PSI and RC SMIs

File No.
RDSO-TI0LKO(PSI)/54/2020-O/o PED/TI/RDSO-Part(2)
Government of India, Telephone: 2465763 (O). 42805(Of.)
Ministry of Railways Fax : 91-0522-2465763
Research Designs & Standards Organisaton, E-mail:dt.psi.rdso@gmail.com
Manak Nagar, Lucknow– 226 011
No. RDSO-TI0LKO(PSI)/39/2021-O/o PED/TI/RDSO Date: As signed
1. Central Railway, Station Building, Mumbai CST – 400 001.

2. Eastern Railway, Fairlie Place, Kolkata-700 001.
3. East Central Railway, Hajipur-844 101.
4. East Coast Railway, Bhubaneshwar-751 023
5. Northern Railway, Baroda House, New Delhi - 110 001.
6. North Central Railway, Allahabad-211 001.
7. North Eastern Railway, Gorakhpur-220 055.
8. North Frontier Railway, Mailgaon - 781 011.
9. North Western Railway, Jaipur – 302 017.
10. Southern Railway, Park Town, Chennai- 600 003.
11. South Central Railway, Railnilayam, Secunderabad-500 371.
12. South Eastern Railway, Garden Reach, Kolkata-700 043.
13. South East Central Railway, Bilaspur-495 004.
14. South Western Railway, DRM’s Office, Hubli-580 028.
15. Western Railway, Churchgate, Mumbai-400 020.
16. West Central Railway, Jabalpur- 482 001.
17. Konkan Railway Corporation Ltd, Belapur Bhavan, Sector-11, CBD-Belapur,
Navi Mumbai, Maharastra-400 614.
Sub: Regarding Revision of Maintenance Instructions for Provision of

Disconnector Assembly to the Lightening Arresters.
*****
The frequent problems being faced due to present arrangement of Disconnector
Assembly connected to the 42kV Lightening Arresters, have been reported by various
Zonal Railways.
In view of the above, the ‘Maintenance Instructions for Provision of Disconnector

Assembly to the Lightening Arresters provided over 25 kV side of traction system’ has
been revised after considering feedback/suggestions from Zonal Railways. The copy of
revised Instruction No. TI/MI/0048 Rev.02 is attached herewith for your information
and further Necessary action, please.
यह सक्षम प्राधधिकारी के अनुमोदन से जारी ककया जाहा है ।
(जजितेन्द्र कुमारत)
ननिदे शक/क.सं.-3
कृते महारननिदे शक/(क.सं.)
संलग्निक: As stated above
Page 1 of 10 Effective from: Instruction no. Technical Instructions for improving reliability of traction SCADA
August-2010 TI/IN/0025 (08/2010) systems on IR
TRACTION INSTALLATION DIRECTORATE
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,
MINISTRY OF RAILWAYS
Instruction No. TI/IN/0025 (08/2010)
TECHNICAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR IMPROVING RELIABILITY

OF TRACTION SCADA SYSTEMS ON IR
Aug 2010
ISSUED BY
Traction Installation Directorate

Research Designs and Standards Organization
(Ministry of Railways)
Manak Nagar, Lucknow – 226011
TI/IN/00-- Rev 0
Technical Instructions for improving reliability of traction SCADA systems on IR
1.0 Scope & objective: This technical Instruction is applicable to different types of SCADA systems
provided on Indian Railways. Objective of this technical instruction is to improve the overall reliability
of SCADA systems existing on Indian Railways by increasing awareness of the operating personals
against any form of mal-operation of the system. These instructions should not be treated as the
substitute of Annual Maintenance Contract (AMC), however, these shall help Railways in developing
good operation & maintenance practices for SCADA system.
2.0 Development of SCADA system on IR: Prior to development of PC’s, microprocessor based SCADA
systems were commissioned in Indian Railways. Now most of them have been replaced with PC based
SCADA systems running with proprietary SCADA software and protocols. The microprocessor based
SCADA systems had its own limitations, like large size mimic diagram boards in RCC & their inability to
implement difficult logics. Now a days PC based SCADA systems working on Railways proprietary
SPORT (Standard Protocol for Railway Traction SCADA) Protocol have been made so intelligent &
efficient that any logic can be easily implemented through user friendly SCADA software for control,
monitoring and data acquisition.
Over the years there have been number of improvements in RTU designs as well, in terms of reduction
in their size, reliability of electronic components, use of IED’s in place of transducers etc.
The current specification for SCADA systems for traction is TI/SPC/RCC/SCADA/0990 (5/07) with
amendment no. 1. Approximate break up of different types / legacies of SCADA systems working on IR
is given below.
Approx. no. of Approx. year of
SN Description & specification Features
systems comm.
1 SCADA system for 25kV ac  Proprietary 40 (Mostly 1994-2001
traction SCADA on IR. protocols under up
ETI/PSI/76(12/93)  Proprietary gradation)
software and hardware
2 TI/SPC/RCC/SCADA/0986 for  CMC software 6 2001-2005

Standard SCADA for single 25 kV,  Hardware /RTU
50 Hz ac Traction Power Supply of any approved vendor

 Standard
Protocol ‘SPORT’
3 TI/SPC/RCC/SCADA/0990  SCADA vendors/ >12 2006 onwards
(05/2007) with Amendment No.1 OEM Hardware/RTU &
for Standard SCADA for single 25 own software with
kV, 50 Hz ac Traction Power SPORT protocol
Supply
4 TI/SPC/RCC/SCADA/1080(9/08)  For Mumbai 1 2009
with amendment no.1. only
Technical specification for SCADA  SPORT
for 25 kV 1 phase 50 Hz traction  IEC 60870-5-103
Power supply for Mumbai area. based communication
between RTU’s &
numerical relays.
3.0 Maintenance to SCADA systems: As explained above, IR is having a wide range of SCADA systems
installed and also technical features of these systems varies widely, therefore, Railway Board & RDSO
has time & again reiterated importance of proper un-interrupted maintenance support from OEM for
all SCADA systems and in this regard instructions issued from Rly. Board & RDSO are tabulated as
under.
SN Railway Board /RDSO references Subject

1 Letter No. 93/RE/220/3/Pt.I dated SCADA related TRD works: up gradation and AMC of
21.11.2007 existing SCADA system on IR.
2 Letter No. TI/RCC/SCADA/SPC/07 Issue of technical guide lines for awarding AMC of
dated 15.06.2007 SCADA system.
3.1 SCADA System mainly consists of Remote Control Centre (RCC), Remote Terminal Units (RTU) &
Communication Media and its reliability can be improved by following certain procedures, guidelines
and taking some precautions against mal-operations of these sub- systems.
3.2 Railways should follow these instructions during operation & maintenance of SCADA system by
themselves or through AMC.
4.0 Remote Control Centre:

4.1 General Instructions:
4.1.1 All the latest documents such as Technical Manuals, Operating Instruction, Troubleshooting
manuals & specifications should be available at RCC.
4.1.2 Only licensed copies of Microsoft Windows operating systems along with service packs
compatible to SCADA software should be used.
4.1.3 Only genuine Anti-virus software should be available and loaded on all computers.
Operating system should be upgraded with latest available service pack by the SCADA
vendor who has taken the AMC.
4.1.4 As the system is having redundancy in respect of server, FEP and MMIs, these can be
connected with internet one by one for any available upgrades for operating system & Anti-
virus software.
4.1.5 SCADA application software latest version should be available on CD-ROM and it should be
loaded on all the computers.
4.1.6 Preferably on weekly basis hot & standby computers (Host and FEP) must be interchanged.
By doing so, healthiness of system can be ensured.
4.1.7 Old PCs should be upgraded especially in respect of their RAM size. Latest available
maximum RAM size compatible to PC may be opted. Refer RDSO’s Instruction No.-
TI/IN/0020 (12/2009) for timely replacement & up-gradation of Computers at Remote
Control Centre of traction SCADA systems on IR.
4.1.8 Improper shut down of computers (i.e. Windows not shut down properly) should never be
done as it results into lost data/ Windows files.
4.1.9 Scandisk & defragment utilities should be run at least once in a month on all computers.
4.1.10 Peripherals should not be unplugged from the computer when powered on.
4.1.11 ‘C‘ drive of computers should have minimum 600 Mb free memory space for its optimum
performance, otherwise computers slow down considerably and may also hang.
4.1.12 All the program drives and software supplied originally on CD-ROM should be properly
stored and readily available on demand.
4.1.13 Computer & accessories should be cleaned at least once in a month by using soft cloth &
vacuum cleaner.
4.1.14 When SCADA application is running properly no other application like games, movies,
spread sheet & word processor etc. should be run on same computer. It is also not
recommended to load such applications on any work station/ FEP/ HOST.
4.1.15 Opening multiple instances/ Windows of the same application at a time should be avoided.
4.1.16 All the floppy, CD drives & USB drives should be disabled through software or it is preferable
to protect the access of these drives through software lock.
4.1.17 The computers and its peripherals along with LAN Hub & master modem should be placed in
such a way that a minimum space of nearly 20 cm is available for ventilation on back of the
computer & devices.
4.1.18 All SCADA computers should be properly designated as per specification.
4.1.19 LAN switch/ hub should be kept at a place where it does not infringe the movement of
personals.
4.1.20 Electrical and LAN connections including master modem should be checked periodically.
4.1.21 The LAN cables should be firmly cleated & its settings and connections should not be
disturbed.
4.1.22 Power source circuits supplying to computers should be properly grounded as per IS: 3043
on earthing practices.
4.1.23 It is recommended that backup of data/entire folder of SCADA software configured for the
project should be taken every month. For procedure of the same, the instructions of OEM or
agency undertaking AMC should be followed. In exigencies this backup file may be used to
restore the system.
4.1.24 Any error message such as debug error/ run time error on computer screen, should be
saved by giving print screen command and pasting it in MS Paint by opening through
start>programs>accessories>paint>edit>paste, File>save as. For any other type of on screen
error messages etc., instruction of OEM or agency undertaking AMC should be followed.
4.1.25 Dead RTUs should be made Off SCAN to enhance the performance of the system.
4.1.26 The system should never be powered off suddenly when the application is running therefore
healthiness of UPS & its battery set should be ensured. Working of both the UPS should be
checked in presence of AMC personals at least once in a month at any convenient time by
switching ‘off’ the power supply.
4.1.27 Unauthorized usage of system should not be permitted & different passwords for individual
time users’ login should be created.
4.1.28 There should not be more than one project and its backup on host. More project/
application may create the confusion at the time of restoration etc. and may also affect the
real time application running on the system due to memory space occupied on computer.
4.1.29 Error and temporary files generated on each computer should be got deleted periodically.
4.2 Step by step procedure to start and shut down:

There is a step by step procedure prescribed by the OEM to start and shut down the SCADA software.
This should always be followed. As an example, the steps given below are for running & stopping of
the SCADA application developed by M/s CMC.
The sequence for running the applications is as follows:

4.2.1 Start the Host application and wait till the message “This machine is Active Host” appears on
the screen.
4.2.2 Start the MMI application and wait till the MMI displays its Active status on the Status bar of
MMI.
4.2.3 Start the FEP application and wait till all the stations are polled.
4.2.4 Run the standby machines (Host and FEP).
The sequence for closing the application is as follows:

4.2.5 First close standby FEP then Active FEP,
4.2.6 Close all MMIs one by one
4.2.7 Close standby Host and then active host.
5.0 Remote Terminal Units:

5.1 General Instructions:
All manufacturers furnish installation, commissioning, upkeep & maintenance instructions. These
should be readily available with maintenance staff and it should be referred to whenever required,
however the following general instructions should be followed:
5.1.1 The RTU door should be properly locked and gaskets provided on the door should be
available for proper sealing of the door.
5.1.2 RTU modules layout diagram should be available on the backside of the door within the
RTU.
5.1.3 Various modules such as CPU, DI/ DO, AI, PSU & Modem etc. in RTU should be named.
5.1.4 Detailed maintenance instructions as issued by manufacturer should be got followed by

agency undertaken AMC of complete SCADA system.
5.1.5 While inserting/ withdrawing components like modules or PCBs etc. power supply of RTU
should be switched off.
5.1.6 RCC Host computer synchronizes RTU Clock periodically. If time drift displayed at RCC is
more than 2 sec within half an hour period. Lithium battery of the CPU cards may require
replacement.
5.1.7 Some times RTU response is same for any command due to malfunctioning. In this case RTU
should be reset from RCC through reset command or if not successful then locally.
5.1.8 Under voltage and PT indication voltages at site should not be set by using any un-calibrated
variable source and generally setting of any transducer should not be disturbed.
5.1.9 The CPU cards of different RTU’s should not be swapped because every card is having
station address link settings. If unknowingly different station address card is put, then in
spite of communication OK, the telesignals, telecommand, analog data of wrong station may
be displayed and in case of command execution, a wrong device may get operated.
5.1.10 Generally plunger of contactors should not be pressed manually to operate contactors
directly when RTU is interfaced with field devices as it may damage contacts apart from
causing unwanted operation of the field devices.
5.1.11 The RTUs where “energy meters” are used as IEDs, it should be ensured that CT by pass links
are properly inserted before removing these devices. Similarly to make IEDs in circuit, be
sure that CT bypass links are removed.
5.1.12 Lightning protection module (LPU) should never be bypassed. It may damage modem or
entire RTU during lightning or voltage surges.
5.1.13 The fuses of BMs in control circuit should not be bypassed. These are protective devices. For
close command fuse is provided but for trip command fuse is not required because even in
case of emergency trip command should get executed.
5.1.14 No foreign material should be kept inside the RTU panel.
5.1.15 RTUs may be operated on 110 V dc in place of 240 V ac as per RDSO’s instruction no.
TI/IN/0023(02/2010 for existing traction SCADA system on IR.
5.2 EMI precautions at RTU

Possible sources of Electro-Magnetic interference at a TSS may be switching surges, fault currents,
lightning apart from inductive equipment, e.g. coils of contactors, relays or solenoid valves or due to
two circuits sharing one cable, two adjacent cables susceptible to mutual interference via
electromagnetic field, transformers and transmitters.
In view of the above following precautions should be taken:
5.2.1 Arrangement of the wiring at TSS/switching post should be such that all types of cable run
separately i.e. power supply cables, data lines, analog signal lines and shielded signal lines
should be separated from cables that are used to switch high currents or high inductive
loads.
5.2.2 In TSS compound signal lines should not be laid parallel to power cables and ensure that
distance to sources of interference (contactors, transformers) is 1metre minimum.
5.2.3 In case of conduit wiring, both ends of the metal ducts should be grounded.
5.2.4 All inactive metal parts should be grounded and make sure all connections to earth have
good contact. All metal parts should be connected together such that they give good contact
(broad earthing strips) with screw connections connected to ensure good contact, i.e. using
lock washers or fan type lock washers.
5.2.5 The earthing connections of RTU body with earthing strip of control room & effective
earthing resistance should be got checked periodically. Its value should not be > 2 Ω.
6.0 Communication Media:

6.1 For communication between the RCC and the RTU, 6 wires are generally used, 2 wires are for
receive (Rx + & Rx-) and 2 are for send (Tx + & Tx-) and 2 as spare.
6.2 Instruction No. TI/IN/0021 (1/2010) for increasing data transfer speed of traction SCADA system on
IR from 600/1200 to a minimum of 9600 bps may be referred for the implementation of new
communication scheme for operation of SCADA on High Speed Data Transfer Communication
System.
6.3 Present modems support 600 & 1200 bps speed. If OFC has been laid (between stations) it is
recommended that master and slave modems should be tried to work on 1200 bps speed. However,
if communication noise problem increases speed may be again set at 600 bps.
6.4 Tx and Rx wires should have crimped lugs and their connections should be checked at master &
slave modem periodically.
6.5 Port monitor or any other similar utility software is generally installed in FEP which shows the data
bits sent to & received from field. The analysis of this data can give exact cause of failure and useful
for troubleshooting. This can be saved through file>save as> File name as per requirement.
6.6 It may be noted that Portmon application or similar utility should not be run continuously for more
than three hours; otherwise it may cause the system to slow down. (It also depends on the storage
capacity i.e. Hard Disk capacity. If this capacity is 500 GB or more then such utility software can be
run for longer time.)
6.7 The exercise of tuning communication parameters should be carried out jointly with supplier’s
technical representative and S & T engineers normally at the time of commissioning of system. If
retries to scan any particular RTU are more, communication parameters of that particular RTU
should be checked thoroughly once again.
6.8 Regular checks on communication copper cable between RTU and Hut at station should be carried
out with the help of S & T supervisors and the no. of joints in cable should be recorded jointly.
6.9 The acceptable and recommended range of standard parameters decided in consultation with
Telecom Directorate of RDSO are enclosed as Annexure-I. The signal dB level should be checked at
RCC & individual RTU modem terminals as per the requirements. Signal dB level should be measured
by dB level meter keeping one RTU on line at a time and other RTUs in Off SCAN condition.
Page 10 of
Effective from: Instruction no. Technical Instructions for improving reliability of traction SCADA
10
Annexure-I
Check list for checking health of communication channel for SCADA purpose (for each RTU)
Value as RDSO
SN Description Instruments Acceptable Recommended Remarks
range range
1. Insulation resistance of Megger >10,000 >10,000 As per SCADA
cable MΩ/km MΩ/km spec. clause
at 500 V 4.2.1
2. Trans signal from RCC dB level 0 to -30 dBm -3 to -20 dBm As per SCADA
Modem meter spec. clause
4.5.6 (vii)
3. Receive signal at Modem 0 to -43 dBm -3 to -20 dBm As per SCADA
spec. clause
4.5.6 (viii)
4. Trans signal at OFC terminal 0 to -30 dBm -3 to -20 dBm As per Telecom
near RCC Dte. Note no.
5. Receive signal at OFC 0 to -30 dBm -3 to -20 dBm STT/ DC/ MUX/
terminal near to RCC Prototest/ 245
6. Trans signal at OFC terminal 0 to -30 dBm -3 to -20 dBm dated 1.12.2005
near to switching post (stn)
7. Receive signal at FC terminal 0 to -30 dBm -3 to -20 dBm
near to switching post (stn)
8. Trans signal at SWS (before 0 to -30 dBm -3 to -20 dBm
connection to RTU is made)
9. Receive signal at RTU 0 to -30 dBm -3 to -20 dBm
10. Signal to noise ratio SNR meter >20 dB >20 dB
Effective from: Instruction No. Instruction for relay setting guideline for
18.04.2018 TI/IN/0036 protection scheme for 25 kV a.c. Traction System
low density routes
Government of India
Ministry of Railways
Instruction No. TI/IN/0036
For
Relay setting guideline for protection
scheme for 25 kV a.c. Traction System low
density routes
Month Year: April 2018
ISSUED BY

Research Designs and Standards Organization (Ministry
of Railways) Manak Nagar, Lucknow – 226011
Page 1 of 4
low density routes
1. Introduction:
Railway Board has deduced scheme for traction power supply with
increased TSS spacing & provision of traction transformer single /
double alternatively for low density route. The following has been
advised by Railway Board vide their letter No.2017/RE/161/29 FTS-
3241642 dated 24.01.2018.
a. The TSS spacing shall be kept approximately 100 Km.
b. No. of Traction transformer shall be single and double at
alternate TSS. The TSS having Single Traction Transformer shall
be provided with capacity of 21.6 MVA while TSS adjacent to it
there shall be two transformers each having capacity of 13.5 MVA.
2. Description of 25 kV traction power supply as proposed.
It is presumed that TSS having double traction transformer of 13.5
MVA capacity will feed individually to one end only in normal
condition. The parallel operation of the transformers is not allowed
due to increase of fault level. In case of failure of one
transformer, the healthy transformer will feed both end OHE through
designated feeder circuit breakers. This will require neutral
section in front of TSS to avoid shorting of two separate feed
causing any eventuality. TSS having single transformer of capacity
21.6 MVA shall feed in existing manner through Feeder CBs.
3. Protection scheme for low density route having TSS spacing
approximately 100Km:
a. Transformer & Shunt Capacitor Bank protection
Control and Relay panel for 25 kV ac TSS including specification for
numerical type protection relays for traction transformer, 25 kV
shunt capacitor bank and transmission line for 25 kV ac TSS shall be
as per the existing latest specification No. TI/SPC/PSI/PROTCT/6071
with Amendment No.1. For transformer protection and its relay
setting, the existing RDSO instruction no. TI/IN/0022 with
Amendment 1 and setting of Delta I relay for High resistive fault,
the instruction no. TI/IN/0029 & TI/Report/35 with amendment shall
be applicable
b. Feeder protection
(i) Numerical integrated feeder protection module shall be used for
the protection of 25 kV AC traction overhead equipment as per
the RDSO Specification No. TI/SPC/PSI/PROTCT/5070 (Rev.1) with
Amendment No.1 or latest.
(ii) The methodology of relay calculation shall be as per RDSO Report
No. TI/Report/35 with amendment. The setting of two stage OCR
protection elements in feeder protection module has not been
mentioned in the report. The setting of the two stage OCR
elements of the feeder protection module has been detailed below
along with settings.
Relay Element Recommended setting
Over Current Relay: Stage1: Instantaneous OCR setting.

Current setting shall be 150% of the
There is a provision of two rated secondary current of the
stages over current relay i.e. traction power transformer.
Page 2 of 4
low density routes
Stage 1- instantaneous and Stage MVA ISEC 1.5*ISEC (CTR: 150 in case
2- definite time. The relay as of 21.6MVA and 100 for
per Para 6.3 of RDSO 13.5 MVA)
specification No.
TI/SPC/PSI/PROTCT/5070(Rev.1), 21.6 800 1200A
the over current relay is Current setting in Relay
settable from 20% to 1000% in =1200/150
steps of 1%. = 8A
Setting in % = 8*100/5
=160%
13.5 500 750A

Current setting in Relay
=750/100
=7.5A
Setting in %
=7.5*100/5 = 150%
As per para 6.3 of the specification,

operating time of instantaneous OCR is
within 25 ms.
Stage2: Definite time OCR setting.
The setting may be done as high as it
may not affect the physical property
of the conductor. This setting is done
to protect the OHE from parting due to
softening of conductor caused by high
current for longer period. However, it
may be set below the current setting
done for stage 1 OCR element and the
setting may be done for 125% of the
rated current (ISEC).
MVA ISEC 125% Period
21.6 800 1.25*800 5 minutes
13.5 500 1.25*500 5 minutes
(iii) Minimum operating current setting of the Distance Protection

relay 0.5 A.
(iv) The relay shall be blocked for operation in case 2nd harmonic
component in current exceeds more than set value ‘15%’. The
percentage of second harmonic for block the operation shall be
settable from 5 to 20 % in steps of 1%.
Page 3 of 4
low density routes
c. Delta I Protection Relay: The report no TI/Report/35 with Amendment

and instruction no. IN/TI/0029 may be referred. Nos. of loco may be
2 or more in case of starting loco on restoration power supply.
Hence current setting of 2A shall be appropriate.
*****
Page 4 of 4
File No.RDSO-TI0LKO(PSI)/1/2022-O/o PED/TI/RDSO
भारत सरकार, रे ल मंत्रालय

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
PSI GUIDELINE FOR
INCREASING SPEED POTENTIAL TO 160KMPH
ON
INDIAN RAILWAYS
INSTRUCTION No. TI/IN/0043 Rev.01
(This supersedes the Instruction No. TI/IN/0043 Rev.00)
Issued by:
RESEARCH DESIGNS & STANDARDS ORGANISATION,
MANAK NAGAR,
LUCKNOW – 226 011
(For official use only)
February, 2022
Page 1 of 27
Subject: PSI Guidelines for Increasing Speed Potential to

160kmph on Indian Railways
Technical Instruction No: TI/IN/0043 Rev.01
Prepared By
Signature Digitally
Rame signed by RATAN Digitally signed Pravee Digitally signed
by Praveen PRA Gauta Digitally signed
Ramesh Kr by RATAN
n Chandra Yadav Digitally signed by
MOD
by Gautam
sh Kr Pal
Date: KUMAR KUMAR
Date:
SINGH Date:
Chandr 2022.02.25
PRAMOD SAHU
Date: 2022.02.25
10:36:32 +05'30'
m Kumar
Date: 2022.02.25
Date 2022.02.25
Pal 10:41:32
2022.02.25
SINGH 10:37:45 +05'30' 10:39:55
a Yadav +05'30' SAHU Kumar 10:46:21 +05'30'
+05'30'
Designation SSE/PQ SSE/PR SSE/TR SSE/SCADA JE(D)/TI
Checked By Reviewed By Approved By
GYAN Digitally signed Digitally signed

by BHARDWAJ SUNIL Digitally signed
Signature by SUNIL KUMAR
PRAKAS by GYAN
PRAKASH BHARDWAJ CHAUDHARY KUMAR 15:49:48 +05'30'
Date: 2022.02.25
Date:
H KATIYAR
Date: 2022.02.25
CHAUDHARY 2022.02.25
Date KATIYAR 10:57:43 +05'30' 11:18:13
+05'30'
Designation Director/TI-3 ED/TI PED/TI
Page 2 of 27
1.0 Up gradation of existing routes of Indian Railways for 160kmph
1.1 This Guideline shall supersede the Guideline no. TI/IN/0043 Rev.00 Issued on 24.11.2020.
1.2 Railway Board vide letter No. 2001/Elect(G)/170/1 dated 11.11.2019 instructed RDSO to issue the
suitable guidelines for the up gradation of existing NDLS-HWH and DLI-KOTA-MUMBAI ROUTES for
160kmph in phased manner. Accordingly, RDSO vide letter no. TI/PSI/TSS/Policy/2019 dated
18.11.2019 and 24.12.2019 proposed certain guideline to Railway Board for approval. Draft PSI
Guidelines were circulated to Zonal Railways (via CEDE’s & 160kmph DLI-HWH, DLI-MUM Whatsapp
Group) on 17.10.2020 for comments. The received observations from Railways were addressed and
initial guideline was issued on 24.11.2020.
1.3 At the time of issue of initial guideline, number of specifications and drawings were under preparation
and now these have been finalized and issued. In addition to this, the layouts of the TSS, SP and SSP
have also been revised based on the various technical deliberations within the RDSO and suggestions
received form Zonal Railways. Accordingly, the guideline is being revised and issued for
implementation.
2.0 Proposal of Power Supply Installation for the 160kmph on the said routes:
In continuation to the different proposal as discussed in letters mentioned in Para 1.2 above, the
proposal of 2X25 kV system is recommended as it is preferred solution across the globe to cater the
higher power requirement on high density routes. Therefore, 2X25kV System may be used for these
sections. The Traction Sub Station (TSS), Sectioning and paralleling Post (SP) and sub-Sectioning and
Paralleling Post (SSP) are to be commissioned for 2X25kV System at location identified by Zonal
Railways. A boundary SP i.e. interface post of 1x25 & 2x25 kV system may be considered.
3.0 2X25kV system

3.1 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE 2 X 25 KV SYSTEMS.
In 2x25 kV system, power is fed from the TSS at 50 kV and utilization is achieved at 25 kV by providing
Auto-transformers of adequate capacity and by providing one additional conductor normally referred
as feeder wire (similar to the return conductor in BT/RC system). Centre point of the Auto Transformer
is connected to the earth/Rail. This arrangement facilitates +25 kV Voltage between OHE and rail and
-25 kV voltage between earth/Rail and the Feeder Wire.
Figure:1
3.2 Advantage of 2X25kV system:-
(a) The 2X25 kV AT feeding system is suitable to meet larger power supply needs with the inherent
advantage of less voltage drop in feeder circuit for a given spacing of traction substations. To meet
the larger power supply requirements, 2X25kV system is used in various countries including
DFCCIL in India.
Page 3 of 27
(b) Power is generally obtained from 220 kV or 132 kV three phase networks from the power utility to
reduce voltage unbalance on the transmission network. In the 2X25kV TSS, the three phase supply
is utilized at the Traction Sub-station.
(c) The 2X25 kV Auto Transformer (AT) system is having feeding voltage of 50 kV from the substation
which is dropped to 25 kV by the AT installed at about 10 to 18 Km spacing along the track for
supply to overhead equipment and rolling stocks. A pilot project for this system was provided in
Bina-Katni Section. The design of the system was done with the help of Japanese Consultants.
(d) Better voltage regulation even at higher load currents.
(e) Minimized rail currents resulting in reduction in rail potential rise. Return current through ground
also reduces considerably.
(f) In 2X25kV system, the return current flows through the feeder wire. Since the direction of current
in the feeder wire is opposite to the direction of current in the catenary wire, it minimizes the
effect of the electromagnetic Interference in the proximity of the traction line.
(g) Preferred solution across the globe to meet higher power requirement for Traction Purpose.
4.0 Schemes proposed for 2X25kV System along with various Transformers.
4.1 Scott Connected Transformer Scheme:

(a) In this scheme two Scott connected Transformers & four Auto-transformers are to be installed at a
TSS along with associated switchgear for Control & protection. The two windings of a Scott
transformer i.e. Main and Teaser windings are of equal power rating and feed either side of the TSS
independently. The supply of both the windings is at a phase difference of 90 degree and separated
by neutral section provided near TSS. Out of two Scott transformers, only one is in operation and
the other is on standby.
(b) Scott Connected Transformer:

Scott- connected transformer of 60/84/100 MVA (ONAN/ONAF/OFAF) is used to feed power to the
traction system. It has a voltage input of 220kV or 132kV, 3 phase, 50 Hz and two independent
secondary winding for output at 50 kV. The Transformer has two secondary windings, known as the
main winding and teaser winding. The two windings are identical in voltage and current rating but
are in phase difference of 90 degree. These two windings of equal power rating i.e. Main & Teaser
windings, feed power on either side of the TSS. The feed of different phase is separated by neutral
section provided near TSS. The Scott Connected Transformer in ONAN Mode shall feed the 30MVA
Power to each side of the TSS.
(c) Auto Transformers:

Auto- transformers are used at TSS, SP and SSP. The transformer winding of 50kV with Centre
tapped neutral with both the terminals of the Autotransformer winding connected to feeder and
contact /Catenary wire. The neutral terminal of the ATs is connected to rail.
Two adjacent ATs feeding on the network share train loads on the section between them and
transfer the load current on 25 kV circuit to 50 kV circuit, consisting of contact wire and AT feeder.
This reduces the voltage drop on feeding network remarkably. Furthermore, it minimizes the return
current on the rail, which results in reducing induced voltage on nearby telecommunication lines.
In the Scott connected arrangement for 2 Line section, 12.3 MVA Auto transformers are to be
installed at the TSS and 8MVA Auto transformers to be used at the SP & SSP, as adopted by DFCCIL
in Western Corridor. Further, the Scott connected arrangement for 3 Line and 4 line sections have
been provided with 12.3 MVA auto transformers at TSS and 16.5 MVA auto transformers at SP/SSP.
Moreover, no independent AT post has been proposed in any scheme.
4.2 V Connected Transformer Scheme:

(a) In this scheme, three single phase transformers are connected to different pairs of three phase of
incoming supply forming an open delta connection on the primary side. Out of the three single
Page 4 of 27
phase transformers, first transformer feeds the OHE on one side of the TSS, second transformer
(mid one) remains as standby and third transformer feeds the OHE on the other side of the TSS.
The power supply on either side of TSS is at a phase difference of 120 degree and therefore
separated by a neutral section provided near TSS.
(b) V- Connected Transformer:

In the above arrangement, three 38/53/63 MVA (ONAN/ONAF/OFAF) Transformers are provided at
TSS along with associated switchgear for Control and Protection. Each single phase transformer has
a voltage input of 220kV or 132kV, 50 Hz and two independent secondary windings, to be
connected externally in such a manner (two inner terminals of these secondary windings are
connected with each other and also connected to earth/Rail) so as to give an output voltage of
2X25kV. The outer terminals of the windings are connected to Feeder wire and overhead
contact/catenary wire respectively. Two transformers shall be in operation at a time and one shall
be on standby. In the V connected Scheme, each transformer in ONAN mode shall feed the 38MVA
Power in either side of the TSS.
(c) Auto Transformers:

i. Auto- transformers are used at SP and SSP. The transformer winding is 50 kV with Centre
tapped neutral with both the terminals of the winding connected to AT feeder and the contact
wire. The neutral terminals of the ATs are connected to rail.
ii. Two adjacent ATs feeding on the network share train loads on the section between them and
transfer the load current on 25 kV circuit to 50 kV circuit, consisting of contact & catenary wire
and AT feeder. This reduces the voltage drop on the feeding network remarkably. Furthermore,
it minimizes the return current on the rail, which results in reducing the induced voltage on
nearby telecommunication lines.
iii. Auto transformers are not used at the TSS. However, these have been provided at SP/SSP of
16.5 MVA capacities. Moreover, no independent AT post has been proposed.
4.3 Scott connected vs V Connected Scheme

i. Considering the three phase utilization equally in the Scott Connected scheme, it is better in
reducing the unbalancing at point of common coupling with the utility as compared to V-
Connected scheme. The point of common coupling is already defined in the clause no. 2.2 of
RDSO Instruction no. TI/IN/0019 (09/09).
ii. The Voltage Unbalance in Scott Connected Transformer Scheme is least and therefore the
Railways should preferably provide Scott Connected Transformer wherever the voltage
unbalance problem is seen. The detailed study regarding this is available in clause no. 2.1.13 of
Chapter 1, Part-II in Volume-1 of Treatise on Electric Traction Distribution, which can be readily
referred (page no. 125 of Volume-1).The problem of unbalancing has been raised by few power
utilities and therefore Scott or V connected arrangement should be chosen judiciously after
coordinating with the power utilities.
iii. Scott Connected Transformer is more complex and costlier than the V connected Transformer
but Scott connected Transformer effectively checks the voltage unbalance.
iv. Initially, in Bina-Katni Section of IR, the Scott Connected Transformers were imported;
however, Transformers for V connected scheme were supplied by an Indian Manufacturer.
v. The maintenance/Overhauling of the Scott Connected Transformer is more complex in
comparison to Single Phase Transformer. V connected scheme is economical in comparison to
Scott Connected scheme.
vi. Since, no AT is to be used at the TSS of V connected scheme; it is simpler than Scott Connected
scheme.
Page 5 of 27
4.4 Utilisation of Scheme:

Considering the complexities involved of the unbalancing (as deliberated under Para 4.3 above), space
constraints and other site problems, the Scott connected or V connected arrangement may be chosen
by the Zonal Railways after coordinating with the power utilities and with the approval of PCEEs.
5.0 Spacing of the TSS & Switching post (SP/SSP):
5.1 Two-line section – Considering the load requirement of 0.5MVA/TKM in ONAN mode on the main line
section, the spacing of TSS in Scott connected scheme of 60-70 Km is suggested. In the proposed V
connected scheme, the transmission of full power from the transformer is not at 50 kV and therefore
the spacing of the TSS in V connected scheme for 2 Line system has been kept same as in Scott
connected scheme i.e. 60-70 KM with power requirement of around 0.6MVA/TKM in ONAN mode.
5.2 Three line sections – In the 3 Line section, the loading in MVA/TKM basis will be less than the 2 line
system as all the three lines will not be fully loaded at a time. Therefore, the load requirement of
around 0.4 MVA/TKM in ONAN Mode for 3 Line section has been considered and accordingly the
spacing of TSS in Scott connected scheme is suggested as 50-60 KM. In the proposed V connected
scheme for 3 line, the transmission of full power from the transformer is not at 50 kV and therefore
the spacing of the TSS in V connected scheme for 3 Line system has been kept same as in Scott
connected scheme i.e. 50-60 KM with power requirement of around 0.5 MVA/TKM in ONAN mode.
5.3 Four line section– In the 4 Line section, the loading in MVA/TKM basis will be less than the 3 line
system as all the four lines will not be fully loaded at a time. Therefore, the load requirement of less
than 0.4 MVA/TKM in ONAN Mode for 4 Line section has been considered and accordingly the spacing
of TSS in Scott connected scheme is suggested as 40-50 KM. In the proposed V connected scheme for
4 line, the transmission of full power from the transformer is not at 50 kV and therefore the spacing of
the TSS in V connected scheme for 4 Line system has been kept same as in Scott connected scheme
i.e. 40-50 KM with a power requirement of around 0.5 MVA/TKM in ONAN mode.
5.4 The sectioning and paralleling post (SP) is to be constructed at approx. midway between consecutive
TSS and SSP may be constructed at approx. midway between TSS & SP.
5.5 The transformer is provided with ONAF/OFAF mode to meet the power requirement under feed
extension condition and to account for the margin of 10 KM given in the spacing.
5.6 Wherever the Traction Sub Station feeds a mix of 2 line- 3 line sections, 3 line-4 line sections etc., the
spacing and location selection of the Traction Sub Station may be decided by considering the above
power requirement in ONAN mode on TKM basis as per the scheme adopted. In such cases, the power
requirement on each side of Traction Sub Station may be done separately and accordingly the TSS and
SP to be located in terms of spacing. The SSP may be provided at approximately mid of TSS and SP.
6.0 Operational Philosophy
6.1 The spacing of the Traction Sub Station has been proposed in the above Para considering the ONAN
ratings of the Traction Power transformers and considering the load requirement of normal operation.
6.2 In the case of feed extension from a particular Traction Sub Station due to failure of the adjacent
Traction Sub Station, the Transformer of the healthy TSSs may be utilized on the ONAF/OFAF mode
and it will be possible to take the full load of the failed Traction Sub Station.
Page 6 of 27
6.3 In Scott connected scheme, there are two double pole feeder circuit breakers for either side of the
Traction Sub Station. One Circuit Breaker feeds the OHE with/without interrupters and another is kept
redundant for each side of the Traction Sub Station.
6.4 In V connected scheme, the secondary voltages of the traction transformers are out of phase by 120O
from each other and therefore it is required to understand the operation. The standby transformer
provided in the middle can feed in either direction through the motorized coupling isolator provided
on the bus, in case of failure of any of the outer transformer. Also, there are two double pole feeder
circuit breakers for either side of the Traction Sub Station. One Circuit Breaker feeds the OHE
with/without interrupters and another is kept redundant for each side of the Traction Sub Station.
6.5 SP and SSP for 2 Line systems have been proposed separately for Scott connected arrangement and V
connected arrangement. The SP/SSP for 2 Line V connected arrangement is of common Bus type. The
SP/SSP for 3 lines and 4 Lines section have been proposed of common bus type and may be used with
both kind of feeding arrangement i.e. Scott connected or V connected arrangement.
6.6 In Common Bus type of SP & SSP, the fault on common Bus may hamper the train operation.
Therefore, the Bypass Motorised Isolator (for off-load sectioning or off-load feed extension) has been
provided to continue the train operation even in fault at common Bus. Further, the common Bus type
SP/SSP may be used as a boundary post for interfacing 2Line/3Line/4Line sections of 2X25 kV sections
with each other.
6.7 Interlocking
a. Scott Connected TSS
 The Closing of the LVCB on the secondary side of Traction Transformer (i.e. 50kV, SF6CB) shall
be possible only when any one of the Circuit Breaker of associated Autotransformer at TSS is
in closed condition.
 The automatic opening of the LVCB on the secondary side of Traction Transformer (i.e. 50kV,
SF6CB) shall happen as soon as all the Circuit Breakers of the associated Autotransformers at
the Traction Sub Station are opened.
 The closing of coupling motorised isolator between Main Bus and Teaser Bus should be
possible only when all the LVCBs of the Transformer are open. This coupling isolator has been
provided for the feed extension in case of failure of TSS.
 To ensure above, necessary interlock shall be provided.
b. V Connected TSS
In this scheme the middle Traction transformer is to be used in either direction in case of failure of
any one of the outer transformer. Therefore necessary interlock is to be provided between
Motorised Coupling Isolator and LV Circuit Breaker in order to avoid wrong phase coupling as well
as to ensure off load operation of the Motorised isolator.
6.8 There is off load circuit tap changer on primary side of the transformer with 6 tap positions (including
principal tap) for voltage adjustment. Therefore, the tap changer should be operated only when both
the primary and secondary circuit breakers are in open condition.
7.0 Three Phase connectivity to TSS:-

Railways to work out for new 3 phase, transmission line or extending/upgrading the existing
transmission line on 3 phase to new location for connecting different TSS on these routes considering
Page 7 of 27
the economics of building this transmission line. In case the new Line is constructed, the line should
support the capacity of transformer and adequate redundancy. To meet the power requirement with
adequate redundancy, the provision of double circuit Transmission line may be considered. As per the
CEA notification, dated 20.08.2010 Chapter IV, Part-A, Para 41 (3), table 7, In case of 66kV Voltage
Level, The transformation capacity of any single sub-station for meeting loads shall not normally
exceed 75MVA. In view of this limitation, if 66kV incoming supply is there, only ONAN Mode
Transformer i.e. 60MVA Scott Connected or 38X2= 76MVA, V connected can be used. To address the
huge power requirement for future load, it is suggested to not to take feed from the utility at 66 kV.
Therefore, it is suggested to use 220kV or 132kV incoming Voltage only.
8.0 Layout of the TSS, SP & SSP
8.1 Details of the layouts of the Traction Sub Station

8.1.1 Traction Sub Station Layouts with Scott Connected Transformers
SN Description Drawing No. Required area

*(Depth x Width)
1. Typical layout of 132/2X25kV Traction Sub Station TI/DRG/PSI/AT/RDSO/ (46 X 120.5)
with Scott Connected Transformers (For Double Line 00009/20/1 Mod C
section) with parallel to track.
2. Typical layout of 132/2X25kV Traction Sub Station TI/DRG/PSI/AT/RDSO/ (103X48.75)
with Scott Connected Transformers (For Double Line 00010/20/1 Mod C
section) with perpendicular to track.
3. Typical layout of 132/2X25kV Traction Sub Station TI/DRG/PSI/AT/RDSO/ (50X122)
with Scott Connected Transformers (For Three Line 00030/20/1 Mod B
4. Typical layout of 132/2X25kV Traction Sub Station TI/DRG/PSI/AT/RDSO/ (105.5X50)
with Scott Connected Transformers (For Four Line 00032/20/1 Mod B
7. Typical layout of 220/2X25kV Traction Sub Station TI/DRG/PSI/AT/RDSO/ (46.25X131.5)
with Scott Connected Transformers (For Double Line 00024/20/1Mod C
section) with parallel to track
with Scott Connected Transformers (For Double Line 00025/20/1Mod C
section) with perpendicular to track
9. Typical layout of 220/2X25kV Traction Sub Station TI/DRG/PSI/AT/RDSO/ (47.55 X 134.5)
with Scott Connected Transformers (For Three Line 00038/20/1Mod B
10. Typical layout of 220/2X25kV Traction Sub Station TI/DRG/PSI/AT/RDSO/ (117.5 X 48.5)
11. Typical layout of 220/2X25kV Traction Sub Station TI/DRG/PSI/AT/RDSO/ (47.579 X142)
Page 8 of 27

* (Depth: Dimension perpendicular to track in meter, width: Dimension parallel to track in meter)
8.1.2 Traction Sub Station Layouts with V Connected Transformers

*(Depth x Width)
with V-Connected Transformers (For Double Line 00034/20/1 Mod B
with V-Connected Transformers (For Three Line 00011/20/1 Mod B
with V-Connected Transformers (For Four Line 00013/20/1 Mod B
7. Typical layout of 220/2X25kV Traction Sub Station TI/DRG/PSI/AT/RDSO/ (54.5 x 122)
with V-Connected Transformers (For Double Line 00042/20/1 Mod B OR
section) with parallel to track. (50X122)**
8. Typical layout of 220/2X25kV Traction Sub Station TI/DRG/PSI/AT/RDSO/ (110 x 54.5)

9. Typical layout of 220/2X25kV Traction Sub Station TI/DRG/PSI/AT/RDSO/ (54.5x130.75)
with V-Connected Transformers (For Three Line 00026/20/1 Mod B OR
section) with parallel to track. (50X130.75)**
10. Typical layout of 220/2X25kV Traction Sub Station TI/DRG/PSI/AT/RDSO/ (110 x 54.5)
11. Typical layout of 220/2X25kV Traction Sub Station TI/DRG/PSI/AT/RDSO/ (54.5 x 145)
with V-Connected Transformers (For Four Line 00028/20/1 Mod B OR
section) with parallel to track. (50X145)**

* (Depth: Dimension perpendicular to track in meter, width: Dimension parallel to track in meter)
**Road is not planned initially and Control room to be shifted at the space available towards 25kV Bay.
Page 9 of 27
8.2 Details of the layouts of the SP & SSP

*(Depth x Width)
1. General arrangement of Sub Sectioning and Paralleling TI/DRG/PSI/AT/RDSO/ (25X50) or
Post (SSP) in 2X25kV ‘AT’ System (on double line 00015/20/01 Mod A (23.5X50)**
section) for Scott Connected Transformer TSS
2. General arrangement of Sectioning and Paralleling Post TI/DRG/PSI/AT/RDSO/ (23.5X50)
(SP) in 2X25kV ‘AT’ System (on double line section) for 00016/20/01 Mod A
Scott Connected Transformer TSS
Post (SSP) in 2X25kV ‘AT’ System (on double line 00036/20/01 Mod A (23.5X50)**
section) for V- Connected Transformer TSS
4. General arrangement of Sectioning and Paralleling Post TI/DRG/PSI/AT/RDSO/ (25X50) or
(SP) in 2X25kV ‘AT’ System (on double line section) for 00037/20/01 Mod A (23.5X50)**
V- Connected Transformer TSS
Post (SSP) in 2X25kV ‘AT’ System (on three line section). 00017/20/01 Mod A (23.5X50)**

(SP) in 2X25kV ‘AT’ System (on three line section). 00018/20/01 Mod A (23.5X50)**

Post (SSP) in 2X25kV ‘AT’ System (on four line section). 00019/20/01 Mod A (23.5X50)**

(SP) in 2X25kV ‘AT’ System (on four line section). 00020/20/01 Mod A (23.5X50)**
9. General arrangement of Boundary Sectioning and TI/DRG/PSI/AT/RDSO/ (23X50)

Paralleling Post (SP) in 2X25kV ‘AT’ System for Scott 00021/20/01 Mod A
Connected Transformer TSS (on double line section)
10. General arrangement of Boundary Sectioning & TI/DRG/PSI/AT/RDSO/ (25X50) or
paralleling post (SP) in 2 x 25 kV ‘AT’ system ( on 3 line 00022/20/01 Mod A (23.5X50)**
section)
paralleling post (SP) in 2 x 25 kV ‘AT’ system ( on 4 line 00023/20/01 Mod A (23.5X50)**
section)
Paralleling post (SP) in 2 x 25 kV "V-connected" 'AT' 00050/21/01 Mod A (23.5X50)**
system ( on Double line section)
*(Depth: Dimension perpendicular to track in meter, width: Dimension parallel to track in meter)
**Reduced size where gantry is on boundary.
Note:
1. The layout of the TSS, SP & SSP detailed in above Para has been prepared by utilizing minimum
possible area. Thus, if the required space is not available, use of the underground cables on the HV
& LV side may be considered keeping in view the economy of design. The location of the control
room, road in TSS etc. can be changed by the Zonal Railways based on their experience and
availability of space. Wherever, the acute shortage of land is faced, the Road may not be provided
Page 10 of 27
initially for access but at the same time the process of land acquisition may be started and the
layout to be finalized accordingly.
2. The guideline for the provision of ABT based meter has already been issued by this office vide letter
no. TI/PSI/TSS/POLICY/17 dated13.10.2017 (Annexure-1) and letter no. TI/PSI/TSS/POLICY/18/02
dated 26.07.2018 (Annexure-2).
8.3 Other Miscellaneous drawings

SN Description Drawing No.
1. Typical schematic diagram of protection for 132/2x25kV TI/DRG/PSI/AT/RDSO/
Traction sub-station with Scott-connected transformers 00051/21/0 Mod A
2. Typical schematic diagram of protection for 220/2x25kV TI/DRG/PSI/AT/RDSO/
Traction sub-station with V-connected transformers 00044/21/0
3. General scheme of supply for 2x25 kV, 50 Hz Scott connected TI/DRG/PSI/SLD/RDSO/
traction transformer traction system 00045/21/0
4. General scheme of supply for 2x25 kV, 50 Hz V- connected TI/DRG/PSI/SLD/RDSO/
traction transformer traction system 00046/21/0
5. Typical layout of cable trench, foundation & cable schedule of TI/DRG/PSI/TRCSFD/RDSO/
132/2x25 kV Traction Sub - Station with Scott connected 00047/21/0
transformers (for four line section) with parallel to track
6. Typical layout of cable trench, foundation & cable schedule of TI/DRG/PSI/TRCSFD/RDSO/
132/2x25 kV Traction Sub - Station with V connected 00048/21/0
transformers (for four line section) with perpendicular to track
7. Typical layout of cable trench, foundation & cable schedule of TI/DRG/PSI/AT/RDSO/
Switching Station in 2X25kV ‘AT’ System (for four line section) 00049/21/0
8. Typical layout of cable trench, foundation & cable schedule of TI/DRG/PSI/AT/RDSO/
Sectioning and Paralleling Post (SP) in 2x25 kV AT System on 00052/21/0
Double line for Scott Connected Transformer TSS.
9. Typical layout of Control room Building in 2X25kV Traction Sub- TI/DRG/PSI/CR2X25/RDSO/
Station. 0210
10. Typical layout of Control room Building in 2X25kV SP/SSP/AT TI/DRG/PSI/CR2X25/
Post. SPSSPATP/0210
11. Tee Connector to suit “BERSISMIS” ‘AAAC’ and “BERSISMIS” TI/DRG/PSI/CONECT/RDSO/
‘AAAC’ in 2X25 kV system. 00053/21/0
12. Tee Connector to suit BULL ‘AAC’ conductor and BULL ‘AAC’ TI/DRG/PSI/CONECT/RDSO/
conductor in 2X25 kV system 00054/21/0
13. Rigid connector on S.I. to suit BERSISMIS (36mm Dia.) TI/DRG/PSI/CONECT/RDSO/
“AAAC” conductor in 2X25 kV system. 00055/21/0
14. Rigid connector on S.I. to suit BULL (38.25mm Dia.) “AAC” TI/DRG/PSI/CONECT/RDSO/
conductor in 2X25 kV system. 00056/21/0
15. Flexible connector to suit 50MM O/D Al. Tube Bus bar for TI/DRG/PSI/CONECT/RDSO/
Double Pole circuit breaker and LV side of Traction transformer 00057/21/0
in 2X25kV system.
16. Rigid through connector to suit BERSIMIS (36mm Dia) “AAAC” TI/DRG/PSI/CONECT/RDSO/
Conductor and SPIDER “AAC” conductor for 25 kV PT type II. (T- 00058/21/0
Type)
17. Rigid through connector to suit BULL (38.25mm Dia) “AAC” TI/DRG/PSI/CONECT/RDSO/
Conductor and SPIDER “AAC” conductor for 25 kV PT type II (T- 00059/21/0
Page 11 of 27
Type)
18. Tee Connector to suit 50 O/D Al. Tube and “BERSISMIS” ‘AAAC’ TI/DRG/PSI/CONECT/RDSO/
19. Tee Connector to suit 50 O/D Al. Tube and BULL ‘AAC’ conductor TI/DRG/PSI/CONECT/RDSO/
in 2X25 kV system. 00061/21/0
20. Typical Termination arrangement for strung bus “BERSISMIS” TI/DRG/PSI/CONECT/RDSO/
(AAAC) conductor in 2X25 kV system. 00062/21/0
21. Typical Termination arrangement for strung bus “BULL” (AAC) TI/DRG/PSI/CONECT/RDSO/
22. Flexible connector to suit BULL (38.25mm Dia.) “AAC” TI/DRG/PSI/CONECT/RDSO/
Conductor for Double Pole circuit breaker and LV Side of 00064/21/0
traction transformer in 2X25kV System.
23. Bimetallic terminal Connector to suit ZEBRA (28.58mm Dia.) ETI/PSI/P/11030 Mod. D
ACSR conductor & AL/CU Pad of isolator/CT/CB or 50mm O/D Al
tube and AL/CU Pad of isolator/CT/CB.
9.0 Power Factor Improvement

9.1 Railway Board vide letter no. 2008/RE/170/1 dated 12.06.2012 (Annexure-3) has already
communicated that "it has been decided that Railways/CORE/MRVC/RVNL etc. should provide only
fixed type capacitor bank in all new & existing 25kV & 2X25kV TSSs for the time.” Thus, it is proposed
to provide only conventional fixed type Capacitor Bank & Reactors in the 2X25kV TSSs.
9.2 There are routes where modern locomotives and train sets having unity power factor are in operation
and therefore the extent of compensation of Reactive Power as proposed in the initial guideline and in
the initial issued layouts may not be required at certain locations. Further, there may be locations
where the compensation at TSS is not being done at all. Therefore, the connection of shunt Capacitor
bank in the layouts may be treated as indicative only. Hence, the capacity of the shunt capacitor has
to be selected judiciously considering the existing load and Power Factor conditions.
9.3 In Scott Connected Scheme, initially the insulation class of equipment’s on Main and Teaser Bus was
considered as 72.5kV. After the introduction of interlocking (para 6.7 above) the insulation class of
52kV has been considered. Accordingly, the 52kV Insulation class conventional fixed type Capacitor
Bank & Reactors which are provided in 25kV Traction system, are to be provided (if required) in both
of the schemes as detailed below:
(a) If there is no requirement of compensation equipment, it is not required to be provided.
(b) If reactive power compensation of 2400kVAR at 25kV is required on both sides of the Traction Sub
Station, then capacitor bank along with series reactor and associated equipment will be connected
by using Single Pole Circuit Breaker and Isolators in the following manner
 In TSS of V Connected scheme, the capacitor bank along with associated equipment is to
be connected on each side of the TSS on Traction Bus.
 In TSS of Scott Connected scheme, one capacitor bank along with associated equipment is
to be connected on Traction Bus of Main winding and another is to be connected on
Traction Bus of Teaser winding.
(c) If reactive power compensation of 4800kVAR at 25kV is required on both sides of the Traction Sub
Station, then in addition to (b) above, another capacitor bank along with series reactor and
associated equipment of 2400kVAR at 25kV is to be provided on the Feeder Bus also by using
DPCB and isolators as indicated in Layouts.
Remark: For connection arrangements, layouts of the Traction Sub Station to be referred.
Page 12 of 27
10.0 Protection
Technical Specification No. TI/SPC/PSI/PROTCT/7101 or latest for Control and Relay Panel Including
Numerical type protection relays for Scott-connected Traction Power Transformers/V-Connected
Traction Power Transformers, OHE protection, 55KV AT Protection and Shunt Capacitor Bank
Protection for 2X25 kV Traction Sub-Station, Sectioning and Paralleling Post, Sub-Sectioning and
Paralleling Post shall be referred.
10.1 Scott Connected TSS (02 Line/03Line/04Line): The details of the required relays for protection in
scheme of 2x 60/84/100 MVA for supplying C&R panel for Scott connected transformers of 2x25 kV
AT System are as below:
SN Item 2 Line 3 Line 4 Line

1. Control & Relay Panel, Incorporating Numerical Type Protective As per design of supplier
Relays given as under for TSS and Capacitor Bank
2. Numerical 3OC+EF protection Relay 02 02 02
3. Numerical Differential Protection Relay As required for 2 TRFR
4. Numerical 2OC+EF Relay 04 04 04
5. Numerical Feeder Protection Relay 04 04 04
6. Numerical Delta I Relay + Under Voltage Protection Relay to 04 04 04
prevent closing of feeder CB under extended feed condition
7. Numerical DC& AC Monitoring Relay As per design of supplier
8. Inter-tripping Relay 02 02 02
9. Master tripping Relay 08 08 08
10. Voltage operated Auxiliary Tripping Relays As per design of supplier
11. Numerical OC+ Current Unbalance Relay 02 02 02
12. Numerical Under Voltage & Voltage Unbalance Protection Relay 02 02 02
14. Numerical AT Differential Protection Relay 04 04 04
16. Voltage operated Auxiliary Tripping Relays for 4 no. AT As per design of supplier
10.2 V-Connected TSS (02 Line/03Line/04Line): The details of the required relays for protection in
scheme of 3x 38/53/63 MVA V Connected Transformers 2x25 kV AT System are as below:
SN Items 2 Line 3 Line 4 Line

1. Control & Relay Panel, Incorporating Numerical Type Protective As per design of supplier
Relays given as under for TSS and capacitor Bank
2. Numerical 3OC+EF protection Relay 03 03 03
3. Numerical Differential Protection Relay 03 03 03
4. Numerical 2OC+EF Relay 03 03 03
5. Numerical Phase Failure Protection Relay 03 03 03
6. Numerical Feeder Protection Relay 04 04 04
7. Numerical Delta I Relay+ Under Voltage Protection Relay to prevent 04 04 04
closing of feeder CB under extended feed condition
8. Numerical DC& AC Monitoring Relay As per design of supplier
9. Inter tripping Relay 03 03 03
11. Voltage operated Auxiliary Tripping Relays As per design of supplier
12. Numerical OC+ Current Unbalance Relay 02 02 02
13. Numerical Under Voltage & Voltage Unbalance Protection Relay 02 02 02
Page 13 of 27
10.3 The details of the required relays for protection at SP and SSP in scheme of Scott Connected for
02 line:
SN Item SP SSP
1. Control & Relay Panel, Incorporating Numerical Type Protective Relays As per design of supplier
for SP & SSP
2. Numerical AT Differential Protection Relay 04 02
3. Master tripping Relay 04 02
4. Voltage operated Auxiliary relay As per design of supplier
10.4 The details of the required relays for protection at SP and SSP in scheme of V Connected for 02
line:
SN Item SP SSP
1. Control & Relay Panel, Incorporating Numerical Type Protective As per design of
Relays for SP & SSP supplier
2. Numerical AT Differential Protection Relay 03 02
3. Master tripping Relay 03 02
4. Voltage operated Auxiliary relay As per design of
supplier
10.5 In 3 Line and 4 Line section, same SP and SSP are proposed in both schemes, therefore, the
required relays for protection at SP and SSP as detailed under are same in both scheme.
SN Item 03 Line 04 Line

SP SSP SP SSP
1. Control & Relay Panel, Incorporating As per design of supplier
Numerical Type Protective Relays for SP &
SSP
2. Numerical AT Differential Protection Relay 03 02 03 02
3. Master tripping Relay 03 02 03 02
10.6 Boundary (i.e. Interface post of 1X25kV & 2X25kV System) SP for 2 Line/3Line/4Line (for both
Scott & V connected scheme)
SN Item Panel
1. Control & Relay Panel, Incorporating Numerical 01
Type Protective Relays for SP
2. Numerical AT Differential Protection Relay 02
3. Master tripping Relay 02
(i) Instrument transformer shall be provided as per the relevent specification applicable for the
relays.
(ii) The above relays modules are indicative only, some of the above protection function may be
clubbed or may be additionally required as per layout.
Page 14 of 27
10.7 Protection for AT to be provided at TSS, SP & SSP
Figure: 2
Protection for Auto Transformer: Auto transformers are to be installed with bushing current
transformers, 2X25kV DPCB & isolator as shown in figure 2 above, in order to protect and isolate
autotransformer.
(a) Differential Relay (87T): Auto Transformer is protected for its inter-turn short circuits and
internal earth faults by means of current differential relay by sensing current from both Line’s
CTs and comparing it with its neutral CT current.
(b) Other Protective Devices: The Auto transformers as supplied by the purchaser shall be fitted
with the following additional protective devices, for which 4 Nos. Voltage operated Aux.
Tripping Relays shall also to be provided.
i. Buchholz relay with alarm and trip contacts.
ii. Oil temperature indicator with alarm and trip contacts.
iii. Winding temperature indicator with alarm and trip contacts.
iv. Pressure relief device trip contact.
v. Low oil level alarm contacts.
11.0 SCADA System:
(a) Technical Specification No. TI/SPC/RCC/SCADA/0133 or latest for Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) system may be referred.
(b) As per revised SCADA specification no. TI/SPC/RCC/SCADA/0133, the single set of SCADA server
can cater 100 numbers of RTUs. The RTU shall communicate with numerical relays on IEC 61850
protocols. New SCADA system as per RDSO specification no. TI/SPC/RCC/SCADA/0133 shall be
provided for 2x25KV traction system. Further, the section where some TSS/SSP/SP are at 2x25
traction and some are on 25KV traction, the existing RTUs of 25KV traction, if feasible, may be
interfaced with SCADA server provided for 2x25KV system, to the extent possible.
12.0 Earthing at TSS/SP/SSP:
(a) Earthing as per the RDSO Specification no. TI/SPC/PSI/ERTHNG/0210 is to be provided. The
neutral of the Autotransformers at TSS/SP/SSP should also be connected to Buried Rail as
mentioned in the specification.
(b) The fault level on the 2X25kV system is to be taken as 12kA for 3 seconds on the lines of DFCCIL
as the MVA ratings of the transformers are higher than conventional. Accordingly, Earthing grid
at the switching post (SP/SSP) should be prepared by taking fault current of 12kA with 3 second
duration in the calculations given in the specification no. TI/SPC/PSI/ERTHNG/0210. The
Page 15 of 27
switching post (SP/SSP) shall have the provision of buried rail for connection of traction return
current. The Neutral of the Autotransformer should be connected to Buried rail.
13.0 The main equipment used in various schemes along with their Specification is detailed as under-
(Latest specification should be referred)
13.1 Traction Sub Station with Scott Connected Transformer

SN Equipment Description Specification no. Quantity in No.
DL TL FL
1. 220kV or 132kV , 1250A Triple Pole Isolator TI/SPC/PSI/ISOLTR/0210(06/21) 02 02 02
(with earth blade)
(For Bus Coupling)
3. 220kV or 132kV Potential Transformer To be procured as per the 06 06 06
(accuracy class 0.2) for ABT metering specification/sources of
(Indication and Metering) DISCOMs/Power utilities
4. 220kV or 132kV Current Transformer To be procured as per the 06 06 06
(accuracy class 0.2s) for ABT metering specification/sources of
(Metering) DISCOMs/Power utilities
(without earth blade)
6. 220kV or 132kV Support Insulator TI/SPC/OHE/POST/0100 (01/10) As As As
reqd reqd reqd
with A&C slip no.01.
7. 220kV (400-200/5A) or 132kV (800-400/5) TI/SPC/PSI/CT/0210(06/21) 06 06 06
Current transformer (For Transformer
Protection)
8. 220kV or 132kV SF6 Circuit Breaker (Triple TI/SPC/PSI/HVCB/0121 (05/21) 02 02 02
Pole) with A&C slip no. 01
9. 198kV or 120kV Lightening arrester (HV ETI/PSI/137(08/89) with A&C slip 06 or 06 or 06 or
Side) no. 01 to 07 12 12 12
10. 60/84/100MVA, 220/2X25kV or TI/SPC/PSI/TRNPWR/5200 02 02 02

132/2X25kV Single Phase Traction Power (02/21) with A&C slip no. 01
Transformer with Bushing CTs
11. 60kV Lightening arrester ETI/PSI/137(08/89) with A&C slip 08 08 08
no. 01 to 07.
12. 50kV Current Transformer (1500-750/5) TI/SPC/PSI/CT/0210(06/21) 08 08 08
13. 50kV Double pole SF6 Breaker (2000A) TI/SPC/PSI/HVCB/0121(05/21) 04 04 04
14. 50kV Double Pole Manual Isolator TI/SPC/PSI/ISOLTR/0210(06/21) 04 04 04
15. 50kV Support Insulator or 66kV Support TI/SPC/OHE/POST/0100 with As As As
Insulator A&C slip no. 01 reqd reqd reqd
16. 27.5kV/110V Potential Transformer (Type- TI/SPC/PSI/PT/0210(06/21) 08 08 08
II)
(52kV Insulation Class)
17. 25kV Double Pole Manual Isolator (2000A) TI/SPC/PSI/ISOLTR/0210(06/21) 12 24 28
18. 27.5kV/110V Potential Transformer (Type-I) TI/SPC/PSI/ PT/0210(06/21) ---- 12 16
19. 12.3MVA Autotransformer (55/27.5kV) TI/SPC/PSI/AUTOTR/1200 (02/21) 04 04 04
with Bushing CTs
20. 25kV Double Pole Vacuum Interrupter TI/SPC/PSI/LVCBIN/0120(12/13) 02 06 08
Page 16 of 27
with A&C slip no. 01

21. 50kVA, 25kV/240Volt LT supply transformer ETI/PSI/15 (08/03) 02 02 02
22. 25kV Drop Out Fuse ETI/PSI/14(01/86) with A&C slip 02 02 02
no. 01
23. 42kV Lightening Arrester TI/SPC/PSI/MOGTLA/0101 12 16 16
(02/15)
24. Shunt capacitor 2400kVAR at 25kV TI/SPC/PSI/FC&SR/0100 (01/10) 04 04 04
25. Series Reactor for Low loss TI/SPC/PSI/FC&SR/0100 (01/10) 04 04 04
26. 25kV Single Pole Manual Isolator TI/SPC/PSI/ISOLTR/0210 (06/21) 04 04 04
27. 25kV Double Pole Vacuum Circuit Breaker TI/SPC/PSI/LVCBIN/0120(12/13) 10 10 10
(2000A) with A&C slip no. 01
28. 25kV Current Transformer (1500-750/5A) TI/SPC/PSI/CT/0210(06/21) 08 08 08
(For compensation equipment)
30. Low Tension Distribution Panel TI/SPC/PSI/LTDPNL/0210 (10/21) 02 02 02
31. 25kV Support Insulator TI/SPC/OHE/INS/0070 (04/07) As reqd As reqd As reqd
with A&C slip no. 01 & 02

32. 25 kV Double Pole Motorised isolator TI/SPC/PSI/ISOLTR/0210(06/21) 01 01 01
(2000A)
13.2 Traction Sub Station with Transformers in V Connection
SN Equipment Description Specification no. Quantity in no.

DL TL FL
(with earth blade)
(For Bus Coupling)
3. 220kV or 132kV Potential Transformer To be procured as per the 06 06 06
(accuracy class 0.2) for ABT metering specification/sources of
(Indication and Metering) DISCOMs/Power utilities
4. 220kV or 132kV Current Transformer To be procured as per the 06 06 06
(accuracy class 0.2s) for ABT metering specification/sources of
(Metering) DISCOMs/Power utilities
5. 220kV or 132kV , 1250A Double Pole Isolator TI/SPC/PSI/ISOLTR/0210(06/21) 03 03 03
(without earth blade)
6. 220kV or 132kV Support Insulator TI/SPC/OHE/POST/0100 (01/10) As As As
with A&C slip no.01. reqd reqd reqd
7. 220kV (400-200/5A) or 132kV (800-400/5) TI/SPC/PSI/CT/0210(06/21) 06 06 06
Current transformer (For Transformer
Protection)
8. 220kV or 132kV SF6 Circuit Breaker (Double TI/SPC/PSI/HVCB/0121(05/21) 03 03 03
Pole)
9. 198kV or 120kV Lightening arrester (HV Side) ETI/PSI/137(08/89) with A&C 06 06 06
slip no. 01 to 07 or or or
12 12 12
10. 38/53/63MVA, 220/2X25kV or 132/2X25kV TI/SPC/PSI/TRNPWR/4200 03 03 03
Single Phase Traction Power Transformer (02/21)
11. 42kV Lightening arrester TI/SPC/PSI/MOGTLA/0101 18 22 26
(02/15)
Page 17 of 27

(Including 03 as NCT)
(For compensation equipment)
14. 25kV Double pole Vacuum Circuit Breaker TI/SPC/PSI/LVCBIN/0120(12/13) 09 09 09
(2000A) with A&C slip no. 01
15. 25kV Double Pole manual Isolator (2000A) TI/SPC/PSI/ISOLTR/0210 17 25 29
16. 25kV Support Insulator TI/SPC/OHE/INS/0070 (04/07) As As As
with A&C slip no. 01 & 02 reqd reqd reqd
17. 50kVA, 25kV/240Volt LT supply transformer ETI/PSI/15 (08/03) 02 02 02

18. 25kV Drop Out Fuse ETI/PSI/14(01/86) with A&C slip 02 02 02
no. 01
19. 27.5kV/110V Potential Transformer (Type-II) TI/SPC/PSI/PT/0210(06/21) 12 08 08
20. 27.5kV/110V Potential Transformer (Type-I) TI/SPC/PSI/PT/0210(06/21) ---- 12 16
21. 25kV Double Pole Vacuum Interrupter (2000A) TI/SPC/PSI/LVCBIN/0120(12/13) 02 06 08

with A&C slip no. 01
22. Shunt capacitor (2400kVAR at 25kV) TI/SPC/PSI/FC&SR/0100 (01/10) 04 04 04
23. Series Reactor for Low loss TI/SPC/PSI/FC&SR/0100 (01/10) 04 04 04
24. 25kV Double Pole Motorized Isolators (2000A) TI/SPC/PSI/ ISOLTR/0210 02 02 02
25. Low Tension Distribution Panel TI/SPC/PSI/LTDPNL/0210(10/21) 02 02 02
13.3 Sectioning and Paralleling post (SP) for two line

Scott V Scheme
Scheme
1. 8MVA Auto Transformer (55/27.5kV) TI/SPC/PSI/AUTOTR/1200 (02/21) 04 --------
with Bushing CTs
16.5MVA Auto Transformer TI/SPC/PSI/AUTOTR/1200 (02/21) --------- 03
(55/27.5kV) with Bushing CTs
2. 25 kV Double Pole Vacuum Circuit TI/SPC/PSI/LVCBIN/0120(12/13) with 04 05
Breaker (2000A) A&C slip no. 01
3. 50kV Double Pole SF6 Circuit Breaker TI/SPC/PSI/HVCB/0121 (05/21)with A&C 02 02
(2000A) slip no. 01
4. 25 kV Double Pole Vacuum Interrupter TI/SPC/PSI/LVCBIN/0120(12/13) with 02 04
(2000A) A&C slip no. 01
5. 25 kV Double Pole Isolator (Manual) TI/SPC/PSI/ISOLTR/0210 (02/21) 12 13
(2000A)
6. 25 kV Double Pole Isolator (Motorised) TI/SPC/PSI/ISOLTR/0210 (02/21) ----- 02
(2000A)
7. 25kV Potential Transformer (Type-1) TI/SPC/PSI/PT/0210 (06/21) 04 04
8. 25kV/240V LT Supply Transformer ETI/PSI/15 (08/03) 02 02
(10kVA)
9. 25kV Dropout Fuse Switch ETI/PSI/14(01/86) with A&C slip no. 01 02 02
10. 42kV Lightning Arrester TI/SPC/PSI/MOGTLA/0101 (02/15) 08 08
11. Low Tension Distribution Panel TI/SPC/PSI/LTDPNL/0210 (10/21) 02 02
12. 25kV Support Insulator TI/SPC/OHE/INS/0070 (04/07) with A&C As reqd As reqd
slip no. 01 & 02
Page 18 of 27
13.4 Sub Sectioning and Paralleling Post (SSP) for Two line

Scott V
Scheme Scheme
1. 8MVA Auto Transformer (55/27.5kV) TI/SPC/PSI/AUTOTR/1200 (02/21) 02 --------
with Bushing CTs
16.5MVA Auto Transformer TI/SPC/PSI/AUTOTR/1200 (02/21) --------- 02
(2000A) A&C slip no. 01
(2000A)
5. 25 kV Double Pole Isolator (Motorised) TI/SPC/PSI/ISOLTR/0210 (06/21) ----- 02
(2000A)
6. 25kV Potential Transformer (Type-I) TI/SPC/PSI/PT/0210 (06/21) 04 04
7. 25kV/240V LT Supply ETI/PSI/15 (08/03) 02 02
Transformer(10kVA)
8. 25kV Dropout Fuse Switch ETI/PSI/14(01/86) with A&C slip no. 01 02 02

slip no. 01 & 02
13.5 Sectioning and Paralleling Post (SP) For three line and Four Line (for both Scott Connected and V
connected Scheme)

TL FL
1. 16.5MVA Auto Transformer TI/SPC/PSI/AUTOTR/1200 (02/21) 03 03
2. 25 kV Double Pole Vacuum Circuit TI/SPC/PSI/LVCBIN/0120 (12/13) with 03 03
3. 50kV Double Pole SF6 Circuit Breaker TI/SPC/PSI/HVCB/0121 with A&C slip no. 02 02
(2000A) 01
(2000A) A&C slip no. 01
(2000A)
6. 25 kV Double Pole Isolator (Motorised) TI/SPC/PSI/ISOLTR/0210 (06/21) 03 04
(2000A)
Transformer(10kVA)
9. 25kV Dropout Fuse Switch (1A) ETI/PSI/14(01/86) with A&C slip no. 01 02 02
Page 19 of 27

slip no. 01 & 02
13.6 Sub Sectioning and Paralleling Post (SSP) For three line and Four Line (for both Scott Connected and
V connected Scheme)

TL FL
1. 16.5MVA Auto Transformer TI/SPC/PSI/AUTOTR/1200 (02/21) 02 02
(2000A) A&C slip no. 01
(2000A)
5. 25 kV Double Pole Isolator (Motorised) TI/SPC/PSI/ISOLTR/0210 (06/21) 03 04
(2000A)
Transformer(10kVA)
8. 25kV Dropout Fuse Switch (1A) ETI/PSI/14(01/86) with A&C slip no. 01 02 02

slip no. 01 & 02
13.7 Boundary Sectioning and Paralleling Post (SP) for Two line, three Line and Four Line
SN Equipment Description Specification no. DL TL FL

Scott V Connected
Scheme Scheme
1. 12.3MVA Auto Transformer TI/SPC/PSI/AUTOTR/1200 02 ---- ----- ----
(55/27.5kV) with Bushing (02/21)
CTs
16.5MVA Auto Transformer TI/SPC/PSI/AUTOTR/1200 ----- 02 02 02
(55/27.5kV) with Bushing (02/21)
CTs
2. 50kV Double Pole SF6 Circuit TI/SPC/PSI/HVCB/0121 02 02 02 02
Breaker (2000A) (05/21)with A&C slip no. 01
3. 25 kV Double Pole Vacuum TI/SPC/PSI/LVCBIN/0120(12 02 02 02 02
Circuit Breaker (2000A) /13) with A&C slip no. 01
4. 25 kV Double Pole Vacuum TI/SPC/PSI/LVCBIN/0120(12 01 02 03 04
Interrupter (2000A) /13) with A&C slip no. 01
5. 25 kV Single Pole Vacuum TI/SPC/PSI/LVCBIN/0120(12 01 02 03 04
Page 20 of 27
Interrupter (2000A) /13) with A&C slip no. 01

6. 25 kV Double Pole Isolator TI/SPC/PSI/ISOLTR/0210 08 07 09 12
(Manual) (2000A) (06/21)
7. 25 kV Double Pole Isolator TI/SPC/PSI/ISOLTR/0210 ----- ---- 03 04
(Motorised) (2000A) (06/21)
8. 25 kV Single Pole Isolator TI/SPC/PSI/ISOLTR/0210 02 05 07 08
(Manual) (2000A) (06/21)
9. 25 kV Single Pole Isolator TI/SPC/PSI/ISOLTR/0210 --- 02 ---- ----
(Motorised) (2000A) (06/21)
10. 25kV Potential Transformer TI/SPC/PSI/PT/0210 (06/21) 04 04 06 08
(Type-1)
11. 25kV/240V LT Supply ETI/PSI/15 (08/03) 02 02 02 02
Transformer(10kVA)
12. 25kV Dropout Fuse Switch ETI/PSI/14(01/86) with A&C 02 02 02 02
(1A) slip no. 01
13. 42kV Lightning Arrester TI/SPC/PSI/MOGTLA/0101 06 06 09 12

(02/15)
14. Low Tension Distribution TI/SPC/PSI/LTDPNL/0210 02 02 02 02
Panel (10/21)
15. 25kV Support Insulator TI/SPC/OHE/INS/0070(04/07 As reqd As reqd As reqd As reqd
) with A&C slip no. 01 & 02
14.0 Bus Bar and Conductor to be used in various TSS/SP/SSP are as below:
a) 19/2.5mm Galvanized Steel Stranded Earth Wire to be used as an earth wire. (RDSO Drawing no.
ETI/PSI/0225 (Mod B)).
b) Primary Side of the TSS: For 220kV & 132kV, 28.62mmm ACSR “Zebra” conductor to be used. (IS: 398
Part-II).
c) Secondary Side of the TSS:

 For Scott Connected TSS - 50mm DIA Aluminum Bus Bar as per IS-5082 (Aluminium Alloy to Grade
in WP condition) & 36mm Dia AAAC ‘Bersismis’ Conductor (IS: 398 Part-4, 767mm2, 61/4.00
conductors) is to be used. For the specific location of use of Bus bar or Conductor please refer the
drawings.
 For V Connected TSS: 50mm DIA Aluminium Bus Bar (IS-5082 (Aluminium Alloy to Grade in WP
condition) & 38.25 mm Dia AAC ‘Bull’ Conductor (IS: 398 Part-1, 865.4mm2, 61/4.25 conductors) is
to be used. For the specific location of use of Bus bar or Conductor please refer the drawings.
d) At the SP/SSP Also, 50mm DIA Aluminium Bus Bar (IS-5082 (Aluminium Alloy to Grade in WP
condition) & 38.25 mm Dia AAC ‘Bull’ Conductor (IS: 398 Part-1, 865.4mm2, 61/4.25 conductors) is to
be used. For the specific location of use of Bus bar or Conductor please refer the drawings.
e) Accordingly, the connectors of the suitable matching size of the conductor/Bus bar (para 14 above)
should be purchased from the CORE approved sources of the connectors. In case, CORE approved
sources are not available, the connector shall be procured as per IS: 5561.
f) Required Cables to be procured as per relevant Indian Standard.
Page 21 of 27
15.0 Battery Capacity and battery charger to be used

The stand by battery charger at TSS/SP/SSP should be provided.
SN Location Capacity Specification For
Battery Battery Charger
1. TSS Lead Acid Batteries RDSO/PE/SPEC/TL /0040 (Rev. ‘2’)- TI/SPC/PSI/200-250/
110V, 250AH 2021 CHGR/0210 (07/21)
2. SP/SSP Lead Acid Batteries RDSO/PE/SPEC/TL /0040 (Rev. ‘2’)- TI/SPC/PSI/40-150/
110V, 150AH 2021- CHGR/1210 (07/21)
16.0 Interface of 25kV system with 2X25kV system and extension of feed from 25kV system to 2X25kV
System and vice versa:
16.1 The SP may be proposed as an interface between subject two systems as the SP have been
provided with adequate AT capacity to cater the feed extension. However, the overloading of the
Autotransformer/Autotransformers installed at SP shall determine the extent of feed extension.
16.2 Extension of feed between 2 x25 kV system and 1x 25 kV system
General Principle
Generally speaking, extension of feed from 1x 25 kV section to 2x 25 k V section and vice versa is
possible with following remarks concerning capacity of AT at the boundary of both systems.
a) Extension of feed from 1x 25 k V section to 2x 25 kV section.
Figure:3
In this case, AT-1 at boundary of both systems is burdened with all the train loads which are
located at right side of AT -2 and nearly half of the train loads between AT-1 and AT-2 Therefore,
overload of AT-1 shall be observed.
b) Extension of feed from 2 x25 kV section to 1x 25 kV section.
Figure:4
Page 22 of 27
In this case, AT-1 at boundary of both systems is burdened with all the train loads on 1X25 kV
section and nearly half of the train loads between AT-1 and AT-2 which shall be remarked on the
extension.
***End***
Page 23 of 27
Annexure-1
Page 24 of 27
Annexure-2
Page 25 of 27
Page 26 of 27
Annexure-3
Page 27 of 27
TI/IN/0044 Rev.00 Document Title: PROCEDURE ORDER FOR CROSS ACCEPTANCE Page 1 of 31
भारत सरकार, रे ल मंत्रालय

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
PROCEDURE FOR CROSS ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

FOR NEW ITEM/DESIGN/SPECIFICATION FOR 25KV & 2X25KV AC
TRACTION SYSTEM
25 केवी और 2X25KV एसी टै क्श ससिस् के सलए शनई

वितु/डडिजाइश/ववनशरर ् के सलए ्रस िवीकृनत ्ाशरं डि के सलए ्र्का
INSTRUCTION No. TI/IN/0044 Rev.00
ननिरर श ससं्या: TI/IN/0044 Rev.00
(Reference: Railway Board leter no. 2021/Elect(Dev)/225/44

dated 09.12.2021 & leter no. 2021/Elect(Dev)/221/45 dated
18.02.2022)
RESEARCH DESIGNS & STANDARDS

ORGANISATION
(Ministry of Railways)
Manak Nagar, Lucknow (UP) 226011
1. PREFACE
1.1 The Railway Board vide letter no. 2021/Elect(Dev)/225/44 dated 09.12.2021
(Enclosed as Annexure-2) has directed RDSO to frame the cross acceptance
criteria for new items/design/specification used for Traction Installation
system for 25kV and 2X25kV AC system for approval by Railway Board.
1.2 Further, PED/TI vide note no. ED/TI/Misc/21 dated 16.12.2021 (Enclosed as
Annexure-3) has nominated the committee of DTI/III, DTI/Civil, JDTI/I &
JD/TI-II of Traction Installation directorate to prepare the cross acceptance
criteria. Also, Railway Board vide letter no. 2021/Elect(Dev)/221/45 dated
18.02.2022 (Annexure – 9) has advised to issue Cross Acceptance Criteria to
all concern for implementation on Indian Railways.
1.3 This guideline of cross acceptance is being framed in view of the liberty given
to the Contractor in Para 6 of schedule D and Para 2 of Annexure I (Schedule
D) in standard EPC document issued by Railway Board vide letter no.
218/CE-I/CT/36-EPC Contract Policy Pt-1 dated 15.11.2021 (Enclosed as
Annexure-4) to adopt international practices, alternative specifications,
materials and standards to bring in innovation in the design and construction.
1.4 The liberty is given to bring in innovation and therefore an alternative item
which is not as per the designs/specifications issued by RDSO, but the same
is already in use with satisfactory performance in one or more major
Indian/World Railway(s) system.
1.5 The specifications of items are created/revised & issued by RDSO as per the
RDSO’s ISO procedure no. QO-D-8-1.1 and QO-D-8-1.2 for creation and
revision of specifications respectively. During the specification preparation
stage the draft specifications are uploaded for the comments of
Industry/firms on RDSO’s open portal for a period of 30 days and on the
basis of comments received, a reason document is prepared for the
acceptance/non-acceptance of the comments. Thereafter, Reasoned
Document and Final Draft are uploaded again on RDSO’s open portal for
comments for 15 days. Again the comments received are discussed and
reason document is prepared and on the basis of it, Directorate head
approves the specification for issue. The process adopted is very transparent
as anybody can comment on the specification being framed and the
acceptance or rejection of comments is well reasoned and on the basis of this
reason document and with the approval of Directorate head the specification
is issued. The procedure has been further strengthened w.e.f 19.06.2020 to
bring out more transparency and expertise by adopting procedures
suggested by Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) and consequent recognition
of RDSO by BIS as Standards Development Organisation (SDO).
1.6 However, the industry always moves with new technologies and the same are
not getting updated in the specification as fast as the industry moves.
Therefore, there should be some mechanism to introduce the superior/cost
effective technology items/design/specification without taking up the task of
specification/STR revision and subsequent vendor development.
1.7 It is pertinent to mention here that cross acceptance criteria have been in
vogue in METRO/DFCCIL in lump sum/design built contract where the
Contractor quotes a lump sum cost for whole work on the basis of functional
requirement and is given freedom to adopt new technologies within the ambit
of the quoted cost and meeting the functional requirement at the same time.
1.8 Following may please be ensured before proposing an alternate solution;

(i) The proposed new items/design/specification is not specifically refused/
restricted in the RDSO specifications.
(ii) The new items/design/specification should not degrade the performance
with respect to the item/design as mentioned in the RDSO specification.
2. OBJECT
The object of this guideline is to outline the procedure for cross acceptance of
new items/design/specification in terms of process, responsibility, spare and
maintenance etc. in a uniform procedure.
3. APPLICABILITY
i. The cross-acceptance guideline shall be applicable to the items having

alternative specifications to RDSO specification which are being used first time
in Indian Railways in 25 kV or 2x25 kV systems.
ii. This guideline shall be applied for evaluation & acceptance of alternative
products for which there is no RDSO specification but are already in use with
satisfactory performance in one or more major Indian/World Railway(s)
system.
4. PROCEDURE FOR CROSS ACCEPTANCE
4.1 The alternative specifications of the items/design shall be framed by

contractor and shall be supported with authentic specifications and
standards specified in paragraph 5, schedule D under chapter ‘specifications
and standards’ of standard EPC document issued by Railway Board vide
letter no. 218/CE-I/CT/36-EPC Contract Policy Pt-1 dated 15.11.2021. Such
a proposal shall be submitted by the Contractor to the Authority. The
specifications of the product offered shall be made by the contractor with
clause wise justification vis a vis applicable RDSO specification that offered
product is superior/cost effective to the technology stipulated in the
applicable RDSO specification. Along with the proposal following minimum
details/documents shall also be submitted.
i. Description of item as per the RDSO Specification.
ii. Proposed items/design/specification.
iii. Deviations from RDSO’s specification considering the alternate proposal
in consultation with OEM.
iv. Advantages of new items/design/specification over as mentioned in

RDSO specifications in consultation with OEM.
v. Documents in support of the advantages mentioned.
vi. Schedule of Guaranteed performance.
vii. Reference IS/IEC of the new items/design/specification.
viii. Design/Codal Life of the new item certified by OEM.
ix. Prototype test report issued by designated/notified body/OEM. The
details of the testing agencies/lab along with accreditation certificates.
x. Provenness performance certificate from the competent official of end
user i.e. from world Railway(s)/ Indian Railways & its
PSUs/Metro/DFC/Other Railways (as the case may be). New
items/design/specification should be of satisfactory performance as
mentioned in Annexure-1. Name, Designation, Phone & Fax Nos. and
address of the official and Organisation certifying the performance
feedback should be clearly mentioned. It would be responsibility of
contractor to ensure that certificate submitted is issued only from
competent official of certifying organisation.
4.2 The Cross Acceptance Criteria for the (a) Items not covered by RDSO/CORE
Specification OR (b) Items being adopted for the first time in Indian
Railways, shall be as under:
a. The item should have already been in-use with satisfactory

performance in one or more major world Railway(s)/ Indian Railways &
its PSUs/Metro/DFC/Other Railways, for more than 5(five) years from
the date of bid opening for the same or higher design speed/rating of
equipment offered. The manufacturer should have to meet the criteria
of satisfactory performance and has to submit the certificate to this
effect as per Annexure-1.
b. The manufacturer should have supplied at least 20% quantity to be
used in this contract in last seven years or they can supply, maximum
Five times the quantity supplied in last seven years. However, this
should not be treated as impediment in timely completion of the
project and therefore, the contractor can place the quantity even
beyond this with the approval of authority, in order to ensure timelines
of Contract.
c. Prototype test Report/Certificate for offered items is to be submitted.
Fresh prototype test is to be conducted, if the same has not been
carried out:
i. In last five (5) years from one month prior to date of Bid
Opening or later;
ii. Considering the environmental conditions as specified in the
specification or contract.
d. The Manufacturer shall have to support maintenance and repair of the

equipment in India and supply spares till the design life of the material
such as transformers etc. in India. The Contractor shall submit an
undertaking to this effect from the Original Equipment Manufacturer
(OEM).
The Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) may transfer technology
to any Indian Company for manufacture and supply as per Clause 8
(iii) of this document.
4.3 In case, the Authority is of the opinion that the proposal submitted by the
Contractor is not in conformity with any of the international standards (IEC,
IS, EN, AAR, UIC etc.) or codes or the proposed new
items/design/specification is inferior/poor than the RDSO specification, the
proposal shall be rejected by the Authority and same shall be communicated
to the contractor with reasons of rejection.
4.4 In case, the offered new items/design/specification is accepted by the

Authority, the proposal along with documents/details mentioned in Para 4.1
above, in support of justification shall be submitted to RDSO for final
approval.
4.5 The decision of RDSO for the acceptance/rejection of the new

items/design/specification shall be final and binding.
4.6 After acceptance of the new items/design/specification, following details

shall also be submitted by the Contractor,
i. The operation and maintenance manual along with recommended
maintenance schedule.
ii. Undertaking regarding the maintenance spare/support till the codal
/design life of the product (On stamp/legal paper of appropriate value).
iii. Proposed Training schedule of Indian Railway officials (as required) for
the new item.
iv. The design drawings of the new item for the reference of the Indian
Railways.
4.7 Type testing for the product as per the new items/design/specification;
i. In case the type test has already been conducted, the repetition of the
type test may be waived off in terms of Clause 4.2 of this document. In
this case Contractor have to submit a declaration of OEM that
submitted prototype test report is of identical equipment (same rating),
manufactured with identical component/raw material at the same
manufacturing facility & premises and to the identical quality Standard,
which have been supplied in world Railway(s)/ Indian Railways & its
PSUs/Metro/DFC/Other Railways (as the case may be).
ii. The type test report shall be submitted to RDSO for

approval/acceptance.
iii. The non-acceptance of the type test report (completely or partially) shall
necessitate the type testing of the new item (completely or partially, as
the case may be).
iv. In case the type testing is to be conducted, following shall be followed;
a) The Contractor shall submit the detailed test plan along with the
internal test report of the item under consideration to the Authority
consisting of the tests to be conducted/verified against test
certificates (TC), procedure and acceptance/rejection criteria. The
procedure and acceptance /rejection criteria should be supported by
the Indian/international standards as applicable.
b) The test plan accepted by RDSO shall be forwarded to nominated
testing agency as per Para 5.0 of this guideline for witnessing the
type test.
c) Accordingly, the Type test schedule along with internal test reports
shall be submitted to the nominated testing agency as per Para 5.0
of this guideline at least 15 days in advance. The schedule shall
contain the location and number of days required for testing of each
tests.
5. TYPE TESTING AGENCY
RDSO or any other reputed agency approved by RDSO for witnessing

the type tests.
6. TYPE TEST RESULTS
i. The final type test certificate of the item shall be issued by the RDSO or
nominated testing agency as the case may be.
ii. In case the alternate design/product has failed during the type testing, if
the vendor desires for re-testing of same sample or re-testing of
improved sample, he may do so by submitting the details of technical
explanation and corrective actions taken.
7. CHARGES OF THE TYPE TESTING
Type testing charges shall be borne by the contractor.

8. MAKE IN INDIA POLICY
i. Make in India Policy regarding Public Procurement issued by Department of

Promotion and Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT), Ministry of Commerce
and Industry vide order no. P-45021/2/2017-PP(BE-II) dated 16.09.2020
(Enclosed at Annexure-7), Railway Board letter no.
2020/RS(G)/779/2/Pt.1 dated 25.09.2020 (Enclosed at Annexure-6),
Railway Board Letter no. 2015/RS(G)/779/5(Vol.III) dated 19.02.2021
(Enclosed as Annexure-5), Public Procurement Policies/Orders issued for
business with countries that share land boundaries with India and other
relevant policies shall be applicable.
ii. As per Railway Board Letter no. 2015/RS(G)/779/5(Vol.III) dated

19.02.2021 (Enclosed as Annexure-5), Para 3.0 except short neutral
section assembly for all items/material used in Railway Electrification, only
class I local suppliers shall be eligible to bid and supply, irrespective of the
purchase value, shall also be applicable for cross acceptance.
iii. However, in case OEM manufacturing is based outside India, the transfer
of technology (TOT) is also permitted as per the following particulates;
a. The manufacturer (OEM) shall transfer technology to any Indian firm
for manufacture and supply of 100% quantity used in the project.
However, for Short Neutral section assembly, up to 50% of the
required quantity may be supplied by OEM and remaining, i.e. more
than 50%, has to be supplied through TOT.
b. The Provenness criteria of OEM i.e. foreign based firm (item installed
in India or abroad) shall be accepted subjected to certification under
Annexure-1.
c. The OEM should have technology tie up with the Indian manufacturer
and has signed a Joint Deed of Undertaking (Format enclosed as
Annexure-8), by the OEM, the contractor and Indian Equipment
Manufacturer/Indian Partner.
d. Indian Equipment Manufacturer/Indian Partner undergoing with TOT
for the supply of offered product by OEM should meet the requirement
of “Class–I local supplier” for that item as mentioned in Para 8 (i)
above.
e. In order to ensure satisfactory transfer of technology, the OEM shall
provide following:
(i) Design drawings
(ii) Manufacturing drawings.
(iii) Process sheets for Manufacture
(iv) Inspection and Quality Management procedures
(v) Complete Material Specifications
(vi) Jigs and Fixtures
(vii) List of Machinery and Plants along with their functional

specifications, which are needed for manufacture
(viii) Manufacturing supervision
(ix) Inspection by OEM’s representative
(x) Extended Guarantee for 3 years for items proposed under cross
acceptance after expiry of Defect Notification Period.
(xi) Any other assistance, reasonably required.
Annexure-1
CRITERIA FOR THE SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE
1. The item should have already been in-use with satisfactory performance in
one or more major world Railway(s)/ Indian Railways & its
PSUs/Metro/DFC/Other Railways, for more than 5(five) years from the date
of bid opening for the same or higher design speed/rating of equipment
offered.
2. The provenness performance of quantity, 02 numbers or required quantity
for 100 Track Kilometres, whichever is higher, shall be provided as per
following format by competent official of end user.
Format for the submission of the performance certicate for provenness
Equipment descripton with design speed/ ratng

Quantty (in fgures)
Governing Specifcaton
Past applicaton history of the equipment
SN Model Batch/ Serial User Staton/ Date of Date of start Details of Remarks/
no. Lot no. of Rly/ Locato commis of Failures Observat
no. equip Auth n/Sect sioning commercial tll date on
(as ment ority on service
applica
ble)
Note:
i. All the above details shall be provided/certified by the competent official of
end user. It would be responsibility of contractor to ensure that certificate
submitted is issued only from competent official of certifying organisation.
ii. Name, Designation, Phone & Fax Nos. and address of the Official certifying
the performance feedback should be clearly mentioned.
Annexure-2
Annexure-3
Annexure-4
Annexure-5
Annexure-6
Annexure-7
Annexure-8
JOINT DEED OF UNDERTAKING BY THE ORIGINAL EQUIPMENT

MANUFACTURER ALONGWITH THE CONTRACTOR AND INDIAN EQUIPMENT
MANUFACTURER/INDIAN PARTNER
THIS DEED OF UNDERTAKING executed this ……………. day of ………………………….

Two Thousand and ………… by
M/s. ……………………, a Company incorporated under the laws of …………. and having
its registered Office at ………………………… (hereinafter called the “Original Equipment
Manufacturer”, which expression shall include its successors, executors and
permitted assigns),
And
M/s. ……….…………….., a Company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act of

1956 and having its Registered Office at ……………………………….. (hereinafter called
the “Indian Equipment Manufacturer/Indian Partner”, which expression shall include
its successors, executors and permitted assigns),
Through
M/s. ……….…………….., a Company incorporated under the laws of …………………… and

having its Registered Office at ……………………………. (hereinafter called the
“Contractor”, which expression shall include its successors, executors and permitted
assigns),
In favour of …………………. Railway
WHEREAS:
1. The “…………………. Railway” has invited a bid as per its Tender Specification
No…..……. for the execution of …………… (Insert name of the package along
with project name).
2. The “Contractor” at the time of bidding has submitted its bid to the
“…………………. Railway” vide proposal No. ………dated……………..for the said
package and accepted by the “…………………. Railway”, resulting into a contract
(hereinafter called the “Contract”).
3. The “Contractor” has selected “Original Equipment Manufacturer” along with

its “Indian Equipment Manufacturer/Indian Partner”, for the supply of
Equipment in line with the Clause No.…......., Section ………, of Volume…………
forming part of the contract.
4. Under the provisions of the contract for the supply of the Equipment, the
“Original Equipment Manufacturer” will supply _______ Nos. of Equipment
“Indian Partner” will supply _______ Nos. of equipment.
NOW THEREFORE THIS UNDERTAKING WITNESSETH as under:
1.0 Without in any way affecting the generality and total responsibility in terms
of this Deed of Undertaking, the Contractor, Indian Equipment
Manufacturer /Indian Partner and the Original Equipment Manufacturer to
ensure:
i. Design of the Equipment manufactured in India shall be identical to the

design of equipment to be manufactured and supplied by the Original
Equipment Manufacturer.
ii. Adequate up gradation of the facilities including quality systems at

Indian works.
iii. Training to staff of Indian Equipment Manufacturer/Indian Partner and

certification to its trained personnel to carry out each activity.
iv. Active involvement of Original Equipment Manufacturer expert in various

stages of manufacturing of equipment/complete assembly, quality
assurance and testing for the first unit of the Equipment at Indian
Partner’s works.
v. Manufacturing and Quality assurance process of Indian Equipment

Manufacturer/ Indian Partner shall be same as that of Original
Equipment Manufacturer.
vi. Specification of raw material and specification of major bought out

components shall be same as that of Original Equipment Manufacturer.
vii. Timely supply of the said equipment shall be ensured.
viii. If necessary the Original Equipment Manufacturer shall advise the

Indian equipment manufacturer/Indian Partner and/or Contractor
suitable modifications of designs and implement necessary corrective
measures to discharge the obligations under the Contract.
2.0 This Deed of Undertaking shall be construed and interpreted in accordance

with the laws of India and the Courts in ……… (Place of court to be decided by
Zonal Railway) shall have exclusive jurisdiction in all matters arising under
the Undertaking.
3.0 We, the Original Equipment Manufacturer/Contractor and/or The Indian

Equipment Manufacturer/Indian Partner agree that this Undertaking shall be
irrevocable and shall form an integral part of the Contract and further agree
that this Undertaking shall continue to be enforceable till the ………………….
Railway discharges it.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the Original Equipment Manufacturer, The Indian Equipment

Manufacturer/Indian Partner and/or the Contractor have through their Authorised
Representatives executed these presents and affixed Common seals of their
respective Companies, on the day, month and year first above mentioned.
WITNESS (For Original Equipment Manufacturer)

Signature ……………………. (Signature of the authorized representative)
Name ……………………….. Name ……………………..
Office Address ………………. Common Seal of Company …...…………….
WITNESS (For Indian Equipment Manufacturer/Indian Partner)

Name ……………………….. Name ……………………..
WITNESS (For Contractor)

Name ……………………….. Name ……………………..
Note:
1. The non-judicial stamp papers of appropriate value shall be purchased in the
name of executants parties and the date of purchase should not be later than
six months of date of execution of the Undertaking.
2. The Undertaking shall be signed on all the pages by the authorised
representatives of each of the partners and should invariably be witnessed.
Annexure-9
Page 1 of 5 Effective from 10-07-2003 Maintenance Instruction No. TI/MI/00026 Rev. 2
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
MINISTRY OF RAILWAY
RESEARCH DESIGN AND STANDARDS ORGANISATION
MANAK NAGAR, LUCKNOW- 11.
1. Titles
Periodic maintenance instructions and trouble shooting guidelines for capacitor

banks provided on Indian Railways.
2. Applicable to:
All class of capacitor banks.
3. Object of special maintenance instructions:
To arrest the Maintenance failures of capacitor banks on Indian Railways due to

maintenance problems and develop suitable guidelines suiting to all category of
capacitor banks provided on Indian Railways.
To develop a suitable Guideline which shall assist the users for proper
rectification of the capacitor banks failures by observing the schedule
maintenance and taking suitable remedial action.
4. Instructions:
4.1 Three monthly schedule:
4.1.1 Clean the dust over the insulators with the help of a damp cloth. In case of oily
deposits carbon tetrachloride or any other suitable solvent may be used for
cleaning of the insulators.
4.1.2 Observe for any dielectric leakage/seepage, if any leakage/seepage is found,

rectify it as given in Para 5.
4.1.3 Observe for any birdcages in and around the traction substations.
4.1.4 Observe physically for any abnormal temperature rise of the capacitor units.
4.2 Six monthly schedule
4.2.1 All the above items as mentioned in Three Monthly Schedule.
4.2.2 Check the excessive tension on any of the connectors. Ease out the tension on the
bushings, if required.
TI MI 0026 REV 2
4.2.3 Observe for any rust collection/corrosion marks on the metallic parts and clean
them.
4.2.4 Observe the current and voltage variations for the capacitor bank for at least 24
hours (Hourly readings of voltage and current for the capacitor bank should be
recorded. If continuous recording facility is available, the same may be used).
Compare the records of measurements with last recorded readings.
Measurements with Digital meters shall be ideal. Examine and execute the
changes for the past few years.
4.3 Annual Maintenance Schedule.
4.3.1 All the above items as mentioned in 4.2.
4.3.2 Ensure proper tightening of the fasteners and the connectors.
4.3.3 Check for functioning of protective relays with the help of primary injection test
kit & secondary injection test kit.
4.3.4 Measure temperature rise in 24 hours of the capacitor unit, which is innermost, by
applying a suitable thermometer on the can of the capacitor bank. The
temperature rise in no case should be 15 deg. C above the ambient temperature
(Temperature of capacitor container can be measured by fixing a thermo -meter on
the wall of the container, its bulb being at one fourth of the height of capacitor
down from the top).
4.3.5 Check that the NCT settings are as per RDSO guidelines and note that the NCT
relay settings have remained stable for last 5 years. Change in the NCT relay
settings are required to be examined.
4.3.6 Measure the capacitance value and tan delta of the capacitor units at nearly the
same ambient temperature. Compare with last measured values.
4.4 Trouble shooting Guidelines for Capacitor Bank on I.R.
S.No TROUBLE CAUSE REMEDIAL ACTION

1. Leakage of Minor transient a) Minor seepage may be attended
dielectric from damages. Dents etc. by M-seal (fast drying type
capacior can compound).
b) Extent of leakage may be studied.
Depending upon the extent of
leakage, the same attended or
units rejected. Original
manufacturer can also be referred.
TI MI 0026 REV 2
2 Seepage of a) Improper handling a) Attend by using Araldite or M-

dielectric. during seal (fast drying type compound)
transportation. b) Ease out the tension by using
b) Due to tension proper size of terminal
coming on bushings connectors. Arrest dielectric
by terminal seepage by M- seal type fast
connectors. drying compound.
c) Overheating of c) Eliminate overheating of
capacitor bank. capacitor banks by instructions at
S. No. 3
3. Overheating of a) Poor ventilation. a) Change location.

the units (can Erection is near a b) Capacitor unit elements inside the
temperatrature hot body. capacitor unit have failed.
should not be b) Capacitor units Replace capacitor unit with a new
more by15 values have one if needed (Ref: Item 6 for
deg. C above changed over the details).
ambient). last recorded c) The dielectric might have run the
values. safe limit. The unit might fails.
c) Excessive oil Replace unit. Measure capacitor
seepage/leakage. value and decide.
d) Capacitor drawing d) The dielectric medium aged.
high currents. Refer to manufacturer and replace
units.
e) Refer Point No. 4 for details.
4. Capacitor a) High system a) Reduce voltage by changing taps

drawing high voltage. of the transformer.
current
b) Harmonic current. b) Harmonics in the system are on
the increase. Conduct harmonic
analysis.
5. Capacitor a) Less system a) Correct voltage by transformer.
drawing lower voltage.
current b) Measure capacitance value and if
b) A capacitor value changes are there. Replace the
of individual cell units.
has changed due to
blowing of internal c) Check Neutral CT and associated
fuses. protection for proper functioning.
6. Abnormal a) Gas formation due to a) Replace unit.

bulging/ internal arching.
bursting of b) Check neutral CT and associated
capacitor units. protection for proper functioning.
TI MI 0026 REV 2
7. Black marks a) External fault a) Clean bushing and check

on bushing of between terminal installation for external short
the capacitor and container. circuits ,presence of bird cages
banks. b) High voltage surge etc.
due to lightning or b) Check for effectiveness of the
restriking of circuit lighting arrestor and its proper
breakers. rating.
c) Consult original manufacturer, if
situation persists.
8. Terminals a) Loose terminal b) Properly tighten connectors.
overheated or connectors or c) Clean for rust/ corrosion. If
melted. corrosion is taking required, change the connector.
place.
9. Capacitor bank a) Capacitor unit a) Replace unit, if value has changed

tripping on rating has changed. (Ref. Item 6 for details)
unbalanced b) Neutral C.T.
protection. connections not
proper or setting
wrong.
5. Arresting leakage
Take out the defective unit having leakage/seepage and put it in a position so that
the leakage/seepage point is topmost. The capacitor unit is filled with dielectric but on
the top some nitrogen is present. The can should be placed such that the dielectric does
not ooze out from the cracked location. Clean the seepage point by carbon tetrachloride
or a similar oil removing solvent, so that it is perfectly dried. Apply fast drying type M-
seal compound (or equivalent) for arresting the leakage of the can. For arresting the
leakage near the insulator bushings, araldite (or equivalent) may be used. Allow it to dry
for 6-8 hrs. or as recommended by the adhesive supplier. Re-erect the unit after making a
red cross mark with the paint, which is visible from down below so as to identity the
capacitor unit from the ground level. Continue to monitor the capacitor bank for its
performance.
This exercise is applicable for attention of minor leakage of the capacitor units
only. For major leakage from the bushings or otherwise where the dielectric might have
already reduced to a level where the internal elements are getting exposed the capacitor
unit may be replaced.
6. Bird Electrocution Proble m:
To avoid the bird electrocution leading to capacitor failure problem, provide bird
caps made of polypropylene on the capacitor’s terminal bushings and PVC sleeves on the
bus-bars. These caps and sleeves should be procured from RDSO approved H.T.
capacitor vendors and should have a minimum 15 kV, AC voltage withstand value
continuously.
TI MI 0026 REV 2
7. Measurement of capacitance:
Use a digital multimeter capable of recording reading in microfarad upto first

decimal place. The range of the capacitance meter should be 2 to 100 microfarad
minimum. Measure the readings of the capacitance upto the first decimal value. Also
note the ambient temperatures. Reading of the capacitor values is likely to change
(within 0 to –5%) in the initial 3 to 12 months. These may be recorded for reference only.
Any changes in values beyond this period from 0 to 3% per unit suggest starting of the
deterioration cycle of the capacitor units. Such capacitor banks should be measured for
the values more often. Changes in values beyond –6% indicates that the capacitor bank is
likely to fail and should be removed from service.
8. Measurement of Tan Delta (Dielectric loss angle):
The tan delta measurements should be done annually with the help of a standard
shearing bridge. Abrupt changes in the dielectric constants shall be the indicators of
deterioration of the capacitor. The measured value of the dielectric loss angle shall not
exceed 0.0005.
8 References:
i) UNISTAR Installation, operation and Maintenance of High voltage Power

capacitors.
ii) Rough Metallized PP for AC Applications by Denis Pallemand & Lucien
Tamic.
iii) Performance assessment and field Experience by S.A Backer &
P.R.B.Nair.
iv) The Effect of water content of the impregnation Liquid on Agening of All
Film Capacitor Windings by H. Suonppa, T. Martinmaki & V. Rasanen.
9. Suggestion for improvement upon these instructions are most welcome and may be
addressed to Executive Director/TI, R.D.S.O., Manak Nagar,Lucknow-226 011
(N.K.Gupta)
Director/TI-V
Distribution:
Copy to:
1. Secretary (Elec.), Railway Board , New Delhi – 110 001.
2. Chief Electrical Engineer:

i.) Central Railway, Mumbai CST- 400 001.
ii.) Eastern Railway, Fairlie Place, Kolkata – 700 001.
iii.) Northern Railway, Baroda House, New Delhi- 110 001.
iv.) Southern Railway, Park Town, Chennai – 600 003.
v.) South Central Railway, Rail Nilayam, Secunderabad – 500 371.
vi.) South Eastern Railway, Garden Reach, Kolkata – 700 043.
vii.) Western Railway, Churchgate, Mumbai – 400 020.
TI MI 0026 REV 2
Page 1 of 11 Effective from 08.04.2010 Maintenance Instructions on condition monitoring of Lightening Arresters TI/MI/0041 Rev. 1
Government of India
Research Designs & Standards Organisation
Manak Nagar, Lucknow - 226011
MAINTENANCE INSTRUCTION NO. TI/MI/0041 Rev. 1
Maintenance Instructions
for
Condition monitoring of Lightening Arresters provided on traction systems on
Indian Railways
1. Scope:
The technical instructions compiled in this document are related to the different aspects of the
condition monitoring of lightening arresters including measurement of resistive leakage current as
applicable to metal oxide gapless type lightning arresters of different voltage class existing on
traction system of IR.
2. Objectives :
Objective of these instructions is to develop awareness about the condition monitoring of Lightening
Arresters of different voltage class
3. Introduction
3.1 Applicable standards for Lightening & surge arresters
These instructions are based on following standards, specifications and RDSO documents issued in
past:
S.No. Standard/reference Subject

a. IEC 60099-1, 3, 4 Different types of surge/lightening arresters
b. IEC 60099-5 Surge arresters-selection & application recommendation
c. IS 3070 part-3 Lightning Arresters for Alternating Current Systems - Specification
- Part 3: Metal Oxide Lightning Arresters without Gaps.
d. IS 15086 part-3 Selection & application guide
e. RDSO specification No. for Third Harmonic resistive Current measurement equipment
TI/SPC/PSI/LCMLA/0030
f. RDSO instructions Maintenance instructions for Lightening Arresters
TI/MI/0041 dated 27-09-05
3.2 Diagnostic Indicators of metal oxide Surge Arresters in service.
Except for brief occasions when a surge arrester is functioning as an over voltage-limiting device, it is
expected to behave as an insulator therefore its insulating properties are most essential for
operational reliability of the power system.
Different diagnostic methods and indicators for revealing possible deterioration or failure of the
insulation properties have been tried since the introduction of surge arresters. These methods range
from fault indicators and dis-connectors for indication of complete arrester failures, to instruments
that are able to measure slight changes in the resistive leakage current or the power loss of metal
oxide arresters.
3.2.1 Fault indicators
Fault indicators provide a clear visual indication of a failed arrester, without disconnecting the
arrester from the line. They may be an integrated part of the arrester, or a separate unit installed in
series with the arrester. The working principle is usually based on the amplitude and duration of the
arrester current, or on the temperature of the non-linear metal-oxide resistors.
3.2.2 Dis-connectors
Dis-connectors, often used on medium-voltage arresters, provide a visual indication of a failed

arrester by disconnecting it from the system. The typical working principle is an explosive device
triggered by the fault current: however, the dis-connectors are not intended to extinguish the fault
current. The dis-connector may be an integral part of the arrester or insulating bracket, or a
separate unit installed in series with the arrester. The advantage is that the line remains in operation
after disconnection of the arrester. The major disadvantage is the lack of overvoltage protection
until the failed arrester has been discovered and replaced.
3.2.3 Surge counters
Surge counters operate at impulse currents above certain amplitude, or above certain combinations
of current amplitude and duration. If the interval between discharges is very short (i.e. less than
50ms), surge counters may not count every current impulse. Some counters are not so sensitive and
may not count the short impulse currents through metal-oxide arresters.
Depending on the operating principle and sensitivity of the counter, it may give an indication about
over voltages appearing in the system, or it may provide information on the number of discharges
corresponding to significant arrester energy stresses. The counter provides no specific information
about the condition of the arrester.
The arrester with surge counters are equipped with an insulated earth terminal and a conductor
between the arrester and counter that is insulated from earth. For safety reasons, the surge counter
should be installed beyond easy reach of personnel; it shall be located where it can be read from
ground level with the arrester in service. The installation should be provided with shortest length of
the earth connection without reducing its cross-section.
3.2.4 Monitoring spark gaps
Monitoring of spark gaps is done to indicate the number and estimate the amplitude and duration
of discharge currents through the arrester. Special experience is necessary to properly interpret the
marks on the gap. Some spark gaps can be examined with the arrester in service, while other types
require that the arrester is de-energized. It is required that the arrester be equipped with an
insulated earth terminal. Alternatively, the device should be an integral part of the arrester. Spark
gaps give no direct information about the actual condition of the arrester, but may help to make
decisions about continued operation.
3.2.5 Temperature measurements
Remote measurement of the arrester temperature can be carried out by means of thermal imaging
methods. The measurements are only indicative with regards to the condition of the arrester, since
the temperature drop between the resistors and the housing surface may be substantial.
Nevertheless, comparative measurements made on adjacent arresters or arrester units may indicate
excessive heating.
Direct measurements of the metal-oxide resistor temperature may give an accurate indication of the
condition of the arrester, for this it is essential that the arrester should be equipped with special
transducers at the time of manufacturing. Therefore, this method is used only in special arrester
applications.
3.2.6 Leakage current measurements of metal-oxide arresters
Any deterioration of the insulating properties of a metal-oxide arrester causes an increase in the
resistive leakage current or power loss at given values of voltage and temperature. The majority of
diagnostic methods for determining the condition of gapless metal-oxide arresters are based on
measurements of the leakage current.
The measuring procedures can be divided into two groups: on-line measurements, when the
arrester is connected to the system and energized with the service voltage during normal operation,
and off-line measurement, when the arrester is disconnected from the system and energized with a
separate voltage source on site or in a laboratory.
Off-line measurements can be made with voltage sources that are specially suited for the purpose,
e.g. mobile ac or dc test generators. Good accuracy may be obtained by using the off-line methods,
provided that a sufficiently high test voltage is used. The major disadvantages are the cost of the
equipment and the need for disconnecting the arrester from the system.
Measurements carried out on-line under normal service voltage are the most common method. For
practical and safety reasons, the leakage current is normally accessed only at the earthed end of the
arrester. To allow measurements of the leakage current flowing in the earth connection, the
arrester must be equipped with an insulated earth terminal.
Out of the monitoring methods mentioned above leakage current monitoring especially the
monitoring of resistive leakage current is most popular and same has been adopted in IR and
discussed in detail in Para’s below.
4.0 Properties of the leakage current of nonlinear metal-oxide resistors
The ac leakage current can be divided into capacitive and resistive part, with a pre-dominant
capacitive component and a significantly smaller resistive part.
4.1 Capacitive leakage current
The capacitive leakage current measured at the earth terminal of an arrester is caused by the
permittivity of the non-linear metal-oxide resistors, the stray capacitances and the grading
capacitors, if applied. The specific capacitance of a resistor element typically results in a capacitive
peak leakage current of about 0.5mA to 3mA under normal service conditions.
The capacitive current does not change significantly due to deterioration of the voltage-current
characteristic of the non-linear metal-oxide resistors. Therefore, its measurement cannot reliably
indicate the condition of metal-oxide arresters.
4.2 Resistive leakage current
At given values of voltage and temperature, the resistive component of the leakage current is a
sensitive indicator of changes in the voltage-current characteristic of non-linear metal-oxide
resistors. The resistive current can, therefore, be used as a tool for diagnostic indication of changes
in the condition of metal-oxide arresters in service.
The resistive component under ac voltage is defined as the current level at the instant of voltage
maximum (dU/dt=0). The resistive leakage current of a non-linear metal-oxide resistor is in the order
of 5% to 20% of the capacitive current under normal operating condition, corresponding to about
10µA to 600 µA peak at a temperature of ±200C.
In the leakage current region, the resistive current depends on the voltage and temperature. Typical
curve indicating voltage and temperature dependencies for different components of leakage current
is shown below.
4.3 Harmonics in the leakage current
The non-linear voltage-current characteristic of a metal-oxide arrester gives rise to harmonics in the
leakage current when the arrester is energized with a sinusoidal voltage. The harmonic content
depends on the magnitude of the resistive current and the degree of non-linearity, which is a
function of voltage and temperature. As an example, the third harmonic content of the resistive
current is typically 10% to 40%. The harmonic content can, therefore, be used as an indicator of the
resistive current.
Another source of harmonics, beside negligible ones, that may considerably influence the
measurement of harmonics in the leakage current, is the harmonic content in the system voltage.
The capacitive harmonic currents produced by the voltage harmonics may be of the same order of
magnitude as the harmonic currents created by the non-linear resistance of the arrester. This aspect
is very important in case of Traction load which is a big source of harmonic distortion with
predominant 3rd Harmonic contents of up to 20 % in current.
4.4 Surface leakage current
As with any other outdoor insulator, external surface leakage current may temporarily occur on the
arrester housing in rain or in conditions of high humidity combined with surface pollution. In
addition, internal surface leakage current may also appear due to moisture penetration. During
measurements, the surface currents may interfere with the leakage current of the resistors,
however, the sensitivity to external and internal surface currents may be different for the various
measurement methods. The influence of the external surface leakage current can be avoided, either
by performing the measurements in dry conditions, or by any other suitable method, e.g. bypassing
the surface leakage current to ground.
5.0 Measurement of leakage currents
5.1 Measurement of total Leakage Current (To be adopted on IR)
The total leakage current depends mainly on the capacitive current, since the resistive part is only a
fraction of the capacitive current component. Furthermore, the capacitive and resistive current
components differ in phase by 900, therefore, a large increase in the resistive current of the non-
linear metal-oxide resistors is needed before a significant change can be noticed in the total leakage
current level. In addition, the total leakage current is sensitive to the installation, since the
capacitive current depends on the stray capacitances.
On-line measurements of the total leakage current are extensively used in practice by means of
conventional mA-meters built into the surge counters or into portable instruments, showing the
r.m.s., mean or peak value of the total leakage current. However low sensitivity to changes in the
resistive current level makes the measurement of total leakage current not reliable as a diagnostic
indicator.
5.2 Measurement of Resistive Leakage current
As per IEC 60099-5 there are number of direct and indirect methods specified for measurement of
the resistive component of the leakage current. Out of these, B-2 method involving “Third harmonic
analysis with compensation for harmonics in the system voltage” has so far been recommended for
traction system on IR.
Method B-2 -Third order harmonic analysis with voltage harmonics compensation
The method is based on the fact that harmonics are created in the leakage current by the non-linear
voltage-current characteristic of the arrester. It is assumed that all harmonics arise from the non-
linear resistive current. The harmonic content depends on the magnitude of the resistive current
and on the degree of non-linearity of the voltage-current characteristic, i.e. the harmonic content
varies also with the voltage and temperature of the arrester.
The third harmonic is the largest harmonic component of the resistive current, and it is the most
commonly used for diagnostic measurements. The conversion from harmonic to resistive current
level, if required, relies on information supplied by the arrester manufacturer or from
measurements in the laboratory.
The method can be readily used for measurements in service. The main problem is the sensitivity to
harmonics in the system voltage. The harmonics in the voltage create capacitive harmonic currents
that are comparable in size with the harmonic currents generated by the non-linear resistance of
the arrester. As a result, the error in the measured harmonic current may be considerable if the
harmonic content in the voltage is high. However the sensitivity to harmonics in the voltage is
greatly reduced by the introduction of a compensating current signal for the capacitive third
harmonic current in the arrester. The compensating current signal is derived from a
“field probe” positioned at the base of the arrester. After proper scaling, the harmonic current
induced in the probe by the electric field is subtracted from the total harmonic current. The result is
the harmonic current generated by the non-linear resistive current of the arrester. The conversion
from third harmonic to resistive current requires additional information from the arrester
manufacturer. The method is suitable for measurements in service.
6.0 Condition monitoring of lightening arresters in traction system
6.1 General recommendations to be adopted on IR
6.1.1 It is noticed worldwide that reliability of lightning arresters can be improved by taking
precautions e.g. periodical monitoring of the health of arrester by checking the possible
deterioration and identifying the defects in initial stages.
6.1.2 Failure of lightning arresters takes place mainly due to ingress of moisture inside lightning
arresters and / or ageing of zinc oxide blocks.
6.1.3 Leakage current measurement can be done only on lightning arresters fitted with porcelain
insulated base of the same mounting dimension as that of the lightning arrester.
6.1.4 If surge monitors are provided for lightning arresters the connection from lightning arrester
base to surge monitor unit/earth terminal should be made through a small piece of 35 mm2,
1100 volts grade, unarmored PVC insulated copper cable to facilitate on line measurement
of leakage current. For 25 kV side LAs at FP/SSP/SP, surge monitor shall be provided on the
uprights of the gantries at a height of 1.5 meter to facilitate monitoring of leakage current
through surge monitor and on line measurement of third harmonic leakage currents.
6.1.5 IR value of lightning arresters should be measured during annual maintenance and it
should be above 1.0 G ohms (for 42 kV LAs on 25 kV side) and more than 10 G ohms (for
LAs on HV side). The IR measurement should be done by 2.5/5.0 kV equipment. In the
periodic maintenance, connections on HT side and earth side have to be checked and
ensured in proper condition.
6.1.6 The checks and maintenance as indicated in Annexure-I are to be done at time of receipt,
before commissioning and during maintenance of the lightning arrester.
6.2 Measurement of resistive current
6.2.1 As explained above the degradation of metal oxide lightning arresters in service can be
diagnosed by estimating resistive part of the total leakage current using the third harmonic
analysis with compensation for voltage distortion. Third harmonic analysis based
assessment of resistive component of leakage current is recorded by sophisticated
equipment. The block diagram of the measurement system is shown below.
6.2.2 Assessment of resistive component of leakage current is a very sensitive measurement due
to its small value (few micro amperes) and its dependence on Voltage and temperature.
Every reading recorded is also accompanied by the Voltage and temperature at the time of
reading.
6.2.3 The measurements should be taken preferably under dry climatic conditions to avoid
interference with surface leakage currents. It is suggested to complete one cycle of
measurements prior to onset of monsoon.
6.2.4 The calibration of the equipment should be checked with the equipment manufacturer. The
readings recorded should be carefully examined for consistency of results e.g. very high
leakage currents for all LA’s at one place or wide variations in repeated measurements
needs cross verification.
6.2.5 The antenna of the equipment is to be kept at the foot of the LA base. In case LA’s are
provided on gantries and if at such height it is not possible to place antenna, the antenna can
be placed at the base of any nearby PT or base insulator connected in the same circuit.
6.2.6 Features, operating instructions and displays of different equipment manufacturers may vary
widely therefore it is suggested that end user must get proper training from the manufacturer.
Generally the resistive leakage current monitoring equipment may provide:
It –Total leakage current (mA)

Ic – Capacitive component of leakage current (mA)
I3t –Third harmonic component of leakage current (µA)
Ir –Resistive component of leakage current (µA)
Ir corr. – corrected value of Ir after considering effect of temperature (µA)
6.2.7 As pointed out in Para’s 4.3 & 5.2.1, this method of measurement is extremely sensitive to the
harmonic distortion present in the supply. The antenna probe picks up the harmonic
distortion levels for its compensation however as traction load current contains high content
of third harmonic which results in to voltage distortion also, it is observed in field that number
of times the equipment fails to record any reading and may also repeatedly display an error.
There are more chances of such incidences when the traction load is present. In such
conditions, if possible measurements may be planned at no load/ light load condition.
6.2.8 Records of periodic maintenance and measurement of each lightning arrester should be
maintained including location, rating, make, serial no., date of manufacturing, date of
commissioning, date of measurement, IR value, value of resistive leakage current, total
leakage current, No. of surges passed and maintenance remarks.
6.2.9 The value of resistive leakage current shall be recorded and in case of abrupt variation or very
high leakage current, the concerned lightning arresters should be taken out from the service
for detailed investigation. It is also suggested that some such arresters should be jointly
examined with the arrester manufacturer to identify the cause of deterioration so that
improvements in the design can be made. The data bank of different makes and ratings of
arresters may also be made for fixing the maximum value of permissible leakage currents for
each type/make.
A comparative study of results shall indicate the deterioration in the condition of arrester. RDSO
has summarized the data of measurements received from Railways and based on which, it is
suggested that LA’s with resistive leakage currents in between 350-500 µA should be closely
monitored and beyond 500 µA should not be permitted & removed from service at the earliest.
The limits prescribed above are based on limited experience of Railways & data collected from
other utilities; however same shall be further reviewed based on feed backs received from Railways. It
is therefore advised that proper data/statistics should be maintained by Zonal Railways, traction sub-
station wise and report should be sent to RDSO in the enclosed Annexure-II for further study, review &
modification required, if any.
Annexure-I
Stage of Items to be Type of check & Records and Activities and measurements / Remarks
checking checked Instruments to be used standards observations
Lightning arrester Visual check on condition Packing list/invoice Check for any damage to crates, arrester Advise firm in case of
unit and accessories of crate. units and accessories as per packing list / shortage, damage and
At time of
including insulating invoice. mismatch in dimensions to
receipt
base, surge monitor Dimensional verification Approved drawings Item shall be as per approved drawings. arrester units as well as
accessories.
Lightning arrester Dimensional verification, Approved drawings Item shall be as per approved drawings. Advise firm in case of
unit Measuring tape, Celofin mismatch in dimensions
tape, Calipers and low IR values.
Measurement of IR value
2.5 kV Insulation tester for Measure and record IR values-
42 kV LAs and 5 kV megger Should be > 1 GΩ for 42 kV LAs
for LAs above 42 kV. Should be > 10 GΩ for above 42 kV LAs
Pre erection
Galvanization thickness on
strips using micro tester.
Grading rings Functional check of IS 2633, IS 6745 >65 µ for thickness between 2-5 mm
counter 24 V DC & 7 V rms >85 µ for thickness more than 5 mm
source multi meter.
Surge Monitors Approved GTP, Should record given pulses
Suppliers test Should flicker at 7 V rms
certificate Should be <10 V DC
Lightning arrester Post commissioning and Records previous Cleaning of LA housing In case of low IR values LA
unit periodical annual measurements of IR Measure IR value and leakage current has to be taken out of
maintenance. value and THRC before and after cleaning of LAs service and jointly
leakage current IR values after cleaning should be > 1 GΩ investigate with LA
2.5/5.0 kV megger, value (for 42 kV LAs) and > 10 GΩ (for above 42 manufacturer.
Post kV LAs)
commissioning Leakage current monitor Measurement of resistive component of In case of leakage current
rd
and annual to measure 3 harmonic leakage current after cleaning should not between 350 – 500 µA,
maintenance resistive leakage current indicate any abrupt variation from its keep it under close
previous reading. Further resistive leakage observation & beyond 500
current should be less than 500 µA. µA, remove from service
and jointly
examine/investigate with
LA manufacturer.
Annexure-II
Measurement of resistive leakage current of lightening arrestors
Railway Division Name of Voltage Make & year Make & Year of Voltage at Itotal I3t Ir
TSS/GSS class of LA of manufacturing of equipment the time of
manufacturing used for measurement of each Total
of LA resistive leakage current measurement Leakage
current (mA)
Effective from: Instruction No. Instruction for monitoring & analysis of Feeder Circuit
01.06.2010 TI/IN/0024 Breakers tripping for 25 kV ac Traction system
Government of India
For
Monitoring & analysis of Feeder Circuit Breaker Tripping
for 25kV ac Traction systems
June, 2010
ISSUED BY

Research Designs and Standards Organization (Ministry of Railways)
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Page 1 of 9
1.0 Scope
This instruction stipulates the action to be taken by Zonal Railways for monitoring &
analysis of feeder CBs tripping and also suggests relevant check points for system
improvements.
2.0 Background
In conventional 25 kV ac traction system, two feeder circuit breakers feed the traction
power to the OHE on both sides of the TSS. As per the tripping data analyzed over the
years, it is learnt that maximum numbers of faults occur on OHE only. With
continuous increase in the number of trains at any time in the feeding zone due to
increase in traffic density and automatic signaling, even a small interruption of traction
supply results in to number of trains losing punctuality. The problem of signal getting
blank is also observed if IPS (Integrated Power Supply) is not provided by signaling
department. It is therefore essential to analyze the feeder CB tripping as a preventive
and corrective action to ensure better reliability of OHE (traction power).
3.0 Analysis of faults on OHE
3.1 Every fault results in to flow of heavy current causes stress in the overhead equipment
(OHE). The damage is more in case of arcing faults wherein cutting of some strands of
catenary wire, pitting of contact wire and flashing / breakage of insulators shed etc.
may also result.
3.2 Repeated transient faults occurring at same location may finally result in breakage of
catenaries / contact wires or insulators resulting in permanent breakdown of OHE.
3.3 In case of permanent faults due to failure of any equipment e.g. insulators,
substation/switching post equipment, lightening arresters and OHE breakdowns etc.
feeder CB trips. The single shot auto re-closer automatically closes the CB after nearly
500 ms and it trips again and relay locks out. It is easier to locate such faults as in most
of the cases damage is visible.
3.4 Traction Power controllers reclose the CB with different combinations of system
configurations so as to identify & localize the faulty section.
3.5 It is observed from the details of feeder CB trippings as provided by Railways, that
large number of tripping are of transient in nature i.e. CB holds after re-closing. Likely
reasons of transient tripping attributed by Railways are tabulated as under. The
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Page 2 of 9
remarks/remedial measures to be adopted by Railways have been suggested against

each to minimize the tripping.
Likely reasons of transient Remarks/Remedial measures

tripping
Suspected bird/monkey/snake RDSO has issued drawing of anti- climbing
faults arrangement of OHE mast vide RDSO letter no.
TI/OHE/INS/GEN/08 dated 03.11.2008 which
should be adopted to reduce such menace.
Over loading on TSS (feed  Record loading data at TSS. Refer to RDSO
extension or low incoming instruction TI/IN/0019 (09/09).
voltage)  Analyze voltage profile, whether voltage is falling
below the minimum permissible limit.
 Long term planning of feeding zone
rationalization.
 Consider options of ONAF, higher capacity &
parallel operation of transformers.
Tree touching  There are instructions for tree trimming before
onset of monsoon
Flash overs on insulators /  Minimum creepage distance of insulators has been
tracking & bad weather/extreme increased from 840 mm to 1050 mm.
pollution conditions  Ensure that insulators of correct type &creepage
distance are provided based on the pollution level
(calculation of ESDD) as per the policy directives
issued from Rly. Bd./RDSO from time to time.
Faults on the roof or on HT side  Feeder CB tripping time with modern numerical
equipment of Loco relays is 100-110 ms (30-40 ms for relay+ 60 ms
for CB+ 10ms for MTR).
 The loco CB time (for both DJ and VCB types) is
nearly same or more than this therefore even in
case of fault in Loco HT equipment like
transformer, bushing etc. TSS CB tripping may
occur.
 Tripping due to loco should be dealt as per Para
20521 of ACTM Vol-II Part-I and close interaction
of TPC with TLC should be ensured.
Fault created by foreign Provision of standard jalis and boards on ROB &
materials like small wires etc. FOB apart from maintenance precautions taken at
the time of birds nesting periods can reduce the
problem.
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3.6 There are some cases reported by Railways wherein a persistent arcing fault on
OHE results in to severe damage to system e.g. melting of insulators or ferrous
fittings etc. Such incidences occur mainly due to high resistive faults, which should
be analyzed in detail as elaborated in Para 5.0 below.
3.7 In addition to above from the CB tripping data received from Railways, it is
observed that large number of feeder CB tripping results if it is feeding to a nearby
loco shed, long siding or a large yard.
3.7.1 In order to reduce tripping of feeder CB’s, under these situation some Railways
have provided separate feeder breakers for loco sheds/yards at the nearest
switching post however as no time delay (grading) is permitted in distance
protection both the feeder CB’s connected in series trip simultaneously. However
in such cases auto re-closer function in the CB feeding the loco shed/yards should
be kept off so that it remains open while main feeder CB should reclose for
identifying faults in loco sheds/yards. After confirming the cause of tripping by
TPC from loco shed/yard, the CB may be closed.
3.7.2 Other possible options for this problem may be provision of a separate CB in the
TSS and feeder line for loco sheds/yards based on techno economic
considerations.
4.0 Use of numerical protection relays for fault analysis
Before 2009 the protective relays developed by RDSO for 25kV feeder protection
were electromagnetic / static / microprocessor type, in these types of relays event
recording, display of current, voltage, resistance & reactance parameters of fault
was either not available or not standardized, however with the development of
numerical type relays as per latest specification following features have been
standardized:
4.1 Capability to store maximum 10 numbers of latest fault events with date and time
stamping. Each event comprise of 45 pre and 5 post-fault waveforms.
4.2 Facility to retrieve the following data from relay through serial communication
port for analysis:
 Peak, average and RMS value of fault current and voltage
 Fault clearing time
 R-X and phase angle
 Percentage harmonics analysis of fault current
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4.3 Display of Voltage, current and R-X value of 5 latest faults with date and time on
relay LCD display.
Railways should make use of above features to the maximum extant for fault
analysis purpose.
5.0 High Impedance or High resistive faults
There are two characteristics of such faults on OHE i.e. low fault currents and
arcing. Arcing is the result of air gaps due to the poor contact made with the
ground or a grounded object.
The high impedance of the fault does not result in a substantial increase in
current and due to this fault cannot be reliably detected & cleared using
conventional protection relays like OCR & DPR.
5.1 To clear the high resistive faults scalar Delta-I relay was developed in 1998 and
subsequently in order to increase its sensitivity, in place of scalar characteristics
vectorial type relays were developed in 2003.
5.2 ∆-I relay monitors the vectorial difference between base current and fault current in
pre defined time interval (generally 2-3 cycle), if vectorial difference is more than
set current and other conditions are satisfied then relay executes trip command. By
using Vectorial ∆-I relay the failure of OHE due to high resistive fault may be
minimized.
I1 and I2 are two consecutive current values seen by Vectorial ∆ I relay
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5.3 RDSO has circulated setting guidelines for ∆I relay vide letter
No.TI/PSI/PROTCT/STATIC/07 dated 23.04.2007 which should be followed.
Main features of this protection relay are:
(a) It is a backup protection of DPR or OCR. Its operating time is above 200 ms. In
view of this all cases wherein it has operated must be carefully examined for any
possibility of fault in the system or mal-operation of the relay or tripping due to in
correct setting. There are cases reported by Railways wherein this relay operates
along with the DPR which means either the ∆I relay is not having correct setting or
DPR operation might have resulted due to culmination of high resistive fault in to
a solid earth fault after damage to the system or equipment.
(b) The suggested settings of Delta-I current are based on practical experiences
however Railways must critically review and suggest any changes if required for
increasing effectiveness of this protection.
(c) X-blinder value- This is the line reactance value monitored by relay and it does not
trip if it is not less than the set value.
(d) There is a logic to differentiate between sudden rise in current due to load or fault
i.e. generally load current has got high 3rd harmonics therefore for 3rd Harmonics
contents < 15% relay trips for ∆I > 2A, however for 3rd Harmonics > 15% it
automatically increases set value to ∆I > 4A. Thus in this way it analyses 2nd and
3rd harmonics level to distinguish between load & fault currents.
6.0 Important points for monitoring & analyzing faults on OHE
6.1 Transient faults
 Maintain the individual CB tripping detail history.
 Protection relay / element acted (DPR-{OCR, WPC, PTFF}, Panto flashover, ∆-I,
IDMT etc.) should be clearly indicated for each tripping.
 If numerical type relays are provided for feeder protection the information as
mentioned at Para 4.0 above must be retrieved. For each feeder, it should be stored
chronologically in soft copies with date and location tags for analysis.
 Estimate the fault distance with the help of recorded reactance value i.e. X
considering 0.3853 Ω/km reactance for single line and 0.2255Ω/km for double line
sections.
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 Compare the voltage, current, resistance & reactance of each tripping, if during
transient tripping similar values of reactance are observed repeatedly for same CB,
inspect the OHE surrounding the calculated fault distance (± 500 meters) and look
for the flash mark on catenary and contact wire, cutting of catenary strands, flash
mark / breakage on insulator shed, foreign material hanging on the catenary/
contact wire etc.
6.2 Additional important points for investigation of permanent faults resulting in to

large scale damage to OHE or traction supply system
If relay has taken excessive time in clearing the fault or consequential damage to
equipment/system is found to be substantial then following additional areas should
also be studied to arrive at the root cause of problem.
Sr Important points Remarks

No.
1 One of the most important reason of Condition/availability of earthing
non/delayed operation of distance protection bonds at fault location should be
relays is that effective impedance (with checked.
predominantly resistive arc component) as seen If possible earthing resistance can
by the relay falls outside the parallelogram also be measured at fault location.
characteristics as depicted in the diagram below. The condition of bond joints with
Rail should be carefully examined
for signs of arcing, loose
connections etc.
If repeated cases of high impedance
faults are observed from a single
TSS then substation buried Rails
and their connections to the Rails
must also be checked.
________________________________________________________________________
Page 7 of 9
2 Check how many times CB has been closed by A fault localization control card
TPC for fault localization. Repeated closing of should be readily available with
CB under persisting fault condition may also TPC’s in line with Para 20522 of
result in to damage to system. ACTM Vol-II Part-I. While
preparing the control card due
consideration should be given to
quick isolation of tripping prone
loco sheds, yard lines.
3 Verification of the relay settings & calculations Examine if in the recent past
done earlier changes have been made in the
feeding arrangements or layouts.
4 Distance of fault location from feeding post Fault currents are more near to the
feeding point.
5 Type of Delta I relay provided Check whether scalar or vectorial

∆-I relay is provided. Vectorial
Delta I relays are the latest and
having better resolution.
6 Check the CB tripping time. It should not be more than 60 ms.
Testing of relays Check functionality of relays at set

values. Also check operating time
of relay by secondary injection test
kit.
Features like Local Breaker Back
up protection must also be checked.
Find out errors, if any, in the relay
operating values especially near
boundary conditions.
Examine the data recorded in relay
(see Para 4.0 above)
7 Parallel operation of 2x21.6 MVA transformers Parallel operation of 2x21.6 MVA

transformers leads to nearly double
the fault current for close in faults.
New protection scheme suggested
by RDSO vide TI/IN/0017 dated
July 2008 should be adopted.
________________________________________________________________________
Page 8 of 9
8 Feed condition (normal / extended) at the time If problem occurs in the extended
of incidence. feed zone verify the relay setting
calculations carefully.
9 Power block status and its location. There have been cases reported
from some heavily loaded
substations wherein power block of
one subsector (i.e say DN line)
between TSS & first SSP has
resulted in to feeding of complete
load current from single line OHE
(i.e UP line in this case), thereby
resulting in overloading and melting
or damage to OHE/jumpers.
10 Flash overs due to breaking of load currents If a moving loco/train crosses from
the live section to dead section on
an IOL at TSS/FP, the resulting
flash over may cause parting of
contact/catenary wires.
Similar condition may occur on
section insulators provided in yards
or loco sheds especially under
power block conditions.
Even sudden lowering of the
pantograph drawing heavy current
may also result into arcing and
damage to contact/catenary wires.
Use of Panto flash over relays must
be considered for all TSS/FP having
IOL.
________________________________________________________________________
Page 9 of 9
Protection scheme & relay setting guideline for
Effective from
Instruction No. TI/IN/0026 25kV, ac traction sub-station provided with 30MVA
23.09.2010
capacity of traction transformers.
Government of India
Instruction No. : TI/IN/0026
FOR
Protection scheme & Relay setting guideline for

25 kV, ac traction sub-station provided
with 30MVA traction transformers
September 2010
ISSUED BY

______________________________________________________________________________
Page 1 of 4
Effective from
23.09.2010
1.0 Introduction
In order to meet the increased traction power requirement arising due to higher train density,
train loads and speeds, RDSO issued technical specification number
TI/SPC/PSI/30TRN/2070 (10/2007) for 30 MVA traction power transformers.
The comparison of 21.6 MVA & 30 MVA transformers is as under.
Transformer Rating Rated current in Amp Prospective maximum fault current

( 12.5% impedance) (neglecting source / earth resistance) at
25 kV bus
21.6 MVA (ONAN) / 800/ 6.4 kA
30 MVA (ONAF) 1111
30 MVA (ONAN) / 42 1111/ 8.9 kA
MVA (ONAF) 1555
Existing protection scheme (RDSO specification ETI/PSI/65(1/97)) and relay setting guide
lines for transformer protection (issued vide letter Nos.ETI/SS/7 dated 22 April 1988) and
ACTM relevant Para’s were all based on 21.6 MVA traction power transformers.
This instruction now proposes to define protection scheme for TSS provided with 30 MVA
traction transformers to provide.
(i) Optimum utilization of overload capacity of the traction transformer

(ii) Improvements in relay protection coordination.
1.1 Utilization of overload capacity of the traction transformer
1.1.1 The relay setting guidelines and protection relays provided as per old RDSO
specification ETI/PSI/65(1/97) at 25 kV ac TSS does not allow to utilize the rated over load
capacity of the traction transformer over 150% of transformer capacity while traction power
transformers are designed to deliver 50% over load for 15 minutes and 100% over load for 5
minutes. The current setting of IDMT over current relay as per old specifications is adjusted
at 150% of transformer rating i.e. above 150% of transformer loading it executes trip
command to transformer CBs in around 3-4 second.
1.1.2 Moreover in the existing traction sub-stations provided with 21.6 MVA traction
transformers no protective relays are provided to protect the transformer against over
loading between 100 to 150 % of transformer rated load and the traction transformer is
protected by only winding and oil temperature sensing relays provided with transformer
tank.
1.1.3 In order to utilize the permissible over load rating of traction transformer between 150
to 200 % and protection against over load between 100 to 150%, three stage definite time
OCR with independent setting of current and time for each stage is essential.
______________________________________________________________________________
Page 2 of 4
Effective from
23.09.2010
1.2 Improvements in relay protection coordination
1.2.1 The static type transformer protection relays (IDMT over current on HV & LV sides)
as per earlier RDSO specification ETI/PSI/65(1/97) does not have current and TMS settings
in fine steps.
1.2.2 This sometimes results in to tripping of HV, LV or both side breakers for some faults
on OHE. Moreover there is no coordination between HV & LV side IDMT over current
relays (both are set at 150 %) which sometime results in tripping of HV breaker which has to
be reclosed only after manual resetting of the Inter trip relay (ITR) at TSS thereby affecting
TSS supply.
1.2.3 In order to utilize the rated over load capacity of traction transformer by provision of
additional definite time over current relays for over load protection an improvement in relay
protection coordination is essential.
1.2.4 The fine steps and better coordination in setting parameters/zones amongst all relays
provided at TSS can only be achieved by using more precision numerical type protection
relays having fine steps of setting.
1.2.5 Advanced numerical protection relays for transformer (IDMT OCR, Definite time
OCR, REF and Differential) have already been developed and being provided on IR as per
new specification TI/SPC/PSI/PROTCT/6070(9/08).
2.0 Protection scheme at 25 kV TSS with 30 MVA traction transformer
2.1 The new specification no. TI/SPC/PSI/PROTCT/6070(9/08) for control and relay panel with
numerical type relays for traction transformer protection has already been issued to Zonal
Railways. Which also covers the protection requirements of 30 MVA traction transformer
permitting utilization of the over load capacity of traction transformer.
2.2 It is advised to provide numerical relays & control and relay panels as per RDSO
specification no. TI/SPC/PSI/PROTCT/6070(9/08) with 30 MVA traction transformers.
2.3 The relay setting guide lines for all the numerical type protection relays of above
specification have been circulated by RDSO vide Technical Instruction No. TI/IN/0022
(2/10) which should be followed. The procedure for setting different parameters of relays
shall be according to manufacturer’s instruction manual, field requirement and actual
equipment provided at TSS.
2.4 Setting guidelines issued vide RDSO letter No. TI/PSI/PROTCT/STATIC/07 dated 23-04-
2007 for feeder protection shall continue to be followed. At present no additional protection
for overloading of feeder is being proposed because it is assumed that at any time only one
transformer is in service and feeding the up and down lines on both side of IOL, hence the
______________________________________________________________________________
Page 3 of 4
Effective from
23.09.2010
total current will be divided in four circuits and current in each circuit will be approximately
280 A in normal case and 560 A under maximum over loading (200%) of transformer,
which is below the continuous rated current of catenary and contact wire (65 sq mm
catenary & 107 sq mm contact wire). However during some unbalanced loading conditions
or power block of any one line of any sub-sector within feeding zone of TSS, especially
close to TSS, the total load current may flow in one line of sub-sector under power block, it
may be more than the rated current of OHE. The policy of overload protection of OHE may
be reviewed by RDSO based on the suggestions and experience generated by Railways in
due course of time.
2.5 The 25 kV side CT are provided as per RDSO Spec No. ETI/PSI/90 (6/95) with A&C 1 to 7
where in CT Ratios of 750/5 and 1500/5 are available. It is recommended to use 1500/5 ratio
in case of 30 MVA transformers as normal rated (permissible load) current are much higher
than 21.6 MVA transformers.
2.6 The relay setting calculations of traction transformer and feeder protection relays should be
done considering the actual parameters of given below equipment:
 Actual fault level at TSS.

 Bushing CTs ratio of 30 MVA transformers.
 CT ratio of HV and LV side.
 PT ratio.
 OHE configuration.
 Rating of traction transformer.
2.7 The transformer specification stipulates use of ONAF mode for 40 MVA output however the
recommended settings of Definite time OCR elements for traction transformer protection
shall not permit the operation of 30 MVA traction transformer in ONAF mode i.e. 40 MVA
continuously. Hence during ONAF mode of operation, the setting of stage-1 definite time
OCR on LV and HV side shall have to be reviewed.
______________________________________________________________________________
Page 4 of 4
Technical Instructions on maintenance practices to be adopted
Instruction No. Effective from
for numerical type microprocessor based protection relay
TI/IN/0027 25.10.2010
modules for 25 kV ac traction system on Indian Railways
Government of India
Instruction No: TI /IN/0027
For
Technical Instructions on maintenance practices

to be adopted for numerical type microprocessor based
protection relay modules for 25 kV ac traction system
on Indian Railways
October, 2010
ISSUED BY

Page | 1 of 17
TI/IN/0027 25.10.2010
1.0 Introduction
Protection relays are vital part of any power system and play an important role in minimization
of damage to power system equipment by detecting and isolating the faulty equipment or
section automatically in minimum possible time. Minimization of damages & safety of power
supply equipment depend on relay characteristics, operating time, accuracy, sensitivity and
reliability.
Electric traction load on Indian Railways system is increasing due to rise in number of trains,
induction of higher power locomotives (fitted with state of the art traction converters capable of
regenerating during braking) and running of faster and heavier trains. This trend has led to the
reduction in the margin between the likely fault and the load currents and has further increased
need for an effective, intelligent and faster protection system capable of ensuring reliable &
uninterrupted traction power supply and with this objective development of numerical
protection relays has gradually progressed on IR.
The purpose of this instruction is to develop awareness, knowhow and testing & maintenance
procedures to be followed for numerical protection relays by Railways.
1.1 Development of traction protection relays on Indian Railways

Initially simple electro-mechanical type over current relays were considered adequate for
protection of traction system and 25 kV ac traction only used distance (mho), over current,
wrong phase coupling, restricted earth fault and differential type of electro-mechanical relays.
With the gradual shift in technology world over from the electro-mechanical technology to static
technology IR also adapted such relays in late 1980’s. Significant advances in the digital
processor based techniques have now enabled development of new protective relays to suit the
modern electric traction requirements and making their operations more effective, reliable and
accurate. The processing power in the relays has grown phenomenally over the years to perform
variety of complex integrated protection functions.
The milestones in the field of traction protection system on Indian railways in last 3 decades are
given below:
Apr 1982 Auto reclosure with overriding scheme introduced
Aug 1984 Static relays were introduced superseding the electromechanical relays
Apr 1991 High speed single shot auto reclosure scheme introduced
Oct 1990 Development of parallelogram characteristics microprocessor based distance
protection relays
July 1998 Development of high resistive fault selective relay (Delta-I) and Panto flashover
protection relays
Nov 2000 Development of microprocessor based compact Control &Relay panel for trial.
2000 Development of protection scheme for Mumbai suburban area to isolate the
minimum possible faulty sub sector automatically.
2005 Development of protection scheme for MRVC project in Mumbai sub urban area
having all numerical relays, minimum subsector isolation and parallel operation
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TI/IN/0027 25.10.2010
of TSS.
2008 Development of numerical relays for all protection functions with reduced panel
size
2009 Integration of numerical relay with SCADA RTU as per IEC 60870-5-103
protocol in Mumbai area.
1.2 Electromechanical and static relays

1.2.1 Electro-mechanical Relays
The operation of electromechanical relays depends on comparing the operating torque/force with
restraining torque/force. These types of relays are now only preferred for simple protection
functions because for each protection function separate element is essential, resulting in to very
large control panel and wiring.
The limitations/demerits of electromechanical type relays are
 Integration of several protection functions in one relay is not possible.

 Implementation of complicated logic functions is difficult and requires lot of control panel
wiring.
 More VA burden on CT & PT. Bulky in size and gets affected due to vibration & shock.
 Deterioration of relays characteristics with time requiring periodic maintenance &
calibration.
 No ability of self check feature or redundancy of components.
 Non availability of features like communication & data storage.
 Operation affected due to distorted wave forms & harmonics.
 Fine steps of setting range are not possible.
1.2.2 Static type or solid state relays

In static relays the analogue measurement techniques are used and comparison of measured
parameters is performed by electronic/magnetic/optical or other components without mechanical
motion. Its functioning comprise of the analog voltage/current rectification, filtration to provide a
conditioned input to the relay and relay measuring circuit by using discreet electronic components
like comparators, transistors etc. The low level output is amplified to drive the output circuit
providing the trip contacts.
The limitations/demerits of static relays are:

 Poor thermal stability i.e. operation and relay characteristics get affected with temperature.
Frequent calibration is required due to ageing and drift effect.
 Fine steps of setting range are not possible due to limitation of voltage /current dividers,
potentiometers etc.
 Multiple characteristics and integrated protection functions are not possible in a single unit.
 No digital data is available. Fault wave form recording, time stamping and digital
communication are not possible.
 Sensitive to electrostatic discharge.
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TI/IN/0027 25.10.2010
1.3 Microprocessor based numerical relays

Numerical relays are defined as relays which utilize software based numerical measuring techniques
& digital microprocessor hardware for their operation. These are now being preferred for all
complex protection, control and monitoring functions of power system. In these relays hard ware
platform and soft ware library can be programmed for achieving different types of protection
functions. The most important advantages of these types of relays are given below:
1.3.1 Multiple functions

These relays provide many functions like multiple setting groups, programmable and adaptive
logics, self-monitoring, self-testing, sequence-of-events recording, fault data recording,
oscillography and ability to communicate with other relays and computers.
1.3.2 Custom logic schemes

A major feature of microprocessor-based relays that was not available in previous technologies is
the ability to allow users to develop their own logic schemes, including dynamic changes in that
logic.
1.3.3 Panel space

Microprocessor-based protection systems require significantly less panel space than the space
required by electromechanical and solid-state systems for similar applications due to integration of
the hardware and the ability of using one physical device for performing multiple protection
functions, such as, over current, multiple zone distance, PT fuse failure, Wrong Phase Coupling
protections are combined in one relay module.
1.3.4 Burden on instrument transformer

Microprocessor-based relays place significantly less burden on instrument transformers (less than
0.3 VA) than the burden placed by the electromechanical relays (8-10 VA).
1.3.5 Sequence of events and oscillography

Sequence of events recording and oscillography are a natural by-product of microprocessor-based
protection systems. These features make it possible to analyze the performance of relays as well as
system disturbances at minimal additional costs.
1.3.6 Self monitoring and self testing

Another advantage of microprocessor-based relays is their ability to perform self-monitoring and
self-testing functions. These features reduce the need for routine maintenance because the relays
automatically alert the operators of the problem while detecting any functional abnormalities.
1.4 Working principles of Microprocessor based Numerical relays

1.4.1 The relay samples voltages and currents obtained from respective CT’s or/and PT’s. The
levels of these signals are reduced by voltage and current transformers typically to 110V and 5A
nominal values.
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TI/IN/0027 25.10.2010
1.4.2 The outputs of instrument transformers are applied to the analog input subsystem of the relay.
This subsystem electrically isolates the relay from the power system, reduces the level of the input
voltages, converts currents to equivalent voltages and removes high frequency components from the
signals using analog filter. The outputs of the analog input subsystem are applied to the analog
interface, which includes amplifiers, multiplexers and analog-to digital (A/D) converters.
These components sample the reduced level signals and convert their analog levels to equivalent
numbers that are stored in memory. The status of isolators and circuit breakers in the power system
is provided to the relay via the digital input subsystem and are read into the microcomputer
memory.
1.4.3 A relaying algorithm, which is a part of the software, processes the acquired information. The
algorithm uses signal-processing techniques to estimate the magnitudes and angles of voltage and
current phasors. These measurements are used to calculate other quantities, such as impedances.
The computed quantities are compared with pre-specified thresholds (settings) to decide whether
the power system is experiencing a fault or not. If it is, the relay sends a command to open one or
more circuit breakers for isolating the faulted zone of power system.
1.4.4 The relay settings and other vital information are stored in non-volatile memory of the relay.
Random-access memory (RAM) is used for storing data temporarily. The power supply to a
relaying microcomputer must be available even when the system supply is interrupted.
1.4.5 The relay is isolated from the power system by using auxiliary transformers which receive
analog signals and reduce their levels to make them suitable for use in the relays. The digital
signals, also called binary or contact inputs are applied to the relay via optic isolators that ensure
physical disconnection of the relay from the power system.
1.4.6 After being quantized by the A/D converter, analog electrical signals are described by discrete
values of the samples taken at specified instants of time. These discrete numbers are processed by
using numerical methods. For example, quantized values of current and voltage samples are used to
estimate the magnitudes and angles of their phasors. Voltage and current phasors are further used to
calculate impedances as seen from a relay location.
1.4.7 Microprocessor-based relays are called numerical relays specifically if they calculate the
algorithm numerically. The signal and data flows in these relays are shown in Annexure-I &II.
1.5 Short comings of Numerical relays

While microprocessor-based relays have several advantages, they also have a few shortcomings
which should be known to decide a correct maintenance strategy for these type of relays. Some of
the areas of concern are listed below.
1.5.1 Short life cycle:-

Microprocessor-based devices, including the protection systems offer relatively short life cycles due
to the pace of change in the field of electronics making the equipment/technology obsolete very
fast. Similarly changes in the software used on the existing hardware platforms also become
unavoidable after few years. On the positive side these changes effectively generate newer and
better product designs.
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TI/IN/0027 25.10.2010
1.5.2 Susceptibility to transients

Electromechanical relays were inherently immune to electrical transients such as EMI, RFI, etc.
Early designs of relays using electronic devices were susceptible to incorrect operations due to
transients but now latest designs include adequate counter measures like reduction in wiring
lengths, proper design of enclosures, surge suppression for power supply as well as transducer
inputs, use of line filters and proper shielding and grounding.
All the numerical microprocessor-based protection systems for IR are therefore being designed
conforming to the IEC 61000 & 60255 series of standards providing reliability under difficult
conditions.
1.5.3 Setting and testing complexities

Single numerical type relay module is designed to replace the functions of several solid-state or
electromechanical relays apart from offering programmable functions that increase the application
flexibility compared with the fixed function relays therefore there are significant number of settings
to be done. The increased number of settings sometimes poses problems in managing the settings
and in conducting functional tests.
It should however be appreciated that all the shortcomings listed above can be overcome by proper
designing and management of the relays. It is now more or less concluded world over that the
benefits of numerical relays far outweigh the shortcomings and the acceptance of numerical type
microprocessor based protection systems has reached to almost all power applications including 25
kV ac traction.
2.0 Numerical microprocessor based protection relays on IR

2.1 Feeder (OHE) protection
 Numerical integrated Feeder protection module comprises of following functions:
o Parallelogram characteristics distance protection with independent setting of R and X
(Up to 3 Zones possible if as per RDSO spec No. TI/SPC/PSI/PROTCT/4050 is used).
o Wrong phase coupling protection.
o Instantaneous OCR (definite time OCR elements also if relays as per RDSO spec No.
TI/SPC/PSI/PROTCT/4050 is used).
o PT fuse failure indication/alarm and trip
o Feeder breaker failure backup protection function
o Single shot (2 shot for RDSO spec No. TI/SPC/PSI/PROTCT/4050) auto re-closure
functions
o Monitoring of CB trip circuit
o Monitoring of SF-6 gas pressure low alarm.
 Delta-I relay: To provide protection against high resistive faults with fault current less than load
current as a back up to feeder protection.
 Pantograph flash over protection relay: To provide protection against flash over at Insulated
overlap in front of TSS, when Panto enters from live to dead section.
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TI/IN/0027 25.10.2010
2.2 Traction transformer protection

 Transformer differential protection numerical relay module and contact multiplication function
for transformer auxiliary trip i.e. PRD trip, winding and oil temperature high trip, buchholz trip
etc.
 Transformer over current and REF protection modules for both HV and LV side separately
comprising of instantaneous over current, IDMT over current, definite time over current and
restricted earth fault along with monitoring of CB trip circuit, gas pressure low alarm and trip.
2.3 25 kV shunt capacitor bank protection

 IDMT Over current and neutral unbalance current protection module
 Over and under voltage protection module.
3.0 Maintenance practices for Numerical protection relays-General

3.1 The Railways should ensure that manufacturers operating, troubleshooting and maintenance
manuals are readily available with the concerned technical persons.
3.2 RDSO has issued time to time relay setting guidelines which should be readily available.
The present list of guidelines is placed at Annexure-III.
3.3 The relay setting procedures are defined by manufacturers in their manuals. Initially relay
settings based on RDSO guidelines should be got done in presence of the technical
representatives of the relay manufacturer however knowledge to change the same as and
when required should be available with Railways.
3.4 The ACTM refers to Electro mechanical type of protection relays & recommends its
calibration & maintenance accordingly. The ACTM guiding notes on Maintenance on
Protective relays Para 20221 should be read with following clarifications:
3.4.1 20221-6 (a) In present designs there is no relay cover or dust proof gasket and the complete
relay assembly is sealed. There is no need to either open the relay or even remove it from the
panel only for cleaning purpose.
3.4.2 20221-6 (b) Manual operation of the relay to check the correctness of wiring of breaker
tripping circuit and contact healthiness of internal trip relay should be verified. In case of
numerical relays, this is generally done after entering in to the setting menu and enabling the
trip test features for activating test button on the outside console of the relay. As such
instructions in the manufacturer’s operating manual should be followed.
3.4.3 20221-6 (c) There are no moving parts in the numerical relays therefore its settings do not
get disturbed hence annual calibration is not necessary but as recommended in this Para
Distance protection relay functionality should be verified using primary injection set which
covers CT, PT and wiring connections etc. also.
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TI/IN/0027 25.10.2010
3.4.4 20221-6 (d) As recommended secondary injection tests on all protection relays for
verification of their operation & settings of all protection functions as mentioned in Para 2.0
above should be done annually. The major protection features of numerical relays are
explained in 5.2.3 below.
3.4.5 20221-6(e) The overhauling or repair of numerical relays should not be attempted by
Railways and OEM’s should only be approached for this work. After attempting overhauling
the functional, calibration & operating time tests should be carried out and a record should
be maintained showing the date and results.
4.0 Installation and commissioning checks on numerical protection relays

4.1 The Para 20929 to 20942 of ACTM (Vol.-II, Part-I ) must be ensured wherever applicable.
However some additional checks are explained below.
4.2 Check the correctness of indication LEDs, display on LCD and terminals for annunciation &
telesignalling by injecting the desired input to operate the protection function.
4.3 Check online & fault values of current, voltage, R, X etc. as applicable on relay display and
compare with the actual injected values considering CT & PT ratio selected on the relay
during secondary injection testing.
4.4 The functional verification, pickup, dropout and operating time tests should be carried out at
the time of installation and commissioning of relays / panels. The errors in operating value
and operating time should be within permissible limit as per RDSO specifications or latest
type tests results done by RDSO.
4.5 Download the event and disturbance data stored in relay memory and compare with actual
inputs applied to the relay. The time stamping done by the relay for particular event should
also be verified.
4.6 Relay wiring should be done as per wiring diagrams provided by manufacturers based on
RDSO approved design drawings of control and relay panels.
4.7 CTs, PTs and auxiliary dc supply to the relay should be connected with proper polarity. The
correct values of CT & PT ratio should only be entered as per the procedure of relay setting
defined by the manufacturer.
4.8 Ensure that the relay earthing terminal is always connected to the local earth bar provided in
the control and relay panel.
4.9 The insulation resistance of the relay between all terminals shorted and relay cabinet should
be measured by 1000 V Megger and it should not be less than 1Mega ohm.
4.10 The relay setting calculations should be done as per relevant RDSO relay setting guidelines
considering the actual field parameters. However procedure for the same should be
according to manufacturer’s maintenance and commissioning manual.
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4.11 The password protection is provided in the numerical relay for entering in setting mode.
Only authorized Railway persons should have password for relay setting to avoid
unauthorized changes.
5.0 Periodic maintenance checks on numerical protection relays

5.1 The numerical protection relays provide generally maintenance free operation under the
normal environmental conditions. The relays also have got features of continuous
monitoring of important internal components and indication on its display (along with
telesignalling and annunciation contact) in case of failure of any critical component.
5.1.1 One LED is provided on front side of the relay to indicate the healthiness status of the
relays. The telesignaling / annunciation contacts are also provided to transmit the relay fail
to RCC through SCADA.
5.1.2 Whenever relay fail indication appears, note down the type / code on relay display.
Subsequently replacement of the affected relay with healthy one should be ensured. The
failure of relays should be informed to manufacturer. The failure should be reported to the
RDSO clearly indicating make, specification, year of manufacturing, model, details of
defects or problem observed and any failure investigation done by Railways independently
or jointly with manufacturer.
5.2 The functional tests are to be carried out using secondary injection test kit annually as
specified in the ACTM. The following parameters of the relay should be checked :
5.2.1 Functionality of LEDs

The healthiness of LEDs provided on the relay should be checked by operating the particular
protection element for creating the operating conditions by injecting the operating values as
per relay settings / apply the status input voltage at correct terminals of relay through
secondary injection test kit.
5.2.2 Check continuity of output tripping, annunciation & telesignaling contacts for each
protection & status input functions.
The continuity of tripping, annunciation and telesignalling contacts provided inside the relay
should be checked by continuity tester at specified terminals after actuating the particular
protection element one by one by injecting the operating value with the help of secondary
injection test kit.
5.2.3 Pickup, dropout and operating time of the protection elements

The important features of main protection and monitoring elements available in the
numerical type protection modules are explained below. During annual testing of the relays
these should be checked. While testing operating & reset values along with time taken by
the relay should be recorded.
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TI/IN/0027 25.10.2010
5.2.3.1 Feeder protection (RDSO specification TI/SPC/PSI/PROTCT/5070 or latest)

(a) Numerical integrated feeder protection module comprising of DPR, WPC, OCR, PTFF,
Auto reclosure & LBB
Protection function General logic / working / definition

i. DPR element
Minimum operating The minimum operating current is current below which DPR
current element will not act even though the impedance seen by
relay is inside the set parallelogram.
Parallelogram Inside the parallelogram boundary is the operating area of
characteristic the DPR element, if impedance measured by relay falls
inside the parallelogram and second harmonic contents less
than set value then relay execute trip command.
ii. WPC element
Impedance The WPC relay provides protection against wrong phase
characteristic test coupling of two TSSs supply connected with different
Angle test phases. The relay should be actuated only, if all condition
Regenerative current given below is satisfied:
immunity.  Measured impedance is in between low and high
impedance settings.
 Impedance angle is in second quadrant within the set
range.
 current more than the regenerative current setting.
iii. Over current element
Current setting This is a simple over current relay and initiates trip
command when current seen by relay is above the set value.
iv. PT fuse failure element
PT Fuse failure alarm The relay continuously monitors the feeder current and
& trip voltage and in case of PT fuse failure the voltage seen by
relay falls close to zero and in most of the cases the load
current remains above the set minimum operating current of
DPR element, in this condition DPR element will be
operated along with PTFF element.
The logic of PTFF element is:
(i) If voltage and current both are less than set value and CB
is in close condition PTFF alarm LED (if provided) along
with annunciation & telesignalling will result.
(ii) If voltage is less than set value and current is more than
set current, CB tripping will result with PTFF trip LED along
with annunciation & telesignalling.
Page | 10 of 17
TI/IN/0027 25.10.2010
v. Auto reclosure relay

Dead time test Dead time is the time after which the relay executes close
command.
Reclaim time test Reclaim time is the time after which executing the close
command, if breaker again trips, the autorclosure is locked
out.
Auto reclosure If current seen by relay is more than high set auto reclosure
bypassed on high set bypass current then auto reclosure action will not occur.
current
vi. LBB trip
Local Breaker Back After executing the trip command by relay if concerned CB
up fails to open or operating current does not fall below the set
value within the pre set time, then relay as a backup
protection actuate another contact which can be utilized to
trip another circuit breaker upstream e.g. LV CB of
transformer.
vii. Trip circuit supervision
Relays has got feature to monitor the continuity of trip coil
circuit of concerned CB by sensing the 110V dc supply. In
case of continuity break of the trip circuit, indication along
with annunciation and telesignaling results.
viii. Gas pressure low alarm and low pressure trip & lock status.
Contact multiplication The contact multiplication for SF6 CB gas pressure status is
inbuilt in relay module, which can be checked by giving the
110 V dc status at input terminal of relays provided for this
purpose.
(b) Vectorial Delta-I type high resistive fault selective relay (RDSO specification No.
TI/SPC/PSI/PROTCT/1982 or latest)
Operating value test

i. Operating current Relay monitors the vectorial difference between base and
ii. Reactance value (X fault current in pre defined time interval and executes trip
blinder setting) command when vectorial difference is more than set value,
measured reactance less than the set value and 2nd harmonic
content less than 2nd harmonic setting, the relay operation
should take place after the set time delay.
If 3rd harmonic content is more than set value then relay
operates with higher vectorial difference current according to
3rd harmonic de-sensitivity setting.
Page | 11 of 17
TI/IN/0027 25.10.2010
(c) Panto flashover relay (TI/SPC/PSI/PROTCT/2983 or latest)
Operating logic and threshold voltage test

i. Logic test Panto flashover relay is a logic based relay and operates only
ii. PT Threshold after all trip conditions are satisfied i.e. status of BMs, CBs
operating Voltage and PT’s (for trip logic refer the RDSO specification no.
level test TI/SPC/PSI/PROTCT/2983) after which it executes the trip
command.
The relay also monitors the PT voltage level and gets
activated only when PT voltage is more than set value.
iii. Operating value for The PTs voltage continuously monitored by relay if PT
PT dead voltage voltage is less than set PT dead voltage, then relay display
the PT is dead alongwith annunciation and telesignaling
contacts.
5.2.3.2 Transformer protection relays (TI/SPC/PSI/PROTCT/6070 or latest)

(a) OC + REF Protection module
Operating value and status input functional test
i. Inst. OCR element This is a non directional over current relay and is provided
on transformer HV side. It continuously monitors the CT
current and actuate trip command when measured current is
more than set current.
ii. IDMT OCR element The IDMT OCR is provided on both side of transformer, it
provide protection to transformer against overloading as well
as works as a backup protection to Feeder relays beyond the
set current of IDMT element.
iii. REF element It is a current actuated relay used to provide the protection
against internal fault of traction transformer.
iv. Transformer Alarm The contact multiplication for transformer alarms (Buchholz,
status input Oil temperature, winding temperature, low oil level) status is
available in the relay module hence no separate aux. relays is
required for the same.
The LED indications on front side of the relay and contacts
for annunciation & telesignaling for above mentioned alarm
contacts should be checked by giving 110V dc supply at
correct terminal used for status input.
v. Trip circuit Relays has got feature to monitor the continuity of trip coil
supervision circuit of concerned CB by sensing the 110V dc supply. In
case of continuity break of the trip circuit, indication along
with annunciation and telesignaling results.
vi. Gas pressure low The contact multiplication for SF6 CB gas pressure status is
alarm and low inbuilt in relay module, which can be checked by giving the
pressure trip & lock 110 V dc status at input terminal of relays provided for this
status. purpose.
Page | 12 of 17
TI/IN/0027 25.10.2010
(b) Biased differential protection relay
Operating value and status input functional test

i. Bushing CT The bushing CTs provided in the transformer do not match
multiplication factor the same secondary current, so in order to match the same
secondary current, external ICTs are used with static /
electromagnetic type relays.
Numerical differential relay have a settable HV & LV ICTs
correction factor to match the same secondary current of HV
& LV bushing CTs, hence no external ICTs is required.
ii. Differential current The relay monitors the current difference between primary
test and secondary bushing CTs and initiate trip command when
iii. Biased test measured current difference is more than set differential
current and second harmonic contents less than 15%.
iv. Transformer trip status The contact multiplication for transformer auxiliary
input protection tripping (Buchholz, winding temperature, oil
temperature, PRD Trip) are provided in the relay module
hence no separate aux. relays is required for the same.
The LED, contacts for annunciation & telesignaling provided
on relay for transformer alarm contact multiplication should
be checked by giving 110V dc supply at correct terminal
used for status input.
5.2.3.3 25 kV shunt capacitor bank protection relays
i. IDMT OCR Check functionality

ii. Current unbalance
iii. Under voltage
iv. Over voltage
v. Trip circuit supervision Same as above
vi. Gas pressure low alarm and low Same as above
pressure trip & lock status.
5.3 Check the on line & fault values of current, voltage, R, X etc. as applicable on relay display
and compare with the actual injected values considering CT & PT ratio selected on the relay.
5.4 Download the event and disturbance data stored in relay memory and compare with actual
inputs applied to the relay. The time stamped by relay for particular event should also be
verified.
5.5 The insulation resistance of the relay between all terminals shorted and relay cabinet should be
measured by 1000 V megger and it should not be less than 1 Mega ohm.
Page | 13 of 17
TI/IN/0027 25.10.2010
5.6 Date wise record should be maintained for all measured values, type of abnormality observed
and action taken by Railways / manufacturers.
5.7 Numerical protection relays work based on the software loaded on them. It is therefore very
important to keep record of any changes or up gradation done on the relay software by
manufacturer. It should also be ensured that whenever changes in relay software are effected
all functional tests on the relay (by secondary injection set) are repeated along with
verification of relay settings.
Page | 14 of 17
TI/IN/0027 25.10.2010
Page | 15 of 17
TI/IN/0027 25.10.2010
Annexure-II
Page | 16 of 17
TI/IN/0027 25.10.2010
Annexure – III
List of relay setting guidelines issued by RDSO
S.N. Description Document / letter no. Date of issue
1. Guide lines for calculating relay Letter No. ETI/SS/7 dated 22 April 1988
settings at ac traction sub-stations
and setting posts
2. Microprocessor based integrated Report No. TI-35 (7/95) July, 1995

feeder protection module type
AZ 1114 for 25 kV ac traction
sub-station
3. Amendment to report no. TI-35 Letter no. 23.04.2007

(7/95) TI/PSI/PROTCT/STATIC/07
4. Guidelines on protection scheme Instruction No. : TI/IN/0017 Vide letter no.

with parallel operation of 2 x (July/2008) TI/PSI/PROTCT/CONVEN/08
21.6 MVA traction transformers Dated 15.07.2008
5. Setting guide lines for traction Instruction No. TI/IN/0022 Vide letter no.
transformer & 25kV shunt (February/2010) TI/PSI/PROTCT/CONVEN/08
capacitor bank protection relay Dated 02.02.2010
developed as per RDSO
specification no.
TI/SPC/PSI/PROTCT/6070(9/08)
for 25 kV ac traction sub-station
6. Protection scheme & Relay Instruction No. : TI/IN/0026

setting guideline for 25 kV, ac
traction sub-station provided with
30MVA traction transformers
Page | 17 of 17
Effective from Instruction No. Technical instructions on important aspects of relay settings of Vectorial
04/2011 TI/IN/0029 Delta-I relays as per RDSO specification TI/SPC/PSI/PROTCT/1982
Government of India
For
Technical instructions
on important aspects of relay settings of Vectorial Delta-I relays
as per RDSO specification No. TI/SPC/PSI/PROTCT/1982
April, 2011
ISSUED BY
Page 1 |of 10
1.0 Introduction & background
Vectorial delta- I relays are being provided at 25kV ac traction sub-station in IR (as per the
RDSO specification No. TI/SPC/PSI/PROTCT/1982(12/2003)) to detect the high resistive fault
above the set Delta-I current, even though total fault current less than rated full load current of
traction transformer and the same may also be considered as a backup protection to the main
feeder protection module mainly DPR & OCR element.Recently some Railways have reported
mal operation cases of vectorial delta-I relay, occurring when the feeding post Insulated Overlap
(IOL) is bridged by a pantograph.
There is no auto recloser function provided with Delta-I relay in newly developed C&R panel as
per RDSO spc. No. TI/SPC/PSI/PROTCT/6070(9/08), therefore this situation may sometime
lead to flash over (caused by pantograph passing from live to dead section) as Panto Flash over
relay may also fail to open the live section CB as explained in the following Para’s of this
instructions.
2.0 Developments and functioning of Vectorial Delta-I relay
2.1 RDSO developed scalar Delta I relay to specification No. TI/SPC/PSI/PROTCT/1981 in

1998.This relay used to detect scalar difference of two current samples for its operation. With
the advancement of protection technology for high impedance earth faults, more accurate and
reliable relay for such an application was developed in 2001 as per RDSO spec. No.
TI/SPC/PSI/PROTCT/1982. In this type of relay vectorial difference of two current samples is
used (vectorial difference of base load current and the fault current) for its operation.
2.2 The delta I relay works on the principle of Vectorial difference between the base load current
and fault current. The relay has a feature to prevent unnecessary operation by the inrush current
of power transformer and due to starting of multiple numbers of electric locos in the section. The
inrush currents of power transformers contain significantly high 2nd harmonics currents. If the
2nd order harmonic component is larger than 15% of the fundamental components, the relay
blocks out, thus preventing unnecessary operation of the relay.
2.3 The relay is operated by Vectorial delta I current at the same value as of setting current
notwithstanding the magnitude of base current. There is a provision of differentiation between
fault current and load current. The load current normally has got a high percentage of 3rd
harmonic distortion as compared to the fault current. The relay sensitivity restrains according to
the de-sensitivity setting at set current when Vectorial delta I current include more than 15% of
3rd harmonic current (generally set for 2 times of set vectorial Delta-I current).
2.4 Relay continuously monitors the reactance (X) of OHE at the fault point and ensure its
operation only when X value is below the set value of X-blinder setting provided other
conditions of relay operation are fulfilled.
2.5 Delta-I relay is a backup protection function therefore its operating time (with settable time
delays) is higher than the primary feeder protection relays.
Page 2 |of 10
3.0 Mal operation of Vectorial Delta I relay
3.1 Delta I relay continuously monitors the vectorial difference between base current and fault
current (vectorial difference between consuctive cycles), if vectorial difference is more than set
current for set delay time and other condition for tripping also satisfy i.e. IInd harmonic content
less than 15% and value of X (reactance) is less than set value then relay initiate trip command.
The mal operation of vectorial Delta-I relay may result if such condition occur under normal
load conditions.
3.2 Some mal operation incidences experienced by Zonal Railways and analyzed by RDSO have
occurred when the loco pantograph bridges the IOL opposite FP/TSS and Delta I relay operates.
This situation may arise when there is large difference in currents being fed by two feeder CB’s
on either side of the TSS i.e. in example shown below two feeder CB current are 100A and
900A.
3.2.1 When a loco pantograph bridges the IOL, both the feeder CB supplies are paralleled and
redistribution of load currents take place wherein both the feeder CB currents are nearly
equalized as depicted below. This causes sudden rise of CB-1 current from 100 A to 500 A. The
vectorial difference may be higher than 400 A sufficient to trip the Delta-I relay.
Page 3 |of 10
3.2.2 As Delta-I relay is a backup protection provision of auto recloser is not provided. This may
result in to flashover if Loco is moving from live to dead section. Even if auto recloser is
activated with Delta-I relay it may not be able to prevent flashover under all conditions due to
total auto recloser time of 600-700ms.
3.2.3 Panto flash over relay (with live CB tripping time of 100-110ms) may also get activated in
this condition however it may also be not able to safeguard against the flashover under all
conditions depending upon train speed & length of IOL.
3.3 Other cases of mal operation of Delta-I relay may be due to higher actuating Delta-I current
on account of sudden variation in load current. The prevention against mal operation in such
case is only restraint feature which increases the delta-I setting by 100% if 3rd harmonic content
is above 15 % however 3rd harmonic content of traction load current varies widely and relay may
still operate if actuating current is even more than 100% above the set value or 3rd harmonic
content is less than 15% to initiate restraint action.
4.0 Performance review of Delta-I relays on IR
4.1 Tripping details and overall performance of Delta-I relays received in 2006-07 & 2010 and
from Zonal Railways were analyzed for transient and high resistive fault tripping and following
observations are made.
4.1.1 Tripping details of 5 Railways i.e. CR, SR, SCR, ER and WR were received in 2006-07.
All Railways reported cases of Delta-I relay tripping without any fault noticed. One of the
reasons for transient tripping is reported as sudden rise of load current by most of the Railways.
4.1.2 CR, SR and SCR respectively reported at least 4, 7 and 3 cases (suspected high impedance
faults caused by bird faults, electrocution and insulator flashing) detected and cleared by Delta-I
relay.
4.1.3 Overall performance submitted by 8 Zonal Railways (SR, SER, WR, WCR, NR, SWR, CR
& SCR) was analyzed in 2010. The holding of TSS having Delta-I relay and its reported
performance is as under:
Railway Number Number of TSS Performance

of TSS having Delta-I
relay
SR 30 30  At shoranur TSS 3 cases and 1 case at Kazhakuttam TSS

of Delta-I not acted after tree fallen on OHE.
 Spurious tripping at Vridhachalam TSS & Relay
dissconnected. No spurious tripping at other TSS.
 Sankaridrug TSS Delta-I acted after tree fallen on OHE.
 Working satisfactory at other TSS.
SER 21 1  No spurious tripping.
 Performance satisfactory.
Page 4 |of 10
WR 26 15  Although no spurious tripping reported. Separate case of

contact wire parting at IOL reported after mal
operation of Delta-I.
 Performance satisfactory. Actual tripping on high resistive
fault not available.
WCR 21 17  Spurious tripping at 4 TSS reportedly attended by firm.
NR 11 11  No individual tripping, its always occur with DPR &
OCR at BTR/TSS which means spurious operation.
 Overall performance is under observation.
SWR 2 1  7 times fault cleared by Delta-I relay.
 No spurious tripping.
 Performance satisfactory.
CR 36 36  Spurious tripping on 12 occasions & attended by firm.
 At BDI/TSS 24 occasions where delta-I acted with DPR
& OCR.
 Number of cases where Delta-I relay cleared the fault.
 Performance is reported good at other TSS.
SCR - -  SEC division reported mal operation cases of Delta-I
relay leading to contact wire parting at IOL opposite
TSS.
4.1.4 With above it is summarized that there have been reports of operation of this relay acting
to detect and clear high impedance faults however there are cases of mal operation of Delta-I
relays which can be addressed by reviewing its settings and at the same time.
5.0 Features & setting options of different make/models of Delta-I relays in service on IR
The different Delta-I relay developed by RDSO since 1999 along with their make & features are
tabulated below.
Make / Type Year of Features

approval &
RDSO
specification
M/s ALIND/ 1999  Monitors the scalar difference between base current and
ADI -11 load / fault current with definite time interval and execute
TI/SPC/PSI/PR trip command if scalar difference more than set Delta-I
OTCT/1981 current.
 3rd harmonic restrain, if 3rd harmonic contents in total

current more than 15%, then relay will operate at 2 times of
set current.
 2nd harmonic blocking, if 2nd harmonic contents in total
Page 5 |of 10
current more than 15%, then relay will block the trip
command.
 Relay monitor the MTR status, if MTR status come within

operating time of Delta-I relay, then relay is not executes
trip command.
 Only Delta-I current setting is provided.
 No features of fault wave form recording and storage in

relay memory.
M/s ALIND/ 2004  Monitors the Vectorial difference between base current and
AVDI -11C load / fault current with definite time interval and execute
TI/SPC/PSI/PR trip command if vectorial difference more than set Delta-I
OTCT/1982 current.
(12/2003)
current more than set value, then relay will operate at 2
times of set current. The 3rd harmonic percentage is settable
from 5 to 50% in steps of 5%.

current more than set value, then relay will block the trip
command. The 2nd harmonic percentage is settable from 5
to 50% in steps of 5%.
 Relay monitors the MTR status, if MTR status come within

trip command.
 Delta-I current is settable from 1 to 6 A in steps of 0.1 A.
 Forward and reverse reactance (X) is settable in the range of

0.5 to 30 ohm in steps of 0.01 ohm.
 Additional time delay is settable from 0 to 250 ms in steps

of 25 ms.
 No features of fault wave form recording and storage in

relay memory.
M/s ALIND/ 2010  Monitor the Vectorial difference between base current and
AVDI -11C load / fault current with definite time interval and execute
(AN SERIES) TI/SPC/PSI/PR trip command if vectorial difference is more than set Delta-I
OTCT/1982 current.
(12/2003)
current more than set value, then relay will operate at 2
times of set current. The 3rd harmonic percentage is settable
from 1 to 100% in steps of 0.5%.

Page 6 |of 10
current more than set value, then relay will block the trip
command. The 2nd harmonic percentage is settable from 1
to 100% in steps of 0.5%.
 Relay monitors the MTR status, if MTR status come within

trip command.
 Delta-I current is settable from 0.5 to 10 A in steps of 0.1 A.
 X blinder (reactance) is settable in the range of 0.0 to 99.99

ohm in steps of 0.01 ohm.

of 10 ms.
 Settable Delta-I cycle 20 to 100 ms in steps of 10 ms.
 Settable 3rd harmonic de-sensitivity 0 to 100% in steps of

5%.
 Provision of local breaker backup feature.
 Event and Fault wave form recording and storage in relay

memory.
M/s 2004  Monitors the Vectorial difference between base current and
ASHIDA/ load / fault current with definite time interval and execute
(AIDI/1C) TI/SPC/PSI/PR trip command if vectorial difference more than set Delta-I
OTCT/1982 current.
(12/2003)
current more than 15%, then relay will operate at 2 times of
set current.

current more than 15%, then relay will block the trip
command.
 Relay monitor the MTR status, if MTR status come within

trip command and not provided relay supplied after 2008, as
this function is implemented software logic by monitoring
the delta-I current within set delay time also.
 Delta-I current is settable from 1 to 6 A in steps of 0.1 A.
 X blinder (reactance) is settable in the range of 0.5 to 60

ohm in steps of 0.01 ohm and 0.04 to 60 ohm in steps of
0.01 ohm in relays supplied after 2008.

of 10 ms and 0-500 ms in steps of 20ms in relays supplied
Page 7 |of 10
after 2008.
 Settable Delta-I cycle 40 to 100 ms in steps of 20 ms and 20

to 100 ms in steps of 10 ms in relays supplied after 2008.
 Settable 3rd harmonic de-sensitivity 0 to 1A in steps of 0.1A.
 Event and Fault wave form recording and storage in relay

memory.
6.0 Recommendations for setting of Delta-I relays

6.1 Existing setting guide lines of vectorial Delta – I relay
The existing guidelines were issued vide letter No.TI/PSI/PROTCT/STATIC/07 dt. 23-04-07.
The highlights of this are as under.
6.1.1 Current setting of Delta-I relay is based on the assumption on number of locos entering or
number of locos switched on simultaneously in the section causing sudden rise of load current to
avoid the false tripping due to sudden rise of load current. The Delta-I current setting should be
more than the sudden rise of load current. Assuming 2 numbers loco entering or switched on
simultaneously in the section and considering load current of one loco as 150 A, setting of
current was proposed as 300 A.
6.1.1.1 The setting should be done taking into account the correct CT ratio. It was also
recommended that if relay gives more spurious tripping then next higher value may be selected.
6.1.2 The X-BLINDER setting is the reactance of OHE in ohms below which delta I relay shall
pick up if other conditions like delta I, time delay etc. are met. Its calculation was recommended
based on the OHE impedance from feeding TSS to adjacent feeding TSS considering the lowest
OHE configuration (Single line OHE).
6.1.3 Second harmonic blocking & Third harmonic restraint feature setting features in different
make/type of relays are explained in Para 5.0 above. Generally manufacturer set these
parameters internally during relay manufacture. However some relay manufacturers made
provision to set these parameters externally through knob or keypad. At present both 2nd
harmonic block and 3rd harmonic restraint are set at 15 % with desenstivity set at 100%
(meaning double the set delta-I current).
6.1.4 Additional time delay setting of 145 ms or higher was recommended. Moreover as the
relay monitors the current samples continuously, this delta time setting i.e. time duration
between the two samples was recommended as 60 ms.
6.2 Changes required to be done in settings of Vectorial Delta-I relay
In continuation of guidelines issued vide letter No. TI/PSI/PROTCT/STATIC/07 dt. 23-04-07,

following changes are to be done in the setting guidelines of the Vectorial Delta-I relay for any
two TSS where Delta-I relay tripping on spurious/unknown accounts are maximum. The
performance should be watched and after getting a positive feedback from Railways these
instructions shall be implemented for all substations.
Page 8 |of 10
6.2.1 Current setting of the Delta-I relay should be increased so as to correspond to 450A
primary current (on 25 kV side) from existing value of 300A. This increase in relay setting has
been decided based on the fault waveforms recorded by Delta-I relay spurious tripping cases at
WR and SCR.
6.2.2 The setting of 3rd harmonic restraint should be done at 10% in place of 15%. This change
in setting option is possible only in case of latest M/s Alind relay AVDI-11C and in all other
models/makes this change shall require change in relay software which shall have to be got
uploaded in the relay by relay manufacturers. This reduction in the 3rd harmonic restraint value
has been taken after analysis of load data recorded at number of locations on IR (NR, ECR,
WCR & NCR etc.) wherein it is observed that % of 3rd harmonic current in the load current
varies in the range of 10 to 25% most of the time. By reducing the 3rd harmonic restraint it is
expected that relay shall be better placed for not operating due to sudden load variations and
situations like pantograph bridging the IOL.
6.2.3 3rd harmonic de-sensitivity factor should be set so as to increase the Delta-I setting by
200% (i.e. 3 times the set current value as against maximum 2 times setting done presently).
This will also require change in relay software and up graded relay software shall have to be up
loaded by relay manufacturers.
The above changes in setting are expected to substantially reduce cases of mal operation &
spurious tripping.
7.0 Analysis of tripping caused by Vectorial Delta-I relays
Railways should examine and analyze cases of Delta-I relay tripping as explained below:
Sr. Items relevant to Delta-I Remarks and explanations

no. relay tripping analysis
i. Make, type & year of Delta-  Check whether scaler/vectorial type. Scaler types are
I relay more prone for maloperations.
ii. Whether any fault located or  It should be clearly decided whether the relay
not operated due to some fault or it was a spurious
tripping. This is important to judge & report the
overall performance of the relay.
iii. Past tripping History of the  Past tripping history of the relay should be readily
relay available for reporting to manufacturer & RDSO.
iv. CT ratio  The relay setting of Delta-I (in Amp) should properly
corresponds to the correct actuating 25 kV side
current therefore in relay setting calculation, put
correct CT ratio as provided at respective TSS.
 If CT ratio is settable in particular relay, then correct
setting is also put in the relay.
Page 9 |of 10
v. Download data, current and  In old version relay, this feature is not available.
time. See fault current Latest versions of relays are having features of
waveform. recording and storage of latest 10 fault wave forms
Harmonic analysis of (50 cycles i.e. 45 before trip command is given by
recorded fault current relay and 5 after trip command).
 The tripping of Delta-I relay should be analyzed for
Delta-I current, harmonics & operating time.
 Check 3rd harmonic content is above/below set value
and whether set delta-I current is increased as per
setting of de-sensitivity.
 Check power factor at the time of relay tripping and
compare it with load power factor prevalent in
previous cycles recorded.
 Check timings of CB operation.
vi. Whether any train at FP-  Try to figure out if any spurious tripping are taking
IOL at the time of tripping place at the time of any pantograph bridging the IOL
opposite TSS.
 Such cases are more likely where TSS/FP location is
such that the feeding length or loading pattern on two
sides of IOL widely varies e.g. presence of large
yards, sheds & stations on one side as compared to
other.
vii. Any other feeder protection  Generally Delta-I relay tripping should not
relay also tripping accompany with DPR because it is a back up
protection with time delay however if DPR picks up
after giving the tripping command by Delta-I relay
both can operate.
 In most of the cases it may be spurious tripping of
Delta-I therefore check its relay setting and time
delay.
 The setting and timing of DPR and CB may also be
checked.
Page 10 |of 10
Page 1 of 7 Effective from Technical instructions related to the installation and commissioning of the 42 kV Metal TI/IN/0030
06.05.2011 oxide gapless Lightning Arresters provided on Traction systems on Indian Railways
Government of India
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vuqla?kku vfHkdYi vkSj ekuad laxBu
ekuad uxj]y[kuÅ & 226 011
Research Designs & Standards Organisation
Manak Nagar, Lucknow – 226 011
Technical Instruction No.: TI/IN/0030
Technical instructions related to the installation and commissioning of

the 42 kV Metal oxide gapless Lightning Arresters provided on
Traction systems on Indian Railways
Important points related to the installation and commissioning of the 42 kV

Metal oxide gapless Lightning Arresters
1.0 Background
Functioning of the 42 kV lightning arresters (provided on 25 kV side) to a large extant

depends upon its correct installation. Similarly it is important to understand the
construction and working of the Lightning Arresters to fully appreciate its failure modes
and importance of the installation and commissioning aspects. Failures of 42 kV LA’s are
on higher side as compared to the LA’s provided on HV supply at TSS. Some failures of
Lightning Arresters are reported from Railways however the failure investigation part is
generally missing therefore investigation of failed LA’s is also covered in this instruction.
1.1 Historical developments related to the provision of 42 kV class LA’s over IR
1.1.1 Gapless Metal Oxide Lightning arresters are compulsorily provided at all the Traction
substations and switching posts. The LA’s provided at TSS are for protection of
equipment there while LA’s provided at SP/SSP mainly acts to divert travelling surges on
OHE. Lightning Arresters provided at AT locations were gradually removed from 1982
onwards due to the reliability issues associated with them.
1.1.2 Subsequently instructions were issued to SER, ER, ECR & SECR in 1/2005 for providing
LA’s before selected lightning prone AT locations and furnish performance to RDSO for
further study of the issues. Afterwards, based on encouraging results submitted by
Railways extensive trials of LA’s at selected AT locations under lightning prone areas
were advised to all Railways in 9/2006 & reiterated in 7/2008.
1.1.3 After field trials in above 100 locations, SR suggested provision of an additional arcing
horn (gapped at 165 mm) at 9 - Tonne insulator prior to DO fuse of AT lightning prone
areas in 8/08. Reduction in the cases of DO fuse blowing cases was confirmed by S.Rly.
Subsequently on advise of RB, RDSO examined the issue and submitted its
recommendations of providing additional arcing horns and monitor its performance to
RB on 1/2009 which was approved in 7/2009 and RDSO issued a scheme of providing
arcing horn at 9-T insulator prior to AT, to all Railways in 2/2010 and periodical
performance feedback was requested.
2.0 Other relevant RDSO documents and standards on LA maintenance
Document/Standard Subject
RDSO specification No. Technical specification for metal oxide
TI/SPC/PSI/MOGLA/0100 (07/10) gapless type lightning arrester for use on 25
kV side of Railway traction substations and
switching stations.
RDSO specification No. Technical specification for leakage current
TI/SPC/PSI/LCMLA/0030 revision 1 (07/10) monitor for lightning arresters.
RDSO Maintenance Instruction No. Maintenance Instruction for lightning

TI/MI/0041 Rev.1 arresters.
IEC 60099-4 Metal oxide Surge arresters without gaps
for a.c. system
IS 3070 part-III Lightning arresters for alternating current
system – specification – part 3: Metal oxide
lightning arresters without gaps
3.0 Construction & working of the Lightning Arresters
A high voltage surge arrester basically consists of a stack of cylindrical MO elements

kept together by a supporting structure and a housing. The main parts of arrester are its
porcelain housing, Metal Oxide resistor blocks, pressure relief mechanism, spring
mechanism to hold MO blocks and sealing arrangement as shown in the diagram below.
The general purpose of the housing is to:
(i) Protect the MO elements from environmental impacts such as humidity and
pollution as well as damages due to transport,
(ii) Carry external forces, e.g. by conductor wires, wind or earthquake
(iii) Control the pressure relief behavior in case of electrically overloading the
arrester,
(iv) Provide a dielectric strength (withstand voltage) above the protection level of
the arrester and to
(v) Keep the stack of MO elements together by maintaining a certain pressure
within the stack.
A very important part of above design MO surge arresters with respect to safety and
reliability is the sealing and pressure relief system. The sealing system is designed to
prevent ingress of moisture for the whole lifetime of LA i.e. 15 years. Similarly the
porcelain housing is designed to withstand the internal pressure and arc heat and
remain mechanically undamaged during flow of short circuit current and pressure relief.
3.1 Failure modes of Lightning arresters
Most of the LA failures are caused by deficiency of the sealing system due to
transportation damage or perishing of rubber sealing gasket due to ageing. Another
mode of failure may be, stressing the arrester above its specification, e.g. by direct
lightning strokes with extremely high currents or by voltage transfer.
In case of an arrester failure and internal short circuit, the pressure relief system must
release the pressure inside the housing which is caused by the arc heat before the
housing is violently destroyed by the pressure shock wave. Furthermore, the pressure
relief forces the arc out of the housing to prevent from further pressure built-up and
burning of the internal parts and housing.
It must be noted that failure of an arrester is a very rare event. Gapped SiC (Silicone
carbide) surge arresters used to fail quite frequently and these are now mostly replaced
by modern Metal Oxide gapless surge arresters, failure rates of which are considered
much lower.
Under normal circumstances (@ operating voltage, without presence of surge) a very

low leakage current flows through the LA however with the ingress of moisture and
deterioration of MO blocks it goes on increasing finally causing its short circuiting (due
to internal losses & heat generation).
4.0 Important points related to the Installation & commissioning of Lightning Arresters
4.1 National/international earthing codes, standards & manuals stipulate requirements for
good earthing for lightning surge arresters as explained below.
 IEEE- 80 Clause 17.7 stipulates that “Surge arresters should always be provided with a
reliable low-resistance ground connection. Arresters should be connected as close as
possible to the terminals of the apparatus to be protected and have as short and direct
a path to the grounding system as practical. While many utilities provide separate
ground leads from arresters mounted on metal structures, other utilities use the
arrester mounting structures as the surge arrester ground path because the large cross
section of the steel members provides a lower resistance path than a copper cable of
the usual size. In these cases it is important to ensure adequate electric connections
from the structure to both arrester ground lead and ground grid; and also to be sure
that the steel cross sectional area is adequate for conductivity, and that no high
resistance is introduced into joints from paint films, rust, etc.”
 Article 280 of National Electricity code (NEC) of NFPA 70 also defines installation of the
surge arresters i.e. Para 280.12 Routing of Surge Arrester Grounding Conductors- “The
conductor used to connect the surge arrester to line, bus, or equipment and to a
grounding conductor connection point as provided in 280.21 shall not be any longer
than necessary and shall avoid unnecessary bends.” Size of the lead prescribed is not
less than 6 AWG Cu or Al.
 IE rules (Para 92- 2) also recommend that the earthing lead for any lightning arrestor
shall not pass through any iron or steel pipe, but shall be taken as directly as possible
from the lightning-arrestor to a separate earth electrode and/or junction of the earth
mat already provided for the high and extra high voltage sub-station subject to the
avoidance of bends wherever practicable.
 Code for Earthing Traction Power Supply Installation” vide Appendix III of ACTM Vol-II
part-II (ETI/PSI/120(2/91)) clearly states the earthing arrangements of LA at TSS, SSP/SP
which should be followed.
4.2 Higher grounding resistance causes large voltage drop when lightning discharge current
passes through it thereby stressing the insulation voltage withstand capabilities of Surge
arrester.
4.2.1 The length of HV and earth connection leads need to be short and as straight as
practical in order to minimize the loop inductance and ensure minimum voltage drop
across the leads. The inherent resistive and inductive impedance in the leads increases
the effective residual voltage seen by the equipment being protected. This issue is
particularly sensitive for protection from fast-front over voltages. Therefore it is
important to keep these lead lengths short and free of inductive loops.
4.3 The cross-sectional area of the connecting leads is determined more by mechanical than
by electrical requirements. Due to the very short time of discharge current flow, power
or energy consumption in the conductor plays lesser role even though the currents may
be high. If LA’s are placed on an insulating base (as recommended in RDSO specification
for Traction Installation also) then it is connected to earth by a 35 mm2, 1100 volts
grade, unarmored PVC insulated copper cable. This arrangement has got advantage of
measurement of leakage currents for condition monitoring however this lead introduces
an inductance in to the lightning discharge circuit.
4.4 In Railway traction installations like SP, SSP and AT’s where LA’s are fitted on gantries &
masts, length and connection of grounding leads is very important.
4.5 Maximum permissible earthing resistance at AT locations is 10 Ω as compared to 0.5 & 2

Ω at TSS & SP/SSP.
It is therefore recommended that if it is decided to provide LA at AT location then a

separate earthing pit should be provided and LA earthing lead should be directly
connected to this independent earthing and bonding it to the earthing arrangement at
AT location as per Para 11 of the Code for Earthing Traction Power Supply Installation”
vide Appendix III of ACTM Vol-II part-II (ETI/PSI/120(2/91)) to achieve earthing
resistance comparable to SP/SSP.
4.6 While storing and transporting Lightning Arresters it should be ensured that these are
kept vertical with porcelain sheds pointing downwards to prevent any ingress of
moisture inside. In any case, the precautions specified by the manufacturer for
transportation and storage should strictly be followed as porcelain-housed arresters are
very sensitive to transportation stress, which often represents the highest mechanical
stress during an arrester's lifetime.
5.0 Failure investigation of the Lightning Arresters
A format recommended for failure investigation of LA’s is given below:
Check points Remarks
1 Location of LA (TSS/SP/SSP or  Check that there are no repeated failures

at AT) from same location. If so check earthing and
connections to LA.
2 Weather conditions at the  Most of the LA failures occur during rainy
time of LA failure (lightning) season however failure even
during dry conditions must be jointly
recorded with the manufacturer.
3 Make & year of  Ascertain age of LA, compare from codal life.
manufacturing and  Repeated failures of one particular make,
commissioning batch of LA’s. Report to manufacturer &
CORE/Ald.
 Failure immediately after installation may be
either due to poor quality of LA or installation
related issues.
4 Earthing Resistance at the  Check from records & whether it is a high
point where LA’s earth earth resistance area. Any special efforts
terminal is connected done to reduce earth resistance.
5 Length of Earthing lead from  Connections should be as short as possible.
LA’s to Earth terminal
6 Size/cross section of Earthing  As per LA specifications and Para 7.6 & 8.3.3
conductor used as earthing of Code for Earthing Traction Power Supply
lead for LA’s Installation” vide Appendix III of ACTM Vol-II
part-II (ETI/PSI/120(2/91)).
7 Distance of LA’s from earth  Connections to earth should be as short as
terminal possible.
8 Distance of failed LA at  LA’s at SP/SSP are practically protecting OHE.
SP/SSP from TSS
9 Last values of following  Check for any trends of deterioration in
measurements condition of LA.
(i) Total leakage current of LA  Review the threshold (limiting values) of
(ii) Resistive leakage current. resistive leakage current for replacement.
(iii) Surge counter readings
10 Any flash mark observed at  Signs of a direct lightning strike on or near

the site on LA/Mast etc. the LA location.
11 Bonding condition (whether  Signs of a direct lightning strike on or near
any flash mark observed) the LA location.
12 Whether LA was with or  It is important to have a proper
without insulating base connecting lead for LA’s with insulating
base.
13 Whether burst or simply earth  Cases of LA bursting indicate failure of its
pressure relief mechanism & should
therefore be informed or recorded in the
joint minutes with the manufacturer.
 Instead of bursting of housing, opening of
the top cover indicates that its pressure
relief mechanism worked.
14 Any flashing marks on the  Check record of cleaning done on housing.
outer surface of the porcelain
LA housing
15 Condition of its electrical  Look for any breakage, flashing signs.
terminal connections at top
(live) & bottom (to
earth/surge counter/leakage
current meter)
16 Joint report with the  If failed LA is not burst then break open it
manufacturer in presence of manufacturer and check
signs of water leakage up to MO blocks
and damage/condition of MO blocks.
w.e.f Instruction Implementation of Feeder circuit breaker backup Page
12/10. No.TI/IN/P&S/0028 feature of different makes/types of feeder 1 of 20
protection modules provided in C&R panels as
per old RDSO spec. No. ETI/PSI/65(1/97)
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
T EC H N IC AL I N S TR UC T I ON N O .TI/IN/P&S/0028
Implementation of Feeder circuit breaker backup feature

in different makes/types of feeder protection modules
provided in C&R panels as per old RDSO spec. No.
ETI/PSI/65(1/97).
December, 2010
ISSUED BY
TRACTION INSTALLATION DIRECTORATE
RESEARCH DESIGNS AND STANDARDS ORGANISATION
MANAK NAGAR, LUCKNOW – 226011
1.0 Background:
In Northern Railways an incident of OHE break down occurred on 23-11-10 at Narela

TSS wherein feeder CB did not clear the fault as MTR contacts were not passing feed.
The traction transformers were operating in parallel condition (with extended feed
conditions) without any improved protection scheme available (as per RDSO instructions
TI/IN/0017) and as the fault was at the farthest end of extended feeding section (i.e. with
not substantial fault current) the LVCB IDMT relays (set at 150 %) also failed to detect
the same as total fault current is shared by both transformers.
The feature of Feeder breaker back up available in the modern numerical feeder
protection relays was also not implemented there hence effectively no backup protection
operated and extensive damage to OHE was resulted.
1.1 Introduction to Feeder breaker back up protection feature
This feature monitors the status of Feeder CB or magnitude of fault current after issue of
trip command to feeder CB and issues a trip command for LVCB’s after a lapse of set
time delay, if either Feeder CB fails to open or fault current is not falling below the
actuating value.
This feature has been defined in Para 6.1.7 of RDSO spec TI/PSI/SPC/PROTCT/5070
and Para 7.2.1.1 of RDSO spec TI/SPC/PSI/PROTCT/6070(3/09). Setting of time delay
is explained in the amendment to the setting guidelines issued vide letter No.
TI/PSI/PROTCT/STATIC/07 dated 23-04-07.
2.0 History of development of feeder protection modules
The different feeder protection modules developed by RDSO since 1995 along with their
make & features are tabulated below.
Sl Type Year Make Features

. Of approval &
N RDSO specification
o
1. AZ1114 1995 M/s Micro processor based design and
ETI/PSI/141(10/90) ALIND integration of DPR, WPC, Inst.
OCR & PTFF in one module.
2. ADDR/1 2002 M/s  Micro processor based
ETI/PSI/141(10/90) ASHIDA numerical design.
 Integration of DPR, WPC, Inst
OCR, PTFF, Auto reclosure,
LBB (Local breaker backup)
relay in one module.
 Storage of 50 cycle fault

current and voltage of latest 10
faults in relay memory.
3. AZ1114+ 2003 M/s  Micro processor based
ETI/PSI/141(10/90) ALIND numerical design.
LBB (Local breaker backup)
relay (only one trip contact for
LBB).
4. ADR 219A 2007 M/s  Development as per revised
TI/SPC/PSI/PROT ASHIDA RDSO specification no.
CT/5070 (5/2007) TI/SPC/PSI/PROTCT/5070.
 Micro processor based
numerical design.
LBB (Local breaker backup),
and CB trip coil monitoring
5. AZM1114+ 2009 M/s  Development as per revised
TI/SPC/PSI/PROT ALIND RDSO specification no.
CT/5070 (5/2007) TI/SPC/PSI/PROTCT/5070.
 Micro processor based
numerical design.
LBB (Local breaker backup),
6 ADR 219 B 2008 M/s  Development as per RDSO
TI/SPC/PSI/PROT ASHIDA specification No.
CT/4050 & Parallel TI/SPC/PSI/PROTCT/4050 for
operation of Mumbai area.
transformers vide  Micro processor based

letter no. numerical design.
TI/PSI/PROTCT/C  Integration of DPR, WPC, Inst
ONVEN/08 dated OCR, PTFF, Auto reclosure,
15.07.2008. LBB (Local breaker backup),
relay in one module. The DPR
is having 3 zone and 3 stage
OCR .
7. AZM1114 + 2010 M/s  Development as per RDSO
(AN TI/SPC/PSI/PROT ALIND specification No.
SERIES) CT/4050 TI/SPC/PSI/PROTCT/4050 for
TI/SPC/PSI/PROT Mumbai area and also meets
CT/5070 (5/2007). the revised RDSO
& specification no.
Parallel operation TI/SPC/PSI/PROTCT/5070.
of transformers  Micro processor based
vide numerical design.
TI/PSI/PROTCT/C  Integration of DPR, WPC, Inst
ONVEN/08 dated OCR, PTFF, Auto reclosure,
03.03.2010. LBB (Local breaker backup),
relay in one module. The DPR
is having 3 zone and 3 stage
OCR .
3.0 Implementation of Feeder circuit breaker back up feature
3.1 All feeder protection modules being used in IR except S.No.1 (i.e. AZ1114 of M/s
Alind) in table above are having this feature of Feeder circuit breaker back up
protection.
3.2 Current specifications of feeder protection module
(TI/SPC/PSI/PROTCT/5070(5/2007)) and control & relay panels
(TI/SPC/PSI/PROTCT/6070(8/09)) are having this feature and all the panel
drawings approved by RDSO includes its implementation.
3.3 Implementation of this feature was first referred by RDSO in amendment of

setting guidelines issued by RDSO vide TI/PSI/PROTCT/STATIC dated
23-04-07 wherein it was suggested to carry out the wiring by taking the details
from relay manufacturers.
3.4 It has been observed that number of Railways have still not implemented this
feature in the wiring of old control & relay panels (as per old RDSO spc.
ETI/PSI/65(1/97) or older specifications).
3.5 In view of the above it is again advised to implement this feature in different
make/type of relays locally/by works using the required material only from the
approved sources. If required, necessary technical assistance of relay or panel
manufacturers may be taken. The wiring and other technical details are tabulated
below.
Relay make/Type Scheme of implementation

AZ1114+ -Wiring details given in Annexure-I.
-Implementation shall require one additional
auxiliary relay (Type: AEMS32 of M/s Alind or
Type :AVAJS13 of M/s Ashida ) for each feeder
protection module for contact multiplication needed
for trip, annunciation and telesignalling purposes.
AZM1114+ -Wiring details are given in Annexure-II.
AZM1114+ (AN series) -Wiring details are as per the approved drawing of
M/s Alind and enclosed as Annexure-III.
ADDR/1 -Wiring details are given in Annexure-IV.
ADR 219A -Wiring details are as per the approved drawings of
M/s Ashida and enclosed as Annexure-V
ADR 219B -Wiring details are given in Annexure-VI.
4.0 Other important precautions for protection of 25 kV ac traction feeders
Some other important observations emerging out of the failure of the OHE at
NDLS division of NR along with the actions to be taken by Railways are as
under.
4.1 The simplified trip coil circuit is shown below. The NO contact of MTR and CB
auxiliary NC contact are in series. When Feeder protection relay operates, MTR is
actuated and it’s NO contact closes thereby energizing the CB trip coil. As CB
opens, its NC auxiliary contact should first open and break the inductive trip
circuit current. If this NC interlock is sluggish and operates later then MTR NO
contact (which also opens with the resetting of Feeder & MTR relays), MTR
contact shall interrupt the inductive current and may get flashed as their breaking
capacity is much lesser then CB contact.
4.2 The burning or flashing of Master Trip Relay contacts may be due to a short
circuit in the trip coil circuit, CB trip coil failure and also due to opening of trip
coil current by MTR contact instead of CB auxiliary contact as explained above.
4.3 The total resetting time of Feeder protection relay and MTR should be measured
using a secondary relay test kit and same should be between 160-250ms.
Similarly the CB NC interlock opening time should be checked for any spare
interlock and same should not be more than 100 ms. In any case the time
difference between the two should ideally be above 80-100 ms to avoid any
possibility of opening of MTR contacts before CB auxiliary contact.
4.3.1 The Feeder protection relay resetting time can be adjusted by software hence if
any such situation arises where the difference of 80 ms is not available then relay
manufacturer should be advised to increase the relay reset time.
4.3.2 The condition of NC (Normally Closed) auxiliary interlock of CB provided in

series with MTR (Master Trip Relay) NO (Normally Open) interlock should be
checked visually for any sign of wear & tear, damage or sluggishness.
4.3.3 The rotary switch type auxiliary interlocks provided in Alind make CB’s should
be visually examined & attended/replaced on observing signs of loosening of
insulated disks and holding bolts.
4.4 Railways replace complete control & relay panels as well as individual protection
relays therefore it is recommended that before a new protection relay is provided
in to the existing panel its specification should be thoroughly studied and
thereafter implementation of all the features should be ensured at the time of
wiring of the same in panel.
4.5 It has been observed that Railways generally decide parallel operation of 21.6
MVA transformers based on IDMT OCR (LVCB) tripping on overloading. In this
regard it is recommended that a complete load pattern recording & monitoring
should be carried out as per RDSO instructions TI/IN/0019.
4.5.1 It is important to assess the magnitude and durations of overloading pattern
because traction transformers can withstand overloads of 150% for 15 minutes &
up to 200 % for 5 minutes and this feature can be utilized by adopting relays and
panels for which refer new specification TI/SPC/PSI/PROTCT/6070 and setting
guidelines issued vide TI/IN/0022.
4.5.2 Moreover traction transformers of 21.6 MVA can be continuously operated up to
30 MVA in ONAF mode.
4.5.3 The decision of paralleling of transformers should be taken only after above
possibilities have been fully explored.
ANNEXURE-III
ANNEXURE-V

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File No.

No. RDSO-TI0LKO(PSI)/39/2021-O/o PED/TI/RDSO Date: As signed

1. Central Railway, Station Building, Mumbai CST – 400 001.

Sub: Regarding Revision of Maintenance Instructions for Provision of

In view of the above, the ‘Maintenance Instructions for Provision of Disconnector

यह सक्षम प्राधधिकारी के अनुमोदन से जारी ककया जाहा है ।

TRACTION INSTALLATION DIRECTORATE

Instruction No. TI/IN/0025 (08/2010)

TECHNICAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR IMPROVING RELIABILITY

Traction Installation Directorate

2 TI/SPC/RCC/SCADA/0986 for  CMC software 6 2001-2005

50 Hz ac Traction Power Supply of any approved vendor

SN Railway Board /RDSO references Subject

4.0 Remote Control Centre:

4.2 Step by step procedure to start and shut down:

The sequence for running the applications is as follows:

The sequence for closing the application is as follows:

5.0 Remote Terminal Units:

5.1.4 Detailed maintenance instructions as issued by manufacturer should be got followed by

5.2 EMI precautions at RTU

6.0 Communication Media:

Traction Installation Directorate

Instruction No. TI/IN/0036

Month Year: April 2018

Traction Installation Directorate

Relay Element Recommended setting

Over Current Relay: Stage1: Instantaneous OCR setting.

13.5 500 750A

As per para 6.3 of the specification,

21.6 800 1.25*800 5 minutes

13.5 500 1.25*500 5 minutes

(iii) Minimum operating current setting of the Distance Protection

c. Delta I Protection Relay: The report no TI/Report/35 with Amendment

भारत सरकार, रे ल मंत्रालय

PSI GUIDELINE FOR

INCREASING SPEED POTENTIAL TO 160KMPH

INSTRUCTION No. TI/IN/0043 Rev.01

(This supersedes the Instruction No. TI/IN/0043 Rev.00)

Traction Installation Directorate

RESEARCH DESIGNS & STANDARDS ORGANISATION,

LUCKNOW – 226 011

(For official use only)

Subject: PSI Guidelines for Increasing Speed Potential to

Technical Instruction No: TI/IN/0043 Rev.01

Designation SSE/PQ SSE/PR SSE/TR SSE/SCADA JE(D)/TI

Checked By Reviewed By Approved By

GYAN Digitally signed Digitally signed

Designation Director/TI-3 ED/TI PED/TI

1.0 Up gradation of existing routes of Indian Railways for 160kmph

3.0 2X25kV system

4.1 Scott Connected Transformer Scheme:

(b) Scott Connected Transformer:

(c) Auto Transformers:

4.2 V Connected Transformer Scheme:

(b) V- Connected Transformer:

(c) Auto Transformers:

4.3 Scott connected vs V Connected Scheme

4.4 Utilisation of Scheme:

5.0 Spacing of the TSS & Switching post (SP/SSP):

6.0 Operational Philosophy