40

Chapter 4

Obstacles to Achieving the Sustainable

Development Goals: Emerging Global
Challenges and the Performance of the
Least Developed Countries

Carl Dahlman and Sam Mealy

4.1 Introduction
The least developed countries (LDCs) are defined as low-income developing countries
suffering from severe structural obstacles to sustainable development (UNDESA,
2015a). Indicators of such obstacles include a low level of human assets and high
vulnerability to economic and environmental shocks. Nearly half the population of
the 48 LDCs—some 400 million people—remain in extreme poverty, compared with
less than a quarter in any other developing country (UNCTAD, 2015). The headline
commitment of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is to eradicate global
poverty by 2030. Improving the prospects of the LDCs will play a crucial role in this.
This chapter argues that, despite relatively fast economic growth, the track record of
LDCs graduating from their category has been poor, with only four graduating since
1971. Moreover, the LDCs are facing a new set of interrelated global challenges that
will hamper further progress. If the SDGs are to be met, the international community
must ratchet up development efforts to help equip the LDCs for prosperity in an
increasingly constrained development context.
This chapter pursues its argument in two sections. First, it outlines global challenges
across six domains—economic, demographic, technological, environmental, security
and governance—that have significant implications for LDCs in achieving the SDGs.
Second, it explores the implications for the international community and for LDCs,
as well as for development strategies more generally, of an increasingly constrained
development context.

4.2 Challenges to meeting the SDGs

The period 2000–2015 was generally one of robust economic growth for the LDCs.
From 2002 to 2008, for the group, gross domestic product (GDP) grew at an average
rate of more than 7 per cent. This represented the strongest and longest period of
sustained growth achieved by these countries since 1970 (UNCTAD, 2010). Although,
this growth slowed somewhat after 2010, it remained strong, averaging around 5 per
cent in the period 2010–2015 (UNCTAD, 2015). This rapid economic growth has
translated into better outcomes in terms of improving human assets and reducing
susceptibility to economic and environmental shocks.
Obstacles to Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals 41

Despite this progress, the LDCs as a group cannot be expected to meet most of the
SDGs unless critical action is taken. This argument is based on three key factors:
first, the LDCs’ historical record of graduating from their category and meeting
the previous Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) has not been stellar. In the
40 years since the LDC category was established, the Committee for Development
Policy (CDP) recommended only seven countries for graduation, and found another
two countries eligible for graduation (Kawamura, 2014). While the pace of LDCs
graduating/being found eligible to graduate has accelerated since 2000, it has not
been nearly fast enough to meet the Istanbul Programme of Action (IPoA) target or
the MDGs. Moreover, the SDGs and their related indicators are more comprehensive,
more universal in scope and more ambitious in magnitude than the MDGs. For
example, SDG 1 is to ‘by 2030, eradicate poverty for all people everywhere, currently
measured as people living on less than USD 1.25 a day’ (UNDP, 2016). As such, they
will be more difficult to attain.
Second, the LDCs failed to meet the MDGs and the targets for graduation during
a period of unprecedented economic growth (2000–2015), when they on average
out-performed other developing countries. They now face a significantly more
constrained development context in which they must progress towards the SDGs.
The global economic outlook is one of secular stagnation: growth in China is slowing,
global output is reduced, the favourable commodity super cycle has come to an end,
interest rates are rising and it is becoming increasingly difficult to access international
finance.
Third, LDCs face a set of interconnected global challenges—economic, technological,
demographic, environmental, security and governance-wise—that will hamper
seriously their prospects of achieving the SDGs. Compounding the more pessimistic
economic outlook are income inequality, automation, jobless growth, demographic
imbalances, climate change-related shocks, political instability and security threats
and weakened domestic governance. Underpinning all of these challenges is that,
despite the progress LDCs have made on reducing their vulnerability, they remain
the most susceptible to economic and environmental shocks. Moreover, these
shocks have the potential to proliferate between now and 2030, and their associated
costs will fall disproportionately on the LDCs. Taken together—the poor historical
performance of the LDCs, the worsening economic climate and the emergence of
new global challenges—these factors will limit LDC progress towards achieving the
SDGs unless serious action is taken, both domestically as well as by the international
community. The remainder of this section explores the emergence of a series of global
challenges pertinent to this discussion.

4.2.1 Economic
Economic convergence between the advanced and emerging countries is slowing
down: the gap in the economic growth rate between Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) and non-OECD countries has narrowed
in the past decade. This is compounded by the slowing growth of China (Figure 4.1),
whose previously rapid growth benefited neighbours and suppliers, in particular
exporters of natural resources, such as the LDCs (OECD, 2014b).
42 Achieving the Istanbul Programme of Action by 2020

Figure 4.1 Actual and projected slowing growth

Source: Datamapper (2016).

The slowdown in LDC growth since 2010 can be attributed partly to their
dependence on commodity exports and falling commodity prices. All commodity
price indices, including food, agricultural raw material, mineral ores and metals and
crude petroleum, declined between 2012 and 2015 (UNCTAD, 2015). Falling prices
were a result of weakening demand, oversupply (following overinvestment during
the preceding decade of higher prices), an appreciating dollar and unusually large
harvests (World Bank, 2015a). Decreasing demand from the US following the gains
made by fracking and other deposits, as well as the Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries’ decision not to reduce production, has pushed down oil prices.
LDC reliance on commodities has also resulted in a pro-cyclical investment strategy,
leaving them vulnerable to price fluctuations. Almost one quarter of LDCs (11) are
highly dependent on natural resource rents as an engine of growth and are thus
especially susceptible to commodity price shocks (Table 4.1).1
Slowing growth and falling commodity prices are compounded by the prospect of
jobless growth. GDP and employment growth trends have been diverging over the
past two decades in almost all countries, including the major OECD economies,
the BRIICS (Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China and South Africa) and certain
low-income countries, such as Ghana and Bangladesh (Figure 4.2) (OECD, 2015a).
Jobless growth is thought to be a significant global risk for the coming decade
(WEF, 2015).
Income inequality, both across and within countries, was also on the rise. In 2015,
the poorest 66 per cent of the world’s population were estimated to receive just 13
per cent of global income, while the richest 1 per cent received nearly 15 per cent.
Approximately 50 per cent of the world’s wealth is owned by 1 per cent of the global
population (OECD, 2015a). Of the 27 LDCs with data pertaining to their Gini
Obstacles to Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals 43

Table 4.1 LDCs are highly dependent on non-renewable natural resources

Country Non-renewable natural resource rents (% of GDP)
Equatorial Guinea 53.3
Mauritania 41.9
Angola 34.6
South Sudan 25.8
Chad 23.3
Congo, Dem. Rep. 21.1
Eritrea 18.8
Zambia 16.6
Yemen, Rep. 15.7
Burkina Faso 13.7
Lao PDR 10.3
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Development Indicators (2016c).

coefficient available, 12 have worsened in terms of income inequality since the early
2000s (World Bank, 2016c).
This more constrained economic environment is making international finance more
difficult to come by for the LDCs. Real bilateral official development assistance
(ODA) from OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members has
stagnated since 2010 (UNCTAD, 2015). While foreign direct investment (FDI) to
LDCs grew rapidly during the 2000s, it has stagnated since 2010. Moreover, FDI
inflows are concentrated in a few key resource-rich countries. Mozambique, Zambia,
Tanzania, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Haiti accounted for
58 per cent of total FDI to the LDCs in 2014 (ibid.). Although extractive industries in

Figure 4.2 Jobless growth occurring in LDCs: Bangladesh

Source: World Development Indicators (2016c) and ILO Employment Trends (2015).
Notes: Indexed GDP (constant 2005 US$), total employment and total labour force, 1991=100
(LHS); labour force participation rate, total in % of total population ages 15–64 (RHS).
44 Achieving the Istanbul Programme of Action by 2020

LDCs will continue to attract foreign investment, accessing the levels of international
finance required to help meet the SDGs will be problematic.

4.2.2 Technology
Technology has been responsible for significant productivity increases throughout
human history and technological adoption and penetration have contributed to
economic convergence between advanced and emerging countries. Technology also
poses risks, however. Automation may accelerate the trend of jobless growth. The rise
of processing power and digital information has enabled computers to increasingly
perform both routine manual and routine cognitive tasks more cheaply and effectively
than people. Moreover, skill-biased technological change is exacerbating income
inequality trends. The income and wealth gains the digital revolution has generated
are increasingly accruing to capital owners and the highest-skilled workers. Over the
past three decades, labour’s share in output has shrunk globally from 64 to 59 per cent
(The Economist, 2014).
The prospect of digital technologies and automation worsening income disparities
and disrupting society is relevant to developing countries too. Nike used 106,000 fewer
contract workers in 2013 than in 2012 because it is ‘shifting toward automation,’ even
in lower-margin countries such as China, Indonesia and Vietnam (McAfee, 2014).
The rise of 3D printing and additive manufacturing has the potential to re-localise
parts of the production process and shorten global supply chains, with significant
implications for jobs in low-value added manufacturing activities in developing
countries. These trends are contributing to ‘premature deindustrialisation’ and mean
developing countries need to think carefully about where they want to position
themselves in global value chains (Rodrik, 2013). This implies a particular challenge
for developing regions with fast-growing working-age populations, such as South
Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, which may be less able to employ the millions of job
entrants in emerging basic manufacturing industries.

4.2.3 Demography
The world will experience large-scale demographic transitions over the next 50 years.
Working-age populations will expand rapidly in low-income countries, particularly
in Africa and South Asia (Figure 4.3). Africa in particular has experienced a rapid
decrease in child mortality combined with high fertility rates, contributing to a
population explosion. The LDCs have experienced a growing share of the total
global population but their share of global GDP has not matched this (Figure 4.4).
Meanwhile, LDCs will continue to experience sustained population growth figures
until 2050 (Figure 4.5).
Countries with a high ratio of non-dependants to dependants can enjoy a ‘demographic
dividend’. A country’s capacity to exploit this demographic dividend, however, relies
on its capacity to employ the growing youth bulge in the labour force. Sub-Saharan
Africa’s labour force is expanding by about 8 million people per year; South Asia’s by
12 million per year (World Bank, 2012). There should be around 600 million more
jobs in 2020 than in 2005 in order to maintain the world’s ratio of employment to
Obstacles to Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals 45

Figure 4.3 Working-age populations are expected to grow substantially in

low-income countries

Source: UNDESA World Populations Prospects: The 2012 Revision, www.esa.un.org/wpp

Figure 4.4 LDCs’ population and GDP share of world total

Source: Author’s calculations based on UNCTAD (2015), IMF Datamapper (2015) and http://
esango.un.org/sp/ldc_data/web/StatPlanet.html

Figure 4.5 LDCs will experience sustained population growth figures

(annual %)

Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Bank Health Nutrition and Population Statistics:
Population estimates and projections 2016.
46 Achieving the Istanbul Programme of Action by 2020

working-age population (ibid.). However, the gap between actual employment and
the working-age population is significant, and is growing in several regions; it may
reach about 200 million in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2030 (ibid.). Such a youth bulge and
employment gap may cause significant social and political problems if left untended.

4.2.4 Environment
Environmental degradation and GDP growth are tightly and negatively correlated
(van Zanden et al., 2014) and climate change is expected to reduce economic growth
in most regions (Figure 4.6). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) estimates that the global mean temperature will increase by 0.5–1.2 degrees
Celsius between 2015 and 2035 (IPCC, 2014). Significant portions of plant and
animal species face extinction risks as a result. The frequency of natural hazards,
such as floods, droughts, typhoons and hurricanes, is already increasing because of
climate change. The number of people exposed to droughts is expected to increase
by 9–17 per cent in 2030 and 50–90 per cent in 2080. The number exposed to river
floods is expected to increase by 4–15 per cent in 2030 and 12–29 per cent in 2080
(World Bank, 2016a). Coastal systems and low-lying areas are at increasing risk from
sea level rise, which will continue for centuries even if the global mean temperature
is stabilised (IPCC, 2014). People living in LDCs are disproportionately at risk from
climate change-related shocks. LDCs suffered 1.3 million climate-related deaths from
1980 to 2013, accounting for 51 per cent of global casualties, although they are home
to only 12 per cent of the world’s population (IIED, 2013).
Climate change poses a significant threat to food security: fisheries productivity and
wheat, rice and maize production in tropical regions will be severely challenged.

Figure 4.6 Climate change will reduce economic growth in most regions
(OECD projection of regional economic impact (in % of GDP) owing to
climate change)

Source: OECD (2014b).

Obstacles to Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals 47

Water scarcity will become increasingly prevalent in light of the projected reduction in
renewable surface water and groundwater resources. Climate change is also expected
to affect human health by compounding existing health problems and diseases, such
as malaria and diarrhoea.
Poorer people suffer disproportionately from climate-related shocks. In the absence of
rapid and inclusive development policies, climate change could result in an additional
100 million, mostly based in LDCs, living in poverty by 2030 (World Bank, 2016a).
Meeting the SDGs is highly unlikely under such a scenario.

4.2.5 Security
Security and peace are essential for development. Yet 1.5 billion people live in countries
affected by conflict. Inter-state conflict is one of the most important global risks in
terms of its high likelihood and probable negative impacts (WEF, 2015). Globally,
forced displacement has been accelerating, reaching unprecedented levels. By the end
of 2014, conflict, persecution and human rights violations had forcibly displaced 59.5
million people worldwide (UNHCR, 2015). The burden of these displaced peoples
falls disproportionately on low-income countries and LDCs. Developing regions
hosted 86 per cent of the world’s refugees in 2014, whereas the LDCs hosted 25 per
cent in 2014—some 3.6 million refugees (ibid.). Meanwhile, political instability and
violence continue to blight many LDCs (Figure 4.7).
Persistent conflicts in many low-income countries have negative impacts on
development, as the rise in poverty in such countries demonstrates. For example,
countries that experienced major violence between 1981 and 2005 had average
poverty rates 21 percentage points higher than in countries that experienced no
violence (World Bank, 2011). Moreover, the negative externalities of conflicts spill

Figure 4.7 Perceptions of political stability and absence of violence/

terrorism remain high in the LDCs

Source: World Bank (2015b).

Note: Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions of the likelihood
of political instability and/or politically motivated violence, including terrorism. Estimate of
governance ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance.
48 Achieving the Istanbul Programme of Action by 2020

over to other countries: neighbouring countries host 75 per cent of refugees (UNHCR,
2015). Moreover, while inter-state conflicts have declined, new forms of security risks
have emerged. Terrorism has become an increasingly salient problem for advanced
countries and LDCs since 9/11. The rise of rogue terrorist groups, such as Al-Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al-Shabaab
in Somalia, is making governance in already fragile states increasingly difficult. All
these groups are propagating conflict beyond their origin countries.

4.2.6 Governance
The final global challenge is one of governance. Several significant challenges to
governance have emerged worldwide, including bureaucracies’ reluctance to change,
an institutional ‘silo’ mentality and the weakness of subnational entities. Public
trust in governments has stagnated and fallen in many places over recent decades.
Moreover, the governments of LDCs face greater financial constraints and find it
increasingly difficult to carry out programmes of action with reduced mandates from
the citizen body. The World Governance Indicators project estimates that government
effectiveness—perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy
formulation and implementation and the credibility of the government’s commitment
to such policies—has deteriorated rapidly since the early 2000s (Figure 4.8).
Another way of assessing the governance prospects of the LDCs is through the concept
of fragility. A total of 31 of the 48 LDCs are defined as ‘fragile states’ as classified by an
OECD composite index (OECD, 2015b).2 These are countries whose governmental

Figure 4.8 Perceptions of government effectiveness in LDCs have been

declining

Source: World Bank (2015b).

Note: Estimate of governance ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance
performance.
Obstacles to Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals 49

effectiveness, regulatory quality and accountability are weak. The OECD’s composite
list of fragile states is partly based on the Fund for Peace’s Fragile States’ Index (FSI).3
Of the 38 most fragile states on the 2015 FSI—marked as on ‘very high alert’, ‘high
alert’ and ‘alert’—26 are LDCs (Table 4.2). Moreover, a critical portion of LDCs have
become more fragile over time. Since the Fund for Peace began compiling its index
in 2005, 13 LDCs have experienced ‘worsening’, ‘significant worsening’ or ‘critical
worsening’ in their fragility indices (Fund for Peace, 2015).
These governance issues should be cause for concern. Meeting the SDGs will require
significant domestic resource mobilisation, in terms of generating government
revenues, coordinating and implementing programmes and evaluating progress.
Several LDCs lack such effective government capacity and are thus at risk of falling
further behind in their development.
The challenges outlined above are of course not discrete. Rather, they interact with one
another in complex and often mutually reinforcing ways. For example, automation and
skill-biased technological change may widen disparities in the income distribution
and contribute to a worsening economic environment. Moreover, the democratic
youth bulge in many LDCs will place pressure on economies already struggling to
create sustainable jobs in large numbers. The negative effects of climate change will
interact with and exacerbate the other challenges, causing additional economic,
governance and security problems. It is important to emphasise that a significant
portion of the burden of these global challenges falls disproportionately on the LDCs,
and this has severe implications for whether or not they can meet the SDGs.

4.3 Implications for the international community and

development strategy
This chapter has highlighted the difficulty in achieving the SDGs for the LDCs.
This is based on their historical record of graduation from the LDC category, the
more pessimistic global economic outlook they now face and the emergence of a
set of global challenges particularly problematic for their development context. It
is important to recognise that the ultimate objective is development, and the SDGs
are just one mechanism by means of which to gauge progress towards this. However,
because of their universality of scope and unprecedented magnitude of ambition,
they do represent a significant departure from previous development frameworks
and deserve to be treated seriously. It is thus imperative that the LDCs and the
international community realise that a ‘business as usual’ approach will be insufficient
to meet the SDGs. Detailing a comprehensive framework for how the LDCs can
achieve the SDGs is beyond the remit of this chapter. That said, the remainder of this
section sketches what steps the international community and the LDCs can take to
put themselves on a path to success.

4.3.1 Increase the total allocation of ODA to LDCs and improve

ODA targeting
ODA to LDCs has stagnated since 2010. Moreover, it has become increasingly
unevenly distributed, with significant portions going to countries based on
50 Achieving the Istanbul Programme of Action by 2020

Table 4.2 LDCs are among the world’s most fragile states
Ranking Country Fragility Index 2015 Status since 2006
Very High Alert
1 South Sudan* 114.5 Some worsening
2 Somalia* 114 Worsening
3 Central African Republic* 111.9 Significant worsening
4 Sudan* 110.8 Some improvement
High Alert
5 Congo (D. R.)* 109.7 Marginal change
6 Chad* 108.4 Some worsening
7 Yemen* 108.1 Worsening
9 Syria 107.9 Significant worsening
8 Afghanistan* 107.9 Worsening
10 Guinea* 104.9 Some worsening
11 Haiti* 104.5 Marginal change
12 Iraq 104.5 Strong improvement
13 Pakistan 102.9 Marginal change
14 Nigeria 102.4 Some worsening
15 Cote d’Ivoire 100 Strong improvement
16 Zimbabwe 100 Strong improvement
Alert
17 Guinea Bissau* 99.9 Critical worsening
18 Burundi* 98.1 Marginal change
19 Niger* 97.8 Significant worsening
20 Ethiopia* 97.5 Some worsening
21 Kenya 97.4 Significant worsening
21 Liberia* 97.3 Some improvement
23 Uganda* 97 Marginal worsening
24 Eritrea* 96.9 Significant worsening
25 Libya 95.3 Critical worsening
26 Mauritania* 94.9 Some worsening
27 Myanmar* 94.7 Some improvement
28 Cameroon 94.3 Some worsening
29 North Korea 93.8 Some improvement
30 Mali* 93.1 Critical worsening
31 Sierra Leone* 91.9 Strong improvement
32 Bangladesh* 91.8 Some improvement
33 Congo (Republic) 90.8 Some improvement
34 Sri Lanka 90.6 Marginal change
34 Timor-Leste* 90.6 Some improvement
36 Nepal* 90.5 Some improvement
37 Rwanda* 90.2 Some improvement
38 Egypt 90 Marginal worsening
Note: LDCs are marked with an asterisk. Source: Fund for Peace (2015).

geostrategic imperatives. Between 2003 and 2012, 22 per cent of all OECD ODA was
allocated to Afghanistan and Iraq (OECD, 2015b). Per capita ODA is also unevenly
distributed across LDCs, heightening the risk of ‘aid orphans’—countries that are
potentially under-aided and thus at risk of being left further behind.
Obstacles to Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals 51

4.3.2 Improve the quality of aid distribution and test innovative aid
modalities to LDCs
The ultimate objective of aid to LDCs is to develop local capacity until it is no longer
required as a financing mechanism. As such, ODA should reward national reforms
that enhance domestic resource mobilisation, enable multi-sectoral approaches, build
trust and quality (not just quantity) of public services, extend the use of technology
among the poorest and most vulnerable people and scale up South–South, regional
and triangular cooperation (OECD, 2015b).

4.3.3 Adapt traditional aid modalities, such as sector and budget

support, to more specific LDC contexts
This could include supporting national ownership and capacity-building by
distributing aid through national systems (OECD, 2015b).

4.3.4 Ease access to international finance and agree on quantifiable

targets for mobilising additional sources of finance beyond aid
This includes increasing LDCs’ own domestic revenues, making international
commitments to raise support for public financial management, reducing the
transaction cost of remittances and a new global partnership to stem illicit financial
flows.

4.3.5 Help LDCs tap existing global knowledge as well as develop new
knowledge relevant to their needs
Ultimately, aid and international finance will go only so far. The key to long-term
cross-national income convergence is the widespread adoption of policy knowledge
and existing technology (Comin and Ferrer, 2013). While the pace of technology
adoption across developing countries and LDCs has been increasing in recent years,
its widespread penetration within countries has been slowing down. In addition,
there is rapid development of new digital technologies that disrupt existing ways of
operating as well as providing new possibilities to leapfrog to produce and deliver
goods and services more efficiently (OECD, 2015, 2016b). Moreover, equally large
disruptions and potential are possible with rapid advancement in biotechnology as
well as new materials (OECD, 2016a). It is therefore important to help developing
countries tap into existing knowledge as well as to help prepare them to take advantage
of new technological development rather than being left behind. This requires deep
technical expertise and policy knowledge, and institutional capacity with which to
select and use relevant knowledge and technologies. This in turn requires significant
investment in education. To accelerate this process, the international community
should invest heavily in knowledge exchange programmes with LDCs, open up public
data platforms and share intellectual property and expertise on key technologies
around climate change mitigation, disease prevention, agricultural productivity and
new manufacturing technologies.
52 Achieving the Istanbul Programme of Action by 2020

4.3.6 Address specific LDC challenges

The SDGs are to be lauded for their universality. However, the international
community should not forget that the LDC category exists because these countries
face a specific set of obstacles to development, as well as challenges unique to each
member of the group. Two of the challenges outlined in this chapter stand out in
particular: demographic changes and vulnerability to climate-related shocks. Several
LDCs face an explosion in their working-age populations in coming decades.
This youth bulge can provide a demographic dividend if harnessed carefully.
However, widespread political unrest and economic instability could result if sound
development policies on universal education, female empowerment and job creation
are not put in place. LDCs are also more exposed to flooding, droughts and famines
and more vulnerable to their effects, and possess less capacity to prevent and manage
those effects. Mitigating the effects of climate change in LDCs will be a key task in
the short run, while the long-term prevention of climate change will be instrumental
to their sustainable development. LDC private sector capacity can be built through
access to established global funds for climate change mitigation.
This chapter has highlighted the difficulties facing the LDCs in meeting the SDGs
based on their historical record of graduating and meeting the MDGs, the more
challenging economic environment in which the SDGs must be attained, and the
emergence of a set of global challenges that will hamper their progress if not addressed
rigorously. It should be a call to renewed and heightened action by the international
community and the LDCs to mobilise the resources and develop the institutional
capacity necessary to meet these emerging development challenges.

Notes
1 High dependency on non-renewable natural resources is defined as a country’s
total non-renewable natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP exceeding 10
per cent.
2 The OECD began reporting on official development assistance (ODA) flows
specifically to a group of conflict-affected and “fragile states” in 2005 based on
an annually revised composite list drawn from the World Bank and the African
and Asian Development Bank Harmonised List and the Fund For Peace’s Fragile
States Index (FSI) (formerly the Failed States Index).
3 The FSI is a composite index that covers 178 countries and is based on 12
main social, economic and political indicators: social (demographic pressures,
refugees and internally displaced persons, group grievance, human flight and
brain drain), economic (uneven economic development, poverty and economic
decline), political (state legitimacy, public services, human rights and rule of law,
security apparatus, factionalised elites, external intervention).

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