MADHUSUDAN LAW UN IVERSITY

MADHUSUDAN LAW UNIVERSIT, CUTTACK

INTERNAL ASSIGNMENT

BEFORE THE HIGH COURT, ODISHA

UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF CONSTITUTION

WP. NO. _____________/ 2024

IN THE MATTER OF

PARENTS OF RADHE
& CHULBUL…………………………... ………………….. PETITIONER
VS.
MR . PAPA RANJIT ………………………………………..RESPONDENT

UPON SUBMISSION BEFORE THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT JUDGES

NAME: ARPITA PRIYADARSINI MALLICK

CLASS 7TH SEM , BALLB (H)
SECTION : A
ROLL NO. : 7510121018

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Sl. No. Page No

1. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 3

2. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 4

3. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 5

4. STATEMENT OF FACTS 6

5. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 7

6. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 8-9

7. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 10-19

8. PRAYER 20

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations Full Forms

AIR All India Reporter
HC High Court
CPC Code of Civil Procedure
Co. Company
Edn Edition
Ltd Limited
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SCR Supreme Court Reporter

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MADHUSUDAN LAW UN IVERSITY

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

LIST OF BOOKS –

1. INTERPRETATION OF STATUTE – S.R. MYNENI.

2. LAND LAWS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA – DR. N. MAHESWARA
SWAMY

LIST OF CASES –
1. Kanu Sayal vs District Magistrate, Darjeeling (1973)
2. Sanjay Dutt v. State through C.B.I., Bombay (II) (1994 SCC (5) 410)
3. Mohd. Ikram Hussain v. State of U.P. (AIR 1964 SC 1625)
4. Ratanlal v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1971 SC 778)
5. Swaran Singh v. State of Punjab (2000 AIR SC 2017)
6. Ashok Johari v. State of U.P. (AIR 1997 SC 187)
7. ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla (AIR 1976 SC 1207)
8. Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal (1994) SCC (2) 220
9. Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1965 SC 845)
10. the case of R.C. Cooper v. Union of India (AIR 1970 SC 564)
11. Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P. (1994 SCC (4) 260)
12. Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar (AIR 1979 SC 1369)
13. Ramesh Thapper v. State of Madras (AIR 1950 SC 124)
14. State of Maharashtra v. Chander Bhan (1983) SCC 387
15. Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (AIR 1980 SC 1579)
16. Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa (1993 SCR (2) 581)
17. Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India (1950 SCR 869),
18. P.K. Chakraborty v. D.K. Banerjee (AIR 1972 SC 2069),
19. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (AIR 1984 SC 802),
20. Southeastern Railway Co. v. Lacon (1851 15 QB 60),
21. Municipal Board, Manglaur v. Mahadeoji Maharaj (AIR 1965 SC 1147),
22. State of West Bengal v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights (2010),
23. Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel v. Union of India (AIR 1981 SC 728),
24. Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. M/s. Pratibha Industries Ltd. (2010 SCC Del 1107)
25. R.K. Sharma v. Union of India (2001 SCC OnLine Del 917),

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MADHUSUDAN LAW UN IVERSITY

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Respondent most humbly submits that the Hon'ble High Court of Odisha have the
jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate the instant matter under Article – 226 of the
Constitution 1

Thereby, the Respondent submits this memorial which sets forth the facts and the laws on
which the claims are based.

1
226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs -
(1) Notwithstanding anything in article 32 every High Court shall have powers, throughout the territories in relation
to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government,
within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus,
prohibition, quo warrantor and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part
III and for any other purpose.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Petitioners are very good friends. They have been close to each other since childhood
and continue to be the same till date. One fine evening, both the friends decided to
take a walk across the river in order to collect mangoes from the farm named
"Aquarina".

2. Respondent who is the owner of the farm is a man of morals and principles and
strictly follows the law of the Land. Respondent being an enthusiastic farmer has
planted all sorts of vegetables and fruits and also has cows and buffaloes in the farm.
The milk that was produced from the cows and buffaloes present there in sheds are
being used for producing curd, ghee and other milk products.

3. Petitioners entered the farm of Respondent. They climbed up. the mango trees and
plucked a few mangoes. Then Chulbul climbed the coconut tree and plucked a few
green coconuts. Thereafter they entered into one of the sheds and made themselves a
nice mango shake using the mangoes they plucked, and milk stored in the shed. Then
they chopped the coconuts using the heavy knife that was kept in there. While they
were about to drink the water from it, Respondent caught them.

4. Mr. Ranjit instructed all his guards not to allow Petitioners to leave the premises of
the Farm until and unless they paid compensation for the loss he had incurred because
of them. Both the friends were happily roaming around inside the boundaries of the
farm. The parents of Petitioners have filed a Writ of Habeas Corpus before the Orissa
High Court to free their children from captivity.

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STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1. Is the Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by parents maintainable?

2. Has Respondent held Petitioners captive?
3. Can Respondent Collect money from Radhe and Chulbul?

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1. Is the Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by parents maintainable?

It is pertinent to mention that the Writ of Habeas Corpus filed in the present matter is not
maintainable. As the Writ of Habeas Corpus is only applicable in the cases of unlawful
detention or restraint, in the present the Petitioner were not unlawfully restricted or detained
rather there exist sufficient explanation for which they were detained by the Respondent. The
Writ of Habeas Corpus is a remedy that allows individuals to seek relief from unlawful
detention or imprisonment. The core requirement for this writ to be maintainable is the
existence of illegal detention or an absence of legal grounds for confinement. In this case, the
Petitioners' claim through the Writ of Habeas Corpus seems misplaced because the Petitioners
were not held in detention that violated legal rights. The Respondent 's actions were supported
by a legal basis, namely, the intent to recover damages due to alleged trespass and damage to
property. Rather than being held without cause, the Petitioners were temporarily detained to
account for compensation related to damage on the Respondent ’s property. As such, this does
not satisfy the criteria for unlawful detention required to maintain a Writ of Habeas Corpus.
Therefore, the Writ of Habeas Corpus is arguably not maintainable in this scenario, as the
legal grounds for its applicability are not met.

2. Has Respondent held Petitioners captive?

It is pertinent to mention that the Petitioner were not held captive by the Respondent in the
present matter as there was no use of force or unlawful confinement. The Petitioners were not
restricted beyond the reasonable limits imposed to recover compensation. They were held
within the farm premises because of the trespass and the damages caused by them and to
recover the compensation. The concept of captivity or unlawful confinement typically implies
the use of force or restrictions beyond lawful limits. In this case, the Respondent did not
forcibly confine the Petitioners or restrict them against their will without cause. Instead, they
were asked to remain within the premises due to the need for compensation for damages
caused by the Petitioners’ actions on the Respondent ’s property. The restriction imposed was
limited to the Respondent ’s farm premises, suggesting it was not a punitive or wrongful form
of detention but rather a practical step to address the damages caused by the Petitioners'
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actions. The Respondent had grounds to ask the Petitioners to remain, as their actions had
reportedly resulted in property damage. Therefore, the confinement was reasonable under the
circumstances and did not constitute captivity in the unlawful sense.

3. Can Respondent collect money from Radhe and Chulbul?

It is pertinent to mention that the Respondent has the right to collect the compensation money
because of the damages caused by the Petitioner. The Petitioner trespassed into the
Respondent s property (farm) and caused damages and later on were caught by the
Respondent. Hereby, the Respondent has the right to claim compensation money. The
Respondent has a lawful claim to seek compensation for damages resulting from the
Petitioners’ trespass, under legal principles, individuals who suffer damage to their property
due to trespass are entitled to seek compensation. Since the Petitioners entered the
Respondent ’s property without permission, resulting in damages, the Respondent is within
their rights to request compensation. The purpose of holding the Petitioners on the premises
was to secure the compensation for the damages allegedly caused. This action aligns with the
principle of fair restitution, where a property owner has the right to ensure damages are
compensated. By requesting compensation, the Respondent is acting within a legal
framework intended to mitigate the impact of trespass and damage to property. This is not an
unlawful action but a reasonable response to the harm incurred due to the Petitioners' actions.
Therefore, the Respondent ’s claim to collect compensation from Petitioners is legally valid
and justifiable under the circumstances.

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ARGUMENTS ADVANCE

1. Is the Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by parents maintainable?

It is pertinent to mention that the Writ of Habeas Corpus filed in the present matter is not
maintainable. As the Writ of Habeas Corpus is only applicable in the cases of unlawful
detention or restraint, in the present the Petitioner were not unlawfully restricted or detained
rather there exist sufficient explanation for which they were detained by the Respondent. The
Writ of Habeas Corpus is a remedy that allows individuals to seek relief from unlawful
detention or imprisonment. The core requirement for this writ to be maintainable is the
existence of illegal detention or an absence of legal grounds for confinement. In this case, the
Petitioners' claim through the Writ of Habeas Corpus seems misplaced because the Petitioners
were not held in detention that violated legal rights. The Respondent 's actions were supported
by a legal basis, namely, the intent to recover damages due to alleged trespass and damage to
property. Rather than being held without cause, the Petitioners were temporarily detained to
account for compensation related to damage on the Respondent ’s property. As such, this does
not satisfy the criteria for unlawful detention required to maintain a Writ of Habeas Corpus.
The writ of Habeas Corpus is a legal remedy to address wrongful confinement or detention.
In the present case, the Petitioner are not being held unlawfully but are being rightfully
restrained within the farm's boundaries to ensure payment of compensation for the damage
they caused. The detention is conditional and lawful, as it aligns with the Respondent s right
to recover damages as per the law of the land. In the case of Kanu Sayal vs District
Magistrate, Darjeeling (1973) the Hon’ble Supreme held that in a writ of Habeas Corpus, the
legality of the detention is lawful or examined. If the detention is justified under certain
conditions, the writ is not maintainable. The writ of habeas corpus is a fundamental right
under Article 32 (for the Supreme Court) and Article 226 (for High Courts) of the Indian
Constitution, allowing an individual to seek relief from unlawful detention or restraint.
Habeas corpus is a remedy for immediate release from illegal detention and is available when
a person’s liberty is unlawfully deprived without any legal justification.2

A habeas corpus petition is maintainable only if the petitioner can establish that the person’s

2
Kanu Sayal vs District Magistrate, Darjeeling (1973)
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detention is unlawful, arbitrary, or without a legitimate legal basis. In Sanjay Dutt v. State
through C.B.I., Bombay (II) (1994 SCC (5) 410), the Supreme Court emphasized that the
detention must be without legal justification to warrant habeas corpus. Thus, if the
Respondent ’s restraint of the Petitioners is a lawful response to trespass and actual damage,
the writ would not be maintainable.3 In Mohd. Ikram Hussain v. State of U.P. (AIR 1964 SC
1625), the Court ruled that habeas corpus does not apply when the detention is a reasonable
response to secure property rights, where the property owner’s actions align with the law.4
Since Respondent restriction was intended to secure compensation for actual damage caused
by trespass, this falls within lawful self-help measures, and habeas corpus would be
inapplicable as the detention lacks the element of illegality or arbitrary restraint. A property
owner is entitled to take reasonable measures to protect property rights, including reasonable
restrictions to secure compensation from trespassers. In the case of Ratanlal v. State of
Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1971 SC 778), the Supreme Court upheld that a property owner’s
right to prevent trespassers from leaving until damages are compensated is a lawful exercise
of property rights, provided the response is reasonable and not punitive. 5 Thus, Respondent
restriction does not constitute unlawful detention but rather a legal measure to ensure
accountability for damage done to his property.

Furthermore, habeas corpus is a remedy focused on protecting personal liberty and is not
intended to settle civil disputes or compensate property owners. In Swaran Singh v. State of
Punjab (2000 AIR SC 2017), the Supreme Court clarified that habeas corpus does not apply
when the matter involves property disputes or compensation claims. 6 Since Respondent
restriction is related to compensating for property loss rather than arbitrarily restraining Radhe
and Chulbul, the writ of habeas corpus does not serve as an appropriate remedy for this
situation. The writ of habeas corpus applies when there is a clear use of coercion or force
without legal grounds. In Ashok Johari v. State of U.P. (AIR 1997 SC 187), the Court
underscored that habeas corpus requires an unlawful or forcible detention.7 Here, Respondent
restriction of Petitioners is not coercive but instead serves a reasonable purpose, ensuring
accountability for property loss. This aligns with lawful property rights, making the habeas

3
Mohd. Ikram Hussain v. State of U.P. (AIR 1964 SC 1625)
4
Ratanlal v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1971 SC 778),
5
Swaran Singh v. State of Punjab (2000 AIR SC 2017),
6
Ashok Johari v. State of U.P. (AIR 1997 SC 187),
7
ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla (AIR 1976 SC 1207)
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corpus petition untenable. A key aspect of determining the applicability of habeas corpus is
the nature of the detention. In ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla (AIR 1976 SC 1207), the
Supreme Court recognized that detention must be continuous, arbitrary, and indefinite to
constitute unlawful restraint.8 Here, Respondent restriction was temporary and intended only
to secure compensation, meaning that Petitioners could leave as soon as restitution was made.
This temporary, goal-specific restriction does not meet the requirements for habeas corpus
since it does not amount to indefinite, arbitrary detention. In Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State
of West Bengal (1994) SCC (2) 220, the Court highlighted that reasonable measures taken to
prevent further harm or loss are lawful if they serve a legitimate purpose.9 Respondent actions
are neither punitive nor permanent but aimed at addressing immediate property damage. The
writ of habeas corpus does not extend to such reasonable and proportionate actions.

Moreover, the essence of habeas corpus is to protect personal liberty from state interference.
In Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1965 SC 845), the Court specified that the writ
applies when personal liberty is at risk due to arbitrary state actions. Since this case involves
a property owner’s reasonable action rather than state interference, the habeas corpus writ
does not apply.10 The detention was not arbitrary but was conducted with a legitimate purpose,
rooted in property law principles rather than a breach of personal liberty. In the caseof R.C.
Cooper v. Union of India (AIR 1970 SC 564) emphasized habeas corpus applies primarily
to protect personal liberty from unlawful state action.11 The writ of habeas corpus is not
maintainable in this scenario. The temporary and reasonable restriction imposed by Mr.Papa
Ranjit is in line with the property owner’s rights to protect property interests and ensure
compensation. Habeas corpus, as a remedy, is designed to address unlawful and arbitrary
detention that infringes on personal liberty; it is not intended for matters involving lawful
property restrictions or securing compensation for property loss.

Hence, the Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by the Petitioners is not maintainable in the eyes of
law. The Contentions made by the Petitioners has no relevancy and is purely based on their
assumptions that their children were held captive. The actions of the Respondent stand very

8
ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla (AIR 1976 SC 1207),
9
Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal (1994) SCC (2) 220
10
Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1965 SC 845)
11
R.C. Cooper v. Union of India (AIR 1970 SC 564)

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prudent and reflects nothing but genuine intentions. The writ of habeas corpus does not apply
here as Respondent actions are a lawful exercise of his property rights, focused on obtaining
restitution for actual damage. The measure is temporary, minimal, and lacks any element of
arbitrariness or excessive use of force. Thus, the writ of habeas corpus, which is designed to
prevent violations of personal liberty, is not a suitable remedy, and the claim for habeas corpus
in this case should be deemed non-maintainable.

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2. Has Respondent held Petitioners captive?

It is pertinent to mention that the Petitioner were not held captive by the Respondent in the
present matter as there was no use of force or unlawful confinement. The Petitioners were not
restricted beyond the reasonable limits imposed to recover compensation. They were held
within the farm premises because of the trespass and the damages caused by them and to
recover the compensation. The concept of captivity or unlawful confinement typically implies
the use of force or restrictions beyond lawful limits. In this case, the Respondent did not
forcibly confine the Petitioners or restrict them against their will without cause. Instead, they
were asked to remain within the premises due to the need for compensation for damages
caused by the Petitioners’ actions on the Respondent ’s property. The restriction imposed was
limited to the Respondent ’s farm premises, suggesting it was not a punitive or wrongful form
of detention but rather a practical step to address the damages caused by the Petitioners'
actions. The Respondent had grounds to ask the Petitioners to remain, as their actions had
reportedly resulted in property damage. Captivity, as understood in the context of habeas
corpus law, refers to the unlawful restriction of a person's liberty. A person is held captive if
their movement is restrained through the use of force or coercion without a lawful basis. For
detention to be considered unlawful, it must be unreasonable, unjust, and without legal
justification. In the case of Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P. (1994 SCC (4) 260), the Supreme
Court emphasized that detention must be “reasonable, just, and fair,” underscoring that liberty
cannot be restricted arbitrarily.12 In cases where property owners exercise control over
trespassers to secure restitution, such actions can be considered lawful if they are reasonable
and align with property rights. In the case of Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State
of Bihar (AIR 1979 SC 1369), the Supreme Court held that deprivation of liberty must be
scrutinized within its context, ensuring it serves a legitimate purpose.13 Here, Respondent ’s
restriction on Petitioners was a preventive measure to ensure compensation and does not
equate to wrongful captivity under law. In the case of Ramesh Thapper v. State of Madras
(AIR 1950 SC 124), the Supreme Court of India held that “reasonable restrictions” are
permissible when they serve a legitimate purpose.14 Here, Respondent ’s actions meet the
criteria of reasonableness: they are a minimal response aimed only at securing compensation

12
Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P. (1994 SCC (4)
13
Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar (AIR 1979 SC 1369),
14
Ramesh Thapper v. State of Madras (AIR 1950 SC 124),
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and are not punitive or excessive. He has not imposed any harm or severe hardship on Radhe
and Chulbul, merely instructing them to remain on the property until restitution is paid.

In State of Maharashtra v. Chander Bhan (1983) SCC 387, the Supreme Court permitted
certain temporary restraints on movement to secure justice in cases where compensation was
due. The Court emphasized that measures taken in good faith, proportionate to the harm
caused, and for securing legitimate redress are valid and do not violate personal liberty
principles.15 Therefore, Respondent ’s restriction is justified as it serves the lawful purpose of
protecting his property interests by ensuring Petitioners compliance with compensation.

Further, to constitute unlawful detention, there must be evidence of malicious intent, undue
coercion, or excessive use of force. In the case of Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (AIR
1980 SC 1579), the Supreme Court established that detention should be assessed based on the
16
intent and reasonableness behind it. Here, the Respondent acted without malintent; he
simply required restitution for damages. His actions lack the elements of undue coercion or
intimidation, aligning with a reasonable response under tort law principles. Under the
principles established in the case of Nila Bati Behera v. State of Orissa (1993 SCR (2) 581),
where the Court examined detention that is inflicted without lawful purpose, it was held that
such detention is unlawful if it lacks proper justification. In contrast, Respondent ’s restriction
on Petitioners is narrowly tailored to secure compensation, meeting the lawful justification
threshold. The restraint imposed on them was temporary, proportional, and ceased upon
payment, distinguishing it from any form of wrongful captivity.17

Moreover, based on the above precedents and statutory principles, Respondent ’s actions to
restrict the Petitioners movement within his farm premises are legally justified. The restriction
was necessary to secure compensation, exercised without malice, and proportional to the
actual damage incurred. This response fits within the legal framework protecting property
rights and does not constitute unlawful captivity. By temporarily restricting the Petitioners,
the Respondent balanced his right to protect his property with the principle of personal liberty.
y both statutory law and case law precedent. In Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India

15
State of Maharashtra v. Chander Bhan (1983) SCC 387
16
Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (AIR 1980 SC 1579),
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(1950 SCR 869), the Supreme Court observed that reasonable restrictions to secure
compensation or restitution are lawful, particularly when they are proportionate to the damage
caused.18 In this case, Respondent actions—temporarily restricting Petitioners movement to
collect damages for property loss—are justified as they are minimal, reasonable, and focused
solely on securing his right to compensation. In P.K. Chakraborty v. D.K. Banerjee (AIR
1972 SC 2069), the Supreme Court allowed a form of temporary restraint by property owners
to ensure that individuals causing property damage to remain until restitution or a resolution
is achieved. The Court recognized the owner’s right to take reasonable steps to secure
remedies when unauthorized use or damage to property has occurred. 19 Here, Respondent
restriction of Radhe and Chulbul, which was temporary and conditional upon compensation
payment, is similarly a lawful exercise of his right to secure restitution for property loss.

Hence, based on the principles of property rights, reasonable restriction, and the absence of
malicious intent, Mr. Papa Ranjit’s temporary restriction Petitioners is a lawful measure taken
in response to trespass and actual damage. The restriction does not equate to captivity, and
the Respondent’s actions are justified as they align with the law and established precedent.

18
16
Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India (1950 SCR 869
19
P.K. Chakraborty v. D.K. Banerjee (AIR 1972SC2069_)
2069)
MADHUSUDAN LAW UN IVERSITY

3. Can Respondent collect money from Radhe and Chulbul?

It is pertinent to mention that the Respondent has the right to collect the compensation money
because of the damages caused by the Petitioner. The Petitioner trespassed into the
Respondent s property (farm) and caused damages and later on were caught by the
Respondent. The Respondent has a lawful claim to seek compensation for damages resulting
from the Petitioners’ trespass, under legal principles, individuals who suffer damage to their
property due to trespass are entitled to seek compensation. Since the Petitioners entered the
Respondent ’s property without permission, resulting in damages, the Respondent is within
their rights to request compensation. The purpose of holding the Petitioners on the premises
was to secure the compensation for the damages allegedly caused. This action aligns with the
principle of fair restitution, where a property owner has the right to ensure damages are
compensated. By requesting compensation, the Respondent is acting within a legal
framework intended to mitigate the impact of trespass and damage to property. This is not an
unlawful action but a reasonable response to the harm incurred due to the Petitioners' actions.

Trespass is a civil wrong involving the unauthorized entry onto another person’s property
with or without causing physical harm. It infringes on the property owner's right to exclusive
possession and enjoyment of their property. Trespass is actionable per se (without the need
to prove damages) but becomes especially significant when actual damage to property or
resources occurs. In the case of Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (AIR 1984 SC
802), it was stated that every individual’s property rights must be respected, and any
encroachment or unauthorized use is subject to liability. 20 In the present matter thePetitioners
entered into the Respondent s farm without his permission, thus committing a trespass. They
further escalated the trespass to actionable damage by plucking mangoes, taking coconuts,
and using the milk in the shed for personal use. This unauthorized use of theRespondent s farm
resources represents a clear case of actual damage as it depletes his produce and livestock
output without his consent, warranting compensation. In the case of Southeastern Railway
Co. v. Lacon (1851 15 QB 60), it was held that a trespasser is liable for any damage caused
by their unauthorized entry, highlighting the principle that one cannotbenefit at the expense
of another’s property without consent. 21
Therefore, the unauthorized taking of mangoes, coconuts, and milk directly results in
17
18
Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India (1950 SCR 869
19
P.K. Chakraborty v. D.K. Banerjee (AIR 1972SC2069_)
2069)
MADHUSUDAN LAW UN IVERSITY

financial loss for the Respondent. The value of these resources, which could have been sold
or used for further processing (such as producing milk products), represents tangible
economic harm. This harm justifies not only compensation for the actual goods taken but also
for any associated losses in value. According to the law in question, trespassers causing actual
damage are subject to a base compensation amount and an additional fine of Rs.1,00,000. The
purpose of this statutory fine is to deter trespass and protect the rights of property owners.
The High Court in Municipal Board, Manglaur v. Mahadeoji Maharaj (AIR 1965 SC 1147),
emphasized that fines and damages are legitimate and enforceable remedies for owners
suffering loss from trespass. By appropriating farm resources, the Petitioners not only
infringed the Respondent s property rights but also violated the statutory protection afforded
to property owners. The imposition of the Rs.1,00,000 fine, in addition to compensation for
actual damages, acts as a punitive measure to underscore the seriousness of their unauthorized
actions. The law expressly entitles the Respondent to demand this fine alongside the
compensation amount, ensuring that property owners have sufficient recourse against
trespass. In the case of State of West Bengal v. Committee for Protection of Democratic
Rights (2010), the Supreme Court underscored the fundamental nature of property rights and
affirmed that property owners have a legitimate expectation of redress in cases of
23
infringement. This precedent justifies the Respondent s right to compensation as it aligns
with the principle that property rights are protected under law, and any loss arising from
unauthorized actions must be remedied. The law supports the Respondent s actions to restrict
the Petitioners within his property as a reasonable means to ensure compensation is paid. In
the case of Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel v. Union of India (AIR 1981 SC 728), the Supreme
Court noted that property owners possess the right to seek legal and reasonable measures to
24
enforce compensation from those who infringe upon their property. Here, by temporarily
detaining the Petitioners, the Respondent merely exercised his right to secure compensation,
which is neither excessive nor illegal.

Furthermore, If the Petitioners are allowed to leave without compensation, it would

undermine property rights and set a precedent of tolerance towards trespass, which could lead
to future violations of property without accountability. Therefore, enforcing compensation

22
Municipal Board, Manglaur v. Mahadeoji Maharaj (AIR 1965 SC 1147),
23
State of West Bengal v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights (2010),
24
Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel v. Union of India (AIR 1981 SC 728),
18
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not only remedies the Respondent ’s loss but also upholds the integrity of the law by
emphasizing that trespassers are liable for the damage they cause. In the case of Municipal
Corporation of Delhi v. M/s. Pratibha Industries Ltd. (2010 SCC OnLine Del 1107) the
Delhi High Court emphasized that property owners have a legal right to protect their property
from unauthorized use and damage. The court held that allowing a trespasser to occupy or
cause damage to property without compensating the owner would not only infringe upon the
owner's rights but would also set a harmful precedent, potentially encouraging future
trespassers. This case underscores that compensation is not merely a remedy for loss but a
necessary deterrent, emphasizing accountability and protecting property rights.25
In the case of R.K. Sharma v. Union of India (2001 SCC OnLine Del 917), the Delhi High
Court reaffirmed that damages resulting from trespass must be compensated to preserve the
sanctity of property rights. The court ruled that allowing a trespasser to leave without
compensating for damages would effectively encourage disregard for property rights, making
it crucial to uphold financial accountability for trespass-related losses. This case established
that enforcement of compensation for trespass not only remedies specific loss but also serves
as a preventive measure, reinforcing the legal principle that trespassers are responsible for the
consequences of their actions.26

Hence, based on the above analysis, the Respondent prays for a decision in favor of enforcing
compensation for both actual damages and the statutory fine. Respondent ‘s actions are
legally justified, and his demand for compensation is consistent with statutory and common
law precedents aimed at safeguarding property rights.

25
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. M/s. Pratibha Industries Ltd. (2010 SCC OnLine Del 1107)
26
R.K. Sharma v. Union of India (2001 SCC OnLine Del 917)
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MADHUSUDAN LAW UN IVERSITY

PRAYER

Wherefore in the light of the facts of the case, issues raised, arguments advanced and
authorities cited this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to adjudge and declare that: –

1. Dismiss the Writ of Habeas Corpus on the grounds that Petitioners movement
restriction is a lawful and reasonable measure for securing compensation due to their
trespass.

2. Recognize Respondent ’s right to compensation for the actual damages caused by

Petitioners actions, including the statutory fine.

3. Order Petitioners to pay the compensation amount and additional fine as prescribed
by the law.

AND/OR

Pass any other order it may deem fit, in the interest of justice, equity and good conscience,
and for this, the Respondent as in duty bound, shall humbly pray.

DATE: _____________________________

PLACE: ( COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDANT)

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