Power System Security in the New Industry Environment: Challenges and Solutions

Prabha Kundur Powertech Labs Inc. Surrey, B.C. Canada

Prabha Kundur Powertech Labs Inc. Surrey, B.C. Canada IEEE Toronto Centennial Forum on Reliable Power Grids in Canada October 3, 2003

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Power System Security

Security of a power system is affected by three factors: Characteristics of the physical system: the integrated generation, transmission and distribution system protection and control systems Business structures of owning and operating entities

The regulatory framework

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Challenges to Secure Operation of Today's Power Systems

Power Systems are large complex systems covering vast areas national/continental grids

highly nonlinear, high order system

Many processes whose operations need to be coordinated

millions of devices requiring harmonious interplay

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Challenges to Secure Operation of Today's Power Systems (cont'd)

Complex modes of instability

global problems
different forms of instability: rotor angle, voltage, frequency

"Deregulated" market environment

many entities with diverse business interests system expansion and operation driven largely by economic drivers; lack of coordinated planning

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Traditional Approach to Power System Stability

The November ,9 1965 blackout of Northeast US and Canada had a profound effect on consideration of stability in system design and operation focus, however, has been largely limited to transient (angle) stability The changing characteristics of power systems requires careful consideration of other aspects of stability

Interarea oscillations; voltage stability

System designed/operated to withstand loss of a single element Operating limits based on off-line studies

scenarios based on judgment and experience

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November 9, 1965 Blackout of Northeast US and Ontario

November 9, 1965 - Blackout of Northeast US and Ontario

Clear day with mild weather Load levels in the regional normal Problem began at 5:16 p.m. Within a few minutes, there was a complete shut down of electric service to

virtually all of the states of New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Vermont
parts of New Hampshire, New Jersey and Pennsylvania most of Ontario Nearly 30 million people were without power for about 13 hours
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Events that Caused the 1965 Blackout

The initial event was the operation of a backup relay at Beck GS in Ontario near Niagara Falls
opened circuit Q29BD, one of five 230 kV circuits connecting Beck GS to load centers in Toronto and Hamilton

Prior to opening of Q29BD, the five circuits were carrying

1200 MW of Beck generation, and 500 MW import from Western NY State on Niagara ties

Net import from NY 300 MW

Loading on Q29BD was 361 MW at 248 kV; The relay setting corresponded to 375 MW
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Events that Caused the 1965 Blackout (contd)

Opening of Q29BD resulted in sequential tripping of the remaining four parallel circuits Power flow reversed to New York total change of 1700 MW Power surge back to Ontario via St. Lawrence ties ties tripped by protective relaying Generators in Western New York and Beck GS lost synchronism, followed by cascading outages After about 7 seconds from the initial disturbance system split into several separate islands eventually most generation and load lost; inability of islanded systems to stabilize
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Formation of Reliability Councils

Northeast Power Coordinating Council (NPCC) formed in January 1966 to improve coordination in planning and operation among utilities in the region that was blacked out first Regional Reliability Council (RRC) in North America Other eight RRCs formed in the following months National/North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) established in 1968 Detailed reliability criteria were developed Procedures for exchange of data and conducting stability studies were established many of these developments has had an influence on utility practices worldwide still largely used
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Examples of Recent Major System Disturbances/Blackouts

1. July 2, 1996 disturbance of WSCC (Western North American
Interconnected) System

2. August 10, 1996 disturbance of WSCC system 3. 1998 power failure of Auckland business districts, New Zealand

4. March 11, 1999 Brazil blackout

5. July 29, 1999 Taiwan disturbance 6. August 14, 2003 blackout of Northeast U.S. and Ontario

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July 2, 1996 WSCC (WECC) Disturbance

WSCC July 2, 1996 Disturbance

Started in Wyoming and Idaho area at 14:24:37 Loads were high in Southern Idaho and Utah; High temperature around 38C Heavy power transfers from Pacific NW to California Pacific AC interties - 4300 MW (4800 rating) Pacific HVDC intertie - 2800 MW (3100 capacity)

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WSCC July 2, 1996 Disturbance (cont'd)

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WSCC July 2, 1996 Disturbance (cont'd)

LG fault on 345 kV line from Jim Bridger 2000 MW plant in Wyoming to Idaho due to flashover to a tree

tripping of parallel line due to relay misoperation

Tripping of two (of four) Jim Bridger units as stability control; this should have stabilized the system

Faulty relay tripped 230 kV line in Eastern Oregon

Voltage decay in southern Idaho and slow decay in central Oregon

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WSCC July 2, 1996 Disturbance (contd)

About 24 seconds later, a long 230 kV line (Amps line) from western Montana to Southern Idaho tripped

zone 3 relay operation

parallel 161 kV line subsequently tripped Rapid voltage decay in Idaho and Oregon Three seconds later, four 230 kV lines from Hells Canyon to Boise tripped

Two seconds later, Pacific intertie lines separated

Cascading to five islands 35 seconds after initial fault 2.2 million customers experienced outages; total load lost 11,900 MW

Voltage Instability!!!
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WSCC July 2, 1996 Disturbance (cont'd)

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WSCC July 2, 1996 Disturbance (cont'd)

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ETMSP was Used to Replicate Disturbance in Time Domain

MEASURED RESPONSE

SIMULATED RESPONSE

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August 10, 1996 WSCC (WECC) Disturbance

WSCC August 10, 1996 Disturbance

High ambient temperatures in Northwest; high power transfer from Canada to California Prior to main outage, three 500 kV line sections from lower Columbia River to load centres in Oregon were out of service due to tree faults California-Oregon Interties loaded to 4330 MW north to south

Pacific DC Intertie loaded at 2680 MW north to south

2300 MW flow from British Columbia Growing 0.23 Hz oscillations caused tripping of lines resulting in formation of four islands loss of 30,500 MW load
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August 10th, 1996 WSCC Event

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WSCC August 10, 1996 Disturbance (cont'd)

3000 2900 2800

Malin - Round Mountain MW Flow

2700
2600 2500 2400 2300
0 3 6 9 12 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 47 50 53 56 59 62 65 68 71 74

Time in Seconds

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WSCC August 10, 1996 Disturbance (cont'd)

As a result of the undamped oscillations, the system split into four large islands

Over 7.5 million customers experienced outages ranging from a few minutes to nine hours! Total load loss 30,500 MW

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ETMSP was Used to Replicate Disturbance in Time Domain

MEASURED RESPONSE

SIMULATED RESPONSE

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Sites Selected for PSS Modifications

San Onofre (Addition)

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Palo Verde (Tune existing)

Power System Stabilizers

With existing controls Eigenvalue = 0.0597 + j 1.771 Frequency = 0.2818 Hz Damping = -0.0337

With PSS modifications Eigenvalue = -0.0717 + j 1.673 Frequency = 0.2664 Damping = -0.0429

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March 11, 1999 Brazil Blackout

March 11, 1999 Brazil Blackout

Time: 22:16:00h, System Load: 34,200 MW Description of the event: L-G fault at Bauru Substation as a result of lightning causing a bus insulator flashover the bus arrangement at Bauru such that the fault is cleared by opening five 440 kV lines the power system survived the initial event, but resulted in instability when a short heavily loaded 440 kV line was tripped by zone 3 relay cascading outages of several power plants in Sao Paulo area, followed by loss of HVDC and 750 kV AC links from Itaipu complete system break up: 24,700 MW load loss; several islands remained in operation with a total load of about 10,000 MW
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March 11, 1999 Brazil Blackout (cont'd)

Measures to improve system security: Joint Working Group comprising ELECTROBRAS, CEPEL and ONS staff formed organized activities into 8 Task Forces Four international experts as advisors Remedial Actions: power system divided into 5 security zones: regions with major generation and transmission system; emergency controls added for enhancing stability improved layout and protection of major EHV substations improved maintenance of substation equipment and protection/control equipment improved restoration plans
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What Can We Do To Prevent Blackouts?

Methods of Enhancing Security

Impractical to achieve complete immunity to blackouts need to strike a balance between economy and security Good design and operating practices could significantly minimize the occurrence and impact of widespread outages Reliability criteria On-line security assessment

Robust stability controls

Coordinated emergency controls Real-time system system monitoring and control Wide-spread use of distributed generation
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Reliability Criteria
At present, systems designed and operated to withstand loss of any single element preceded by single-, double-, or threephase fault

referred to as "N-1 criterion"

Need for using risk-based security assessment consider multiple outages

account for probability and consequences of instability

Built-in overall strength or robustness best defense against catastrophic failures!

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Enhancement of Stability: Controls

Greater use of on stability controls excitation control (PSS), FACTS, HVDC, secondary voltage control multi-purpose controls Coordination, integration and robustness present challenges good control design procedures and tools have evolved Hardware design should provide high degree of functional reliability flexibility for maintenance and testing

Industry should make better use of controls!

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Development of a Good "Defense Plan" against Extreme Contingencies

Judicious choice of emergency controls

protection against multiple outages

identification of scenarios based on past experience, knowledge of unique characteristics of system, probabilistic approach Coordination of different emergency control schemes complement each other act properly in complex situations Response-based emergency controls should generally be preferred

"self-healing" power systems

Need for advancing this technology!

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State-of-the-Art On-Line Dynamic Security Assessment (DSA)

Practical tools with the required accuracy, speed and robustness

a variety of analytical techniques integrated

distributed hardware architecture using low cost PCs integrated with energy management system Capable of assessing rotor angle stability and voltage stability determine critical contingencies automatically security limits/margins for all desired energy transactions identify remedial measures

The industry has yet to take full advantage of these developments!

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Management of System Reliability

Roles and responsibilities of individual entities well chosen, clearly defined and properly enforced Coordination of reliability management

Need for a single entity with overall responsibility for security of entire interconnected system
real-time decisions

System operators with high level of expertise in system stability

phenomena, tools

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Future Trends in DSA: Intelligent Systems

Knowledge base created using simulation of a large number cases and system measurements Automatic learning, data mining, and decision trees to build intelligent systems

Fast analysis using a broad knowledge base and automatic decision making
Provides new insight into factors and system parameters affecting stability More effective in dealing with uncertainties and large dimensioned problems
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We just completed a PRECARN project

DSA Using Intelligent Systems

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Real-Time Monitoring and Control: An Emerging Technology

Advances in communications technology have made it possible to monitor power systems over a wide area remotely control many functions Research on use of multisensor data fusion technology process data from different monitors, integrate and process information

identify phenomenon associated with impending emergency

make intelligent control decisions A fast and effective way to predict onset of emergency conditions and take remedial actions
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Distributed Generation (DG)

Offer significant economic, environmental and security benefits DG becoming increasingly cost competitive Microturbines small, high speed power plants operate on natural gas, future units may use diesel or gas from landfills

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Distributed Generation (DG) (cont'd)

Fuel Cells combine hydrogen with oxygen from air to generate electricity hydrogen may be supplied from an external source or generated inside fuel by reforming a hydrocarbon fuel high efficiency, non-combustion, non-mechanical process Particularly attractive in Ontario generate hydrogen during light load using nuclear generation

Not vulnerable to power grid failure due to system instability or natural calamities!
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Summary
1. The new electricity supply industry presents increasing challenges for stable
and secure operation of power systems

2. State-of-the-art methods and tools have advanced our capabilities

significantly facing the challenges comprehensive stability analysis tools

coordinated design of robust stability controls

on-line dynamic security assessment

Industry yet to take full advantage of these developments! 3. Need to review and improve the reliability criteria the process for managing "global" system reliability
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Summary (cont'd)
4. Emerging technologies which can better deal with growing uncertainties
and increasing complexities of the problem
Intelligent Systems for DSA Real-time monitoring and control

"Self-healing" power systems

5. Wide-spread use of distributed generation is a cost effective,

environmentally friendly means of minimizing the impact of power grid failures

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Vulnerability of B.C. Power System to Blackouts

Transmission is not very meshed power transmitted from large sources of hydroelectric generation over 500 kV lines Most of the power generation is from hydroelectric plants simple and rugged can be restored quickly Good set of emergency controls generation and load tripping braking resistor Disturbances in western interconnected system result in separation into islands Less vulnerable to complete blackout !
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Terminology

Power System Security

Security: the degree of risk in the ability to survive imminent disturbances (contingencies) without interruption of customer service depends on the operating condition and the contingent probability of a disturbance To be secure, the power system must:

be stable following a contingency, and

settle to operating conditions such that no physical constraints are violated The power system must also be secure against contingencies that would not be classified as stability problems, e.g. damage to equipment such as failure of a cable
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Power System Security (cont'd)

Stability: the continuance of intact operation of the power system following a disturbance

Reliability: the probability of satisfactory operation over the long run

denotes the ability to supply adequate electric service on a nearly continuous basis, with few interruptions over an extended period

Stability and security are time-varying attributes; Reliability is a function of time-average performance

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