Title

IN RE: Cuan

Decision Date
Mar 18, 1954

The court declares Republic Act No. 972 unconstitutional, ruling that the power and
responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of
attorneys-at-law is a judicial function vested in the Supreme Court, and that the law
violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

94 Phil. 534

[ Resolution. March 18, 1954 ]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITIONS FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR OF UNSUCCESSFUL

CANDIDATES OF 1946 TO 1953; ALBINO CUNANAN ET AL., PETITIONERS.

RESOLUTION

DIOKNO, J.:

In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern
as Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules
of Court governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the
Bar) may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained
a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any
subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties
of the different bar examinations held since 1946 and the varying degree of strictness with
which the examination papers were graded, this court passed and admitted to the bar those
candidates who had obtained an average of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70
per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was raised to 75 per
cent.

Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by
this court, and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory
Note to R. A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage
lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the
passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced the passing general average in
bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946. The President requested the views of
this court on the bill. Complying with that request, seven members of the court subscribed
to and submitted written comments adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the President
vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371,
embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the members of this
court reiterated their unfavorable views on the matter, the President allowed the bill to
become a law on June 21, 1953 without his signature. The law, which incidentally was
enacted in an election year, reads in full as follows:

Republic Act No. 972

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY-
FIVE.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled:

Section 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule numbered one hundred
twenty-seven of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general average of
seventy per cent in any bar examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six
up to the August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar examinations; seventy-one per cent in
the nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar examinations; seventy-two per cent in the nineteen
hundred and fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-three per cent in the nineteen hundred
and fifty-four bar examinations; seventy-four per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-
five bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty per cent in any
subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member
of the Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-
half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the next whole
number.

Sec. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject in
any bar examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be deemed to
have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in
computing the passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent
examinations that he may take.

Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.

After its approval, many, of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for:
admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while others whose motions for the revision of
their examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional
ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of
their grades without, however, invoking the. law in question. To avoid injustice to
individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective
of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the court has
found no reason to revise their grades. If they are to be admitted to the bar, it must be
pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should be applied equally to all
concerned whether they have filed petitions or not. A complete list of the petitioners,
properly classified, affected by this decision, as well as a more detailed account of the
history of Republic Act No. 972, are appended to this decision as Annexes I and II, And to
realize more readily the effects of the law, the following statistical data are set forth:

1946 (August) ............... 206 121 18

1946 (November) ............ 477 228 43

1947 ............................ 749 340 0

1948 ............................ 899 409 11

1949 ............................ 1,218 532 164

1950 ............................ 1,316 893 26

1951 ............................ 2,068 879 196

1952 ............................ 2,738 1,033 426

1953 ............................ _2,555 __986 __284

 Total.......... 12,230 5,421 1,168

Of the aforesaid 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent examination, and only 586
have filed either motions for admission to the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere
motions for reconsideration.

(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited by section 2 of

said Republic Act. These candidates had each taken from two to five different examinations,
but failed to obtain a passing average in any of them. Consolidating, however, their highest
grades in different subjects in previous examinations, with their latest marks, they would
be sufficient to reach the passing average as provided for by Republic Act 972.

(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is therefore 1,094,
of which only 604 have filed petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to
1951 had individually presented motions for reconsideration which were denied, while 125
unsuccessful candidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953, had presented similar motions, which are
still pending because they could be favorably affected by Republic Act No. 972,although as
has been already stated, this tribunal finds no sufficient reasons to reconsider their grades.

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the practice of the legal
profession and the administration of justice, and because some doubts have been
expressed as to its validity, the court set the hearing of the aforementioned petitions for
admission on the sole question of whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.

We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant assistance of the
members of the bar who have' amply argued, orally and in writing, on the various aspects
in which the question may be gleaned. The valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia,
Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of the validity
of the law, and of the U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A.
Alafriz, Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente del Rosario,
Juan de Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta against it, aside from the
memoranda of counsel for'.'petitioners, Messrs. Jose M. Aruego, M. H. de Joya, Miguel R.
Cornejo and Antonio Enrile Inton, and of petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet and Galema,
themselves, has greatly helped us in this task. The legal researchers of the court have
exhausted almost all Philippine and American jurisprudence on the matter. The question
has been the object of intense deliberation for a long time by the Tribunal, and finally, after
the voting, the preparation of the majority opinion was assigned to a new member in order
to place it as humanly as possible above all suspicion of prejudice or partiality.

Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those
candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate
preparation. Quoting a portion of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author
Honorable Senator Pablo Angeles David stated:

"The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the tremendous
handicap which students during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation has
to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the
preparation of students who took up law soon after the liberation."

Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And
now it is claimed that in addition 604 candidates be admitted (which in reality total 1,094),
because they suffered from "insufficiency of reading materials" and of "inadequacy of
preparation."

By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law
graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession,
as was exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest
demands of legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal
problem evolved by the times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one
of the vital requisites for the practice of law that should be developed constantly and
maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the protection of property, life,
honor and civil liberties. To approve officially of those inadequately prepared individuals to
dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a serious social danger.
Moreover, the statement that there was an insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly
exaggerated. There were abundant materials. Decisions of this court alone in
mimeographed copies were made available to the public during those years and private
enterprises had also published them in monthly magazines and annual digests. The Official
Gazette has been published continuously. Books and magazines published abroad have
entered without restriction since 1945. Many law books, some even with, revised and
enlarged editions have been printed locally during those periods. A new set of Philippine
Reports began to be published since 1946, which continued to be supplemented by the
addition of new volumes. Those are facts of public knowledge.

Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be enforced.

The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of view of applicable
principles, but the resolution of the question would have been easier had an identical case
of similar background been picked out from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there
any precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal history, from which has been directly derived
the judicial system established here with its lofty ideals by the Congress of the United
States, and which we have preserved and attempted to improve, or in our
contemporaneous juridical history of more than half a century? From the citations of those
defending the law, we can not find a case in which the validity oi a similar law had been
sustained, while those against its validity cite, among others, the cases of Day (In re Day, 54
NE 646), of Cannon (State vs. Cannon, 240 NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR 1061), of Guarina (24 Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of the
President which is expressed in his vote of the original bill and which the proponent of the
contested law respects.

This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other countries had been
promulgated, the judiciary immediately declared them without force or effect. It is not
within our power to offer a precedent to uphold the disputed law.

To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully the case that has been
cited to us as a favorable precedent of the lawthat of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the Court of
Appeals of New York revoked the decision of the Supreme Court of that State, denying the
petition of Cooper to be admitted to the practice of law under the provisions of a statute
concerning the school of law of Columbia College promulgated on April 7, 1860, which was
declared by the Court of Appeals to be consistent with the Constitution of the state of New
York.

It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:

"They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public trust. All votes for either of
them for any elective office except that of the Court of Appeals, given by the Legislature or
the people, shall be void. They shall not exercise any power of appointment to public office.
Any male citizen of the age of twenty-one years, of good moral character, and who
possesses the requisite qualifications of learning and ability, shall be entitled to admission
to practice in all the courts of this State." (p. 93).

According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional precept is as follows:

"Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of appointing them had
previously rested with the judges, and this was the principal appointing power which they
possessed. The convention was evidently dissatisfied with the manner in which this power
had been exercised, and with the restrictions which the judges had imposed upon
admission to practice before them. The prohibitory clause in the section quoted was aimed
directly at this power, and the insertion of the provision respecting the admission of
attorneys, in this particular section of the Constitution, evidently arose from its connection
with the object of this prohibitory clause. There is nothing indicative of confidence in the
courts or of a disposition to preserve any portion of their power over this subject, unless
the Supreme Court is right in the inference it draws from the use of the word 'admission' in
the action referred to. it is urged that the admission spoken of must be by the court; that to
admit means to grant leave, and that the power of granting necessarily implies the 'power
of refusing, and of course the right of determining whether the applicant possesses the
requisite qualifications to entitle him to admission.

"These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity of the act." (p. 93.)

Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to indicate that it provided
that the possession of a diploma of the school of law of Columbia College conferring the
degree of Bachelor of Laws was evidence of the legal qualifications that the constitution
required of applicants for admission to the Bar. The decision does not however quote the
text of the law, which we cannot find in any public or accessible private library in the
country.

In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the Constitution of New York,
the Court of Appeals said of the object of the law:

"The motive for passing the act in question is apparent. Columbia College being an
institution of established reputation, and having a law department under the charge of able
professors, the students in which department were not only subjected to a formal
examination by the law committee of the institution, but to a certain definite period of study
before being entitled to a diploma as graduates, the Legislature evidently, and no doubt
justly, considered this examination, together with the preliminary study required by the act,
as fully equivalent as a test of legal requirements, to the ordinary examination by the court;
and as rendering the latter examination, to which no definite period of preliminary study
was essential, unnecessary and burdensome.

"The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning and ability of the applicant,
and for the mere purpose of substituting the examination by the law committee of the
college for that of the court. It could have had no other object, and hence no greater scope
should be given to its provisions. We cannot suppose that the Legislature designed entirely
to dispense with the plain and explicit requirements of the Constitution; and the act
contains nothing whatever to indicate an intention that the authorities of the college should
inquire as to the age, citizenship, etc., of the students before granting a diploma. The only
rational interpretation of which the act admits is, that it was intended to make the college
diploma competent evidence as to the legal attainments of the applicant, and nothing else.
To this extent alone it operates as a modification of preexisting statutes, and it is to be read
in connection with these statutes and with the Constitution itself in order to determine the
present condition of the law on the subject." (p. 89)

******

"The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of
admission, that has simply prescribed what shall be competent evidence in certain cases
upon that question." (P. 93)

From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper with that at bar may
be clearly seen. Please note only the following distinctions:

(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of Columbia College who failed
in the bar examinations be admitted to the practice of law.

(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has not taken from the
court its jurisdiction over the question of admission of attorney at law; in effect, it does not
decree the admission of any lawyer.

(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the Philippines are entirely
different on the matter of admission to the practice of law.

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their
supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this
attribute, its continuous and zealous possession and exercise by the judicial power have
been demonstrated during more than six centuries, which certainly "constitutes the most
solid of titles." Even considering the power granted to Congress by our Constitution to
repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this Court regarding the admission
to the practice of law, to our judgment the proposition that the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly
belonging to Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously established
rules and principles, (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate
individuals, and (3) decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and
principles; in effect, a judicial function of the highest degree. And it becomes more
undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on the petitions of
these same individuals, are attempted to be revoked or modified.

We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of
admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the
profession is concededly judicial. A comprehensive and conscientious study of this matter
had been undertaken in the case of State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in which the
validity of a legislative enactment providing that Cannon be permitted to practice before
the courts was discussed. From the text of this decision we quote the following paragraphs:

"This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without parallel in the history of the
English speaking people so far as we have been able to ascertain. There has been much
uncertainty as to the extent of the power of the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate
qualifications of attorneys at law, but in England and in every state of the Union the act of
admitting an attorney at law has been expressly committed to the courts, and the act of
admission has always been regarded as a judicial function. This act purports to constitute
Mr. Cannon an attorney at law, and in this respect it stands alone as an assertion of
legislative power, (p. 444)

"No greater responsibility rests upon this court than that of preserving in form and
substance the exact form of government set up by the people, (p. 444)

"Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a Senate and Assembly. (Section 1,
art. 4.) In so far as the prescribing of qualifications for admission to the bar are legislative in
character, the Legislature is acting within its constitutional authority when it sets up and
prescribes such qualifications, (p. 444)

"But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which in its judgment will
serve the purpose of legitimate legislative solicitude, is the power of the court to impose
other and further exactions and qualifications foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444)

"Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are distinct, independent,
and coordinate branches of the government. Neither branch enjoys all the powers of
sovereignty, hut each is supreme in that branch of sovereignty which properly belongs to
its department. Neither department should so act as to embarrass the other in the
discharge of its respective functions. That was the scheme and thought of the people
setting upon the form of government under which we exist. State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525;
Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)
"The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane upon which the
administration of justice is maintained. Its responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By
committing a portion of the powers of sovereignty to the judical department of our state
government, under a scheme which it was supposed rendered it immune from
embarrassment or interference by any other department of government, the courts cannot
escape responsibility for the manner in which the powers of sovereignty thus committed to
the judicial department are exercised, (p. 445)

"The relation of the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar is an
attache of the courts. The quality of justice dispensed by the courts depends in no small
degree upon the integrity of its bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and
reproach to the administration of justice and bring the courts themselves into disrepute, (p.
445)

"Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe supervision over their bars, at
least in the English speaking countries." (p. 445)

After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:

"Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six centuries prior to the
adoption of our Constitution, the courts of England, concededly subordinate to Parliament
since the Revolution of 1688, had exercised the right of determining who should be
admitted to the practice of law, which, as was said in Matter of the Sergeants at Law, 6
Bingham's New Cases 235, 'constitutes the most solid of all titles.' If the courts and the
judicial power be regarded as an entity, the power to determine who should be admitted to
practice law is a constituent element of that entity. It may be difficult to isolate that element
and say with assurance that it is either a part of the inherent power of the court, or an
essential element of the judicial power exercised by the court, but that it is a power
belonging to the judicial entity cannot be denied. Our people borrowed from England this
judicial entity and made of not only a sovereign institution, but made of it a separate
independent, and coordinate branch of the government. They took this institution along
with the power traditionally exercised to determine who should constitute its attorneys at
law. There is no express provision in the Constitution which indicates an intent that this
traditional power of the judicial department should in any manner be subject to legislative
control. Perhaps the dominant thought of the framers of our constitution was to make the
three great departments of government separate and independent of one another. The idea
that the Legislature might embarrass the judicial department by prescribing inadequate
qualifications for attorneys at law is inconsistent with the dominant purpose of making the
judicial independent of the legislative department, and such a purpose should not be
inferred in the absence of express constitutional provision. While the Legislature may
legislate with respect to the qualifications of attorneys, its power in that respect does not
rest upon any power possessed by it to deal exclusively with the subject of the
qualifications of attorneys, but is incidental merely to its general and unquestioned power
to protect the public interest. When it does legislate fixing a standard of qualifications
required of attorneys at law in order that public interests may be protected, such
qualifications constitute only a minimum standard and limit the class from which the court
must make its selection. Such legislative qualifications do not constitute the ultimate
qualifications beyond which the court cannot go in fixing additional qualifications deemed
necessary by the course for the proper administration of judicial functions. There is no
legislative power to compel courts to admit to their bars persons deemed by them unfit to
exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at law." (p. 450)

"Furthermore it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of appointment. It is quite

likely true that the Legislature may exercise the power of appointment when it is in
pursuance of a legislative functions. However, the authorities are well-nigh unanimous that
the power to admit attorneys to the practice of law is a judicial function. In all of the states,
except New Jersey (In re Reisch, 83 N. J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as our investigation reveals,
attorneys receive their formal license to practice law by their admission as members of the
bar of the court so admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 15 L. Ed. 565; Ex
parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 52, 19 L. Ed. 285;
Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan, 843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119
N. W. 1021, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413.

"The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the
courts, it having been so generally held that the act of a court in admitting an attorney to
practice is the judgment for the court, and an attempt as this on the part of the Legislature
to confer such right upon any one being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that
the licensing of an attorney is and always has been a purely judicial function, no matter
where the power to determine the qualifications may reside." (p. 451)

In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in answering a consultation
of the Senate of that State, 180 NE 725, said:

"It is indispensable to the administration of justice and to interpretation of the laws that
there be members of the bar of sufficient ability, adequate learning and sound moral
character. This arises from the need of enlightened assistance to the honest, and
restraining authority over the knavish, litigant. It is highly important, also that the public be
protected from incompetent and vicious practitioners, whose opportunity for doing
mischief is wide. It was said by Cardoz, C. L., in People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N. Y.
456, 470, 471, 162 N. E. 487, 489, 60 A. L. R. 851: 'Membership in the bar is a privilege burden
with conditions.' One is admitted to the bar 'for something more than private gain.' He
becomes 'an officer of the court, and, like the court itself, an instrument or agency to
advance the ends of justice. His cooperation with the court is due 'whenever justice would
be imperiled if cooperation was withheld." Without such attorneys at law the judicial
department of government would be hampered in the performance of its duties. That has
been the history of attorneys under the common law, both in this country and in England.
Admission to practice as an attorney at law is almost without exception conceded to be a
judicial function. Petition to that end is filed in courts, as are other proceedings invoking
judicial action. Admission to the bar is accomplish and made open and notorious by a
decision of the court entered upon its records. The establishment by the Constitution of the
judicial department conferred authority necessary to the exercise of its powers as a
coordinate department of government. It is an inherent power of such a department of
government ultimately to determine the qualifications of those to be admitted to practice in
its courts, for assisting in its work, and to protect itself in this respect from the unfit, those
lacking in sufficient learning, and those not possessing good moral character. Chief Justice
Taney stated succinctly and with finality in Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, 'It
has been well settled, by the rules and practice of common-law courts, that it rests
exclusively with the court to determine who is qualified to become one of its officers, as an
attorney and counsellor, and for what cause he ought to be removed.' " (p. 727)

In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure license to practice
the legal profession by virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in part:

"In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court, holding the test oath
for attorneys to be unconstitutional, explained the nature of the attorney's office as follows:
"They are officers of the court, admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of their
possessing sufficient legal learning and fair private character. It has always been the
general practice in this country to obtain this evidence by an examination of the parties. In
this court the fact of the admission of such officers in the highest court of the states to
which they, respectively, belong, for three years preceding their application, is regarded as
sufficient evidence of the possession of the requisite legal learning, and the statement of
counsel moving their admission sufficient evidence that their private and professional
character is fair. The order of admission is the judgment of the court that the parties
possess the requisite qualifications as attorneys and counsellors, and are entitled to appear
as such and conduct causes therein. From its entry the parties become officers of the court,
and are responsible to it for professional misconduct. They hold their office during good
behavior, and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by the
judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded. Ex parte Hoyfron, 7
How. (Miss. 127; Fletcher vs. Daingerfield, 20 Cal. 430. Their admission or their exclusion is
not the exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is the exercise of judicial power, and has
been so held in numerous cases. It was so held by the court of appeals of New York in the
matter of the application of Cooper for admission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y. 81. 'Attorneys and
Counsellors,' said that court, 'are not only officers of the court, but officers whose duties
relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature; and hence their appointment
may, with propriety, be intrusted to the court, and the latter, in performing his duty, may
very justly considered as engaged in the exercise of their appropriate judicial functions."
(pp. 650-651).

We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions :

"Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded everywhere to be the

exercise of a judicial function, and this opinion need not be burdened with citations in this
point. Admission to practice have also been held to be the exercise of one of the inherent
powers of the court."Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.

"Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and is an inherent
power of the court."A. C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281 Pac. 1018; See
Annotation on Power of Legislature respecting admission to bar, 65, A. L. R. 1512.

On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and
legislative departments of the government.

"The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial departments is
that it is the province of the legislature to establish rules that shall regulate and govern in
matters of transactions occurring subsequent to the legislative action, while the judiciary
determines rights and obligations with reference to transactions that are past or conditions
that exist at the time of the exercise of judicial power, and the distinction is a vital one and
not subject to alteration or change either by legislative action or by judicial decrees.

"The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either of the other
departments of the government."16 C. J. S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.

"If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by requiring of
them construction of the law according to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so
directly, by settling aside their judgments, compelling them to grant new trials, ordering
the discharge of offenders, or directing what particular steps shall be taken in the progress
of a judicial inquiry."Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 192.

In decreeing that bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a
general average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted
in mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgmenta
judgment revoking those promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year affecting the
bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments
even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the
legislative nor executive department, that may be so. Any attempt on the part of any of these
departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as is the case with the law in
question.

That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or supplement
the rules promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the admission to the practice of law, is
no valid argument. Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides:

"Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law.
Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish..
increase or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and
procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Courts, subject to the
power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the
power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines."Constitution of the
Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.

It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal
responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law The primary power and
responsibility which the Constitution recognizes, continue to reside in this Court. Had
Congress found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have
nothing over which to exercise the power granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and
supplement the rules promulgated by this Court, but the authority and responsibility over
the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their
supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court. The power to repeal, alter and
supplement the rules does not signify nor permit that Congress substitute or take the place
of this Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power on the matter. The Constitution does
not say nor mean that Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys
at law, or a determinate group of individuals to the practice of law. Its power is limited to
repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on the matter, if according to its judgment
the need for a better service of the legal profession requires it. But this power does not
relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at
law and supervise the practice of the legal profession.
Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate and enforce rules
for the admission to the practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and
supplement them may and should be exercised with the respect that each owes to the
other, giving careful consideration to the responsibility which the nature of each
department requires. These powers have existed together for centuries without diminution
on each part; the harmonious delimitation being found in that the legislature may and
should examine if the existing rules on the admission to the Bar respond to the demands
which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high virtues, culture, training and
responsibility. The legislature may, by means of repeal, amendment or supplemental rules,
fill up any deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power, which has the inherent
responsibility for a good and efficient administration of justice and the supervision of the
practice of the legal profession, should consider these reforms as the minimum standards
for the elevation of the profession, and see to it that with these reforms the lofty objective
that is desired in the exercise of its traditional duty of admitting, suspending, disbarring
and reinstating attorneys at law is realized. They are powers which, exercised within their
proper constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but rather complementary to each other in
attaining the establishment of a Bar that would respond to the increasing and exacting
necessities of the administration of justice.

The case of Guarina (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion. Guarina took the
examination and failed by a few points to obtain the general average. A recently enacted law
provided that one who had been appointed to the position of Fiscal may be admitted to the
practice of law without a previous examination. The Government appointed Guarina and he
discharged the duties of Fiscal in a remote province. This Tribunal refused to give his
license without previous examinations. The court said:

"Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case seeks
admission to the bar, without taking the prescribed examination, on the ground that he
holds the office of provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes.

Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:

"Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One Hundred and ninety,
entitled 'An Act providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in
the Philippine Islands,' is hereby amended to read as follows:

"1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under the
sovereignty of Spain or of the United States and are in good and regular standing as
members of the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this code;
Provided, That any person who, prior to the passage of this Act, or at any time thereafter,
shall have held, under the authority of the United States, the position of justice of the
Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First Instance, or judge or associate judge of the Court
of Land Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the position of Attorney General, Solicitor
General, Assistant Attorney General, assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney General,
prosecuting attorney for the City of Manila, assistant prosecuting attorney for the City of
Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant city attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney
for the Moro Province, or assistant attorney for the Moro Province, may be licensed to
practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands without an examination, upon motion
before the Supreme Court and establishing such fact to the satisfaction of said court."

"The records of this court- disclose that on a former occasion this appellant took, and failed
"to pass the prescribed examination. The report of the examining board, dated March 23,
1907, shows that he received an average of only 71 per cent in the various branches of legal
learning upon which he was examined, thus falling four points short of the required
percentage of 75. We would be delinquent in the performance of our duty to the public and
to the bar, if, in the face of this affirmative indication of the deficiency of the applicant in
the required qualifications of learning in the law at the time when he presented his former
application for admission to the bar, we should grant him a license to practice law in the
courts of these Islands, without first satisfying ourselves that despite his failure to pass the
examination on that occassion, he now 'possesses the necessary qualifications of learning
and ability.'

"But it is contended that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the applicant is
entitled as of right to be admitted to the bar without taking the prescribed examination
'upon motion before the Supreme Court' accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has
held and now holds the office of provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is urged that
having in mind the object which the legislator apparently sought to attain in enacting the
above-cited amendment to the earlier statute, and in view of the context generally and
especially of the fact that the amendment was inserted as a proviso in that section of the
original Act which specifically provides for the admission of certain candidates without
examination, the clause may be licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine
Islands without any examination.' It is contended that this mandatory construction is
imperatively required in order to give effect to the apparent intention of the legislator, and
to the candidate's claim de jure to have the power exercised."

And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the United States,
articles 2, 16 and 17 of Act No. 136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court continued:

"Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the commission and
confirmed to it by the Act of Congress would be limited and restricted, and in a case such as
that under consideration wholly destroyed, by giving the word 'may,' as used in the above
citation from Act No. 1597, a mandatory rather than a permissive effect. But any act of the
commission which has the effect of setting at naught in whole or in part the Act of Congress
of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of Congress prescribing, defining or limiting the power
conferred upon the commission is to that extent invalid and void, as transcending its
rightful limits and authority.

Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to the positions
enumerated, and with particular emphasis in the case of Guarina, the Court held:

"In the various cases wherein applications for admission to the bar under the provisions of
this statute have been considered heretofore, we have accepted the fact that such
appointments had been made as satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of the applicant.
But in all of those cases we had reason to believe that the applicants had been practicing
attorneys prior to the date of their appointment.

"In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the applicant was
not and never had been practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the date
of his appointment as provincial fiscal, and it further affirmatively appears that he was
deficient in the required qualifications at the time when he last applied for admission to the
bar.

"In the light of this affirmative proof of his deficiency on that occasion, we do not think that
his appointment to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof of his
possession of the necessary qualifications of learning and ability. We conclude therefore
that this application for license to practice in the courts of the Philippines, should be
denied.

"In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell only four points
short of the necessary grade to entitle him to a license to practice; and in view also of the
fact that since that time he has held the responsible office of the governor of the Province of
Sorsogon and presumably gave evidence of such marked ability in the performance of the
duties of that office that the Chief Executive, with the consent and approval of the
Philippine Commission, sought to retain him in the Government service by appointing him
to the office of provincial fiscal, we think we would be justified under the above-cited
provisions of Act No. 1597 in waiving in his case the ordinary examination prescribed by
general rule, provided he offers satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a special
examination which will be given him by a committee of the court upon his application
therefor, without prejudice to his right, if he desires so to do, to present himself at any of
the ordinary examinations prescribed by general rule."(In re Guarifia, pp. 48-49.)
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law
belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of
permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for
the license.

The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has been found also to suffer
from the fatal defect of being a class legislation, and that if it has intended to make a
classification, it is arbitrary and unreasonable.

In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of the Supreme Court, until
December 31 of that year, to grant license for the practice of law to those students who
began studying before November 4, 1897, and had studied for two years and presented a
diploma issued by a school of law, or to those who had studied in a law office and would
pass an examination, or to those who had studied for three years if they commenced their
studies after the aforementioned date. The Supreme Court declared that this law was
unconstitutional being, among others, a class legislation. The Court said:

"This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this state by virtue of
diplomas from law schools issued to the applicants. The act of the general assembly passed
in 1899, under which the application is made, is entitled 'An act to amend section 1 of an act
entitled "An act to revise the law in relation to attorneys and counselors,' approved March
28, 1894, in force July 1, 1874.' The amendment, so far as it appears in the enacting clause,
consists in the addition to the section of the following: 'And every applicant for a license
who shall comply with the rules of the supreme court in regard to admission to the bar in
force at the time such applicant commend the study of law, either in a law office or a law
school or college, shall be granted a license under this act notwithstanding any subsequent
changes in said rules'."In re Day et al, 54 N. Y., p. 646.

* * * "After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of which is that up to
December 31, 1899, this court shall grant a license of admittance to the bar to the holder of
every diploma regularly issued by any law school regularly organized under the laws of this
state, whose regular course of law studies is two years, and requiring an attendance by the
student of at least 36 weeks in each of such years, and showing that the student began the
study of law prior to November 4, 1897, and accompanied with the usual proofs of good
moral character. The other branch of the proviso is that any student who has studied law
for two years in a law office, or part of such time in a law office, 'and part in the aforesaid
law school,' and whose course of study began prior to November 4, 1897, shall be admitted
upon a satisfactory examination by the examining board in the branches now required by
the rules of this court. If the right to admission exists at all, it is by virtue of the proviso,
which, it is claimed, confers substantial rights and privileges upon the persons named
therein, and establishes rules of legislative creation for their admission to the bar." (p. 647.)

"Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a special legislation,

prohibited by the constitution, and invalid as such. If the legislature had any right to admit
attorneys to practice in the courts and take part in the administration of justice, and could
prescribe the character of evidence which should be received by the court as conclusive of
the requisite learning and ability of persons to practice law, it could only be done by a
general law, and not by granting special and exclusive privileges to certain persons' or
classes of persons. Const, art 4, section 2. The right to practice law is a privilege, and a
license for that purpose makes the holder an officer of the court, and confers upon him the
right to appear for litigants, to argue causes, and to collect fees therefor, and creates certain
exemptions, such as from jury services and arrest on civil process while attending court.
The law conferring such privileges must be general in its operation. No doubt the
legislature, in framing an enactment for that purpose, may classify persons so long as the
law establishing classes in general, and has some reasonable relation to the end sought.
There must be some difference which furnishes a reasonable basis for different legislation
as to the different classes, and not a purely arbitrary one, having no just relation to the
subject of the legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs. People, 147 111. 66, 35 N. E. 62; Eitchie vs.
People, 155 III. 98, 40 N. E. 454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.

"The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired by experience, may
furnish a basis for classification (Williams vs. People 121 111. 48, II N. E. 881); but the place
where such physician has resided and practiced his profession cannot furnish such basis,
and is an arbitrary discrimination, making an enactment based upon it void (State vs.
Pennyeor, 65 N. E. 113, 18 Atl. 878). Here the legislature undertakes to say what shall serve as
a test of fitness for the profession of the law. and. plainly, any classification must have some
reference to learning, character, or ability to engage in such practice. The proviso is limited,
first, to a class of persons who began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897. This class
is subdivided into two classesFirst, those presenting diplomas issued :by any law school of
this state before December 31, 1899; and, second, those who studied law for the period of
two years in a law office, or part of the time in a law school and part in a law office, who are
to be admitted upon examination in the subjects specified in the present rules of this court,
and as to this latter subdivision there seems to be no limit of time for making application
for admission. As to both classes, the conditions of the rules are dispensed "with, and as
between the two different conditions and limits of time are fixed. No course of study is
prescribed for the law school, but a diploma granted upon the completion of any sort of
course its managers may prescribe is made all-sufficient. Can there be anything with
relation to the qualifications or fitness of persons to practice law resting upon the mere
date of November 4, 1897, which will furnish a basis of classification. Plainly not. Those who
began the study of law November 4th could qualify themselves to practice in two years as
well as those who began on the 3rd. The classes named in the proviso need spend only two
years in study, while those who commenced the next day must spend three years, although
they would complete two years before the time limit. The one who commenced on the 3d. If
possessed of a diploma, is to be admitted without examination before December 31, 1899,
and without any prescribed course of study, while as to the other the prescribed course
must be pursued, and the diploma is utterly useless. Such classification cannot rest upon
any natural reason, or bear any just relation to the subject sought, and none is suggested.
The proviso is for the sole purpose of bestowing privileges upon certain defined persons,
(pp. 647-648.)

In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N. W. 441, where the legislature
attempted by law to reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the court also held with regards
to its aspect of being a class legislation:

"But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it he granted that the legislature has power
to prescribe ultimately and definitely the qualifications upon which courts must admit and
license those applying as attorneys at law, that power can not be exercised in the manner
here attempted. That power must be exercised through general laws which will apply to all
alike and accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking of the right of the Legislature to exact
qualifications of those desiring to pursue chosen callings, Mr. Justice Field in the case of
Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said: 'It is
undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United States to follow any lawful calling,
business or profession he may choose, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed
upon all persons of like age, sex, and condition. This right may in many respects be
considered as a distinguishing feature of our republican institutions. Here all vocations are
all open to every one on like conditions. All may he pursued as sources of livelihood, some
requiring years of study and great learning for their successful prosecution. The interest,
or, as it is sometimes termed, the 'estate' acquired in themthat is, the right to continue their
prosecutionis often of great value to the possessors, and cannot be arbitrarily taken from
them, any more than their real or personal property can be thus taken. It is fundamental
under our system of government that all similarly situated and possessing equal
qualifications shall enjoy equal opportunities. Even statutes regulating the practice of
medicine, requiring examinations to establish the possession on the part of the application
of his proper qualifications before he may be licensed to practice, have been challenged,
and courts have seriously considered whether the exemption from such examinations of
those practicing in the state at the time of the enactment of the law rendered such law
unconstitutional because of infringement upon this general principle. State vs. Thomas
Call, 121 N. C. 643, 28 S. E. 517; see, also, The State ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172,
76 N. W. 345; State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N. W. 468.

"This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the right to practice law
and to constitute him an officer of this Court as a mere matter of legislative grace or favor. It
is not material that he had once established his right to practice law and that one time he
possessed the requisite learning and other qualifications to entitle him to that right. That
fact in no manner affect the power of the Legislature to select from the great body of the
public an individual upon whom it would confer its favors.

"A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded the Supreme Court to
admit to the practice of law, without examination, all who had 'serve in the military or naval
forces of the United States during the World War and received an honorable discharge
therefrom and who (were disabled therein or thereby within the purview of the Act of
Congress approved June 7th, 1924 known as 'World War Veteran's Act, 1924 and whose
disability is rated at least ten per cent thereunder at the time of the passage of this Act." This
Act was held unconstitutional on the ground that it clearly violated the quality clauses of
the constitution of that state. In re Application of George W. Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227
N. W. 179.

A good summary of a classification constitutional acceptable is explained in 1% Am. Jur. 151-

153 as follows:

"The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a classification to be
valid must rest upon material differences between the person included in it and those
excluded and, furthermore, must be based upon substantial distinctions. As the rule has
sometimes avoided the constitutional prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent and real
differences, as distinguished from irrelevant and artificial once. Therefore, any law that is
made applicable to one class of citizens only must be based on some substantial difference
between the situation of that class and other individuals to which it does not apply and
must rest on some reason on which it can be defended. In other words, there must be such
a difference between the situation and circumstances of all the members of the class and
the situation and circumstances of all other members of the state in relation to the subjects
of the discriminatory legislation as presents a just and natural reason for the difference
made in their liabilities and burdens and in their rights and privileges. A law is not general
because it operates on all within a clause unless there is a substantial reason why it is made
to operate on that class only, and not generally on all." (12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)

Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any
subject, have obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to
1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954,
and 73.5 per cent in 1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of
office as members of the Bar, notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general
average of 75 per cent, which has been invariably followed since 1950. Is there any motive
of the nature indicated by the abovementioned authorities, for this classification? If there is
none, and none has been given, then the classification is fatally defective.

It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before, with the general
average indicated, were not included because the Tribunal has no record of the
unsuccessful candidates of those years. This fact does not justify the unexplained
classification of unsuccessful candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955.
Neither is the exclusion of those who failed before said years under the same conditions
justified. The fact that this Court has no record of examinations prior to 1946 does not
signify that no one concerned may prove by some other means his right to an equal
consideration.

To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on account of its
retroactivity, it is argued that it is curative, and that in such form it is constitutional. What
does Rep. Act 972 intend to cure? Only from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in which the
Tribunal permitted admission to the bar of candidates who did not obtain the general
average of 75 per cent: in 1946 those who obtained only 72 per cent; in the 1947 and those
who had 69 per cent or more; in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent; and in 1950 to
1953, those who obtained 74 per cent, which was considered by the Court as equivalent' to
75 per cent as prescribed by the Rules, by reason of circumstances deemed to be
sufficiently justifiable. These changes in the passing averages during those years were all
that could be objected to or criticized.. Now, is it desired to undo what had been donecancel
the license that was issued to those who did not obtain the prescribed 75 per cent?
Certainly not. The disputed law clearly does not propose to do so. Concededly, it approves
what has been done by this Tribunal. What Congress lamented is that the Court did not
consider 69.5 per cent obtained by those candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952 as sufficient
to qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of will or defect of judgment of the
Court that is being cured, and to complete the cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of the
disputed law is being extended up to the years 1953, 1954 and 1955, increasing each year the
general average by one per cent, with the order that said candidates be admitted to the Bar.
This purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best proof that what the law attempts to
amend and correct are not the rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of the Court, by
means of simply taking its place. This is doing directly what the Tribunal should have done
during those years according to the judgment of Congress. In other words, the power
exercised was not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules, which continue in force. What
was done was to stop or suspend them. And this power is not included in what the
Constitution has granted to Congress, because it falls within the power to apply the rules.
This power corresponds to the judiciary, to which such duty been confided.

Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations, at indefinite

intervals. The grave defect of this system is that it does not take into account that the laws
and jurisprudence are not stationary, and when a candidate finally receives his certificate,
it may happen that the existing laws and jurisprudence are already different, seriously
affecting in this manner his usefulness. The system that the said law prescribes was used
in the first bar examinations of this country, but was abandoned for this and other
disadvantages. In this case, however, the fatal defect is that the article is not expressed in
the title of the Act. While this law according to its title will have temporary effect only from
1946 to 1955, the text of article 2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. This
is contrary to Section 21(1), article VI of the Constitution, which vitiates and annuls article 2
completely; and because it is inseparable from article 1, it is obvious that its nullity affects
the entire law.

Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within the
legislative powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second,
because they create or establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional
principles; and third, because their purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic
principles. As has already been seen, the contested law suffers from these fatal defects.

Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. 972 is
unconstitutional and therefore, void, and without any force nor effect for the following
reasons, to wit:

1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar
examinations of 1946-1952, and who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to
practice law, as was exactly found by this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the
admission to the Bar of these candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to
determine if they are at present already prepared to become members of the Bar. It obliges
the Tribunal to perform something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a
manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.

2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the petitions
of these 810 candidates, without having examined their respective examination papers, and
although it is admitted that this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time for
justifiable reasons, only this Court and no other may revise and alter them. In attempting to
do it directly Republic Act No. 972 violated the Constitution.
3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and
supplement the rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as
they ought to be, intended to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should tend
to improve and elevate the practice of law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as
minimum norms towards that end in the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily
performance of judicial functions and is essential to a worthy administration of justice. It is
therefore the primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the
ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law
according to existing rules.

4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law
makes, is contrary to facts which are of general knowledge- and does not justify the
admission to the Bar of law students inadequately prepared. The pretended classification is
arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class legislation.

5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what
the Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire
law is void.

6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to the
examinations of 1953 to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations
in those years, shall continue in force.

RESOLUTION

Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the magnificent and
impassioned discussion of the contested law by our Chief Justice at the opening and close
of the debate among the members of the Court, and after hearing the judicious
observations of two of our beloved colleagues who since the beginning have announced
their decision not to take part in voting, we, the eight members of the Court who subscribe
to this decision have voted and resolved, and have decided for the Court, and under the
authority of the same:

1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No, 972 referring to the examinations of
1946 to 1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and
without force and effect.

2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the
examinations subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is
valid and shall continue to be in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of the
Constitution.

Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the
examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the
examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a
grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as having passed, whether they have
filed petitions for admission or not. After this decision has become final, they shall be
permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar on
the date or dates that the Chief Justice may set. So ordered.

Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo, Padilla, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

(See Annex I Volume 94 Philippine Reports Pages 565-582)

The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972

As will be observed from Annex I, this Court reduced to 72 per cent the passing general
average in the bar examination of August and November of 1946; 69 per cent in 1947; 70 per
cent in 1948; 74 per cent in 1949; maintaining the prescribed 75 per cent since 1950, but
raising to 75 per cent those who obtained 74 per cent since 1950. This caused the
introduction in 1951, in the Senate of the Philippines of Bill No. 12 which was intended to
amend Sections 5, 9, 12, 14 and 16 of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, concerning the
admission of attorneys-at-law to the practice of the profession. The amendments embrace
many interesting matters, but those referring to sections 14 and 16 immediately concern us.
The proposed amendment is as follows:

"Sec. 14. Passing average.In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed the
examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 70 per cent without
falling below 50 per cent in any subject. In determining the average, the foregoing subjects
shall be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 20 per cent; Land Registration and
Mortgages, 5 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law, 10 per cent; Political Law,
10 per cent; International Law, 5 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and
Practical Exercises, 5 per cent; Social Legislation, 5 per cent; Taxation, 5 per cent.
Unsuccessful candidates shall not be required to take another examination in any subject
in which they have obtained a rating of 70 per cent or higher and such rating shall be taken
into account in determining their general average in any subsequent examinations:
Provided, however, That if the candidate fails to get a general average of 70 per cent in his
third examination, he shall lose the benefit of having already passed some subjects and
shall be required, to the examination in all the subjects.
"Sec. 16. Admission and oath of successful applicants.Any applicant who has obtained a
general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without falling below 50 per cent in any
examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, or who has been otherwise found to be
entitled to admission to the bar, shall be allowed to take and subscribe before the Supreme
Court the corresponding oath of office. (Arts. 4 and 5, 8, No. 12).

With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the portion pertinent to the matter before us being:

"It seems to be unfair that unsuccessful candidates at bar examinations should be

compelled to repeat even those subjects which they have previously passed. This is not the
case in any other government examination. The Rules of Court have therefore been
amended in this measure to give a candidate due credit for any subject which he has
previously passed with a rating of 75 per cent or higher."

Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by Congress on May 3, 1951, the President
requested the comments of this Tribunal before acting on the same. The comment was
signed by seven Justices while three chose to refrain from making any and one took no
part. With regards to the matter that interests us, the Court said:

"The next amendment is of section 14 of Rule 127. One part of this amendment provides that
if a bar candidate obtains 70 per cent or higher in any subject, although failing to pass the
examination, he need not be examined in said subject in his next examination. This is a sort
of passing the Bar Examination on the installment plan, one or two or three subjects at a
time. The trouble with this proposed system is that although it makes it easier and more
convenient for the candidate because he may in an examination prepare himself on only
one or two subjects so as to insure passing them, by the time that he has passed the last
required subject, which may be several years away from the time that he reviewed and
passed the first subjects, he shall have forgotten the principles and theories contained in
those subjects' and remembers only those of the one or two subjects that he had last
reviewed and passed. This is highly possible because there is nothing in the law which
requires a candidate to continue taking the Bar examinations every year in succession. The
only condition imposed is that a candidate, on this plan, must pass the examination in no
more than three installments; but there is no limitation as to the time or number of years
intervening between each examination taken. This would defeat the object and the
requirements of the law and the Court in admitting persons to the practice of law. When a
person is so admitted, it is to be presumed and presupposed that he possesses the
knowledge and proficiency in the law and the knowledge of all law subjects required in bar
examinations, so as presently to be able to practice the legal profession and adequately
render the legal service required by prospective clients. But this would not hold true of the
candidates who may have obtained a passing grade on any five subjects eight years ago,
another three subjects one year later, and the last two subjects the present year. We believe
that the present system of requiring a candidate to obtain a passing general average with no
grade in any subject below 50 per cent is more desirable and satisfactory. It requires one to
be all around, and prepared in all required legal subjects at the time of admission to the
practice of law.

*******

"We now come to the last amendment, that of section 16 of Rule 127. This amendment
provides that any applicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all
subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after the
4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of
office. In other words, Bar candidates who obtained not less than 70 per cent in any
examination since the year 1946 without failing below 50 per cent in any subject, despite
their non-admission to the Bar by the Supreme Court because they failed to obtain a
passing general average in any of those years, will be admitted to the Bar. This provision is
not only prospective but retroactive in its effects.

"We have already stated in our comment on the next preceding amendment that we are not
exactly in favor of reducing the passing general average from 75 per cent to 70' per cent to
govern even in the future. As to the validity of making such reduction retroactive, we have
serious legal doubts. We should not lose sight of the fact that after every bar examinations,
the Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to the Bar those
who have obtained a passing general average grade, but also rejecting and denying the
petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The present amendment would have
the effect of repudiating, reversing and revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying
and rejecting the petitions of those who may have obtained an average of 70 per cent or
more but less than the general passing average fixed for that year. It is clear that this
question involves legal implications, and this phase of the amendment if finally enacted
into law might have to go thru a legal test. As one member of the Court remarked during the
discussion, when a court renders a decision or promulgate a resolution or order on the
basis of and in accordance with a certain law or rule then in force, the subsequent
amendment or even repeal of said law or rule may not affect the final decision, order, or
resolution already promulgated, in the sense of revoking or rendering it void and of no
effect.

"Another aspect of this question to be considered is the fact that members of the bar are
officers of the courts, including the Supreme Court. When a Bar candidate is admitted to the
Bar, the Supreme Court impliedly regards him as a person fit, competent and qualified to be
its officer. Conversely, when it refused and denied admission to the Bar to a candidate who
in any year since 1946 may have obtained a general average of 70 per cent but less than that
required for that year in order to pass, the Supreme Court equally and impliedly considered
and declared that he was not prepared, ready, competent and qualified to be its officer. The
present amendment giving retroactivity to the reduction of the passing general average
runs counter to all these acts and resolutions of the Supreme Court and practically and in
effect says that a candidate not accepted, and even rejected by the Court to be its officer
because he was unprepared, undeserving and unqualified, nevertheless and in spite of all,
must be admitted and allowed by this Court to serve as its officer. We repeat, that this is
another important' aspect of the question to be carefully and seriously considered."

The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951, stating the following:

"I am fully in accord with the avowed objection of the bill, namely, to elevate the standard of
the legal profession and maintain it on a high level. This is not achieved, however, by
admitting to practice precisely a special class who have failed in the bar examination.
Moreover, the bill contains provisions to which I find serious fundamental objections.

"Section 5 provides that any applicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in
all subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after
the 4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribed the corresponding oath of
office. This provision constitutes class legislation, benefiting as it does specifically one
group of persons, namely, the unsuccessful candidates in the 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949 and
1950 bar examinations.

"The same provision undertakes to revoke or set aside final resolutions of the Supreme
Court made in accordance with the law then in force. It should be noted that after every bar
examination the Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to
the Bar those who have obtained a passing general average but also rejecting and denying
the petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The provision under
consideration would have the effect of revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying
and rejecting the petitions of those who may have failed to obtain the passing average fixed
for that year. Said provision also sets a bad precedent in that the Government would be
morally obliged to grant a similar privilege to those who have failed in the examinations for
admission to other professions such as medicine, engineering, architecture and certified
public accountancy."

Consequently, the bill was returned to the Congress of the Philippines, but it was not
repassed by 2/3 vote of each House as prescribed by section 20, article VI of the
Constitution. Instead Bill No. 371 was presented in the Senate. It reads as follows:
 AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM 1946 UP TO AND
INCLUDING 1953

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled:

Section 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 14, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, any
bar candidate who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any bar examnations after
July 4, 1946 up to the August 1951 bar examinations; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar
examinations; 72 per cent in the 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar
examinations; 74 per cent in 1955 bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade
below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding
oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That 75 per cent passing
general average shall be restored in all succeeding examinations; and Provided, finally,
That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be
considered as one and included as part of the next whole number.

Sec. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any bar
examination after July 4, 1946 shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects
and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing' general average that
said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take.

Sec. 3. This bill shall take effect upon its approval.

With the following explanatory note:

"This is a revised Bar bill to meet the objections of the President and to afford another
opportunity to those who feel themselves discriminated by the Supreme Court from 1946 to
1951 when those who would otherwise have passed the bar examination but were
arbitrarily not so considered by altering its previous decisions of the passing mark. The
Supreme Court has been altering the passing mark from 69 in 1947 to 74 in 1951. In order to
cure the apparent arbitrary fixing of passing grades and to give satisfaction to all parties
concerned, it is proposed in this bill a gradual increase in the general averages for passing
the bar examinations as follows; For 1946 to 1951 bar examinations, 70 per cent; for 1952 bar
examination, 71 per cent; for 1953 bar examination, 72 per cent; for 1954 bar examination, 73
percent; and for 1955 bar examination, 74 per cent. Thus in 1956 the passing mark will be
restored with the condition that the candidate shall not obtain n any subject a grade of
below 50 per cent. The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade, is the
tremendous handicap which students during the years immediately after the Japanese
occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the
inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up law soon after the liberation. It is
believed that by 1956 the preparation of our students as well as the available reading
material's will be under normal conditions, if not improved from those years preceding the
last world war.

In this bill we eliminated altogether the idea of having our Supreme Court assumed the
supervision as well as the administration of the study of law which was objected to by the
President in the Bar Bill of 1951.

"The President in vetoing the Bar Bill last year stated among his objections that the bill
would admit to the practice of law 'a special class who failed in the bar examination'. He
considered the bill a class legislation. This contention, however, is not, in good conscience,
correct because Congress is merely supplementing what the Supreme Court have already
established as precedent by making as low as 69 per cent the passing mark of those who
took the Bar examination in 1947. These bar candidates for whom this bill should be
enacted, considered themselves as having passed the bar examination on the strength of
the established precedent of our Supreme Court and were fully aware of the
insurmountable difficulties and handicaps which they were unavoidably placed. We believe
that such precedent cannot or could not have been altered, constitutionally, by the
Supreme Court, without giving due consideration to the rights already accrued or vested in
the bar candidates who took the examination when the precedent was not yet altered, or in
effect, was still enforced and without being inconsistent with the principles of their
previous resolutions.

"If this bill would be enacted, it shall be considered as a simple curative act or corrective
statute which Congress has the power to enact. The requirement of a 'valid classification' as
against class legislation, is very expressed in the following American Jurisprudence :

" 'A valid classification must include all who naturally belong to the class, all who possess a
common disability, attribute, or classification, and there must be a "natural" and substantial
differentiation between those included in the class and those it leaves untouched. When a
class is accepted by the Court as "natural" it cannot be again split and then have the
diservered factions of the original unit designated with different rules established for
each.'" (Fountain Park Co. vs. Rensier, 199 Ind. 95, N. E. 465 (1926).

'"Another case penned by Justice Cardozo: "Time with its tides brings new conditions
which must be cared for by new laws. Sometimes the new conditions affect the members of
a class. If so, the correcting statute must apply to all alike. Sometimes the condition affect
only a few. If so, the correcting statute may be as narrow as the mischief. The constitution
does not prohibit special laws inflexibly and always. It permits them when there are special
evils with which the general laws are incompetent to cope. The special public purpose will
sustain the special form. * *, * The problem in the last analysis is one of legislative policy,
with a wide margin of discretion conceded to the lawmakers. Only in the case of plain
abuse will there be revision by the court. (In Williams vs. Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore, 286 U.S. 36, 77 L. Ed. 1015, 53 Sup. Ct. 431). (1932)

"This bill has all the earmarks of a corrective statute which always retroacts to the extent of
the care or correction only as in this case from 1946 when the Supreme Court first deviated
from the rule of 75 per cent in the Rules of Court.

"For the foregoing purposes the approval of this bill is earnestly recommended.

(Sgd.) "Pablo Angeles David

"Senator"

Without much debate, the revised bill was passed by Congress as above transcribed. The
President again asked the comments of this Court, which endorsed the following:

Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Acting Executive Secretary, Manila, with the
information that, with respect to Senate Bill No. 371, the 'members of the Court are taking-
the same views they expressed on Senate Bill No. 12 passed by Congress in May, 1951,
contained in the first indorsement of the undersigned dated June 5, 1951, to the Assistant
Executive Secretary.

(Sgd.) Ricardo Paras

The President allowed the period within which the bill should be signed to pass without
vetoing it, by virtue of which it became a law on June 21, 1953 (Sec. 20, Art. VI, Constitution)
numbered 972 (many times erroneously cited as No. 974).

It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was an election year, and that both the President
and the author of the Bill were candidates for re-election, together, however, they lost in the
polls.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

Labrador, J.:
The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has always been, the exclusive privilege of
this Court, because lawyers are members of the Court and only this Court should be
allowed to determine admission thereto in the interest of the principle of the separation of
powers. The power to admit is judicial in the sense that discretion is used in its exercise.
This power should be distinguished from the power to promulgate rules Which regulate
admission. It is only this power (to promulgate amendments to the rules) that is given in
the Constitution to the Congress, not the exercise of the discretion to admit or not to admit.
Thus the rules on the holding of examination, the qualifications of applicants, the passing
grades, etc. are within the scope, of the legislative power. But the power to determine when
a candidate has made or has not made the required grade is judicial, and lies completely
with this Court.

I hold that the act under consideration is an exercise of the judicial function, and lies
beyond the scope of the congressional prerogative of amending the rules. To say that
candidates who obtain a general average of 72 per cent in 1953, 73 per cent in 1954, and 74
per cent in 1955 should be considered as having passed the examination, is to mean
exercise of the privilege and discretion judged in this Court. It is a mandate to the tribunal
to pass candidates for different years with grades lower than the passing mark. No
reasoning is necessary to show that it is an arrogation of the Court's judicial authority and
discretion. It is furthermore objectionable as discriminatory. Why should those taking the
examinations in 1953, 1954 and 1955 be allowed to have the privilege of a lower passing
grade, while those taking earlier or later are not?

I vote that the act in toto be declared unconstitutional, because it is not embraced within
the rule-making power of Congress, because it is an undue interference with the power of
this Court to admit members thereof, and because it is discriminatory.

DISSENTING OPINION

Paras, C.J.:

Under section 14 of Rule of Court No. 127, in order that a bar candidate "may be deemed to
have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75
per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject." This passing mark
has always been adhered to, with certain exception presently to be specified.
With reference to the bar examinations given in August, 1946, the original list of successful
candidates included only those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more.
Upon motion for reconsideration, however, 12 candidates with general averages ranging
from 72 to 73 per cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of December 18, 1946. In the
examinations of November, 1946 the list first released containing the names of successful
candidates covered only those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more; but,
upon motion for reconsideration, 19 candidates with a general average of 72 per cent were
raised to 75 per cent by resolution of March 31, 1947. This would indicate that in the original
list of successful candidates those having a general average of 73 per cent or more but
below 75 per cent were included. After the original list of 1947 successful bar candidates
had been released, and on motion, for reconsideration, all candidates with a general
average of 69 per cent were allowed to pass by resolution of July 15, 1948. With respect to
the bar examinations held in August, 1948, in addition to the original list of successful bar
candidates, all those who obtained a general average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective of
the grades in any one subject and irrespective of whether they filed petitions for
reconsideration, were allowed to pass by resolution of April 28, 1949. Thus, for the year 1947
the Court in effect made 69 per cent as the passing average, and for the year 1948, 70 per
cent; and this amounted, without being noticed perhaps, to an amendment of section 14 of
Rule 127.

Numerous flunkers in the bar examinatons held subsequent to 1948, whose general
averages mostly ranged from 69 to 73 per cent, filed motions for reconsideration, invoking
the precedents set by this Court in 1947 and 1948, but said motions were uniformly denied.

In the year 1951, the Congress, after public hearings where law deans and professors,
practising attorneys, presidents of bar associations, and law graduates appeared and
argued lengthily pro or con, approved a bill providing, among others, for the reduction of
the passing general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent, retroactive to any bar
examination held after July 4, 1946. This bill was vetoed by the President mainly in view of
an unfavorable comment of Justices Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Bautista and
Jugo. In 1953, the Congress passed another bill similar to the previous bill vetoed by the
President, with the important difference that in the later bill the provisions in the first bill
regarding (1) the supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court of the study of law, (2)
the inclusion of Social Legislation and Taxation as new bar subjects, (3) the publication of
names of the bar examiners before the holding of the examinations, and (4) the equal
division among the examiners of all the admission fees paid by bar applicants, were
eliminated. This second bill was allowed to become a law, Republic Act No. 972, by the
President by merely not signing it within the required period; and in doing so the President
gave due respect to the will of the Congress which, speaking for the people, chose to repass
the bill first vetoed by him.

Under Republic Act No. 972, any bar candidates who obtained a general average of 70 per
cent in any examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar
examinations; 72 per cent in 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar
examinations; and 74 per cent in the 1955 bar examinations, without obtaining a grade
below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to pass. Said Act also provides that any
bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any examination after
July 4, 1946, shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or
grades shall be included in computing the passing in any subsequent examinations.

Numerous candidates who had taken the bar examinations previous to the approval of
Republic Act No. 972 and failed to obtain the necessary passing average, filed with this
Court mass or separate petitions, praying that they be admitted to the practice of law under
and by virtue of said Act, upon the allegation that they have obtained the general averages
prescribed therein. In virtue of the resolution of July 6, 1953, this Court held on July 11, 1953
a hearing on said petitions, and members of the bar, especially authorized representatives
of bar associations, were invited to argue or submit memoranda as amici curiae, the reason
alleged for said hearing being that some doubt had "been expressed on the constitutionality
of Republic Act No. 972 in so far as it affects past bar examinations and the matter" involved
"a new question of public interest."

All discussions in support of the proposition that the power to regulate the admission to the
practice of law is inherently judicial, are immaterial, because the subject is now governed
by the Constitution which in Article VII, section 13, provides as follows:

"The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in ail courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify
substantive right. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme
Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to
the practice of law in the Philippines."

Under this constitutional provision, while the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate
rules concerning the admission to the practice of law, the Congress has the power to
repeal, alter or supplement said rules. Little intelligence is necessary to see that the power
of the Supreme Court and the Congress to regulate the admission to the practice of law is
concurrent.

The opponents of Republic Act No. 972 argue that this Act, in so far as it covers bar
examinations held prior to its approval, is unconstitutional, because it sets aside the final
resolutions of the Supreme Court refusing to admit to the practice of law the various
petitioners, thereby resulting in a legislative encroachment upon the judicial power. In my
opinion this view is erroneous. In the first place, resolutions on the rejection of bar
candidates do not have the finality of decisions in justiciable cases where the Rules of Court
expressly fix certain periods after which they become executory and unalterable.
Resolutions on bar matters, specially on motions for reconsiderations filed by flunkers in
any given year, are subject to revision by this Court at any time, regardless of the period
within which the motions were filed, and this has been the practice heretofore. The obvious
reason is that bar examinations and admission to the practice of law may be deemed as a
judicial function only because said matters happen to be entrusted, under the Constitution
and our Rules of Court, to the Supreme Court. There is no judicial function involved, in the
strict and constitutional sense of the word, because bar examinations and the admission to
the practice of law, unlike justiciable cases, do not affect opposing litigants. It is no more
than the function of other examining boards. In the second place, retroactive laws are not
prohibited by the Constitution, except only when they would be ex post facto, would impair
obligations and contracts or vested rights or would deny due process and equal protection
of the law. Republic Act No. 972 certainly is not an ex post facto enactment, does not impair
any obligation and contract or vested rights, and denies to no one the right to due process
and equal protection of the law. On the other hand, it is a mere curative statute intended to
correct certain obvious inequalities arising from the adoption by this Court of different
passing general averages in certain years.

Neither can it be said that bar candidates prior to July 4, 1946, are being discriminated
against, because we no longer have any record of those who might have failed before the
war, apart from the circumstance that 75 per cent had always been the passing mark
during said period. It may also be that there are no pre-war bar candidates similarly
situated as those benefited by Republic Act No. 972. At any rate, in the matter of
classification, the reasonableness must be determined by the legislative body. It is proper to
recall that the Congress held public hearings, and we can fairly suppose that the
classification adopted in the Act reflects good legislative judgment derived from the facts
and circumstances then brought out.

As regards the alleged interference in or encroachment upon the judgment of this Court by
the Legislative Department, it is sufficient to state that, if there is any interference at all, it is
one expressly sanctioned by the Constitution. Besides, interference in judicial adjudication
prohibited by the Constitution is essentially aimed at protecting rights of litigants that have
already been vested or acquired in virtue of decisions of courts, not merely for the empty
purpose of creating appearances of separation and equality among the three branches of
the Government. Republic Act No. 972 has not produced a case involving two parties and
decided by the Court in favor of one and against the other. Needless to say, the statute will
not affect the previous resolutions passing bar candidates who had obtained the general
average prescribed by section 14 of Rule 127. A law would be objectionable and
unconstitutional if, for instance, it would provide that those who have been admitted to the
bar after July 4, 1946, whose general average is below 80 per cent, will not be allowed to
practice law, because said statute; would then destroy a right already acquired under
previous resolutions of this Court, namely, the bar admission of those whose general
averages were from 75 to 79 per cent.

Without fear of contradiction, I think the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making
power conferred by the Constitution, may pass a resolution amending section 14 of Rule 127
by reducing the passing average to 70 per cent, effective several years before the date of the
resolution. Indeed, when this Court on July 15, 1948 allowed to pass all candidates who
obtained a general average of 69 per cent or more and on April 28, 1949 those who obtained
a general average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective of whether they filed petitions for
reconsideration, it in effect amended section 14 of Rule 127 retroactively, because during
the examinations held in August 1947 and August 1948, said section (fixing the general
average at 75 per cent) was supposed to be in force. It stands to reason, if we are to admit
that the Supreme Court and the Congress have concurrent power to regulate the admission
to the practice of law, that the latter may validly pass a retroactive rule fixing the passing
general average.

Republic Act No. 972 cannot be assailed on the ground that it is unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious, since this Court had already adopted as passing averages 69 per cent for the
1947 bar examinations and 70 per cent for the 1948 examinations. Anyway, we should not
inquire into the wisdom of the law, since this is a matter that is addressed to the judgment
of the legislators. This Court in many instances had doubted the propriety of legislative
enactments, and yet it has consistently refrained from nullifying them solely on that
ground.

To say that the admission of the bar candidates benefited under Republic Act 972 is against
public interest, is to assume that the matter of whether said Act is beneficial or harmful to
the general public was not considered by the Congress. As already stated, the Congress
held public hearings, and we are bound to assume that the legislators, loyal, as do the
members of this Court, to their oath of office, had taken all the circumstances into account
before passing the Act. On the question of public interest I may observe that the Congress,
representing the people who elected them, should be more qualified to make an appraisal. I
am inclined to accept Republic Act No. 972 as an expression of the will of the people
through their duly elected representatives.

I would, however, not go to the extent of admitting that the Congress, in the exercise of its
concurrent power to repeal, alter, or supplement the Rules of Court regarding the
admission to the practice of law, may act in an arbitrary or capricious manner, in the same
way that this Court may not do so. We are thus left in the situation, incidental to a
democracy, where we can and should only hope that the. right men are put in the right
places in our Government.

Wherefore, I hold that Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional and should therefore be given
effect in its entirety.

Candidates who in 1953 obtained 71.5 per cent, without falling below 50 per cent on any
subject, are considered passed.