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visible deeds of music
visible deeds of
m u s i ca r t and music from
wagner to cage
simon shaw-miller
yale university press
new haven & london
Copyright © 2002 by Yale University. All rights reserved. This book may not be reproduced,
in whole or in part, including illustrations, in any form (beyond that copying permitted by
Sections 107 and 108 of the U.S. Copyright Law and except by reviewers for the public press),
without written permission from the publishers.
Small sections of Chapter 1 appeared in the review essay ‘‘Sounding Out,’’ Oxford Art
Journal 20, no. 1 (1997), 105–9. A section of Chapter 2 appeared as ‘‘Skriabin and
Obukhov—Mysterium and La Livre de vie: The Concept of the Total Work of Art,’’ in
Consciousness, Literature and the Arts 1, no. 3 (December 2000; e-journal:
www.aber.ac.uk/tfts/journal/december/skria.html). An earlier version of Chapter 3 appeared
as ‘‘Instruments of Desire: Musical Morphology in the Early Work of Picasso,’’ Musical
Quarterly 76, no. 4 (Winter 1992), 442–64. An earlier version of Chapter 6 appeared as
‘‘Concerts of Everyday Living’’: Cage, Barthes and Fluxus: Interdisciplinarity and Inter-
Media Events,’’ in a special number of Art History, entitled Image-Music-Text 19, no. 1
(March 1996), 1–25. Music examples 5.3–5.8 were created by Robert Michael Weiss and first
published in the catalogue Josef Matthias Hauer, 80 Jahre Zwölftonmusik (Kulturamt der
Stadt Wiener Neustadt, 1999) for the J. M. Hauer exhibition in Wiener Neustadt, April 1999.
They are reproduced by courtesy of Josef Matthias Hauer Studio Robert Michael Weiss,
Vienna. Music example 5.12 was made for this publication by Robert Michael Weiss,
transcribed from the first recording made by Victor Sokolowski on LP Phillips 6599
333 (1973).
Designed by Nancy Ovedovitz and set in Times Roman with Meta types by Tseng
Information Systems, Inc. Printed in the United States of America by Edwards Brothers, Inc.
The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Committee
on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Council on Library Resources.
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Dedicated to a most harmonious sound:
‘‘LA!’’
(Lindsey and Aniella)
and a silence:
in memoriam
(John Raisin, 1938–1999)
contents
Preface ix
Acknowledgments xiii
Notes 245
Index 283
preface
The absolute arts are a sad modern impertinence. Everything is falling apart.
There is no organization to foster all the arts together as Art.
—Friedrich Nietzsche
The relationships between music and visual art in the first half of the twentieth
century are the subject of this book. From Richard Wagner to John Cage, I ex-
plore a number of themes that emerge in the consideration of modernism on the
nexus of sight and sound, the spatial and the temporal. This work is not an at-
tempt to cover all instances of art and music’s interrelations in this extraordinary
period. Rather, it addresses the media bias of discussions of modernism through
consideration of a number of key moments—between c. 1860 and c. 1960, when
the purism of modernism (especially in the writings of Clement Greenberg and
Michael Fried), in terms of definition through media specificity, is contrasted
with the more hybrid and ‘‘theatrical’’ manifestations of practices that operate
under the ‘‘surface’’ of this paradigm of modernism.
Chapter 1 raises a number of issues in relation to interdisciplinary study and
aims to differentiate inter- from cross- and multidisciplinary research. It takes up
the philosopher Jerrold Levinson’s discussion of hybridity (into the categories
x
preface
Olivier Messiaen. Consideration of these figures shows that at the birth of moder-
nity, one powerful strain of practices stands in antithesis to the purism of formalist
modernism, in its pull to achieve unification.
Chapter 3 considers a central defining plank of the modernist canon: cubism,
specifically the cubism of Pablo Picasso. Although for Greenberg, Edouard
Manet was the first modernist, cubism marks a fundamental shift in the develop-
ment of modern art. Greenberg discusses cubism in terms of formal innovation,
and it has been seen by many to mark a fundamental shift in the history of art:
from a perceptual to a conceptual emphasis. However, if we consider a contex-
tual understanding, focusing on music, we can show conceptual contact with a
wide range of cultural issues. Cubism’s concern with traditional subject matter,
as a vehicle for that formal innovation in technique, is important, but it is not
the whole story. Music and musical instruments, in Picasso’s cubist works, both
signify Idea, rather than the visible particular (indeed its invisibility gives music
its power), and through musical objects (instruments) other extravisual elements
such as touch and hearing, and physical bodies, are played on within the rules
of a complex game. The subject matter of these works is far from neutral. Such
corps sonores resonate outside the confines of the frame.
Greenberg’s ideas lead to (and from) abstraction, indeed were formulated in
the 1940s within the context of abstraction’s identification as avant-garde, and
as such form the elite vehicle that maintains superiority over kitsch or academi-
cism. Here music again acts as a powerful agent of meaning. Following Wagner,
this is achieved not via the mind but via the feelings, through the instinct of the
artist. It is apparent that music means something profound, but its significance
lies in the subject rather than the object. In Chapter 4, the role of music in the
work of František Kupka, a little discussed but important early abstract artist, is
contrasted with that of Paul Klee. Music for Kupka is a transcendental signifier,
a re-presentation of the will, the spirit, the idea. For Klee, music is to be under-
stood as an organic, and already cultural, metaphor of growth, creation, and the
forces of nature. For Klee music was principally seen as a way to emphasize the
dimension of time, and therefore change, in visual art, as against Lessing’s divi-
sions. Klee’s work does not pursue or reflect a simple teleology of modernism
but is a more circular, essentially an experimental rubric.
The Austrian composer Josef Matthias Hauer is the main focus of Chapter 5.
Like Klee, Hauer stands to one side of the modernist paradigm. Hauer’s music
and ideas have much in common with Greenbergian modernism, for example, in
the attempt to develop a new metamusical language. Yet if we look in detail at
his little discussed aesthetic, if we distinguish its specificity—in contrast to the
more familiar tactic of describing it as an inferior form of serialism—we find
not so much a minor modernist, but rather a challenging, somewhat anachronis-
xii
preface
tic figure, a figure whose aesthetic, by virtue of its deviance from this paradigm,
is conceptually close to minimalism, the first art movement to challenge Green-
bergian ideology in the 1960s. This chapter necessarily contains a good deal of
technical discussion due to the unfamiliarity of Hauer’s ideas, especially for the
English-language reader. The argument considers Hauer’s ideas in relation to the
developments from dodecaphony to Karlheinz Stockhausen’s notion of moment
form to minimalism, in both music and visual art. It relates Hauer’s aesthetic to a
concern with three basic categories, first employed by the musicologist Jonathan
Bernard in relation to minimalism: (1) the avoidance of aleatoricism, (2) the em-
phasis on surface, and (3) the concern with disposition rather than composition.
The final chapter brings back the idea of the Gesamtkunstwerk, but in the con-
text of John Cage’s work, which is in many ways antithetical to the idea in its
Wagnerian guise. Here the concern is with silence over amplification, coexistence
over synthesis; music does not sublimate the other arts (nor, in Greenberg’s terms,
provide them with a ‘‘notion of purity derived from the example of music’’).
Volume does not drown out the other arts’ voices. Rather, it is through Cage’s
aesthetic of silence that the other arts can be seen to be a part of the discourse
of music—textual, visual, and theatrical. They are already part of the fabric of
music, part of the chorus of voices that make up the concept ‘‘music.’’ This allows
us to relate back to the initial discussion of the separation of the arts and its empha-
sis in Greenbergian modernism. But in the face of a post-Cagian (postmodernist)
culture, we are made more aware of the blurring of disciplinary boundaries and
the necessity to rethink relationships.
acknowledgments
Comparing the resources of totally different arts, one art learning from
another, can only be successful and victorious if not merely the externals,
but also the principles are learned.
—Wassily Kandinsky
Novalis: ‘‘This is waking, that is a dream, this belongs to the body, that to
the spirit, this belongs to space and distance, that to time and duration. But
space spills over into time, as the body into the soul, so that one cannot be
measured without the other. I want to exert myself to find a different kind
of measurement.’’
—Penelope Fitzgerald, The Blue Flower
Our words for the practices of art and music have classical roots. The Greek word
technē and the Latin ars both originally related closely to notions of skill. Technē
included a specific form, mousike technē, which signified the ‘‘art of the Muses.’’
2
ut pictura musica
However, the word technē was often omitted in Greek usage, and mousike on
its own stood for ‘‘art of the Muses.’’ And although this is the root of our word
music, it was first a concept signifying any art form over which the Muses pre-
sided: poetry, song, dance, astronomy.1 Mousike did not, therefore, signify in a
narrow sense what we might now think of as ‘‘music’’; it is not used in Greek as
a term for a solely auditory art form until at least the fourth century b.c.
The visual arts of painting, sculpture, and architecture, activities that can be
distinguished in part by their devotion to aesthetic issues above utility and craft,
appear not to have been thought of as a group before the fifth century b.c. In-
deed, in antiquity it would be more accurate to designate all such ‘‘visual’’ cultural
practices under the concept ‘‘craft’’ rather than art. Similarly, the artist had no
social status above other artisans, until in the fifth century art was developed as a
more distinct activity, although this was then a relatively subtle distinction. One
of the definitive contentions that emerged at this time was the relationship of the
arts to necessity and luxury. Painting and music were famously classified by Plato
(against the more hedonistic views of some of his contemporaries) as luxuries,
but with the proviso that elements of them could rise above this material status to
provide benefit to the soul; a link is made between beauty and moral worth: ‘‘ugli-
ness of form and bad rhythm and disharmony are akin to poor quality expression
and character, and their opposites are akin to and represent good character and
discipline.’’2 This statement is part of a general discussion of education in which
Plato is concerned to promote exposure only to the good. Both music and the
graphic arts share rhythm and harmony as the means to produce beauty.
For Plato, central to the classification and purpose of the arts was the con-
cept of imitation (mimesis), as this relates directly to his notion of the eidos, the
realm of suprasensible reality, which is distinct from the eidolon, which is the
impression of this reality based on likeness (eikon). The fact that the visual arts
might be more than mere imitation is not of concern to Plato, and indeed for him,
only certain types of music or musical modes (harmoniai ) were acceptable or
beneficial to the soul, and thus appropriate to education. In this it was impor-
tant to distinguish the intellectual principles of harmony, for example, and not to
surrender to their more sensuous elements. The close relationship between tone
and word (in mousike)—the invariable length and pitch of Greek syllables from
which the sound was related and developed—linked sound and meaning through
the medium of the word. However, music gradually became more independent
of the word. By the middle of the fifth century instrumental improvisations had
developed, often based on imitations of natural sounds rather than words, and it
was to this that Plato largely responded in his attempts to promote and prohibit
certain types of aesthetic development. The relationship between music and the
word is an issue we shall take up again in the next chapter.
3
ut pictura musica
For Aristotle, all arts are arts of imitation. He wrote in the Poetics: ‘‘Epic and
tragic poetry, comedy too, dithyrambic poetry, and most music composed for the
flute and lyre, can all be described in general terms as forms of imitation or rep-
resentation.’’ Here music is in service to the word and aims to represent ‘‘men’s
characters and feelings and actions.’’3 Music is seen to function as a natural sign
system, one grounded in imitation. In The Politics, he characterizes rhythm and
melody as aesthetic elements best able to produce imitations of such passions as
anger, courage, and other qualities of character.
Neoclassical thinkers tended to think of music and imitation in narrower terms,
more suited to the visual arts alone, as representations in a medium that shares
properties in common with the thing represented. The medieval division of the
arts into the seven ‘‘liberal’’ arts consisted of grammar, logic, rhetoric, arith-
metic, geometry, astronomy, and music. In the fifteenth century the conceptual
separation or combination of art and science as two different activities would not
have been a part of the artist’s project. For Leonardo da Vinci, ‘‘art’’ referred to
something like skill and ‘‘science’’ meant something like knowledge.4
Until the seventeenth century ‘‘art’’ still included such varied activities as
mathematics, medicine, and angling, but then it came to signify a more special-
ized group of skills that had not before been formally grouped together—namely,
drawing, painting, engraving, and sculpture. Up to the eighteenth century it was
common to discuss painting and sculpture, music and dance but not to speak of
‘‘art’’ as a general term.5
Indeed, our common use of ‘‘art’’ did not come into being until the nineteenth
century, along with the distinction between art and craft, artist and artisan. Alex-
ander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714–62) coined the word aesthetics in Reflections
on Poetry in 1735 and used the word slightly later as the title of his two-volume
work Aesthetica (1750–58). But in the reconsideration of music’s place in aes-
thetics that took place in the eighteenth century, Aristotle’s terms of reference—
music as the imitation of the passions or as the sonic signifier of the passions—
again emerged as important elements in the debate. Principal among these terms
was the notion of music as a natural sign system, as part of a general represen-
tational theory. Abbé Jean-Baptiste Dubos wrote early in the century: ‘‘Whereof
as the painter imitates the strokes and colours of nature, in like manner the musi-
cian imitates the tones, accents, sighs, and inflextions of the voice; and in short all
those sounds, by which nature herself expresses her sentiments and passions.’’6
The dominant tradition of aesthetics up to the eighteenth century was not one
that aimed to pursue generic differences, seeking out and patrolling the bor-
ders between the arts. Rather, it was primarily concerned with the issue of re-
semblance, that which was shared by art forms, the ‘‘sister arts.’’ Horace’s (65–
8 b.c.) phrase ‘‘ut pictura poesis’’ (as is painting, so is poetry) derives from the
4
ut pictura musica
cannot hope to explore all the ideological issues that underlie the approaches I
discuss in these pages. Instead, in the following chapters, I argue that it is more
appropriate to see attempts at systemization and demarcation in the arts as his-
torically grounded, as part of a dialogue, one that questions at the level of both
theory and practice. I provide a series of case studies that complicate the concep-
tion of modernist art practice as grounded in unique, practice-specific essences.
In doing this I am aware that issues of class and gender, among others, could be
developed from the discussion, issues bound up with the social history of art. My
intention is to expose the intellectual basis of art and music relationships within
notions of modernism—a level of theory that is diminished within social and
political analysis—and to make sonoric concerns visible. In this way ideological
notions can become apparent and open to question, even if all social ramifications
cannot be exposed here.
So let us briefly explore the nature of the ‘‘essential’’ identity of music and
visual art. I begin with the premise that there is no single essential or sufficient
defining difference between them, although that is not to say that there are not
necessary characteristics.
We have seen that in antiquity the boundaries between the arts were not as
they now are. But one of the most famous accounts of demarcation, indeed per-
haps the first extended attempt to define distinctive and ‘‘appropriate’’ spheres
of action between art forms, a work that characterizes artistic medium and is
the source for modernist assumptions of the uniqueness and autonomy of the
individual arts, a work written in the eighteenth century but based on antique
practices, is Gotthold Ephraim Lessing’s Laokoon: Oder, Über die Grenzen der
Malerei und Poesie (1766).9 Using the Late Hellenistic sculpture of Laocoön
and his two sons being attacked by serpents, Lessing follows Johann Joachim
Winckelmann in promoting the assertion that classical art is invariably tranquil
and static, concerned with the presentation of flawless beauty (fig. 1.1).10 The
display of strong emotion or impassioned movement would distort the purity of
form, he argues, and in the visual arts formal considerations must always control
expression. Poetry, by contrast, could display strong emotion without disrupting
form.Virgil’s evocation of the scream in his account of the death of Laocoön ‘‘has
a powerful appeal to the ear, no matter what its effect on the eye.’’11 Although
the Laocoön is concerned with poetry and painting, Lessing’s characterization
of poetry as a temporal art and painting as a spatial art can be applied equally to
music and painting (the ear and the eye). It was Lessing’s intention in the planned
second part of this work to consider music in relation to poetry, and in the third
part the relation of dance to music and the different genres of poetry, one with
the other. Both these further parts, however, remained incomplete at his death
in 1781.
[To view this image, refer to
the print version of this title.]
1.1 Hagesandros, Athenodoros, and Polydoros of Rhodes, The Laocoön Group, c. 175–
150 b.c., height 242 cm. Museo Pio Clementino, Vatican. Monumenti Musei e Gallerie
Pontificie, Rome
7
ut pictura musica
LAOCOÖN
Taking up the antique view that music is seen to function as a natural sign system,
one grounded in imitation, a useful starting point for our discussion is the work
of the philosopher Moses Mendelssohn (1729–86, grandfather of the composer
Felix). He was a contemporary and close friend of Lessing, whose ideas had an
impact (negative in the case of music) on Lessing’s formulations. Mendelssohn’s
essay ‘‘Hauptgrundsätze der schönen Wissenschaften und Künste’’ (On the main
principles of the fine arts and sciences) of 1757, revised in 1771, is in part an at-
tempt to separate the arts on semiotic grounds.12 What Lessing and Mendelssohn
share is a particular conception of mimesis. In the case of painting, a highly mi-
metic art, there are certain physical properties, such as color and contour, which
it shares with the original. However, for precisely this reason its efficacy is re-
duced, for it partakes of the physical nature of the original and therefore incurs
the same restrictions as the original. A more effective mimesis, a representation
to the imagination of ideas, would be one of ideas itself, where materiality is left
behind. This is a major reason for the supersession of poetry and its use of meta-
phor over the visual arts: if painting adopts a similar strategy—allegory—it is
merely an inferior form of poetry, what Lessing calls a ‘‘speaking picture.’’13
Both Lessing and Mendelssohn’s work was part of a more general interest in
systematizing the arts; their work aims to provide a theoretical structure of aes-
thetics as a hierarchy of rules. They tend toward a definition of the ‘‘essence’’ of
each art form in order to make artistic communication more autonomous, more
transparent. The purpose of art was characterized as the presentation to the imagi-
nation (or soul) of an intuitive representation of the object, to elicit pleasure. The
arts can then be compared in terms of the means to this end, characterized in
terms of the different semiotic media they employ. Music, for Mendelssohn, is a
natural semiotic, as opposed to language, which is an arbitrary one:
The signs by means of which an object is expressed can be either natural or arbitrary.
They are natural if the combination of the sign with the subject matter signified is
grounded in the very properties of what is designated. . . . Those signs, on the other
hand, that by their very nature have nothing in common with the designated subject
matter . . . are called arbitary. . . . The fine sciences [arts], by which poetry and rheto-
ric are understood, express objects by means of arbitrary signs, perceptible sounds,
and letters.14
According to Mendelssohn, both the visual arts and music are natural sym-
bols, or sign systems, as opposed to poetry, which employs arbitrary symbols.
The arts are further distinguished by the sense organ to which they appeal, which
separates music from the visual arts. In turn, the visual arts can be subdivided
8
ut pictura musica
according to the arrangement of their parts—in time or space (the only temporal
visual art for Mendelssohn is dance). This focus on media-based rules separates
aesthetic experience, as we have seen, from other experiences aiming to facilitate
transparency between aesthetic object and the subject.
The understanding of how the arts combine, having been separated by such a
taxonomy, follows similar structural lines. Mendelssohn argues that there must
always be a dominant partner, for if this were not the case a clash between ‘‘es-
sences’’ could occur, causing confusion. For example, in song, music must always
take second place to poetry; in opera, to drama. Wagner, as we shall see, took a
rather different view.
According to the notes for the planned second volume of Laocoön, Lessing,
while sharing many ideas with Mendelssohn, differed in his view of music. For
these notes suggest that music is, at least in part, an arbitrary sign system, as
it, too, frees the imagination.15 This view, which allies music and poetry, was to
become dominant by the end of the century.
Autonomous music, separated from poetry, was viewed at first as something
of a loose cannon. The mimetic view of music was, throughout this time, pro-
gressively diminished, which led to music’s assuming a different place within the
aesthetic hierarchy. One of the clearest examples of this change, toward the end of
the century, is to be found in British rather than German theorizing. The Scottish
thinker Adam Smith sees music as a primarily expressive medium: ‘‘The effect
of instrumental Music upon the mind has been called expression. . . . Whatever
effect it produces is the immediate effect of that melody and harmony, and not
of something else which is signified and suggested by them: they in fact signify
and suggest nothing.’’16
For Smith there is a decided break between music as a signifier and its (natu-
ral) signified, although for him this is not necessarily a good thing. Moreover,
seen in such terms there was an inherent (Platonic) danger: music free of the con-
trol of words was music free of morality. Legislation was needed to contain this
influence. As Lessing put it in the Laocoön:
We laugh when we hear that among the ancients even the arts were subject to the
civil code. But we are not always right when we do so. Unquestionably, laws must
not exercise any constraint on the sciences, for the ultimate goal of knowledge is
truth. . . . But the ultimate goal of the arts is pleasure, and this pleasure is not indis-
pensable. Hence it may be for the lawmaker to determine what kind of pleasure and
how much of each kind he will permit.17
But not all eighteenth-century minds saw music in such Platonic terms. Some
saw the origin of music in the divine (Orpheus, Apollo, or his biblical counter-
9
ut pictura musica
I reason thus: if it is true that in its imitations painting uses completely different
means or signs than does poetry, namely figures [bodies] and colours in space rather
than articulated sounds in time, and if these signs must indisputably bear a suitable
relation to the thing signified, then signs existing in space can express only objects
whose wholes or parts coexist, while signs that follow one another can express only
objects whose wholes or parts are consecutive.
Objects or parts of objects which exist in space are called bodies. Accordingly,
bodies with their visible properties are the true subjects of painting.
Objects or parts of objects which follow one another are called actions. Accord-
ingly, actions are the true subjects of poetry.20
Interestingly, Lessing next acknowledges that such distinctions are not as cut-
and-dried as this would lead us to believe. ‘‘However, bodies do not exist in space
only, but also in time. . . . On the other hand, actions cannot exist independently,
10
ut pictura musica
CHAPTER XIV
THE JUDGMENT OF GOD
CHAPTER XV
THE HONEYMOON
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