Comparative Study on Energy R&D Performance:

Gas Turbine Case Study

Prepared by
Darian Unger and Howard Herzog
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Energy Laboratory
Prepared for
Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry
(CRIEPI)
Final Report
August 1998
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.
INTRODUCTION/OVERVIEW .............................................................
....................1
2. GAS TURBINE
BACKGROUND.........................................................................
......4
3. TECHNOLOGICAL
IMPROVEMENTS ......................................................................
.6
4. GAS SUPPLY AND
AVAILABILITY ......................................................................
.20
5. ENVIRONMENTAL
CONCERNS...........................................................................
.25
6. ELECTRIC RESTRUCTURING AND CHANGING MARKET CONDITIONS ....................27
7. DRIVER
INTERACTIONS ......................................................................
...............33
8. LESSONS FROM OTHER CASE
STUDIES ................................................................39
9. CONCLUSIONS AND
LESSONS............................................................................
.42
APPENDIX A: TURBINE
TIMELINE..........................................................................4
4
APPENDIX B: REFERENCES
REVIEWED ..................................................................49
APPENDIX C: EXPERTS
INTERVIEWED....................................................................56
i
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Gas turbines have emerged as a strong force in the generation market. Gas and
combined cycle
power plants dominate current orders from electricity generators. Figure A shows a
resurgence
of growth in this field during the past decade. This followed the development of
gas turbines in
the 1940s, their emergence into the peak power market in the 1960s, and the gas
turbine slump of
the late 1970s and 1980s, during which almost no gas turbines were ordered in the
US. This new
growth can be explained by the way that R&D advancements interacted with other
drivers to gas
turbine success. These other drivers were fuel availability, environmental
concerns, and changing
market conditions stemming from electrical restructuring.
R&D was one of the major keys to gas turbine success. Technical improvements such
as material
advancements and cooling innovations helped to increase gas and combined cycle
turbine
efficiency and make them more competitive in the power generation market. Figure B
displays a
rise of efficiency of gas turbine combined cycle systems.
Natural gas availability was another force that interacted with technical
improvements to advance
gas turbines. Figure C demonstrates how natural gas prices were high during the
same period as
the gas turbine slump. Prices peaked during the early 1980s due to natural gas
deregulation, a
perceived lack of natural gas reserves, and a general trend of rising fuel prices.
When additional
reserves were discovered and the deregulatory process ended, natural gas prices
returned to a
more competitive level and could be relied upon as a generally available commodity,
driving the
gas turbine market.
Other forces interacting with R&D and natural gas availability were environmental
concerns and
the changing power generation market. Environmental concerns began to show their
effect
during the 1970s with regulations which drove up the costs of both coal and nuclear
power plants.
Changing market conditions, hallmarked by electricity restructuring, is changing
the way that
management decisions are being made about turbine orders. Lower capital costs and
higher
efficiencies are now driving demand for additional gas and combined cycle turbines.
The success of gas turbine power generation can be explained by the interaction of
technical
R&D with gas availability, environmental concerns, and changing market conditions.
As a result,
we can see that R&D alone does not ensure success. We have developed a series of
criteria for
evaluating energy R&D spending:
·
It is important to have a sufficient basic research and technology base upon which
to build.
The military aerospace industry provided this for gas turbines.
·
Until the interaction occurs, R&D can be sustained by niche or alternative markets.
For
gas turbines this included commercial aviation and the peak power market.
ii
·
While it is hard to predict the future, there needs to be at least a plausible
scenario of the
interaction of forces that will make the technology attractive to a larger market.
As the
20th century comes to a close, these forces have converged for gas.
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
Year
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Million kW
Great Northeast
Blackout
Deregulation Starts
Fuel Use Act Begins
Deregulation
Ends
Fuel Use
Act Ends
Energy
Policy Act
Figure A: Electric utility net summer capability for gas turbines over time. 1
1 Energy Information Administration:
ftp://ftp.eia.doe.gov/pub/energy.overview/aer/aer8-8.txt Table 8.8.
iii
1965
1975
1985
1995
2005
Year
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
Efficiency (Lower Heating Value)
Figure B. General Graphics showing major gas turbine trends and developments over
time
(Combined Cycle Gas Turbine Efficiency)
iv
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
Year
0
100
200
300
400
1982 cents per million Btu
Gas
Coal
Deregulation
Ends
Deregulation Starts
Fuel Use Act Begins
Fuel Use
Act Ends
Figure C: General Graphics showing major gas turbine trends and developments over
time (Natural Gas Costs for Utility Plants)
1
1. INTRODUCTION/OVERVIEW
This study for the Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry (CRIEPI)
details the MIT
Energy Laboratory case study on gas turbines to help us better understand energy
R&D
performance. The project included three main tasks:
·
Performing a rigorous, documented study of gas and combined cycle turbine
improvements. This involved a detailed analysis of the development and deployment
of
gas and combined cycle turbine technologies through literature review, market
examination, and interviews with key industry leaders and researchers.
·
Drawing conclusions about energy R&D performance in specific cases. To accomplish
this, we used our gas turbine case study in addition to other analyses of
generation
development.
·
Applying the lessons learned from these case studies to emerging energy
technologies.
This study focuses on the evolution of gas and combined cycle turbines. These
turbines have
emerged as a strong force in the power generation market and are marked by both
rapid
development and high demand. Their success and growth in popularity would not have
been
possible without decades of previous R&D and ongoing advancements which allowed
them to be
practical machines when market economics demanded them.
Market success demanded that the power generation industry go beyond simply
improving gas
turbine technology. Although the technological improvements had been occurring for
years, often
sustained by non-energy markets, it was not until these advances interacted with
three other
drivers that a new and substantive shift took place in the gas turbine industry.
These other drivers
to gas turbine success were fuel availability, restructuring of the electric
utility industry, and
environmental concerns.
The notion of technical R&D as part of a convergence has a substantive history. For
example,
when Shell International Petroleum examined the evolution of the world’s energy
systems, it
found that a number of “converging developments” all contributed to the process.
Figure 1 shows
an example of how various developments played important roles in large changes in
the energy
field. In this example, automobiles achieved widespread success due to four major
inputs: the
availability of oil, new and improved materials such as polymers and high-quality
steel, new
manufacturing techniques such as assembly line production, and a social desire for
freedom and
consumption.
We find that a similar framework can be used to help explain the large expansion in
the gas and
combined cycle market in the late 1980s and 1990s. Our study indicates that four
major forces
and events interacted to contribute to and cause the industry developments. One set
of important
advancements took place in turbine technology. Materials engineering and cooling
improvements
allowed gas turbines to operate at higher temperatures and thus increase their
efficiencies.
Second, the deregulation of natural gas prices led to gas being both plentiful and
available at
reasonable cost, leading to the increased desire to use this fuel in electrical
generation. Third,
2
environmental concerns led to greater constraints on coal and steam-turbine plant
emissions,
increasing the competitiveness of gas and combined cycle turbines. Finally, the
strategic
management decisions which corresponded with US electric restructuring and changing
market
conditions also acted to propel gas and combined cycle development, deployment, and
use. After
a brief history of gas turbine development, these four interacting drivers for
development
(Figure 2) are described individually in the following sections.
Individual Mobility
(Automobile)
Social Desire
Oil
Assembly
Line
Machine Tools
Polymers and
Aluminum
Steel
Figure 1. Converging developments in the 1920s leading to success of the
automobile.
Adapted from Shell Oil Company: The Evolution of the World’s Energy System, 1860-
2060.
3
Gas Supply
Gas Turbines and
Combined Cycles for
Power Generation
Environmental
Concerns
Market
Conditions
Restructuring
Cooling
Technology
New Alloys
Figure 2. Interacting developments in the 1990s leading to gas turbine success.
4
2. GAS TURBINE BACKGROUND
Gas, or combustion, turbines were originally developed in the 18th century. The
first patent for a
combustion turbine was issued to England’s John Barber in 1791. Patents for modern
versions of
combustion turbines were awarded in the late nineteenth century to Franz Stolze and
Charles
Curtis, however early versions of gas turbines were all impractical because the
power necessary to
operate the compressors outweighed the amount of power generated by the turbine. To
achieve
positive efficiencies, engineers would have to increase combustion and inlet
temperatures beyond
the maximum allowable turbine material temperatures of the day. It was not until
the middle of
this century that gas turbines evolved into practical machines, primarily as jet
engines. Although
some prototype combustion turbine units were designed, the developments that led to
their
practical use were a result of World War II military programs.
The race for jet engines was spurred by World War II and therefore included
enormous
government subsidization of initial R&D. The gas turbines for power generation were
to emerge
later from these military advances in technology. Germany’s Junkers and Great
Britain’s Rolls-
Royce were the only companies successful enough to enter general production with
their engines
during the war.2 Technology transfers began to take place as early as 1941, when
Great Britain
began working with the US on turbine engines. Engineering drawings were shared
between
England’s Power Jets Ltd. and America’s GE Company during this period. American
companies
such as GE and Westinghouse began development of gas turbines for land, sea and air
use which
would not prove deployable until the end of the war. Other companies which were to
emerge
later in the combustion turbine market, such as Solar Turbines (the “Solar” refers
only to the
name of the company, not the source of energy) also emerged during the war by
fabricating high-
temperature materials, such as steel for airplane engine exhaust manifolds. The
knowledge gained
by manufacturers during this time would help them manufacture other gas turbine
products in the
post war period.
After World War II, gas turbine R&D was spurred in some areas and stunted in
others. In an
example of R&D expansion, the transfer of detailed turbine plans from Rolls-Royce
to Pratt &
Whitney was made as a repayment to the US for its assistance to Great Britain under
the Lend-
Lease agreement.3, 4 This allowed Pratt & Whitney, previously specialists in
reciprocating engines,
to emerge as a strong developer of combustion turbines. In contrast, German and
Japanese
companies were expressly barred from manufacturing gas turbines. These companies
were able to
emerge later. For example, Siemens began recruiting engineers and designers from
the jet engine
industry as soon as it was allowed, beginning in 1952.5
2 William W. Bathie, Fundamentals of Gas Turbines, 2nd Ed. p. 7
3 The Lend Lease Agreement was an agreement between Great Britain and the United
States. It was a means by
which the US could circumvent previous isolationist/neutrality legislation that
barred its transfer of military goods
to other nations.
4 William W. Bathie, Fundamentals of Gas Turbines, 2nd Ed. p. 10
5 W J Watson, “The ‘Success’ of the Combined Cycle Gas Turbine” Opportunities and
Advances in International
Power Generation, University of Durham Conference Publication, March 18-20, 1996,
London: Institution of
Electrical Engineers, 1996. p 88.
5
Most developments in the 1950s and 1960s were geared towards gas turbines for
aircraft use.
R&D received a boost when turbofan engines were employed by commercial aircraft as
well as
for military use. For example, GE and Pratt & Whitney engines were used in early
Boeing and
Douglas commercial planes. This advance of combustion turbines into the commercial
aviation
market, and in some cases the boat propulsion market, allowed manufacturers to
sustain their
development efforts even though entrance into the baseload electric power
generation market was
not yet even on the horizon. Gas turbines also began to emerge slowly in the
peaking power
generation market. Westinghouse and GE both began to form power generation design
groups
independent of their aircraft engine designers. Westinghouse would later exit the
jet engine
business in 1960 while keeping its stationary gas turbine division. Among US
turbine
manufacturers, only GE was especially able to transfer knowledge between its
ongoing aircraft
engine and power generation turbine businesses.
The early 1960s saw the beginning of gas turbine “packages” for power generation.
This
occurred when GE and Westinghouse engineers were able to standardize (within their
own
companies) designs for gas turbines. This technology marketing innovation took
place for two
main reasons. First, in order to win over customers from traditional steam turbine
or
reciprocating engine equipment, manufacturers found that they were more successful
if they
offered fully-assembled packages, which included turbines, compressors, generators,
and auxiliary
equipment. Second, this standardization allowed for multiple sales with little
redesign for each
order, easing the engineering burden and lowering the costs of gas turbines.
The 1960’s also marked the introduction of cooling technologies to gas turbines.
This advance
was the single most important breakthrough in gas turbine development since their
practical
advent during World War II. The cooling involved the circulation of fluids through
and around
turbine blades and vanes. These cooling advances were originally part of the
military turbojet
R&D program, but began to diffuse into the power generation turbine programs about
five years
later. Advances in cooling, along with continuing improvements in turbine
materials, allowed
manufacturers to increase their firing and rotor inlet temperatures and therefore
improve
efficiencies.
Although manufacturers were making great technological strides in gas turbine
development, it
was not until the Great Northeast Blackout of 1965 that the US utility market truly
awoke to
need for additional peaking generation capacity. This peaking is exactly what gas
turbines were
good for; their fast startup times would allow generators to match periods of high
demand. Even
though simple-cycle gas turbines of the day had dismal efficiencies (only about
25%) compared to
those of coal-fired plants, their ability to handle peak loads led to an increase
in demand and
renewed R&D from manufacturers. The combustion turbine capabilities of US utilities
rose
dramatically in the late 1960s and early 1970s in response to this trend.
6
3. TECHNOLOGICAL IMPROVEMENTS
Gas turbines for power generation have improved greatly since their predecessors
from the middle
of the century. The best way to see how they have advanced is by looking at their
rising
efficiencies over time (see Figure 3). A doubling of efficiency has occurred for
simple cycles, with
the introduction of combined cycles causing a tripling in efficiency. Turbine
efficiencies, along
with cost and reliability, are among the most important criteria when power
producers place
orders for new plants. Therefore, the gas turbine gains in efficiency, which is the
result of
technological development, have been crucial for their success.
1945
1955
1965
1975
1985
1995
2005
Year
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
Efficiency (LHV)
Combined Cycle
Simple Cycle
Figure 3. General efficiency increases over time for simple and combined cycle gas
turbines.
To increase efficiencies, turbine designers have worked to increase firing
temperatures without
damaging the turbines themselves. The advantage of having high firing and rotor
inlet
temperatures (RITs) is that they nudge gas turbine cycles closer to Carnot
thermodynamic cycles.
However, firing turbines beyond the threshold temperatures of their components
threaten their
integrity and reliability. R&D addressing this concern has progressed along two
major avenues of
development: material improvements and cooling advances. Each of these two pathways
is
discussed in detail below.
7
Material Improvements
Materials used in gas turbines have gone through many incremental improvements
since the first
practical turbines were developed in the 1940s. Most R&D efforts led to improved
steel alloys
for use in turbine vanes, blades, and inlet blocks. This R&D in turbine materials
and coatings led
to two important effects. First, gas turbines were better able to withstand high
temperatures.
These more rugged materials allowed for hotter inlet gas to enter the turbine’s
first stage blades,
leading to higher efficiencies. Second, material improvements led to an increase in
rotor life and
reliability. Gas and combined cycle plants could not have achieved popularity and
larger market
shares without solving problems such as premature blade cracking or component
deformations.
Together, the higher temperatures, higher efficiencies, and improved reliabilities
have advanced
the deployment of gas turbines in the power generation market.
Material improvements have often been marked by iterative advancements through the
years. In
the 1950s and 1960s, materials were often selected from available in-house steam
turbine and jet
engine experiences. However, differences between industrial gas turbines and these
other types of
turbines eventually required that their material paths diverge. For example,
aerospace turbines
operate under significantly different conditions because turbojets operate in
relatively pristine
environments and situations for which light weight is a benefit. Many of their
materials are not
suitable for the corrosive operating environments of power generation gas turbines.
Furthermore,
jet engines are subject to strict government safety regulations which require
inspections at short
and regular intervals. In contrast, industrial gas turbines, subject to more
commercial
considerations, are expected to operate for longer periods of time with less
rigorous inspection
and maintenance. Steam turbines also differ significantly from gas turbines in
their material needs.
The main concern in steam turbine blade design is the structural integrity of large
blades and
dealing with the corrosion due to steam and water passing through the blades and
vanes. In
contrast, gas turbines have smaller blades which are subject to higher temperatures
and different
fluids passing through and around them. The unique problems and characteristics of
power
generation gas turbines required that their material evolution follow a different
path of
development.
Progress in gas turbine material development often came in the form of alternative
stainless steel
or metal alloys that had improved heat characteristics. Different parts of gas
turbines use a variety
of alloy metals, including varying quantities of cobalt, nickel, and chromium. In
turbine
compressors, manufacturers vary in their metals and manufacturing methods, but
initial blades are
often made with stainless steel because it is strong and easy to machine.6
Compressors have not
gone through many drastic changes in material over the years. As in cases from
decades ago,
tertiary row compressor blades may use a 12 percent chrome material because of its
high strength,
good corrosion resistance, and superior damping characteristics. One example of an
addition
comes from Westinghouse’s use of CuNiIn coating on the compressor blade roots to
inhibit
fretting.7
6 Interview with Lee McLurin, Westinghouse.
7 Bannister et. al. “Evolution of Westinghouse Heavy Duty Power Generation and
Industrial Combustion
Turbines,” Transactions of the ASME, April, 1996., p. 325
8
Materials in other parts of the turbine have been changed more frequently as the
state of the art
advanced. This is certainly the case with stationary turbine blades (or vanes).
Some early
stationary blade designs used welded structures in AISI 310, a 25-20 austenitic
stainless steel that
had excellent resistance to both corrosion and to oxidation at elevated
temperatures, but which
had limited strength capabilities.8 Some turbojets then switched to higher
strength, nickel-based
alloys, but this proved to be unsuitable for industrial gas turbines because they
either lacked
corrosion and oxidation resistance or they were too difficult to weld with enough
integrity. In the
1960s, engineers began to design these vanes with cobalt alloys for two reasons.
First, cobalt
alloys have high heat tolerances and can withstand high firing temperatures and
corrosion with
less cracking or warping. Second, cobalt alloys tend to have favorable welding
characteristics.
The welding ease of this metal can be extremely important when facing the
inevitable fact that
turbine vanes will occasionally crack with time and use. Having the ability to
adequately repair a
vane through welding is far preferable and less costly then having to replace the
whole
component. In this sense, material improvements in stationary blades and vanes have
improved
heat characteristics and increased rotor life by reducing turbine damage and
allowing easier
maintenance. Cobalt alloys are still used today, although the type of alloy has
been improved to
increase creep and oxidation resistance. Another set of improvements took place
with a move to
the use of more low-chromium alloys. This shift to use of 247 and 979 chromium
alloys took
place to enhance strength, even though use of these materials sacrificed some
resistance to
corrosion. Some turbine manufacturers have also increased their use of titanium, a
particularly
strong but expensive metal, in their gas turbine components. 9
Rotating turbine blades have also improved with progressions in their materials.
These rotating
blades tend towards nickel alloys, which also display improved properties with
iterative change.
Early designs used a variety of nickel-based alloys and even some 12 percent chrome
material
similar to that used for compressor blades. Development led to the more widespread
use of some
standard Inconel nickel alloys, which were necessary as firing temperatures
increased. In another
example, improving from 520 nickel alloy to 750 and 738 alloys have allowed some
manufacturers to maintain or improve high heat tolerances while simultaneously
improving their
production characteristics.10 Among the most important production characteristics
is the
determination of whether a blade is cast or forged. Forging and machining a blade
may be easier
for some cases, but intricate designs and complex configurations may require that a
blade be cast
instead. Other times, there can be considerable difference between the ability to
be able to cast a
blade in a press than it is to painstakingly forge and machine one. The casting may
be a simpler
process that is less expensive. Some turbine material improvements, such as
Westinghouse’s
switch to 738 alloy, have led to the use of more “crystallized” metals that are
directionally
solidified and more amenable to successful and simple production. Metals used
previously would
be more likely to crack if they were cast because their internal structure is not
as strong as today’s
alloys.11 This incremental progression in alloys has been instrumental in improving
gas turbines.
8 Bannister et. al. “Evolution of Westinghouse Heavy Duty Power Generation and
Industrial Combustion
Turbines,” Transactions of the ASME, April, 1996., p. 325.
9 Interview with Lee McLurin, Westinghouse.
10 Bannister et. al. “Evolution of Westinghouse Heavy Duty Power Generation and
Industrial Combustion
Turbines,” Transactions of the ASME, April, 1996. p. 326
11 Interview with Lee McLurin, Westinghouse.
9
Future gas turbines may be able to make better use of ceramics materials. The
introduction of
ceramic parts, with their excellent abilities to withstand heat and corrosion, has
the potential to be
a great technological breakthrough in the future. Unfortunately, the brittleness of
ceramics have
prevented their widespread use and dampens the enthusiasm of many engineers for the
prospects
of this material. So far, attempts have yielded mixed results. Solar turbines, as
part of the US
government’s Advanced Turbine Systems (ATS) project, has been developing and
testing the first
modern gas turbines with major ceramic components. This research is not yet
commercially
viable, however the hope is to develop ceramic turbine components that will not
shatter and can
tolerate even higher rotor inlet temperatures. Current experimental applications
with ceramic first
stage blades, combustor liners, and nozzles for small turbines have resulted in 37
degree Celsius
increases in allowable firing temperatures and corresponding 5.7% increases in
efficiency,
however the long-term durability of these ceramics are still questionable and
require further
documentation.12 This would increase efficiency and, if cooling were no longer
necessary, reduce
the need to divert compressed air from the engine’s compressor for component
cooling.
Advocates of ceramics hope that these advancement materials can be the next big
breakthrough in
gas turbines, succeeding the major breakthrough which occurred in the 1960s in the
area of
turbine cooling.
Cooling Advancements
The introduction of cooling to gas turbines was the most important technological
breakthrough in
gas turbine development since the end of World War II. Advancements in turbine
cooling also
helped to advance the penetration of gas turbines in today’s power generation
market. Like
material advancements, cooling innovations allowed power producers to allow higher-
temperature
inlet gases into the turbine bladepath. Gas turbine operation at these higher
temperatures allows
for higher efficiencies and make these turbines more viable sources of electric
power.
12 Bautista, Paul, “Rise in Gas-Fired Power Generation Tracks Gains in Turbine
Efficiency,” Oil & Gas Journal,
Vol. 94, No. 33, August 12, 1996, p. 45.
10
Figure 4: The introduction of cooling allowed a breakthrough in rotor inlet
temperatures.13
Figure 4 demonstrates how the introduction of cooling helped to increase rotor
inlet
temperatures. Without it, turbine designers would have been limited to the ordinary
heat
tolerances of metal alloys and coatings. Firing temperatures would have leveled off
after the
1960s at their threshold levels of about 1800°F (1000°C). Instead, rotor inlet
temperatures were
13 Bannister et. al. “Evolution of Westinghouse Heavy Duty Power Generation and
Industrial Combustion
Turbines,” Transactions of the ASME, April, 1996. p. 325.
11
able to increase and improve turbine efficiencies while minimizing thermal damage.
These trends
helped gas turbines break into the power generation market.
Cooling usually involves the circulation of air or steam through hot turbine
components. This
includes extremely intricate pathways, tunnels, and holes to allow for maximum heat
transfer to
the cooling fluid. The source of the cooling fluid is often another part of the
generation process.
For example, air-cooled turbines may receive their cooling fluid directly from the
compressor.
Combined cycle power plants may use steam for cooling because it is readily
available from the
steam turbine boiler or heat recovery steam generator (HRSG) and the heat transfer
and heat
capacity coefficients of steam are nearly double those of air.14 In either case,
the cooling fluid
follows an extremely complicated and carefully calculated path to maximize
circulation and heat
transfer.
The progression of cooling has been critical in gas turbine development. Cooling
was originally
introduced into military turbojet engines in the early 1960s. The advance followed
a relatively
common trend in gas turbine technology transfer: new developments in the turbines
of military
turbojets would become available to civilian aircraft about two or three years
later, followed by
diffusion to the power generation gas turbine industry after about five years.15 GE
and
Westinghouse helped to pioneer stationary gas turbine cooling in the mid to late
1960s, beginning
with stationary components and then gradually moving to more complex cooling
geometries.
Cooling techniques were able to advance with improvements in computer codes and
modeling.
Engineering required models and tools for finite element analysis, heat transfer,
and fluid
dynamics to be able to design better and more complicated cooling systems.
Initially, engineers
were only able to use simple two-dimensional modeling techniques for heat transfer
calculations.
In this sense, they were technologically limited in the same way as material
engineers who were
unable to perform complex stress distributions in irregular shapes. To the benefit
of both material
stress and cooling efforts, finite element analysis codes improved during the
following decades.
For example, Westinghouse turbine engineers switched codes repeatedly, beginning
with tools
developed in-house, then moving to general modeling application such as Ansys,
which was
developed in great part by National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
efforts to
model its own materials and devices. Current versions of Ansys, Pro-Engineer (ProE)
and
computation fluid dynamics remain an integral part of modern turbine development
and allow for
much faster advancements.16 As a result, cooling designs have become increasingly
intricate and
effective. An example of the evolution of cooling technology can be seen in Figure
5, which
shows how Westinghouse has improved its 1st row gas turbine blade through the
years.
14 Bautista, Paul, “Rise in Gas-Fired Power Generation Tracks Gains in Turbine
Efficiency,” Oil & Gas Journal,
Vol. 94, No. 33, August 12, 1996, p. 45.
15 Allen Hammond, William Metz, Energy and the Future: Power Gas and Combined
Cycles, pp. 17-18
16 Interview with Lee McLurin, Westinghouse.
12
Figure 5: The evolution and complexity of component cooling.17
Comparing material improvements and cooling advancements
Material improvements and cooling advancements have been complementary in gas
turbine R&D,
however each type of development is different. The first points of comparison are
the costs
involved with each type of advancement. For example, an advantage of material
improvements is
that they allow for increased turbine performance without necessitating additional
machining
costs. Unlike intricate cooling schemes, which require expensive machining during
the
manufacturing of blades with complex fluid pathways, material improvements may
simply mean a
change in liquid metal alloy that is poured into preexisting molds. In contrast,
cooling can boast
of the fact that it requires no changes to potentially more expensive materials.
Another major difference between types of development is the nature of their
progress. Although
both initial material and cooling techniques stemmed from the military aerospace
industry, power
system engineers soon began adapting each type of technology independently.
Material
improvements occurred incrementally, only making substantive leaps when parts could
advance to
the point where they could be manufactured less expensively. In contrast, cooling
advancements
17 Bannister et. al. “Evolution of Westinghouse Heavy Duty Power Generation and
Industrial Combustion
Turbines,” Transactions of the ASME, April, 1996, p. 324.
13
were marked by a large breakthrough during their introduction, followed by great
strides forward
as computer codes and modeling improved. This contrast may be modified in the
future if
material developments lead to the widespread use of ceramic components, which would
be the
first real breakthrough in turbine material engineering.
Finally, mechanical and cooling advancements have differed somewhat in their
sources and
methods of technology transfer. For turbine materials, initial blade structures and
material
specifications were transferred from the military turbojet industry. Major turbine
manufacturers
such as GE and Westinghouse Electric Corporation got their start in the gas turbine
industry by
developing gas turbines for applications in military aviation. These turbojets
became the first
crude models for power generation gas turbines. As gas turbines became accepted in
the field of
power generation, engineering and manufacturing companies began to split teams of
gas-turbine
engineers into “aviation” side and “power generation” sides. (GE also separated its
steam turbine
engineering groups from its gas turbine engineering groups, whereas Westinghouse
kept them
together until the 1980s.)18 The power generation groups then began developing and
applying
their own lessons for power-producing turbines as opposed to thrust-producing
turbines. The
power generation engineering efforts let to independent advances in materials
applications,
including improved heat tolerance and distribution for turbine inlet components.
Both power and
aviation engineering efforts led to the applications of protective coatings on the
high-temperature
turbine components.
Advances in cooling technology have four identified sources. The first is
development in the
aviation industry, which has led to technology transfer to the power generation
field. The first
cooled turbine concepts were applied to military aircraft and then spread to civil
aviation and
power generation. A second source of cooling technology transfer is the drilling
industry, which
also requires that rapidly rotating metal be cooled to prevent damage.19 A third
major resource
for cooling advancements came through design codes and programs pioneered by both
turbine
design engineers and other groups in unrelated fields, such as NASA. Finally, the
power
generation industry itself has pioneered some efforts in keeping its own product
temperatures cool
enough to allow inlet temperature increases without the thermal breakdown of
turbine
components.
Despite their differences, both material improvements and cooling advancements
helped to
increase the RITs of gas and combined cycle plants. These higher RITs helped to
boost the
efficiencies shown earlier in this section. Figures 6 and 7 demonstrate this trend.
Figure 6 shows
how the rotor inlet temperatures increased with time for one manufacturer’s
specific family of
turbines, in this case the Westinghouse 251 series. It shows its biggest jump in
RIT as cooling
was introduced in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In this chart, improvements can
be seen in
differences between the models. The AA model turbines only had their first row
stationary vanes
cooled. The B model turbines also had the first row blade cooling and compressors
similar to
earlier versions, but also included second row vane segment cooling. The B8 model
included an
improved combustion system and temperature profile as well as fine advancements to
the first row
blade cooling. The B12 model hallmarked considerably improved air flow which
allowed
18 Interview with Lee McLurin, Westinghouse.
19 Interview with Craig Tedmon, ABB.
14
improvements to the both the first row blades and vanes. By this time, two levels
of blades and
three levels of vanes were cooled.
Figure 7 shows similar data for another family of turbines, the larger 501 series
by the same
company. This figure shows how RITs increased with the use of cooling in the early
1970s,
stalled during a period of slow development during the 1980s, then increased when
development
resumed using advanced computer codes in the 1990s. As in the case of the 251
series, each
successive turbine included improved or expanded cooling. The AA model only cooled
the first
row stationary vanes. The B model cooled its first row blade and second row vane
segment as
well. The D model included improved early stage cooling as well as an expansion of
cooling the
second row blade. The D5 model cooled the first two rows of blades and three rows
of vanes.
Figure 8 shows how increased efficiencies and higher RITs are linked for another
turbine
manufacturer as well. This figure shows how series of GE family turbines improved
in both RIT
and efficiency. As before, each letter designates a family of similar machines. The
letter
designations are company-specific, however they generally reflect groups of
turbines which have
similar RIT and size (output) characteristics. Together, these figures clearly show
how
technological improvements have increased firing temperatures and efficiencies.
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
Year
800
900
1000
1100
1200
Temperature (C)
251 A
251 AA
251 B12
251 B
251 B8
251 B10
251 B2
15
Figure 6. Rotor Inlet Temperatures (RIT) of the Westinghouse 251 Gas Turbine
Family.20
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
Year
800
900
1000
1100
1200
1300
1400
1500
Temperature (C)
501 AA
501 A
501 B
501 D
501 D5
501 D5
501 F
501 G
Figure 7. Rotor Inlet Temperatures (RIT) of the Westinghouse 501 Gas Turbine
Family.21
20 Bannister et. al. “Evolution of Westinghouse Heavy Duty Power Generation and
Industrial Combustion
Turbines,” Transactions of the ASME, April, 1996.
21 Bannister et. al. “Evolution of Westinghouse Heavy Duty Power Generation and
Industrial Combustion
Turbines,” Transactions of the ASME, April, 1996.
16
Figure 8. GE Power Systems chart showing advances in both firing temperature and
efficiency.22
Other Advances
Although material enhancements and cooling evolutions were the main gas turbine
technological
improvements, R&D did lead to other engineering advances as well. These include the
adaptation
of steam injection into gas turbines, which first occurred in 1984. This process
injects steam from
the Heat Recovery Steam Generator (HRSG) into the gas turbine combustor. The high
pressure
steam is heated, expands in the gas turbine, and boosts power output. Another new
advancement
was ABB’s unique use of sequential combustion (or reheat) which produced some of
the benefits
of high-temperature firing without causing the same level of thermal damage or the
same NOx
levels which result from the more simple type of high temperature combustion.23 In
explaining
this advancement, it should be noted that Brown Boveri’s closed its own gas turbine
business in
the mid 1980s because of the slump in the gas turbine market. When it merged with
Asea in 1988
to become ABB, it immediately began a brand new development program which was
relatively
independent from past programs because of the complete break in the business. In
addition, ABB
hired some key engineers who had previously worked for GE.
22 Data provided by Joel Haynes, GE
23 Interview with Craig Tedmon, ABB.
17
Other advances include industry-wide attempts to reduce harmful emissions by
adapting dry low
NOx systems to gas turbines. NOx reduction techniques began with models and field
tests
evaluating emission formation. This led to more accurate predictions of combustor
operations
and variations in their parameters. Water injection for NOx control was first
applied, followed by
steam, which was found to be less effective. The goal for both was to reduce flame
temperature
and subsequently lower the NOx formation rate, but these injections impose
performance penalties
and may increase carbon monoxide emissions.24 More modern methods concentrate on
combustor-oriented “dry low NOx” schemes, which were explored in three areas:
premixed lean
combustion, rich-lean combustion, and catalytic combustion. Premixed lean
combustion occurs in
hybrid combustors which mix air and fuel on a molecular level, cause the thermal
fixation of
atmospheric nitrogen, and reduce harmful emissions.25 The rich-lean burn approach
to NOx
reduction was found to be useful if the fuel contained fuel-bound nitrogen (FBN)
which defeated
water injection and premixing schemes. In rich-lean burning, the burning is staged
to occur in a
fuel-rich zone where the oxygen deficiency prevents NOx formation. Then, a second,
lean zone
completes the burning process at a temperature low enough to prevent NOx formation.
Finally,
catalytic combustion offers a third developmental alternative to emissions
reduction.
Westinghouse engineers first evaluated this method in 1971, when tests found that
catalytic
combustion could achieve uniform temperature patterns and drastically reduce NOx
levels.
However, the mechanical integrity of the substrate was poor, and the method was not
pursued
when R&D efforts tapered off during the gas industry stall of the late 1970s and
1980s.26 Activity
resurged with the new market boost and has led to new designs of advanced catalytic
systems.
The nature of government in technological advancements
In analyzing the technological development of gas turbines, it is important to note
how
government involvement has contributed to R&D. The clearest involvement took place
in the
beginning of the gas turbine era, when defense programs poured money into turbojet
research. As
noted above, this greatly aided turbine manufacturers such as Westinghouse and
General Electric,
which went on to transfer much of this technology to industrial turbine use.
Siemens and ABB contrasted in their development of gas and combined cycle turbines.
These
two European manufacturers are important players on the world market, but followed
a different
route. Brown Boveri, as noted in Appendix A, was a Swiss manufacturer involved in
early
version of gas and combustion turbines. However, it was not as closely related to
the military
turbojet industry as its American counterparts, even though its future partner,
Asea, did work
with Swedish jet manufacturing. As a result of this relatively nonmilitary (and
less government
subsidized) course of development, Siemens and ABB had initial designs that were
much closer to
traditional steam turbine technology. Their initial turbines, compressors, and
combustors were
essentially bolted together, with only a few (one or two) large combustors
resembling a
24 Paul Bautista, “Rise in Gas-Fired Power Generation Tracks Gains in Turbine
Efficiency,” Oil & Gas Journal,
Vol. 94, No. 33, August 12, 1996, p. 46.
25 Bautista, Paul, “Rise in Gas-Fired Power Generation Tracks Gains in Turbine
Efficiency,” Oil & Gas Journal,
Vol. 94, No. 33, August 12, 1996, p. 46
26 Bannister, et. al. “Evolution of Westinghouse Heavy Duty Power Generation and
Industrial Combustion
Turbines,” Transactions of the ASME, April, 1996, pp. 328-329.
18
conventional steam boiler. This branch of gas turbine evolution withered and died.
In contrast,
the integrated gas turbines produced by GE and Westinghouse also drew on steam
turbine
construction methods in the beginning, but were considerably different on the
inside. They
contained aero-derived blading and more combustors in an annular ring.27 These are
the
companies which led to more substantive developments as a result of their military
and
government background. Their methods were later adopted by other companies.
Government involvement through aviation R&D continues to this day. The US
government alone
has spent over $13 billion since 1940 on jet engine development and still spends
about $400
million per year on R&D efforts through companies such as GE and Pratt & Whitney.28
As a
result of these efforts, there is a “supermarket of technology” created by the jet
engine programs
which is slowly being utilized by power equipment companies. As noted above, this
supermarket
contains everything from new alloys that can withstand higher temperatures to
computer codes
for advanced turbine blade profiles.29
Governments have also devoted some attention to the power generation uses for gas
turbines.
The 1970s saw the US Department of Energy (DOE) sponsorship of the High Temperature
Turbine Technology program and the Japanese Moonlight project. Westinghouse and GE
were
closely associated with the American project, while Mitsubishi was the lead company
for the
Japanese work.30
A more recent initiative is the US Advanced Turbine Systems (ATS) program, which is
being
spearheaded by Federal Energy Technology Center and six turbine manufacturers in
the US,
including GE, Westinghouse, and Solar. The consortium also includes 83 universities
and
multiple DOE research centers. The goal is to subsidize and coordinate R&D which
will lead to
the next generation of efficient gas and combined cycle turbines. The goals for
technology base
research closely parallel the advances noted earlier. They include advanced
combustion systems
to minimize pollution, heat transfer and aerodynamics to improve turbine blade life
and
performance, and materials to permit higher operating temperature for more
efficient systems.31
Solar Turbines has experimented with ceramic parts for its share of the project
(simple cycle gas
turbines less than 20 MWe) but larger turbine manufacturers have not devoted the
effort or
government funding to analogous efforts for larger industrial turbines for baseload
generation.
When they do, it will be for stationary components of the ATS engine. To date, the
program has
not reached its major goals and is viewed skeptically by many in the field because
it is not a major
27 W. J. Watson, “The ‘Success’ of the Combined Cycle Gas Turbine” Opportunities
and Advances in
International Power Generation, University of Durham Conference Publication, March
18-20, 1996, London:
Institution of Electrical Engineers, 1996. p. 88.
28 Goncalves, Chuang, and Cohn, “Advanced Gas Turbine Systems,” May, 1996, p. 9.
29 W. J. Watson, “The ‘Success’ of the Combined Cycle Gas Turbine” Opportunities
and Advances in
International Power Generation, University of Durham Conference Publication, March
18-20, 1996, London:
Institution of Electrical Engineers, 1996. p. 91.
30 W. J. Watson, “The ‘Success’ of the Combined Cycle Gas Turbine” Opportunities
and Advances in
International Power Generation, University of Durham Conference Publication, March
18-20, 1996, London:
Institution of Electrical Engineers, 1996. p. 91.
31 United States Department of Energy, “Advanced Turbine Systems: The Next
Generation of Gas Turbines”
Federal Energy Technology Center.
19
driver of turbine improvements.32 Nevertheless, turbine manufacturers are
continuing in the same
directions of higher temperatures and efficiencies.
32 Bannister, et. al. “Development Requirements for the Advanced Gas Turbine
System,” Journal of Engineering
for Gas Turbines and Power, October, 1995. P. 731.
20
4. GAS SUPPLY AND AVAILABILITY
The availability of natural gas at competitive prices served as a major boost for
gas turbine
development. Until the early 1970’s, the cost of gas for electric utilities was
extremely low, but
utilities did not consider natural gas to be a reliably available source of fuel.
Furthermore, gas
turbines were not as advanced, efficient or competitive as they are today, so most
gas used by
electric utilities was burned mainly as fuel for steam turbine plants. Since coal
was cheaper than
gas and used for the same purpose of vaporizing water in Rankine cycle plants,
electric utility
demand for gas remained slight, despite the low price of the fuel.
The 1970s proved to be a turbulent time for the natural gas industry. Prices
controls created
shortages, first in reserves, then in production as producers failed to supply as
much gas as
customers were willing to buy at the regulated price. Eventually, prices did begin
to rise, and the
system became ripe for reform. In 1978, the US Congress passed two landmark pieces
of
legislation: the Natural Gas Policy Act and the Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use
Act.
The Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA) set a timetable for deregulating the gas industry
by dropping
restrictions on the wellhead prices of natural gas. However, the policy was complex
and detailed;
it deregulated different classes of gas distinctly, depending on when the gas was
discovered and in
a series of steps. First the NGPA brought intrastate gas under federal price
controls. Second, it
designated that all gas that had come into production in 1977 or before would
remain regulated.
This “old gas” would be regulated at a price higher than the previous price and
would be allowed
to increase with inflation. Third, it established a deregulation schedule for “new
gas” that came
into production after 1977. Deregulation of “new gas” would occur by 1985 and would
involve a
series of steps in which the price of gas would rise at a rate roughly four percent
higher than the
rate of inflation. There were more than 20 price categories for this new gas until
it would be
totally deregulated in 1985. Fourth, the act specified that certain categories of
“high cost” gas
would be deregulated about one year after the enactment of the legislation. “High
cost” gas, for
example, included gas produced from wells deeper than 15,000 feet.33 This US
version of natural
gas deregulation was in many ways experimental; the attempt would later serve as a
model for
other countries in their deregulatory efforts.
The NGPA actually allowed gas prices to increase for several years for four main
reasons. First,
the oil price shock of the era raised general fuel prices. Gas prices, now
partially freed from
regulation, rose along with the price of other fuels. Second, the deregulation
shocked the system
because previous price ceilings had held the price of gas significantly lower than
its actual value to
consumers. Third, the schedule itself actually included increases for gas prices
beyond inflation.
Finally, following the previous curtailments, gas pipeline companies began locking
up long term
gas supplies, almost regardless of cost.34 However, the increases ended when the
last controls on
newly-discovered gas reserves were dropped in 1985. With the oil crisis long over,
the shock of
33 Legislative summary adapted from Kash and Rycroft, U.S. Energy Policy, Oklahoma:
University of Oklahoma
Press, 1984. p. 208.
34 Crandall and Ellig, “Economic Deregulation and Customer Choice: Lessons for the
Electric Industry,” Fairfax,
Virginia: Center for Market Processes, 1997. p. 10.
21
deregulation passing, and a free market, gas prices plunged to approximately the
levels we have
today. Gas is now freely available at an economical price for electric utilities.
It is not cheaper
than coal, but the price is in a window of acceptability. The history of utility
gas prices, including
the visible price increase that stifled the gas turbine boom during the late 1970s
and early 1980s,
can be seen in Figure 9.
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
Year
0
100
200
300
400
1982 cents per million Btu
Gas
Coal
Deregulation
Ends
Deregulation Starts
Fuel Use Act Begins
Fuel Use
Act Ends
Figure 9. The rise and fall of utility gas prices in the US.
The Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act was enacted in 1978 at the same time as
the NGPA.
For context, at this time it was believed that supplies of gas were permanently
short and remaining
supplies should be preserved for residential and commercial customers. However,
this belief was
disproved once newly discovered natural gas was decontrolled and new gas
discoveries increased
significantly.35
The Fuel Use Act harmed the gas turbine industry in the US. The act took note of
the rapidly-
increasing price of natural gas and of the lack of new supply. It was believed that
the natural gas
supply was limited and that gas reserves would expire shortly. Natural gas was
deemed too
valuable to burn for power generation. As a result, the Fuel Use Act prohibited the
burning of
35 Gray and Nakayama, U.S.-Japan Energy Policy Considerations for the 1990’s,
Maryland: University Press of
America, 1988. p. 46.
22
natural gas or oil in most new industrial boiler facilities and all new power
plants. The goal was
to preserve natural gas for residential and commercial customers. Until the early
1980s, the
notion of the imminent expiration of both US and world gas reserves remained;
producers which
had little interest in raising their production earlier had not invested heavily in
new exploration, so
predictions on the future of gas as an available source were pessimistic. Figure 10
shows a
graphical history of natural gas reserves in both OECD and Non-OECD countries. It
demonstrates how, from 1977 to 1981, the number of reserves failed to increase
substantially,
fueling fears of a permanent shortage. Some estimates predicted that the world
would run out of
accessible natural gas within 20 years.
Figure 10. OECD and Non-OECD Natural Gas Reserves, 1975-1997.36
During this time, the Fuel Use Act virtually shut down the US installation of gas
turbines. In an
example of its effect on turbine purchases, orders for GE’s “Frame 7” turbine fell
from 37 to 5 in
the year following its passage.37 Although turbine manufacturers could not expect
to produce
many gas turbines for the US utility market, GE continued with R&D during this
difficult period
and shifted its focus to Europe.38 However, it should also be noted that the
European Community
36 Sources: 1975-1996 International Petroleum Encyclopedia: Worldwide Oil and Gas
at a Glance (Tulsa, OK:
Pennwell Publishing Co.) various issues. 1997: “Worldwide look at Reserves and
Production,” Oil and Gas
Journal, Vol 93, No. 52 (December 25, 1996) pp. 44-45. Generally,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo96/gas.html,
37 Richard Tabors and Thomas Lee, Energy Aftermath, Boston: Harvard Business School
Press, 1990, p. 149.
38 Interview with Craig Tedmon, ABB.
23
(EC) also issued a directive in 1975 restricting the use of gas for power
generation.39 During this
same period, Brown-Boveri, a European turbine manufacturing company, virtually shut
down its
gas turbine business. Westinghouse allowed its gas turbine development program to
flounder and
almost sold it to its partner, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) in 1987.
New reserves were discovered throughout the 1980s and concerns about the rapid
expiration of
gas supply vanished later in the decade. Exploration activity from 1980-1986 showed
that natural
gas could be found in prolific quantities. By 1986, the US was found to have over
50 years of
conventional gas resources.40 The Fuel Use Act was finally rescinded in 1987 and
spurred a large
growth in interest in gas turbines.41 The EC directive restricting gas use in power
generation was
also lifted.
Estimates of gas reserves have continued to grow, assuring generators that gas will
remain an
available fuel. Over the last two decades, estimated reserves have increased by 94
percent.42 By
1991, estimates of natural gas reserves ranged from 4384-4682 trillion cubic
feet.43 By 1996, the
world proven gas reserves had expanded to 4933 trillion cubic feet. Proven reserves
are the
estimated quantities that analysis of geological and engineering data demonstrate
with reasonable
certainty to be recoverable in future years from known reservoirs under existing
economic and
operating conditions. On a worldwide basis, these known reserves would be
sufficient to maintain
production at current rates for over 60 years.44
It is important to note that natural gas demand is expected to grow by over 76
percent over
current levels by 2015, increasing from 70 trillion cubic feet per year to about
133 trillion cubic
feet per year.45 Despite this increase in demand, the current estimates of gas
reserves are so
tremendous that GE estimates that the currently-known supply of gas should exceed
almost 70
years. This can be seen in Figure 11, which shows how the years of gas supply
stagnated during
the late 1970s, but have increased since then. This implies that the availability
of fuel stretches
past the horizon of expected plant life of any turbine manufactured in this
generation. As such,
this assurance of a future natural gas supply helps to build utility and non-
utility generators’
demand for gas and combined cycle turbines, in turn fueling greater manufacturer
research and
development in the field.
39 W J Watson, “The ‘Success’ of the Combined Cycle Gas Turbine” Opportunities and
Advances in International
Power Generation, University of Durham Conference Publication, March 18-20, 1996,
London: Institution of
Electrical Engineers, 1996. p. 89.
40 Gray and Nakayama, U.S.-Japan Energy Policy Considerations for the 1990’s,
Maryland: University Press of
America, 1988. p. 46.
41 Goncalves, Chuang, and Cohn, “Advanced Gas Turbine Systems,” May 1996, p. 16.
42 EIA, “Natural Gas” www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo96/gas.html#head p. 2
43 EIA, Office of Oil and Gas, “International Oil and Gas Exploration and
Development, 1991” November, 1993,
Appendix B.
44 EIA, “Natural Gas” www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo96/gas.html#head p. 3
45 EIA, Ibid., p. 1
24
Figure 11. Years of supply remaining given currently proven reserves of gas and
oil.46
46 Courtesy of GE Power Systems, Hank Stein, Turbomachinery International, Nov/Dec
97
25
5. ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS
Growing social awareness of air pollution associated with fossil fuel use has
contributed to
advances in gas and combined cycle turbines. This section outlines three major ways
that
environmental concerns prompted gas turbine development. First, regulations drove
up the cost
of the polluting competitors to natural gas, making combustion turbines more
competitive.
Second, environmental sustainability affected decisions on fuel choice. Finally,
environmental
pressures forced gas turbine manufacturers to develop emission reduction techniques
for their
own relatively clean machines.
The U.S. passage of the Clean Air Act in 1970 demonstrated the first major federal
commitment
to restrictions on power plant emissions. These restrictions had a profound impact
on the power
generation market. The major fossil fuel for power generation, coal, has
significant and
pronounced environmental disadvantages. For example, coal combustion leads to
considerably
more particulate and SO2 production than natural gas combustion. In contrast,
natural gas plants
have only traces of SO2 (typically between 0.001 and 0.002 lbs of SO2 per MMBtu
since sulfur is
removed from gas before it enters the pipeline) and negligible amounts of
particulates.47
Environmental laws spurred by social concerns turn those environmental
disadvantages into
economic costs which must be considered by power producers. In effect,
environmental
regulations turn negative environmental externalities into real costs which can be
seen in the
construction and operation of power plants,
The real costs of environmental legislation manifest themselves through regulation
compliance.
Gas turbines benefit from the application of these costs because of their “clean”
nature relative to
coal and nuclear plants. For example, Table 1 shows some typical incremental costs
to control
SOx, NOx and Hg from coal-fired power plants. If these costs for environmental
control were
considered part of the fuel costs, it can be seen that controlling coal for SOx and
NOx makes its
fuel costs roughly equal to that of gas. If Hg control becomes mandated, coal would
effectively
cost more than gas.
47 Steven I. Freedman, “The Role of Natural Gas in Electric Power Generation 1990-
2020,” MIT Energy
Laboratory Conference: Energy and the Environment in the 21st Century, March 26-28,
1990, p. DI39.
26
Incremental
Control Cost
($/ton coal)
Cumulative
Equivalent Fuel
Cost
($/106 Btu)
Base Coal
1.4
SOx
9-15
1.75-2
NOx
8-12
2.1-2.5
Hg
4-13
2.2-3
Base Gas
2.3-2.6
Table 1. Cost of Environmental Controls
Environmental concern over the sustainability of fuels has also impacted gas
turbine development.
For example, the passage of the Fuel Use Act in 1978, and its deleterious effect on
the US gas
turbine market, was prompted by predictions of imminent natural gas reserve
shortages.
However, the discovery of new reserves during the 1980s counteracted this trend and
led to a
new environmental view on the desirability of gas turbines. As noted previously,
the revelation
that this cleaner fuel was also plentiful helped to spur further development.
Finally environmental concerns over NOx has impacted gas turbine emission
development. Air
quality issues were first a pure boon for gas turbines because they were a
relatively clean
alternative to coal power plants. However, gas turbine emissions were soon to come
under
scrutiny as well. Regulation and environmental forces would induce manufacturers to
invest in
emissions research for Breyton cycles. The Clean Air Act of 1970 gave the
Environmental
Protection Agency the task of establishing aircraft exhaust emissions levels. The
EPA published
these levels in 1973 and assigned a compliance date of 1979. While this did not
directly affect
power generation gas turbines because their sales were weak in the late 1970s and
1980s, this
manifested an initial way in which environmental concerns would lead to direct
impacts in turbine
design . Although the gas turbine industry as a whole benefited from environmental
pressures
such as Clean Air Act amendments and acid rain legislation, some pressures did
cause some
change in combustion turbine designs, as detailed previously in the description of
wet and dry low
NOx efforts.
27
6. ELECTRIC RESTRUCTURING AND CHANGING MARKET CONDITIONS
Major changes in the electricity market led to management decisions to pursue gas
turbine
development. There are four main reasons why electrical restructuring is helping to
drive the
turbine market:
·
the changing and new market conditions favor power plants with lower capital costs
and
shorter payback periods.
·
restructuring benefits projects with short construction lead times.
·
high efficiency plants are likely to thrive in a competitive market.
·
generation competition leads to more dynamic and fast-changing power markets which
are
well suited by combustion turbines.
All four of these major effects create circumstances in which gas and combined
cycle turbines may
win favor if they are reliable and efficient. Indeed, the emergence of gas turbines
is partially
attributable to restructuring in addition to technological developments. To
understand how they
interact, it is important to begin with some background on the structure of the
power market.
Electric restructuring refers to the partial deregulation of the electric power
industry. The power
industry has historically consisted of regulated monopolies which controlled
vertically integrated
markets. As such, utilities controlled the generation, transmission, and
distribution of electric
power in a certain geographic region. In the US, these utilities were regulated
primarily by state
authorities which controlled the rates that utilities could charge to customers.
The utilities
retained monopolistic benefits because they had a guaranteed set of customers.
Consumers
maintained some leverage through the state regulation which prevented price
gouging. The
system worked because the power industry was generally deemed to be a “natural
monopoly”
since it would produce more efficiently if competing utilities were not battling
for customers by
haphazardly building power lines everywhere or inputting whatever power they could
into the grid
and causing system congestion.
Under regulation, coal and nuclear plants were generally favored for electric power
generation.
The only exception for gas turbines took place in the peak power market. Gas
turbines gained
favor for peak power generation after 1965, when the Great Northeast Blackout
occurred. This
incident in the US and similar blackouts in other countries forced utilities to
recognize the need to
acquire additional peak power capacity for emergencies or periods of high demand.
Steam
turbines tend to be reliable, but do not start or stop quickly or cheaply. In
contrast, gas turbines
are ideal peaking units because they take only a few hours to start and can be put
on-line quickly.
Predictably, gas turbine orders increased in the 1970s as a result of greater
concern for peaking
needs. However, management strategy for baseload generation remained unchanged with
the
continuance of regulation.
Coal and nuclear plants used to dominate the market for three main reasons. First,
they benefited
from economies of scale. Coal and nuclear plants were large and successful in an
era when
demand was growing rapidly and electricity was cheaper to produce if it was
generated in bulk.
28
Second, the fuel costs for these types of power stations were low. Coal and nuclear
fuel materials
were not lacking in the US and could readily be used to generate cheap power.
Finally, utilities
did not have to be concerned about large capital outlays or long payback periods.
Regulation
allowed them to pass costs onto consumers without fear that their customers could
leave them in
favor of another power generator. Making fast returns on their investments were not
an
overriding factor in the decisions of most utilities. Regulated rates of return
allowed them to
avoid making traditional business decisions regarding the benefits of their
investments and power
generation purchases.
In contrast, gas turbine generation was generally shunned by US utilities under
regulation. They
were used almost exclusively for peak power, and even then only after emergencies
convinced
utilities that gas turbines were necessary and useful. Simple cycle gas turbines
were embryonic
and inefficient relative to large coal plants. Furthermore, gas was not always
readily available.
When it was, the cost per Btu of gas became higher than that of coal since 1975 and
has remained
higher ever since. These reasons kept gas turbines from reaching their potential
during this
regulated period.
The era of complete electric utility regulation has come to an end. The
introduction of non-utility
power producers helped to increase consumer awareness that the generation market
might not be
a natural monopoly. In the US, passage of the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies
Act (PURPA)
in 1978 opened the door to non-utility generation of power and showed that this
electricity could
successfully be integrated into existing power grids. The act also provided
incentives for
alternative power sources. The resulting entrance of new, non-utility qualifying
facilities and
independent power producers (IPPs) into the electricity market would later lead to
consumer
demand for cheaper power through competition in electric power generation. The 1992
Energy
Policy Act opened the door for electric restructuring in the US.
Similar restructuring forces were at work in other countries. Great Britain, parts
of Canada,
Norway, Chile, and even New Zealand led the charge in electric restructuring.
Although
restructuring efforts vary worldwide, a basic scheme remains; the vertically
integrated monopoly
is to become a relic of the past. Although transmission and distribution may remain
regulated,
restructuring is introducing competition into the electric power generation market.
This
unbundling process is providing new opportunities for gas and combined cycle
turbines which did
not exist previously.
As the era of generation regulation ends, the high capital costs of large power
plants have become
huge liabilities for utilities. Utility management has been burned by the US
nuclear experience, in
which utilities were urged through incentives to build nuclear power plants. As
noted in the
previous section, regulations stemming from safety and environmental concerns
increased costs
for these types of plants. Nuclear plants now require enormous capital and fixed
operation costs
and represent stranded costs for utilities which can no longer simply pass costs to
consumers in an
unregulated market.
Similar capital cost problems plague coal-fired turbine power plants. With coal
plant sizes varying
from a few hundred megawatts to well over a gigawatt each, these plants are
necessarily large and
29
require huge investments. Use of coal also requires specific and expensive siting
needs or an
advanced transportation system so that trains or barges can bring fuel directly to
the plant. The
air standards mentioned previously also impact the initial construction fees and
drive up capital
costs.
In contrast, gas turbine capital outlays remain low. They tend to be considerably
smaller than
other plants and can be operated more efficiently and less expensively in smaller
sizes than can
steam or nuclear facilities.48 In addition, they pollute less and therefore have
fewer regulatory-
imposed initial outlays for waste fuel disposal or scrubber technology. Finally,
natural gas is now
easily available by pipeline and allows for cheaper power plant siting. In some
cases, plant siting
may be so easy and capital costs so cheap that distributed generation takes hold
and calls for even
more gas turbine use. In other cases, such as in countries with weak national power
grids,
distributed generation may be preferable anyway in comparison to the costs of
establishing an
expansive and costly transmission and distribution system. In such a situation, gas
turbines again
have a natural advantage if they are technologically efficient enough to run cost-
effectively.
Figure 12 displays how the capital costs for gas turbines are low relative to other
sources of
power. It shows how, at $325/kW gas turbines have the lowest capital cost outlays.
As noted
the previous section on technological advances, improvements in the 1990’s brought
cost
reductions on gas and combined cycle turbines to allow the effect seen here.
Average actual cost
estimates vary: one estimate shows that the capital cost of combined cycle
generating capacity
dropped from $600/kW in 1991 to $350/kW in 1996.49 The Energy Information Agency
(EIA)
pins the current costs at $400/kW instead. Despite some variation, it is clear to
see from the
figure that simple cycle and combined cycle gas turbines have considerably lower
costs than
competing energy technologies.
48 Lee Langston, “Reasons for the Revolution” Global Gas Turbine News, Vol. 36,
1996, No. 3, p. 10.
49 Hansen and Smock, “Gas Turbines Aim at World Power Market Dominance,” Power
Engineering, Vol. 100, No.
6, June 1996, p. 23.
30
Coal (PC)
Coal (IGCC)
Gas (steam)
Gas (CC)
Gas (adv CC)
Gas (CT)
Gas (adv CT)
Nuclear
Biomass
Geothermal
MSW
Solar thermal
Solar PV
Wind
Plant Type
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
1996 $ per kW
Figure 12. A key factor in the new power market is the initial capital costs for
various
power plants.50
The low capital costs of small gas and combined cycle turbines make them
particularly attractive
in today’s market. First, cheaper plants are the choice of favor for IPPs and non-
utility generators
which cannot always raise capital as easily as large investor-owned or municipally-
owned utilities.
Second, the ongoing changes in the market are leading to risk-averse behavior in
power
generation management, leading to greater interest the iterative capacity increases
possible with
the orders of smaller turbines. Third, once the major changes are complete and a
restructured
power market emerges, large investments continue to shunned because sales will no
longer be
guaranteed as they were during the regulated era. This merges with the risk
aversion to explain
why restructuring is spurring the gas turbine industry to greater heights.
Gas turbines have short construction lead times which, in conjunction with low
capital costs, lead
to shorter payback periods. Faster returns on investment are often preferred in a
competitive
setting, whereas they were less important during a fully regulated era. Small,
packaged simple
cycle gas units are small and easy to fuel. Gas fired combined cycle power
generation can be on
50 Costs are standard costs for the USA. Cost differences due to regional
distinctions are calculated by applying
regional multipliers. Adapted from Energy Information Administration, 1998 AEO,
Appendix, Table 37.
31
line in about 2 years.51 These short times compare favorably to lead times of ten
years or even
more which have been noted for some large coal and nuclear plants. Such long lead
times are
unacceptable in a competitive and dynamic marketplace, giving gas turbines another
advantage.
A competitive market demands for high efficiency plants. When generators are forced
to compete
against other generators, only those who can provide electricity at low cost will
survive. To
reduce costs, they must achieve high levels of production operation for as little
fuel as possible. A
good analog of simple efficiency is heat rate, which is the number of Btu’s
necessary for each
kWhe of plant operation. The lower the heat rate is, the more efficient the plant
will be. Figure
13 shows how combined cycle gas turbines have the lowest heat rates among all types
of fossil
plants. This correlates well with their high and unmatched efficiencies, which are
currently
reaching 60%.
Coal (PC)
Coal (IGCC)
Gas (steam)
Gas (CC)
Gas (adv CC)
Gas (CT)
Gas (adv CT)
Plant Type
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
Btu/kWh
Figure 13: A major factor in the new power market is overall efficiency as
illustrated by
the above heat rates.52
51 Gray and Nakayama, U.S.-Japan Energy Policy Considerations for the 1990’s,
Maryland: University Press of
America, 1988. p. 46.
52 Costs are standard costs for the USA. Cost differences due to regional
distinctions are calculated by applying
regional multipliers. Adapted from Energy Information Administration, 1998 AEO,
Appendix, Table 37.
32
A final reason for the superiority of gas turbines in a restructured market is
their ability to be
dynamic in a fast-changing and unpredictable generation system. A restructured
marketplace
leads to another source of uncertainty for suppliers of electricity: they do not
know how much
electricity to provide. Although demand has always been in flux, now generators
must deal with
both the electricity demanded by consumers and the electricity produced by
competitors. The
new markets may be operated by either power exchanges or independent system
operators (ISOs)
which serve as market mechanisms for exchange. This complication means that
individual
generators do not know how much electricity to provide to a regional power pool or
how little
notice they will receive from an ISO before they must provide power. As electricity
becomes
more of a commodity in this setting, spot markets may emerge causing unprecedented
dynamism
in generation. If a generator receives short notice from an ISO that its
electricity will be sellable
in a matter of hours, it will require versatility from its generating equipment. As
in the late 1960s
and early 1970s, the ability of gas turbines to start and stop quickly proves to be
an advantage
over steam turbines, which require entire days and great expense to repeatedly fire
up and cool
down. Such a dynamic situation would have been unimaginable in a fully regulated
power
market. However, restructuring provides these new and unique circumstances for
which
combustion turbines are well suited.
33
7. DRIVER INTERACTIONS
The four main drivers, technical improvements, gas supply, environmental concerns,
and changing
market conditions, were all instrumental to gas turbine development. Individually,
these forces
alone did not cause the gas and combustion turbine boom; it was their interaction
that made
success possible.
To capture the nature of this interaction, we reexamine recent gas turbine history,
beginning with
the period when the rise in natural gas costs strangled the new expansion of gas
turbines. The late
1970s and early 1980s proved to be slow and difficult years for the gas turbine
industry. This can
be seen in Figure 14, which shows how US gas turbine capability stopped increasing
during this
period. The rest of the gas turbine history is traced along this figure with
allusions to some key
events.
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
Year
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Million kW
Great Northeast
Blackout
Deregulation Starts
Fuel Use Act Begins
Deregulation
Ends
Fuel Use
Act Ends
Energy
Policy Act
Figure 14. Electric utility net summer capability for gas turbines over time.53
Some factors induced manufacturers to increase R&D spending, such as the passage of
the 1970
Clean Air Act which would decrease the economic attractiveness of relatively dirty
coal plants.
53 Energy Information Administration:
ftp://ftp.eia.doe.gov/pub/energy.overview/aer/aer8-8.txt Table 8.8.
34
However, this positive development for gas was mitigated by several negatives. A
key negative
development was the lack of availability (both perceived and actual) of natural
gas. Gas became
an uneconomical and unpopular fuel during these years, virtually shutting down
utility orders of
gas power plants. The flat period of Figure 14 is consistent with Figure 9, which
showed how gas
prices increased dramatically during the same period as a result of shortages and
the US gas
deregulation process which occurred from 1978-1985. In addition to these high
prices, the supply
of natural gas was underestimated during this period, leading many to believe that
it was an
unreliable fuel. Finally, the 1978 Fuel Use Act barred most utility companies from
using natural
gas in any new plants. Manufacturers, utilities, governments, and other potential
R&D sponsors
all commensurately lost interest. However, development efforts continued for the
sake of
international power generation and aircraft engine markets. With the help of
advances in
computer engineering tools (including those developed for aerospace purposes and in
technology
transfers from other markets) companies made incremental improvements in materials
and cooling
technologies, but the gas turbine market was essentially flat during this period.
Market interest in gas turbines surged in the late 1980s and 1990s when gas
availability increased
and gas prices dropped, and additional gas reserves had been discovered. These
discoveries
allowed power planners to assume that natural gas would be available for the entire
life span of
any gas turbines that they chose to order. The Fuel Use Act was rescinded in 1987,
allowing
utilities a free hand in ordering new gas turbines.
Electricity restructuring and changing market conditions were also key to the
resurgence of
combustion turbines. Uncertainty and impending competition led both utility and
non-utility
power producers to seek fast, low-capital projects such as gas turbines and high-
efficiency
projects such as combined-cycle turbines so that they could earn appreciable rates
of return.
Passage of the 1992 Energy Policy Act buttressed the deregulatory atmosphere in the
US by
allowing retail competition between electric generators. As competition was
introduced
internationally, the power generation industry continued to pursue development of
low-risk, fast-
starting gas turbines.
The gas turbine manufacturing industry was waiting for these other drivers to meet
with their own
developments. When environmental concerns, gas availability, and electric
restructuring merged
to create an atmosphere favorable for gas turbine deployment, manufacturers were
ready to jump
back into industrial turbine development. Gas turbines were primed to fill the
power generation
gap; technological improvements such as steam injection and advanced computer
design codes
had improved gas and combined cycle turbine during the earlier demand slump. The
rapid rise in
gas turbine popularity led to major rededication to gas turbine R&D. Brown Boveri,
which had
shut down its own gas turbine business in the mid 1980s, merged with Asea to become
ABB and
immediately began a brand new development program. Westinghouse had also reduced
its
combustion turbine development efforts dramatically and closed down its domestic
large gas
turbine manufacturing facilities, transferring its production to MHI.54 It almost
left the gas turbine
54 WJ Watson, “The ‘Success’ of the Combined Cycle Gas Turbine” Opportunities and
Advances in International
Power Generation, University of Durham Conference Publication, March 18-20, 1996,
London: Institution of
Electrical Engineers, 1996. p. 89.
35
business entirely by nearly selling it to MHI in 1987.55 However, it charged back
two years later
with major new development programs in the face of renewed demand. Siemens later
announced
plans to buy Westinghouse’s Power Generation Business Unit by which it would
acquire all the
institutional knowledge, workers, and patents for the US manufacturer’s gas
turbines.
Westinghouse/Siemens is currently redistributing its engineering personnel towards
combustion
turbines at the expense of steam turbines. The power generation market and external
drivers have
finally interacted with the technological developments that have been ongoing since
the 1930s,
propelling the entire gas turbine industry. Orders for gas turbines are again
increasing as
generators respond to turbine improvements, market changes and the need for more
dynamic
generation capability in the future. This boom can again be seen in Figure 16 by
examining the
most recent decade.
Today, the most important players in turbine R&D include manufacturers, purchasers,
and
governments. Major manufacturers include the General Electric Company, Siemens AG,
Solar
Turbines, Westinghouse Electric Corporation (whose power generation business has
recently been
acquired by Siemens), Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, and Asea Brown Boveri. These
companies
have growing groups of partners who are entering the expanding field. Other
companies, such as
Rolls-Royce and Pratt & Whitney, excel at jet engine development which sometimes
lead to
power generation spinoffs. Turbine purchasers are utilities and non-utility power
producers
worldwide. Finally, governments have also played a role in gas turbine R&D by
promulgating
policies and programs that affect power generation technologies.
The outlook for gas and combined turbines looks bright. While Figure 16 showed how
utilities
had ordered gas turbines, Figure 15 shows how utility management used the gas
turbine capacity
they had purchased. As narrated by the history, the utilities used the gas turbines
they purchased
following the 1965 Great Northeast Blackout. Then, as capacity stagnated and gas
prices rose,
they made less of their electricity with their gas turbines. When improved gas
turbines reemerged
in the market in the late 1980s and 1990s, utilities began to both order more gas
turbines and
operate them more often.
55 Interview with Lee McLurin, Westinghouse.
36
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
Year
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
Billion kWh
Figure 15. Net generation of gas turbine electricity at utility plants.
In addition, Figures 16 and 17 demonstrate how gas and combined cycle turbines
dominate
current power plant orders. Worldwide, orders for combined cycle generation totaled
only 3.9
GW in 1988. By 1994, that had exploded to 26 GW with another 25 GW ordered in
1995.56 In
terms of new wattage capacity, combustion turbines alone account for over half of
all new orders
in the US. Combined cycle capacity is increasing by over 33% in less than a
decade.57 Combined,
these two types of turbines account for almost 70% of both utility and non-utility
orders
domestically.
56 Hansen and Smock, “Gas Turbines Aim at World Power Market Dominance,” Power
Engineering, Vol. 100, No.
6, June 1996, p. 23.
57 Adapted from Energy Information Agency data which considers both existing
capacity and current plant
construction schedules.
37
Combustion turbine
56%
Combined Cycle
12%
Fossil Steam
16%
Nuclear
6%
Other
10%
Total = 21.8 GW
Figure 16. Combustion and combined cycle turbines dominate planned capacity
additions
for 1996-2000.58
58 Source: Utility Data: Energy Information Administration, Form EIA-860, "Annual
Electric Generator Report,"
(1995). Nonutility Data: Energy Information Administration, Form EIA-867, "Annual
Nonutility Power Producer
Report," (1995).
38
1996
by 2005
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Capacity (GW)
Gas
Steam
Figure 17. Projected growth of combined cycle generating capacity.
Review of the success of gas turbines reveals that development has flourished with
the interaction
of four major driving forces. Some of the drivers, such as material and cooling
advances, include
technology transfers from other fields and independent advances in the power
generation
engineering. Other drivers, such as gas supply, environmental concerns, and
management strategy
in response to market changes, environmental concerns, and fuel supply are non-
technological
forces which nevertheless spur development. Together, these diverse influences have
prompted
development in the gas and combined cycle turbine industry and led to their
significant entry in the
power generation market.
39
8. LESSONS FROM OTHER CASE STUDIES
The gas turbine R&D case study is one of a series of cases analyzed for this
report. The MIT
Energy Laboratory also draws upon previous MIT studies in wind energy and advanced
gas
turbine systems. These two reports, “Technological Change and Public Policy: A Case
Study of
the Wind Energy Industry” and “Advanced Gas Turbine Systems” included conclusions
which can
be incorporated here. These are the summaries of their findings.
Wind
The wind study examined the advancement of wind turbines in the power generation
market59. It
focused on government efforts and detailed both technological innovations and
policy steps which
contributed to wind turbine development. According to this report, attempts to
advance this field
took two forms: supply push and demand pull. Each of these was a way in which
governments
could help to spur the wind turbine market.
Technologically, wind turbines have developed significantly since their practical
inception in
beginning of this century. They first became viable in areas where fuel supply was
problematic for
other forms of power generation. As oil, coal, and gas became more readily
accessible
worldwide, the wind power market floundered. Interest resurged in the 1970s when
environmental and fuel pressures once again raised awareness of renewable energy.
Wind turbines progressed in materials, structure, cost, efficiency, and electronic
controls. For
example, blade materials have switched from wood to fiberglass. They have also
advanced in
geometry from simple and uniform slats to tapered, twisted, aerodynamic shapes.
Structurally,
some turbines advanced by combining their hubs and blades rather than requiring
separable parts.
The introduction of sophisticated control systems also helped these turbines with
orientation,
generator synchronization, and variable speed generation. However, most changes
have been
incremental and many basic concepts have not changed since Danish efforts of the
1950s.
Some of these advancements that did occur were made as a result of demand-side
policies. The
Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) was instrumental because it mandated
that
utilities buy power from small power producers. Although it did not specifically
address wind
power, it promoted renewable energy technologies, from which wind turbines
benefited.
Government was also involved with two other forms of demand-side encouragement. The
first
was economic: a set of tax incentives and subsidies for use of renewable energies,
making such
energy commercially viable. The second was social: information dissemination and
diffusion
which allowed a multitude of research efforts to learn from the experiences of
others.
Supply-side policies were also instrumental in wind turbine development. The
largest portion of
this type of support, which more directly funds R&D, was the US government’s Mod
program,
59 Jeff Loiter and Vicki Norberg-Bohm, “Technological Change in Public Policy: a
Case Study of the Wind Energy
Industry,” MIT Environmental Technology and Public Policy Program Working Paper,
1997.
40
which was a centralized research program which unsuccessfully attempted to develop
a large-
scale wind turbine that could be mass produced and would generate cost-competitive
electricity.
This effort was spearheaded by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) and
the Department of Energy (DOE). Research was also conducted within the DOE network
of
national research laboratories, which produced a few commercial wind turbines.
Both demand-side and supply-side policies related to wind energies in the US were
short-lived,
leading to an inconsistent overall effort. This was one of the major reasons why
wind power has
not achieved full commercial viability in the power market.
The wind report concluded with an analysis of which policies were successful, which
were not,
and why. It found that the supply-side policies were unsuccessful because there was
no market to
sustain development of a commercially successful turbine. In addition, there were
other problems
with the supply-side attempts at development. These flaws included a harmful bias
towards
earlier design models and poor integration of participating firms despite high
costs. These
problems led to incremental improvements in turbines rather than radical
breakthrough
technologies. Finally, it was argued that supply-side technological pushes may be
unnecessary if
economies of scale are utilized to make existing wind turbines competitive.
On the demand side, government market-pull policies did help in technology
diffusion, but were
too inconsistent to create a lasting industry. The drop in energy prices
counteracted attempts to
increase demand for wind energy by lowering the price of its competition.
Additionally,
government incentives were rushed and also failed to distinguish between turbines
of various
kinds and benefits, leading to the support of some low-quality turbines and
degrading the field.
The wind study took special note of the importance of a consistent market for
success and
indicated that inconsistent government policies had failed to create such a market.
It
recommended improved and more consistent demand-side policies in conjunction with
more path-
independent supply-side efforts.
Advanced Gas Turbine Systems
The advanced gas turbine system investigation examined a subject more closely
related to this
case study60. It examined primarily combined cycle and steam injected gas turbines
and their
impact on the electric power industry. The report began with an analysis of the
structure of the
electric power and equipment industries. Then, the study focused on the innovation
development
process and the factors involved in the emergence of new technologies.
The historical section of the advanced gas turbine system study set the stage for
the industry
structure into which advanced turbines would emerge. This overview included a
review of US
regulatory policy, the development of electric utilities, and the nature of the
turbine manufacturing
industry. It then traced the driving and sustaining forces of turbine innovation.
60 Paolo Goncalves, Cynthia Chuang, and Adam Cohn, “Advanced Gas Turbine Systems:
Innovation Development
and Impacts on the Electric Power and Equipment Industries,” Unpublished MIT Study,
1996.
41
Driving forces for innovation were deemed to be government regulatory changes such
as PURPA
and the Fuel Use Act. These led to technological needs from nonutility generators
which had
previously not existed. The shortcomings of existing turbine equipment and the
improvements in
modern turbine technologies were also initial drivers in the report.
Sustaining forces were of three varieties: economic, technical and structural.
Economically, gas
turbines were attractive because of their low capital, O&M, and fuel costs.
Technically,
combustion turbines gained market share because of their high efficiencies and low
environmental
impacts. Structurally, gas turbines benefited from the slow demand growth which led
to demand
for incremental, modular growth with short lead times.
The study encapsulated the innovation development process as a reinforcing cycle of
advancements leading to demand, which led to more advancements. Its conclusion was
that the
spark to the innovation cycle were the government regulatory changes. Further, it
concluded that
many of the gas turbine technical advancements would have happened without the
regulatory
spark, but that then gas and combined cycle turbines “would not have been the
revolutionary
technologies that have transformed the electric power sector,” suggesting that gas
turbines may
have been a driver to electric restructuring.
42
9. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS
This case study focused on gas and combined cycle turbine success. These machines
are
technologically very complicated, far advanced from the simple aero-offshoots that
gave birth to
the modern industrial gas turbine industry. Multiple factors and sources went into
the
advancement of gas turbines into the power generation market. This report detailed
how the
interaction of technical R&D with other drivers led to gas turbine success.
R&D focused on improvements to turbine efficiency, reliability and emissions, with
the most
intense work on materials and cooling to allow high firing temperatures.
Advancements
continued for over 40 years before the interactive period when the current market
boom began.
Until then, R&D advancements were sustained by a variety of ways. Government
funding of
military projects were instrumental in the beginning, followed by a few smaller
government
industrial turbine programs. Many technologies were transferred or adapted from
other
industries. As the industrial turbine field grew, it emerged with more of its own
independent
advances. Industry managed to continue this R&D by finding niche or alternative
markets which
allowed them to continue gas turbine developments outside of the baseload
generation market.
Other MIT case studies, such as those on advanced gas turbine systems and wind
energy, point
out some conclusions which can be incorporated. The study on technological change
and wind
energy noted that government R&D incentives did lead to innovations, but that these
innovations
were not marketable without commercial support; success required the interaction of
markets and
technological developments. It further stated the importance of continuity as a
necessary factor in
advancing technology. Finally, it also noted that energy prices and social factors
such as
environmental concerns affected development. The other study on advanced gas
turbine systems
pointed out that government regulatory steps were crucial to the gas turbine
transformation of the
electric power industry. Further, it concluded that many of the gas turbine
technical
advancements would have happened without the regulatory spark, but that then gas
and combined
cycle turbines “would not have been the revolutionary technologies that have
transformed the
electric power sector.”
Unlike wind energy, gas and combined cycle turbines have not been heavily
subsidized by
government, with the notable exception of technology transfers from military
turbojets. However,
some key conclusions can be drawn:
·
Interaction is essential. R&D is crucial, but there must be a market to support the
product
begin developed. This did not occur for wind energy, where the market flattened
without
government subsidies. The free market did not meet the product developed.
·
Until the interaction occurs, developments in energy technologies can be sustained
or
incubated in non-energy or unrelated markets. Finding an alternative or niche
market can
be key to sustaining a developmental technology on its path to the baseload power
43
generation market. In the case of gas turbines, alternative markets included
military
turbojets, commercial aviation, and industrial turbines for the peak power
market.61
From these, we can glean some lessons which might be applied to future
technologies. First, until
drivers interact and the power generation market expands to incorporate the new
technology,
other applicable markets should exist - or have potential to exist - for successful
and sustained
R&D. In addition, there should be potential spurs for expanded demand in R&D. These
spurs
may be viewed as equivalents to the 1965 blackout which first prompted major
interest in gas
turbines. A future spur might be concern over global warming and CO2 emissions.
A series of criteria for future R&D spending may be proposed with these lessons.
·
Past performance. The level of technological development may be key to future
success.
It is important to have a basic research and technology base upon which to build.
For
example, one reason fusion energy is still a distant dream is that key basic
technologies
still need to be developed.
·
Present opportunities. This can include an evaluation of any niche or alternative
markets
available. Governments may in some cases provide a niche market through its own
purchasing power or through subsidization of a market.
·
Future outlook. The alternative market is meant to be a stepping stone; at some
point in
the future, there should be a plausible interaction of forces similar to those seen
in this
study. This anticipated interaction should drive new demand for the new technology.
The gas and combined cycle turbine successes resulted from a complicated series of
innovations,
technology transfers, social concerns and market drivers. Once the recent boom was
spurred, the
market created a loop of technological improvement followed by implementation and
increased
market demand for additional improvement. With wise R&D efforts, this path may be
emulated
by other energy technologies.
61 It is interesting to note how these alternative markets can apply to other
developmental technologies which are
related to this study. For example, solar energy was used in space applications
long before it achieved more
practical uses in power generation. A future niche market for this technology might
emerge in the peak power
industry in certain locations. Another example of applying developments to
alternative markets is the case of
battery technology, which is of importance to such diverse industries and electric
automobiles and laptop
computers.
44
APPENDIX A: TURBINE TIMELINE
Early History:
1791
John Barber patent for elementary combustion turbine-compression outweighed
power generation.
1873
Franz Stolze (Berlin) applies for combustion turbine patent - rejected.
1895
Charles Curtis granted US patent for complete gas turbine.
1897
Franz Stolze reapplies for patent (multistage turbines for compression and
expansion) - granted.
1904
Stolze prototype in Berlin - unlikely that it ran under its own power.
1905
Armengaud (France) gas turbine developed with carborundum combustor lining
(1st ceramic application - demonstration only).
Modern History:
1930
Whittle applies for assistance from British Air Ministry; turned down.
1936
Brown Boveri (BB) “accidentally” created an operational gas turbine while making
turbines and compressors for a Sun Oil Company process requiring superchargers
in petroleum refineries.
1936
Power Jets, Ltd. is formed; platform for Whittle.
1937
Testing of first demonstration jet engine (Independent British and German efforts).
1939
Brown Boveri built first sizable gas turbine expressly for power generation.
Terminal output of 4000kW; designed for standby power only (first industrial gas
turbine in commercial service).
1939
(8/27) First turbojet-powered flight was made in Germany.
1941-45
British efforts (Power Jets Ltd.) fly turbojet aircraft with centrifugal
compressors.
Germany abandons centrifugal compressors in favor of axial compressors.
1941
Power Jets Ltd. sends engine drawings to General Electric in the US. GE makes
some mechanical changes and tests its first engine, known as the I engine.
45
Early 40s
Wright Aeronautical Corporation, upon learning of the Power Jets Ltd.
developments, tries unsuccessfully to obtain an American license for the
manufacture of the Whittle engine.
1941
Westinghouse Electric Corporation, through a US Navy contract, works on an
axial-flow compressor turbojet engine known as the 19. Led to first test flight in
1943 and W’s first industrial gas turbine in 1949.
1942
(10/42) A modification of the first GE engine, the I-A, was first flown in a
Bell P-59A.
1942
(March) Germany makes first flight with Junkers 004 engine. (Flight tested in late
1941.)
1943
(6/12) British make first flight with Rolls-Royce Welland engine.
Note: The Junkers 004 and RR Welland were the only turbine engines that
entered production before the end of WWII. They both had approximately
the same turbine inlet temperature.
1941
GE begins work on an axial-flow turbojet engine. It later becomes the J35.
(Production in 1947.)
1941
Westinghouse had already begun work on another axial-flow engine which would
become the J40.
1941
Westinghouse starts development of a land-based gas turbine generator set (W12)
that would have an efficiency of 18%.
Post-WWII
Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Company, which had been working on air-cooled
reciprocating engines during most of the war, was not deeply involved in gas
turbine work. As partial payment for the Lend-Lease during WWII, Pratt &
Whitney was given the plans and details for the Rolls-Royce Nene engine and a
layout of the Rolls-Royce TAY engine. These were developed further and later
become the Pratt & Whitney J42 and J48 engines, respectively.
Siemens, along with all other German and Japanese companies, were prevented by
a ban from manufacturing combustion turbines. They did, however, recruit
engineers, such as the chief designer of Junkers to work on their first designs
starting in 1952.
46
1946
Turbine inlet temperatures of various turbojet engines:
GE I16: 1472F
RR Derwent I: 1560F
Junkers 004-B4 (Jumo): 1472F
(The only axial of those listed here)
GE I40: 1472F 62
1948
(Nov. 14) GE built the second gas turbine locomotive. It was experimental, but
successful enough for an order to be placed 12/50 and the first commercial units
delivered 1/52.
1949
First stationary gas turbine built in the US for the purpose of generating electric
power went into service in Oklahoma City on 7/29/49. Unit was 3500 kW and had
a turbine inlet temperature of 1400F.
1949
Brown Boveri placed a 10,000 kW, double-shaft unit with intercooling,
regeneration, and reheat in operation in Lima, Peru.
Late 40s
Westinghouse forms a design group independent of the aircraft group to develop
gas turbines for land based application.
1950
(4/50) Brown Boveri delivers the first commercial gas turbine locomotive to Great
Western Railway in England.
1952
West Texas Utilities helps pioneer commercial combustion turbine baseload
generation with a 5000 kW (W) unit. The new W81 combustion turbine achieves
21% efficiency at an inlet temperature of 1350F. Other technical advances
included removable blading (a steam turbine spinoff) and more aerodynamic design
of five-stage turbine (taken mainly from Westinghouse aircraft engine design
practice).
1954
Boeing 707 makes maiden flight with four Pratt & Whitney JT-3 turbojet engines.
1954
Westinghouse offers a 5000 kW basic power generation turbine with a rotor inlet
of 1350F and a full-load efficiency of 29%. Another turbine provides 15,000 kW
and reaches 34% efficiency with the addition of intercooling to the regenerative
cycle.
1956
GE begins development for first US turbofan engine (the CJ805-23.) It is tested
on 12/27/57 and enters airline service in the 1960s.
Late 50s
Introduction of light-weight simple-cycle gas generators and gas turbines into the
power generation market. They have pressure ratios of about 12 and thermal
efficiencies of about 25%.
62 William W. Bathie, Fundamentals of Gas Turbines, 2nd Ed. Ch. 1.
47
By the late 1950’s, firing temperatures had reached 1450F.
1960
Pratt and Whitney continues development on its turbofan engine (the JT3D) until it
makes its first test flight on a Boeing 707-120 on 6/22/60. It was later installed
in
some DC-8’s.
Cooling develops for turbojet engines
1961
General Electric designed the first “packaged” or “standardized” gas turbine power
plant (turbine, generator, exciter, auxiliary equipment, etc.)
1962
Westinghouse designed the first “packaged” or “standardized” gas turbine power
plant (turbine, generator, exciter, auxiliary equipment, etc.)
1965
(November ’65) The “Northeast Blackout” ushers in new age of gas turbines as
manufacturers are swamped with orders for peaking power plants. Gas turbine
development accelerated and technical staffs expanded.
Blade and vane cooling, pioneered by aircraft engine industry, becomes available
for use in industrial turbine engineering and begin to emerge in initial designs.
Post 1965
Rotor Inlet Temperatures (RITs) approached 1550F with efficiencies of 25%.
1967
West Texas Utilities San Angelo Power station achieves a US-record 39 percent
combined cycle efficiency. (W 301 turbine, 25 MW, 1450F firing temp.)
The 1960’s had many utilities install simple-cycle gas turbine engines as peaking
units. Generally
selected due to nature of size, short lead time, and low capital costs.
Late 1960’s saw the introduction of GE pre-engineered heat recovery combined cycles
for power
generation. The early units were from 11 MW to 21 MW.
1970
Clean Air Act charges EPA with establishing aircraft exhaust emission levels.
These are published in 1973 and the first compliance date is 1/1/79.
1971
Large GE combined cycles introduced in the form of a New Jersey 340 MW plant.
1978
Natural Gas Policy Act is enacted to deregulate the natural gas industry in the
United States. The deregulatory process is to happen over seven years.
The Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act bars use of gas in all new power
plants. US manufacturers turn to international markets, but gas turbine industry
suffers. Gas is deemed “too valuable to burn” for industrial purposes.
The number of gas turbine orders at US utilities begins to flatten.
48
1984
Gas prospects improve with discoveries of additional reserves.
1984
First steam-injected gas turbine introduced.
1986
ABB commissions a combined cycle plant with an inlet temperature of 1070C and
efficiency of 51.8%.
1980-86 showed great strides in gas exploration and the determination that natural
gas could be
found in prolific quantities.
This period and the late 1970s were also marked by strides in computer-assisted
engineering tools
which could be applied to gas turbine design.
1987
Industrial Fuel Use Act is rescinded, clearing way for use of new natural gas
plants
The end of the 1980s saw the first installation of combined-cycle power plants with
thermal
efficiencies of greater than 50%.
Improvements over the 1990’s brought cost breakthrough on combined cycle turbines.
Cost of
combined cycle generating capacity dropped from $600/kW in 1991 to $350/kW in
1996.63
1992
Congress passes the Energy Policy Act, setting the stage for deregulation of the
power generation industry
1996
State of the art in simple cycle gas turbines: RIT=2300F, Efficiency = 32%.
1998
Gas turbine engineering development seeing inlet temperatures increase to around
2600F.
The late 1990’s sees breaking the 60% efficiency barrier with combined cycle
plants.
63 Hansen and Smock, p. 23
49
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56
APPENDIX C: EXPERTS INTERVIEWED
Dr. Janos M. Beer, MIT Department of Mechanical Engineering (1/98)
Rep. Richard Gephardt, (D-MO) Minority Leader of the U.S. House of Representatives
(11/97)
Dr. Joel Haynes, General Electric - Combustion Research, (4/98)
Sen. John Kerry, (D-MA) U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation
(4/98)
Mr. Lee McLurin, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Manager of Combustion Turbine
Engineering (5/98)
Mr. David Miller, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Combustion Turbine Sales and
Marketing
(5/98)
Mr. Ryan Pastrana, Westinghouse Electric Corporation - Power Generation (2/98)
General Electric - Power Systems (4/98)
Ms. Holly Propst, Legislative Assistant to Congressman Daniel Schaeffer (R-CO)
Chairman of
the House Commerce Subcommittee on Energy and Power (11/97)
Mr. Joseph Schlepko, Westinghouse Electric Corporation - Combustion Turbine
Division (1/98)
Mr. Kirk Speer, Westinghouse Electric Corporation - Power Generation (4/98)
Dr. Craig Tedmon, Retired Director of ABB Research and Development (2/98)
Dr. David Gordon Wilson, MIT Department of Chemical and Fuel Engineering (1/98)