark (1985, 295).
3. Sometimes metaphors become so commonplace that they become
what Robert Claiborne (1988, 14) calls “lost metaphors—words and
phrases we still use figuratively, but whose original, literal senses have
been obscured or erased by times and change.”
4. For an excellent review of the history of metaphor in philosophy, see
Johnson (1981).
5. Metaphors are closely related to two other linguistic devices:
metonymy and synecdoche. Metonymy is a “figure of speech in which
one word or phrase is substituted for another with which it is closely
associated, as in the use of Washington for the United States gov-
ernment” (American Heritage Dictionary, 1136–1137, italics in the
original). Synecdoche is a “figure of speech in which a part is used
for the whole (as hand for sailor), the whole for a part (as the law for
police officer), the specific for the general (as cutthroat for assassin),
the general for the specific (as thief for pickpocket), or the material
for the thing from which it is made (as steel for sword)” (ibid., 1821,
italics in the original).
6. On mathematics as metaphor, see Lakoff (1987, Chapter 20).
7. As Duncan Snidal (1986, 34, n. 11) points out, mathematical equa-
DEMO
tions offer ways to pursue the deductive implications of a metaphor
or a model. In that sense, metaphors often are ways of suggesting
what numerical principles can be expressed in the form of mathemat-
ical equations. Or, as Max Black (1962, 242) puts it: “Perhaps every
science must start with metaphor and end with algebra; and perhaps
without the metaphor there never would have been any algebra.”
8. Similarly, the naming of pets and other animals is based on metaphor-
ical substitution, reflecting an understanding of how they correspond
to human society. See Lévi-Strauss (1966, 204–208).
9. Hence, when children are taught to count it is not assumed that they
know a priori that two plus two equals four. Rather, “four” is a new
concept that is evoked by metaphorically representing the addition of
two to two in the form of a novel numerical quantity.
10. Metaphor is so ingrained in human cognition that when individuals
suffer from aphasia, it typically afflicts the person’s ability to express
himself or herself in ways that employ metaphorical imagery. See
Jakobson and Halle (1971, 90) and Stachowiak (1985, 559–599).
11. This sentiment is echoed by Paul de Man (1978, 25), who writes that
“being and identity are the result of a resemblance which is not in
things but posited by an act of the mind which, as such, can only be
verbal” (emphasis added). See also Ricoeur (1978).
12. John Searle states: “The basic principles on which all metaphor works
is that the utterance of an expression with its literal meaning and cor-
responding truth conditions can, in various ways that are specific to

202 N ot e s
metaphor, call to mind another meaning and corresponding set of

truth conditions” (Searle 1979a, 85). See also Brown (1976, 170),
Searle (1979b).
13. Portions of this section are adapted from my earlier book The Prison
as Metaphor (2004).
14. For contrary views to the cognitive approach to metaphors, see
Davidson (1979), Rorty (1979).
15. See also Lakoff and Johnson (1980a).
16. For an example of research on foreign policy using Lakoff and
Johnson’s embodied mind approach to metaphors, see Beer’s (2001,
96–103) examination of the Persian Gulf War.
17. See also McCoy (2000, 41).
18. For example, Lakoff and Johnson’s view that metaphors represent
human experiences was asserted by Giambattista Vico in The New Sci-
ence (first published in 1725). Terence Hawkes (1972, 39) sums up
Vico’s thesis as follows: “Metaphor, in short, is not fanciful ‘embroi-
dery’ of the facts. It is a way of experiencing the facts. It is a way of
thinking and living; an imaginative projection of the truth” (emphasis
in the original).
19. See Nietzsche (1979). The connection between Nietzsche and Lakoff
and Johnson is made explicit in Murphy (2001, especially 2).
20. As Paul Cantor (1982, 73) observes, “For Nietzsche, man becomes
DEMO
man only through a process of metaphor.” Cantor (73) goes on to
quote Nietzsche (1979, 50–51): “The drive toward the formation
of metaphor is the fundamental drive, which one cannot for a sin-
gle instance dispense with in thought, for one would thereby dispense
with man himself.”
21. As Sarah Kofman (1993, 25) points out: “Metaphorical activity is
termed instinctive because it is unconscious, and because like all drives
it seeks sole mastery of the world. It is not just a drive like any other;
it could be called the general form of all drives. It is instinctive also
because it is hereditary and specific.”
22. For Nietzsche, “The starting-point, ‘the impression,’ is itself a
metaphor, a transposition of a nerve stimulus which varies from one
individual to the next, producing individual sensation-images in the
symbolic language of one of the five senses” (Kofman 1993, 35).
23. Lakoff (1987, xv) rejects “objectivism” in favor of “experiential
realism” or “experientialism.”
24. Terence Hawkes (1972, 91) offers a similar view: “In the long run
the ‘truth’ does not matter because the only access to it is by means
of metaphor. The metaphors matter: they are the truth.”
25. This formulation is supported by Zenon Pylyshyn (1979, 435),
who argues that “metaphor induces a (partial) equivalence between
two known phenomena, [while] a literal account describes the phe-
nomenon in the authentic terms in which it is ‘seen’ ” (emphasis in

N ot e s 203
the original). On literal versus metaphorical expression, see also Black

(1962, 30–34).
26. Hayden White (1978, 114) offers a similar view, arguing that while
all language contains a mixture of “dead” and “vivid” metaphors,
the former (which share qualities with literal expression) possess more
“objectivity” or “nonpoetic” qualities than the latter.
27. Lakoff (1993, 205) also puts it this way: “Those concepts that are not
comprehended via conceptual metaphor might be called ‘literal.’ ” For
more on the relationship between metaphorical and literal language,
see Brinkley (1974), Cohen (1976).
28. Or, to put it another way, “metaphor is . . . primarily a matter of
thought, not language” inasmuch as “conceptual metaphor is ubiq-
uitous and unavoidable for human beings” (Slingerland, Blanchard,
and Boyd-Judson 2007, 56, emphasis in the original).
29. A good contemporary example of how metaphors can affect public
policy can be found in the “greenhouse” metaphor associated with
global warming. See Brown (2003, 164ff.).
30. One of the most grisly examples of this occurred in Nazi Germany,
where the metaphorical depiction of the “Jewish problem” in terms
of illness allowed Nazi leaders to suggest a “final solution” designed
to eradicate this metaphorical “disease.” See Sontag (1978, 82–84).
31. A recent example of metaphors in the study of economics is the
32.
(2008). DEMO
metaphor of market “earthquakes” (see Dash 2010). On metaphor-
ical images in the study of traffic patterns, see Vanderbilt
Zoltan Kövecses (1986, 8) calls these “epistemic correspondences”

whereby what is known about the source domain of a metaphor is
brought to bear on what is learned about the target domain. This
capacity of metaphors was recognized by Black (1979, 36–40) even
before the cognitive linguistics revolution in the study of metaphors.
See also Schäffner (1996).
33. Hobbes (1962, 34) declared that abuses occur “when [men] use
words metaphorically; that is, in other sense than that they are
ordained for; and thereby deceive others.” Ironically, as many scholars
have noted (see, e.g., Ball 1975, Ashcraft 1977, Miller 1979, Chilton
1996), despite the fact that Hobbes denounced metaphorical lan-
guage, metaphors permeate his own work, for example, his “state of
nature” metaphor to elaborate a thesis about anarchy.
34. Cooper is not an unqualified supporter of Black, it should be noted,
observing that Black ignores situations in which metaphors are used
not to generate theory, but rather, to merely give expression to the-
ories that have already been formulated and accepted. See Cooper
(149).
35. Boyd (359) gives as some examples metaphors of “‘worm-holes’ in
general relativity, the description of the spatial localization of bound

204 N ot e s
electrons in terms of an ‘electron cloud,’ [and] the description of

atoms as ‘miniature solar systems.’ ”
36. Brown (28) cites Thomas Kuhn (1993, 539), who observes that
theory change can be brought about by changes in the metaphors
that aid scientists in their conceptualizations of nature. For additional
thoughts on the role of metaphors in science, see also Hesse (1966,
1972, 1980), Arbib and Hesse (1986), Haack (1987–1988).
37. Brown’s thesis can also be observed in the social sciences. In inter-
national relations examples can be found in the form of evolutionary
theories of change (borrowed, of course, from evolutionary biology)
and George Modelski’s theory of “long cycles” (borrowed from the
study of large-scale systems such as climatology, annual seasons, and
the life-cycle of animate beings). See Modelski (1987).
38. For additional observations on metaphors in physics, see Stahl (1987).
39. For similar statements on the usefulness of metaphors in theorizing,
see Nisbet (1969, 4) and Geertz (1993, 211), both quoted in Little
(2007, 33).
40. Similar sentiments are expressed by Barbour (1974), Zashin and
Chapman (1974), Barnes (1996).
41. On the limited utility of old metaphors, see Steiner (1975, 21),
quoted in Little (2007, 34).
42. Philip Eubanks (2000, 136) offers a variation on this view, writing,
DEMO
“we cannot sufficiently analyze a conceptual metaphor without taking
into account the intellectual habits, conventional values, and points
of controversy that unite communities around particular topics and
communicative occasions.”
43. Miller cites Ricoeur (1977) as being influential in his development of
the “manifestationist view.”
44. The role of narrative in international relations was highlighted by
an anonymous reviewer of this book. I am greatly indebted to the
reviewer for bringing to my attention this key element in analyzing
the role of metaphors in international relations theory.
45. The relationship between narrative and metaphor is spelled out by
Mark Johnson (1993, 154): “Narratives make use of other imagina-
tive framing devices (e.g., prototype structure, conceptual metaphor)
which often give us perfectly adequate descriptions of a situation
without rising to the level of narrative unity.”
46. Other scholars have asserted that the study of IR is based on narrative
stories. Franke Wilmer (2003, 223) writes: “IR thinkers and policy
makers . . . rely on the construction and maintenance of a network of
categories, terminologies, and more important, meanings—Foucault
simply calls them ‘notions’ . . . —that are used to create and reproduce
discursive continuity among International Relations storytellers and
a certain structure of power in the relationship between these sto-
rytellers.” Also drawing on Foucault and echoing these sentiments,

N ot e s 205
Jim George (1994, 30) writes, “the process of discursive representa-

tion is never a neutral, detached one but is always imbued with the
power and authority of the namers and makers of reality.”
47. Furthermore, as Polkinghorne (171–172) asserts, “narrative explana-
tions are genuinely explanatory, for they can answer the question of
why something has happened.” For a narrative to be explanatory, “it
should be intelligible in human terms, it should have an appropriately
unified subject matter, and it should be causally related.”
Chapter 3
1. The “anarchy” metaphor has been so prevalent in the field that Brian
Schmidt’s disciplinary history of international relations is titled The
Political Discourse of Anarchy. Schmidt (1998, 1) proclaims on the
first page of his book that anarchy “has served as the core constituent
principle throughout the evolution of the field of international rela-
tions.”
2. In the Leviathan, Hobbes (1962, 100) writes: “Hereby it is manifest,
that during the time men live without a common power to keep them
all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a
war, as is of every man, against every man.” Ironically, as Roger Mas-
DEMO
ters (1964) shows, relations among “primitives” in a “state of nature”
are not characterized by the presumed “anarchy” that is attributed to
them, thus rendering the “state of nature” metaphor questionable to
begin with.
3. “States, like people, are insecure in proportion to the extent of their
freedom. If freedom is wanted, insecurity must be accepted” (Waltz
1979, 112).
4. For an extensive discussion of the “primitives in a state of nature”
metaphor in international relations, see Jahn (2000, especially
Chapter 8). The scholars Jahn identifies as embracing the metaphor
of primitives in a state of nature include Waltz (1959), Bull (1977),
Hoffman (1981), and Doyle (1983).
5. Wight suggests that one “way of pursuing the enquiry would be
to take a definition of a state-system and refine it.” To that end
he draws on the works of Monatgue Bernard, who defines state-
system as “a group of states having relations more or less permanent
with one another” (Wight, 22, referring to Bernard with no source
given), and A. H. L. Heeren’s 1846 A Manual of the History of the
Political System of Europe and its Colonies, which Wight (22) quotes
(with no reference to the page number in the Heeren original) offer-
ing a definition of state-system as “the union of several contiguous
states, resembling each other in their manners, religion, and degree
of social improvement, and cemented together by a reciprocity of
interests.”

206 N ot e s
6. Kaplan’s six international systems are “(1) the ‘balance of power’

system, (2) the loose bipolar system, (3) the tight bipolar system,
(4) the universal system, (5) the hierarchical system in its directive
and non-directive forms, and (6) the unit veto system” (21).
7. While the meaning of “system” is in dispute, so too are modifier terms
and the scope of what “systemic” relations include. Many scholars uti-
lize the expression “international system” that is made up of states.
The phrase “global system” and the “world system” also have cur-
rency in the field, and the “international” system, the “global” system,
and the “world” system can comprise actors aside from states.
8. Martin Wight (1977) supposed that there could be multiple interna-
tional systems or one international system depending on the potential
for cultural differentiation (or lack thereof) among systems of states.
9. In some ways, “system” in international relations provides the same
metaphorical function as “universe” in cosmology: Both terms define
a context relative to something else. “The” universe in cosmology is
that which is deemed knowable, although physicists now agree that
some other universes may exist. Likewise, scholars of international
relations speak of “the” international system, although there may be
other systems including regional systems within “the” international
system.
10. This problem is in many ways the impetus for much systemic theoriz-
DEMO
ing. In his effort to effect systemic theories of international relations,
Morton Kaplan (1957, 4) confronts the fact that “any set of specified
variables may be considered a system.”
11. Elsewhere Wendt (314) includes other metaphorical aspects of struc-
ture, for example, “deep” structure of international politics.
12. In a critique of Waltzian Neorealism, Robert Cox (1986, 218) opines
that structure comprises “three categories of forces (expressed as
potentials) [that] interact in a structure.” These forces are “mate-
rial capabilities, ideas and institutions.” Cox (217) asserts that unlike
structure in Neorealism, the configuration of structure in Marxist
analysis “does not determine actions in any direct, mechanical way but
imposes pressures and constraints.” While the composition of struc-
ture for Neorealism and Marxism may be different, from a metaphor-
ical perspective the “mechanical determinism” of Neorealism and the
“pressures” and “constraints” of Marxism sound very similar.
13. For other approaches to verticality and horizontality in international
politics see, for example, Modelski (1987), (2004, 135–151).
14. Of course, the metaphorical notion of hierarchy as an ordering prin-
ciple is much older than the contemporary study of international
relations. See, for example, Arthur Lovejoy’s elaboration on hierar-
chy in Medieval thought in the aptly metaphorically titled The Great
Chain of Being (1953).
15. This emphasis on territorial space in theories of international relations
is lessening in recent years. As Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach

N ot e s 207
(2004, 67) point out: “Political space refers to the ways in which iden-
tities and loyalties among adherents to various polities are distributed
and related, and territorial space is only one of the possibilities.”
16. Wight cites Collier (1989, 85) as his source for the distinction
between “structure” and “structuratum.”
17. “Structure” as a noun and a verb comes from the same Latin root
structūra, “to build.” The neologism “structuratum,” made up as it is
as a variation on “structure,” entails the same metaphorical expression
of the conceptual mapping of building, construction, and the spatial
organizations and arrangements they imply.
18. Wight (218–219) disagrees, writing a “structuratum, we might say,
emerges out of the various structures that make it up, and it has a
concrete existence, whilst a structure, as a set of relations, is abstract”
(emphasis added), and adds that even “structures” “are abstract only
in the sense that they exist as relations between their relata. They still,
however, possess causal power.” Wight asserts this because, as a sci-
entific realist, he accepts that “relations really exist, independently of
our concept of them.” As I will discuss at further length in the con-
cluding chapter of this book, mind independence of social relations is
a debatable proposition. Wight uses “structure” and “structuratum”
to metaphorically express his conceptual mapping of social relations in
terms of spatial organization and arrangement. Since there are other
DEMO
ways of physically experiencing, conceptually mapping, and metaphor-
ically expressing social relations, “structure” and “structuratum” are
just one way of metaphorically depicting physical experiences that are
cognitively processed in one’s head.
19. This concept is expressed subtly in the subtitle of William Schinkel’s
2009 book Globalization and the State, which reads Sociological Per-
spectives on the State of the State (emphasis added) as well as Erik
Ringmar’s (1996) article “On the Ontological Status of the State”
(emphasis added).
20. On the state envisioned in bodily terms see, for example, Luoma-aho
(2009). Theories of “corporatism” also rest on the corporeal body
metaphor.
21. This theme is expanded and elaborated on by Hindess (2006, 244)
and Vaughan-Williams (2008, 325–326).
22. Spaces between borders also can be imagined metaphorically, e.g.,
a “no-man’s land.” See Bennington (1996).
23. For more on Hobbes’ depiction of the polity as enclosed behind walls,
see Campbell (1998, 60). In the practice of contemporary foreign pol-
icy, the “container” perhaps is most closely associated with the Cold
War policy of “containment” (see Kennan, 1947). For a discussion of
the evolution of containment policy and its relationship to metaphors,
see Chilton (1996, 133–153, 190–202).
24. Anssi Paasi (1999, 73) states that “as a power container [a state]
strives to preserve existing boundaries . . . As a wealth container, a

208 N ot e s
state will strive to enlarge its territory,while conversely, as a cul-

tural container it will tend towards smaller territories, although it
will concomitantly aim to maintain the national identity space and,
linked with the economic space, this may again presuppose a larger
territory.”
25. Thus, for example, in his discussion of “domestic” forces in the for-
mulation of foreign economic policy, Peter Katzenstein (1978, 22)
observes that the “management and the analysis of interdependence
must start at home” (emphasis added). For another discussion of the
“home” metaphor implied by “domestic politics,” see Fierke (1997,
226–227).
26. As Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little (1993, 205–206)
point out, the metaphorical treatment of the state as an individual can
be traced back to the writings of sociologists and anthropologists such
as Marcel Mauss.
27. Some scholars use the terms “actor,” “individual,” and “person”
interchangeably to characterize the state in international relations.
28. Wendt’s effort to scientifically establish a personhood of the state
answers previous criticisms of the state-as-actor thesis which argue that
this thesis is based on untested assumptions. See, for example, Ashley
(1984, 238–242).
29. Wendt (1999, 328) has also claimed that states have metaphori-
30. DEMO
cal “bodies” which are “a function of shared ideas supervening on
biology.”
It is worth noting that the voters of the Netherlands voted against the
EU constitution the same year as the voters of France. However, since
the constitution required unanimous approval by all EU states, a veto
from a single state would render the constitution unratified. Thus, any
single state acting alone could derail the ratification process.
31. It is worth remembering that “corporate entity” is itself a metaphor
imputing human qualities to inanimate objects since “corporate” is
rooted in the Latin corpus meaning “body.”
32. As a footnote, it is interesting to note that the Indo-European sek
also gives rise to the modern English word “sect.” Hence “society”
and “sect” are in many ways metaphorical derivations of the notion of
“following” one or more individuals. Hence, in etymological terms,
both sects and societies comprise “followers.”
33. If one can talk metaphorically about international “society,” then one
can also theorize that metaphorical international “socialization” also
takes place. Checkel (2007, 5) defines socialization as “a process
of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given commu-
nity.” On international socialization, see also Ikenberry and Kupchan
(1990), Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel (2006).
34. Buzan points out that there is some confusion over these terms, for
example, in the works of Martin Wight (e.g., Wight 1977) “who

N ot e s 209
used the term ‘systems of states’ to mean what is now meant by

international society” (Buzan 1993, 331).
35. Buzan (1993, 340–341) reinforces this formulation, averring that
one can “imagine an anarchic international system before any societal
development takes place: pure system, no society.”
36. “We are choosing an approach when we choose to speak of world
society and not international relations. The study of world society is
a much wider study than the relations of units within it” (Burton
1972, 19).
37. Some treatments of “international,” “global,” and “world” society
treat these concepts as involving all the world’s people joined together
in common purpose aside from, despite, or as an adjunct to whatever
relations exist among states. Therefore, whether international society,
global society, and world society are metaphors or literal expressions
of discrete human individuals joined together with a common culture
is a somewhat murky issue. For two related pieces that seemingly treat
world or global “society” both as a literal joining of discrete individ-
uals and a metaphor using systems theory, see Helmig and Kessler
(2007) and Jaeger (2007).
38. There are, of course, many definitions of “society” in international
relations. Christian Reus-Smit (1997, 584), who advances what he
calls a “new Constructivist theory” of international relations, defines
39.
DEMO
“society” in a way similar to Bull: “All historical societies of states
have begun as gemeinschaft societies, as communities of states linked
by common sentiment, experience, and identity.”
Only the third definition of “community” in the American Her-
itage Dictionary (383) makes mention of a “group of people having
common interests.” The first two definitions are generic descriptions
merely of a group of individuals living together.
40. This debate was raised in a special issue of Foreign Policy
(no. 132, September-October 2002) with no resolution to the que-
stion.
Chapter 4
1. It should be noted that the “unit-of-analysis” rubric does not avoid
spatial metaphors either. In discussing units of analysis, Barry Buzan
(1995, 204) notes that units of analysis are arrayed on a “spatial scale
(small to large, individual to system).”
2. Linking the levels idea to Kant, Onuf (198–202) observes that in
thinking about levels in other disciplines, the metaphor of “levels”
to conceptually divide a subject in some cases was chosen with little
reflection on its metaphorical significance relative to other concep-
tual systems for making analytical distinctions. For example, Onuf
(201) points out that at different times Herbert Simon (1962, 1973)

210 N ot e s
suggests both the metaphors of “levels” and “nesting” to capture the

meanings of hierarchy. See also Onuf (1995).
3. For Singer and Wolfers the two levels of analysis are the international
system and the state. Waltz adds to this the level of the individual.
Jervis’ fourth level of analysis is bureaucratic processes. Rosenau’s fifth
level is achieved by dividing the state into society and intermediating
institutions. Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998, 5–6) also list five
levels of analysis (at which military, environmental, economic, social,
and political affairs take place), but specify them as international sys-
tems, international subsystems, units, subunits, and individuals. For
another view, see Moravcsik (1993, 34–35, n. 3). Even more levels of
analysis can be identified by carving out distinctions within the main
three levels of analysis typically associated with Waltz’s division of the
international system, the state, and the individual. See, for example,
Yalem (1977), Andriole (1978), Mouritzen (1980), Holis and Smith
(1990), North (1990).
4. Although Singer does not address this directly, the “black box”
metaphor of which he writes does more than simply treat the state
as a unitary actor by concealing the preferences and actions of domes-
tic actors. On a more fundamental level it enshrines state sovereignty
in systemic theories of international relations by casting the state as
an unproblematic political authority mediating between the presumed
DEMO
anarchy of international relations and the purported tranquility of
domestic politics. For critiques of metaphorical images of states as
“boxes” or “containers” see, for example, Walker (1990, 17–18),
Ferguson and Mansbach (2004, 31–32, 84–85).
5. For a critique of spatial theorizing in international relations, see, for
example, Rodgers (2003).
6. On the “bridge” metaphor between levels of analysis, see Caporaso
(1997).
7. Although, as Colin Wight (2006, 109) points out, when Patomäki
admits that there are levels that can be interpenetrated in the first place
he “seems to be redesrcibing the problem rather than addressing it.”
Wight’s (111–112) solution is to treat levels “as ‘levels-of-being’ that
require further disaggregating into their component parts,” which
include content, setting, situated activity, and self-agent. Ironically,
Wight (112) ultimately accepts Patomäki’s metaphor, stressing that
relationships sketched out in his diagram “shade and interweave with
each other: Patomäki’s interpenetration.”
8. McCoy refers to Yanow (1993, 57).
9. See also Walker (1990, especially 14–20), Luke (1991, especially
316), and Manning (2000, especially 53).
10. In particular, I argue that prisons represent a distinct “level” of dan-
gerous activity “below” the state, much as international relations is
said to occupy a realm of danger “above” it.

N ot e s 211
11. Scālae itself is a metaphor with its etymological roots in the Indo-
European skand-, meaning “to leap” or “climb” (American Heritage
Dictionary, 2124).
12. Lawson’s micro-, meso-, and macro-level explanations should not
be confused with James Rosenau’s micro- and macro-level actors in
which micro-level actors include citizens and members, officials and
leaders, and private actors while macro-level actors include states,
subgroups, transnational organizations, leaderless publics, and move-
ments. See Rosenau (1990, 118–137). This typology leads Rosenau
(152–153) to suggest replacing levels of analysis with what he calls
“levels of aggregation,” which “distinguishes between macro and
micro levels by the form, structure, or scope of the aggregated enti-
ties: the least encompassing, and most concrete of them are treated as
micro phenomena, while others are placed at the macro level. In other
words, the macro – micro distinction is a dichotomy between the
smallest units out of which world politics can emanate and larger
units.”
13. Obviously, examinations of the philosophical relationship between
agent and structure (or other formulations stating the concept) did
not begin with Wendt, as Wendt himself observes. However, for the
purposes of tracking its development in international relations theory,
Wendt’s opening salvo is a logical starting point.
DEMO
14. Echoing Wendt, Walter Carlsnaes (1992, 246) writes that the agent –
structure problem in international relations coincides with the “his-
torical development of seemingly intractable dichotomies between
‘individual and society,’ ‘action and structure,’ ‘actor and system,’
‘part and whole,’ ‘individualism and holism,’ ‘micro and macro,’ ‘vol-
untarism and determinism,’ ‘subjectivism and objectivism,’ and so
forth [that] has at present evolved into what is often claimed to con-
stitute the central problem in social and political theory” (emphasis
in the original). Colin Wight (2006, 105) disagrees with Wendt and
Carlsnaes that “micro – macro” is simply different terminology from
“agent – structure” writing, “the micro – macro distinction differs
from the agent – structure problem in that the agent – structure
problem is concerned with the character of social reality whereas the
micro – macro problem is concerned with a particular aspect of the
predefined social reality that is selected for consideration.”
15. Ken Booth’s definitions of “agent” in the agent – structure debate
echoes the dictionary definition: “An agent is defined as a person or
group capable of making things happen” (Booth 2007, 215).
16. Wight and I would appear to be in agreement here. Wight (222)
writes that “the state appears as a complex ensemble of competing
forces which offer unequal chances to groups within and outside the
state to act for differing political purposes,” hence, “agency is not
agent-specific” (ibid., 293). However, while Wight refers to groups

212 N ot e s
and individuals that act as “agents,” I would argue that since actors’
actions, pace Enloe, are not necessarily always undertaken by groups
and individuals who are witting in their actions, dispensing with the
metaphor of “agent” eliminates the need to potentially erroneously
infer their agential intent from their active behavior.
17. Wight (198) forcefully rejects the “personification theory” of the state
since such a theory “accords human agency no role, because the state
now takes on the properties of human agency and the real human
agents that act in the world are theoretically redundant” (emphasis in
the original). Like Enloe, Wight focuses attention on individuals who
act, and then opens a discussion of their agency. As I mention previ-
ously, a reflection on human agency is a welcome endeavor. However,
as a metaphor in the agent – structure debate it shifts the focus to pur-
posefulness of action, including the actions of the state, thus needlessly
opening up a dialogue Wight himself sees as misleading in its focus.
Wight (ibid.) writes: “If the agent – structure problem is resolved
by acceding agential status to the state, then the concern to navigate
between individualism and structuralism is not addressed but simply
displaced.” I would argue that the metaphor of “agency” itself does
just that, despite the best of intentions of scholars who use the term.
18. A version of evolutionary theorizing about international politics is
offered by Ferguson and Mansbach (2004, 107) who, although
DEMO
preferring “becoming” over “evolving” paint a picture based on
evolutionary metaphors: “All polities are evolving (‘becoming’ in
our terminology) and, while some endure, none lasts anything like
‘forever.’ Yet both individual polities and polity types rarely disap-
pear completely; rather, they remain as a part of the world’s ‘living
museum,’ sometimes as an historical oddity or an exhibit that sooner
or later may go back on show or be reconstructed in one fashion or
another.”
19. Modelski (331) writes that conscious “socialization” and “training”
are also part of this conscious process of evolution.
20. Furthermore, norms can enter a system not as biological genetic
change does by means of random mutation but “through the efforts
of a ‘norm entrepreneur,’ an individual or organization that sets out
to change the behavior of others” (Florini, 375). For an additional
statement on the evolution metaphor and norms, see Axelrod (1986).
21. This is not necessarily surprising since Wendt has been influenced
by Nicholas Onuf’s World of Our Making (1989), the title of which
suggests that political realities can be “made” much in the way that
natural selection brings about the re-“production” of states and other
political entities and practices.
22. To highlight the way metaphors generate understandings about inter-
national relations, one could engage in a thought experiment to
imagine how one would view the “structure” of international relations
as opposed to how one would view the “nature” of international

N ot e s 213
relations. The former metaphor suggests that international rela-

tions is “constructed” of something (“structures”), while the latter
invites organic metaphors that characterize international relations (its
“nature”). The contrast between organic and mechanistic metaphors
in international relations theory is explored in greater depth in
Chapter 8.
23. Constructivism’s metaphorical label makes sense given Construc-
tivists’ preoccupation with language as a source of understanding.
As the Constructivists Vendulka Kubálková, Nicholas Onuf, and Paul
Kowert (1998, 19) observe: “We use language to represent the world
to ourselves, just as we have always thought, and we use language
quite deliberately to bring our representations of the world—as we
think it is and as we want it to be—to bear upon that world. Lan-
guage is the most powerful tool available to us for social construction
as an ongoing, largely unpremeditated activity in which everyone is
inevitably and perpetually engaged.” Indeed, Kubálková, Onuf, and
Kowert put their money where there mouth is, devoting much of the
introductory chapter to their coedited book to a discussion of the
“forest” metaphor of international relations and what it implies about
the ontological, epistemological, and methodological choices of Con-
structivism and the other main paradigms in the study of international
relations. See also Onuf (1998a).
DEMO Chapter 5
1. This account is summarized in Little (2007, 43). See more on the
early history of the language of the balance of power on pages
43–45 in Little. While origins of the balance of power concept in
Renaissance Italy are traced out by Little and others, Daniel Deudney
(2007) observes that the contemporary theory of the balance of power
also has roots in republican political philosophy.
2. Sheehan refers to Savigear (1978, 41).
3. See also Alker, Biersteker, and Inoguchi (1989, 139), Anderson
(1993, 168), Sheehan (1996, 82).
4. Vagts cites a New York Times article of April 20, 1948 in his quotes
from the medical expert in question.
5. Dimitrios Akrivoulis (2008, 21) disputes the suggestion that
Morgenthau articulates a “scales” metaphor of the balance of power,
writing “as the old system of European power politics has given way to
Cold War bipolarity, the old metaphor of a fragile, uncertain equilib-
rium produced by the wavering balance of scales has been replaced by
the Newtonian metaphor of a bipolar and gravitational international
system . . . In this system, state-politics are fixed like planetary move-
ments and regulated by measurable state-interests, as if they followed
calculable orbits in a cosmos (international system)” (Akrivoulis cites
pages 343–345 and 351 of the fifth edition of Morgenthau’s Politics

214 N ot e s
Among Nations). While it is true that Morgenthau invokes planetary

metaphors, it is also the case, as has been demonstrated, that his the-
ory of the balance of power relies on a variety of mixed metaphors,
and thus accommodates both the “scales” and Newtonian metaphors
referenced in Akrivoulis’ essay.
6. For more on the incomplete nature of Morgenthau’s thesis, see Little
(2007, Chapter 4).
7. For example, in formulating what he calls a “new Constructivist the-
ory” of international society, Christian Reus-Smit (1997, 555) asserts
that “fundamental institutions” are what shape international society
and “transcend changes in the balance of power,” which is a tacit
admission that there is a balance of power even though, apparently, it
is subordinate to other elementary forces.
8. The “balance of power” metaphor has also been contrasted with other
metaphorical states of international relations, for instance, metaphor-
ical “concerts.” See, for example, Jervis (1986). On the relation-
ship of the balance metaphor with concepts of peace, see Schäffner
(1995).
9. Walt (1987, 17) says that he has borrowed the term “bandwagoning”
from Kenneth Waltz (1979, 126) who credits the term to Stephen
Van Evera. Walt also refers to Arnold Wolfers (1962, 122–124) who
uses a similar terminology. However, as Randall Schweller points out,
DEMO
the origins of the term “bandwagoning” have been confused over the
years. It is Schweller (1997, 928, n. 1) who reveals that the term origi-
nated with Quincy Wright’s A Study of War (1942) and that the term
was later used in Arnold Wolfers’ Discord and Collaboration (1962)
before Waltz erroneously credited Van Evera with coining the term.
10. What qualifies as a “threat” is subject to debate, of course, so to
clarify the concept Walt employs additional metaphors, including the
metaphor of “birds of a feather flocking together (and flying apart)”
as a means of illustrating ideological aspects of alliance formation
(Walt, 33).
11. Among notable works focusing on bandwagoning are Larson (1991),
Snyder (1991), Kaufman (1992), and Schroeder (1994).
12. That most of these definitions involve two ends of an axis is accounted
for etymologically given the origin of the word “pole” in the Greek
polos, meaning “axis” or “sky.” The definition of “polarity” is similar
to the definition of “pole” given their common etymological origins:
“1. Intrinsic polar separation, alignment, or orientation, especially of
a physical property. 2. An indicated polar extreme. 3. The possession
or manifestation of two opposing attributes, tendencies, or principles”
(American Heritage Dictionary, 1400).
13. The term “bloc” itself obviously is a metaphor, derived as it is from
the old French block (before that, Old High German bloh) which pro-
duced the modern English word of the same spelling. Metaphorically,

N ot e s 215
“block” meaning a “set of like items” (which gives rise to the political
meaning contained in the word spelled “bloc”—a “group of nations,
parties, or persons united for common action”) has its origins in
meanings of “block” as a physical object (such as a “solid piece of hard
substance, such as wood, having one or more flat sides”) that is char-
acterized by intact physical integrity (American Heritage Dictionary,
203).
14. “Uni-” is from the Latin “ūnus,” meaning “one;” “pole” is from the
Greek “polos,” meaning “axis” or “sky.”
15. Almost by definition a metaphor must rest on a simple concept the
meaning of which is extended to something potentially more complex.
Thus, for example, many metaphors in the English language start with
parts of the human body (things that are innately evident and simple
for people to understand) that are then used to express something
more complicated and abstract. For instance, the abstract concept of
the position of the leader of a country is expressed metaphorically as
the “head” of state.
16. See, for example, Little (2007, 216) who appears to use these terms
interchangeably.
17. The Oxford English Dictionary give’s Nye’s 1990 book Bound to Lead
(Nye 1990a) as the first written reference to “hard power” and “soft
power,” on pages 33 and 188, respectively. However, in these ref-
18.
DEMO
erences the terms are used without being specifically defined. Nye
explicitly defines “hard power” and “soft power” in his 1990 article
in Foreign Policy (Nye 1990b).
Later in the discussion Nye (1990b, 167) uses “soft” and “hard”
as modifiers, referring to the terms “soft co-optive power” and
“hard command power.” On the same page Nye also refers to what
he calls “co-optive power . . . and soft power resources” (emphasis
added). Other metaphors also enter into Nye’s discussion, for exam-
ple, “power,” presumably of both the “soft” and “hard” variety is
referred to metaphorically as “leverage” (ibid., 156).
19. For recent examples of studies of “soft power,” see, for example, Datta
(2009), Miller (2009).
20. Nye (166) also relies on secondary metaphors to illustrate the com-
ponents of “soft power,” for example, treating states’ ability to spread
their ideology or engage in agenda setting metaphorically as the
influence parents have over their children.
21. Paul (ibid.) adds that “soft balancing is often based on a limited arms
buildup, ad hoc cooperative exercises, or collaboration in regional or
international institutions; these policies may be converted to open,
hard-balancing strategies if and when security competition becomes
intense and the powerful state becomes threatening.” For more on
soft balancing see, for example, Brooks and Wohlforth (2005), Pape
(2005), and Paul (2005).

216 N ot e s
22. “They, who are eager, on every Occasion, to prostitute her [Great
Britain’s] Dignity, to pawn her Purse, and to sacrifice her Com-
merce, by entangling Her not only too much with the other great
Powers of Europe, from whom she may sometimes want reciprocal
Engagements, but even with those diminutive Powers, from whom it
would be ridiculous to expect any” (Bolingbroke 1735, 11).
23. In the title of his book, Fox (1944) lists the United States, Britain,
and the Soviet Union as “Super-Powers,” although in most contem-
porary usages only the United States and the USSR are identified with
the term.
Chapter 6
1. Determining what needs to be “secured” is a matter for both schol-
ars and policymakers alike. As this book is concerned with metaphors
in international relations theory and not the practice of international
security itself, this chapter will concern itself with the former instead of
the latter. As far as the latter is concerned, scholars working within the
“Copenhagen School” in international relations theory have detailed
the ways in which “speech-acts” on the part of state representatives
can “securitize” an issue. See, for example, Wæver et al. (1993),
DEMO
Wæver (1995), Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998), Williams (2003).
2. Chilton (61) also sees a relationship between “securing” something
and keeping it “stable,” as well as a connection between “security” and
the metaphor of “containers,” which is common in conceptualizations
of state sovereignty in which states are “contained” within “secure”
territorial borders. Likewise, Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998, 26)
write that the process of “securitization” involves a “rhetorical struc-
ture” focusing on, among other things, “survival” and “priority of
action.” For Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, “securitzation” can thus
involve matters beyond military affairs. For additional critical analyses
of the meanings of “security,” see the chapters in Krause and Williams
(1997).
3. The categorization of international security as “high” politics and
international economic relations as “low” politics has been challenged
by scholars of international relations. See, for example, Ripsman
(2005).
4. It is probably not accidental that the founders of the “League” of
Nations envisioned the organization as a form of alliance in which
member states were obliged to come to the defense of fellow member
states the sovereignty of which was under attack.
5. Christensen and Snyder’s image of allies chained together should
not be confused with Thomas Schelling’s similar, although theo-
retically distinct, metaphorical image of mountain climbers chained
together who may be tempted to intimidate each other by playing a
metaphorical game of “brinkmanship.” See Schelling (1966, 99–105).

N ot e s 217
6. It is indicative of the historical context of words that among the syn-

onyms listed for satellite state in Roget’s Thesaurus (87) are terms
from earlier historical eras including “free city,” “territory,” “pos-
session,” “colony,” “settlement,” “protectorate,” “mandate,” and
“buffer state.”
7. The Latin cliēns itself comes from the Indo-European root prefix klei-,
which means “to lean” (American Heritage Dictionary, 2109). Thus,
a follower or dependent individual is one who metaphorically leans on
another.
8. Orwell used the term “cold war” to describe relations between a
hypothetical state resembling the Soviet Union and other countries.
A 1938 headline in The Nation referred to “Hitler’s Cold War.”
On the use of the term la guerra fría to describe relations between
the Christian and Islamic words, see García Arias (1956).
9. Baruch declared: “Let us not be deceived—we are today in the midst
of a cold war. Our enemies are to be found abroad and at home. Let
us never forget this: Our unrest is the heart of their success. The peace
of the world is the hope and the goal of our political system; it is the
despair and defeat of those who stand against us” (quoted in Platt
1989, 48).
10. The term “war on” produces 133,000,000 hits in a Google search
including such wars as the “war on want,” the “war on greed,”
DEMO
the “war on Christmas,” the “war on ALS” (Lou Gehrig’s dis-
ease), the “war on fat,” and the “war on religion,” among other
things against which people have metaphorically declared war. The
phrase “war against” turns up a similarly large number of Google hits
(55,500,000) including a Time magazine article about efforts by uni-
versity administrators to crack down on drinking games on campus
entitled “The War Against Beer Pong” (Time, July 31, 2008).
11. What is left out of the phrase “war on terrorism” is any sense of the
political or other aims for which war or terrorism is waged, but this
is a conversation left for other inquiries since war or terrorism waged
one against another has no meaning unless Clausewitz is completely
wrong and humans enter into organized and prolonged armed conflict
for no reason whatsoever.
12. For a critique of the “war on terrorism” metaphor, see Sarbin (2003).
13. The desirability of “stability” itself engages a metaphorical question.
In international relations theory “stability” is often considered some-
thing desirable (see Chilton 1996, 61) since “instability” implies the
potential for erratic behavior among international actors or systemic
violence. In fact, “stability” and “stable” are defined by the dictio-
nary primarily to mean in one way or another “resistant to change”
(American Heritage Dictionary, 1748–1749). Uses of the terms “sta-
ble,” “stability,” and “instability” in international relations theory are
thus to a certain extent metaphorical. What is seen as desirable, sys-
temic “stability,” is in fact an expression of the benefits that accrue

218 N ot e s
when the system is resistant to change understood as a the absence

of anything that would disrupt the status quo. Whether this would
have benefits for certain actors versus others is relatively unexamined
in light of this metaphorical construction of the concept.
14. As noted, thirteenth-century Spanish thinkers coined the term la
guerra fría to describe the uneasy coexistence between Christianity
and Islam.
15. See also Chilton (1996, 124).
16. A Google search of the terms “world’s policeman United States” turns
up 65,500,000 references.
17. Haass’ Hollywood western imagery of the sheriff extends to chapters
in his book with titles such as “Foreign Policy by Posse.”
18. The Fund for Peace Failed State Index comprises twelve indicators:
Demographic Pressures, Refugees/IDPs, Group Grievance, Human
Flight, Uneven Development, Economic Decline, Delegitimization
of the State, Public Services, Human Rights, Security Apparatus,
Factionalized Elites, and External Intervention. See http://www.
fundforpeace.org/web/ (last modified, September 26, 2010). Robert
Rotberg (2004) also offers a list of indicators of failed states.
19. An example of this is found in Robert Bates’ When Things Fell Apart:
State Failure in Late-Century Africa (2008), in which the term “state
failure” is at no point defined.
20.
DEMO
There is an interesting discussion (which space does not permit here)
that could be had of the metaphorical language scholars use of states
that “lose” sovereignty, which begs the question of whether losing
sovereignty is comparable to, say, “losing” one’s keys, “losing” one’s
spouse, or “losing” one’s virginity, just to mention three forms of loss.
21. To extend this metaphor, there have been many successful individ-
uals throughout human history who have not experienced academic
success. Had their teachers not seen them as “failures,” perhaps their
paths to success would have been even more noteworthy than they
already are.
22. It probably doesn’t help matters that state “strength,” “weakness,”
and “failure” are supplemented by measures of metaphorical state
“fragility” and state “collapse.” But inasmuch as very little in the study
of international relations does not combine some set of metaphori-
cal images this is simply par for the course (metaphorically speaking).
On state “fragility,” see for example, USAID (2006). On state “col-
lapse,” see, for example, Zartman (1995), Menkhaus (2004), Rotberg
(2004).
23. I would like to thank Jonneke Koomen for alerting me to the ways
that violence can be used as a metaphor in the study of international
relations.
24. Galtung (1969, 171) writes, “when one husband beats his wife there
is a clear case of personal violence, but when one million husbands
keep one million wives in ignorance there is structural violence.”

N ot e s 219
25. On the other hand, there is also a certain logic to having words
that apply to all sorts of violence including war, terrorism, and the
harm that is caused by economic and structural violence. Adriana
Cavarero (2009) suggests “horrorism” as an overarching expression
for multiple forms of violence that have existed throughout human
history.
26. Specifically, the metaphors “hawk” and dove” were used in an article
in the December 8, 1962, issue of The Saturday Evening Post in which
it was mentioned that, with regard to the Kennedy administration’s
reaction to the Cuban Missile Crisis, “the hawks favored an air strike
to eliminate the Cuban missile bases . . . The doves opposed the air
strikes and favored a blockade” (Oxford English Dictionary).
27. Additionally, “hawk” and “dove” are later made synonymous with
two other metaphors, “hard-liner” and “soft-liner,” respectively
(Schultz, 9).
28. Vultures and buzzards are scavengers while hawks are bird of prey.
Both scavenging and predation could be said to be related metaphor-
ical qualities of certain types of states, and sometimes making
the distinction between the two is precisely a process of allowing
metaphorical concepts to dictate theoretical propositions.
29. So common are animal metaphors that Robert Palmatier (1995) has
compiled an entire dictionary of animal metaphors, any number of
DEMO
which could be used to theorize about states and other international
actors and their qualities in the realm of international security.
30. Likewise, Thomas Preston’s book on world security and biological
and nuclear weapons is entitled From Lambs to Lions (2007).
31. Lawrence (BR22) instead argues that “better labels would be ‘real-
ist’ and ‘liberal internationalist,’ which, though hardly the stuff of a
catchy title, capture the core distinction between Kennan’s insistence
on the limits of American capabilities and Nitze’s more optimistic
view.”
32. Meyer (56) lists the following countries as qualifying as “pariah states”
according to his criteria: Cuba (1970–), Israel (1955–), South Africa
(1965–), South Korea (1955–1959), and Taiwan (1975–).
33. The same three states are the focus of the chapters in Lennon and
Eiss (2004). See also Tanter (1998), Caprioli and Trumbore (2003),
Lebovic (2009).
34. Seemingly synonymous in the literature (though less frequently used)
to “rogue states” is “outlaw states,” although the Oxford English
Dictionary definition of “outlaw”—“a person declared to be out-
side the law and deprived of its benefits and protection”—is distinct
from that given for “rogue.” For a work that uses the “outlaw state”
terminology, see Simpson (2004).
35. The dichotomy between “guns” and “butter” has been challenged by
scholars of international relations. See, for example, the chapters in
Dombrowski (2005), especially Ripsman (2005).

220 N ot e s
36. The etymology of the word “clash” is one of onomatopoeia, that is,
to “collide with a loud, harsh, usually metallic noise” (American Her-
itage Dictionary, 352). The use of the word to describe conflict or
opposition thus represents a metaphorical transference of the idea of
loud sounds to the aural manifestations of energetic conflict.
37. Brecher uses “international political earthquake” as a metaphor for
international crisis. Comparing international political earthquakes to
their geological counterparts, Brecher seeks to develop a severity scale,
similar to the Richter Scale, that measures the severity of international
political earthquakes as well as “the impact of political earthquakes
on the landscape of international politics” (Brecher 2008, 2, emphasis
added). A similar tectonic metaphor is contained in the title of Hilary
Charlesworth and Jean-Marc Coicaud’s Fault Lines of International
Legitimacy (2009).
38. On turbulence, see also Rosenau (1997, 55–77).
39. Rosenau’s initial image of “turbulence” relies on a climatological
metaphor, although later in the book (page 53) he observes that
metaphorical turbulence can also refer to stock markets, life stages
(e.g., adolescence), and economic planning.
40. The correspondence between atmospheric turbulence and global
political turbulence is laid out in a table on page 57 of Rosenau’s
book.
DEMO
41. Eight pages later Bull (16) offers a somewhat revised definition of
international order: “By international order is meant a pattern or dis-
position of international activity that sustains those goals of the society
of states that are elementary, primary or universal.”
42. The American Heritage Dictionary (1810) gives several definitions
for “sustain” including the following: “To keep in existence; maintain;
To supply with necessities or nourishment; provide for; To support
from below; keep from falling; prop; To support the spirits, vitality, or
resolution of; encourage.”
43. The English word “order” itself is etymologically a metaphor that
derives from the Latin ōrdō, which comes from the Indo-European
ar-, meaning “to fit together” (American Heritage Dictionary, 2095.)
44. Onuf (158) adds: “The metaphor ‘order’ suggests a stable arrange-
ment comparable to stable arrangements of the physical world, or
nature.”
Chapter 7
1. Game theory was originated by John Von Neumann and Oskar
Morgenstern in their 1944 classic text Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior. As pioneering game theorist Anatol Rapoport (1960, 226)
observes: “[Game] theory can be viewed as a self-contained branch
of pure mathematics—a system of theorems built up from a set of
postulates.”

N ot e s 221
2. In the discussion below I will follow this convention: The names of

game theoretic models will be capitalized as in the game of “Stag
Hunt,” while the metaphors on which these games are based will be
in lower case as in “stag hunt” unless otherwise indicated in quoted
passages from authors who have employed a different naming practice.
3. For examples of the types of metaphors that are employed liberally
throughout game theory in the field of international relations, see
Stein (1990). In his book, Stein discusses a variety of games that are
based on extended metaphors: Deadlock, Prisoners’ Dilemma, Called
Bluff, Protector, Bully, Big Bully, Chicken, Hero, Leader, Chain Store
Paradox, and Critical Risk. Books devoted exclusively to game theory
include many more examples. One such book analyzes over 50 such
games, ranging from The Dr. Strangelove Game and The Samaritan’s
Dilemma to The Little Miss Muffet Game. See Gintis (2000).
4. Portions of this section are adapted from my earlier book The Prison
as Metaphor (2004).
5. Stated succinctly, the classic dilemma posed by traditional inter-
pretations of Prisoner’s Dilemma is as follows: “There is a special
malignancy associated with prisoner’s dilemma because the choice
of dominant strategies leads to outcomes that are undesirable for all
the participants and because efforts to improve the situation through
cooperation are always vulnerable to cheating or defection on the part
DEMO
of individual actors seeking to exploit the goodwill of others for their
own benefit” (Young 1999, 59).
6. Flood, Dresher, and Tucker were thus working in the tradition of
formal theory, in which abstract ideas find expression in mathemati-
cal models that are illustrated with a convenient vocabulary or set of
analogies. See O’Neill (1989, 135), Walt (2000, 5).
7. See also a review of Axelrod’s book in Beer (1986).
8. Prisoner’s Dilemma is occasionally presented as a scientific principle
that has been discovered. See Poundstone (1992, 8–9).
9. For examples of theories that posit cooperation under Prisoner’s
Dilemma, see Axelrod (1984), Lipson (1984), and Oye (1986).
10. For works that question the presumptions of Prisoner’s Dilemma
game, see Jervis (1978), Marks (2004).
11. According to Steven Brams (2000), among the problems that are
endemic to game theory are misspecification of rules, confusing goals,
arbitrary reduction of the multiplicity of equilibria, and a forsaking of
backward induction. See also McGillivray and Smith (2000, especially
815, notes 18 and 19).
12. See, for example, Marks (2004, 56).
13. Even critical interpretations of Prisoner’s Dilemma leave the empirical
assumptions of the game unexamined. See, for example, Kratochwil
(1989, especially 71).
14. A good example of this is provided by Duncan Snidal (1986). In an
effort to tighten up the application of game theory to international

222 N ot e s
relations, Snidal explicitly sets out to formulate a consistent game the-

ory rather than rely on games “merely” as metaphors. In order to
do this, however, the various metaphors within game theory must
embody prior assumptions about international relations. Yet these
assumptions too often are derived from the metaphors themselves,
rather than the experiential bases of these metaphors.
15. Similarly, William Poundstone (1992, 247) uses the metaphor of
predator and prey to describe the nature of the tit for tat strategy.
Another strategy—the so-called grim trigger strategy—generates its
own bellicose metaphors for interaction among agents charged with
cooperation. See McGillivray and Smith (2000).
16. See, for example, Schelling (1958), as well as Rapoport’s (1960,
227–228) discussion of Schelling.
17. Alker (1996, 310) observes:
“Whereas Hobbesian conservatives are likely to identify with the
coercive state apparatus wielded by the district attorney [in the
Prisoner’s Dilemma story], or lament its absence in an ‘anarchic’
world of power politics, liberals will try to paint such ‘anarchy’
in a better light, and leftists will typically emphasize anti-statist,
or anti-exploitation solidarity themes. In either case, choice-linked
narrative protocols greatly facilitate such deliberative construc-
DEMO
tions, deconstructions or reconstructions of the options faced by
states or players in analogously structured situations.”
18. Conclusions about Prisoner’s Dilemma are frequently drawn not from
real prisoners, but from paid volunteers. See Gintis (2000, 103ff.).
19. As Paul Chilton and George Lakoff (1995, 47) observe: “The
game metaphor, taken seriously, makes it seem natural to use the
mathematical theory of games in theorizing about international rela-
tions . . . However, the mathematics does not model real, culturally
embedded games, played with the interaction of calculation and
passion.”
20. Examining the real world of prisoners follows through on Hayward
Alker’s suggestion that games like Prisoner’s Dilemma be told from
alternative points of view than those typically suggested by game theo-
rists. Alker (1996, 311) suggests: “If game play is understood as more
or less skilled, meaning revealing, creative and always play-like perfor-
mances by socialized, responsible and self-monitoring human beings,
then conflicting performative interpretations—with ‘plots’ and casts
of passionately motivated characters should be found in appropriately
represented action descriptions.”
21. Skyrms cites Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature.
22. Grant’s gendered retelling of the stag hunt is supported by research
on the hunting patterns of certain groups of Aboriginal people in
Australia who engage in a division of labor whereby men typically
hunt large animals such as kangaroos that have a low catch rate while

N ot e s 223
women typically hunt smaller animals that are more easily caught. See
Eastwood (2010).
23. “Two-level” games are a subset of “multilevel” games. On mul-
tilevel games, see for example, Axelrod and Keohane (1986,
239–243), Pahre and Papayoanou (1997). Multi-level games can
be found in other areas of political science theory. See, for exam-
ple, O’Donnell and Schmitter’s discussion of “multilayered chess”
as a metaphor for democratic transitions (O’Donnell and Schmitter
1986).
24. Likewise, in the first two headings in the essay Putnam refers to the
metaphorical “entanglements” of domestic and international politics.
25. The concept of “two-level” games within game theoretic approaches
to the study of international relations also opens up other consid-
erations inasmuch as the metaphors of the games themselves are
supplemented by the metaphor of spatial “levels,” which follows
from the classic division of international relations theory according
to metaphorical “levels of analysis.” For an expanded discussion of
the levels of analysis metaphor, see Chapter 4.
26. McCoy refers to Yanow (1993, 57).
27. As Snidal (35) writes: “For game theory to be a theory of inter-
national politics (rather than a general theory of strategic behav-
ior), specific empirical assumptions (correspondences) are required.”
28.
DEMO
Snidal’s admonition notwithstanding, game theorists routinely use
game theoretic scenarios with little or no reference to the analogical
correspondences contained within them.
As Donald McCloskey (1985, 75) points out, even in scientific mod-
els, metaphorical allusions are at the source of assumptions about how
the world works: “The world is said to be ‘like’ a complex model, and
its measurements are said to be like the easily measured proxy vari-
able to hand. The complex model is said to be like a simpler model
for actual thinking, which is in turn like an even simpler model for
calculation.”
29. Ernst Haas observes that the concept of international regimes itself
is fraught with metaphorical implications, for example, spawning
debates between those who subscribe to an organic metaphor of inter-
national regimes and those who follow a mechanical metaphor of
regimes (Haas 1983, 30–52).
30. The word “game” originates in the Old English gamen, meaning
“fun” (American Heritage Dictionary, 744).
31. For a related discussion of how the language of sports and games
enters into the discourse of international relations in practice, see
Shapiro (1989a).
32. In some episodes the pairing took place on stage and was aired during
the show while on other episodes the pairing took place offstage and
did not air as part of the program.

224 N ot e s
33. Statistical data on how contestants behaved at the Trust Box has
been collected and analyzed in a scholarly paper. See Olberholzer-Gee,
Waldfogel, and White (2003).
Chapter 8
1. I use the term “international relations” loosely here since it is a
contemporary expression that should applied only informally when
referring to political, economic, and cultural interactions in the era
predating the emergence of the modern state.
2. For additional observations on medieval conceptions of geography,
see Grant (1994), Bartelson (2010, especially 222–227).
3. The debate over mechanistic versus biological metaphors for the social
sciences can be found in economics as well as international relations
theory. See, for example, Gilpin (1996).
4. A good example of a biological metaphor in contemporary interna-
tional relations theory is Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink’s
(1998) treatment of international norms in terms of norm “life
cycles.”
5. Rosenau supplements the “worlds” metaphor with additional
DEMO
metaphorical images, for example, the spatial metaphor of the two
worlds being either state-“centric” or multi-“centric.” By 2003
Rosenau had expanded his “two worlds of world politics” to 12
worlds, consisting of four local worlds, four global worlds, and four
private worlds. See Rosenau (2003, especially chapters 4–7).
6. The word “world,” like many words in the English language, itself
is a metaphor. In this case the word is derived metaphorically from
the Old High German weralt, meaning “life or age of man,” itself
derived from the Germanic compound of wer- (man) and -ald- (age)
(American Heritage Dictionary, 2133). Thus, the world in the
English language is that place that metaphorically encompasses the
life or age of man.
7. By typing the words “world of” into a Google search one discov-
ers that there are thousands of “worlds” devoted to any number of
endeavors that comprise a shared set of understandings, from the
“world of mathematics,” to the “world of learning,” to the “world
of radio,” to the “world of prevention,” just to name a few. All of
these represent some set of shared understandings that, collectively,
comprise a self-contained, yet metaphorical, “world.”
8. In international relations theory Mathias Albert and Lothar Brock
(1996, 94) use the term “world of states” as a synonym for “inter-
national relations.”
9. The “levels of analysis” metaphor is discussed in greater detail in
Chapter 4.

N ot e s 225
10. Rosenau’s “governance ladder” should not be confused with what he

deems the “ladder of abstraction,” a metaphorical conceptualization
of theories, the higher rungs of which explain categories of phenom-
ena and the lower rungs of which explain concrete manifestations of
those phenomena. See Rosenau (2003, 411–412).
11. Rosenau’s governance ladder is similar to the metaphor of “multi-level
governance” used to study European integration. See, for example,
Marks (1992, 1993), Marks, Hooghe, and Blank (1996), Hooghe
and Marks (2001), Bache and Flinders (2004), Marks and Hooghe
(2004), Piattoni (2010).
12. On the Mobius Strip metaphor, see also Agamben (1998, 31),
Vaughan-Williams (2008, 332–333).
13. In developing this definition Stanislawski relies on descriptions of
transnational criminal organizations as elaborated by Bunker and
Sullivan (2003, 48). For more on “Black Spots” see Pełczyńska-
Nał˛ecz, Strachota, and Falkowski (2008).
14. Ferguson and Mansbach (78–79) are quick to caution that the
neomedievalism metaphor, as useful as it is, can be misleading in
two respects: It suggests that the medieval era was historically unique
(many historical eras, including the Westphalian one, have been
marked by multiple forms of political authority), and it unduly stresses
the distinctions between the medieval era and the Westphalian era
DEMO
that followed. For more on neomedieval theory see, for example,
Anderson (1996).
15. Contained in this vision is the idea that changed circumstances, which
assert that the concept of hard-shelled states that keep the outside out
and the inside in, no longer make sense in a world of multiple types
of international actors (Hill 2000, 168). See also Strange (1997).
16. The neomedieval metaphor sheds light on the increasingly false dis-
tinction between “high” and “low” politics in an age in which
globalizing trends entail linkages between issues pertaining to state
sovereignty and global economic flows. See Deibert (1997, especially
184–187).
17. See, for example, Rosenau (1999, 295). Rosenau’s suggestion of
a “spheres of authority” ontology is similar to Anthony Jarvis and
Albert Paolini’s argument (1995, 4) that international relations has
given way to what they call “world politics,” which they define as “the
multilevel interaction of all actors and groups, characterized by mul-
tiple forms of association, both patterned and unpatterned.” It also
resembles the so-called complex conglomerate system, an image for-
mulated by Richard Mansbach, Yale Ferguson, and Donald Lampert
(1976) to describe an international system comprising a variety of
global actors interacting in the metaphorical “web” of world pol-
itics. See also Haas (1970), Camilleri (1995), Hall and Biersteker
(2002).

226 N ot e s
18. Albert and Brock (1996, 70) describe a process of “debordering,” by

which there emerges “new political spaces that transcend territorially
defined spaces without leading to new territorial demarcations.”
19. Thus, globalizing trends put a squeeze on the state’s ability to regulate
areas as far-ranging as economic exchange, environmental protection,
and the creation of ethnic communities (see Linklater 1998, 30–31).
See also Weller (2000, 67).
20. It should be noted that within political science it is not uncommon
for scholars to speak of a subfield of international “politics.” Yet most
political scientists concede that the practice of international politics
takes place within the wider realm of international “relations,” which
comprises a range of political as well as economic, cultural, social,
artistic and literary, and commercial dealings among international
actors. Thus, it is fair to say that international politics is embedded
within a larger concept of international relations and that political
scientists study international politics within this wider realm.
21. The synonymous nature of the terms “relations” and “sexual inter-
course” was famously and humorously illustrated during a speech by
United States President Jimmy Carter in Poland in which a transla-
tor’s fumble miscommunicated Carter’s desire for positive relations
between the United States and Poland as a wish for sexual intercourse
with the Polish people.
DEMO
22. Agathangelou and Ling cite Gandhi (1990, 348).
23. The six “global actors” in Mansbach, Ferguson, and Lampert’s model
of the “complex conglomerate system” are interstate governmental
actors, interstate nongovernmental actors, nation-state actors, gov-
ernmental noncentral actors, intrastate nongovernmental actors, and
individuals. The four “global tasks” engaged in by these actors are
physical protection, economic development and regulation, residual
public interest tasks, and the fostering of group status. See Mansbach,
Ferguson, and Lampert (1976, 37–45).
Chapter 9
1. As Wendt (1999, 64) puts it, “what scientific realists claim is that the
behavior of things is influenced by self-organizing, mind-independent
structures that constitute those things with certain intrinsic powers
and dispositions.” However, one could argue that, epistemologically,
“scientific realism” itself is a metaphor inasmuch as it is like science,
not literally as such, given that it does not conduct scientific exper-
iments in a way that would be identical to or the equivalent of
science.
2. It is possible to formulate a theory that builds on a series of hypotheses
stated metaphorically. For example, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn
Sikkink (1998) propose a theory of metaphorical “evolution” of

N ot e s 227
metaphorical norm “life cycles” that traces out a chain of metaphori-

cal norm “emergence,” “tipping points” or “thresholds” (involving
metaphorical organizational “platforms”), and “cascades,” before
norms are metaphorically “internalized.” At each stage of the theory
a metaphor is the gauge for measuring the progress of disseminating
international standards of behavior. The proposition that metaphors
are integral to hypothesis testing and theory generation is supported
by Brown (2003).
3. Equating metaphor with “perspective,” Kenneth Burke (1969, 504)
writes that metaphors can form the basis for “experimental or heuristic
purposes.”
4. As Guilhot (300) points out, the early Realist effort to enshrine the
view of international relations as an “art” as opposed to a “science”
ultimately failed in favor of “systemic-structural notions” of IR that
are the legacy of Kenneth Waltz in particular.
5. Brooks (449) points out that Waltz’s view of human nature as moti-
vated by wariness and anxiety is different from Hans Morgenthau’s
view, which sees human nature rooted in aggression. Nonetheless,
both rely on some assumption of human nature as the starting point
for theorizing.
6. As Donald Polkinghorne (1988, 50) points out, in narrative explana-
tion it is the observer, not actors themselves, who attributes signifi-
DEMO
cance to actions. This significance can be represented via metaphor, as
Wendt himself readily admits. On the significance of the location of
the observer for formulating theory, see also Mannheim (1984, 205),
Behr (2010, 223).
7. There are theoretical implications of metaphors, which is an impor-
tant reason to take them seriously. When metaphors are used casually,
they then beg questions about what assumptions have informed the-
oretical projects and empirical research. To take one example, in her
review of an edited volume on the impact of international organiza-
tions in Central and Eastern Europe, Nina Wichmann (2004) points
out that none of the authors in the book undertake an examination of
the book’s metaphorical title, Norms and Nannies (Linden 2002). If a
different metaphor had been used, for example, Wichmann suggests
“educators of adults” rather than “nannies,” a different set of assump-
tions would be indicated and a different research agenda might have
been suggested.
8. As George Lakoff and Mark Turner (1989, 59) observe, even when
“conceptualizations are non-metaphoric this does not mean that they
are mind-free.”
9. To his credit, Rosenau is the rare scholar who confesses up front
that his theoretical analyses are shaped by his personal perspectives.
Rosenau (2003, 405) writes frankly: “It is self-deceptive to believe
that one can be fully objective about the materials one probes. In the

228 N ot e s
absence of perfect information . . . we can never tell the whole story

about a situation, country, political system, or any other phenomena
we seek to explain. Perforce we must select some of their aspects as
important and dismiss others as trivial, and our bases for making these
selections stem from our values and prior experiences, as well as our
expertise. The only way distortions derived from these built-in biases,
premises, or understandings can be minimized is by making them as
explicit as possible.”
10. In fact, “scientific realists” in the social sciences might be disap-
pointed to find out what physical and natural scientists think about
them. Brown (180) writes: “In dealing with problems characterized
by complexity and uncertainties, the physical and natural sciences are
not fundamentally different in character from the social sciences in
their approach to model building and interpretation. The models in
each case are formed from metaphors that reflect embodied and social
experiences, as appropriate.”
11. One way to engage in critical reflection of the ideas IR scholars bring
to the field is to identify the empirical universe that comprises inter-
national relations apart from the metaphors used to conceptualize it.
The work of feminist scholars is particularly useful here, for example,
the work of Cynthia Enloe (1989), who focuses on the everyday acts
of everyday people and encourages scholars to consider that these acts
12.
DEMO
and individuals are or should be the main focus of study in interna-
tional relations. See also Grant and Newland (1991), Peterson (1992),
Tickner (1992, 2001), Sylvester (1994, 2002), Whitworth (1994).
As Jens Bartelson (2010, 223) observes: “Conceptualizing the world
as a spherical object was a precondition of the subsequent division of
that globe into distinct portions by means of geometrical methods,
but also for the subjection of these to exclusive sovereignty claims.”
Today, as Bartelson (232) notes, the territorial claims of sovereignty
have been challenged as new ways of experiencing a spherical planet
lead to new understandings of the location of political authority.
13. For an opposing perspective, see Ghemawat (2007).
14. Among the different ways of visualizing global trends is Richard
Florida’s vision of the world as “spiky,” that is, characterized by cer-
tain geographic regions that represent spikes of economic, scientific,
and technological activity. See Florida (2005).
15. For example, Alexander Wendt (1999, 112) argues in favor of mak-
ing a distinction between the material world and ideas because “they
are constituted as different kinds of independently existing stuff ”
(emphasis added). Wendt goes on to say that the world is separated
into “two kinds of phenomena—in effect, mind and body—and [sci-
entific realism] may be criticized for that reason” but Wendt does “not
see any other way to think about the problem if we are to be scien-
tific realists about social life.” However, as we have seen through the

N ot e s 229
works of scholars of metaphors such as Lakoff and Johnson, the body

and the mind are linked through the metaphorical processing of mate-
rial experiences, and thus there is no getting around the connection
between the material world and ideas.
16. McCloskey (75) also cites Richard Rorty (1979, 12), who claimed
that it “is pictures rather than propositions, metaphors rather than
statements, which determine most of our philosophical convictions.”
DEMO

DEMO

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DEMO

Index
agent – structure debate, 64–9 biological imagery, 83, 166–7
metaphorical aspects, 65, 66–7 holder of the balance of power,
notions of agency, 67–8 87–8
notions of structure, 68–9 mechanical imagery, 83–4, 87,
relationship to macro-/micro 164–6, 167
metaphors, 65 metaphorical aspects, 24, 82–4,
states as agents, 66–8 85, 86, 187
Albright, Madeleine, 7–8 as a myth, 24, 82, 86
ally as a metaphor, 110–11, 112 origins of the term, 82–3
anarchy Realist conceptions, 86–8, 187
DEMO
compared to “civilized” world, relationship to equilibrium, 84,
32–3 86–7
conceptualized as a void, 31 Renaissance conceptions, 83–5,
evolutionary aspects, 72 86
history in international relations scales imagery, 83, 85–6, 87–8,
theory, 31–4 165
Hobbesian view, 30 spatial imagery, 87
in international relations, 30–4, bandwagoning metaphor, 89–93,
41, 46, 47, 57, 72, 139, 144, 128
145, 168, 186, 188 Baruch, Bernard, 115
as a metaphor, 30–1, 32, 188 behavioral revolution, 191
as a “problem” in international billiard ball metaphor, 6–8, 60, 87,
relations, 30–1, 186 172, 173, 188, 189
state of nature conception, 30–1, biological metaphors, 71–4, 78, 83,
33–4, 203 n. 33 166–9, 191, 223 n. 29
animal metaphors, 89, 91, 93, 128, Black, Max, 18, 21, 195, 201 n. 7
214 n. 10 black box metaphor, 60
aphasia, 201 n. 10 black spots metaphor, 174–5
Aristotle, 9, 12, 15 bloc metaphor, 214–15 n. 13
body metaphors, 10–11, 125,
Bacon, Francis, 83 215 n. 15
balance of power, 24, 82–9, 99, Bonaparte, Napoleon, 133
128, 164–6, 191 brinkmanship, 146–7, 153, 216 n. 5
biblical origins, 85 burning house metaphor, 6

258 Index
Carter, Jimmy, 226 n. 21 evolution

causation, 22, 64, 79, 104, 183–4 in biology, 69–70, 71, 72, 73, 76
chain gang metaphor, 111–12 compared to other forms of
Chicken, 146–9, 153–4 change, 69–70
Churchill, Winston, 115 compared to construction, 74–8
clash of civilizations, 133 definitions, 69–70
Clauswitz, Carl von, 116 in international relations, 69–73,
Clinton, Bill, 7 74, 76–7, 190
cognitive linguistics, 3–5, 10, as a metaphor, 69–73, 74, 187,
12–15, 29, 34, 111, 188–9, 204 n. 37
193, 228–9 n. 15 metaphor applied to cooperation,
“cold” as a metaphor, 115–16, 118 72–4
Cold War, 95, 112, 113, 118–19, metaphor applied to norms, 71–2,
213 n. 5 76
metaphorical aspects, 115–19
failed states metaphor, 121–4
origins of the term, 115
feminist theory, 228 n. 11
complex conglomerate system,
flat world metaphor, 195–7
179–81, 225 n. 17
forest metaphor, 6, 213 n. 23
construction
Foucault, Michel, 204 n. 46
compared to evolution, 74–8
“fragmegration,” 172
in Constructivism, 75–7
DEMO
French Revolution, 166–7
as a metaphor, 74–6
Friend or Foe, 158–60
relationship to change, 76–8 functionalism, 168
Constructivism, 39, 74–7, 78, 173,
176, 184–5, 188, 214 n. 7 game theory
container metaphor, 45–6, 47, 108, analytical problems, 139, 140,
151, 172, 173, 175, 177, 142, 151–7
216 n. 2 Red–Black game, 157–8
“containment”, 115, 207 n. 23 Chicken, 146–9, 153–4
cooperation, 139, 140, 143, 144, Friend or Foe, 158–60
145, 157–8, 159–60 mathematical aspects, 137, 138,
evolutionary qualities, 72–4 139, 152, 155
Copenhagen school, 216 n. 1 Prisoner’s Dilemma, 73, 138–43,
Cuban Missile Crisis, 127, 129 144, 152–3, 155, 157, 158,
159–60
dark corners metaphor, 175 Stag Hunt, 143–6, 152–3
deterrence, 146–7, 148, 153, 154 two-level games, 61, 149–51, 186
“distant proximities”, 171, 172 globalization, 169, 171, 172, 177,
domestic politics, 46–7 196, 225 n. 16
Godfather, The, 190
earthquake metaphor, 133, guns versus butter metaphor, 132–3
203 n. 31 Great Britain, 101–2
economic violence, 125–7 great powers, 101–2, 103, 131
egg-box metaphor, 6 greenhouse metaphor, 203 n. 29

Index 259
hard power, 96–8, 99–100, 105 relationship to scales analysis,

hawks and doves metaphor, 127–9 62–4
hegemony, 95–6 relationship to systemic analysis,
hierarchy, 41–2, 209–10 n. 2 60–1
high and low politics, 108–9, spatial considerations, 59, 61, 62,
225 n. 16
64, 171
Hobbes, Thomas, 21, 30, 45, Liberalism, 139, 168, 184
200 n. 7 “linguistic turn” in international
Hobson, John, 183–4 relations theory, 1, 197–8
hologram metaphor, 7, 173–4 literal communication, 15–18, 50,
horizontality in international 73–4, 163, 180
relations, 40–1, 171, 172 long cycles metaphor, 204 n. 37
Horn of Africa, 113
human nature, 138, 158, 168, macro- /micro analysis, 64, 65
191–3 Mappamundi, 162, 163
Hume, David, 143 mechanistic metaphors, 74, 76, 78,
83–4, 91–2, 164–6, 167,
instrumentalism, 184–5 190–1, 223 n. 29
international community, 53–5 Medici, Lorenzo, 83, 86
international norms, 131 metaphors
international regimes, 155–6
in academic inquiry, 1, 20–5,
international society, 51–3, 135, 167
DEMO
66, 74–5, 189, 194–5, 197
institutionalize as a metaphor, 38
analytical problems in
“Iron Curtain”, 115
international relations theory,
139, 140, 142, 151–7
Johnson, Samuel, 9
comparison view, 21
journalistic bias, 189
compared to literal
jungle metaphor, 200 n. 10
communication, 15–18, 50,
Kennan, George, 115, 207 n. 23 73–4, 163, 180
contextual metaphors in
ladder metaphor, 171 international relations, 29–30
levels of analysis definitions, 9–11
bracketing levels, 60 experientialism (conceptual
bridging levels, 61–2, 151, 186 theory of metaphors), 13–14,
conceptualizations, 58–9 15, 22–3, 193, 228–9 n. 15
epistemological considerations, 59 in economics, 4, 19, 116, 185
relationship to “inside - outside” in human cognition, 3–5, 10,
metaphors, 46, 62 12–15, 29, 34, 111, 188–9,
in international relations, 46, 57, 193, 197, 228–9 n. 15
58–64, 151, 172, 186 interaction view, 21
as a metaphor, 46, 58, 59, 61, in the international relations
151, 223 n. 25 canon, 186–8
number of levels, 59–60 in international relations theory,
relationship to macro-/micro- 1–8, 25, 29, 34, 55–6, 57–8,
metaphors, 64 161–81, 183–98

260 Index
metaphors—continued objectivism, 202 n. 23

in mathematics, 11 order
in physics, 23, 58, 197 in domestic politics, 45, 47, 151
in political science, 2, 23, in international relations, 133,
24–5 134–5, 194
in politics and policy, 2, 7–8, metaphorical aspects, 38
19–20, 185, 190–1 Orwell, George, 115
post-positivist strategies, 24
relationship to narrative, pariah state metaphor, 129–31
26–7 patron and client state metaphors,
relationship to “problems”, 113–14
18–20, 58, 109, 112, 119, post-Cold War international
123, 141–2, 150 relations, 88, 119, 131, 134,
in science, 4, 21–3 170, 173–4, 176–8, 190
in social science, 23–4, Powell, Colin, 131
226–7 n. 2 power
substitution view, 21 criticisms of, 103–5
definitions, 81–2, 88
traditional views, 10–13
distribution, 93–4
metonymy, 201 n. 5
“hard” and “soft” power,
mobius strip/web metaphor, 171–2
96–101, 105, 189
Morgenthau, Hans, 86–8, 191, 192,
DEMO
narratives, 81–2, 105, 107
227 n. 5
polarity, 94–6
multi-level governance, 225 n. 11
predators and parasites metaphor,
131–2
nanny metaphor, 227 n. 7 Prisoner’s Dilemma, 73, 138–43,
narrative 144, 152–3, 155, 157, 158,
in the context of international 159–60
security, 107, 133–5 proxy state metaphor, 113
in game theory, 137
relationship to metaphors, 26, Realism, 86, 132–3, 168, 175–6,
78–9, 185, 227 n. 6 184, 187, 191
relationship to scientific reality
reasoning, 27 relation to metaphors, 15–18, 189
relationship to theories of Red–Black game, 157–8
international relations, 27, rogue state metaphor, 130–1
29–30, 34, 56, 57–8, 69, root metaphor, 183–4
78–9, 81, 105, 161, 169, Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 143, 145
178–81, 183, 190–1, 197 Russell, Bertrand, 148
neomedievalism, 176–8, 181
Neorealism, 30, 33–4, 75, 187, satellite state metaphor, 112–13
191–2 scales analysis, 62–4
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 14–15 scales metaphor, 64, 83, 85–6,
nuclear umbrella metaphor, 103, 87–8, 165
113 Schelling, Thomas, 146–7

Index 261
scientific models, 21–4, 154–5, structural violence, 125–7

194–5 structure
scientific realism, 27, 78, 184–5, in the agent – structure debate,
190, 192, 207 n. 18 38–9, 68–9
security Constructivist conceptions, 38–9,
etymology, 107–8 41, 75
conceived of as high politics, institutionalized structure, 38
108–9 in international relations, 34,
as a metaphor, 108, 135 36–44, 109
snowflake metaphor, 6 macro-and micro-structure, 37
social contract, 144, 164 Marxist conceptions, 206 n. 12
soft balancing, 99 as a metaphor, 5, 42–4, 65–6,
soft power, 97–101, 105, 189 187
sovereignty, 46, 60, 164, Neorealist conceptions, 37–8, 39,
210 n. 4 41, 75, 206 n. 12
Spam, 132 physicality, 43–4
spheres of influence as a metaphor, relationship to “structuratum”,
98, 114–15 43–4
spiky world metaphor, 228 n. 14 relationship to systems, 38
stability as a metaphor, vertical and horizontal structure,
217–18 n. 13 39–41
DEMO
Stag Hunt, 143–6, 152–3 superpowers, 102–3
state, the Swift, Jonathan, 165
container metaphor, 45–6, 47, synecdoche, 201 n. 5
108, 172, 173, 175, 177, system
216 n. 2 compared to international society,
corporeal aspects, 30, 44–5, 49, 52
50, 53, 72 imprecision of the concept, 34–6
etymology, 44 in international relations, 34–6,
“inside - outside” conceptions, 52
46, 47, 62, 151 as a metaphor, 35–6, 65–6
metaphorical qualities, 44–5, relationship to levels of analysis,
168 60–1
metaphorically conceived of as an relationship to structures, 38
individual, 47–51, 168, 173,
192 territory
relationship to anarchy, 32 relationship to the state, 42, 45–6
relationship to domestic politics, terrorism, 99, 117
46 “thorny” as a metaphor, 18–19
states as agents, 66–8 “transparency” as a metaphor,
territorial aspects, 42, 45–6, 167, 155–6
177 turbulence metaphor, 133–4, 170
state death metaphor, 124–5 two-level games, 61, 149–51, 186
state of nature metaphor, 30–1,
33–4, 45, 144, 203 n. 33 universalism, 163, 164

262 Index
verticality in international relations, web metaphor, 6, 171, 172–3, 180,

39–42 225 n. 17
violence as a metaphor, 116, Westphalian international relations,
125–7 225, n. 14
“world” as a metaphor, 169–70
War and Peace, 81 World of Warcraft, 169–70
“war” as a metaphor, 116–17, world society, 179
118 “world’s policeman,” 119–21
“war on terrorism,” 116–17 “Worldism,” 179
DEMO

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10.1057/9780230339187 - Metaphors in International Relations Theory, Michael P. Marks

10.1057/9780230339187 - Metaphors in International Relations Theory, Michael P. Marks

The Formation of European Policy in Post-Franco Spain: The Role of Ideas,

10.1057/9780230339187 - Metaphors in International Relations Theory, Michael P. Marks

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10.1057/9780230339187 - Metaphors in International Relations Theory, Michael P. Marks

10.1057/9780230339187 - Metaphors in International Relations Theory, Michael P. Marks

10.1057/9780230339187 - Metaphors in International Relations Theory, Michael P. Marks

3 The Metaphorical Context of International Relations 29

4 Contributions of Metaphors to International Relations

7 Game Theory Metaphors 137

8 Metaphors and Changing Conceptions of International

10.1057/9780230339187 - Metaphors in International Relations Theory, Michael P. Marks

10.1057/9780230339187 - Metaphors in International Relations Theory, Michael P. Marks

10.1057/9780230339187 - Metaphors in International Relations Theory, Michael P. Marks

10.1057/9780230339187 - Metaphors in International Relations Theory, Michael P. Marks

T his is a book about discourse, specifically, scholarly discourse in the

10.1057/9780230339187 - Metaphors in International Relations Theory, Michael P. Marks

such as international security, international political economy, strate-

Scope of the Book

10.1057/9780230339187 - Metaphors in International Relations Theory, Michael P. Marks

use metaphors to support their favored theories to explain the world.

Constructing Knowledge in International

10.1057/9780230339187 - Metaphors in International Relations Theory, Michael P. Marks

the facts of international relations are conceived. As Jim George

10.1057/9780230339187 - Metaphors in International Relations Theory, Michael P. Marks

equilibriums, and structures,” each of which is a metaphorical image

10.1057/9780230339187 - Metaphors in International Relations Theory, Michael P. Marks

something, the language that eventually is chosen is both inevitably

Why Metaphors Matter

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In recent years scholars have become rather creative in contriving

The Realist metaphorical imagery of these statements is unmistakable

10.1057/9780230339187 - Metaphors in International Relations Theory, Michael P. Marks

former Secretary of State’s 2005 observations is that her own think-

10.1057/9780230339187 - Metaphors in International Relations Theory, Michael P. Marks

What Are Metaphors?

Philosophers and linguists have been fascinated by the way metaphors

10.1057/9780230339187 - Metaphors in International Relations Theory, Michael P. Marks

Traditional Views of Metaphors

10.1057/9780230339187 - Metaphors in International Relations Theory, Michael P. Marks

quality to the person of John to create a new understanding about

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That all language is metaphorical is a claim that has been widely

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Cognitive Linguistics and Current Research on

[The] findings of cognitive science are profoundly disquieting in two respects.

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