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Saghir Ahmed v. State of Uttar Pradesh

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​ Case Analysis
Saghir Ahmed v. State of Uttar
Pradesh

​ Post author:

​ Team LawFoyer

​ Post published:

​ 31 August 2024

​ Post category:

​ Case Analysis / Constitutional Law Cases

​ Reading time:

​ 15 mins read
Author: Supragya Singh

Edited by: Biraj Kumar Sarkar


ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The appellants in the case were private bus owners who used to ply their buses on public
for passenger service through permits granted under the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939,
though the state had an exemption. The state of Uttar Pradesh decided to nationalize the
road transport business. It attempted to do so – First, by order [later held unjustified
under Art. 19(6) and violative of Art. 14 & 19(1)(g) by the state High Court]; later,
through passing the U.P. State Road Transport Act, 1950. The Act excluded private bus
owners from plying their vehicles on the Bulandshahr-Delhi route. The High Court, this
time, did not hold the act violative of either Art. 14, 19(1)(g) or Art. 31. The matter came
on appeal before the Supreme Court of India to direct a writ against the state for
violation of their rights under Art. 14, 19(1)(g) and 31 of the Constitution. The court held
the Act to violate Art. 19(1)(g) and 31 but not Art. 14 in any manner. The Hon’ble Court
set aside the judgment of the High Court and directed the state by way of a writ not to
implement any part of the U.P. State Road Transport Act against appellants or anyone
working under them.
Keywords: right, freedom, occupation, property, restriction, violation

CASE DETAILS:
i) Judgement Cause Title / Saghir Ahmad vs The
Case Name
State of U. P.
ii) Case Number Civil Appeals No. 182 & 183 of 1954
iii) Judgement Date 13th October 1954
iv) Court Supreme Court of India
v) Quorum / Constitution of M.C. Mahajan, B.K. Mukherjea, S.R.
Bench Das, Vivian Bose, Ghulam Hasan
vi) Author / Name of Judges B.K. Mukherjea
vii) Citation A.I.R. 1954 SC 728
viii) Legal Provisions Involved Art. 14, Art. 19(1)(g), Art. 31 [presently
stands omitted] – The Constitution of
India, 1950; The U.P. Road Transport
Act, 1951
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The Constitution of India came to be entirely enforced in 1950. At its inception, it laid
out specific rights in its territory for its citizens and persons in Part III of the
Constitution as Fundamental Rights. With time, the interpretation relating to the rights
bestowed in the provisions of Part III has also evolved. Some crucial amendments have
also been made to Part III.
Article 14 in the Constitution gives the right to equality to all its citizens irrespective of
their caste, religion, sex, place of birth, or any other such ground. The duty is thereby
bestowed upon the state to treat all equally before the law and protect them equally
under the law.

Article 19, on the other hand, provides several freedoms that the citizens in India would
have. Art. 19(1)(g) specifically gives the citizens the freedom to carry out any occupation
or trade. The freedoms in the article are not unrestricted; hence, Art. 19(6) lays certain
reasonable restrictions upon Art. 19(1)(g). Laying reasonable restrictions upon freedom
means that any restriction cannot be arbitrary, and the court would be fit to decide if it’s
arbitrary by considering the context and facts.
Article 31 of the constitution, later removed from the fundamental rights by the
forty-fourth amendment, initially had its place as a fundamental right, and it bestowed
upon citizens the property right.

Initially, the Indian state had to juggle balancing the rights of its citizens and the general
development and public interest. The state also often sought to nationalize specific
industries so disputes concerning fundamental rights would reach the court’s doors to
seek justice.
1. FACTS OF THE CASE

Procedural Background of the Case


1. Writ petitions were filed by the appellants, private bus operators, before the
Allahabad High Court due to the non-issuing and canceling of the permits
granted to them under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, as the state attempted to
have a monopoly over road transport. The court opined such a procedure is
violative of Art. 14 & 19(1)(g) and unjustified under Art.16(6) of the
Constitution. The Transport Authorities were directed to deal with the
application of permits by private vehicle owners.
2. In 1951, the state passed the U.P. Road Transport Act, which later prohibited
private bus operators on the Bulandshahr-Delhi route. Private bus owners
again filed several petitions before the Allahabad High Court under Article 226
of the constitution. The court did not find the U.P. Road Transport Act to
conflict with Art. 14, 19(1)(g) and 31 of the constitution. As a result, the matter
came before the Supreme Court of India as an appeal challenging the Act’s
constitutionality, especially its section 3. The different appeals were clubbed
on the matter, and the matter was up for hearing before a 5-judge
constitutional bench.

Factual Background of the Case


1. The appellants, private bus owners, and public bus operators carried on the
business of plying motor vehicles for passenger service on the
Bulandshahr-Delhi route. This was regulated by the Motor Vehicles Act of
1939, under which one could get a permit to run a vehicle by the Transport
Authorities. The Motor Vehicles Act also provided an exemption for state
vehicles under section 42(3) from getting a compulsory permit unless these
vehicles are used concerning the Indian State Railway’s business.
2. After 1947, the Uttar Pradesh government started running public buses
alongside private operators. Later, the government ordered a state monopoly
over the road transport system, and section 42(3) would allow it to run as
many buses as it wanted. However, the permits issued to the private bus
operators were stopped, and previously issued permits were canceled. As a
result, petitions were filed, and the matter came up before the Allahabad High
Court.
3. The court opined that such a procedure conflicts due to section 42(3)
contradicting Art. 14 of the constitution and that the state’s order is unjustified
under Art.19(6). Following the court’s order, the issuing of permits resumed.
4. The Uttar Pradesh state legislature passed the U.P. Road Transport Act, 1951
to nationalize the road transport business. Subsequently, several other
notifications were issued following the notification dated 25th March 1953 that
prohibited private operators as passenger service on the Bulandshahr-Delhi
highway.
5. The matter came up before the Allahabad High Court, but the private bus
owners were provided no relief. As a result, the private operators approached
the Supreme Court of India through an appeal, and the matter was up before a
5-judge constitution bench challenging the constitutionality of the U.P. Road
Transport Act, specifically its section 3.
LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

1. Whether the U.P. Road Transport Act, 1951 violated Art. 19(1)(g) of the
constitution and is not justified under Art.19(6)?
1. Whether the U.P. Road Transport Act,1951 violate Art. 31 of the constitution?
2. Whether the U.P. Road Transport Act, 1951 violate Art. 14 of the constitution?
APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

1. The counsel for the Appellant submitted that the U.P. Road Transport Act
violates Art. 19(1)(g) of the constitution guaranteeing the right to carry on any
occupation, trade, or business; the appellants under this right can carry onto
their business of plying buses on hire on a public highway.
2. The counsel for the Appellant argued that the U.P. Road Transport Act violates
Art. 31 of the constitution as their ‘property,’ i.e., the beneficial interest
involved in the business of plying buses on hire is violated without conforming
to any requirements of compensation under Art. 31.
3. The counsel for the Appellant also contended that the Act violates Art.14 in
making a different classification for the state against ordinary citizens.
However, the state stands in the same position as private traders when it
engages in some industry.
1. The counsel for the Appellant also put forth that the Act violates Art. 14 by
allowing the state to discriminate among citizens by bestowing unregulated
discretion upon the state to ‘associate such person as it likes’ in the business of
transport with no rules laid upon which this discretion would be based.
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

● . The counsel for the Respondent submitted that the U.P. State Road Transport
Act does not violate Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution since the said article gives
the right to carry any profession, trade, or business but not to carry it
‘anywhere;’ private operators can’t to use a public highway to ply their vehicle
unless permitted by the state.
1. The counsel for the Respondent submitted that in certain instances, a
restriction, as given in Art. 19(6) would also include a prohibition on
something under which the U.P. State Road Transport Act would be justified.
2. The counsel for the Respondent put forth that the state would choose the
routes and portion of it where private owners could operate and the number of
persons to be given permits, which is regulated under the Motor Vehicles Act
1939, making the discretion bestowed upon the state-regulated, hence not
violative of Art. 14.
RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

1. Article 14: “The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or
the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.”[1]
2. Article 19(1)(g): All citizens shall have the right- “to practise any profession, or
to carry on any occupation, trade or business.”[2]
3. Article 31 (Compulsory acquisition of property[3]): Omitted by the
Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978.
JUDGEMENT

RATIO DECIDENDI
1. Any public member can use a public route within permissible limits under Art.
19(1)(g).
2. The intangible commercial interest involved in plying buses on hire is property
under Art. 31.
3. The different classification of the state against private traders in a monopoly
through law is reasonable under Art. 14.

OBITER DICTA
1. The nature of the long and uninterrupted user of a passage tells the extent of
the right to pass over it. The right to passage extends to all usual traffic forms
and others that are reasonably similar and incidental. The court drawing from
the English Law said the Bulandshahr-Delhi route (part of Grand Trunk
Road), being a public highway, does not mean it could be used just as a foot
passage, and other uses or users would need permission from the State. The
Grand Trunk Road has existed since the 15thcentury and has historically been
used by all prevailing vehicles. The passage of modern motor vehicles is
incidental to its historical use, though the state can regulate the traffic as per
the requirement under Art. 19(6). Hence, it can’t be said that the right of
passing of any user over a public route doesn’t exist before some act. A route
may vest in the state and have a public nature, but it is meant for the use of
members of the public, and it can be restricted only through a reasonable
restriction under Art. 19(6). Since members of the public can use their vehicles
on a public route within permissible limits, they can also ply their vehicles on a
public route for passenger hire. The court emphasized that the Act is not a
reasonable restriction under Art. 19(6), as it stated, “Restrictions would
normally pre-suppose the continued existence- no matter even in a very thin
and attenuated form- of the thing upon which the restrictions were imposed.”
The court made this observation as it referred to the observations made by the
learned judges in A.K. Gopalan v. The State on the interchangeability of the
term ‘restriction’ and ‘deprivation.’ The court pointed out that even if the term
‘restriction’ meant ‘prohibition’ in certain instances, it would still have to be a
reasonable restriction and not an unreasonable restriction over a trade or
occupation that is not perceptually harmful. The court examined whether the
restriction was in the public’s general interest. It concluded that it wouldn’t be
considered a reasonable restriction and would leave hundreds of private bus
owners without a livelihood. The U.P. Road Transport Act, 1951 is not a
reasonable restriction under Art. 19(6), hence violates Art. 19(1)(g).
2. The property under Art. 31(2) would include in its ambit the commercial
interest involved in plying buses on hire by the appellants. The appellants were
deprived of this property, and the state made no compensation. Hence, the Act
also violates Art.31.
● The legislature can make a classification provided it is not arbitrary, and if it is
reasonable, it would not violate the Art. 14. The different classification of the
state from that of citizens won’t mean a violation of Art. 14 per se. In creating a
monopoly, different classifications of the state are inherent, and the
classification would have a rational relation to the sought object. Hence, it
would be reasonable. Hence, such would not be considered a violation under
Art. 14 per se, though it could be invalid because it violates other crucial
constitutional provisions. The court also analyzed and said that the state
doesn’t stand in the same position as a private trader when it engages in an
industry as the state would still be performing sovereign functions required of
it while engaging in it since the functions of the state include more in
contemporary times than what has been conventionally included. The Act
cannot be said to violate Art. 14 of the Constitution. The court, on the
argument of the state having unfettered discretion, expressed that the
arguments pertain to how the provision would be implemented. Even if it is
assumed that the provision would give the state unfettered discretion, that
would make the provision violative of Art. 14 and not the entire act.
Considering the argument by the respondent’s counsel, it can be said that in
this situation, the state would not have unregulated discretion. Hence, neither
the Act nor the provision are violative of the Art. 14.

CONCLUSION & COMMENTS


In its decision, the court set aside the earlier judgment of the Allahabad High Court. It
issued a writ of mandamus directing the state not to implement any provision of the U.P.
State Road Transport Act, 1951, against the appellant or any person working under them.

The court served right in its reasoning, especially on the Art. 19(1)(g) that freedom to
occupation or business, etc., would not only include the right to carry that occupation
but also to use the public routes, whose benefits are meant for the larger public, for
carrying out that occupation or business.
Art. 19(1)(g) indeed serves as a crucial fundamental right, as can be seen through the
case that the violation of this right can affect one’s livelihood and standard of life.

REFERENCES
Important Cases Referred

1. S.S. Motor Services v. The State of Madras


2. Cooverjee v. The Excise Commissioner, 1954 SCR 873
3. West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose, 1954 SCR 587
4. Dwarkadas Shrinivas v. The Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd., 1954
SCR 674
5. Packard v. Banton, 68 LE 596, 264 US 140
6. Frost v. Railroad Commission, 70 LE 1101
7. Stephenson v. Binford, 77 LE 288
8. Motilal v. Uttar Pradesh Government, I.L.R. 1951 All 257
9. Municipal Corporation of the City of Toronto v. Virgo, 1896 AC 88
10. K. Gopalan v. The State, 1950 S.C.R. 88
11. Lokanath Misra v. The State of Orissa, AIR 1952 Orissa 42
12. Commonwealth of Australia and Others v. Bank of New South Wales and
Others, 1950 AC 235
13. P&O Steam Navigation Co. v. The Secretary of State, 1861 5 B.H.C.R. Appendix
1
Important Statutes Referred

1. The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 19(1)(g)


2. The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 31
3. The U.P. Road Transport Act, 1951
4. The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 14
ENDNOTES:

[1] Article 14, Constitution of India (1950).


[2] Article 19(1)(g), Constitution of India (1950).

[3] Article 31, Constitution of India (1950)


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