See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/238730504

Applied Metacognition

Article · November 2002

DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511489976

CITATIONS READS

169 1,929

2 authors, including:

Timothy John Hollins

118 PUBLICATIONS 3,659 CITATIONS

SEE PROFILE

All content following this page was uploaded by Timothy John Hollins on 17 October 2014.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

Applied Metacognition

Edited by
Timothy J. Perfect
Bennett L. Schwartz
         
The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, CB2 1RP, United Kingdom

  

The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, UK
40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA
477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia
Ruiz de Alarcón 13, 28014 Madrid, Spain
Dock House, The Waterfront, Cape Town 8001, South Africa
http://www.cambridge.org

C Cambridge University Press 2002

This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception

and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without
the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 2002

Printed in the United Kingdom at the University Press, Cambridge

Typeface Plantin 10/12 pt System LATEX 2ε []

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data

Applied metacognition / edited by Timothy J. Perfect, Bennett L. Schwartz.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0 521 80189 3 – ISBN 0 521 00037 8 (pbk.)
1. Metacognition–Congresses. I. Perfect, Timothy J. II. Schwartz, Bennett L.
BF311 .A638 2002 153–dc21 2002024499

ISBN 0 521 80189 3 hardback

ISBN 0 521 00037 8 paperback
 Contents

List of contributors page ix

Preface xi

1. Introduction: toward an applied metacognition 1

       .              .       

Part 1 Metacognition in learning and education

2. The relation between metacognitive monitoring and control 15
  .           .       
3. Metacognition for text: findings and implications
for education 39
   .            .     
4. Influence of practice tests on the accuracy of predicting
memory performance for paired associates, sentences,
and text material 68
    ,        .        
  .     

Part 2 Metacognition in everyday memory

5. When does eyewitness confidence predict performance? 95
     .     
6. Autobiographical memories and beliefs: a preliminary
metacognitive model 121
                   
7. Students’ experiences of unconscious plagiarism:
did I beget or forget? 146
                 .       

vii
viii Contents

Part 3 Metacognition in different populations

8. Metacognition in older adults: implications for application 169
           
9. Sense and sensitivity: metacognition in Alzheimer’s disease 197
     
10. The development of metacognitive knowledge
in children and adolescents 224
                   

Conclusions
11. Metacognition research: an interim report 261
      

Index 287
1 Introduction: toward an applied
metacognition

Bennett L. Schwartz and Timothy J. Perfect

Metacognition is traditionally defined as the experiences and knowledge

we have about our own cognitive processes (e.g. Flavell, 1979). Although
ripe for philosophers and cognitive psychologists (e.g. Nelson, 1996),
this topic may not appear at a first glance to be one immediately appli-
cable to everyday human life. However, we hope to show in this book
that metacognition has broad applications across a number of different
settings. Furthermore, we contend that, unlike some laboratory research,
metacognitive data from the lab have parallels to real-world phenomena
and therefore can be applied. The nature of metacognition is such that,
in order to study it effectively in the lab, one must devise situations that
mimic real life. The current volume will also attest to the ease with which
metacognition research moves back and forth from theoretical ques-
tions to applied concerns, a situation we consider most desirable in any
scientific endeavor.
Let us begin with examples from everyday life in which metacognition
is important. Imagine a student studying for an exam. It is well past
midnight, she has been studying for hours, and is exhausted. The decision
that this student must make is whether she has studied the material for the
exam sufficiently and can go to sleep, or whether she must brew another
pot of coffee and keep studying. The student must decide whether the ma-
terial is generally well-learned, and if not, what information necessitates
further study. These decisions influence not only the student’s caffeine
intake but also her studying behavior and, ultimately, her test perfor-
mance (see Nelson, 1993). In the lab, this situation has been modeled
with judgments of learning and the control of study time (see Dunlosky,
Rawson, and McDonald, this volume; Son and Schwartz, this volume).
These studies reveal important and counterintuitive findings which can
be applied in educational settings.
Now imagine a lawyer questioning a witness. The lawyer asks if the
witness is confident that his memory of the events he saw at the scene
of the crime are accurate. The witness replies, “Absolutely, I’ll never for-
get that face as long as I live.” We know, from decades of research, that

1
2 Bennett L. Schwartz and Timothy J. Perfect

eyewitness memory is not always accurate. However, it is also impor-

tant to determine if the witness’ confidence in the accuracy of his own
memory predicts the actual accuracy of the memory. Indeed, there have
been cases in which the witness declares something similar to the sentence
above and then points to the lawyer rather than the defendant. Witness
confidence is a metacognitive judgment, and recent progress in this area
is reviewed in this volume as well (see Perfect, this volume).
In the course of this volume, we will touch on applications of metacog-
nition to children’s learning (Schneider and Lockl), to adult education
(Carroll and Perfect; Maki and McGuire; Dunlosky et al.; Son and
Schwartz), to eyewitness memory (Perfect; Mazzoni and Kirsch), and to
neuropsychological patients and older adults (Moulin; Hertzog). Whereas
the first two fields of application are already quite advanced, the second
two areas are just beginning to gain momentum. In this chapter, we
will briefly review the history of metacognition research, introduce the
key concepts of monitoring and control, reflect on the importance of
metacognition to consciousness, and then entice the reader to read the
remaining chapters.

History of metacognition research

Modern research in metacognition has two parallel roots, one in the
emerging cognitive psychology of the 1960s (e.g. Hart, 1965) and the
other in the post-Piagetian developmental psychology of the 1970s (e.g.
Flavell, 1979). To some extent, these two tracks have remained largely
separate. Today, there are two parallel fields, each called metacognition
(Kuhn, 2000; Schwartz, Benjamin, and Bjork, 1997). Recently, however,
there has been a more concerted effort to bring these two tracks in
metacognition closer together (e.g. Hacker, Dunlosky, and Graesser,
1998; Hertzog, this volume). It is our belief that each track has something
to add to the advancement toward an applied metacognition.
Hart (1965, 1967) was interested in the accuracy of judgments people
made about memory. Coming from an adult cognition tradition, Hart as-
sumed that adults have conscious experiences such as “feelings of
knowing.” What was important to discover was whether they were valid
predictors of behavior. He devised a paradigm, dubbed the RJR proce-
dure, to test metamemory judgments. First, he gave people a recall test
(R), of either newly learned information or general knowledge. For ex-
ample, participants might have been asked, “What is the capital city of
the Bahamas?” (Nassau). If the participant was unsuccessful at recall,
the participant was asked to make a feeling-of-knowing judgment ( J),
 Toward an applied metacognition 3

predicting the answer would be recognized in a multiple-choice format.

In Hart’s (1965) first study, participants simply indicated yes – they had a
feeling of knowing – or no – they did not. In the second experiment, Hart
(1965) used a six-point scale for feeling of knowing, although this was
dichotomized with points 1–3 corresponding to feeling of knowing, and
4–6 corresponding to feeling of not knowing. Subsequent studies intro-
duced more conventional Likert-scale measurements (see Nelson, 1988).
Finally, the participant received the recognition test (R). Hart (1965)
showed that feeling-of-knowing judgments did indeed predict the likeli-
hood of correct recognition for general knowledge materials, an obser-
vation replicated many times (see Nelson, 1988; Schwartz, 1994). Hart
(1967) extended this technique to episodic memory, demonstrating that
feeling-of-knowing judgments were above chance in predicting recogni-
tion of trigram materials in a paired-associate task. The RJR technique
mostly lay dormant until the 1980s when it was revised by Thomas Nelson
and his colleagues (e.g. Nelson and Narens, 1980, but see Gruneberg and
Monks, 1974 for an exception).
Developmentalists were also interested in metacognition, but chose a
different avenue of exploration. Flavell (1979) was interested in finding
out if the improvement in children’s memory abilities was a function of
greater conscious understanding of the rules that govern memory and
cognition (see Kuhn, 2000). Thus, his studies trace the development of
metacognitive thinking, that is, the ability to reflect on one’s cognitive
processes. Unfortunately, not yet fully armed with the ideas of monitor-
ing and control (Nelson and Narens, 1990), Flavell’s research agenda did
not show any strong correlations between metacognitive thinking and im-
provements in memory. Indeed, many developmentalists from this camp
abandoned metacognition for the greener pastures of theory of mind
(Wimmer and Perner, 1983). Nonetheless, Flavell’s approach has had
a strong influence on the development of metamemory in a number of
domains (Hacker, 1998).
In recent years, there has been a impressive confluence of the two
“schools” of metacognition. Developmentalists have begun to borrow the
tools developed by Hart, Nelson, and others to investigate the questions
that Flavell originally set out to answer. In this volume, Schneider and
Lockl offer a more extensive history of this interaction and the many fruits
it is now bearing. They focus on how this has led to new understanding
of how metacognition develops in children. Also in this volume, Hertzog
focuses on how metacognition changes in later adulthood.
In mainstream cognitive psychology, metacognition still lingered at the
fringes. Indeed, at most conferences, metacognition researchers presented
4 Bennett L. Schwartz and Timothy J. Perfect

their papers in memory sessions not metacognition sessions. At the

American Psychonomic Society meeting, a session on metacognition
did not emerge until 1997. Metacognition did receive a significant boost
from its endorsement by the “everyday memory” movement (e.g. Neisser,
1978). Early pioneers in the everyday memory movement studied meta-
memory phenomena, particularly the feeling of knowing (e.g. Gruneberg
and Monks, 1974). In 2002, although not quite as “hot” or “fashionable”
an area as false memories or theories of word recognition, metacognition
has emerged as an important sub-field of cognitive psychology. Perhaps in
part, the emergence of metacognition into the mainstream reflects the
greater focus of cognitive psychologists on the experiential aspects of
memory (Tulving, 1985). The concept of a false memory brings with
it the notions of beliefs in memory and judgments about the source, and
veracity of memories. Thus, cognitive researchers focusing on false mem-
ory are led inevitably towards a consideration of metacognitive aspects of
remembering (see Mazzoni and Kirsch, this volume).

Monitoring and control

Metacognition came into the “modern” era with the publication of
Nelson and Narens’ (1990; see Nelson, 1996) theory of monitoring and
control. This theory was able to organize and integrate almost all of the
extant research on metacognition. As the chapters in this volume show,
it has also served as an effective model for applications of metacognition
(see Son and Schwartz, this volume). The theory concentrates on the in-
teraction between two metacognitive processes, monitoring and control.
Metacognitive monitoring is those processes that allow the individual
to observe, reflect on, or experience his or her own cognitive processes.
Thus, one may know that one has mastered his or her arithmetic tables,
or one may feel that they have understood a text they have just read. In the
laboratory, metacognitive monitoring is revealed by asking participants
to make feeling-of-knowing judgments, judgments of learning, ease-of-
learning judgments, warmth judgments, judgments of comprehension,
etc. Monitoring informs the person of the state of their cognition relative
to their current goal.
Metacognitive control is the conscious and non-conscious decisions that
we make based on the output of our monitoring processes. Control pro-
cesses are revealed by the behaviors a person engages in as a function of
monitoring. Thus, if a person feels that an item is not adequately encoded,
they may choose to continue studying that item. If a person feels that they
have not understood a passage of text, they may re-read it. In the labora-
tory, we can observe control processes through such measures as response
 Toward an applied metacognition 5

latency, allocation of study time, and decisions about which items to study
(e.g. Son and Metcalfe, 2000; Thiede and Dunlosky, 1999).
The idea of control processes is crucial to the development of applied
metacognition. If control processes exist and influence human behavior
and cognition, it may be possible to improve or alter control processes in
ways which will improve human learning. Consider the work of Thiede
and Dunlosky, 1999 (see also Son and Schwartz, this volume). Thiede
and Dunlosky asked students to make judgments of learning ( JOLs) on
paired-associate word pairs, that were either concrete nouns (e.g. dog-
spoon) or abstract words (e.g. democracy–gravity). Later, they were given
the option to chose items for re-study. When time pressure to learn was
high, the students chose those that had been given high JOLs. When
time pressure was low, the students chose the harder items to study, that
is, those given low JOLs. Thus, depending on the context, the students
made different control decisions. Although conducted in a lab under
controlled settings, the applied value of this study is obvious: perhaps we
can teach students to use adaptive and flexible control strategies. Thus,
the introduction of the concept of control radically altered the kinds of
questions that could be asked about how to apply metacognitive findings.

Metacognition and awareness

Flavell (1979) made the distinction between metacognitive knowl-
edge and metacognitive awareness (see also Kuhn, 2000). Metacognitive
knowledge refers to explicit knowledge about our own cognitive strengths
and weaknesses. Thus, the authors of this chapter can confidently assert
that they know most of the capitals of the nations of Western Europe,
but very few of the capitals of the nations of Africa. This statement re-
quires no conscious retrieval. Similarly, the first author would assert that
he knows a great deal about the sport of basketball, but very little about
cricket, with the reverse being true for the second author. Metacognitive
awareness refers to the feelings and experiences we have when we en-
gage in cognitive processes, such as retrieval. Thus, when asked about
what happened during the last series played between the nations of the
West Indies and England at cricket, the first author experiences a vague
feeling of familiarity without being able to specify the when, the where,
and the events associated with this story. He might make a judgment
that he might recognize some of this information, but would also judge
an inability to recall any specific information. The second author on the
other hand recalls the events vividly, can give the exact score of the series,
details of each match, and has clear recollections of a day spent pacing
in front of the television set during a crucial match in the series.
6 Bennett L. Schwartz and Timothy J. Perfect

Traditionally, developmentalists have been more interested in the first

aspect of metacognition. Schneider and Lockl (this volume) and Hertzog
(this volume) concentrate their chapters on the development of metacog-
nitive knowledge and how it changes over the lifespan. Important here is
the concept of memory self-efficacy, that is, how well people think they
are going to learn new information. The very young tend to overesti-
mate their self-efficacy, whereas older adults often underestimate theirs.
Mazzoni and Kirsch (this volume) make some interesting applications
about people’s beliefs about their own memory to the development of
false autobiographical memories. Cognitivists have been more interested
in metacognitive experience, as reflected in their attention to feeling-of-
knowing judgments, judgments of learning, etc. Of interest here are both
the underlying processes and the extent to which these judgments pre-
dict actual performance. We see a focus on this issue in the work here
of Dunlosky et al., Maki and McGuire, Perfect, and Son and Schwartz.
Perfect, for example, examines how people’s feelings of confidence for
witnessed events predict the likelihood that their memories are indeed
accurate.

Domains of application
Our goal in this volume is to establish the importance of metacognition
to a variety of applied concerns, and specifically, to demonstrate how
metacognition can inform these areas. It is our belief that metacognition
has made a good start at being applied, as a number of researchers in
the field are actively engaged in applying their results. In addition, many
metacognition researchers ask questions that are applied in nature to
begin with.
We consider that the following chapters will make important contri-
butions to two applied domains, namely (a) education, specifically appli-
cations toward improving learning and training; and (b) legal contexts,
specifically in the self-evaluation of eyewitness reports. The chapters here
also touch on applications to other domains including counseling (self-
evaluation of coping strategies, beliefs in recovered memories), human
factors (self-monitoring of job performance), and recovery from brain
injuries.
The current volume contains at least one chapter on each of these
topics. Educational applications predominate, as most applied metacog-
nition has had some form of learning as its focus. Maki and McGuire
(this volume) discuss the growing literature on the monitoring of compre-
hension. Many studies find that students, even capable college students,
 Toward an applied metacognition 7

do not always adequately monitor their understanding of texts that they

have read. If they do not know that they do not understand what they have
read, they cannot take steps to ensure learning and understanding. Maki
and McGuire describe steps that can be taken to improve the accuracy
of monitoring of comprehension.
In another chapter with important educational implications, Carroll
and Perfect (this volume) discuss the metacognitive bases of unconscious
plagiarism. As any professor knows, plagiarism occurs quite regularly
among the students we teach. Some of it is largely unintentional and
even unconscious. Nonetheless, such plagiarism can still have disastrous
consequences for students. The ability to self-identify unconscious pla-
giarism, and the ability of teachers to distinguish intentional from uncon-
scious plagiarism has the potential for far-reaching impact in our schools
and universities.
Dunlosky et al. investigate how practicing can help improve metacogni-
tive monitoring. They argue that encouraging people to take practice tests
can improve their ability to predict how they will do on the actual tests.
In this way, practice testing may help people to study more effectively.
Schneider and Lockl write a review of the development of metacognitive
knowledge and its implications for children’s learning. Son and Schwartz
review the theory of monitoring and control and discuss how this theory
may be used to develop better educational techniques.
If we turn our attention to eyewitness memory and the psychology
of memory that has become so important in court proceedings, we find
that metacognitive issues have been at the forefront of this domain from
almost the beginning. The confidence a witness displays in his or her
testimony has a strong effect on juries, judges, and the general pub-
lic. Unfortunately, and surprisingly, much of the research on this topic
suggests that confidence and accuracy are very loosely correlated (e.g.
Bothwell, Deffenbacher, and Brigham, 1987; Perfect, this volume). Does
this research suggest that judges and juries should revise their opinion and
attempt to discount variation among witnesses’ confidence? Perfect (this
volume) argues that it is too early to answer this question. He argues that,
because this research examines a correlation between two psychological
measures, problems inherent in correlational data, such as restricted
range issues, must be addressed first. Instead, he proposes a research
agenda that will assess if confidence–accuracy associations are driven by
such features as level of performance, the details of interest, across per-
sonality types, and across people’s metacognitive beliefs about their areas
of expertise. Perfect finds that whereas personality types do not predict
much about eyewitness accuracy, people who believe they have strong
8 Bennett L. Schwartz and Timothy J. Perfect

memories often express overconfidence leading to poor accuracy. These

findings have important implications for both theoretical and applied
research.
Mazzoni and Kirsch examine the role of metacognitive beliefs in the
retrieval of autobiographical memories and discuss the implications in
legal and clinical settings. In their model, people use metacognitive crite-
ria to assess the veracity of retrieved memories. Furthermore, metacog-
nitive beliefs are also used to assess if the inability to retrieve a memory
implies that person did not witness or participate in an event. Mazzoni
and Kirsch then discuss many studies that support this general system.
For example, they point to research that suggests that misinformation is
more likely to produce a false memory for a plausible than a non-plausible
event (Pezdek, Finger, and Hodge, 1997), and that credible information
indicating that an event did occur increases the rate that the person be-
lieves the event did occur (Mazzoni et al., in press).
For Mazzoni and Kirsch, metacognitive beliefs function similarly to
Flavell’s (1979) notion of metacognitive knowledge, that is, it is ex-
plicit reportable knowledge about how memory functions. As such, it
is educable. Thus, the role of metacognitive beliefs in false memories
is a correctable one. This has implications for both legal and clinical
outcomes.
Hertzog is also concerned with memory beliefs, namely the chang-
ing beliefs about the efficacy of one’s memory as one ages. Hertzog is
concerned that many older adults may have internalized stereotypes of
age-related memory declines, even when these beliefs are not necessarily
accurate. These stereotypes create a self-fulfilling prophecy because the
poor expectations may lead to anxiety and other negative effects. Again, as
these beliefs are educable, it is possible that better education can reassure
and provide a sense of confidence to older adults.
One of the new exciting areas of application of metacognitive theory
is in the area of neuropsychological assessment. Although the role of
the brain in metacognition has been occasionally the subject of inquiry
(Shimamura and Squire, 1986; Metcalfe, 1993), application to patient
groups is a very new area. Moulin (this volume) incorporates concepts
of metacognition, particularly that of improved control, as a method for
softening the loss of mnemonic ability associated with early Alzheimer’s
disease. This is based on his studies, which suggest that early Alzheimer’s
patients can still accurately monitor their memory abilities.
We suspect that metacognition will increasingly be applied in areas
of psychology as diverse as educational psychology, neuropsychology,
psychological gerontology, as well as other sub-fields. Although not
 Toward an applied metacognition 9

represented here, Bjork and his colleagues have been applying metacog-
nition research to a variety of training situations from the military to
sports teams (see Bjork, 1994; 1999). Nelson and his colleagues have
been applying metacognitive research to the learning of foreign language
vocabulary (Nelson et al., 1994). Thus, we anticipate a bright future for
metacognition research.

Conclusions
Hermann (1998) distinguished between four types of research method-
ologies, three of which were related to applied research. The first group
are theory-based researchers, for whom application is not initially rel-
evant. Rather, their goal is to understand basic processes. The second
group of researchers are basic researchers who stress ecological validity,
also known as the “everyday memory” movement, in memory research.
These researchers are fundamentally interested in basic questions of
theory, but wish to address them in a way that has direct validity to
everyday life. The important point about “ecologically valid” research
is that, although it tells us something about ordinary life, it may not be
directly applicable.
The third type of research is labeled “applicable research” by Hermann
(1998). Applicable research implies ecologically valid research, but re-
search for which applications follow naturally. A typical example is that
Loftus’ misinformation-effect studies clearly suggest that investigators
should avoid leading and misleading questions when questioning a wit-
ness or suspect. Finally, Hermann’s fourth type of research is “applica-
tion research.” This involves research on specific instruments, products,
or services which have been designed to work in specific domains. Thus,
application research might involve experimenting on whether a specific
form of therapy helps amnesic patients remember more of what they have
been taught.
The chapters in this book are mostly of the “applicable research”
variety. The researchers have not yet designed specific interventions to im-
prove learning, to ameliorate Alzheimer’s, or to assist judges and juries.
However, because the research is ecologically valid and application is
kept in mind, the potential application of much research on metacog-
nition falls naturally out of the studies used to explore it. Thus, the
schoolteacher looking for specific methods to improve metacognitive
understanding may find these chapters premature, but the researcher
looking to design specific application tools should find these chapters
invaluable.
10 Bennett L. Schwartz and Timothy J. Perfect


Bjork, R. A. (1994). Memory and metamemory considerations in the training
of human beings. In J. Metcalfe and A. P. Shimamura (eds.), Metacognition:
knowing about knowing, pp. 185–205. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
(1999). Assessing our own competence: heuristics and illusions. In D. Gopher
and A. Koriat (eds.), Attention and performance XVII. Cognitive regulation of
performance: interaction of theory and application. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Bothwell, R. K., Deffenbacher, K. A., and Brigham, J. C. (1987). Correlation of
eyewitness accuracy and confidence: optimality hypothesis revisited. Journal
of Applied Psychology, 72, 691–695.
Flavell, J. H. (1979). Metacognitive and cognitive monitoring: a new area of
cognitive developmental inquiry. American Psychologist, 34, 906–911.
Gruneberg, M. M., and Monks, J. (1974). “Feeling of knowing” and cued recall.
Acta Psychologica, 38, 257–265.
Hacker, D. J. (1998). Definitions and empirical foundations. In D. J. Hacker,
J. Dunlosky, and A. C. Graesser (eds.), Metacognition in educational theory
and practice, pp. 1–24. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Hacker, D. J., Dunlosky, J., and Graesser, A. C. (1998). Metacognition in educa-
tional theory and practice. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Hart, J. T. (1965). Memory and the feeling-of-knowing experience. Journal of
Educational Psychology, 56, 208–216.
(1967). Memory and the memory-monitoring process. Journal of Verbal Learn-
ing and Verbal Behavior, 6, 685–691.
Herrmann, D. J. (1998). The relationship between basic research and applied
research in memory and cognition. In C. P. Thompson, D. J. Hermann,
D. Bruce, J. D. Read, D. G. Payne, and M. P. Toglia (eds.), Autobiographical
memory: theoretical and applied perspectives, pp. 13–27. New Jersey: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates.
Kuhn, D. (2000). Metacognitive development. Current Directions in Psychological
Science, 9, 178–181.
Metcalfe, J. (1993). Novelty monitoring, metacognition, and control in a com-
posite holographic associative recall model: interpretations for Korsakoff
amnesia. Psychological Review, 100, 3–22.
Neisser, U. (1978). Memory: what are the important questions? In M. M.
Gruneberg, P. Morris, and R. L. Sykes (eds.), Practical aspects of memory,
pp. 3–24. London: Academic Press.
Nelson, T. O. (1988). Predictive accuracy of feeling of knowing across different
criterion tasks and across different subject populations and individuals. In
M. Gruneberg, P. Morris, and R. Sykes (eds.), Practical aspects of memory:
current research and issues, Volume 1, pp. 190–196. New York: Wiley.
(1993). Judgments of learning and the allocation of study time. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General, 122, 269–273.
(1996). Consciousness and metacognition. American Psychologist, 51, 102–
116.
Nelson, T. O., Dunlosky, J., Graf, A., and Narens, L. (1994). Utilization of
metacognitive judgments in the allocation of study during multitrial learning.
Psychological Science, 5, 207–213.
 Toward an applied metacognition 11

Nelson, T. O., and Narens, L. (1980). Norms of 300 general-information ques-

tions: accuracy of recall, latency of recall, and feeling-of-knowing ratings.
Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 19, 338–368.
(1990). Metamemory: a theoretical framework and new findings. In G. Bower
(ed.), The psychology of learning and motivation, Volume 26, pp. 125–141. San
Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Pezdek, K., Finger, K., and Hodge, D. (1997). Planting false childhood memo-
ries: the role of event plausibility. Psychological Science, 8, 437–441.
Schwartz, B. L. (1994). Sources of information in metamemory: judgments
of learning and feelings of knowing. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 1,
357–375.
Schwartz, B. L., Benjamin, A. S., and Bjork, R. A. (1997). The inferential and
experiential basis of metamemory. Current Directions in Psychological Science,
6, 132–137.
Shimamura, A. P., and Squire, L. R. (1986). Memory and metamemory: a
study of the feeling-of-knowing phenomenon in amnesic patients. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 12, 452–460.
Son, L. K., and Metcalfe, J. (2000). Metacognitive and control strategies in study-
time allocation. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and
Cognition, 26, 204–221.
Thiede, K. W., and Dunlosky, J. (1999). Toward a general model of self-regulated
study: an analysis of selection of items for study and self-paced study time.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 25,
1024–1037.
Tulving, E. (1985). Memory and consciousness. Canadian Psychologist, 26, 1–12.
Wimmer, H., and Perner, J. (1983). Beliefs about beliefs: representation and
constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children’s understanding of
deception. Cognition, 13, 103–128.

View publication stats