GAME THROUGH OPERATION RESEARCH M Saranya Assistant Professor, Department of Mathematics, Rathinam College of Arts and Science, Coimbatore, TamilNadu, India
ABSTRACT This paper analyzes risk-taking on serve to maximize a player’s chances of winning a point on the second serve by either serving a common low risk second serve (with a high second serve percentage) or a high risk second serve by decreasing the second serve percentage but increasing the proportion of points won if the second serve goes in. The notion of “importance” of points is defined and there is evidence to suggest that servers could be encouraged to take more risk on the more “important” points. Key words: Operations Research, Pay off matrix, strategy (pure and mixed).
Cite this Article: M Saranya, A Study on Game Theory in Tennis Game Through Operation Research, International Journal of Advanced Research in Engineering and Technology (IJARET), 8 (6), 2018, pp 137-141. http://iaeme.com/Home/issue/IJARET?Volume=8&Issue=6
1. INTRODUCTION Operations research (OR) is an analytical method of problem-solving and decision-making that is useful in the management of organizations. In operations research, problems are broken down into basic components and then solved in defined steps by mathematical analysis • Identifying a problem that needs to be solved. • Constructing a model around the problem that resembles the real world and variables. • Using the model to derive solutions to the problem. • Testing each solution on the model and analyzing its success. • Implementing the solution to the actual problem.
2. OPTIMAL PROBABILITIES • A (p1 p2 p3) =A (0, 1, 0) • B (q1, q2, q3) =B (0, 1, 0) • In pure strategy there will be 1. Here the strategy is one.So, it’s a pure strategy.
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A Study on Game Theory in Tennis Game Through Operation Research
3. MIXED STRATEGY • In mixed saddle point doesn’t exist. • If there is no saddle point we have another method to solve it. • V=[(a11)(a22)]-[(a21)(a12)]/[(a11)+(a22)]-[(a12)+(a21)] • P1 = (a22)-(a21)/[(a11 )+(a22)]-[(a12)+a21] • Q= [(a22)-(a12)]/[(a11)+(a12)]-[(a12)+(a21)] Given in one n game, multiple players strategy set as 1 s , , n s , every player payoff as 1 u , , n u , all are functions define in 1 2 n s s s , we record the game as＝{ 1 s , , n s ； 1 u , , n u } In concrete terms, every player i simultaneous choose their strategy i i s S from respective strategy set, here i n =1,2,.., .After 1 s , , n s all making selections, every player i will real function. As Figure 1 show the two people game. Among them, 1 1 1 1 2,,, m s is player 1 all counter measures, 2 2 1 1 2,,, m s is player 2 all counter measures, In square,, nm nm a b respectively representative player 1 payoff to player 2, put nm a payoff on the bottom left of square, put nm b payoff on the upper right of square, as Figure 1.
3.1 Player A: Column and Player B: Row
Table 1 Two people game matrix representation a11, b11 a12,b22…………. a1n,b1n a21,b21 a22,b22………..... a2n,b2n a31,b31 a32,b32………….. a3n,b3n
Nash equilibrium is basic theory in game theory. It is introduced under absolute dominant strategy and relative dominant strategy. Nash equilibrium refers to the game that player single changing strategy cannot get benefit. Nash equilibrium isn’t payoff itself but caused payoff strategy combination. Players apply tactics in court is actually a game, one party players have variety of tactics that can be used, while the opponent players also have variety of tactics that can be used, two parties each tactic confrontation will lead to different results, and each party hopes to get benefit from it that is a kind of typical game process. According to above game theory principle, we apply it into tennis tournament tactics selection process. At first, use a、b 、c respectively represent player x (player) tactical selection (strategy), use A 、B、C、D respectively represent player y tactics selection. ‘+, －’(payoff) shows player x tactics selection success, ‘－, +’shows player y tactics selection success, two parties tactics selection success analysis is as Figure 2-2shows, such one permutation matrix is called two people game payoff matrix (payoff matrix), the formed game is called matrix game. In concrete terms, player x adopts some kind of service tactics( as external angle forward spin and so on)would have several payoff, (gain low quality receive, gain high quality receive, passive receive directly ace and so on) use square bottom left corner ‘－or ’to express(it can also give concrete values according to corresponding ratios).Player y according that served ball have several receive strategies(pull forward spin overhead, smash straight line ball, smash crosscourt, smash down- the-middle shot and so on), similarly it also has several payoff( ace, fail etc.), use square top right corner ‘－or+’ to express. Therefore, 2 people game result has following 12 types (as Figure 2). Combine with game theory and tennis tournament features, we think tennis tournament tactics game possess following basic features, it can be regarded as 2 people (team) zero-sum game; decision-making time is quite short; most game is ‘ Nash equilibrium’ game. Therefore, game theory has a certain guiding significance on tennis tactics research.
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3881000
M Saranya
3.2 Player X: Column and Player Y: Row
Table 2 Tennis player x and y tactics selection operation A B C D -,+ -,+ +,- +,- +,- +,- -,+ +,- +,- +,- -,+ -,+ Consider the following example in a Tennis match,
Figure 1
3.3 The potential pure strategies for the server can be analysed as follows: • If the server always aims forehands (F) then the receiver (anticipating the forehand serve) will always move forehands and the payoffs will be (90,10) to receiver and server respectively. • If the server always aims Backhands then the receiver (anticipating the backhand serve) will always move backhands and the payoffs will be (60,40). However, the server will choose neither (1) nor (2) if he/she wants to win the serve. Thus, the server can increase his/her performance by mixing forehands and backhands.For example, suppose the server aims forehand with 50% chance and backhands with 50% chance. Then the receiver's payoff is • 0.5*90 + 0.5*20 = 55 if the receiver moves forehands and • 0.5*30 + 0.5*60 = 45 if the receiver moves backhands. Since it is better to move forehands, the receiver will do that and the payoff will be 55. Hence, if the server mixes 50-50 the payoff will be 45, which is already an improvement for the server's payoff. The next step is to see if we can find a best mix-strategy for the server. Suppose the server aims forehands with q probability and backhands with 1-q probability. Then calculating the receiver's payoff we get: (1). q*90 + (1-q)*20 = 20 + 70q if the receiver moves forehands and (2). q*30 + (1-q)*60 = 60 - 30q if the receiver moves backhands. The receiver will move towards the side that maximize his/her payoff. Therefore, the receiver will move: • (1). forehands if 20 + 70q > 60 - 30q, • (2). backhands if 20 + 70q < 60 - 30q, and • (3). either one if 20 + 70q = 60 - 30q.
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3881000
A Study on Game Theory in Tennis Game Through Operation Research
• So the receiver's payoff = max {20 + 70q, 60 - 30q}.
• In order to maximizing the server's payoff, he/she should minimize the receiver's payoff. The server can do this by setting 20 + 70q and 60 - 30q equal: • 20 +70q = 60 - 30q so that 100q = 40 and q = 0.4. The server should aim forehands 40% of the time and backhands 60% of the time. In this case, the receiver's payoff will be 20 + 70*0.4 = 60 - 30*0.4 = 48. Hence, the server's payoff will be 100-42=52. We can use the similar method to analyze the mix-strategy for the receiver. Suppose the receiver moves forehands with probability p. Then the receiver's payoff is: • p*90 + (1-p) *30 = 30 + 60p if the server aims forehands and • p*20 + (1-p) *60 = 60 - 40p if the server aims backhands. In this situation, the server will aim towards the side that minimizes the receiver's payoff. Hence, the server will aim at: • forehands if 30 + 60p < 60 - 40p • backhands if 30 + 60p > 60 - 40p • either one if 30 + 60p = 60 - 40p. So the receiver should equate 30 + 60p and 60 - 40p to maximize the payoff: • 30 + 60p = 60 - 40p so 100p = 30 and p = 0.3 The receiver should move forehands 30% of the time to maximize the payoff and backhands 70% of time. In this case the receiver's payoff will be 30 + 60*0.3 = 60 - 40*0.3 = 48. The server's payoff will be 100 - 48 = 52. After calculating the payoff for both the server and the receiver, the mixed strategy came out to be: • Receiver: 0.3F + 0.7B • Server: 0.4F + 0.6B And this is the only strategy that cannot be "exploited" by either player.
4. OBSERVATION There is an important observation that found by many mathematicians who study mixed- strategy of tennis: If a player is using a mixed strategy at equilibrium, then he/she should have the same expected payoff from the strategies he/she is mixing. Based on this observation, we can easily find mixed-strategy Nash Equilibrium in a 2*2 game. Let's find the mixed-strategy Nash Equilibrium of the following game which has no pure strategy Nash Equilibrium.
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3881000
M Saranya
In this example, let p be the probability of player 1 playing U and q be the probability of player 2 playing L at mixed-strategy Nash Equilibrium.
5. CONCLUSION Although research has shown that players in a tennis match should constantly adapting his/her mixed-strategy Nash Equilibrium to gain more payoff, it is much harder to find a mixed-strategy Nash Equilibrium in because of the mental portion of the game. But it is important for us to get the idea that either player can do better by choose a mixed-strategy than pure strategy. In this post, I only focus on how mixed-strategy Nash Equilibrium applied to tennis match. Game theory can also applied to whether or not to challenge the line call during a tennis game. I provided some useful links for further reading. All in all, many people have mixed opinions about tennis, but for me it is just a purely enjoyable sport. Through research, it found that tennis competitive process had both dynamic game and static game. In tennis competitive game, tactics selection and tactics applying process essence and features were that it had tactics actions successive occurred sequential game and also strategy actions simultaneous occurred simultaneous game; in tennis tournament tactics selection and application in sequential game process, it could apply roll back backward induction, pursuing optimal strategy so as to get maximum payoff. In tennis tournament tactics application process, game strategy principle that player should apply was giving play to its strong points and avoiding its shortcomings, positively utilizing dominant strategy, avoiding dominated strategy. Game phenomenon widely existed in tennis tournaments, this paper’s research only got involved in tournament partial tactical game aspects researching, suggested other scholars and experts to make more deeply researches, excavate game theory deepen application in tennis tactical aspect, establish a set of relative systematical tennis tournament game theory frame. Suggested tennis coaches and players to learn and improve game theory level and apply game strategies selection method into practical tournaments.
REFERENCES [1] Zhang B.; International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Statistics
[2] Zhang B.; Yue H. International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Statistics, 2013,
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