CHAPTER-I

INTRODUCTION
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INTRODUCTION

Sustainable development and protection and preservation of the environment are

fundamental goals of the WTO. They are enshrined in the Marrakesh Agreement, which
established the WTO, and complement the WTO’s objective to reduce trade barriers and
eliminate discriminatory treatment in international trade relations. While there is no
specific agreement dealing with the environment, under WTO rules members can adopt
trade-related measures aimed at protecting the environment provided a number of
conditions to avoid the misuse of such measures for protectionist ends are fulfilled.

The WTO contributes to the protection and preservation of the environment through its
objective of ensuring sustainable development and avoiding protectionism, through its
rules and enforcement mechanism, and through work in different WTO bodies.

What is the WTO?

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the only global international organization
dealing with the rules of trade between nations. At its heart are the WTO agreements,
negotiated and signed by the bulk of the world’s trading nations and ratified in their
parliaments. The goal is to help producers of goods and services, exporters, and importers
conduct their business.

Who we are

The overall objective of the WTO is to help its members use trade as a means to raise
living standards, create jobs and improve people’s lives. The WTO operates the global
system of trade rules and helps developing countries build their trade capacity. It also
provides a forum for its members to negotiate trade agreements and to resolve the trade
problems they face with each other.

What we do

The WTO is run by its member governments. All major decisions are made by the
membership as a whole, either by ministers (who usually meet at least once every two
years) or by their ambassadors or delegates (who meet regularly in Geneva).
 3

Non-discrimination

A country should not discriminate between its trading partners, and it should not
discriminate between its own and foreign products, services or nationals.

Opening trade

Lowering trade barriers is an obvious way to encourage trade; these barriers include
customs duties (or tariffs) and measures such as import bans or quotas, that restrict
quantities selectively.

Predictability and transparency

Foreign companies, investors and governments should be confident that trade barriers
will not be raised arbitrarily. With stability and predictability, investment is encouraged,
jobs are created and consumers can fully enjoy the benefits of competition – such as
increased choice and lower prices.

Fair competition

Discouraging “unfair” practices, such as export subsidies and dumping products at below
normal value to gain market share; the issues are complex, and the rules try to establish
what is fair or unfair, and how governments can respond, in particular by charging
additional import duties calculated to compensate for damage caused by unfair trade.

Support for less developed countries

Over three-quarters of WTO members are developing economies or in transition to

market economies. The WTO agreements give them transition periods to adjust to WTO
provisions and, in the case of the Trade Facilitation Agreement, provide for practical
support for implementation of the Agreement.

Protection of the environment

The WTO agreements permit members to take measures to protect not only public,
animal and plant health but also the environment. However, these measures must be
applied in the same way to both national and foreign businesses: members must not use
environmental protection measures as a means of introducing discriminatory trade
barriers.
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Inclusion

The WTO seeks to build a more inclusive trading system that will allow more women
and small businesses to participate in trade and to reap the economic benefits of global
trading.

Partnerships

The WTO maintains regular dialogue with civil society, labour unions, universities and
the business community to enhance cooperation and build partnerships. The WTO’s
Trade Dialogues initiative and the annual Public Forum provide a platform for civil
society and business groups to discuss the latest developments in world trade and to
propose ways of enhancing the multilateral trading system.

Digital trade

The WTO recognizes the growing importance of e-commerce. Periodic reviews of the
WTO’s work programme on e-commerce are conducted by the General Council based on
reports from various WTO bodies. In addition, a group of like-minded members are
conducting negotiations on e-commerce, with a view to developing global digital trade
rules and addressing challenges posed by the digital divide

Objective
The WTO operates the global system of trade rules and helps developing countries build
their trade capacity. It also provides a forum for its members to negotiate trade
agreements and to resolve the trade problems they face with each other. What are the 6
objectives of WTO?

The WTO has six key objectives:

(1) to set and enforce rules for international trade,
(2) to provide a forum for negotiating and monitoring further trade liberalization
(3) to resolve trade disputes
(4) to increase the transparency of decision-making processes
(5) to cooperate with other major international economic
6) administering trade agreements.
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Scope;
The WTO provides a common platform to negotiate trade agreements among member
countries and to resolve any trade disputes. It manages 60 global and about 300 regional
trade agreements. The 60 trade agreements are accorded the status of international law.
The WTO comprises 164 member states.

Limiteshans

 Insecurity. The World Trade Organization's only concern is to regulate and

maintain trade conditions and validate the security of governments in this area. ...

 Unfair. ...

 Disregards Labor Rights. ...

 Bends Towards Multinationals. ...

 Hampers Nature.

Needs;
The WTO agreements cover goods, services and intellectual property. They spell out the
principles of liberalization, and the permitted exceptions. They include indivi- dual
countries' commitments to lower customs tariffs and other trade barriers, and to open and
keep open services markets.
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The procedure adopted for conducting the research requires a lot of attention as it has
direct bearing on accuracy, reliability and adequacy of results obtained. It is due to this
reason that research methodology, which we used at the time of conducting the research,
needs to be elaborated upon. Research Methodology is a way to systematically study and
solve the research problems. If a researcher wants to claim his study as a good study, he
must clearly state the methodology adapted in conducting the research the research so
that it way be judged by the reader whether the methodology of work done is sound or
not.
The Research Methodology here includes.
1. Meaning of Research.
2. Research Problem.
3. Research Design.
4. Sampling Design.
5. Data Collection method.
6. Analysis and interpretation of Data.
Meaning Research:
Research is defined as “a scientific and systematic search for pertinent information on a
specific topic”. Research is an art of scientific investigation. Research is a systematized
effort to gain now knowledge. It is a careful investigation or inquiry especially through
search for new facts in any branch of knowledge. Research is an academic activity and
this term should be used in a technical sense. Research comprises defining and redefining
problems, formulating hypothesis or suggested solutions. Making deductions and
reaching conclusions to determine whether they if the formulating hypothesis. Research
is thus, an original contribution to the existing stock of knowledge making for its
advancement. The search for knowledge through objective and systematic method of
finding solutions to a problem is research.
 7

DATA COLLECTION METHOD: -

There are two ways one can collect data i.e. through primary source (which means
generating one’s own information by surveys or interviews etc. or through secondary
source (which are readily available like information in newspaper, magazines, websites
etc.). For this report only secondary data are used as the basic objective is to study IIFL S
financial position, there is no need to conduct a survey or interviews, which are sources
of primary data.

TYPE OF DATA:-
Data included in the balance sheet, profit and loss account and cash flow statement of the
company are used.

METHOD OF ANALYSIS:-
Various financial ratios are used to evaluate the corporate financial positions along with
various graphs a
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CHAPTER-II
LITERATURE REVIEW
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REVIEW ;

How did bananas nearly destroy a world wide trade regulation entity? The Banana War

threatened to destroy a system that was created in response to globalization intended to

make trade more profitable throughout the world. Through policies created by the World

Trade Organization (WTO) and Multinational Corporations (MNCs) have expanded their

trade empires in the late 20th and early 21st century. While MNCs exist to maximize their

own profits the Banana War is an example of how globalization, while meant to enable

people throughout the world to prosper, has allowed MNCs to exploit this new global

system; exploitation that permits MNCs to manipulate international trade and the policies

of nation-states for their own gain.

This paper will look at the dispute in the late 1990’s known as the Banana War that

challenged this new system of trade. This case was brought by the United States, a

country which is not a banana exporter, against the European Union, an importer of

bananas. The challenge was presented at the behest of a company headquartered in the

United States, a company that employs few United States citizens. I will show that the

decision of the fledgling WTO did indeed benefit the United States and MNCs that have

repeatedly shown disregard for human life. I will show that the victory in the Banana War

was a loss for those who believe that the WTO would equally represent developed and

developing nations regarding international trade. It would instead re-enforce a system of

dependency and allow the United States to re-establish hegemony in the Americas.
 10

To gain a better sense of the Banana War one must examine the origins of the WTO. Its

predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), was formed to

stabilize international trade that was in disarray after World War II. The United States

and its allies founded the GATT as part of an attempt to establish order for the world

economy.1 The reason for the United States’ leadership was the fact that the rest of the

industrialized world lay in ruins. Some of the goals of the United States with the GATT

and the Marshall Plan was to open Europe up for trade and investment to United States

based corporations. World War II had demolished the industrial nations of Europe and

the United States’ involvement was crucial to rebuilding those countries not in the Soviet

block.

Signed on October 27, 1947, the GATT went into effect on January 1, 1948.2 The GATT

document outlined principles and procedures for trade amongst the non-Communist

countries but did not specify how the GATT codes would be enforced. The document

was intended to encourage fair and freer trade,3 but without a body to enforce any of the

trade laws it created, the GATT became a paper tiger. GATT policies however helped to

create a system of dependency between the developed world and developing nations. The

issue of dependency has been explored by many authors.

Dependency is defined by Thomas Skidmore and Peter Smith in “Modern Latin

America” as

…a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by

the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is
subjected.4
 11

Some authors believe that when the countries of Latin America gained their

independence from Spain in the 19th century other European powers stepped in and

prolonged dependency that had been created during the colonial period. In the 20th

century the United States replaced the European countries in Latin America and the cycle

of dependency continued, arguably, until today. The GATT was an important institution

in creating Latin American dependency on other nations. Dependency has created an

unequal exchange between the two regions, or in more recent cases, between a country

and one or more MNCs. Latin American countries have became dependant on the export

of single agriculture crop or natural resource for economic survival. This monoculture

benefited countries outside Latin America such as the United States and the European

Community. The GATT helped to support this system until change was needed in the

mid 1980s.

The GATT nations held meetings, called rounds, in which members met and discussed

their policies and suggested revisions. The WTO was formed during the Uruguay Round

which began in 1986 and was scheduled to end in 1990. Instead the GATT nations agreed

to meet until the birth of the WTO in 1995. While the WTO was the outcome of these

meetings, it was not the initial goal. The round was intended to deal with several pressing

issues facing both the developed and developing countries covered by the GATT

agreement. The oil crises of the 1970s, the grain market collapse in the mid 1980s, high

inflation, unemployment, and stagflation were major topics for the altering of the

GATT’s trading policies.5 A new system was needed. It was during this round that

neoliberal trade policies were adopted which replaced the old liberal policies.
 12

Neoliberal trade policy claims that the marketplace defines the way international trade is

conducted by expanding the role of individuals and MNCs and decreasing the control of

governments over trade. While the liberal belief system decreases the role of

governments, its policies raise the importance of nonstate entities and balances them

against the diminished role of governments. Neoliberal policies stress cooperation

between governments and MNCs. Neoliberals believe that the creation of institutions for

cooperation are essential in creating fairness on the trade market and help reflect the

interests of states through the formation of rules and institutions. This is in contrast to the

Liberalism belief in the market setting the conditions of trade by limiting governmental

roles and maximizing that of individuals and MNCs.

All of the member nations had their own agenda for the Uruguay round. The United

States had lost much of its world trade hegemony that it enjoyed immediately after WWII

and wanted to reestablish some of its dominance. The growing United States deficit, a

desire to open foreign markets to its service export services, stronger protection for

intellectual property, and regulations upon investment policies were some of the core

issues on the United States’ agenda. While forcing Newly Industrialized Countries to be

treated as equals within the GATT and the issue of agriculture were underlying issues

behind the United States’ support of the creation of the WTO. The European Union

agreed with the United States on many points but when it came to unilateral actions

within the GATT framework, the United States and EU were on opposite ends of the

spectrum. The issue of agriculture was also a point of contention between the two

countries.6
 13

Two groups that made up the rest of the nations actively involved in negotiations was the

Cairns Group which was made up of fourteen developed and developing countries that

desired significant agriculture reforms within the GATT. They formed their coalition in

order to apply more pressure during the negotiations. The other group was made up of

developing nations who wanted better access to markets within developed countries.

These developing nations were especially concerned with tropical products, especially

the extensive quotas placed on tropical agriculture products. Once the meetings for the

Uruguay round got underway they proceeded sluggishly primarily do to the issues

regarding agriculture despite the intent to move them along at a brisk pace. The sluggish

pace would cause the meetings to be extended beyond the original 1990 ending date so

that by the time the document that founded the WTO was ready it was 1994. On April 15,

1994 the twenty-six thousand-page agreements were ready and signed by one hundred

nine countries. They breathed life into the new World Trade Organization.

Despite being ready, the new agreement would not go into effect until January 1, 1995

when it was ratified by the United States. Once the agreement was ratified by the United

States Congress, other countries began to ratify the agreements in the WTO. A new set of

trading policies was set in place to govern the new, neoliberal trading system established

during the Uruguay round. With the WTO overseeing international trade, old trade

disputes would arise from agreements made prior to the founding of the WTO.

In the article “Nested and Overlapping Regimes in the Transatlantic Banana Trade

Dispute” Karen Alter and Sophie Meunier explore the role of the United States and the

EU’s accumulated international organizations that they are nested with.

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Alter and Meunier define nesting as “…a situation where regional or issue-specific

international institutions are themselves part of multilateral frameworks that involve

multiple states or issues.”1 They use this concept to define the underlying cause of the

banana dispute. This system allows conglomerates within multiple nests to use whichever

forums offer them the most lucrative gain in order to achieve their goal.

According to Alter and Meunier, nesting has led to nations, and as a result, MNCs to

become increasingly enmeshed in multiple agreements. This has given nations and MNCs

the difficult task of determining which set of rules to follow. As they plan their business

they are forced to differentiate or define each realm or agreement individually in order to

set up a hierarchy that will clearly define which set of rules is more important. In the case

of the Banana War many EU countries had agreements with sixty nine African-

Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) countries that offered tariff protection under the 1993 Lyons

Act. Many of those ACP countries were former European colonies.

Despite offering tariff protection, Alter and Meunier point out that the EU limited the

ACP countries to 857,000 tons of tariff-free banana imports while the non-ACP banana

exporters were allotted 2 million tons with a 20 per cent tariff.7 Alter and Meunier point

out that the United States, some countries inside the EU not benefiting from the Lyons

Act, and the Latin American banana countries: Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and

Ecuador all objected to the EU policy. The controversy went to the WTO’s dispute

committee as a violation dispute. Once in the committee the issue is distributed to the

panel members who have 60 days to consult with each other.

1
 15

If the consultations fail then the Dispute Settlement Body establishes a panel of three

members who have nine months to review the case and submit their findings. Even then a

party may appeal, to an Appellate Body. Appeals are to take less than ninety days and

their findings are submitted to all WTO members and the Dispute Settlement Body who

has thirty days to approve the report, only a unanimous vote against a report can block it

from going into effect.8 On April 7, 1999 the Dispute Settlement Panel found in favor of

the United States and its allies.

With the finding in favor of the United States and banana producing countries, the EU

was eventually forced to restructure its agreements with the ACP countries. The authors

highlight in this article that the banana dispute was the first of its kind;

The banana dispute was a specific dispute about a specific policy, but it as not an ‘old
style’ trade dispute about protecting domestic losers from international competition…
Because there is no clear hierarchy of international agreements, a legal victory or loss in
one venue is highly likely to stir politics in another venue to try to undercut the authority
of the settlement.

Thus the point of the authors is made. The system of nesting by countries under the old

GATT agreements led to a challenge of the new system employed by the WTO.

While the former system of the GATT was designed to protect the interests of developed

nations the WTO’s system seems to be formatted to function in favor of MNCs interests.

Despite a successful ruling in favor of the United States led coalition, the Banana War
 16

was the first in a series of complex economic battles that defined the WTO and how its

members would behave under its regulations.

The WTO was intended to encourage developing countries to compete with developed

countries in international trade. The problem was that the WTO’s new policies had to be

tested according to the policies that had been adopted in support of the GATT.

Specifically the behavior of countries and MNC’s had to be defined within the

framework of this new institution.

The Banana War was, in fact a test of the fledgling World Trade Organization’s ability to

enforce its own trade policies on its member nations. When the United States first

complained to the ruling body in 1995 the European Union was able to ignore the finding

against it. When the United States submitted its case for the third time in 1996 the

situation escalated to a trade “war” that had implications beyond the banana exporting

business that affected the legitimacy of the new system which defines the WTO and its

role in regulation of international trade.

In their article; “Bananas: It’s A Trade War”, in The Guardian Charlotte Denny and

Stephen Bates question the United States’s complaint;

I am sure there will be many people asking why it is that the United States, who have no
jobs at stake as far as the banana regime is concerned, is putting at risk the whole WTO
over this particular issue.
 17

This was the question on the EU’s mind as the United States aggressively took their case to the

WTO’s trade dispute board. Denny and Bates express the concerns that this case would

undermine the WTO and prove its power to be on paper only. The danger of having a trade

regulating body with no power is what was experienced with the WTO’s predecessor, the

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or GATT.

The authors were examining the Banana Wars during the tense time when the United States had

threatened to impose sanctions on the EU if full, equal access to the European market were not

granted to all banana growers. Nevertheless the dispute was, according to Denny and Bates, was

not about nations’ access, rather, corporations access to European markets. With another issue,

the export of United States beef to Europe looming on the political horizon, the Banana Wars

was seen by other nations as a surrogate of the interest of big business.

Karl Greenfeld of Time Magazine saw the conflict over bananas as almost laughable. Greenfeld

raises the question of the United States’s justification for involving itself in a trade war when the

United States does not even grow bananas. Unilike Denny and bates he sees the dispute not as

revolving around market share but one setting some growers against another. His answer as to

why the United States would involve itself in a dispute over bananas is:

Before the E.U. imposed the current banana regime in 1993, non-E.U. companies controlled 95%
of the European banana market. Since then, American companies like Chiquita and Dole have
seen their market share plummet 50%. Hardest hit has been Chiquita, which has lost money four
of the past five years—the result, company officials insist, of being denied access to the
European market.
 18

Greenfeld has approached the conflict from the point of view of the American companies. He

does concede that the dispute is “…less attractive for us to go to a trade dispute on,”9 and that the

issue is truly a test of the fledgling WTO’ policies and their enforceability. Whether or not this

case was attractive, Greenfeld’s article shows how MNC’s have been able to set political and

economic policies inside countries in which they operate.

While Greenfeld concedes that the dispute is outlandish, he sees the conflict as a result of

European countries that restricted Latin bananas to support their former colonies. The dispute

revolves around EU protectionism and corporations in the United States buying influence in the

government. The conflict created a volatile trading climate where demand for some goods would

shrink to escalated prices. What was a minor dispute escalated into a clash that endangered free

trade and the liberalization of trade.

In “A Case of Bananas” James Ferguson looks beyond the issue of corporate profits and

examines the social implications of the Banana Wars. According to Ferguson, 20 percent of

Europe’s demand for bananas is provided for by their former colonies, known as the Africa-

Pacific-Caribbean (APC) countries, while the rest is supplied by Latin American countries. This

20 per cent largely benefits the family banana farms in Jamaica, Belize, Surinam and the

Windward Island. The preference shown to these country’s bananas infuriates Chiquita, Dole and

Del Monte companies headquartered in the United States. The companies believe that because of

the preferential treatment they lost “400 million and half of their potential European business

over the last three years.”10

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While they feel wronged, the companies are in fact controlling a larger market share than many

of the former colonies. However

The Windward Island account for around two percent of overall world banana exports and
approximately six percent of the EU market. Poor, wronged Chiquita, meanwhile, controls 30
percent of the world banana trade and a quarter of the EU market. Chiquita’s turnover in 1995
was $2.6 billion, according to Reuters, while the combined GDP of the four island nations is
approximately a half of that.

Looking at Chiquita’s market share diminishes the complaint against the EU’s policy. Ferguson

points out that one of the underlying factors might be that Chiquita lost money in a bid to outsell

small competitors in Europe by oversupplying the market.

Ferguson’s points are highlighted by the fact that the businesses favored by the EU are small,

family farms whose production capabilities are outmatched by those of the Latin American

farms. So outmatched were the farms that the livelihood of the entire island was called into

question and what crop would replace bananas as an export crop. With the United States winning

its case against the EU the small farmers that have supplied six percent of the EU market will be

put in jeopardy. Ferguson showed us the lopsided complaint of the United States companies and

while they claimed foul in name of free trade, they seem to be exploiting a system to further raise

profits.

In Michael Weinstein’s New York Times article “Economic Scene, The banana war between the

United States and Europe is more than a trivial spat”, he examines a trade dispute that was not

seen as necessary by everyday Americans. When examining the situation Weinstein portrays the

US as the faulty party who started the dispute;

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In an odd sense, Europe’s stance may be indirect payback. During the 1994 Congressional fight
over membership in the new W.T.O., Mr. Clinton’s trade representative, Mickey Kantor,
infuriated many Europeans by arguing that membership in the trade organization would not
obligate America to obey its rules.

Weinstein highlights the arguments between countries during the WTO’s infancy. This shows

the volatility of international trading and how unstable the WTO agreements were while

countries tried to figure out the rules and how to exploit or use those rules to their activities.

Weinstein’s article emphasizes the WTO’s weaknesses during its formative years. The EU had

used loopholes for several years to manipulate the WTO’s system and continue to favor their

former colonies in the banana business. Weinstein’s article still did not answer the question as to

why the United States initiated the claim. After all the United States does not export bananas,

rather, the corporations headquartered in its borders do. While Weinstein claims that the trade

war will help enforce the WTO’s trade laws that make countries and MNCs play by the same

rules, he doesn’t answer how small countries, which cannot compete with larger ones, will be

able to avoid loosing their industry due to under-pricing by large countries or companies.

The Economist looks at the Banana War and criticizes the WTO’s lack of ability to enforce its

own policies. The article points out that the WTO had handled 163 disputes since its inception.

The United States brought 53, the EU 43, and developing countries had brought 55 cases against

the EU and United States.11 But this is the first real test of enforcement of an arbitrated case.

Cases that had been judged; Canada’s about magazines, the United States’s against shrimp from

countries that use nets which trap turtles and the EU’s ban on hormone treated beef.
 21

One option is for the WTO to prescribe what must be done in order for countries to comply with

its trade rules. Many countries are against this and favor the system of an arbitrator ruling on

cases independently. Of the many problems “America and the EU are not always willing to

accept that the writ of the WTO can trump domestic political consideration.” 12 This is the true

bottom line of the Banana War. The idea that large powers must comply with an international

organization, defines the actual power of the WTO. Despite addressing these issues the Banana

War did not address the one that it focused on inadvertently, how do small businesses compete

with large corporations on the global level? This question was not answered in the Banana War

and is yet to be addressed by the WTO.

In today’s trading world goods are no longer created in one country and then traded with

another,13 instead MNCs have affiliated companies in multiple countries. This allows the MNCs

to own the whole production chain from start to finish. When the WTO was asked to examine the

banana case the EU and the United States were nested in several different agreements. These

agreements would be tested in the Banana War case when it came before the WTO Dispute

Settlement Body. How has the WTO decision affected the banana trade today?

In order to fully understand why the WTO was called to rule on the case we must examine the

origins of the dispute. Going into the 1990’s the banana trade in the EU was dominated by the

non-ACP dollar bananas of the plantation farms in Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Panama.

These countries accounted for 2,363,000 tons of the EU’s import of bananas.14 The ACP

countries contributed 622,000 tons15 which was sixteen percent of the total imports of the EU.
 22

With the larger share of the European market the amount of imports however does not indicate a

favorable trading situation for the ACP countries that was the basis for the United States’

complaint.

In the 1970’s Great Britain entered the European Community which was the forerunner of the

EU. One Great Britain’s stipulation to joining the EC was that its former colonies receive special

treatment. While this was against the GATT policies, it complied with the Lomé Convention of

1975 which gave preferential treatment to not only Great Britain’s colonies but the rest of the

EC’s as well. In1992 the EU created Regulation 404 which allowed the ACP countries to import

857,700 metric tons of bananas with no tariffs. Regulation 404 allowed 2,000,000 metric tons of

bananas to be imported from non-ACP countries with a tariff of 75 Euros per ton. With this

regulation the EU was nested in the GATT, the Lomé Convention agreement and Regulation

404. Even without the existence of the WTO we can see the problem of nesting developing into a

contentious issue. The United States, however filed complaints with the GATT about the

favoritism shown the ACP countries, complants that the EU ignored.

 23

The United States claimed that the EU’s favoritism limited the ability of the non-ACP countries

to import bananas. When examining the amount of imports to the EU we can see that was not the

case. Figure one shows that in the mid 1990’s the non-ACP countries banana imports began to

increase while the ACP countries share stayed the same.16 In fact there is a significant rise in the

amount of exports from the non-ACP countries from 1993 to 1995 before the foundation of the

WTO. While the ACP countries did experience a small rise in the same time period, their

increase was not as high as the non-ACP countries.

Despite their continued increases in exports the United States and the non-ACP countries

brought their complaint to the Dispute Settlement Body. Why did the United States bring the

complaint to the WTO? Two of the largest banana producing companies in the world are

headquartered in the United States, the Dole Fruit and Chiquita Brands International companies.
 24

While Dole employed a strategy where they used several different methods to begin producing

inside the ACP countries, Chiquita believed that the Lomé Convention would open European

Markets to them. Chiquita then began to expand its shipping fleet and build up the distribution

portion of their empire.17 In order to understand the motivation of Chiquita we must examine its

history in Latin America. Chiquita is the company that brought the United States into the Banana

War. If they had taken the same action as Dole in the ACP countries and bought some of the

farm land then the Banana War would never have happened. Chiquita’s history is filled with

excessive us of its economic power inside banana producing countries as well as the United

States.

In the late 19th century there were over one hundred companies involved in the banana export

business in Latin America. In 1899 approximately 22 remained.18 One of those 22 firms was the

Boston Fruit Company owned by Lorenzo Baker and Andrew Preston. The BFC merged with

companies owned by Minor Keith in March 1899 which gave birth to the United Fruit Company.

This corporation owned infrastructure and banana producing land in the Dominican Republic,

Honduras, Guatemala, Panama, Cuba, Nicaragua, Jamaica and Columbia.19 It established itself as

the premier banana supplier in the United States. The company used many different political and

military schemes to remain in control of its banana empire including the controversial massacre

in Ciénaga, Colombia in December 1928. Workers were striking against the company in

Colombia in 1928. Colombian troops were dispatched and with the support of the companies

representatives, the troops opened fire on the strikers. Conflicting reports on how many men

who were killed while striking against the United Fruit Company range from a few men killed to

thousands. The contemptible use of force was supported by the United States government as a

way to protect American interests in Latin America.

 25

Eli Black in 197020 renamed the company United Brands and whereas again by Carl Lindner to

Chiquita in 1989.21 The name change by Lindner was to identify the company by its most

successful brand and to22 remove the stigma created by Black’s bribing of Latin American

political officials,23 which was one of the many black marks on United Brand’s name. Lindner

was one of the driving forces behind the Banana War in the mid 1990’s. His political

contributions to both the Democratic and Republican Party gained political clout to further his

corporation’s complaint in the 1990’s.

During the 20th century companies like Chiquita enabled the United States was able to establish

hegemony in the Americas. This power however, was threatened by the Lomé Convention and

Regulation 404. With the foundation of the WTO the possibility for a favorable finding

persuaded the United States and its allies to appeal again. When the Dispute Settlement Body

received the appeal the stage was set for a trade decision and “war” that would help define the

WTO’s ability to enforce its regulations.

Table 2 Nesting
 26

With the foundation of the WTO the EU found itself nested in even more international

agreements. It was the nesting of countries in international agreements that were at the heart of

the United States’ complaint. When the WTO’s initial decision favored the United States in May

of 1997 the world watched EU’s reaction to the findings. Would the WTO be another GATT, a

toothless agreement? Or would the EU comply with the Dispute Settlement Body’s findings?

The EU’s members met during 1997 and 1998 in order to revise their agricultural policies.

Despite making several concessions and amending the Lomé Convention agreements and

Regulation 404 in June of 1998 the United States and its allies were not satisfied. In July 1998

the United States asked that WTO’s dispute panel for the banana complaint be reconstituted.

When the EU refused several times the United States Congress prepared a list of products that

would be taxed in retaliation for the calculated loss of $1.5 billion dollars of United States

company’s export profits.

In 1998 the United States targeted 17 exports from countries that were seen to benefit from the

protectionism of the EU. These products came from countries inside the EU that supported the

Lomé Convention and Regulation 404. Products from countries that did not support those

agreements were not sanctioned. This was a way for the United States to put direct pressure on

the ACP supporters in the EU. The countries that the sanctions damaged the most were Britain,

France and Italy.24 The products that were chosen would not affect American consumers or

corporations. By the end of January 1999 the United States was ready to enforce the sanctions

and force the WTO to rule on the matter.

 27

On January 25, 1999 the United States and the EU entered into negotiations and on January 29

they came to an agreement to allow a WTO panel to re-examine the banana case. The panel

released its ruling on April 7, 1999 in favor of the United States and its non-ACP allies. As a

result the EU began to revise its Lomé agreement. Despite having ruled in favor of the United

States led coalition, the EU has succeeded in dragging out the reform process. Since the finding

in 1999 and the reform of the EU’s Lomé agreements, complaints have been brought to the WTO

by the non-ACP countries in late 1999 and again in 2005, so did the WTO’s finding solve

anything?

If we break down the Banana Wars we see that the conflict has implications beyond those

involving international trade. The dependency that has been fostered in third world countries,

United States hegemony in the Americas as well as in Europe, and the role of MNCs all have

been redefined by the WTO’s findings. In the late 1970’s and early 1980’s the United States’

international trade hegemony in Europe and Latin America that had developed after World War

II began to break down. With inflation creeping up, the gas crises and the regeneration of

industrial economies outside of the United States, the balance of power that had come into

existence after the war had shifted. The United States and its corporations faced a decline in

influence while European countries once again began to exert economic power on the world

stage. With their economic power waning, United States corporations became desperate to

reassert its economic influences in Latin America. By encouraging mono-cropping and

dependence on natural resources the United States created an unequal system in the Americas

that has shored up the system of dependence that was created prior to World War II.
 28

By supporting a system where Latin American countries are dependant on the United States,

large MNCs from the United States have been able to exert control throughout the Americas

without regard for the consequences of their actions. Chiquita is one of the largest contributors to

this dependency. During the 19th century the company, under the name United Fruit Brands, held

enough power to politically influence who would govern in banana producing countries. In the

first decade of the 20th century Chiquita has contributed money to the terrorist group the United

Self-Defense Forces of Columbia or A.U.C.25 While Chiquita insists that the money was given to

protect its workers the press reports that group is responsible for atrocities throughout Colombia.

Within this system of dependency held in place and enforced by MNCs, some with pasts like

Chiquita’s, Latin American nations seem to be fated to remain mono-crop economies.

With MNCs enforcing dependence on the United States, the hegemony that was on the decline in

the 70’s and 80’s has been once again re-established. With the WTO finding in favor of the

United States in the banana case when the United States does not produce bananas for export or

employ a significant amount of workers for the plantations that produce these bananas, we ask

why bananas? With Chiquita’s chairman Carl Lindner influencing politicians in Washington in

order to get this case heard by the WTO, the role of MNCs becomes clear. United States MNCs

have become policy builders in the United States and abroad. They possess economic influence

that then wielded globally. Chiquita has failed to accrue a substantial profit despite the WTO’s

ruling in their favor. This failure is due to business decisions that depended on favorable

European markets opening with the revision of the Lomé Agreement. What Chiquita did not

count on is the hostile markets they had created through their aggressive economic maneuvering.
 29

When the WTO came into effect Chiquita used the opportunity to attempt to exert their influence

and have some measure of control re-established in the Latin American sphere. Looking at the

effects of the WTO’s ruling the non-ACP “Dollar” banana country’s production shrank

immediately after the initial decision in 1997 while the ACP country’s production has remained

fairly constant with a small amount of contraction.

Banana Production

25000

20000
Thousands of Tons

15000

Latin American Countries

Caribbean Countries

10000

5000

0
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Years
Figure
26
1 Production by region from 1985-2000

Despite the loss in profits for Chiquita, the WTO’s decision had an affect on the process of

globalization. A case that affected farmers in a developing nation was brought before a ruling

body by a MNC that operates out of a developed nation and employs very few citizens of the

nation in which the country is based.

 30

This global reach of MNCs shows that for positive or negative reasons a large MNC can use

international organizations like the WTO to initiate changes that have world wide consequences.

In spite of intending the case to grow its profits, Chiquita instead lost money; a loss that has

affected people that work for Chiquita in other developing nations and draws attention to the

problem of dependency in the Americas.

The victory did not bring the profits that Chiquita desired. Instead it has shown a new type of

Imperialism, one where the economic behemoths known as MNCs can affect international trade

through the manipulation of countries and international organizations. Chiquita successfully

manipulated the US to support a case in which the US did not directly profit economically or

diplomatically. Instead malice was created towards the Chiquita brand and the US in Europe.

During the age of globalization the Banana War introduces a new form of imperialism, that of

corporations seeking to make profits at any cost.

31
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

CHAPTER-III
26

INDUSTRY & COMPANY PROFILE

ABOUT INDIA INFOLINE SECURITIES LTD:

India Infoline Group :

The India Infoline group, comprising the holding company, India Infoline Limited and its
wholly-owned subsidiaries, straddle the entire financial services space with offerings
ranging from Equity research, Equities and derivatives trading, Commodities trading,
Portfolio Management Services, Mutual Funds, Life Insurance, Fixed deposits, GoI
bonds and other small savings instruments to loan products and Investment banking.
India Infoline also owns and manages the websites www.indiainfoline.com and
www.5paisa.com The company has a network of 976 business locations (branches and
sub-brokers) spread across 365 cities and towns. It has more than 800,000 customers.

India Infoline Group subsidiaries:

India Infoline Media and Research Services Limited

India Infoline Commodities Limited
India Infoline Marketing & Services
India Infoline Investment Services Limited

India Infoline Ltd. (IIFL) is a financial services company. As of March 31, 2010, it has
presence in over 2,300 business locations in 450 cities and towns. It offers a range of
services including equity research, equities and derivatives trading, commodities
trading, portfolio management services, mutual funds, life insurance, fixed deposits, goi
bonds and other small savings instruments to loan products and investment banking.
The Company's segments comprise: equities brokerage and related; financing and
investment; commodities brokerage and related; life insurance distribution; marketing
and online media, and others. Its subsidiaries include India Infoline Investment Services
Ltd., Moneyline Credit Ltd., India Infoline Distribution Company Ltd., India Infoline
Housing Finance Ltd., India Infoline Marketing Services Ltd., India Infoline Insurance
Services Ltd. and India Infoline Insurance Brokers Ltd.

The IIFL (India Infoline) group, comprising the holding company, India Infoline Ltd (NSE:
INDIAINFO, BSE: 532636) and its subsidiaries, is one of the leading players in the Indian
financial services space. IIFL offers advice and execution platform for the entire range
of financial services covering products ranging from Equities and derivatives,
Commodities, Wealth management, Asset management, Insurance, Fixed deposits,
Loans, Investment Banking, GoI bonds and other small savings instruments. IIFL
recently received an in-principle approval for Securities Trading and Clearing
memberships from Singapore Exchange (SGX) paving the way for IIFL to become the
first Indian brokerage to get a membership of the SGX.

IIFL also received membership of the Colombo Stock Exchange becoming the first
foreign broker to enter Sri Lanka. IIFL owns and manages the website,
www.indiainfoline.com, which is one of India’s leading online destinations for personal
finance, stock markets, economy and business. IIFL has been awarded the ‘Best Broker,
India’ by FinanceAsia and the ‘Most improved brokerage, India’ in the AsiaMoney polls.
India Infoline was also adjudged as ‘Fastest Growing Equity Broking House - Large firms’
by Dun & Bradstreet. A forerunner in the field of equity research, IIFL’s research is
acknowledged by none other than Forbes as ‘Best of the Web’ and ‘…a must read for
investors in Asia’. Our research is available not just over the Internet but also on
international wire services like Bloomberg, Thomson First Call and Internet Securities
where it is amongst one of the most read Indian brokers. A network of over 2,500
business locations spread over more than 500 cities and towns across India facilitates
the smooth acquisition and servicing of a large customer base. All our offices are
connected with the corporate office in Mumbai with cutting edge networking
technology. The group caters to a customer base of about a million customers, over a
variety of mediums viz. online, over the phone and at our branches.

1995

 Commenced operations as an Equity Research firm

1997

 Launched research products of leading Indian companies, key sectors and the
economy

 Client included leading FIIs, banks and companies

1999
  Launched www.indiainfoline.com

2000

 Launched online trading through www.5paisa.com

 Started distribution of life insurance and mutual fund

2003

 Launched proprietary trading platform Trader Terminal for retail customers

2004

 Acquired commodities broking license

 Launched Portfolio Management Service

2005

 Maiden IPO and listed on NSE, BSE

2006

 Acquired membership of DGCX

 Commenced the lending business

2007

 Commenced institutional equities business under IIFL

  Formed Singapore subsidiary, IIFL (Asia) Pvt Ltd

2008

 Launched IIFL Wealth

 Transitioned to insurance broking model

2009

 Acquired registration for Housing Finance

 SEBI in-principle approval for Mutual Fund

 Obtained Venture Capital license

2010

 Received in-principle approval for membership of the Singapore Stock Exchange

 Received membership of the Colombo Stock Exchange

Board of directors
 Mr. Nirmal
Jain

Chairman &
Managing
Director, India
Infoline Ltd.
Mr. Nirmal Jain is the founder and Chairman of India Infoline Ltd. He is a PGDM
(Post Graduate Diploma in Management) from IIM (Indian Institute of
Management) Ahmedabad, a Chartered Accountant and a rank-holder Cost
Accountant. His professional track record is equally outstanding. He started his
career in 1989 with Hindustan Lever Limited, the Indian arm of Unilever. During
his stint with Hindustan Lever, he handled a variety of responsibilities, including
export and trading in agro-commodities. He contributed immensely towards the
rapid and profitable growth of Hindustan Lever’s commodity export business,
which was then the nation’s as well as the Company’s top priority.

He founded Probity Research and Services Pvt. Ltd. (later re-christened India
Infoline) in 1995; perhaps the first independent equity research Company in India.
His work set new standards for equity research in India. Mr. Jain was one of the
first entrepreneurs in India to seize the internet opportunity, with the launch of
www.indiainfoline.com in 1999. Under his leadership, India Infoline not only
steered through the dotcom bust and one of the worst stock market downtrends but
also grew from strength to strength.

Mr. R.
Venkataraman
 CHAPTER – IV

DATA ANALYSIS&INTERPRETATION
Data;

Short-term trade in commercial

services
Latest trends
Quarterly trade in commercial services
 Click to see a larger image;

The data includes information on the main service categories

for about 150 economies. Jointly produced with UNCTAD and
ITC, it is updated every quarter, starting in January of every
year. The April release also contains preliminary annual data
for the previous year.
Monthly trade in commercial services

Data are made available for about 40 economies around the

25th of each month.
Other goods
32%

Manufactured goods
68%
 Sea transport Air transport Other transport services Postal and courier services

100% [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE]

90% [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE]
80%
70%
60% [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE]
50%
40%
30%
[CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE]
20% [CELLRANGE]
10%
0%
2019 2020 2021

By type of transport service

2019 2020 2021 2018 2019 2020
Sea transport 475692 468419 631309 41.8 49.8 49.9
Air transport 401586 217837 309721 35.3 23.2 24.5
Other transport services 242178 232629 296885 21.3 24.7 23.5
Postal and courier services 19725 21864 28063 1.7 2.3 2.2

944 1,115
2017

1,036 1,246
2018

1,041 1,237
2019

856
1,025
2020

1,158 1,374
2021

US $ Billion

Imports Exports
Value of Trade in Transport services from 2017-2021
(US $ Billion)

2017 2018 2019 2020

Exports 944 1,036 1,041 856

Import
s 1,115 1,246 1,237 1,025

Other goods
32%
Manufactured goods
68%

Share in total merchandise exports (%)

Manufactured
goods 68
Other goods 32

Other goods Manufactured

32% goods
68%
CHAPTER – V
FINDINGS
SUGGESTIONS
CONCLUSION
FINDINGS& SUGGESTIONS

summary of the facts at the origin of this dispute and claims by the parties
Measure at the origin of the dispute

The measure at the origin of this dispute is Decree No. 96-1133 of 24 December 1996, issued by the Prime
Minister of the Government of the French Republic, banning asbestos, implemented pursuant to the Labour
Code and the Consumer Code (hereinafter the "Decree"). The relevant provisions of the Decree are set out
below:

"Article 1

I. For the purpose of protecting workers, and pursuant to Article L. 231-7 of the Labour Code, the
manufacture, processing, sale, import, placing on the domestic market and transfer under any title whatsoever of
all varieties of asbestos fibres shall be prohibited, regardless of whether these substances have been
incorporated into materials, products or devices.

II. For the purpose of protecting consumers, and pursuant to Article L. 221.3 of the Consumer Code, the
manufacture, import, domestic marketing, exportation, possession for sale, offer, sale and transfer under any title
whatsoever of all varieties of asbestos fibres or any product containing asbestos fibres shall be prohibited.

III. The bans instituted under Articles I and II shall not prevent fulfilment of the obligations arising from
legislation on the elimination of wastes.

Article 2

I. On an exceptional and temporary basis, the bans instituted under Article 1 shall not apply to certain
existing materials, products or devices containing chrysotile fibre when, to perform an equivalent function, no
substitute for that fibre is available which:

- On the one hand, in the present state of scientific knowledge, poses a lesser occupational health risk
than chrysotile fibre to workers handling those materials, products or devices;

- on the other, provides all technical guarantees of safety corresponding to the ultimate purpose of the
use thereof.

II. The scope of application of paragraph I of this Article shall cover only the materials, products or devices
falling within the categories shown in an exhaustive list decreed by the Ministers for Labour, Consumption, the
Environment, Industry, Agriculture and Transport. To ascertain the justification for maintaining these exceptions,
the list shall be re-examined on an annual basis, after which the Senior Council for the Prevention of Occupational
Hazards and the National Commission for Occupational Health and Safety in Agriculture shall be consulted.

Article 3

I. The manufacture, processing, importation and domestic marketing of any of the materials, products or
devices falling into one of the categories mentioned on the list envisaged under Article 2 shall be subject to a
statement, signed, as appropriate, by the head of the business establishment, the importer or the party
responsible for domestic marketing, which should be addressed to the Minister for Labour. This statement shall
be filed in January of each year or, as appropriate, three months before the start of a new activity or the
alteration of an existing production activity, by means of a form decreed by the Ministers for Labour,
Consumption, Industry and Agriculture.

The statement shall be accompanied by all the supporting documents in the possession of the declaring
party making it possible, considering the state of scientific and technological progress, to determine that as of the
date of signature of the statement, the activity covered by the statement meets the conditions set forth in Article
2.I.

II. Activities that have not been the subject of a full statement submitted within the set time-frame may not
benefit from the exception granted under Article 2.
III. The Minister for Labour may at all times convey to the author of the statement such information as may
seem to him to establish that the material, product or device in question, although falling into one of the
categories on the list mentioned in Article 2, does not meet the conditions laid down in paragraph I of that same
Article. After requesting comments from the declaring party, he may serve notice to said party to cease
manufacture, processing, importation or domestic marketing and to observe the ban instituted under Article 1.
He may make such notification public.

Article 4

The manufacture and processing of the materials, products and devices falling into the categories on the
list mentioned in Article 2 of this Decree must conform with the rules laid down under Chapters I and II and
Chapter III, Section 1 of the aforementioned Decree dated 7 February 1999.

Labelling and marking shall conform with the requirements of Article L. 231-6 of the Labour Code and
the rules established by the aforementioned Decree dated 28 April 1998.

Article 5

Without prejudice to the application of the penalties envisaged under Article L. 263-2 of the Labour Code
in the event of violation of the provisions of Article 1.I of this Decree, the act of manufacturing, importing,
introducing into the domestic market, exporting, offering, selling, transferring under any title or possessing for
sale all varieties of asbestos fibres or any product containing asbestos fibres, in contravention of the provisions of
Article 1.II shall be punishable by the fine prescribed for fifth class offences.

Article 6

I. Articles 1, 2, 3 and Article 6.I of the above-mentioned Decree No. 88-466 of 28 April 1998 are hereby
repealed.

II. In the first subparagraph of Article 4 of the same Decree, the words: 'bans envisaged in Article
2 above' shall be replaced by the word: 'bans'.
 III. In Article 6.II of the same Decree, the words: 'other than those envisaged under Article 2' shall be
replaced by the words: 'which are not subject to bans'.

Article 7

Until 31 December 2001 and on a transitional basis, the ban on possession for sale, offering for sale and
transfer under any title shall not apply to the used vehicles nor to the agricultural or forestry machinery put into
circulation before the effective date of this Decree, and covered by Article R.138 of the Traffic Law. […]"

Conclusion;

(a) The TBT Agreement does not apply to the part of the Decree relating to the ban on
imports of asbestos and asbestos-containing products because that part does not constitute a
"technical regulation" within the meaning of Annex 1.1 to the TBT Agreement.

(b) The TBT Agreement applies to the part of the Decree relating to exceptions to the ban
on imports of asbestos and asbestos-containing products because that part constitutes a
"technical regulation" within the meaning of Annex 1.1 to the TBT Agreement. This legal
characterization, however, does not affect the legal characterization of the part of the Decree
banning asbestos nor our consideration of the rest of this case because Canada did not make
any specific claims regarding the exceptions to the general ban.

Application of the gatt 1994 to the decree

1. Preliminary questions
(a) The effect of practice within the GATT 1947 and the WTO

8.74 The Panel notes that, in support of their arguments, the parties refer to panel and
Appellate Body reports adopted in the WTO. They also refer at length to panel reports under
the GATT 1947, some of which were adopted and others not. As certain issues raised by the
parties have been dealt with in detail or even exclusively under the GATT 1947, we deem it
useful to explain how we intend to take into account the panel reports issued within the
framework of the GATT 1947. For this purpose, we shall base ourselves on the approach
followed by the Appellate Body in Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages.
 8.75 In this particular case, the Appellate Body emphasized that, with regard to the reports
adopted by panels under the GATT 1947, Article XVI:1 of the Agreement Establishing the WTO
and paragraph 1(b)(iv) of Annex 1A incorporating the GATT 1994 into the WTO Agreement
allow the "legal history and experience under the GATT 1947" to be brought into the new
WTO. Adopted panel reports "are an important part of the GATT acquis". They create
legitimate expectations among WTO Members and should thus be taken into account when
they are relevant to any dispute.

8.76 Turning to unadopted reports, the Appellate Body stated that unadopted panel reports
"have no legal status in the GATT or WTO system since they have not been endorsed through
decisions by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT or WTO Members". [footnote omitted].
Likewise, "a panel could nevertheless find useful guidance in the reasoning of an unadopted
panel report that it considered to be relevant". [footnote omitted].

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