A11 (Vansh Bansal)

MEMORIAL FOR APPELLANT
CODE: A11
GUJARAT NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY
INTRA ROUND MOOT COURT COMPETITION, SEPTEMBER 2024
IN THE HONOURABLE SUPREME COURT OF VYOMADESH

Special Leave Petition to appeal (C) NO. 57 Of 2024
Under Article 136 of the Constitution of Vyomadesh, 1956
IN THE MATTER OF
SHRUV RATHEE……..………………………………………….……………..…APPELLANT
v.
BADALNATH MAHARAJ...……………………………….…………….
……........RESPONDENT
1
GNLU INTRA ROUNDS MOOT COURT COMPETITION, SEPTEMBER 2024
~WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT(A11)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS………………………………………………………...4
2. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES………………………………………………………….5
3. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION…………………………………………………6
4. STATEMENT OF FACTS……………………………………………………….…...7
5. ISSUES RAISED…………………………………………………………………........9
6. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS……………………………...…………………..…..10
7. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED…………………………………………………………12
 THAT THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION MUST BE ACCEPTED .

(1) THAT THE SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE HAS NOT BEEN DONE AND THERE IS A GRAVE
MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE.
(2) THAT THE PETITION INVOLVES A SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW.
 THAT THE TORT OF DEFAMATION IS NOT ESTABLISHED AGAINST THE APPELLANT.

(1) THAT THE STATEMENT WAS NOT DEFAMATORY BUT TRUE.
(2) DEFENCES APPLICABLE IN FAVOUR OF APPELLANT AGAINST TORT OF DEFAMATION.
A. FAIR OPINION
B. PUBLIC INTEREST AND GOOD FAITH
C. INNOCENT DISSEMINATION
(3) THAT RESPONDENT IS A PUBLIC FIGURE AND MUST TOLERATE GREATER SCRUTINY.
 THAT THE DIRECTION TO REMOVE VIDEO IS VIOLATIVE OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
EXPRESSION.
(1) THAT THE RESTRICTIONS TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH & EXPRESSION DOES NOT APPLY TO
THIS CASE.
(2) THAT THE HIGH COURT DID NOT APPLIED TEST OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE PRESENT
CASE.
2
 THAT THE PRACTICES PERFORMED BY THE RESPONDENT ARE NOT PROTECTED UNDER
THE GARB OF RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION.
(1) THAT RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION IS SUBJECT TO CERTAIN RESTRICTIONS AND IS
NOT ABSOLUTE.
(2) THAT ARTICLE 21 INCLUDES ACCESS TO BASIC NECESSITIES SUCH AS HEALTH & FOOD.
8. PRAYER……………………………………………………………………………………28
3
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Abbreviations Expansions
(C) Case
& And
AIR All India Reporter
Anr. Another
Art. Article
cl. Clause
Co. Company
Const. Constitution
Hon’ble Honorable
Id. Ibidium
Ltd. Limited
Mfg. Manufacturer
Mr. Mister
No. Number
no. number
Rs. Rupees
SLP Special Leave Petition
UOI Union of India
v. Versus
4
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
BOOKS
1. Akshay Sapre, Ratanlal & Dhirajlal Law of Torts (Lexis Nexis 2023)
CASES
1. Amna Bint Basheer v. CBSE, AIR 2016 SC 6813.

2. Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 1308.
3. Arnab Goswami vs. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 2386.
4. Bennet Coleman & co. v. UOI, AIR 1973 SC 106.
5. Commissioner of Police v. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta, AIR 1984 SC
512.
6. Consumer Action Group v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2000 SC 3060.
7. Durga Shankar Mehta v. Raghuraj Singh, AIR 1954 SC 520.
8. Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, AIR 2018 SC 243.
9. Pritam Singh v. The State, AIR 1950 SC 169.
10. R S Nayak v. A R Antulay, AIR 1988 SC 1531.
11. R. Rajgopal v. State Of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1995 SC 264.
12. Rohini Singh v. state of Gujarat, AIR 2019 SC 2378.
13. S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal, AIR 2010 SC 3196.
14. Shayara Bano v. Union of India, AIR 2017 SC 4609.
15. Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, AIR 2015 SC 1523.
16. Sir Chunilal Mehta & Sons Ltd. V. Century Spinning & Mfg. Co. Ltd, AIR 1962 SC
1314.
CONSTITUTION
1. The Constitution of India,1949
STATUTES
1. Defamation Act,1952, No.6, Acts of Parliament,1952(India)

5
2. Information Technology Act,2000, No.66, Acts of Parliament,2000(India)
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Appellant humbly submits this Petition for Special Leave to Appeal under Article 136 of
the Constitution of Vyomadesh. In the present case, the Appellant seeks special leave to
appeal against the impugned final judgment and order dated August 7, 2024, passed by the
High Court of Rudrashtra, wherein the court held the Appellant liable for defamation and
directed the removal of the video dated June 14, 2024, from SelfTube, in violation of the
Appellant's fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression as guaranteed under
Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of Vyomadesh.
The jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court is therefore invoked under Article 136 of the
Constitution of Vyomadesh.
6
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. The archipelago of Vyomadesh boasts of its ancient and rich cultural heritage.
Though multiple religions were practiced there, the majority population practiced a
religion called Vyomism.
2. The primary theme of Vyomism revolved around nurturing the body well so that a
person remains healthy to do his or her duties, as prescribed in the ancient texts, and
finally achieve liberation.
3. The primary theme was practiced in a diverse manner across the islands with various
sects and subsects, one of which was the “Hazari” sect which propounded the
principle of being subservient to all saints who shall function as the representative of
Supreme lord.
4. Shruv Rathee, a graduate from Vyomadesh Institute of Medical Sciences, started his
own channel at Selftube in 2013 with an aim to upload content related to general
awareness and history of the world, especially Vyomadesh.
5. After covering about a issue about Vyomadesh Medical Entrance Test by making a
video on it, Shruv Rathee started making videos of these types of issues which did not
catch any significant attention of general public otherwise.
Date Table of Events
May 21,2024 Tarsandas Mooljee published an article alleging the

possibility of young boys being made to work 10-12
hours for the personal chores of Maharaj at Vyomi
Ashram.
Between May21,2024 Shruv Rathee travelled to Hazariganj and spoke with

& June 14,2024 families of boys staying there and with the boys who
resided there for a considerable period of 6-12 months.
June 14,2024 Shruv Rathee published a video titled “Truth about

Vyomi Ashram” covering history of vyomism attached
with visuals and audio clips of his interaction with young
boys and their families.
June 25,2024 Badalnath Maharaj approached High Court alleging the

7
tort of defamation and claimed damages to tune of Rs.

Ten crores.
June 26,2024 The trial commenced as the High Court of Rudrashtra

exercised ordinary original jurisdiction.
August 7,2024 The High Court pronounced its judgement holding Shruv
Rathee liable for defamation and ordered him to pay
damages of Rs. 5 crores to Mr. Badalnath Maharaj and
further ordered Selftube to immediately erase the video.
August 14,2024 Shruv Rathee, aggrieved by the erasure of video filed a

special leave petition before Supreme Court of
Vyomadesh to overturn the judgement by High court of
Rudrashtra.
8
ISSUES RAISED
1. Whether the special leave to appeal against the judgment dated August 7, 2024,
passed by the High Court of Rudrashtra ought to be granted by the Supreme
Court of Vyomadesh?
2. Whether the tort of defamation stands established against the Petitioner?
3. Whether the direction to remove the video dated June 14, 2024, is void for being
violative of the right to freedom of speech and expression as guaranteed in the
Constitution of Vyomadesh?
4. Whether the activities conducted by the Respondent warrant no interference as

they stand protected under the right to freedom of religion as guaranteed in the
9
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
 THAT THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION MUST BE ACCEPTED.

(1) THAT THE SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE HAS NOT BEEN DONE AND THERE IS A GRAVE
MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE.
In the present case the High Court did not took into notice the aspect of public
interest being served by the video. The appellant researched everything in his
limits so as to confirm about the authenticity of the allegations of exploitation
of young boys at Vyomi Ashram. He was not negligible on his part to know
the right facts and the real truth and only acted in good faith.
The counsel hereby pleads the hon’ble Supreme Court to grant the Special
leave petition so as to stop the grave injustice being done with both the young
boys and the appellant Shruv Rathee.
(2) THAT THE PETITION INVOLVES A SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW.
The case involves a conflict between the right to freedom of speech and
expression and the right to protect one’s reputation, This creates a substantial
question of law regarding the proper boundaries and balance between these
two rights. A substantial question of law would arise whether the High Court
has applied the law of defamation correctly in the given circumstances and
more so in regard to public figures, specifically religious heads.
 THAT THE TORT OF DEFAMATION IS NOT ESTABLISHED AGAINST THE APPELLANT.
(1) THAT THE STATEMENT WAS NOT DEFAMATORY BUT TRUE.
In the present case, the appellant with due care searched about the authenticity of facts
and then published the video in public interest of saving the young boys from being
exploited. The appellant travelled from Vyomapuri to Hazariganj for on-site
investigation, Spoke with families of boys staying at the Vyomi Ashram, Interacted
with boys who had stayed at the Ashram for 6 months to a year, recorded audio clips
and visuals during his research and did everything in his limits without any
negligence on his part.
(2) THAT CERTAIN DEFENCES ARE APPLICABLE IN FAVOUR OF APPELLANT AGAINST
TORT OF DEFAMATION.
The defenses of fair comment, public interest and innocent dissemination are
applicable in favor of the appellant absolving him the liabilities. The respondent must
10
also be subject to greater scrutiny being a public figure. The video made by appellant
should also be restored as it will lead to setting up of a wrong precedent for the
persons who report matters of public interest and general awareness.
 THAT THE DIRECTION TO REMOVE VIDEO IS VIOLATIVE OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH
AND EXPRESSION.
(1) THAT THE RESTRICTIONS TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH & EXPRESSION DOES NOT APPLY TO
THIS CASE.
Article 19(2) of the Constitution limits freedom of speech and expression by allowing
the State to impose "reasonable" restrictions on some grounds. The counsel pleads
before the court that the video published by the petitioner comes under none of the
above-mentioned restrictions, and with regards to the restriction of defamation, the
court may refer to issue no. 2 of the memorial.
(2) THAT THE HIGH COURT DID NOT APPLIED TEST OF PROPORTIONALITY IN PRESENT
CASE.
According to principle of proportionality, the petitioner’s complete removal of the

video is disproportionate to the alleged harm, especially when less restrictive
measures were available. The video "The Truth about the Vyomi Ashram" should be
seen as a legitimate from of journalism and criticism as it was created to reveal the
truth.
 THAT THE PRACTICES PERFORMED BY THE RESPONDENT ARE NOT PROTECTED
UNDER THE GARB OF RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION.
(1) THAT RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION IS SUBJECT TO CERTAIN RESTRICTIONS AND
IS NOT ABSOLUTE.
That the Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of religion, allowing

individuals and groups to freely profess, practice, and propagate their faith. This
right is fundamental; however, the exercise of this right is not absolute and may be
subject to limitations. The involvement of minors in religious practices,
particularly those that may affect their health, education, or well-being, raises
significant legal and ethical questions.
(2) THAT ARTICLE 21 INCLUDES ACCESS TO BASIC NECESSITIES SUCH AS HEALTH &
FOOD.
That the right to life with dignity under Art. 21 involves not just physical survival
but also access to basic necessities such as food, shelter, health care, and
11
education. Children must be protected from conditions of abuse, exploitation, and

neglect that undermine their dignity. Forcing children to the tasks of the Ashram is
unconstitutional. These practices by the respondent does not constitute as
essential religious practices and violates their freedom to health under Art. 21.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
1. Whether the special leave to appeal against the judgment dated August 7, 2024,
passed by the High Court of Rudrashtra ought to be granted by the Supreme
Court of Vyomadesh?
1. It is humbly submitted before the Honorable Supreme Court that the Special leave
petition filed by the appellant against the decision of Hon’ble High court of
Rudrashtra be granted.
2. That the Provision for Special Leave to Appeal has been provided in Article
136(1) of the Indian Constitution(mutatis mutandis to Vyomadesh Constitution),
which states:
“Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its

discretion grant special leave to appeal from any judgement, decree,
determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any
Court or tribunal in the territory of India.”1
3. That in Pritam Singh v. The State2, The Supreme Court held that although, Art.
1363 is an exceptional power, but it confers a discretionary overriding power of
widest amplitude on this Court, which is meant to be exercised on the
consideration of justice, call of duty and eradicating injustice. If it is shown that
special circumstance exists, where substantial and grave injustice has been done
then SLP can be entertained.
1
INDIA CONST. art. 136, cl. 1.
2
Pritam Singh v. The State, AIR 1950 SC 169.
3
Id. At 12.
12
4. That the appeal raises important points of law especially in relation to

Constitutionality of right to free speech and expression and protection of religious
feelings.
5. That in Durga Shankar Mehta v. Raghuraj Singh4 , the Supreme Court

emphasized its wide discretion to intervene under Article 136 of the Indian Const.5
(mutatis mutandis to Vyomadesh Constitution), which allows the Court to hear
appeals from any judgment or order when it finds that a lower court or tribunal's
decision resulted in a miscarriage of justice or involved substantial legal
questions.
6. The Appellant humbly submits before the Hon’ble Supreme Court (hereinafter
SC) that the SC must consider the Special Leave Petition filed by Shruv Rathee
(hereinafter Appellant ) and allow for its Acceptance on the following grounds:
I. That substantial justice has not been done and there is a grave injustice done with
the appellant(reasons for which are discussed in i.).
II. That the petition does involve a substantial question of law(reasons for which are
discussed in ii.).
I. That substantial justice has not been done and there is a grave injustice done
with the appellant.
7. That in Bennett Coleman & Co. v. UOI (1972)6, the Supreme Court has
pronounced that freedom of speech is the basis of the democratic setup, and
therefore, any attempt to limit this right cannot be done without a satisfying
reason.
In R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu (1994)7 also, The Supreme Court
substantiated the same about the freedom of speech & expression.
4
Durga Shankar Mehta v. Raghuraj Singh, AIR 1954 SC 520.
5
Supra note 1,at 12.
6
Bennet Coleman & co. v. UOI, AIR 1973 SC 106.
7
R. Rajgopal v. State Of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1995 SC 264.
13
8. That in the present case the High Court (hereinafter HC) did not took into notice
the aspect of public interest being served by the video. The appellant researched
properly and did everything in his limits so as to be confirm about the authenticity
of the allegations of exploitation of young boys at vyomi ashram. He was not
negligible on his part to know the right facts and the real truth and only acted in
good faith.
9. That this decision of High Court would have a chilling effect on the freedom of
speech & expression and would set out a wrong precedent for other news reporters
and content creators who serve in public interest and make videos for general
awareness and to protect the rights of citizens from being exploited.
10. That in R S Nayak v. A R Antulay 8 , SLP under Art. 136 was sought by A.R.
Antulay on several grounds, including the argument that the fine imposed was
excessive and punitive beyond the scope of justice. He argued that the quantum of
the fine was not only harsh but also out of proportion to the offense he was
convicted of. The Supreme Court, upon reviewing the case, considered the
principle of proportionality. It was observed that penalties must correspond to the
gravity of the offense.
11. That in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020)9, the Supreme Court of India
emphasized the principle of proportionality in restrictions on free speech, stating:
"Any restriction on the freedom of speech and expression must be

necessary and proportionate to the aim sought to be achieved."
12. That the High Court also failed to follow the principle of proportionality in its
judgement by removing the whole video instead of removing a part of it which
may seem to be defamatory and also the damages of Rs. 5 crores are not
proportionate.
8
R S Nayak v. A R Antulay, AIR 1988 SC 1531.
9
Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 1308.
14
13. That in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) 10, The Supreme Court
accepted the SLP and even struck down the section 66A of Information
Technology Act, 2000, so as to protect the violation of fundamental right to
Speech & Expression.
II. That the petition does involve a substantial question of law.
14. That in the case of Sir Chunilal Mehta & Sons Ltd. v Century Spinning &
Mfg. Co. Ltd.11, Court evolved the test to determine whether a substantial
question of law is involved. The tests are: (1) whether directly or indirectly
it affects substantial rights of the parties, or (2) the question is of general-
public importance.
15. That the case in-hand has nexus with right to life and right against
exploitation which has bearing on public at large so this matter passes the
test of ‘substantial question’.
16. That the case involves a conflict between the right to freedom of speech
and expression and the right to protect one’s reputation, This creates
a Substantial question of law regarding the proper boundaries and balance
between these two rights.
17. Another Substantial legal question revolves around the balance between
the right to freedom of religion and the public’s right to be informed about
possible misconduct. The High Court ruled that practices of respondent
were protected by his religious rights. However, the video by appellant
exposed potential exploitation of minors, which raises questions about
whether such religious practices should be immune from public scrutiny
and legal intervention.
10
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, AIR 2015 SC 1523.
11
Sir Chunilal Mehta & Sons Ltd. V. Century Spinning & Mfg. Co. Ltd, AIR 1962 SC 1314.
15
18. That the case throws up an important legal question as to how the law of
defamation will apply to public figures. Badalnath Maharaj, being the head
of a religious sect, is subject to higher threshold of public criticism, more
so in view of the contents of Rathee's video dealing with matters of public
interest. A substantial question of law would arise whether the High
Court has applied the law of defamation correctly in the given
circumstances and more so in regard to public figures, specifically
religious heads.
19. The counsel hereby pleads the hon’ble Supreme Court to grant the Special
leave petition so as to curb the grave injustice done with the appellant
Shruv Rathee and stop the exploitation of young boys.
16
That if the SC exercises its discretion and allows for Appeal, the Appellant submits to the
Court to take into consideration the following arguments.
2. Whether the tort of defamation stands established against the Appellant ?
20. That Civil Defamation refers to any false statement published that harms the
reputation of an individual, organization, or group.
The essentials for the following can be deduced from the definition itself that:
a. The statement must be false and must refer to the plaintiff.

b. The statement must be published.
c. The statement must cause a harm to reputation of plaintiff.
21. That in the present case the second essential is definitely established and maybe
there can be a loss to his reputation also but the first essential of statement being
false is not true in the present case. In the present case, the appellant with due care
searched about the authenticity of facts and then published the video in public
interest of saving the young boys from being exploited.
22. That here are certain defences too for the tort of defamation out of which the ones
applicable in this case are:
a. Fair comment(opinion)
23. This defence applies when the statement in question is an opinion or criticism,
rather than a factual assertion. It must be a fair and reasonable comment on a
matter of public interest.
17
24. That in the present case the video made by the appellant presents a mix of factual
information and opinions based on disclosed facts, which is protected speech
under Art.19 of Indian Constitution.12
25. In Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015)13, the Supreme Court of India
emphasized that the freedom of speech and expression includes the right to
criticize and express personal opinions. It is humbly submitted that the Petitioner's
video, being a critique of certain religious practices, is at the core of protected
speech.
26. That in Arnab Goswami vs. Union of India 14, Arnab Goswami cruelly criticized
the government, still the Supreme Court observed that Arnab’s statements fell
within the purview of protected criticism under Article 19(1)(a) and did not
crossed the line into prohibited speech under Article 19(2).15
27. That Sec. 6 of Defamation Act, 1952 provides that “ In an action for the tort of
defamation in respect of words consisting partly of allegation of fact & partly of
expression of opinion , a defence of fair comment shall not fail by reason only that
the truth of every allegation of fact is not proved if the expression is a fair
comment having regard to such of the facts alleged or referred to the words
complained of as proved”.
b. The video was made in the public interest and in good faith.
28. That in Rohini Singh v. state of Gujarat 16(Gujarat High Court, 2018), it was noted
that opinions expressed in good faith regarding public conduct are protected. This
principle indicates that if the video critiques public figures or addresses public
issues, it may be justified under the good faith exception.
12
INDIA CONST. art. 19.
13
Supra note 10, at 14.
14
Arnab Goswami vs. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 2386.
15
16
Rohini Singh v. state of Gujarat, AIR 2019 SC 2378.
18
29. That in the present case, The Petitioner’s video comes under fair criticism and
public good as the issue affects the interest of children who are forced to do the
personal chores of the Respondent in the name of religion. This leads to violation
of Article 21 of Right to Life and Liberty of young boys.17
30. In S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal18, the Supreme Court held that freedom of speech
and expression includes the right to express controversial opinions on matters of
public interest and
‘we must practice tolerance of the views of others. Intolerance is as much

dangerous to democracy as to the person himself.’
The case highlighted that the legal standards for defamation must not overly
restrict public discourse which the High court clearly failed to do.
31. That the Petitioner conducted thorough research before making the video,
demonstrating good faith. The appellant travelled from Vyomapuri to Hazariganj
for on-site investigation, Spoke with families of boys staying at the Vyomi
Ashram, Interacted with boys who had stayed at the Ashram for 6 months to a
year, recorded audio clips and visuals during his research and did everything in his
limits without any negligence on his part.
32. That the comments of the Appellant were objectively fair, as he was firstly
intrigued by the article of Mr. Tarsandas Mooljee, and then he further researched
into the allegations. He went to the Hazariganj district and researched about the
ground reality there. These facts clearly strengthen the point that the comments he
made were objectively fair.
17
INDIA CONST. art. 21.
18
S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal, AIR 2010 SC 3196.
19
c. Innocent Dissemination
33. Innocent Dissemination is a defence to defamation that applies to individuals or

entities who distribute defamatory material without knowledge of its defamatory
content and without any direct involvement in the creation or publication of the
material and were not negligent on their part to discover the truth.
34. That in the present case, The appellant made the video after reading the article by
Tarsandas Mooljee about the exploitation of young boys of age 9-15 years and
made every possible effort to substantiate the truth from travelling to Vyomapuri
to talking to the families of the aggrieved children.
That the Respondent is a Public Figure and Must Tolerate Greater Scrutiny
35. That the respondent is a well-known and influential religious leader, making him a
public figure. In civil defamation suits involving public figures, the threshold for
proving defamation is significantly higher. Public figures must accept a greater
degree of criticism and scrutiny because of their prominent role in society.
36. That in this case, the appellant, as a social commentator and content creator, was
exercising his right to raise awareness about issues concerning a public institution
(the Vyomi Ashram) run by a prominent public figure. In civil defamation law, it
is generally recognized that criticism of public figures is permissible, especially
when based on factual reporting.
20
37. In R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu19, the Court acknowledged that public
figures cannot claim defamation unless malice is proven—that is, unless the
statements were made with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the
truth.
38. The appellant made no false statements and did not act with malice. His
statements were based on credible evidence, and his intent was to inform the
public about a matter of public concern—the welfare of young boys at the
Ashram. As a result, the respondent’s status as a public figure shields the
appellant’s comments from being classified as defamation.
39. The counsel therefore Pleads before the Hon’ble Supreme Court to overturn the
Judgement passed by the High Court of Rudrashtra and absolve him from the
liability to pay damages of Rs. 5 crores to the appellant. The video made by the
appellant should also be restored as it will lead to setting up of a wrong precedent
for the persons who report matters of public interest and general awareness.
19
21
3. Whether the direction to remove the video dated June 14, 2024, is void for being
violative of the right to freedom of speech and expression as guaranteed in the
40. The High Court’s order to remove the video violates the fundamental rights of the
petitioner, specifically article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution(mutatis mutandis
to Vyomadesh Constitution).20Censoring the content that is of public interest and
is based on factual reporting and personal opinions could have chilling effect on
free speech, discouraging people from engaging in critical discussions on social
issues.
41. In Shreya Singhal v. Union of India21, the Supreme Court emphasized the
importance of protecting free speech, especially regarding the digital age which
was clearly undermined by the order to remove the video by the High Court.
42. That there are certain restrictions which the law can impose on rights under
article19[1]. Article 19(2) of the Indian Constitution (mutatis mutandis to
Vyomadesh Constitution)22limits freedom of speech and expression by allowing
the State to impose "reasonable" restrictions on the below mentioned grounds:
a. Sovereignty and integrity of State.
b. Security of State.
c. Friendly relations with foreign states.
d. Public order.
e. Morality or decency.
f. Contempt of court.
20
21
22
Id. at 22.
22
g. Defamation.
h. Incitement to an offence.
The counsel pleads before the court that the video published by the petitioner
comes under none of the above-mentioned restrictions, and with regards to the
restriction of defamation, the court may refer to issue no. 2 of the memorial.
43. In Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020)23, the Supreme Court of India
emphasized the principle of proportionality in restrictions on free speech, stating:
‘The doctrine of proportionality is not foreign to the Indian Constitution,

considering the use of the word ‘reasonable’ under Article 19 of the Constitution.
In a catena of judgments, this Court has held “reasonable restrictions” are
indispensable for the realisation of freedoms enshrined under Article 19, as they
are what ensure that enjoyment of rights is not arbitrary or excessive, so as to
affect public interest’.
44. That for any restriction on speech to be justified, it must satisfy the dual tests of
necessity and proportionality. The principle of proportionality mandates that a
restriction on a fundamental right should be the least restrictive measure available
and must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and necessity must be
justified on the basis of objective evidence and is the first step before assessing
proportionality. This approach ensures that the restriction serves a pressing social
need and directly addresses the specific harm intended to be prevented.
45. Applying this principle, the petitioner’s complete removal of the video is
disproportionate to the alleged harm, especially when less restrictive measures
were available.
46. That in S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal & Anr24, The Court held that expressions of
opinion, even if they are controversial or provoke strong reactions, must be
23
24
23
protected under free speech unless they directly incite violence or disrupt public
order. This case reinforced the principle that criticism or controversial opinions,
especially on social issues, are protected under the right to free speech. The Court
emphasized that reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2) of Indian
Constitution25 should not be used to stifle public discourse on social issues.
47. That as a religious leader, Mr. Badalnath Maharaj holds a position of public
authority and, as such, is subject to public scrutiny. The public has a legitimate
interest in knowing whether such figures are involved in unethical practices,
especially when they impact the lives of vulnerable individuals like minors.
48. That the video "The Truth about the Vyomi Ashram" should be seen as a
legitimate from of journalism and criticism as it was created to reveal the truth. It
should warrant strong protection under the Constitutional guarantee of freedom of
speech and expression.
49. That the petitioner conducted on-ground research, presenting audio clips from the
interviews with affected families and boys who had stayed at the ashram, included
historical context on Vyomism and quoted religious scriptures. This suggests an
attempt to provide factual investigation and shows sheer commitment to expose
the potential wrongdoings against minors, which shows that the video was a form
of valid journalism rather than a mere attack.
50. These cases shows that the courts have consistently recognized the importance of
such journalism in uncovering wrongdoings, especially when it involves matters
of public interest like the treatment of minors in religious institutions. Therefore,
petitioner’s video should be seen as a legitimate form of journalism and criticism
that warrants constitutional protection.
25
24
51. That it is respectfully prayed that the Hon'ble Court recognizes that The removal
of entire video is a disproportionate and excessive response with regards to gravity
of the issue and the removal of the entire video by High Court is void .
4. Whether the activities conducted by the Respondent warrant no interference as

they stand protected under the right to freedom of religion as guaranteed in the
52. That the Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of religion, allowing
individuals and groups to freely profess, practice, and propagate their faith. This
right is fundamental; however, the exercise of this right is not absolute and may be
subject to limitations.
53. In Commissioner of Police v. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta26the court

held that
‘In order that the practices in question should be treated as a part of religion
they must be regarded by the said religion as its essential and integral part;
otherwise even surely secular practices which are not an essential or an
integral part of religion are apt to be clothed with a religions form and may
make a claim for being treated as religions practices within the meaning
of Art. 26. Similarly even practices though religions may have sprung from
merely superstitious beliefs and may in that sense be extraneous and
unessential accretions to religion itself. Unless such practices are found to
constitute an essential and integral part of a religion their claim for the
protection under Art.26 may have to be carefully scrutinised, in other words,
the protection must be confined to such religious practices as are an essential
and integral part of it and no other’.
This shows that practices that are not an integral part of religion do no warrant
protection under religious freedom.
26
Commissioner of Police v. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta, AIR 1984 SC 512.
25
54. That in Consumer Action Group v. State of Tamil Nadu(2000)27,every individual

right including fundamental right is within Reasonable limit but if it makes
inroads into public rights leading to Public inconvenience, It has to be curtailed to
that extent.
55. That in Amna Bint Basheer v. CBSE(2016)28 SC held that while Right to Freedom
of Religion & to manage religion affairs of any denomination is undoubtly a
fundamental right, the same is subject to public order, morality and health.
56. That the involvement of minors in religious practices, particularly those that may
affect their health, education, or well-being, raises significant legal and ethical
questions. The right to religious freedom cannot be used in a manner that
compromises the rights and welfare of minors, who are entitled to special
protection under the law.
57. That in Shayara Bano v. Union of India29 case, SC held that certain religious
practices can be struck down, even if they have sanctity in the religion if they are
against constitutional morality. This shows that even if the practices at the Vyomi
Ashram have some religious sanction, they go against constitutional principles of
child welfare and should not be protected.
58. These cases shows that the alleged practices regarding minors in Vyomi Ashram
are not essential to the Vyomism religion. These practices are in direct conflict
with the fundamental rights and therefore do no warrant protection under the right
to freedom of religion and calls for state intervention to regulate or prohibit these
practices given their implications.
59. That the right to life with dignity under Art. 21 of Indian Constitution(mutatis
mutandis to Vyomadesh Constitution)30 involves not just physical survival but
also access to basic necessities such as food, shelter, health care, and education.
27
Consumer Action Group v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2000 SC 3060.
28
Amna Bint Basheer v. CBSE, AIR 2016 SC 6813.
29
Shayara Bano v. Union of India, AIR 2017 SC 4609.
30
26
Children must be protected from conditions of abuse, exploitation, and neglect

that undermine their dignity.
60. That in the case of Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala
(2018)31, the court applied a doctrinal prohibition test to examine whether the ban
qualified as an essential religious practice under Article 25. Since there was no
scriptural evidence of such a prohibition, the court concluded it was not an
essential practice. Exclusion due to biological reasons was held to be
unconstitutional. Similarly, if we apply the doctrinal test to the present case, it can
be observed that there is not any mention of a text in the Vyomshastra that
prescribes forcing children to do laborious chores in the Ashram even if it gives
them mental stress and trauma. Forcing children to the tasks of the Ashram is
unconstitutional.
61. That from the above stated facts, cases and arguments, we can deduce that these
practices by the respondent does not constitute as essential religious practices and
violates their freedom to health under Art. 21 of Indian Constitution(mutatis
mutandis to Vyomadesh Constitution)32.
31
Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, AIR 2018 SC 243.
32
27
PRAYER
Wherefore, considering the questions raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, the
Appellant requests the Honorable Supreme Court of Vyomadesh to:
1. Allow for the acceptance of the Special Leave Petition filed by the Appellant under
Art.
136(1) of the Constitution.
2. Overturn the judgement of High Court of Rudrashtra dated August 7,2024 holding the
appellant liable for tort of defamation and to pay damages of Rs. 5 crores.
3. Reinstate the video dated June 14,2024 removed from Selftube after judgement of
High court.
And/or,
Pass any other order that this Hon’ble Supreme Court of Vyomadesh may deem fit in the
interest of equity, justice and good conscience. And for this act of kindness, the counsel shall
duty bound forever pray.
In respectful submission before the Supreme Court of Vyomadesh,
Counsel on behalf of the Republic of Vyomadesh (Appellant).
28

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MEMORIAL FOR APPELLANT

GUJARAT NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

INTRA ROUND MOOT COURT COMPETITION, SEPTEMBER 2024

IN THE HONOURABLE SUPREME COURT OF VYOMADESH

~WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT(A11)

 THAT THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION MUST BE ACCEPTED .

(2) THAT THE PETITION INVOLVES A SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW.

 THAT THE TORT OF DEFAMATION IS NOT ESTABLISHED AGAINST THE APPELLANT.

 THAT THE DIRECTION TO REMOVE VIDEO IS VIOLATIVE OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND

THE GARB OF RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION.

(1) THAT RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION IS SUBJECT TO CERTAIN RESTRICTIONS AND IS

AIR All India Reporter

SLP Special Leave Petition

UOI Union of India

1. Amna Bint Basheer v. CBSE, AIR 2016 SC 6813.

1. The Constitution of India,1949

1. Defamation Act,1952, No.6, Acts of Parliament,1952(India)

2. Information Technology Act,2000, No.66, Acts of Parliament,2000(India)

Date Table of Events

May 21,2024 Tarsandas Mooljee published an article alleging the

Between May21,2024 Shruv Rathee travelled to Hazariganj and spoke with

June 14,2024 Shruv Rathee published a video titled “Truth about

June 25,2024 Badalnath Maharaj approached High Court alleging the

tort of defamation and claimed damages to tune of Rs.

June 26,2024 The trial commenced as the High Court of Rudrashtra

August 14,2024 Shruv Rathee, aggrieved by the erasure of video filed a

2. Whether the tort of defamation stands established against the Petitioner?

4. Whether the activities conducted by the Respondent warrant no interference as

 THAT THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION MUST BE ACCEPTED.

According to principle of proportionality, the petitioner’s complete removal of the

UNDER THE GARB OF RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION.

(1) THAT RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION IS SUBJECT TO CERTAIN RESTRICTIONS AND

That the Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of religion, allowing

education. Children must be protected from conditions of abuse, exploitation, and

“Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its

4. That the appeal raises important points of law especially in relation to

5. That in Durga Shankar Mehta v. Raghuraj Singh4 , the Supreme Court

"Any restriction on the freedom of speech and expression must be

II. That the petition does involve a substantial question of law.

2. Whether the tort of defamation stands established against the Appellant ?

a. The statement must be false and must refer to the plaintiff.

‘we must practice tolerance of the views of others. Intolerance is as much

33. Innocent Dissemination is a defence to defamation that applies to individuals or

‘The doctrine of proportionality is not foreign to the Indian Constitution,

4. Whether the activities conducted by the Respondent warrant no interference as

53. In Commissioner of Police v. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta26the court

54. That in Consumer Action Group v. State of Tamil Nadu(2000)27,every individual

Children must be protected from conditions of abuse, exploitation, and neglect

Appellant requests the Honorable Supreme Court of Vyomadesh to:

In respectful submission before the Supreme Court of Vyomadesh,

Counsel on behalf of the Republic of Vyomadesh (Appellant).

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