Independent Africa:

The Democratic Republic of the

Congo
Study notes

Compiled by C. du Plessis

(Based on Martin Meredith’s The State of Africa)

Introduction

The Berlin West Africa Conference of 1884-1885 would change the fortunes of the
African continent and its people forever. Before this, European contact was limited to
small, coastal enclaves and travellers exploring Africa’s multiple navigable rivers,
which were seen as trading arteries into and out of the continent. Only Algeria and
South Africa had a large European inland presence. Soon stories of huge mineral
deposits and fertile soil reached European powers and with the growing need for raw
materials, Africa became the sought after prize in a European competition. Early
efforts to subdue African tribes and kingdoms were fiercely fought off. The European
technological edge was seldom very great and Africans caught up quickly. It was not
until the great technological leaps represented by breech-loading rifles, armoured
steamships capable of venturing up Africa’s rivers, and the Maxim gun, that Europeans
could gain decisive victories over African armies.

The ensure peaceful competition between European nations as best one could hope
for, Otto von Bismarck, the first Chancellor of the unified German Empire, organised
the Berlin Conference where the partition of Africa between European powers would
be discussed. Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, France, Britain, Italy, Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden-Norway and Germany were all involved in the meeting that
kicked of the mad rush for African territory that came to be known as the “Scramble
for Africa”.

During the Scramble for Africa, European powers staked claim over almost the entire
continent. Their knowledge of the African hinterland was slight, and negotiation for
territory and spheres of influence were often uninformed. This led to maps being drawn
up without any consideration of the local cultural climate. When marking out territories,
European negotiation often resorted to drawing straight lines, taking little into account
of the myriad of traditional kingdoms, chiefdoms and other African societies on the
ground. Large kingdoms and cultural groups were often divided, as was the case with
the Bakongo, who found themselves in French Congo, Belgian Congo and Portuguese
Angola. In West Africa, the Igbo, Hausa and Yoruba, along with some 250 smaller
groups, were all grouped together in British Nigeria, despite having no common

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culture, language or tradition – the only thing that connected them was their
antagonism and disdain for each other. In a book published in 1947, Yoruba leader,
Obafemi Awolowo, wrote: “Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical
expression. There are no ‘Nigerians’ in the same sense as there are ‘English’, ‘Welsh’
or ‘French’. The word ‘Nigerian’ is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish
between those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria and those who do not”.

Decolonisation
The colonial era saw constant struggle and defiance against colonial rule. Episodes of
resistance happened in almost every African colony - the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya
is probably most well known. The anti-colonial protest movement put a lot of pressure
on colonising powers, making a venture that had started as an economic boon, into a
bane. Having expended huge effort in acquiring colonies, European nations soon grew
weary of them. Few colonies still provided opportunities of immediate wealth and most
colonial governments were more concerned with creating self-sustaining colonies than
actively administering them.

The Second World War also changed the fortunes of colonies immeasurably.
European nations were ravished by war and began to doubt their centrality in world
affairs. Principles of racial superiority became at the very least frowned upon and racial
equality and self-governance became popular within the continent; especially with the
publication of the Atlantic Charter, which espoused freedom and “the right of every
people to choose their own form of government”. Very soon, many colonial
governments were reluctantly looking towards the granting of independence to the
African nations over whom they had exercised power for nearly 80 years. As British
Prime Minister Harold MacMillan emphatically pronounced in a speech in February
1960:
The wind of change is blowing through this continent, and whether
we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political
fact. We must all accept it as a fact, and our national policies must
take account of it.

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Decolonisation of Sub-Saharan Africa began in earnest with the independence of the
Ghana (Gold Coast) in 1957 under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah. This was
followed by Guinea in 1958, and with Cameroon gaining independence in 1960,
ushering in the decade of decolonisation.

The 1960s became the era of independence, the era of decolonisation, where African
nations took hold of their own destinies. Yet the euphoria of the independence era is
often spoken of in pessimistic terms, where so many hopes and ambitions faded. For
all their differences, African states had many things in common, not merely their history
as colonial territories, but the similar hazards they have faced. What is indeed striking
is the extent to which African nations have suffered many of the same misfortunes
since independence. Most noticeably, after protracted independence struggles,
African nations, with arbitrarily drawn boundaries and a mélange of disparate cultural
groups, were tasked with setting up modern, functioning governments. This mammoth
task often had to be done without much assistance from colonial exiters, by politically
inexperienced leaders. This paved the way for a politically tumultuous period.

The Independence of the Congo

The historical legacy of colonial rule had a major impact upon African countries,
especially in the early decades of political independence. The dual legacy of
authoritarian rule and artificial “nation states” was to bedevil political stability in the
early years of African independence. The adoption of one-party states was largely an
attempt to overcome the problems of ethnic regionalism, although their
authoritarianism created its own problems of democratic deficit. Some nations did
achieve a peaceful and effective transition from colonial rule. Kenya under Jomo
Kenyatta, Zambia under Kenneth Kuanda and Botswana under Seretse Khama all
remained deeply attached to Britain after independence. Their countries received
assistance in their transition and they were relatively successful in their transformation.
This was all in stark contrast to what happened in the Belgian Congo.

The Congo was not a colony in the traditional sense, but was considered the personal
property of the Belgian King Leopold II. In 1878, under the guise of wanting to “civilise
Africa” Leopold II aimed to satiate his lust for territory and wealth by sending the

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journalist and explorer Henry Morton Stanley into the Congo Basin in search for what
he called “a slice of this magnifique gateau africaine”. Over a period five years, Stanley
signed “treaties” with more than 400 African chiefs, persuading them to give up their
sovereignty, and proceeded to establish outposts along the Congo River on Leopold’s
behalf. After much political toiling, Leopold gained international approval for his
personal empire in 1885, ironically calling it the Congo Free State. The Congo Free
State was seventy time the size of Belgium, an area stretching nearly a million square
miles that includes modern-day Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of
Congo. Leopold II took control of one thirteenth of the African continent and all the
resources that came with it.

Leopold had access to various natural resources including palm oil, timber and copper,
but his main aim, initially, was ivory. Company agents paid on commission went on
numerous ruthless expeditions through the Congo hunting, raiding villages and press-
ganging locals in search of ivory.

Leopold’s next fortune came in the form of rubber. With the invention of the
compression tyre, for use on bicycles and cars, rubber became a very sought after
commodity. Using a form of slave labour, concession companies who shared their
profit with Leopold, stripped the Congo’s vast equatorial forests of all the wild rubber
they could lay their hands on. Local inhabitants were caught up in a ruthless regime
of colonial exploitation centred on the cultivation and extraction of rubber, administered
in a notoriously brutal manner. The Congolese people were used to extract rubber and
were often given quotas to reach. If quotas were not reached, colonial officials would
punish the Congolese workers severely. The chicotte became symbol of Leopold’s
rule - a whip of raw, sun-dried hippopotamus hide, cut into long, sharp-edged strips,
used to flay victims, sometimes to death. Another form of punishment that became
synonymous with the Belgian Congo, was the severing of hands. This often happened
when Congolese workers did not deliver the required quota or refused to go into the
forests to work. When this was not deterrent enough, soldiers were told to shoot any
dissenters and provide proof to the local commissaire, in the form of a body part, that
they had not needlessly wasted bullets. The rule of King Leopold II has become
notorious for the brutality and cruelty that came with it. During his reign from 1885 –

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1908, almost half of the 16 million population died from war, disease and starvation.
Thousands more fled their homes.

Despite his growing reliance on the wealth of the Congo, Leopold never visited this
territory himself. By 1908, the territory was so poorly managed that an international
furore condemning Leopold had erupted. That same year, in an attempt to stem this
furore, the Congo was ceded to Belgium and placed under the control of the Belgian
government, not its king. Belgium then administered the Congo as a colony until
independence in 1960, yet the Congolese people did not experience much
improvement under Belgian governmental rule. The Congo remained an immensely
profitable venture and the Belgian government kept control of the mineral wealth,
including gold, diamonds, copper, cobalt, coltan and uranium, with a firm hand. No
Congolese were ever asked to participate in the running of the country.

Patrice Lumumba
With news of Ghana’s independence, political activity in the Congo began to stir,
especially in the capital of Leopoldville. A young clerk by the name of Patrice Lumumba
became increasingly swept up in the political events across the continent. He watched
how the Congolese people began to awaken politically and believed himself to be the
one to lead them to independence. He helped found the Mouvement National
Congolais (MNC) in 1958 - a national movement, as opposed to tribal political
movements – and in December of the same year he attended the All-African People’s
Conference in Accra. Like any other delegates, he returned home with great
enthusiasm and desire to build the MNC into a national body akin to Kwame
Nkrumah’s CCP, which had gained independence in Ghana. Lumumba declared:

The Mouvement National Congolais has as its basic aims the liberation of
the Congolese people from the colonial regime ... we wish to bid farewell
to the old regime, this regime of subjection … Africa is engaged in a
merciless struggle for its liberation against the coloniser.

A few days after Lumumba’s address, Leopoldville fell victim to vicious rioting.
Discontent over a myriad of issues including unemployment, overcrowding and

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discrimination boiled over when local authorities refused to allow a political meeting by
a local group. The Belgian government tried to restore calm by announcing reform
programs, local elections and even plans for eventual independence. But to little avail.
Across the Congo, political activity burst out in wild and hectic abundance. Hundreds
of political parties sprung from the ground, mostly from tribal origins. In early 1960,
more than 120 political parties were registered and active. In Katanga, the copper rich
eastern province of the Congo, a tribal party emerged by the name of Confederation
des Association Tribales du Katanga or Conakat. The leader of this party was the
politically shrewd businessman, Moise Tshombe, favoured political autonomy for
Katanga and proposed to keep strong ties with Belgium, especially Belgian business.
Amidst this sectarian and tribal squabble, the MNC stood out as the true champion of
Congolese nationalism. Lumumba travelled all across the Congo, giving empowered
speeches to large crowds calling for immediate liberation. Often his rhetoric made the
more moderate members of the MNC quite uncomfortable, and he was almost
removed from the party. In October 1959, a speech by Lumumba led to violent protest
and riots in Stanleyville. Lumumba was arrested for inciting violence and imprisoned
for six months.

Violence and dissent spread across the Congo and Belgian authorities feared a
complete loss of control and possible war (as was the case in e.g. Algeria), and
decided to begin talks of possible independence. In this vain, the Belgian government
invited leaders from thirteen of the most prominent political parties to Brussels in
January 1960, to discuss terms and a timeline for independence. This was the first
time the Belgian colonial authorities asked for Congolese opinion. Among the
delegates were Joseph Kasa-Vubu (leader of the Association des Bakongos, Abako,
a party desiring the restoration of the ancient Kongo kingdom), Moise Tshombe and
Lumumba, who had been released from prison in order to attend the meeting. The
Belgian delegation hoped for a steady transitionary period of four years, but were met
by staunch opposition from the Congolese delegation – a rare united front. The
Congolese leaders, excited by the prospect of self-governance, demanded immediate
elections and complete independence by 1 June 1960. The most the Congolese were
willing to concede to, was a thirty day transitionary period. The Belgians, weary of the
possibility of a colonial war, agreed to complete Congolese independence on the 30th
of June 1960.
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Sudden independence was a dangerous game as very few people in the Congo were
trained in government. Except at the local level, there were no Congolese familiar with
government or parliamentary life. There had been no local or national elections and
very few skilled personnel. Of the 1 400 civil servant posts, only three were held by
Congolese. Education was also terribly neglected by colonial authorities and by 1960,
there was a total of thirty university graduates in the Congo. Only 136 children had
completed secondary education in the 1959-1960 academic year. There were no
Congolese doctors, no secondary school teachers and no army officers. Indeed the
first contingent of Congolese officer cadets were only due to return from Belgium in
1963. The Congo, though excited, was woefully unprepared for self-rule. The Belgian
government were aware of this and hoped that they would be able to allow the
Congolese to gain political responsibility, while Belgium kept control of the core of the
colonial state – the bureaucracy, the army and the economy. The hope was that
moderate, pro-Belgian parties would do well in the elections and would then continue
a favourable relationship with Belgium after independence.

This gamble did not pay off as moderate parties did not fare well, and Lumumba’s
MNC took the lead. Of 137 seats, the MNC and its allies took a majority 41 seats. The
MNC, however, had little support outside of Stanleyville and faced heavy opposition
from Léopoldville and Katanga. The Belgian Government were reluctant to give power
to Lumumba and instead preferred Kasa-Vubu, yet were forced to turn to Lumumba
as he gained more and more support from the Chamber of Deputies. The final
elections results left the Congo with a coalition government consisting of twelve
different parties, some bitter rivals. Kasa-Vubu was chosen as non-executive president
and the thirty five year old Lumumba, unprepared and very distrustful of Belgian
authorities, became prime minister. In his inaugural speech, Lumumba told the Belgian
King Baudouin, “We are no longer your monkeys!”

Kasa-Vubu and Lumumba’s rule was immediately struck by disaster. While Congolese
ran the government, the military remained in Belgian hands. Congolese soldiers felt
that independence had passed them by and were bitterly unhappy the situation. They
contrasted their lot with that the sudden wealth of civilian politicians, former clerks and
salesmen, now driving around in new cars and spending money freely. On July 5,
Congolese soldiers in the Force Publique mutinied against their white Belgian

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commanders at the Thysville military base, seeking higher pay as well as greater
opportunity and authority. The mutiny quickly spread to other bases and violence soon
broke out across the nation. Thousands of Europeans (primarily Belgians) fled, and
stories of atrocities against whites surfaced in newspapers around the globe.
Lumumba blamed Belgian military officials for inciting the riot and decided the entire
officer corps should be replaced by Congolese. He made Victor Lundula the new Army
commander, and appointed his trusted personal aide, Joseph Mobutu, as chief of staff.
Despite these reforms, the mutiny continued. After failing to get permission from either
Kasavubu or Lumumba, the Belgians brought in troops to restore order. As Belgian
troops took control of key points, such as the airport in Leopoldville, Lumumba became
convinced that Belgium was trying to reassert its rule. He broke off any diplomatic
relations and said that as far as he is concerned, the Congo is now at war with Belgium.
On 11 July the situation grew worse. Lumumba was unable to deal with the chaos and
Moise Tshombe took advantage of the turmoil and declared that the mineral rich
province of Katanga would break away from the rest of the Congo. With the assistance
of Belgian forces, Congolese soldiers were disarmed and expelled and a Belgian
technical assistance mission was sent to assist with governing the region from
Elizabethville. This was done most likely to secure Belgian mining interests in the area,
and protect the region from the growing military nationalism sweeping the country.
This of course lent credibility to Lumumba’s claims that Brussels was trying to
reimpose its authority.

Within a few days of independence, the country devolved into chaos. The military was
running riot, white exodus left administration crippled and the secession of Katanga
left the country on the brink of civil war. Belgium desperately wanted Lumumba
removed, while Lumumba looked toward the UN for assistance against the Belgians.
The UN responded swiftly and within days peacekeeping forces were stationed across
the country and plans were set in place for a civilian task force to run public affairs.
Lumumba was not satisfied and urged the UN to expel the Belgian troops from
Katanga by force. Lumumba became increasingly volatile when his demands were not
met. The head of UN operations in the Congo, Ralph Bunche, reported that “Lumumba
was crazy and acted like a child”. On 17 July, Lumumba sent an ultimatum stating that
if the UN had not removed all Belgian forces by midnight of 19 July, he would ask the
Soviet Union to intervene. This made Washington very nervous. The American
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government was fearful of the Congo turning into another Cuba, giving the Soviet
Union a stronghold in Africa. Especially as Africa was seen as an open hunting-ground
for the Cold War powers – both having the opportunity to gain ideological advantage
in the Third World.
Lumumba did not follow through on his threat and decided to visit the United States in
order to sway American opinion in his favour. His trip to Washington in late July was
a disaster. Lumumba was described as “irrational” and even “psychotic” in his
behaviour. He was said to have been incoherent in his demands and often outrageous
and at times his words did not have any relation to what he wanted to discuss. His
personal behaviour also left much to be desired, as Lumumba requested that his CIA
liaison send him a blonde prostitute. Lumumba’s relationship with the West grew
testier by the day and would eventually convince both the United States – especially
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) - and Belgium that he was not the right person
to guide the Congo into independence.

Belgian troops were eventually removed from the Congo, yet Lumumba was not
satisfied. He requested that UN forces put an end to the Katanga secession effort by
any means necessary. When the UN made it clear that they were not mandated to
interfere with internal Congolese affairs, Lumumba was furious. He accused the UN
of working with the Belgians and trying to reinstate colonial rule. A senior UN official
stated that Lumumba’s “…dealings with the UN quickly deteriorated into a bewildering
series of pleas for assistance, threats and ultimatums”. UN officials felt that
Lumumba’s erratic behaviour jeopardised the safety of UN personnel.

Eventually Lumumba’s incessant quarrelling, his dictatorial habits and impetuous

decisions reached a tipping point. With growing tension in Katanga, and facing another
secession in south Kasai – a major diamond mining region – Lumumba took the fateful
decision of asking the Soviet Union for immediate military assistance. Even though the
Soviets were not in a very strong position at the time, they were eager to assert a form
of dominance in Africa. They agreed to send aircraft, trucks, crews and technicians,
which Lumumba wanted to use to regain south Kasai, before moving towards
Elizabethville to overthrow Katanga.

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Lumumba’s military campaign into Kasai resulted in a massacre of hundreds of Baluba
tribesmen. The atrocities committed in this campaign had the characteristics of
genocide, according to the UN, leaving many dead and many more in flight. Joseph
Mobutu, Lumumba’s military leader, condemned this campaign and broke away from
Lumumba. A usually passive President Kasa-Vubu reacted to this campaign by
announcing that he has removed Lumumba from his position of Prime Minister, only
to have Lumumba react by saying he has removed Kasa-Vubu from his position and
charge him with treason.

The Rise of Joseph Mobutu

In the ensuing chaos, Mobutu stepped forward, with backing from the CIA, and
announced that he was neutralising all politicians until the end of the year and
assuming power himself. Mobutu had effectively taken control in a US backed military
coup.

The Congo was politically fragmented and effectively divided into four competing
factions with backing from different foreign powers. Lumumba, supported by the
Soviets, with his base in Stanleyville. Joseph Mobutu, supported by the West, with his
base in Leopoldville. The ramshackle “Diamond State” of Albert Kolonji, with Belgian
business support in South Kasai. And Moise Tshombe, also supported by the
Belgians, in Katanga. Mobutu retained Kasa-Vubu as president, while removing
Lumumba and all his supporters from power. Lumumba remained in the Prime
Minister’s residence in Leopoldville, guarded by an inner ring of UN troops in the
garden to prevent his arrest by Mobutu, and an outer ring of Mobutu’s soldiers on the
parameter to prevent his escape.

The CIA, still fearful of a possible Lumumba resurgence, continued their plans to
eliminate him. An assassination attempt was planned, yet did not materialise.
Meanwhile the Belgian authorities, with backing from both Mobutu and Tshombe,
planned an assassination of their own. Lumumba was very eager to leave his veritable
house arrest in Leopoldville and make his way to his Stanleyville stronghold, even if
this was against UN advice. The UN would be unable to protect him if he left his

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Leopoldville residence. This was the opportunity for which Lumumba’s enemies were
looking.

The Assassination of Lumumba

On the evening of the 27th of November, during a tropical storm, Lumumba left his
residence, crouching in the back of a vehicle taking his servants home for the night.
On the 1st of December, on his way to Stanleyville, he was arrested, severely beaten
and flown back to Leopoldville. Lumumba’s escape attempt proved to his enemies that
he was still a threat and his immediate elimination was necessary. From Leopoldville,
Lumumba was transported to Elizabethville, where he was beaten and tortured by
Baluba soldiers. On the night of January 17, 1961, during a drunken spell at
Tshombe’s residence, it was decided by the Katangese that Lumumba had to be
executed immediately. Lumumba, along with two other prisoners, were driven to a
clearing in a remote area of the bush by Katangese and Belgian soldiers and executed
by a firing squad. Thus the first and only elected Prime Minister of the Congo Republic,
was assassinated a few months after the country gained formal independence from
Belgium.

The murder of Lumumba sent shock waves across the world, receiving condemnation
from all corners. Despite his erratic behaviour and the disdain he received from
Western officials, Lumumba was seen as a great liberator and freedom fighter in the
eyes of not only the Congolese people, but Africans all over the continent. The
pressures he faced in a country torn apart by factionalism and foreign meddling were
immense. To many, he was seen as a heroic figure facing these problems with great
vigour and unwavering passion for his people. He quickly entered a growing pantheon
of martyrs fighting to free his people from the iron grip of imperialism. He was seen as
the victim of a neo-colonial conspiracy, cut down by Western powers because he
dared to challenge their hegemony.

Mobutu takes control

Conflict in Katanga between Tshombe and Lumumba’s successor, Antoine Gizenga,
continued until the latter was also imprisoned. The Soviet Union also gave support to
Gizenga, although many African states were behind Tshombe. Only in 1963, with the

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help of the UN, was Katanga eventually reintegrated into the Congo. By this time
American influence in the country had increased considerably. These years of
problems also left the masses in the Congo confused and uncertain, and there were
already calls for a ‘second independence’. Political and military stability continued to
elude the Congo, until 1965 when Mobutu took complete control of the country in his
second coup, suspending all political activity and assumed the presidency himself. He
described his actions as a necessary step in order to stabilise a country ravished by
factionalism, war and external meddling. Mobutu set out to create a “new Congo” from
the shambles it had become after five years of civil war and political strife, acting
ruthlessly to suppress disorder and dissent. Many political opponents and even former
cabinet members were publicly executed to set an example. The leader of a rebellion
in the Kwilu region, Pierre Mulele, who returned from exile under the impression he
had been promised an amnesty, was tortured then executed. Any and all political
opposition was violently suppressed paving the way for complete control.

Mobutu imposed his own economic policies, which were initially very successful, as
the copper industry was nationalised, inflation halted and the currency stabilised. With
the global copper price soaring in the 1970s, the Congo took in huge revenues and
even saw an influx in foreign investment, led by the United States under President
Nixon. With the newfound wealth, Mobutu launched huge public works programs in an
effort to modernise his country. His grandiose development programs included a steel
mill near Leopoldville, a giant dam on the lower reaches of the Congo river at Inga, a
long distance power-line from Inga to Katanga, an ambitious new copper mining
project, new manufacturing plants and an array of infrastructure projects. The Congo
seemed to be stabilising and this led to an influx in foreign investment with investors
from America and Europe committing more than two billion dollars. With the help of
foreign aid, the huge revenues gained through the booming copper market, and the
multiple development programs, the Congo seemed to finally be on track to reaching
its vast potential. Yet, Mobuto only ushered in another period of corruption and poverty
in the Congo.

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Mobutu’s Cult of Personality
The economic recovery and growth spurred on Mobutu’s political ambitions. He
created a single national political party, the Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution
(MPR), with him as guide and mentor. Under Mobutu, the Congolese people were to
follow an ideology known at first as aunthenticité, later to be called “Mobutuism”.
Mobutuism was enforced by law and any deviation was treated as a constitutional
offense, even though the ideology was never clearly defined. At its core, it was an
ideology based on what Mobutu wanted. Mobutu was the only leader and under the
single party state, his will reigned supreme. His views were clear: “In our African
tradition, there are never two chiefs…can anyone tell me that he has ever known a
village that has two chiefs. That is why we Congolese, in the desire to conform to the
traditions of out continent, have resolved to group all our energies of the citizens of
our country under the banner of a single national party.”

Steadily, he accumulated more and more power, ruling by decree and controlling all
appointments and promotions. In his endeavour to create an “authentic” national spirit,
he ordered that all names of European origin be changed. The Congo became Zaire,
Leopoldville became Kinshasa, Elizabethville became Lubumbashi, and Katanga
became Shaba. Zairians with Christian names were ordered to change their names to
African ones and a five-year jail sentence was ordered for anyone baptising their child
with a European name. Joseph Mobutu came to call himself Mobuto Sese Seko Koko
Ngbendu was za Banga (“the all-powerful warrior who, because of his endurance and
inflexible will to win, will go from conquest to conquest leaving fire in his wake”).
With equal fervour, European style music and dress was replaced by themes that are
more African. Mobutu himself led the way with his signature collarless Mao-style tunic,
worn without shirt or tie (which came to be known as the abacost), along with his
signature leopard skin hat and thick, black-framed glasses.

Personal enrichment of Mobutu

Mobutu’s personality cult became all pervasive. He assumed grand titles such as
“Father of Nations”, “Saviour of the People”, and “Supreme Combatant”. His deeds
were endlessly praised and people started to treat him with religious adoration. Mobutu
used this to his advantage and turned his sights on self-enrichment on a scale never

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before seen in Africa. In 1973, he announced the seizure of some 2 000 foreign-owned
enterprises – farms, plantations, ranches, factories, wholesale firms and shops – in an
effort to secure greater economic freedom for Zaire. This was done without
compensation. Yet instead of state ownership, these enterprises were handed out to
friends and family members as private property, ushering in an era of “cronyism” in
Zaire. At a stroke, Mobutu acquired free of charge a vast agricultural and industrial
empire for him and his friends and family.

Mobutu’s personal fortune grew in leaps and bounds in the 1970s. It is estimated that
during this time one-third of total national revenues was at his personal disposal. He
used the central bank at will for his personal purposes, becoming the largest
stakeholder in the Banque du Kinshasa – where parastatal companies were required
to bank. He also had interests in multinational corporations such as Fiat, Gulf
Volkswagen and Unilever. He was personally involved in diamond, copper, cobalt and
other mining activity, funnelling huge amounts of revenue directly into his personal
account annually. One transaction alone in 1976 saw one million dollars transferred
from one of the plantation companies he seized to his Swiss bank account. An official
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) claimed that, “the budget and the mining
revenues are really the private pool of funds for Mobutu and his friends”. By the end
of the 1970s, Mobutu had become one of the world’s richest men. In the 1980s, his
fortune was an estimated total of five billion dollars.

Mobutu’s personal riches were in stark contrast to the plight of the majority of the
people in Zaire. While Mobutu was living a lavish life with grand villas and mansions
all over not only Congo but also Europe, Zaire was falling headlong into crisis.
Mobutu’s initial economic successes, based on the high copper price and foreign
investment, proved to be short-lived and flawed. His expropriation of foreign
businesses ended in disaster as many went bankrupt or were stripped of their assets
and abandoned. The disruption caused to commerce, agriculture and trade in rural
areas were severe and in 1976 Mobutu was forced to invite back foreign investors, but
few returned.

At the same time, the copper price dropped and the value Zaire’s main export
plummeted. In 1977, it reached an all-time low, while the cost of oil and imported grain
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soared. Zaire was suddenly struck by an onrush of massive inflation, fuel shortages,
falling revenues and huge debt. The huge development programs, which instilled so
much hope in the people of Zaire, also proved to be unsustainable and poorly planned.
The giant steel mill near Kinshasa, constructed at a cost of 250 million dollars, was
designed for a capacity of 250 000 tons of steel a year, four time Zaire’s requirement.
It peaked at 25 000 tons in 1975 and never exceeded 10 000 tons after 1978. In 1986,
it was shut down.

The hydro-electric project at Inga, along with its power line to Katanga proved even
more costly. After initial successes, a second phase was planned (due to the
expansion of the copper industry), yet this second phase took six years longer than
planned at a cost of 1 billion dollars, four times the initial estimate. By then the copper
industry had nearly collapsed and the project was abandoned with only 20 percent of
the electrical capacity realised.

Corruption
Meanwhile, administration rapidly disintegrated as corruption seeped through
government at every level. It seemed as though every aspect of Zairian life was
monetised and controlled by self-serving officials. Many government services
allocated a budget, were never provided. Hospital staff and teachers went unpaid for
months. Civil servants and army officials routinely siphoned off state revenues. An
estimated 40 percent of the state’s operating budget was either lost or diverted to
purposes other than those intended. At one point, it was estimated that one-third of
the 400 000 civil servants on the payroll were in fact fictitious and their salaries were
pocketed by senior officials. Army officials often kept soldier salaries for themselves,
while soldiers would roam villages and confiscate food and money from villagers.
Hospital staff would often sell medical supplies for their own enrichment. Zaire had
turned into a country based on corruption, with nothing being done without a bribe of
sorts. Mobutu criticised the state of affairs as an illness afflicting Zaire and, brazen
with hypocrisy, attacked the manner in which government officials were obsessed with
a drive to enrich themselves. He called it “an invisible tax”.
The plight of Zaire after ten years of Mobutu’s rule was pitiful. Unemployment was
higher than at the time of independence. Inflation has caused wages to drop little more

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than 10 percent of their value in 1960. Hospitals were not functioning as a lack of
medicine and equipment led to staff desertions. Road and transport networks were a
wreck. An estimate of 40 percent of Kinshasa’s population was malnourished and
disease was rife. Agricultural production plummeted and large imports of food was
needed. The state only existed to enrich itself and the people suffered.

In despair at the chaotic state of Zaire’s finances, foreign creditors in 1978 forced
Mobutu to agree to a series of corrective measure. Foreign officials were put into key
positions within the Zaire economy in order to stabilise the economy – mainly to ensure
that Zairian companies, with links to high ranking officials, start paying taxes, which
they had been avoiding. The IMF sent Erwin Blumenthal to take control of the bank.
Blumenthal made an assessment and announced a list of fifty individual businessmen
who were barred from importing and exporting until they had paid all their outstanding
debts. Some companies complied, yet many found ways to circumvent Blumenthal. In
1979 Blumenthal left in disgust, claiming that there was “…no prospect of Zaire’s
creditors to get their money back in any foreseeable future.”
He concluded: “There was, and there still is, one sole obstacle that negates all
prospect: the corruption of the team in power.”

Mobutu effectively held onto power through means of a number of military and police
units. These were usually from his own Ngbendi tribe who he rewarded with high pay
and rewards. As for cabinet ministers, he kept them in a state of flux by rotating them
regularly, dismissing them or imprisoning them to make sure they do not represent
any threat. Critics were often pulled into political positions or paid off. If critics refused
to be silenced, they were arrested and banished to remote villages in Zaire. Exile was
dangerous as critics could make noise from exile. Mobutu’s game was to make sure
his critics had limited capacity to damage him.

Western support
However corrupt and repressive Mobutu’s regime had become, he still enjoyed the
support of Western governments. His pro-Western, anti-Soviet stance earned him
much credit from the West, notably in Washington. In Washington terminology, Mobutu
was a “friendly tyrant”. Within the Cold War setting of the 1970s and 1980s, the West

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regarded Mobutu as a necessary evil. Rather have Mobutu than chaos. Rather have
Mobutu than allow the Soviet Union a foothold in Africa. Mobutu was very good at
bolstering this sentiment in order to retain Western aid, of which he received
approximately 860 million dollars from the United Stated between 1965 and 1988.
America saw Mobutu as one of their most valuable allies and it would not be until the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990 that the United States dared to criticise the brutal
regime in Zaire. In 1992, President George HW Bush implored Mobutu to step down
amidst political turmoil, and eventually in 1993 newly elected President, Bill Clinton,
formally announced their disapproval of the Zairian government by withdrawing the
US ambassador to Zaire.

The Rwandan Genocide and Mobutu’s downfall

Mobutu continued to rule Zaire with the support of a small group of loyal military and
civilian associates, while the country fell into despair. By the mid-90s, Zaire was not
more than a skeleton state with a small group of cannibal capitalists in the capital of
Kinshasa. Provinces were almost self-governing fiefdoms, with very little control from
the capital. Mobutu had by this time lost most foreign allies. The World Bank had
decided to give up on Zaire, after seeing very little result from the 9 billion dollars in
foreign aid they had poured into Mobutu’s regime since 1975. Mobutu, desperate to
regain international standing, would see his intervention in the Rwandan Genocide of
1994 lead to the downfall of his regime.

In 1994 approximately 800 000 people were killed in 100 days, in what came to be
known as the Rwandan Genocide.

A group of Tutsi exiles (the Tutsi monarchy, along with thousands of Tutsis, were
expelled by the majority Hutus in 1959) formed a rebel group called the Rwandan
Patriotic Front (RPF), and invaded Rwanda in 1990. A veritable civil war erupted
between government forces and the RPF, lasting 3 years until a peace treaty was
signed. Yet tensions did not dissipate, as the Hutu government continued to spread
anti-Tutsi propaganda through radio and newspapers. Tutsis were vilified and accused
of trying to reimpose Tutsi rule. On the night of 6 April 1994, a plane carrying the Hutu
president Juvenal Habyarimana was shot down – everyone on board was killed. Hutu

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extremists blamed the Tutsi-led RPF and immediately started a well-organised, pre-
planned campaign of brutal slaughter of Tutsis all over Rwanda.

The killings took place in churches and hospitals, with scenes of machete-wielding
militants hacking scores of people to death, while UN, Belgian and French troops
looked on, claiming that their mandates did not allow them to intervene. The United
States were careful of military intervention, so as not to harm their reputation further,
after a botched operation a few months earlier in Somalia. A New Zealand Security
Council member noted: “While thousands of human beings were hacked to death
every day, ambassadors argued fitfully for weeks about military tactics”. The horrific
scenes finally came to an end on 4 July 1994 when the RPF, under the leadership of
Paul Kagame and backed by Uganda’s army, took control of the capital, Kigali.
Fearing retaliation from Tutsi militants, 2 million Hutus fled into the neighbouring Zaire,
many of which took part in the meticulous murder of Tutsis, either as part of the
government or military. The international community, with the UN at the heart, decided
not to pay much attention to the mass killing of Tutsis, carefully refraining from using
the word “genocide”, as this would have demanded intervention, which they did not
provide. Instead, focus was on the large number of Hutus fleeing from Rwanda into
refugee camps in the eastern Zairian province of Kivu. President Clinton called this
“refugee” camp the worst humanitarian disaster in a generation. The Western world,
unable to mount an operation to prevent genocide, had very little trouble raising
millions of dollars per day to spend on refugees complicit in genocide. The
international world needed Mobutu’s help to avoid a humanitarian crisis and Mobutu
was eager to reassert his position in Africa through this crisis.

As Hutu refugees poured into the eastern Zairian province of Kivu, difficulties arose
immediately. Ethnic conflict flared up between local Zairian groups, Tutsi farmers who
had been living in Kiva for a long time, having emigrated from the early nineteenth
century (known as the Banyamulengu), exiled Tutsis who arrived after 1959 and the
recent Hutu refugees. Foreign aid from Western nations allowed the Hutu militants to
take control of the region from the refugee camps. With Mobutu’s blessing and through
Western aid, the ousted Hutus were able to reorganise and effectively create their own
mini-state in Kivu, with the same financial, political and military structures they had in
Rwanda. Refugee numbers were often exaggerated in order to secure more funds,
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which was then used to fund a growing military. The Hutu politicians and militants were
bent on regrouping and launching an invasion of Rwanda in order “to wage war that
will be long and full of dead people until the minority Tutsis are finished and completely
out of the country.”

Mobutu, seemingly tired of politics, did not care much for deliberating about the chaos
in Kivu. He chose rather to spend his time on his presidential estate outside Kinshasa,
allowing Kivu to descend further into factionalism, with foreign powers eager to take
advantage. Weakened by cancer, Mobutu travelled to France and then Switzerland to
recuperate, far away from the chaos that broke out in Kivu. Rival African leaders like
Paul Kagame from Rwanda and Yoweri Museveni from Uganda used the upheaval in
Kivu to orchestrate the end of Mobutu. Kagame was getting increasingly frustrated
with the situation in Kivu, as Rwanda had become targets of increasing cross-border
attacks, while Museveni resented the way in which the lawless eastern province was
used as a base by anti-government Ugandan militias. Kagame and Museveni planned
to oust Mobutu and replace him with a small-time guerrilla leader Laurent Kabila,
renowned for his brutality and greed.

In 1996, as Rwandan Hutu militias planned on retaking RPF held territories, the RPF
under Kagame launched operations into Zaire. Presented as a Banyamulengu
uprising, the RPF moved into eastern Zaire, taking region after region, pushing Hutu
troops back along with Mobutu’s army who supported them. A long-time opponent of
Mobutu, Laurent Kabila then formed his own, custom-built “liberation movement”
called Alliance des Forces Democratiques de Liberation du Congo-Zaire (AFDL),
jumping on the successes of the RPF. According to Kabila, the ADFL’s aim was to
take Kinshasa and depose Mobutu.
RPF and ADFL forces moved swiftly across Zaire while Mobutu’s ramshackle army
fled in all directions. Zaire became a quagmire of violence as one town after the other
fell to the “rebel” groups. It was as if the putrid body of Zaire, not just Mobutu, was
being consumed by cancer. Eight months after the rebellion first flared up in Kivu,
Kabila’s army walked into Kinshasa as Mobutu’s clique and thousands of his soldiers
fled into neighbouring Republic of Congo. Kagame’s plan had worked and on 17 May
1997 Kabila was sworn in as president, renaming the country the Democratic Republic
of the Congo. Four months later Mobutu died in exile in Morocco, bitter and resentful
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at what he had considered a betrayal by his generals. According to Yoweri Museveni,
Mobutu had assured his own downfall by getting involved in Rwanda:

The big mistake of Mobutu was to involve himself in Rwanda. So

it’s really Mobutu who initiated the programme of his own removal.
Had he not involved himself in Rwanda, I think he could have
stayed, just like that, as he had been doing for the last thirty-two
years – just doing nothing to develop Zaire, but stay in what they
call power, by controlling the radio station, and so on.

Laurent Kabila
The end of Mobutu did not bring peace to the DRC, however, and Kabila turned out to
be no more than a petty tyrant. He filled his cabinet with his own supporters and
suppressed any defiance of his rule. Some saw him as a new breed of leadership
while others saw him as a continuation of the authoritarianism and corruption that he
was purportedly replacing. In 1998, his former allies who helped to bring him to power
launched an open rebellion against him that was supported by Uganda and Rwanda,
plunging the country into a civil war. The DRC was once again flung into turmoil and
conflict, while other nations were eager to get their hands on the riches of the
embattled area. Like vultures picking over a carcass, Uganda, Rwanda, Angola,
Namibia and Zimbabwe engaged in a scramble for the spoils of war. These nations all
tried to assert control over regions of the DRC in order to take control of the vast
mineral wealth. For example, a UN Panel estimated that in the eighteen month period
from 1999 to 2000, Rwanda earned 250 million dollars from the Congo’s coltan. The
Congo had become a plundered nation. Eventually the UN Security Council demanded
that Uganda and Rwanda withdraw from the Congo, citing these countries’ actions as
“illegal exploitation of the Congo’s wealth”. Yet Kabila obstructed this. Rather than
share power, Kabila preferred to share the country.

Joseph Kabila
Kabila was shot at close range by a young member of his bodyguard on 16 January
2001. He was replaced by his 30-year-old son, Joseph Kabila, Little was known about
Joseph Kabila, and the first assessment was that his father’s advisers had chosen him

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as a figurehead. During the following months, however, Kabila surprised many people
by taking initiative and turning the policies of the government in a different direction.
He lifted the ban on political parties and set about making radical changes. He held
talks with rebel groups, and the governments of five countries - Rwanda, Uganda,
Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia - that had troops in Congo, agreed to begin their
withdrawal. Finally, after a series of negotiations in December 2002, an agreement
reached in Pretoria, South Africa, provided for the establishment of a power-sharing
transitional government and an end to the war. Although the civil war was technically
over, the country was devastated. It was estimated that more than three million people
had been killed; those who survived were left to struggle with homelessness,
starvation, and disease. The new government was fragile; the economy was in
shambles; and societal infrastructure had been destroyed. With international
assistance, Kabila was able to make considerable progress toward reforming the
economy and began the work of rebuilding the country. Though Kabila made strides
toward peace, his actions were not without opposition. In 2004, there were alleged
coup attempts against him, but loyalist forces prevailed. Undeterred, Kabila continued
in his attempts to unify the country. Yet in eastern Congo, local warlords continue their
wars of plunder - some acting as proxy forces for sponsors in Rwanda and Uganda.
In early 2008, Kabila signed a peace agreement with more than 20 rebel groups who
had been fighting in the eastern part of the country, but the truce unravelled later that
year when some rebels resumed their attacks. To this day, rebel attacks have
continued to plague a nation desperate for peace and the Congo continue to face
misery and violence.

Yet hope remains as the Congo has entered an era of modern democracy and multi-
party elections. Kabila stepped down on 24 January 2019, handing power to Etienne
Tshisekedi in the first peaceful transition of power in the Congo since the country
became independent in 1960.

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