4. QATAR VS BAHRAIN
4. QATAR VS BAHRAIN
4. QATAR VS BAHRAIN
Facts:
On 8 July 1991, Qatar filed in the Registry of the Court an Application instituting proceedings against
Bahrain in respect of certain disputes between the two States relating to sovereignty over the Hawar
Islands, sovereign rights over the shoals of Dibal and Qit’at Jaradah and the delimitation of their
maritime areas. Qatar founded the jurisdiction of the Court upon certain agreements between the
Parties stated to have been concluded in December 1987 and December 1990, the subject and scope
of the commitment to accept that jurisdiction being determined by a formula proposed by Bahrain
to Qatar in October 1988 and accepted by the latter State in December 1990 (the “Bahraini
formula”). As Bahrain contested the basis of jurisdiction invoked by Qatar, the Parties agreed that the
written proceedings should first be addressed to the questions of jurisdiction and admissibility. After
a Memorial of the Applicant and Counter-Memorial of the Respondent had been filed, the Court
directed that a Reply and a Rejoinder be filed by each of them, respectively.
On 1 July 1994 the Court delivered a first Judgment on the above-mentioned questions. It took the
view that both the exchanges of letters of December 1987 between the King of Saudi Arabia and the
Amir of Qatar, and between the King of Saudi Arabia and the Amir of Bahrain, and the document
entitled “Minutes” and signed at Doha in December 1990 constituted international agreements
creating rights and obligations for the Parties; and that by the terms of those agreements they had
undertaken to submit to the Court the whole of the dispute between them. In the latter regard, the
Court pointed out that the Application of Qatar did not cover some of the constitutive elements that
the Bahraini formula was supposed to cover. It accordingly decided to give the Parties the
opportunity to submit to it “the whole of the dispute” as circumscribed by the Minutes of 1990 and
that formula, while fixing 30 November 1994 as the time-limit within which the Parties were, jointly
or separately, to take action to that end.
On the prescribed date, Qatar filed a document entitled “Act”, which referred to the absence of an
agreement between the Parties to act jointly and declared that it was submitting “the whole of the
dispute” to the Court. On the same day, Bahrain filed a document entitled “Report” in which it
indicated, inter alia, that the submission to the Court of “the whole of the dispute” must be
“consensual in character, that is, a matter of agreement between the Parties”. By observations
submitted to the Court at a later time, Bahrain indicated that the unilateral “Act” of Qatar did not
“create that jurisdiction of the Court or effect a valid submission in the absence of Bahrain’s consent”.
Following the objections raised by Bahrain as to the authenticity of certain documents annexed to
the Memorial and Counter-Memorial of Qatar, the Court, by an Order of 30 March 1998, fixed a
time-limit for the filing, by the latter, of a report concerning the authenticity of each of the disputed
documents. By the same Order, the Court directed the submission of a Reply on the merits of the
dispute by each of the Parties. Qatar having decided to disregard the challenged documents for the
purposes of the case, the Court, by an Order of 17 February 1999, decided that the Replies would
not rely on those documents. It also granted an extension of the time-limit for the filing of the said
Replies.
Unilateral seisin is a legal term that refers to a single party bringing a dispute to a court without the agreement
of other parties. The term "unilateral" means a one-sided action, while "seisin" refers to legal possession of
land.
In its Judgment of 16 March 2001, the Court, after setting out the procedural background in the case,
recounted the complex history of the dispute. It noted that Bahrain and Qatar had concluded
exclusive protection agreements with Great Britain in 1892 and 1916 respectively, and that that
status of protected States had ended in 1971. The Court further cited the disputes which had arisen
between Bahrain and Qatar on the occasion, inter alia, of the granting of concessions to oil
companies, as well as the efforts made to settle those disputes.
The Court first considered the Parties’ claims to Zubarah. It stated that, in the period after 1868, the
authority of the Sheikh of Qatar over Zubarah had been gradually consolidated, that it had been
acknowledged in the Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 29 July 1913 and definitively established in 1937.
It further stated that there was no evidence that members of the Naim tribe had exercised sovereign
authority on behalf of the Sheikh of Bahrain within Zubarah. Accordingly, it concluded that Qatar
had sovereignty over Zubarah.
Turning to the Hawar Islands, the Court stated that the decision by which the British Government had
found in 1939 that those islands belonged to Bahrain did not constitute an arbitral award, but that
did not mean that it was devoid of legal effect. It noted that Bahrain and Qatar had consented to
Great Britain settling their dispute at the time and found that the 1939 decision must be regarded as
a decision that was binding from the outset on both States and continued to be so after 1971.
Rejecting Qatar’s arguments that the decision was null and void, the Court concluded that Bahrain
had sovereignty over the Hawar Islands.
The Court observed that the British decision of 1939 did not mention Janan Island, which it
considered as forming a single island with Hadd Janan. It pointed out, however, that in letters sent in
1947 to the Rulers of Qatar and Bahrain, the British Government had made it clear that “Janan Island
is not regarded as being included in the islands of the Hawar group”. The Court considered that the
British Government, in so doing, had provided an authoritative interpretation of its 1939 decision, an
interpretation which revealed that it regarded Janan as belonging to Qatar. Accordingly, Qatar had
sovereignty over Janan Island, including Hadd Janan.
The Court then turned to the question of the maritime delimitation. It recalled that international
customary law was the applicable law in the case and that the Parties had requested it to draw a
single maritime boundary. In the southern part, the Court had to draw a boundary delimiting the
territorial seas of the Parties, areas over which they enjoyed territorial sovereignty (including sea-
bed, superjacent waters and superjacent aerial space). In the northern part, the Court had to make a
delimitation between areas in which the Parties had only sovereign rights and functional jurisdiction
(continental shelf, exclusive economic zone).
With respect to the territorial seas, the Court considered that it had to draw provisionally an
equidistance line (a line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines
from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each of the two States is measured) and then to
consider whether that line must be adjusted in the light of any special circumstances. As the Parties
had not specified the baselines to be used, the Court recalled that, under the applicable rules of law,
the normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea was the low-water line along the
coast. It observed that Bahrain had not included a claim to the status of archipelagic State in its
formal submissions and that the Court was therefore not requested to take a position on that issue.
In order to determine what constituted the Parties’ relevant coasts, the Court first had to establish
which islands came under their sovereignty. Bahrain had claimed to have sovereignty over the islands
of Jazirat Mashtan and Umm Jalid, a claim which had not been contested by Qatar. As to Qit’at
Jaradah, the nature of which was disputed, the Court held that it should be considered as an island
because it was above water at high tide; the Court added that the activities which had been carried
out by Bahrain were sufficient to support its claim of sovereignty over the island. With regard to low-
Unilateral seisin is a legal term that refers to a single party bringing a dispute to a court without the agreement
of other parties. The term "unilateral" means a one-sided action, while "seisin" refers to legal possession of
land.
tide elevations, the Court, after noting that international treaty law was silent on the question
whether those elevations should be regarded as “territory”, found that low-tide elevations situated in
the overlapping area of the territorial seas of both States could not be taken into consideration for
the purposes of drawing the equidistance line. That was true of Fasht ad Dibal, which both Parties
regarded as a low-tide elevation. The Court then considered whether there were any special
circumstances which made it necessary to adjust the equidistance line in order to obtain an
equitable result. It found that there were such circumstances which justified choosing a delimitation
line passing on the one hand between Fasht al Azm and Qit’at ash Shajarah and, on the other,
between Qit’at Jaradah and Fasht ad Dibal.
In the northern part, the Court, citing its case law, followed the same approach, provisionally drawing
an equidistance line and examining whether there were circumstances requiring an adjustment of
that line. The Court rejected Bahrain’s argument that the existence of certain pearling banks situated
to the north of Qatar, and which were predominantly exploited in the past by Bahraini fishermen,
constituted a circumstance justifying a shifting of the line. It also rejected Qatar’s argument that
there was a significant disparity between the coastal lengths of the Parties calling for an appropriate
correction. The Court further stated that considerations of equity required that the maritime
formation of Fasht al Jarim should have no effect in determining the boundary line.
Unilateral seisin is a legal term that refers to a single party bringing a dispute to a court without the agreement
of other parties. The term "unilateral" means a one-sided action, while "seisin" refers to legal possession of
land.