By: JUDGE MARIA FILOMENA D.

SINGH Presiding Judge, Branch 85, RTC Quezon City Faculty, Ateneo de Manila School of Law Faculty, Philippine Judicial Academy

Cayetano v. Monsod (201 SCRA 210 [1991]) What constitutes practice of law? The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Blacks Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. (111 ALR 23) Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a lawyereconomist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyerlegislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Khan, Jr. v. Simbillo (409 SCRA 299 [2003]) The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public to service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves.

The following elements distinguish the legal profession from a business: 1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain the highest eminence without making much money; 2. A relation as an officer of the court to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability; 3. A relation to clients in the highest degree (of) fiduciary; 4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.

Annulment of Marriage Specialist 5324333/5212667 The solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it were made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar. Thus the use of simple signs stating the names of the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now acceptable. Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is likewise allowable.

Director of Religious Affairs v. Bayot (74 Phil. 579 [1944]) Marriage license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the poor. Everything confidential. It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah.

Bernardo v. Mejia, 531 SCRA 639 [2007]) The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the continuing requirements for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Disbarred lawyer petitions the Supreme Court for readmission to the practice of law. The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character, a fit and proper person to practice law. The Court will take into consideration the applicants character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charges for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement.

Arce v. PNB (62 Phil. 569 [1935]) Attorneys fees for guardianship case: client offered P200, trial court awarded P400, lawyer appealed and asked for P5,000. The SC awarded P1,000. The law is a profession, not a business. Lawyers are officers of the courts. At the same time professional men are entitled to have and recover from their clients a reasonable compensation for their services rendered with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of services rendered, and the professional standing of the lawyer. Courts have constantly to protect clients from unconscionable or unreasonable claims. On the

other hand, the standing of the members of the bar is not enhanced by quibbling relative to just fees, equivalent to the bargaining had between a prospective purchaser and a merchant in the markets before a sale is made.

Ledesma v. Climaco (57 SCRA 473 [1974]) Motion to withdraw as counsel de oficio for accused on ground of appointment as Election Registrar denied. Membership in the bar carries with it a responsibility to live up to its exacting standard. The law is a profession, not a trade or a craft. Those enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in the performance of one of the basic purposes of the State, the administration of justice. To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio. The fact that his services are rendered without remuneration should not occasion a diminution in his zeal. The admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners that there are times, and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes precedence over the promptings of selfinterest.

People v. Daban (43 SCRA 185 [1972]) Counsel de oficio failed to file an appellants brief despite 17 extensions, excusing the omission on the ground of the escape of the prisoner-client. As such counsel de oficio, he has a high duty to the accused as one employed and paid by defendant himself. Because, as in the case of the latter, he must exercise his best efforts and professional ability in behalf of the person assigned to his care. His is to render effective assistance. The accused defendant expects of him due diligence, not mere perfunctory representation. We do not accept the paradox that responsibility is less where the defended party is poor. For indeed a lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of justice is expected to have a bigger dose of social conscience and little less of selfinterest.

In re: Cunanan (94 Phil. 534 [1954]) It is indispensable to the administration of justice and to interpretation of the laws that there be members of the bar of sufficient ability, adequate learning, and sound moral character. This arises from the need of enlightened assistance to the honest, and restraining authority over the knavish, litigant. It is highly important also that the public be protected from incompetent and vicious practitioners, whose opportunity for doing mischief is wide. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. One is admitted to the bar for something more than private gain. He becomes an officer of the court, and, like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice. His cooperation with the court is due whenever justice would be imperiled if cooperation was withheld. Without such attorneys at law, the judicial department of government would be hampered in the performance of its duties.

Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, 105 Phil. 75 [1959]) Patent Office Director imposed an examination to qualify for practice as a patent attorney before the Patent Office. The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the practice of law in the Philippines and any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines. Naturally, the question arises as to whether or not appearance before the Patent Office and the preparation and prosecution of patent applications constitutes or is included in the practice of law. In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and circumstances. (5 Am Jur p. 262, 263).

In re: Sycip, et al. (92 SCRA 1 [1979]) Petition to continue using in the firm name names of partners who have passed away. A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or association for a particular purpose. It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or business or of holding property. The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or franchise. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The right does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege highly personal and partaking of the nature of a public trust.

Cui v. Cui (11 SCRA 755 [1964]) A deed favored as administrator one who possessed a titulo de abogado in a contest between a law graduate and a lawyer previously disbarred but already reinstated. The term titulo de abogado means not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. Abogado is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed and general signification, and has reference to that class of persons who are by license officers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.

In re: Del Rosario (52 Phil. 399 [1928]) Applicant failed the bar thrice, but moved to have results of second try reviewed and it was granted. Case for falsification of public documents (application) filed but applicant acquitted on reasonable doubt although his co-accused pleaded guilty. The acquittal of Felipe del Rosario upon the criminal charge is not a bar to these proceedings. The Court is now acting in an entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal cases. ... While to admit Felipe del Rosario again to the bar examination would be tantamount to a declaration of professional purity which we are totally unable to pronounce. The practice of law is not an absolute right. To be granted everyone who demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of sound discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law.

In re: Cunanan (94 Phil. 534 [1954]) RA 973 The Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 versus Rule 127, Section 14 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 138, Section 14)

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. Even considering the power granted to Congress by our Constitution to repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this Court regarding the admission to the practice of law, to our judgment, the proposition that the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly belonging to Congress is unacceptable. The function requires: (1) previously established rules and principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3) decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial function of the highest degree. And it becomes more undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on the petitions of these same individuals are attempted to be revoked or modified.

What the law attempts to amend and correct are not the rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of the Court, by means of simply taking its place. In other words, the power exercised was not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules, which continue in force. What was done was to stop or suspend them. And this power is not included in what the Constitution has granted to Congress, because it falls within the power to apply the rules. This power corresponds to the judiciary, to which such duty has been confided.

In re: Lanuevo (66 SCRA 245 [1975]) The Bar Confidant schemed to have the bar examination of an applicant reviewed and re-graded, resulting in a passing grade. The Office of the Bar Confidant has absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after their notebooks are submitted to him by the Examiners. After the corrected notebooks are submitted to him by the Examiners, his only function is to tally the individual grades of every examinee in all subjects taken and thereafter compute the general average. The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannot assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiner concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the Examiner. Any request for reevaluation should be done by the examinee and the same should be addressed to the Court, which alone can validly act thereon. A Bar Confidant who takes such initiative, exposes himself to suspicion and thereby compromises his position as well as the image of the Court.

In re: Almacen (31 SCRA 562 [1970]) In a Petition to Surrender Lawyers Certificate to protest against the great injustice committed against his client by the Supreme Court, the lawyer describes the court as peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity. By constitutional mandate, ours is the solemn duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the practice of law those who have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in the Bar. The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent and incidental power in courts of record, and one which is essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all that he is worthy of their confidence and respect. Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a mere inherent or incidental power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of Court.

Disciplinary proceedings like the present one are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not and does not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu propio. Public interest is its primary objective and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice

In re: Guarina ( 24 Phil. 37 [1913])

Applicant seeks admission to the Bar without taking the examination under Act 1597, having been appointed as Provincial Fiscal of Batanes. Section 9 of the Act of Congress placed it beyond the power of the local Legislature to deprive this court of the jurisdiction or power theretofore granted to it Act No. 190, in force at the time when the Act of Congress was enacted, conferred upon this Court the power and jurisdiction to deny admission to candidates for the bar unless, in addition to certain other prescribed conditions, they satisfy the court that they possess the necessary learning in the law, by passing an examination prescribed by general rule. It seems clear, therefore, that the Commission had no authority to deprive this court of its power to deny admission to any candidate who fails to satisfy it that he possesses the necessary qualifications for admission to the bar. Applicant was not and never had been a practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the date of his appointment as provincial fiscal and he was deficient in the required qualifications at the time when he last applied for admission to the bar.

In re: Edillon (84 SCRA 554 [1978]) Attorneys refusal to pay membership dues in the IBP prompted the latter to petition that he be dropped from the Roll of Attorneys. The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent members name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article III of the IBP ByLaws, whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule. looking solely to the language of the provision in the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law, it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law. Thus, when respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties.

To compel a lawyer to be a member of the IBP is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his IBP Chapter, or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the States legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers. The practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyers public responsibilities.

In re: Parazo (82 Phil. 230 [1948]) Reporters refusal to reveal source of news report regarding claimed bar examination leak favoring one school. Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution of the Philippines authorizes this Court to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law, and pursuant to that authority, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court was promulgated, under which rule, this Court conducts the Bar Examinations yearly, appoints a Committee of Bar Examiners to be presided by one of the Justices, to serve for one year, acts on the report of the committee and, finally, admits to the Bar and to the practice of law, the candidates and examinees who have passed the examinations. Any charge or insinuation of anomaly in the conduct of the Bar Examinations, of necessity is imbued with wide and general interest and national importance. We have the inherent power of courts in general specially of the Supreme court as representative of the Judicial Department, to adopt proper and adequate measures to preserve their integrity, and render possible and facilitate the exercise of their functions. .. The revelation demanded of the respondent of the identity of his informants is essential and necessary to the investigation of the charge contained in the publication already mentioned.

In re: Garcia (112 Phil. 884 [1961]) A Filipino who had been admitted into law practice in Spain after legal studies there, applied for admission to law practice in the Philippines under the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between Spain and our country, without taking the bar examination. The privileges provided in the Treaty are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the contracting State in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession; and Section 1 of Rule 127 in connection with Sections 2, 9, and 16 thereof, which have the force of law, require that before anyone can practice the legal profession in the Philippines, he must pass the required bar examinations. The Executive Department may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

US v. Ney and Bosque (No. 3593, March 23, 1907) A Spanish citizen, who was disqualified from practicing law in the Philippines, formed an office with a practicing attorney (Law Office -- Ney and Bosque) for the general practice of law in all the courts of the Islands. A mandate of the court, while in force, must be obeyed. The irregular signature to papers, though affixed by his associate, had his authorization and constitutes a substantial attempt to engage in practice. Moreover the firm circular in setting forth the establishment of an office for the general practice of law in all the courts of the Islands, amounted to an assertion of his right and purpose, not effectively qualified by the addition that he would devote himself to consultation and office work relating to Spanish law. The conduct of defendant Bosque amounts to disobedience of an order made in a proceeding to which he was a party. In the offense of Bosque in holding himself out as a general practitioner Ney participated and for the improper signature of the pleadings he was chiefly and personally responsible.

Robinson v. Villafuerte (18 Phil. 171 [1911]) Law clerk allowed by trial judge to ask questions of witnesses in the presence of the real counsel of the party. It is unquestionable that the intervention of the said law clerk and employee of the plaintiffs attorneys in this suit was improperly admitted; it was not authorized by any law, for the reason that the said Lacalle did not have the capacity and qualifications of a lawyer admitted to practice his profession before the courts of these Islands and, therefore, on objection being made to his presence at the hearing, the judge should have excluded Lacalle and not permitted him to address questions to the plaintiffs witnesses.

Omico Mining v. Vallejos (63 SCRA 285 [1975] Judge entered into a contract of personal and professional services with private individuals to head defendants legal department for a fixed yearly salary. The challenged judgment seeks to enforce a contract which is patently void because it is contrary to law and public policy. The contract of professional services entered into between private respondent and the petitioners, while the former was still a judge of the Court of First Instance, constituted private practice of law in contravention of Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. The aforecited rule was promulgated by this Court pursuant to its constitutional power to regulate the practice of law. It is based on sound reasons of public policy, for there is no question that the rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney-at-law are so inherently incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers, discretions and privileges of a Judge of the CFI.

This inhibitory rule makes it obligatory upon the judicial officers concerned to give their full time and attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending special favors to their own private interests and assure the public of their impartiality in the performance of their functions. These objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency and the desire to promote the public interest. Private respondent should have known or ought to know that when he was elevated to the bench of the CFI as a judge thereof, his right to practice law as an attorney was suspended and continued to be suspended as long as he occupied the judicial position.

Noriega v. Sison (125 SCRA 293 [1983]) Lawyer-SEC Hearing Officer appeared in a JDRC case for a close friend and with the written permit of the SEC Commissioner. The purpose of disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment depriving him of a source of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this function should be competent, honorable and reliable in order that the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in them. In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing, and satisfactory proof. clear, preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty. An attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges preferred against him until the contrary is proved; and as an officer of the court, that he performed his duty in accordance with his oath.

Diao v. Martinez (7 SCRA 475 [1963]) Charge of false representation against a lawyer for stating in his bar application that had completed the requisite academic qualifications but he actually obtained an AA diploma 6 months after beginning his law studies. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to his false representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be and is hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examination is immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential.

Quingwa v. Puno (19 SCRA 439 [1967]) Charge of gross immorality and misconduct against a lawyer who induced the complainant to have sexual relations upon a promise of marriage but reneged on the promise even after he made her pregnant. One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the applicant must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of law, it is essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. The statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent power of the court over its officers can not be restricted. An attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession but also for gross misconduct which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him.

Macarrubo v. Macarrubo (424 SCRA 42 [2004]) Complaint for disbarment on claimed deception leading complainant to marriage without knowledge of respondents prior existing marriage. Then the lawyer-respondent married a 3rd time and left the complainant and their children without support. The rule that a lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for nay misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, in probity and good demeanor, thus rendering him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court bears reiterating. Respondent is indeed guilty of gross misconduct in his private affairs which warrant disciplinary action He and complainant started living as husband and wife in December 1991 when his first marriage was still subsisting as it was only on August 21, 1998 that such first marriage was annulled, rendering him liable for concubinage. Such conduct is inconsistent with the good moral character that is required for the continued right to practice law as a member of the Philippine bar. It imports moral turpitude and is a public assault upon the basic social institution of marriage. As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be perceived to be of good moral character and must lead a life in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community.

De Jesus-Paras v. Vailoces (111 Phil. 569 [1961]) Lawyer-Notary Public convicted of falsification of public document for acknowledging a last will and testament which was proven to be a forgery. A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney if it appears that he has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Moral turpitude includes any act deemed contrary to justice, honesty or good morals. Among the examples given of crimes of this nature are the crimes of seduction and concubinage. The crime of which respondent was convicted is falisfication of public document, which is indeed of this nature, for the act is clearly contrary to justice, honesty and good morals. Embezzlement, forgery, robbery, swindling are crimes which denote moral turpitude and as a general rule, all crimes of which fraud is an element are looked on as involving moral turpitude.

Garcia v. De Vera (418 SCRA 27 [2003]) Petition to disqualify respondent from IBP elections on ground of moral turpitude based on a previous contempt citation. The Court defines moral turpitude as an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals.

Calub v. Suller (323 SCRA 556 [2000]) Lawyer raped his neighbors wife. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. The rape of his neighbors wife constituted serious moral depravity even if his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt in the criminal prosecution for rape. He is not worthy to remain a member of the bar. The privilege to practice law is bestowed upon individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally.

People v. Lee (382 SCRA 596 [2002]) Character is defined to be the possession by a person of certain qualities of mind and morals, distinguishing him from others. It is the opinion generally entertained of a person derived from the common report of the people who are acquainted with him; his reputation. Good moral character includes all elements essential to make up such a character; among these are common honesty and veracity, especially in al professional intercourse; a character that measures up as good among people of the community in which the person lives, or that is up to the standard of the average citizen; that status which attaches to a man of good behavior and upright conduct.

Guevarra v. Eala (AC No. 7136, August 1, 2007) Whether a lawyers sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as grossly immoral conduct depends on the surrounding circumstances. The case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly. While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void ab initio is immaterial. The acts complained of took place before the marriage was declared null and void.

Soriano v. Dizon, A.C. No. 6792 [January 25, 2006] A lawyer gave chase to a taxi and as a resultof an altercation he fell down on the ground, went to hiscar took his gun and shot the taxi driver several times. The Supreme Court found the lawyer guilt of violating Canon 1 for his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm and his refusal to satisfy the civil liabilities imposed on him by the trial court which had convicted him for frustrated homicide. For having violated a law and disobeying a final court judgment, he was also found to have violated his lawyers oath. Moral turpitude was defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.

Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a high degree of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the practice of law. Sadly, herein respondent has fallen short of the exacting standards expected of, and brazen dishonesty of respondent clearly show his unworthiness to continue as a member of the bar. In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending circumstances not the mere fact of their conviction would demonstrate their fitness to remain in the legal profession. In the present case, the appalling vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonesty of respondent clearly show his unworthiness to continue as a member of the Bar.

Gonzales v. Alcaraz, A.C. No. 5321 [2006] Whether in their professional or in their private capacity, lawyers may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct. The penalty is a consequence of acts showing their unworthiness as officers of the courts; as well as their lack of moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor (Calub vs. Suller, 380 Phil. 532 [January 28, 2000]; Saburnido vs. Madrono, 418 Phil 241 [September 26, 2001]; Lao vs. Medel, 453 Phil 115 [July 1, 2003]). When the misconduct committed outside of their professional dealings is so gross as to show them to be morally unfit for the office and the privileges conferred upon them by their license and the law, they may be suspended or disbarred (Soriano vs. Dizon, A.C. No. 6792 [January 25, 2006]; Quingwa vs. Puno, 125 Phil. 831 [February 28, 1967]).

A lawyers brash transgression of any, especially a penal, law is repulsive and reprehensible and cannot be countenanced. The vengeful and violent behavior exhibited by respondent in what should have been a simple traffic alteration reveals his conceit and delusions of selfimportance. By firing his gun openly in a congested highway and exposing complainant and the general public to danger, he showed his utter lack of a sense of responsibility, as well as of respect for law and order.

Co v. Bernardino, A.C. No. 3919, 285 SCRA 102 [1998]

In finding the lawyer administratively liable, the Court held that he is guilty of gross Violation 1.01 through the procurement of personal loans through insinuations of his power as an influence peddler in the Bureau of Customs, the issuance of a series of bad checks and taking undue advantage of his position in the aforesaid government office which the High Court characterized as a propinquity for employing deceit and misrepresentation. The lawyer was suspended for one year

As a general rule, a court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for misconduct alleged to have been committed in his private capacity. But this is a general rule with many exceptions xxx xxx. The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney, and the statutory rules prescribing the qualifications of attorneys, uniformly require that an attorney shall be a person of good moral character. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of law, it would seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice an dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him.

Bon v. Ziga and Arcangel, A.C. No. 5436, 429 SCRA 177 [2001] Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts as private document into a public document thus making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgement executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument. For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined (id. At 184-185, citing Rosales vs. Ramos, A.C. No. 5645, 383 SCRA [July 2, 2001]).

Gonzales v. Ramos, A.C. No. 6649 [2005] The Court found that by notarizing the questioned deed, he engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (and that) he also committed falsehood and misled or allowed the Court to be misled by any artifice in violation of Rules 1.01 and 10.01 of the Code. He was thus suspended for one year from the practice of law and his notarial commission was revoked and he was disqualified from renewing the same for 2 years.

Soriano v. Basco, A.C. No. 6648 [2005] A Notary Public who failed to provide the Office of the Clerk of Court with the required copies of documents he notarized and to retain his own file copies thereof was found guilty of violating the Notarial Law and his commission was suspended for one year. He was, however, not found guilty of having committed a violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code, although there was a finding of a legal transgression. Hence, there was no suspension aspect to the penalty.

Tan Tek Beng v. David (126 SCRA 389 [1983]) A lawyer executed an agreement with a non-lawyer to share attorneys fees from our clients 50-50, and not to deal directly with said clients without the consent of the non-lawyer partner. The agreement is void because it was tantamount to malpractice which is the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do so would be unprofessional. The commercialization of law practice is condemned.

People v. Rosqueta, et al. (55 SCRA 486 [1974]) Disciplinary action against lawyer who failed to file an appeal brief for accused after suspension from the practice for that reason. Instead, moved to withdraw appeal with consent of the accused. Respondent should be aware that even in those cases where counsel de parte is unable to secure from the appellants or from their near relatives the amount necessary to pursue the appeal, that does not necessarily conclude his connection with the case. It has been a commendable practice of some members of the bar under such circumstances to be designated as counsel de oficio. That way the interest of justice is best served. Appellants will then continue to receive the benefits of advocacy from one who is familiar with the facts of the case. What is more there is no undue delay in the administration of justice. Respondents conduct yields a different impression. What has earned a reproof is his irresponsibility. He should be aware that in the pursuance of the duty owed to the court as well as to client, he cannot be too casual and unconcerned about the filing of pleadings. It is not enough that he prepares them; he must see to it that they are duly mailed. Such inattention as shown in this case is inexcusable.

San Jose Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Romanillos, A.C. No. 5580 [2005] A lawyer, who was a former Judge, used the title Judge in his office letterhead, correspondence, and in billboards erected in a subdivision where a dispute was ongoing wherein he represented one party. Such use was deceiving and a clear attempt to mislead the public into believing that the order was issued in his capacity as a judge when he was dishonorably stripped of the privilege. The use of titles such as Justice is reserved to incumbent and retired members of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan and may not be used by any other official of the Republic , including those given the rank of Justice (JBC No. 001 [July 20, 1989]). By analogy the title Judge should be reserved only to judges, incumbent an retired, and not those who were dishonorably discharged from the service. (T)he right to retain and use said title applies only to the aforementioned members of the bench and no other, and certainly not to those who were removed or dismissed from the judiciary, such as respondent.

Considering that, of all classes and professions, lawyers are most sacredly bound to uphold the law, it is imperative that they live by the law. Accordingly, lawyers who violate their oath and engage in deceitful conduct have no place in the legal profession.

Ulep v. Legal Clinic (223 SCRA 378 [1993]) Advertisement SECRET MARRIAGE? P560 for a valid marriage. Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC. Please call Legal support services basically consist of giving ready information by trained para-legals to laymen and lawyers which are strictly non-diagnostic and non-advisory Respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. The services being offered by private respondent which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by para-legals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the Bar and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law. In the Philippines we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be considered as para-legal service. In the absence of constitutional or statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law.

The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyers advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The proscription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession.

Abad v. Bleza (145 SCRA 1 [1986]) Judge charged with ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion and misconduct. To hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make the position unbearable As a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. However, while judges should not be disciplined for inefficiency on account merely of occasional mistakes or errors of judgment, yet it is highly imperative that they should be conversant with basic legal principles. They are called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and to keep themselves abreast of the latest laws, rulings and jurisprudence affecting their jurisdiction.

De Roy v. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 757 [1988]) Petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals on the last day of the 15-day period to appeal. The CA denial was based on the rule laid down in the Habaluyas Enterprises case decided on August 5, 1985, which was reiterated in a line of cases thereafter. Petitioners motion for extension of time was filed on september 9, 1987, more than a year after the expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer within the coverage of the grace period. Considering the length of time from the expiration of the grace period to the promulgation of the decision of the CA on August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court.

Vitriolo, et al. v. Dasig, A.C. No. 4984, 448 Phil 199 [2003] The Officer-in-Charge of the Legal Affairs Service of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) was sought to be disbarred for repeated acts of solicitation or extortion of money from persons who had pending applications for correction of their names in her office, the amounts ranging from P5,000.00 to P20,000.00. She was also reported to have failed to pay her just debts as evidenced by the issuance of dishonored checks. In finding respondents misconduct as a lawyer of the CHED is of such character as to affect her qualifications as a member of the Bar, the Supreme Court upheld its power to discipline a lawyer who holds a government office by clarifying that Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined (by this Court) as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official (Gonzales-Austria( vs. Abaya, A.M. No. R-705-RTJ, 176 SCRA 634, 649 [August 23, 1989]). However, if said misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, the he may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar.

Respondents conduct in office falls short of the integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers, especially from one occupying a high public office. For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice (id, at 209).

Penticostes v. Ibanez (304 SCRA 281 [1999]) A Public Prosecutor received P1,804.00 from a respondent in a preliminary investigation assigned to him who was charged with non-remittance of SSS payments. The amount represented the respondents arrears. The Prosecutor never remitted it to the SSS. The duties of a provincial prosecutor do not include receiving money from persons with official transactions with his office While Pascual may not strictly be considered a client of respondent, the rules relating to a lawyers handling of funds of a client is applicable. The failure of respondent to immediately remit the amount to the SSS gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use. This is a gross violation of general morality as well as professional ethics; it impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment A lawyer does not shed his professional obligations upon assuming public office. In fact, his public office should make him more sensitive to his professional obligations because a lawyers disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in the publics eye. Want of moral integrity is to be more severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible public office.

Pimentel, Jr. v. Llorente (339 SCRA 154 [2000]) Complaint for disbarment against the Election Officer-Lawyer and City Prosecutor who acted as Chair and Vice-Chair of the Board of Canvassers in the 1995 elections. Despite the fact that these discrepancies were apparent on the face of these documents and that the variation involves substantial number of votes, respondents nevertheless certified the statements of votes as true and correct. Their acts constitute misconduct A lawyer who holds a government position may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if the misconduct also constitutes a violation of the CPR or the lawyers oath or is of such character as to affect his qualifications as a lawyer or shows moral delinquency on his part, such individual may be disciplined as a member of the bar for such misconduct.

Suarez v. Platon (69 Phil. 556 [1940]) The prosecuting officer is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor indeed, he should do so. But while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.

Far Eastern Shipping v. CA (297 SCRA 30 [1998]) It took 8 months of extensions (210 days) for the OSG to file a required comment. In the other case, it took 6 extensions totaling 180 days before the OSG filed its comment. The undeniably dilatory disinclination of the OSG to seasonably file required pleadings constitutes deplorable disservice to the tax-paying public and can only be categorized as censurable inefficiency on the part of the government law office. This is most certainly professionally unbecoming of the OSG The OSG is reminded that just like other members of the Bar, the canons under the CPR apply with equal force on lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks. These ethical duties are rendered even more exacting on them because, as government counsel, they have the added duty to abide by the policy of the State to promote a high standard of ethics in public service.

Igoy v. Soriano (367 SCRA 70 [2001]) A litigant before the Court of Appeals was introduced to a certain Justice of the Supreme Court who asked for sums of money to help secure a favorable decision on his case. Respondents offer to resign was obviously an attempt to evade whatever penalty may be imposed upon him. However, the mere expedient of resigning from the service will not extricate him from the consequences of his acts The conduct or behavior of all officials and employees of an agency involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be characterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum in order to earn and maintain the respect of the public for the judiciary Considering that respondent is a senior lawyer (28 years in service) of this Court.

Tatad v. Sandiganbayan (159 SCRA 70 [1988]) Undue delay in preliminary investigation prompted by political motivations. That political motivations played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process is shown by: First, the complaint came to life only after petitioner had a falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which requires the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for fact-finding investigation and report Prosecutors should not allow and should avoid giving the impression that their noble office is being used or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends or other purposes alien to or subversive of the basic and fundamental objective of serving the interest of justice evenhandedly, without fear or favor to any and all litigants alike, whether rich or poor, weak or strong, powerless or mighty. Only by strict adherence to the established procedure may the publics perception of the impartiality of the prosecutor be enhanced. The inordinate delay is violative of the petitioners constitutional rights. A delay of close to 3 years cannot be deemed reasonable or justifiable an undue delay in the conduct of a preliminary investigation cannot be corrected for until now man has not yet invented a device for setting back time.

Tan, Jr. v. Gallardo (73 SCRA 306 [1976]) Private prosecutors contend they are entitled to appear and take part in the criminal proceedings and adopt a position contrary to the OSG. Since a criminal offense is an outrage to the sovereignty of the State, it is but natural that the representative s of the State should direct and control the prosecution The role of the private prosecutors is to represent the offended party with respect to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offenseAlthough the private prosecutors may be permitted to intervene, they are not in control of the case, and their interests are subordinate to those of the People of the Philippines represented by the fiscal. The right which procedural law reserves to the injured party is that of intervening in the prosecution for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability for the criminal action and not demanding punishment for the accused. Where from the nature of the offense, or where the law defining and punishing the offense charged does not provide for an indemnity, the offended party may not intervene in the prosecution of the offense.

Nadayag v. Grageda, A.C. No. 3232, 237 SCRA 202 [1994]

A Notary Public, when asked to notarize a Deed of Sale a Retro was shown the Original Certificate of Title covering the property subject of the deed and gave an opinion to the vendee a retro that it was clear and free from any encumbrances. He then translated the contents to the Visayan dialect and explained it to the vendee before it was signed in his presence. The OCT was thereafter confiscated by the Register of Deeds. Treated as counsel for the vendee, he had the legal duty to advise him properly of the irregularities and the dangers of holding the Original Certificate of Title which should have been in the custody of the Register of Deeds. Respondent had acted recklessly at the least, in his advice of the vendee. He rendered an opinion which was irresponsible that his client relied upon which recklessness is censurable. The Court held that by such omission, the lawyer failed to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession in Violation of Canon 7 because (n)othing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the profession (citing Marcelo vs. Javier, Sr., 214 SCRA [1992]).

Respondent should have been conscientious in seeing to it that justice permeated every aspect of a transaction for which his services had been engaged, in conformity with the avowed duties of a worthy member of the Bar. He should have fully explained the legal intricacies and consequences of the subject transaction as would aid the parties in making an informed decision. Such responsibility was plainly incumbent upon him, and failing therein, he must now face the commensurate consequences of his professional indiscretion.

Saburnido vs. Madrono, A.C No. 4497, 366 SCRA 1 [2001]

In a prior administrative case, respondent was dismissed as a judge for pointing a high-powered firearm at one of the complainants, who was unarmed at the time, during a heated altercation. In 2 other administrative cases, the respondent was subsequently convicted for misconduct as a judge, which resulted in the forfeiture of all his retirement benefits from the judiciary. Complainantsspouses were the complainants also in one of these cases. Thereafter, respondent filed 3 administrative cases against the complainants, and one criminal case. Complainants alleged that these cases were filed by respondent against them in retaliation for his dismissal from the judiciary and forfeiture of his benefits. Respondents act of filing multiple complaints against herein complainants reflects on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His act evinces vindictiveness, a decidedly undesirably trait whether in a lawyer or another individual xxx xxx xxx. We see in respondents tenacity in pursuing several cases against complainants not the persistence of one who has been revenge. He was thus found guilty of gross misconduct land violation of Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code, and imposed the penalty of suspension for one year.

Gacias v. Balauitan, A.C. No. 7280 [2006]) A lawyer sold a portion of his 1,242 square meter parcel of land to complainant and received total payments amounting to P300,000.00 out of the P3220,000.00 purchase price agreed upon. When complainant learned that the lawyer-vendor mortgaged the entire property including the portion sold to her, she asked the lawyer-vendor for the copy of the title, and when the latter refused her request, she did not complete the payment of the balance and instead demanded a refund of her payments, to no avail. In the meantime, the bank to which the property was mortgaged foreclosed on it and was able to consolidate title over it in its name.

The Court held that the lawyers refusal to comply with his just obligation for no justifiable reason, compounded by his act of mortgaging the property after he had received substantial payment from the complainant, was bordering on the fraudulent and surely dishonest. He has thus shown a want of professional honesty. Such misdeed reflects on the moral stuff which he is made of. His fitness to continue in the advocacy of law and manage the legal affairs of others are thus put in the same was concluded without the respondent taking advantage of his legal profession is really of little moment. For a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even it if pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him wanting in honesty, probity or good demeanor.

Marcayda v. Naz (171 SCRA 466 [1983]) A notarized agreement whereby respondent acknowledged paternity of a child and undertook to pay support paved the way for the withdrawal of the complaint and allowed respondent to take his oath. But respondent failed to comply with the undertaking to give support. Complaint was revived this time for disbarment. Naz is not guilty of gross immorality. He should not be disbarred because he had admitted the paternity of Rey in a public document and agreed to support him. This circumstance rendered his immorality not so gross and scandalous (but) Nazs stand of not giving any value to that public document shows a certain unscrupulousness unbecoming a member of a noble profession. His attitude is highly censurable. He wants to make a mockery of the proceedings before this Court by making it appear that he lied brazenly about the filiation of Rey Marcayda just to facilitate his admission to the bar. In his oath, he swore to do no falsehood.

Soberano v. Villanueva (6 SCRA 891 [1962]) Complainant claims respondent induced her to take part in a fake wedding to facilitate their cohabitation as husband and wife, and she bore 2 children out of such cohabitation but respondent left them. In a letter presented as evidence, complainant reminded respondent of his unfulfilled promise to marry her 3 years after the supposed ceremony. Other letters referred to trysts in hotels, delayed monthly periods, and the possibility of being pregnant. Intimacy between a man and a woman who are not married, especially in the light of the circumstances, is neither so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act nor so unprincipled as to warrant disbarment or disciplinary action against the man as a member of the Bar.

In re: Argosino (246 SCRA 14 [1995]) Petition to be admitted to the Bar by an applicant who has been convicted for the death of a hazing victim. He passed the bar examination but was not allowed to take his oath. Argosinos participation in the deplorable hazing activities certainly fell far short of the required standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately led to the death of the unfortunate victim certainly indicated serious character flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to discharge their moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a neophyte who had, by seeking admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of them that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon the victim constituted evident rejection of that moral duty an was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of good moral character.

People v. Sesbreno, (130 SCRA 465 [1984]) In reply filed in a civil case, a lawyer branded his adverse counsel as an irresponsible person, cannot be trusted, like Judas, a liar, and an irresponsible childish prankster. On the basis of these utterances, an Information for libel was filed against the lawyer. The accused-lawyer sought to quash the Information on ground that said utterances are absolutely privileged in nature.

The doctrine of the privileged communication that utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and motions, belong to the calls of communications that are absolutely privileged has been expressed in a long line of cases (citations omitted). The doctrine of privileged communication rests upon public policy, which looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice, though as an incidental result it may, in some instances, afford an immunity to the evil-disposed an malignant slander (People vs. Castelo, 4 SCRA 947) xxx xxx xxx (t)he purpose being that members of the legislature, judges of courts, jurors, lawyers, and witnesses may speak their minds freely and exercise their respective functions without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or an action for recovery of damages (Deles vs. Aragona, Jr., 27 SCRA 633). Lawyers, most especially, should be allowed a great latitude of pertinent comment in the furtherance of the causes they uphold, and for the felicity of their clients, they may be pardoned some infelicities of language (id).

The privilege, however, musts be extended only if the statement is relevant, pertinent, or material to the cause in hand or subject of inquiry (Tolentino vs. Baylosis, 1 SCRA 396; People vs. Alvarez, 14 SCRA 901; People vs. Aquino, 18 SCRA 555) and courts are inclined to be liberal in favor of extending the privilege (People vs. Alvarez, id; Malit vs. People, 1114 SCRA 348).

In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyers language should likewise be dignified (In re: Climaco, 55 SCRA 107, 121). Choice of language is a very important requirement in the preparation of pleadings. Appropriately, in the assertion of their clients right, lawyers, even those gifted with a superior intellect, are enjoined to rein up their tempers. Greater care and circumspection must be exercised in the preparation of their pleadings and to refrain from using abrasive and offensive language (Yangson vs. Saladanan, 68 SCRA 42). A becoming modesty is a desirable trait also of practicing attorneys.

Tolentino vs. Baylosis, (1 SCRA 396 [1961])

In a Reply to Answer on Counterclaim filed in a civil case for damages, a lawyer made the following statements against adverse counsel: for the death of the said five plaintiffs xxx xxx xxx the cause of their death may be due to the will of God, or due to the heavy expenses which they may have suffered from their leader and counsel; when Atty. Tolentino made this allegation, he must be certainly not of his usual mind, otherwise with his old age and long practice of law, he would have not dared to make such fictitious and malicious claim; Before the public, Atty. Tolentino cannot be judged as a prominent attorney or a bright attorney for his several failures in the bar and his several losses of his cases are not in hi sfavor; Atty. Tolentino was badly humiliated because of his lack of knowledge of law and unpreparedness; It is therefore the contention of the defendant that the caliber and standing of Atty. Miguel Tolentino is not the type of attorney who can demand a professional service of ten thousand pesos, and in the honest belief of defendant, Atty. Tolentino is a counsel for just five hundred pesos in the event that plaintiff wins this case.

Applying a test of relevancy and pertinence that counsel, parties, or witnesses are exempted from liability in libel or slander for words otherwise defamatory published in the course of judicial proceedings, provided that the statements are connected with, or relevant, pertinent or material to the cause in hand or subject of inquiry (citing 53 C.J.S. 170-171; Tupas vs. Parreno, G.R. No. L-12545 [April 30, 1959]), the Court found that as the propriety of award of claim for attorneys fees was a legitimate issue before the court, Atty. Tolentino himself laid open his own standing as a lawyer as material and relevant. The statements relating to this issue were thus held privileged.

But as for the statement regarding plaintiffs deaths being caused perhaps by counsel, and the averment that Atty. Tolentino was not of his usual mind otherwise he would not have made such fictitious and malicious claim, the Court found these irrelevant and impertinent. However, as these were uttered in retaliation for Atty. Tolentinos own prior libelous remarks against adverse counsel, and since Atty. Tolentino did not come to court with clean hands, to penalize him for likewise indulging in offensive personalities in the course of judicial proceedings constituting highly unprofessional conduct according to the High Court, which merits disciplinary action, the Court ruled to uphold the dismissal by the trial court of Atty. Tolentinos complaint for damages.

Torres v. Javier, A.C. No. 5910 [2005] In finding the utterances to be beyond the privilege granted to relevant and material judicial statements, the Supreme Court held that the statements what kind of lawyer is Atty. Torres?, he lies through his teeth, if he has any common sense at all he should shut up, and Atty. Torres forgets the sad chapter of his life as a practitioner when he lost out to Prof. Javier in the petitoin for audit which he filed to gain pogi points, the undersigned thinks that even a dim-witted first-year law student would not oblige with such a very serious charge, and respondent Torres is a member of the Philippine Bar. But what law books is he reading?, were irrelevant and immaterial to the petition for audit case and the labor case. Respondent lawyer was found guilty of violating Canon 8 and Rule 8.01, in particular for the use of offensive and improper language in his pleadings and was suspended for one month from practice.

The fact that counsel was defending his wife from what he perceived were unwarranted attacks, did not convince the High Court to exonerate him. They held: Clients, not lawyers, are the litigants, so whatever may be the ill-feelings existing between clients should not be allowed to influence counsel in their conduct toward each other or toward suitors in the case (citing People vs. Sesbreno, 130 SCRA 465, 470 [1984]]). The Court reminded counsel that Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 instruct that respondents arguments in his pleadings should be gracious to both the court and opposing counsel and be of such words as may be properly addressed by one gentleman to another (Hueysuwan-Florido vs. Florido, 420 SCRA 132, 137 [22004]). The language does not run short of expressions which are emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive. (Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441, 445 [1967]) (id.).

In an answer to a complaint for damages, respondent lawyer made the following statements against the plaintiff: for the plaintiff to do such acts with a twisted color is indicative of a twisted mind; It is only a dirty-minded mind of plaintiff that can concoct an equally dirty thinking, for plaintiff to say otherwise is again a delimitation of a limited mind; the accusations in par. 10 and 11of the complaint as purely false, a devise of wickedness a earmarks of plaintiffs traits; to think and allude the way plaintiff did is again characteristic of plaintiffs wicked, twisted and ignominious mentality; he cannot be a dignified pater familias as plaintiff claim he is because he had been hailed to the police station, the fiscals office and the courts many times for crimes which do not bespeak of a dignified person, much less a dignified parter familias which is indeed a big joke; instead of capitalizing on it for vindictiveness and in procuring money from his neighbors under a disguise of a court action since such results are voluntary in the course of human relations.

Gutierrez v. Abila, et al., (111 SCRA 658 [1982]) The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the statements are absolutely privileged. Applying the rule on relevancy, the Supreme Court reversed the trial curts finding of materiality, it was held that far from being isolated statements, these slanderous matters pervade the entire dimensions of the defendants answer, with almost every paragraph thereof scathing with spiteful imputations against the plaintiff. These imputations constitute a grave reflection upon the mental and moral character and reputation of the plaintiff, and they certainly achieve no purpose except to gratify the defendants rancor and ill-wid. The aforementioned personal opinions of the defendants, expressed in vituperative and intemperate language, are palpably devoid of any relation whatever to the subject of inquiry and have no place in a pleading. xxx xxx xxx The defendants answer in Civil Case No. C-6607 is quite complete and sufficient without the derogatory statements in question and their inclusion therein was clearly made solely for the purpose of giving vent to their ill-feelings against the plaintiff for the purpose to which the mantle of absolute immunity does not extend.

Yulo v. Yang Chiao Seng (106 Phil. 110 [1959]) A lawyer took advantage of adverse counsels absence to secure court permission to present evidence ex parte and thereafter judgment despite agreement between the parties to ask for a postponement in view of a possible settlement. In setting aside the judgment and granting a new trial, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial courts reconsideration and stated that As the parties had agreed to postpone the trial because of a possible amicable settlement, the plaintiff could not take advantage of defendants absence at the time of the fixed hearing in the interest of justice.

Macias v. Malig (157 SCRA 762 [1988]) Charge and counter-charge between two lawyers, the first as original counsel and the second as the counsel who substituted the first upon motion of the client-litigant. The Court is not prepared to pass sub silentio the misconduct of which complainant and respondent are guilty one vis--vis the other. Each party here has shown himself to be too ready to believe the other guilty of serious misconduct in the practice of the profession to which they both belong while vehemently asserting his own good faith. Each party here was too anxious and willing to make serious accusations against the other which the exertion of reasonable diligence along with simple courtesy would have shown to be unwarranted by the facts and the records. Each attorney here was too prone to use intemperate and offensive language in describing the professional behavior of the other. Macias insisted that respondent Malig extorted P10,000 from him. The dictionary meaning of to extort is to obtain from an unwilling or reluctant person by physical force, intimidation or the abuse of legal or official authority. Clearly extortion is an unethical act and well be criminal. Harassment and intimidation are other similarly unethical and offensive acts that complainant Macias so freely ascribed to respondent Malig. Corruption with which complainant Macias accused both respondent Malig and the deceased Judge Tiangco is an even more deplorable term. Upon the other hand, respondent Malig was not to be outdone and referred to complainant Macias as a denizen of a jungle who preys upon his brother lawyer and his own clients and likened him to a baneful snake biting the hand of the client who fed him.

Complainant Macias and respondent Malig are not, however, in pari delicto. For purposes of determining appropriate penalties in respect of complainant Macias, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that this is not the first time that complainant Macias has been found guilty of using improper and unethical language. In GR No. L-34395, this Court held certain statements made by complainant Macias in pleadings filed before this Court as intemperate, tactless and offensive and as constituting contempt of court in facie curiae for which complainant Macias was severely reprimanded and warned that for a repetition of the offense, a more drastic penalty would be imposed. This Court would also take judicial notice of the fact that complainant Macias has more than once in the past been rebuked by this Court in relation to his conduct vis--vis clients and former clients. We hold that both complainant Macias and respondent Malig are both guilty of conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the court. Lawyers must at all times treat each other, and as well their clients, former clients and the rest of the community, with that personal dignity, courtesy and civility rightly demanded of members of the ancient and learned profession of the law.

In re: Soriano (33 SCRA 801 [1970]) Entry as counsel done 1 year and 8 months after the decision became final. The entry of appearance of a counsel in a case which has long been sealed and terminated by a final judgment, besides being an unmitigated absurdity in itself and an unwarranted annoyance to the court which pronounced the judgment, is a sore deviation from normal judicial processes. It detracts heavily from the faith which should be accorded final judgments of courts of justice, generating as it does in the minds of the litigants, as well as of the public, an illusory belief that something more can be done toward overturning a final judicial mandate. We find Atty. Soriano grossly remiss and inexcusably precipitate in putting an officious finger into the vortex of the case. He was wanting in the reasonable care which every member of the Bar must need exercise before rushing into the midst of a case already litigated or under litigation.

Camacho v. Pangulayan (328 SCRA 631 [2000]) Charge of misconduct against lawyers for defendant school for allegedly procuring and effecting on separate occasions, without knowledge of the counsel, compromise agreements with four of his clients in the civil case which resulted in the waiver of all kinds of claims against defendant school, and to terminate all proceedings. When the individual letters of apology and re-admission agreements were formalized, complainant was by then already the retained counsel for plaintiff students in the civil case. Respondent lawyers had full knowledge of this fact. Although aware that the students were represented by counsel, respondent attorney proceeded, nonetheless, to negotiate with them and their parents without at the very least communicating the matter to their lawyer, herein complainant, who was counsel of record. This failure of respondent, whether by design or because of oversight, is an inexcusable violation of the canons of professional ethics and in utter disregard of a duty owing to a colleague. Respondent fell short of the demands required of him as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.

Osop v. Fontanilla (365 SCRA 398 [2001]) Lawyer convinced complainant in a civil case to write a letter of reconsideration to the Chancellor of the defendant-university on representation he will try to help, despite contrary advice of complainants counsel. After manifesting that the university was not amenable to settlement, the lawyer moved to dismiss the case on ground of forum shopping based on the letter seeking reconsideration. Misconduct is improper or wrong conduct. It is the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment.

The act of Atty. Fontanilla in rushing to court and filing the Manifestation the minute he got the Indorsement brings out in the open his not being totally bent on the idea of negotiation even if he was the one who broached the idea and his desire to have the case dismissed at the expense of Mr. Osop. Furthermore, since it is the University President who would decide on complainants letter, it would have been prudent of Atty. Fontanilla to preserve the status quo and wait for the resolution on the said letter. It is deplorable that the letter written by Mr. Osop in good faith and upon the solicitation of respondent was used against him as ammunition to have his case dismissed. And that this unconscionable act was done by a member of the Philippine Bar. Atty. Fontanillas employment of the said letter against the interest of Mr. Osop, after he had actively solicited the same, was not proper and revealed his lack of candor and absence of good faith in his dealings with Mr. Osop. Moreover, Atty. Fontanilla conveniently omitted to state in his motion to dismiss that the letter of reconsideration was written at his solicitation to facilitate a possible settlement. The said omission is not only unfair to Mr. Osop but had a tendency to mislead the court as to the true circumstances material to resolving the incident.

Eco v. Rodriguez (107 Phil. 612]) Filing of notice of appeal and appeal bond was made out of time. In motion for relief, excusable negligence alleged was counsels clerk erroneous computation of the period to appeal. What was delegated by petitioners counsel to his clerk was the computation itself of the period within which the appropriate pleading may be filed. This act is hardly prudent or wise. As the lower court aptly held: the duty to compute the period to appeal is a duty that devolves upon the attorney which he can not and should not delegate unto an employee because it concerns a question of study of the law and its application, and this Court considers this to be a delicate matter that should not be delegated. The negligence here cannot be considered excusable.

US v. Go-Leng (21 SCRA 426 [1912]) Lawyers services engaged to suppress, reduce and refund toll rates. Lawyer was able to obtain these resulting to economic benefit to respondent corporation. Reasonable compensation for the services sued for: claim of P20,000, trial court award of P10,000, CA award of P3,500. Although the professional services rendered by the petitioner are purely administrative and did not require a high degree of professional skill and experience, the fact remains that these services were rendered and were productive of substantial beneficial results to his clients. It is clear that for these services the petitioner is entitled to compensation, and the only question is the reasonable amount to which he is entitled ... The importance, merits and value of professional services of a lawyer are measured not alone by his work taken separately, but by his work taken as a whole an attorney is entitled to have and receive the just and reasonable compensation for services performed at the special instance and request of client. That as long as the plaintiff was honestly and in good faith trying to serve and represent the interest of the client, he should have a reasonable compensation for his services.

People v. De Luna (102 Phil. 968]) Applicants for admission to the Bar using the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 who were denied permission to take the oath, filed a manifestation with the Supreme Court as attorneys stating that they have taken the oath before a notary public and ending thus: This manifestation is made for all legal effects as they will practice law in all the Courts of the Philippines. Appellees knew that they did not pass the bar examination. Although they likewise sought admission to the Bar under the provisions of RA 972 known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953, they were subsequently notified of the resolution of this Court denying said petition. In as much as the oath as lawyer is a pre-requisite to the practice of law and may be taken only before the Supreme Court, by those authorized by the latter to engage in such practice, the resolution denying the petition of appellees herein, implied, necessarily, a denial of the right to take said oath, as well as a prohibition of or injunction against the taking thereof. When this notwithstanding appellees took the oath before a notary public, and formally advised this Court not only of such fact but also that they will practice in all the courts of the Philippines, they accordingly disobeyed the order implied and resisted the injunction implicit in said resolution.

By their aforementioned acts, appellees herein expressed clearly their intent to and did in fact challenge and defy the authority of this Court to pass upon and settle, in a final and conclusive manner, the issue whether or not they should be admitted to the bar, as well as embarrass, hinder and obstruct the administration of justice and impair the respect due to the courts of justice in general and the Supreme Court, in particular. Thus, they performed acts constituting an improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice. By taking the oath of office as attorneys-at-law and notifying the Supreme Court that they had done so and would practice law in all courts of the Philippines, the appellee shad for, all intents and purposes, held out to the public as such attorneys-at-law.

Amalgamated Laborers Assn. v. CIR (22 SCRA 1266 [1968]) Controversy over attorneys fees for legal services in labor case based on alleged oral agreement that the union president would share in the attorneys fees. Canon 34 of Legal Ethics condemns this arrangement in terms clear and explicit. It says: No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with another lawyer, based upon a division of service or responsibility. The union president is not the attorney for the laborers. He may seek compensation only as such president. An agreement whereby a union president is allowed to share in attorneys fees is immoral. Such a contract we emphatically reject. It cannot be justified.

CANON 10
A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT

Edison Cheng vs. Atty. Agravante (A.C. No. 6183 [March 23, 2004]) In his Memorandum on Appeal filed with the National Labor Relations Commission, a lawyer certified to a false date of receipt of the Decision sought to be appealed to make it appear it was seasonably filed. The Supreme Court found the lawyer guilty of violating Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 of the Code, for having committed a falsehood and misleading the NLRC by his artifice, likewise Canon 18 and Rule 18.03, for having been negligent in the handling of his clients case. In suspending the lawyer for one year and imposing a fine of P10,000.00, the court stated: It cannot be stressed enough how important it is for a lawyer as an officer of the court to observe honesty at all times, especially before the courts.

Heirs of the Late Herman Rey Romero vs. Atty. Venancio Reyes, Jr. (461 SCRA 1 [June 23, 2005]) Respondent-lawyer represented defendants in a civil case where the parties entered into a Compromise Agreement by way of settlement. The trial judge rendered judgment based on this agreement. As there were 3 groups of litigants, the signing was done in 3 stages, the last signatories being respondent-lawyer and his clients. A fire gutted the courthouse and the records of the case were burned. The court granted a motion for reconstitution but the copy of the agreement presented did not bear the signatures of respondent-lawyer and his clients.

After a lapse of 2 years, since defendants still had not fully complied with their obligations under the compromise, a motion for execution was filed with the court. Respondent-lawyer moved to dismiss the motion for being premature arguing that his clients period to comply has not yet expired. Much later, lawyer-respondent raised the issue that one of his clients had not signed the agreement and that she had no authority to sign for co-defendant corporation. As a result, the trial judge denied the motion for execution and declared the Compromise Agreement unenforceable and without legal effect.

The Supreme Court found that through his acts and representations, respondent-lawyer impressed upon the parties and the trial judge that his clients were bound to the Compromise Agreement. Then suddenly and conveniently, he repudiated it by falsely alleging that one of his clients had never signed it. Obviously, he was anticipating a dead end in shielding them from the courts Order of execution. Suspiciously, he raised the issue only after they had no other recourse but to comply with their obligation under the Agreement. His subterfuge was undoubtedly a ruse to mislead the court because, as later proven, the Compromise Agreement had in fact been duly signed by the said client.

Thus, he was found guilty of deception, dishonesty and doublespeak, which the Court lumped with other forms of moral flaw, in violation of Rule 10.01 and Rule 10.03, which require of lawyers complete and absolute honesty when they appear and plead before the courts. Any act that obstructs or impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct and justified disciplinary action against lawyers. Respondent-lawyer was penalized with suspension from the practice of law for one year and reminded that True, lawyers are obliged to present every available remedy or defense to support the cause of their clients. However, their fidelity to their causes must always be made within the parameters of law and ethics, never at the expense of truth and

Encinas v. National Bookstore (464 SCRA 572 [2005])

Counsel made to show cause why he should not be cited in contempt for his participation in the submission of a fake judicial decision to the SC. Direct contempt, or contempt facie curiae, is misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge so as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, and can be punished summarily without hearing. It is conduct directed against or assailing the authority and dignity of the court or a judge, or in the doing of a forbidden act. It is insulting to assert a claim before this Supreme Court based on an obvious and incompetent forgery and conceived by one with so primitive a sense of what normative standards would pass judicial muster. We cannot accept counsels declarations of good faith and honest mistake since, as a member of the Bar and an officer of the court, he is presumed to know better. He is required to thoroughly prepare himself on the law and facts of his case and the evidence he will adduce. The minimum he could have done was to verify with the appropriate authorities the documents upon which his clients based their claims, and not have relied on his clients assertions. Counsels actuations may even constitute a violation of the lawyers oath. As an officer of the court, he is reminded of his basic duties to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers, to do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court, nor mislead or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice, and to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.

Castaneda v. Ago (65 SCRA 505 [1975]) Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the sheriffs sale, elementary justice demands that the petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them for, the respondents Agos, abetted by their lawyer, have misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to the extended prejudice of the petitioners. Respondents with the assistance of counsel, maneuvered for 14 years to doggedly resist execution of the judgment thru manifold tactics in and from one court to another (5 times in the SC). Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an officer of the court, counsel has allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice.

A counsels assertiveness in espousing with candor and honesty his clients cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyers insistence despite the patent futility of his clients position, as in the case at bar. It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his clients cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his clients propensity to litigate. A lawyers oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.

Request for Consolidation (364 SCRA 189 [2001]) First complaint for declaration of nullity of title with damages RTC Cabanatuan City. Second complaint for annulment of contract with damages RTC Mindoro, both filed by same plaintiff against same defendant. Cabanatuan court dismissed the complaint for forum shopping and for failure to submit a certificate of NFS. Third complaint with RTC Cabanatuan City also for declaration of nullity of title with damages with identical allegations as the dismissed case but with proper CNFS, also by same plaintiff against same defendant. All 3 complaints were filed by the same lawyer. The 3rd complaint was dismissed with prejudice.

If the civil cases were to be tried separately then conflicting decisions can arise Such conflicting results can be disruptive of the orderly administration of justice. . . It is true that if the complaint is dismissed based on the failure to submit the proper certification of NFS, then the dismissal is without prejudice. However, if the dismissal is based on the clear existence of forum shopping, then such dismissal is with prejudice. The resolution of RTC Cabanatuan shows that the dismissal was based on clear existence of forum shopping Merely enumerating and admitting the existence of related cases in the certification of NFS cannot exculpate a complainant who is obviously deliberately seeking a more friendly forum for his case. Atty. Martinez conspired with his client in filing 3 complaints involving the same parties, issues, and subject matter. Instead of aiding in the orderly administration of justice, the complaints filed in different for a only caused confusion among the trial courts.

Melo v. CA (318 SCRA 94 [1999]) The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. .. The requirement to file a certificate of NFS is mandatory. Failure to comply with this requirement cannot be excused by the fact that plaintiff is not guilty of forum shopping Compliance with the certification against forum shopping is separate from and independent of the avoidance of forum shopping itself. Thus, there is a difference in the treatment in terms of imposable sanctions between failure to comply with the certification requirement and violation of the prohibition against forum shopping. The former is merely a cause for the dismissal, without prejudice, of the complaint or initiatory pleading, while the latter is a ground for summary dismissal thereof and constitutes direct contempt. Nor can subsequent compliance with the requirement excuse a partys failure to comply in the first instanceCompliance with the certification requirement on NFS should not be made subject to a partys afterthought, lest the policy of the law be undermined.

BA Savings Bank v. Sia (336 SCRA 484 [2000]) The certificate of non-forum shopping required by SC Circular 28-91 may be signed, for and on behalf of corporation, by a specifically authorized lawyer who has personal knowledge of the facts required to be disclosed in such document. Unlike natural persons, corporations may perform physical actions only through properly delegated individuals, namely, its officers and/or agents counsel of the corporation was in the best position to verify the truthfulness and the correctness of the allegations in the complaint and to know and to certify if an action had already been filed and pending with the courts.

Maricalum Mining Corporation v. NLRC (298 SCRA 378 [1998]) The certificate of NFS as provided by this Court Circular 04-94 is mandatory and should accompany pleadings filed before the NLRC. Court Circular No. 04-94 is clear and needs no further interpretation: the following requirements, in addition to those in pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court and other existing circulars, shall be strictly complied with in the filing of complaints, petitions, applications or other initiatory pleadings in all courts and agencies other than the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals The NLRC is a quasi-judicial agency, hence, initiatory pleadings filed before it should be accompanied by a certification of NFS.

Banogan v. Zerna (154 SCRA 593 [1987]) Original decision in cadastral case rendered in 1926. A motion to amend the decision was filed 31 years later in 1957 followed by an amended petition for review of the judgment. In 1971, 14 years after, a motion to dismiss the petition was filed and it was granted on ground of laches. Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them.

One reason why there is a degree of public distrust for lawyers is the way some of them misinterpret the law to the point of distortion in a cunning effort to achieve their purposes. By doing so, they frustrate the ends of justice and at the same time lessen popular faith in the legal profession as the sworn upholders of the law. While this is not to say that every wrong interpretation of the law is to be condemned, as indeed most of them are only honest errors, this Court must express its disapproval of the adroit and intentional misleading designed precisely to circumvent or violate it As officers of the court, lawyers have the responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary, especially this Court, which is burdened enough as it is. They do not advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts.

Pajares v. Abad Santos (30 SCRA 748 [1969]) The appeal is frivolous and a plain trick to delay payment and prolong litigation unnecessarily. Such attitude deserves condemnation, wasting as it does, the time that the courts could well devote to meritorious cases. Here, this simple collection case has needlessly clogged the court dockets for over 7 years. Had appellant been but prudently advised by her counsel to confess judgment and ask from her creditor the reasonable time she needed to discharge her lawful indebtedness, the expenses of litigation that she has incurred by way of filing fees in the CFI, premiums for her appeal bond, appellate court docket fees, printing of her appellants brief, and attorneys fees would have been much more than sufficient to pay off her just debt to appellee. Yet, here she still remains saddled with the same debt, burdened by accumulated interests, after having spent uselessly much more than the amount in litigation in this worthless case. The cooperation of litigants and their attorneys is needed so that needless clogging of court dockets with unmeritorious cases may be avoided. The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.

Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete (66 SCRA 425 [1975]) The procedural maneuver resorted to by private respondent in securing the decision in her favor was illconceived. It was characterized by that which every principle of law and equity disdains taking unfair advantage of the rules of procedure in order to unduly deprive the other party of full opportunity to defend his cause. The idea of dropping the non-defaulted defendants with the end in view of completely incapacitating their co-defendants from making any defense, without considering that all of them are indispensable parties to a common cause of action to which they have countered with a common defense, readily connotes an intent to secure a one-sided decision, even improperly.

Manila Pest Control, Inc. v. Workmens Compensation Commission (25 SCRA 700 [1968]) It is one thing to exert to the utmost ones ability to protect the interest of ones client. It is quite another thing, and this is to put it at its mildest, to take advantage of any unforeseen turn of events, if not to create one, to delay if not to defeat the recovery of what is justly due and demandable, especially so, when as in this case, the obligee is a necessitous and povertystricken man suffering from a dreaded disease, that unfortunately afflicts so many of our countrymen and even more unfortunately requires an outlay far beyond the means of our poverty-stricken masses. The ancient and learned profession of the law stresses fairness and honor that must ever be kept in mind by everyone who is enrolled in its ranks and who expects to remain a member in good standing. This Tribunal is rightfully entrusted with the serious responsibility of seeing to it that no deviation from such a norm should be countenanced. If what occurred here would not be characterized for the shocking thing it was, then it could be said that the law is less than fair and far from honorable.

Samar Mining Co. v. Arnado (24 SCRA 402 [1968]) The illness on which Abuyens claim is based took place in 1956. Yet through the present case, petitioner has succeeded in prolonging the litigation for the compensation involved for 12 years. What is more, petitioners contention was based upon a theory that had been rejected by this Court as early as August 1961. Then again the compensability of Abuyens disability has never been questioned by petitioner herein. Hence, it is manifest that the purpose of this case has been merely to delay, a policy often resorted to as a means of draining the resources of the poorer party, in this case a TB patient, and of compelling it to submit out of sheer exhaustion. Thus, the conduct of petitioners counsel is hardly compatible with the duty of the Bar to assist in the administration of justice, not to obstruct or defeat the same.

Cruz v. Salva (105 Phil. 1151 [1959]) CFI found accused guilty of murder and sentenced them to death. Motion for new trial by one accused granted but he was still found guilty. While appeals were pending, President Magsaysay ordered a reinvestigation and the PC obtained a confession from different persons as the supposed real killers. Based on this, several accused wrote respondent Fiscal to reinvestigate. A motion for new trial was also filed with the SC where the appeals were pending. Respondent Fiscal reinvestigated through a committee he created and chaired. Petitioner was subpoenaed to appear before the committee because he was implicated as the mastermind in the killing based on the new evidence. He sought to prohibit and stop the reinvestigation.

Ordinarily, when a criminal case in which a fiscal intervened though nominally is tried and decided and it is appealed to a higher court such as this Tribunal, the functions and actuations of said fiscal have terminated; usually, the appeal is handled for the government by the OSG. Consequently, there would be no reason or occasion for said fiscal to conduct a reinvestigation to determine criminal responsibility for the crime involved in the appeal. However, respondent has established a justification for his reinvestigation the duty and role of a prosecuting attorney is not only to prosecute and secure the conviction of the guilty but also to protect the innocent. We come to the manner in which said investigation was conducted by respondent. He could well have conducted the investigation in his office, quietly, unobtrusively and without much fanfare, much less publicity with the permission of, if not the encouragement by the respondent, news photographers and newsmen had a field day. Not only this but in the course of the investigation, on two occasions, respondent, addressing the newspapermen said, gentlemen of the press, if you want to ask questions I am willing to let you do so and the questions asked will be reproduced as my own; Why respondent was willing to abdicate and renounce his right and prerogative to make and address the questions to the witnesses under investigation in favor of the members of the press is difficult for us to understand, unless he wanted to curry favor with the press and publicize his investigation as much as possible.

It seemed as though the criminal responsibility for the killing of Manuel Monroy which has already been tried and finally determined by the lower court and which was under appeal and advisement by this Tribunal, was being retried and redetermined in the press, and all with the apparent placet and complaisance of respondent. His actuations in this regard went well beyond the bounds of prudence, discretion and good taste. It is bad enough to have such undue publicity when a criminal case is being investigated by the authorities even when it is being tried in court; but when said publicity and sensationalism is allowed, even encouraged, when the case is on appeal and is pending consideration by this Tribunal, the whole thing becomes inexcusable, even abhorrent, and this Court, in the interest of justice, is constrained and called upon to put an end to it and a deterrent against its repetition by meting an appropriate disciplinary measure, even a penalty to the one liable.

Ochida v. Cabarroguis (71 SCRA 40 [1976]) Counsel in an oral arguments on a motion, characterized defendant in the case as a fugitive from justice because there are 5 warrants of arrest pending against her. Defendant filed a complaint for disbarment against counsel. A lawyer should treat the opposite party or suitor with fairness and due consideration and should avoid offensive personalities and improper speech against an opposing litigant. Respondent lawyer used abrasive language in branding defendant as a fugitive from justice, an expression which, according to Merriam-Websters dictionary, refers to one who having committed or being accused of a crime in one jurisdiction is absent for any reason from that jurisdiction; specifically, one who flees to avoid punishment. A lawyer with a keen sense of decorum and propriety would have avoided such intemperate language. [on the other hand] respondents infelicitous utterance does not constitute gross misconduct.

PNB v. Uy Teng Piao (57 Phil. 337 [1932]) One of the attorneys for the bank testified, in an action to revive a judgment against defendant, that the latter had waived the right to redeem. Although the law does not forbid an attorney to be a witness and at the same time an attorney in a cause, the courts prefer that counsel should not testify as a witness unless it is necessary, and that they should withdraw from the active management of the case. When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to merely formal matters such as the attestation or custody of an instrument and the like, he should leave the trial of the case to another counsel. Except when essential to the ends of justice, a lawyer should avoid testifying in court in behalf of his client.

Oparel v. Abaria (40 SCRA 128 [1971]) Charge against respondent lawyer who was retained by complainant to recover damages from his employer for injuries suffered. Settlement was reached: complainant received P500, P55 of which was deducted as attorneys fees of respondent. It was discovered that respondent actually received P5,000. Counsel explained that of the P5,000, P3,500 was spent for the complainants hospital expenses and another P1,000 was given to complainants family during his confinement. Complainant later executed a desistance acknowledging a misunderstanding. It is not amiss to impress on members of the Bar that the utmost care be taken to minimize occasions for any misunderstanding between them and their clients. The relationship being one of confidence, there is ever present the need for the latter being adequately and fully informed of the mode and manner in which their interest is defended. They should not be left in the dark. They are entitled to the fullest disclosure of why certain steps are taken and why certain matters are either included or excluded from the documents they are made to sign. It is only thus their faith in counsel may remain unimpaired.

Where the client happens to be poor and unlettered, seeking to enforce what he considers his just demands against an employer, it is even more imperative that matters be explained to him with all precision and clarity. More than that, no effort should be spared for him to get fully what he is entitled to under the law. The same zeal should characterize a lawyers efforts as when he is defending the rights of property More specifically, in a case like the present, he should not invite loss of trust by inadvertence or even by a failure to use the simplest and most understandable language in communicating matters. For he may lend himself to the suspicion that he is lacking in candor and may be taking undue advantage of his client for his own profit and advantage in any dealing with the adverse party.

Lim Siok Huey v. Lapiz 103 Phil. 930 [1958]) Plaintiffs who are the widow and children of the deceased Chua Pua Lun are all citizens and residents of Communist China and notwithstanding the fact that they have been informed of the death of the deceased, they have not sent any communication to anyone in the Philippines giving authority to take whatever action may be proper to obtain an indemnity for his death other than two letters which do not contain any intimation nor authorization for the filing of the present action While a lawyer is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears he may however be required by the court on motion of either party to produce his authority under which he appearsWhen in the course of the trial it developed that he never had any communication with any of the heirs and much less received any authority from them either to prosecute this case or to act as such guardian in behalf of the minors, the trial court lost no time in disauthorizing him and considering his representation in effective.

Santos v. NLRC (254 SCRA 673 [1996]) The fact that Atty. Perez has been able to timely ask for a deferment of the initial hearing on 14 November 1986, coupled with his subsequent active participation in the proceedings, should disprove the supposed want of service of legal process. .. Appearance by a legal advocate is such voluntary submission to a courts jurisdiction. It may be made not only by actual physical appearance but likewise by the submission of pleadings in compliance with the order of the court or tribunal. To say that petitioner did not authorize Atty. Perez to represent him in the case is to unduly tax credulity. The Court likewise considers it unlikely that Atty. Perez would have been so irresponsible as to represent petitioner if he were not, in fact, authorized. Atty. Perez is an officer of the court and he must be presumed to have acted with due propriety. The employment of a counsel or the authority to employ an attorney need not be proved in writing; such fact could be inferred from circumstantial evidence. Petitioner was not just an ordinary official of the MMDC; he was the President of the company.

People v. Solis (128 SCRA 217 [1984]) The appellants contend that they were deprived of due process for failure of the trial court to afford them the right to be defended by a lawyer of their own choice. This contention is devoid of factual basis. Appellants were arraigned on April 11, 1969, but actual trial did not start until February 5, 1970, or ten months later. This was due to frequent postponements caused by their failure to secure the services of a lawyer of their own choice. Their alleged counsel de parte never appeared in court. If they were indeed sincere in their desire to secure the services of a lawyer of their own choice, that period of ten months was more than sufficient for them to do so. Besides, during the proceedings a quo appellants never informed the trial court of their desire to be defended by a lawyer of their own choice; neither did they protest the appointment or the actuations of their counsel de oficio. It has been held that where a counsel has been assigned to a person on trial and such counsel has acted without objection from the accused, the latters conviction cannot be set aside on the sole ground that said counsel was not of his own choice.

People v. Daeng, et al. (49 SCRA 221 [1973]) In every case, the defendants either pleaded guilty on initial arraignment or later changed their plea from not guilty to guilty. The appointment of atty. Galvan as counsel de oficio in all 3 cases might just have been a coincidence since there is no evidence before us that would show that he applied for and has been granted such appointment. We would, nevertheless, caution all courts against the frequent appointment of the same attorney as counsel de oficio for 2 basic reasons: first, it is unfair to the attorney concerned, considering the burden of his regular practice that he should be saddled with too many de oficio cases; and second, the compensation provided for by the Rules of Court might be considered by some lawyers as a regular source of income, something which the Rule does not envision. In every case, the accused stands to suffer because the overburdened counsel would have too little time to spare for his de oficio cases, and also would be inordinately eager to finish such cases in order to collect his fees within the earliest possible time.

Gonzales v. Chavez (205 SCRA 816 [1992]) Whether the SolGen neglected his public duty by withdrawing as counsel for the RP and the PCGG in cases he had filed in court, and whether the PCGG acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in hiring private lawyers (40) as a result of the OSGs withdrawal. All these legal provisions ineluctably lead to no other conclusion but that under the law of its creation and the complementary rules, the law office of the PCGG, as it is for the rest of the government, is the OSG. Although the PCGG is empowered to file and prosecute all cases investigated by it, it does not thereby oust the OSG from its lawful mandate to represent the Government and its agencies in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. Moreover, such express grant of power to PCGG does not imply that it may abdicate such power and turn over the prosecution of the cases to private lawyers whom it may decide to employ The SolGen should not decline to appear in court to represent a government agency without just and valid reason, especially the PCGG which is under the Office of the President, he being a part of the Executive Department The Court is not compelling him to act in a particular way. Rather, the Court is directing him to prevent a failure of justice resulting from his abandonment in midstream of the cause of the PCGG and the Republic and ultimately, of the Filipino people.

Republic v. CA (200 SCRA 226 [1991]) The OGCC is the principal law office of all government-owned and controlled corporations. The Sugar Regulatory Administration need not bee represented by the OSG. It may appear on its own behalf through its legal personnel or representative. Since the SRA is neither a government-owned or controlled corporation nor a subsidiary thereof, OGCC does not have the authority to represent it when confronted with a situation where one government office takes an adverse position against another government agency, the SolGen should not refrain from performing his duty as a lawyer of the government. It is incumbent upon him to present to the court what he considers should legally uphold the best interest of the government although it may run counter to a clients position. In such an instance, the government office adversely affected by the position taken by the SolGen, if it still believes in the merit of its case, may appear in its own behalf through its legal personnel or representative.

San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc. vs. Atty. Roberto Romanillos (A.C. No. 5580 [June 15, 2005]) A lawyer represented the Homeowners Association before the Human Settlements Regulation Commission in a case against the subdivision developer for violation of P.D. No. 957, the Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protection Act. The HOA alleged that the subdivision plan submitted to the Bureau of Lands designated a certain lot as a school site but it was sold by the developer to the Spouses Durano. While still counsel for the HOA, the lawyer represented the Sps. Montealegre in requesting the HOAs conformity to construct a school building at the questioned lot, which the Montealegres were buying from the Sps. Durano. When the HOA denied the request,

the lawyer applied for a clearance from the Housing and Land Use Regulatory board in behalf of the Sps. Montealegre. The HOA then terminated the lawyers service as counsel. Thereafter, the lawyer acted as counsel also for the party-successor of the subdivision developer in a civil case filed by the HOA against the developer. A disbarment case was thus filed by the HOA against the lawyer for representing conflicting interests. In the initial report of the IBP Board of Governors, the complaint was recommended for dismissal with a strict admonition, based on a plea of good faith by lawyer and as it was his first offense. Notwithstanding this, however, the lawyer continued representing the successor-in-interest of the developer in the case filed by the HOA. A second disbarment case was filed against him by the HOA.

The Supreme Court found the lawyer guilty of representing conflicting interests. As long as the lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing clients, he is guilty of violating his oath. Rule 15.03 of the code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandated that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure. Coupled with the lawyers prior infractions, the supreme penalty of disbarment was imposed upon him.

Ilusorio-Bildner vs. Atty. Luis Lokin, Jr. (A.C. No. 6554 [December 14, 2005])
The law firm of respondent-lawyer represented the late Potenciano Ilusorio in a civil case filed against him by the Republic of the Philippines over shareholdings in the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC) and the Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT). Respondent-lawyer with 2 other lawyers from his law firm, actively handled the case for Ilusorio, and assisted the latter in executing a Compromise Agreement with the Republic which was approved by the Sandiganbayan.

At a special stockholders meeting of PHILCOMSAT, a new set of directors and officers were elected which Ilusorio questioned before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In this case, respondent-lawyer appeared on behalf of Manuel Nieto, et al., the newly elected directors and officers. Respondent-lawyers defense that the Ilusorio case before the Sandiganbayan was a personal account of just one attorney of the firm was found contrary to the evidence submitted by respondent himself, specifically letters regarding negotiations for the compromise bearing his name and signature on behalf of the law firm.

Respondent was personally barred by the rules of ethics from representing an interest contrary to that earlier espoused by his firm. xxx xxx xxx An information obtained from a client by a member or assistant of a law firm is information imparted to the firm. This is not a mere fiction or an arbitrary rule; for such member or assistant, as in our case, not only acts in the name and interest of the firm, but his information, by the nature of his connection with the firm, is available to his associates or employers. For such misconduct in violation of Rule 15.03, the lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for 3 months.

Gonzales vs. Atty. Gabucana, Jr. (479 SCRA 320 [January 23, 2006]) In a civil case for sum of money, the plaintiff was represented by a law firm, of which respondent-lawyer was an associate/partner. Plaintiff was able to secure a favorable judgment. The Sheriff of the court failed to fully implement the writ of execution in the case prompting the plaintiff to sue him administratively. The Sheriff and his wife went to the plaintiffs house to harass her into executing an affidavit of desistance in the administrative case. Plaintiff thus filed criminal cases against the Sheriff and his wife. Notwithstanding pendency of the civil case, where the judgment still had to be fully executed, respondent-lawyer assumed the representation of the Sheriff and the latters wife in the cases filed against them by the plaintiff in the civil case. The plaintiff thus sued respondent-lawyer for disbarment for violating the lawyer-client relationship.

It is well-settled that a lawyer is barred from representing conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of facts. Such prohibition is founded on principles of public policy and good taste as the nature of the lawyer-client relation is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree,. Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. xxx xxx xxx The repersentation of opposing clients in said cases, through unrelated, constitutes conflict of interests or, at the very least, invites suspicion of doubledealing, which this Court cannot allow.

However, although so found to have transgressed the proscription against conflict of interests, the Court appreciated as mitigating circumstances the fact that respondent-lawyer represented the Sheriff and his wife pro-bono, and that it was his firm, not him personally, which handed the civil case for the plaintiff. In all the pleadings for the cases filed against the Sheriff and his wife, respondent-lawyer signed alone, without any mentioned of the law firm. Instead of the penalty of suspension, the Court only imposed a fine of P2,000.00 against respondent-lawyer.

One of tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyers duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty.

The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action. It is of no moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one

It is enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, re present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyers respective retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients. The representation of opposing clients in said cases, though unrelated, constitutes conflict of interests or, at the very least, invites suspicion of double-dealing which this Court cannot allow.

Rolion vs. Naraval (452 SCRA 675 [2005]) Lawyers owe fidelity to their clients. The latters money or other property coming into the formers possession should be deemed to be held in trust and should not under any circumstance be commingled with the lawyers own; much less, used by them. Failure to observe these ethical principles constitutes professional misconduct and justified the imposition of disciplinary sanctions. Ordinarily, lawyers are not obliged to act either as advisers or as advocates of any person who may wish to become their client. They may decline employment and refuse to accept representation, if they are not in a position to carry it out effectively or competently. But once they agree to handle a case, attorneys are required by the Canons of Professional Responsibility to undertake the task with zeal, care and utmost devotion.

Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the clients cause. Every case accepted by a lawyer deserves full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of importance. Hence, practicing lawyers may accept only as many cases as they can efficiently handle. Otherwise, their clients would be prejudiced. Once lawyers agree to handle a case, they should undertake the task with dedication and care. If they do any less, then they fail their lawyers oath.

The circumstances of this case indubitably show that after receiving the amount of P8,000 as filing and partial service fee, respondent failed to render any legal service in relation to the case of complainant. His continuous inaction despite repeated follow-ups from her reveals his cavalier attitude and appalling indifference toward his clients cause, in brazen disregard of his duties as a lawyer. Not only that. Despite her repeated demands, he also unjustifiably failed to return to her the files of the case that had been entrusted to him. To top it all, he kept the money she had likewise entrusted to him. Furthermore, after going through her papers, respondent should have given her a candid, honest opinion on the merits and the status of the case. Apparently, the civil suit between Rosita Julaton and complainant had been decided against the latter. In fact, the judgment had long become final and executory. But he withheld such vital information from complainant. Instead, he demanded P8,000 as filing and service fee and thereby gave her hope that her case would be acted upon.

Rule 15.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires the lawyers give their candid and best opinion to their clients on the merit or lack of merit of the case, neither overstating nor understating their evaluation thereof. Knowing whether a case would have some prospect of success is not only a function, but also an obligation on the part of lawyers. If they find that their clients cause is defenseless, then it is their bounded duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than to traverse the incontrovertible. The failure of respondent to fulfill this basic undertaking constitutes a violation of his duty to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients.

Likewise, as earlier pointed out, respondent persistently refused to return the money of complainant despite her repeated demands. His conduct was clearly indicative of lack of integrity and moral soundness; he was clinging to something that did not belong to him, and that he absolutely had no right to keep or use. Lawyers are deemed to hold in trust their clients money and property that may come into their possession.

Velasquez vs. Barrera, ( 29 SCRA 312 [1969]) While it is true that the civil case for ejectment was filed against Pedro Velasquez, who is complainants brother, it was the complainant himself who hired the services of the respondent to institute the appeal paying him P100.00 for his attorneys fees and P120.00 for appeal bond and other expenses. Complainant himself was an interested party in the outcome of the case since he was a part owner of the personal properties to be confiscated by the sheriff. It appears that the respondent failed to pay the appeal bond out of the amount of P100.00 he received from the complainant.

Complainant had to execute a chattel mortgage on his properties in favor of Alberto Ymson and Nicolas Ymson. The execution of the chattel mortgage was upon the advice of the respondent. Respondent was already giving legal advice not only to the parties to the civil case, namely, Pedro Velasquez and Jose Pangan, but also the complainant himself, who was to be adversely affected in the outcome of the case. Respondent neglected and failed to exert all his efforts to protect the interest of his client. He even induced the complainant to sign an alleged chattel mortgage and later turned against him representing this time Nicolas and Alberto Ymson as mortgagees. He even instituted a criminal case of estafa against the complainant. He also represented Ymson brothers in the third and fourth party complaints.

As admitted by the respondent himself, the civil case for ejectment against complainants brother was a hopeless case since they admitted that they failed to pay the annual rentals. That being the case, respondent should have advised complainant and his brother not to institute the appeal. Even though upon the evidence fore us, the respondent did not represent complainants brother and the latters co-defendant in the Court of First Instance of the city of Baguio, it would have been more in accordance with the demands of the ethics of the legal profession that he should have refrained from representing the Ymsons in the latters fourth party complaint; in the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage mentioned heretofore, and in the prosecution of the Criminal Case No. 2003 against herein complainant. His intervention in the ejectment case in the municipal court on behalf of Pedro B. Velasquez apparently left the complainant with the impression that he had continued to represent said party in the court of first instance, thus concluding that his actuations in said case on appeal and in the criminal case already mentioned were in violation of his oath of office.

Bautista vs. Barrios, (9 SCRA 695 [1963])

Rufina Bautista complains that Atty. Barrios committed malpractice in that having drafted a deed of partition at her request, and as her attorney, he afterwards, in suit to enforce it, refused to appear for her, and what is worse, he appeared instead as counsel for the other party to the deed of partition and opposed her rights thereunder.

Upon refusal of Rovero to comply with the terms of the deed, Rufina went to ask Barrios to enforce ithe admits Rufina went to see himby filing a complaint against Rovero, strongly corroborates Rufinas testimony that she had actually engaged his services to draft the partition. Indeed, when she asked him to file the complaint, and he refused, he did not tell her that he had been engaged by Rovero to draft the partition. He merely told her she had no case, and that he was reluctant to take up a lost cause.

Even supposing that he was employed by both Rovero and the Baustista brothers to draft the partition, it is doubtful whether he could appear for one as against the other in a subsequent litigation. At most, if he could appear for one client, it should be for him who seeks to enforce the partition as drafter. Yet he appeared for Rovero who sought to avoid compliance with it, asserting that it did not contain all the terms of the agreement, that it was subject to certain modifications, etc. Moreover, in his defense of Rovero, he raised issued which obviously violated Rufinas confidence because he allegedin behalf of Rovero that the undisclosed modifications were known to Rufina at the time of the execution of the partition. The inconsistent positions taken by the respondent coupled with some flimsy arguments he had advanced, do not favorably impress this Court with his alleged good faith in the matter.

Tiania vs. Ocampo, (200 SCRA 472 [1991]) Baylock sued Tiania for ejectment. Ocampo appeared for Tiania and also for Blaylock. Ocampo prepared the answer in the said ejectment case, which Tiania signed. Then Ocampo made Tiania sign a Compromise Agreement which the latter signed without reading. Two years from the submission of the Compromise Agreement, Tiania was shocked when she received an order to vacate the property in question. To hold off her ejectment for another tow years, Ocampo advised Tiania to pay him a certain amount for the sheriff.

The Angel spouses, sold their house in favor of Blaylock. Ocampo acted as their counsel and prepared the Deed of Sale. With the money paid by Blaylock, the Angel spouses bought another parcel of land. Again, Ocampo prepared the Deed of Sale. In addition, Ocampo made the Angel spouses sign two (2) more documents which, accordingly, were made parts of the sale transaction.

Those two (2) documents later turned out to be a Real Estate Mortgage of the same property purchased from Laurea Dalanan and a Promissory Note, both in favor of Blaylock.
The Angel spouses never realized the nature of the said documents until they received a complaint naming thme as defendants in a collection suit filed by Ocampo on behalf of the plaintiff, Commercial Corporation of Olongapo, a firm headed by Blaylock.

We prohibit the representation of conflicting interests not only because the relation of attorney and client is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree, but also because of the principles of public policy and good taste. An attorney has the duty to deserve the fullest confidence of his client and represent him with undivided loyalty. Once this confidence is abused, the entire profession suffers. The test of the conflict of interest in disciplinary cases against a lawyer is whether or not the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance thereof.

Indeed, the aforementioned acts of the respondent in representing Blaylock, and at the same time advising Tiania, the opposing party, as in the first administrative case, and once again representing Blaylock and her interest while handling the legal documents of another opposing party as in the second case, whether the said actions were related or totally unrelated, constitute serious misconduct. They are improper to the respondents office as attorney.

Natan vs. Capule, (91 Phil. 640 [1952])

Failed to appear, without any justifiable reason, in

the hearing of a case for which he had received his fees in full;
Accepted professional employment in the very case

in which his former client is the adverse party, and utilizing against the latter papers, knowledge, and information obtained the course of his previous employment;
Falsely accusing tenants of his former client and

causing their detention, in order to compel them to enter into a compromise by giving him (respondent) one-half of their rice harvests.

We are convinced that the respondent had utilized the papers and the knowledge and information that he had received from his former client Simplicio Natan, in relation to the Hacienda Minit, against Natan and for the benefit of his new client Patero. It is evident from the foregoing that respondent, because of his previous relationship with the complainant herein, was disqualified to accept the case of Olimpio Patero, who claimed ownership of Hacienda Minit. The immediate objective of Patero was to wrest possession of the Hacienda Minit from respondents former client, Natan, which possession it was the latters duty to protect and support.

The fact that respondent herein retired from the forcible entry case on November 21, 1949, prior to retaining the case of Olimpio Patero, did not relieve him from his obligation of fidelity and loyalty to his former client. The inconsistency between his position as attorney for Olimpio Patero and that as attorney for complainant was so apparent that it could not have escaped respondents attention. Respondent may not excuse his conduct behind the shield of the presumption of good faith, because the inconsistency was clear. But what makes the violation of his obligation of fidelity more improper is the fact that in forwarding Pateros interest, he did actually utilize the papers, knowledge, and information which he had received in the course of his employment as lawyer for complainant herein.

An attorney is forbidden to do either of two things after severing his relationship with a former client. He may not do anything which will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which he formerly represented him, nor may he at any time use against his former client knowledge or information acquired by virtue of the previous relationship. (Wutchumn Water Co. vs. Bailey) But if the conduct of the respondent in accepting Pateros case and in using papers and documents to the prejudice of his former client is inexcusable, in prosecuting the tenants of his former client for estafa without reasonable grounds, causing their imprisonment in order to compel them to deliver portion of their palay harvests to his second client, his conduct was reprehensible, constituting not merely unethical practice but a clear and direct violation of oath as lawyer. His conduct evinces a character wanting in truthfulness, and devoid of that sense of fairness and justice so essential to the profession that he has embraced.

Nakpil vs. Valdes, (286 SCRA 758 [1998]) Respondent became the business consultant, lawyer and accountant of the Nakpils. Nakpil became interested in purchasing a summer residence in Moran Street, Baguio City. He requested respondent to purchase the Moran property for him. They agreed that respondent would keep the property in trust for the Nakpils until the latter could but it back. It was the Nakpils who occupied the Moran summer house. When Jose Nakpil died on July 8, 1973, respondent acted as the legal counsel and accountant of his widow, complainant. Respondent excluded the Moran property from the inventory of Joses estate. On February 13, 1978, respondent transferred his title to the Moran property to his company, the Caval Realty Corporation.

There was a conflict of interest when his law firm represented the estate in the intestate proceedings while his accounting firm served as an accountant of the estate and prepared the claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. against the estate. As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business transaction must be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. The measure of good faith which an attorney is required to exercise in his dealings with client is a much higher standard than is required in business dealings where the parties tread at arms length. Business transactions between an attorney and his client are disfavored and discouraged by the policy of the law. Hence, courts carefully watch these transactions to assure that no advantage is taken by a lawyer over his client. This rule is founded on public policy for, by virtue of his office, an attorney is in an easy position to take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client. Thus, no presumption of innocence or improbability of wrongdoing is considered in an attorneys favor.

It is well-established that respondent offered to the complainant the services of his law and accounting firms by reason of their close relationship dating as far back as the 50s. She reposed her complete trust in respondent who was the lawyer, accountant and business consultant of her late husband. Respondent and the late Nakpil agreed that the former would purchase the Moran property and keep it in trust for the latter. In violation of the trust agreement, respondent claimed absolute ownership over the property and refused to sell the property to complainant after the death of Jose Nakpil. To place the property beyond the reach of complainant and the intestate court, respondent later transferred it to his corporation.

Respondents bad faith in transferring the property to his family corporation is well discussed in this Courts Decision. Respondents misuse of his legal expertise to deprive his client of the Moran property is clearly unethical. To make matters worse, respondent, through his accounting firm, charged the two loans of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00 as liability of the estate, after said loans were obtained by respondent for the purchase and renovation of the property which he claimed for himself. The interests of the estate and that of it creditors are adverse to each other. Respondents accounting firm prepared the list of assets and liabilities of the estate and, at the same time, computed the claims of two creditors of the estate. There is clearly a conflict between the interest of the estate which stands as the debtor, and that of the two claimants who are creditors of the estate. In fact, at one instance, respondents law firm questioned the claims of creditor Angel Nakpil against the estate.

Respondent is a CPA-lawyer who is actively practicing both professions. He is the senior partner of his law and accounting firms which carry his name. In the case at bar, complainant is not charging respondent with breach of ethics for being the common accountant of the estate and the two creditors. He is charged for allowing his accounting firm to represent two creditors of the estate and, at the same time, allowing his law firm to represent the estate in the proceedings where these claims were presented. The act is a breach of professional ethics and undesirable as it placed respondents and his law firms loyalty under a cloud of doubt. Even granting that respondents misconduct refers to his accountancy practice, it would not prevent this Court from disciplining him as a member of the Bar. The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for ANY misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.

Nombrado vs. Hernandez, (26 SCRA 13 [1968])

Malpractice on two counts: (1) appeared as counsel for Crispin Nazareno in a civil case for forcible entry against Arsenio Pansaon, his former client, being the offended party and complainant, in a criminal case for serious physical injuries wherein Eufemio Velasco (Nazareno), a son of Crispin, was the accused; (2) appeared as counsel for the accused and also for the complaining witness in Criminal Case No. 329 of the Justice of the Peace Court (now municipal court) of Baganga, Davao (now Davao Oriental).

Even if respondent did not use against his client any information or evidence acquired by him as counsel it cannot be denied that he did become privy to information regarding the ownership of the parcel of land which was later litigated in the forcible entry case, for it was the dispute over the land that triggered the mauling incident which gave rise to the criminal action for physical injuries. Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a complicated affair, consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well known facts. In the complexity of what is said in the course of dealings between an attorney and client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice the complainant's cause.

Whatever may be said as to whether or not respondent utilized against his former client information given to him in a professional capacity, the mere fact of their previous relationship should have precluded him from appearing as counsel for the other side in the forcible entry case An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated and it is not good practice to permit him afterwards to defend in another case other person against his former client under the pretext that the case is distinct from, and independent of the former case.

Gesuden vs. Ferrer, (128 SCRA 357 [1984]) When respondent was hired to prepare the documents for the partition of the property, he became, for all intents and purposes, the lawyer of all the heirs. In this situation, he was in a position to know the relevant and irrelevant, secret and wellknown facts. In the complexity of what is said in the course of the preparation of the documents, an attorney acquires data and/or information that might prejudice one or all of the heirs.

In later becoming a counsel for one of the heirs in a case file against the other heirs, and in disputing the division or partition which he himself devised in the extra-judicial partition, respondent Edwin Z. Ferrer failed to adhere to proper professional standards and to comply with the duties imposed upon him as a lawyer. Thus, even without impugning respondents good faith, his taking up to the cause of one of the heirs in a case filed against the other heirs, should not be sanctioned. It had the tendency to bring the profession, of which he is a distinguished member, into public disrepute and suspicion and undermine the integrity of justice.

Assuming for the sake of argument that the respondent did advise against the filing of the complaint, the proper thing for him to do was not to involve himself in it. As to his withdrawal therefrom, the order of the court allowing him to do so shows that he withdrew after he had presented the principal evidence for the plaintiff. We hold that the respondent violated his duty as a lawyer when he appeared as counsel for one of the heirs in her suit against the other heirs over a matter which the respondent had handled for all of them.

Periquet vs. National Labor Relations Commission, (186 SCRA 724 [1990])

The petitioner was dismissed as toll collector by the Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines, private respondent herein, for willful breach of trust and unauthorized possession of accountable toll tickets allegedly found in her purse during a surprise inspection. Claiming she had been "framed," she filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and was sustained by the labor arbiter, who ordered her reinstatement within ten days "without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and with fun back wages to be computed from the date of her actual dismissal up to date of her actual reinstatement.
The NLRC sustained the appeal.

She entered into a compromise agreement with CDCP where she waived her right to reinstatement and received from the CDCP the sum of P14,000.00 representing her back wages from the date of her dismissal to the date of agreement. She applied for re-employment with the CDCP and was won on March 16, 1987. Petitioner accepted this additional amount and signed another Quitclaim and Release. On March 11, 1989, she filed the motion for execution.

As officers of the court, counsel are under obligation to advise their clients against making untenable and inconsistent claims like the ones raised in this petition that have only needlessly taken up the valuable time of this Court, the Solicitor General, the Government Corporate Counsel, and the respondents. Lawyers are not merely hired employees who must unquestioningly do the bidding of the client, however unreasonable this may be when tested by their own expert appreciation of the pertinent facts and the applicable law and jurisprudence. Counsel must counsel.

Choa vs. Chiongson, 253 SCRA 371 [1996]) Atty. Raymundo A. Quiroz, counsel for the complainant, must have been aware of the utter lack of merit of the charges against the respondent. As a Member of the Philippine Bar he is bound: (1) by his oath, not to, wittingly or willingly, promote or sue any groundless, false, or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; (2) by Section 20(c)i Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to counsel or maintain such action or proceedings only as appear to him to be just; and (3) to uphold the Code of Professional Responsibility. It was incumbent upon him to give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of the complainant's case (Rule 15.05, Canon 15, Code of Professional responsibility) with the end in view of promoting respect for the law and legal processes (Canon 1, Id.). He should, therefore, be required to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for his apparent failure to observe the foregoing duties and responsibilities.

In the case of People of the Philippines vs. Cainglet (16 SCRA 748) the Court held that "every interest of public policy demands that perjury be not shielded by artificial refinements and narrow technicalities. For perjury strikes at the very administration of the laws (Jay vs. State, [1916] 15 Ala. App. 255, 43 So. 137). It is the policy of the law that judicial proceedings and judgment shall be fair and free from fraud, and that litigants and parties be encouraged to tell the truth and that they be punished if they do not (People vs. Niles, 300 Ill., 458, 133 N.E. 252, 37 A.R.L. 1284, 1289)".

Pasay Law and Consience Union, Inc. vs. Paz, (95 SCRA 24 [1980])
On the charge of representing clients with conflicting interests, the evidence has duly established that the respondent, David D.C. Paz , as PARGOS Legal Officer and Legal Prosecutor and head of the Charlie Division, took part in the investigation of the anti-graft case against ex-Mayor Cuneta by administering oaths to witnesses and gathering evidence. He acquired knowledge of the facts and circumstances surrounding the anti-graft case. The respondent obtained confidential information and learned of the evidence of the PARGO against ex- Mayor Cuneta. There was undoubtedly a relationship of attorney and client between the respondent David D.C. Paz and the PARGO. It is also a fact that at the early stages of the preliminary investigation conducted by the City Fiscal of Pasay of the anti-graft case against ex-Mayor Pablo Cuneta, the respondent appeared as counsel for said Cuneta. This is the same anti-graft case investigated by the PARGO when the respondent was head of the "Charlie Division" thereof. That the respondent later withdrew his appearances as counsel of Cuneta is of no moment. He had already violated the Canons of Legal Ethics and Sec. 20(e) of Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court

The respondent has displayed a lack of concern for his duties as a lawyer and an officer of the court. Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a complicated affair, consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well known facts. In the complexity of what is said in the course of dealings between an attorney and client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial of other matters that might only further prejudice the complainant's cause

Whatever may be said as to whether or not respondent utilized against his former client information given to him in a professional capacity, the mere fact of their previous relationship should have precluded him from appearing as counsel for the other side in the forcible entry case. In the same cast of Hilado vs. David, supra, this Tribunal further said: Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interest. This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as wok to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. ... It is founded on principles of public policy of good taste. As has been said in another case, the n 43 not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like 's Ceasar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.

People vs. Babiera, (52 Phil. 94 [1928]) In regard to the first assignment of error, the fact that the prosecuting attorney filed an information against Clemente Babiera, Justo Babiera and Dominga Bores, for the murder of Severino Haro, and then another information for frustrated homicide and less serious physical injuries against Severino Haro, Margarito Mediavilla and Fermin Proces, because Severino Haro had fired three shots at Clemente Babiera with his revolver, because Margarito Mediavilla has wounded the latter at the base of the little finger of his right hand, does not disqualify said fiscal from sustaining said accusations, because the accused in the one are the offended parties in the other and vice versa, nor does it violate professional ethics which forbids an attorney to represent conflicting interests, since in both cases the prosecuting attorney represents the public, or the people of the Philippine Islands, who is the primary offended party in every crime, as being a violation of its sovereign will manifested in the law.

Mortera, et al. vs. Atty. Pagatpatan, (A.C. No. 4562 [June 15, 2005])

How far may a lawyer go to ensure that he gets paid? Plaintiffs in a civil action for rescission of contracts won a judgment in the amount of P155,000.00. Their lawyer, through a secret agreement with one of the defendants, accepted P150,000.00 as partial payment of the judgment sum, even issuing a receipt for the amount. He deposited the money in his personal bank account without the knowledge of plaintiffs. Despite the orders of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals for the lawyer to return the money to plaintiffs, he refused to do so. He insists that plaintiffs owe him for services already rendered.

In deciding to suspend the lawyer for 2 years, the Court took into account the following factors: (a) He has been a practicing lawyer since 1974 and runs his own small firm. He nevertheless continues to deny liability for concealing and withholding his clients money. This attitude was found to be inexcusable; (b) He had other means for recovering his failure to implead an indispensable party. By reason of his own neglect or omission, he chose a shortcut which was against both law and procedure. The High Court concluded: Clearly, the respondents actuations were thoroughly tainted with bad faith, deceit and utter contempt of his sworn duty as a lawyer. Thus a heavier penalty than a mere one year suspension is definitely called for.

Aldovino vs. Pajalte (423 SCRA 135 [Feb. 17, 2004]) Respondent-lawyer faced similar disbarment charge for having withheld his clients money in violation of Canon 16. the Supreme Court suspended him for one year for keeping the P250,000.00 rightfully belonging to his client. Obviously his failure to return the money to complainants upon demand gave rise to the presumption that he misappropriated it in violation of the trust reposed on him. His act of holding on to their money without their acquiescence is conduct indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. He was clinging to something not his and to which he had no right.

De Guzman Buado and Lising vs. Layag (A.C. No. 5182 [August 12, 2004]) Where respondent-lawyer received 3 checks from the Sheriff, only one of which was his, the other 2 being payable to the plaintiffs whom he represented in the case. He did not inform his clients of the check payments and he had somebody encash all the checks on the strength of a Special Power of Attorney purportedly executed by the deceased plaintiff. Even after his clients learned of the check payments 2 years later, and demanded delivery of the proceeds thereof from the lawyer, he refused to comply. The Court En Banc chose to impose the heavier penalty of indefinite suspension considering the lawyers years of experience, his ignorance of the law, specifically Civil Code, and his violation of 3 Canons.

CORPUS vs. CA (98 SCRA 424 [1980])

There was no contract for contingent fee between Corpus and respondent David. Contingent fees depend on an express contract therefor. Thus, an attorney is not entitled to a percentage of the amount recovered but his client in the absence of an express contract to that effect.
While there was no express contract between the parties for the payment of attorneys fees, the fact remains that respondent David rendered legal services to petitioner Corpus and therefore as aforestated, is entitled to compensation under the innominate contract of facio ut des. And such being the case, respondent David is entitled to a reasonable compensation.

Where one has rendered services to another, and these services are accepted by the latter, in the absence of proof that the service was rendered gratuitously, it is but just that he should pay a reasonable remuneration therefor because 'it is a well-known principle of law, that no one should be permitted to enrich himself to the damage of another (emphasis supplied).

 In determining a reasonable fee to be paid to

respondent David as compensation for his services, on a quantum meruit basis, it is proper to consider all the facts and circumstances obtaining in this case particularly the following: a) The extent of the services rendered by respondent David should be considered together with the extent of the services of petitioners other counsel, Atty. Rosauro Alvarez.

b) The benefits secured for petitioner Corpus may also be considered in ascertaining what should be the compensation of respondent David.

Beltran vs. Fernandez, (70 Phil. 248 [1940])

Charging respondent with having purchased a property of his

client involved in a pending litigation in which he appeared as counsel.

conflicting claims to lot C, a series of suits, civil and criminal, in

all these suits, respondent Inocentes Fernandez appeared as counsel for the opponents of the complainant.
while criminal case No. 6585 aforementioned was pending

appeal, respondent purchased from his client, Natividad Ypan, lot C in question.
Respondent has accordingly violated article 1459 of the Civil

Code, in breach of professional conduct.

Suspended for six months.

For failure to appear in two consecutive hearings and to submit a position paper in the Hanopol case which resulted in complainant LFCs default and judgment against it by the Labor Arbiter, the respondent is faulted for negligence.

The setting aside of the adverse Decision of the Labor Arbiter cannot obliterate the effects of respondents negligence. Indeed, had respondent attended the two scheduled hearings and filed the required position paper, then at least, there would have been no delay in the resolution of the case, which , perhaps, would have been in favor of complainant. The delay, by itself, was prejudicial to complainant because it deprived successor-counsel Atty. Loy of time which he should be devoting to other cases of complainant. In fact he had to prepare complainants position paper which respondent should have done earlier.

From the foregoing, it is manifest that the respondent is indeed guilty of negligence, a clear violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility further found that the respondent assisted Roberto San Juan in the preparation of the counter affidavit, submitted in defense of the latter in the accusation of estafa filed against San Juan by LFC. As a matter of fact, the respondent signed the jurat of the San Juan counter-affidavit he (respondent) helped prepare. It is also a fact that the respondent investigated this same charge of estafa while he was still the lawyer of the complainant and San Juan still likewise an employee of LFC.

We are convinced that the respondent had betrayed the confidences of the complainant, his former client. xxx An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated, and it is not a good practice to permit him afterwards to defend in another case other persons against his former client under the pretext that the case is distinct from and independent of the former case.

B.R. SEBASTIAN ENTERPRISES, INC. APPEALS, 206 SCRA 28 [1992]

vs. COURT OF

On 19 February 1974, petitioner, thru its then counsel of record, received notice to file Appellant's Brief within 45 days. It had, therefore, until 5 April 1974 within which to comply.
Counsel for petitioner failed to file the Brief; thus, on 9 July

1974, respondent Court issued a Resolution requiring said counsel to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed was received by counsel for petitioner on 17 July 1974. failed to comply, appeal dismissed

 The trial court issued a writ of execution Motion to Reinstate Appeal with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ

of Preliminary Injunction In the instant case, no fraud is involved; what obtains is simple negligence on the part of petitioner's counsel, which is neither excusable nor unavoidable. Petitioner thus failed to demonstrate sufficient cause to warrant a favorable action on its plea. Petitioner's counsel was the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES and not merely Atty. Crispin Baizas. Hence, the death of the latter did not extinguish the lawyer-client relationship between said firm and petitioner.

 The death of Attorney Baizas was not a valid excuse on the

part of his associates for not attending to Alvendia's appeal, supposing arguendo that his office was solely entrusted with the task of representing Alvendia in the Court of Appeals. Attorney Espiritu (not Attorney Baizas) was the one actually collaborating with Viola in handling Alvendia's case. He did not file a formal appearance in the Court of Appeals.
There was inexcusable negligence on the part of petitioner's

counsel in failing to file the Appellant's Brief.

petitioner's counsel, the BAIZAS ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES

law firm, received the notice to file Brief on 19 February 1974. It failed to do so within the 45 days granted to it. Said law firm also received a copy of the respondent Court's Resolution of 9 July 1974 requiring it to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the Brief within the reglementary period. Petitioner chose not to comply with it,

 Then, on 28 September 1974, the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE moved for

reconsideration of the said Resolution

Nothing more was heard from petitioner until after a year when, on 6

November 1975, it filed the instant petition in reaction to the issuance of a writ of execution by the trial court following receipt of the records for the respondent Court.
Atty. Crispin Baizas is not a valid justification for its failure to file the Brief. With Baizas' death, the responsibility of Atty. Alberto and his Associates to the petitioner as counsel remained until withdrawal by the former of their appearance in the manner provided by the Rules of Court. This is so because it was the law firm which handled the case for petitioner before both the trial and appellate courts. That Atty. Espiritu, an associate who was designated to handle the case, later left the office after the death of Atty. Baizas is of no moment since others in the firm could have replaced him.. Upon receipt of the notice to file Brief, the law firm should have re-assigned the case to another associate or, it could have withdrawn as counsel in the manner provided by the Rules of Court so that the petitioner could contract the services of a new lawyer.

The "confusion" in the office of the law firm following the death of

 that negligence of counsel binds the client. petitioner itself was guilty of negligence when it failed to make

inquiries from counsel regarding its case. Petitioner failed to act with prudence and diligence, thus, its plea that they were not accorded the right to procedural due process cannot elicit either approval or sympathy.

TUASON vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 256 SCRA 158 [1996]

On May 8, 1990, two days before the scheduled hearing , a

counsel for petitioner moved for a postponement on the ground that the principal counsel was out of the country and due to return on the first week of June. The court granted the motion and reset the hearing to June 8, 1990.
On June 8, 1990, petitioner failed to appear. On oral motion of

private respondent, the court declared petitioner to have waived his right to present evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence presented.
Counsel for petitioner received a copy of this decision on

August 24, 1990. No appeal was taken from the decision.

 On October 17, 1990, petitioner, through new counsel, filed

with the trial court a petition for relief from judgment of the June 29, 1990 decision.
The trial court denied the petition on August 8, 1991. The records, however, show that the former counsel of

petitioner did not inform the trial court of this confinement. And when the court rendered its decision, the same counsel was out of the country for which reason the decision became final and executory as no appeal was taken therefrom.
The failure of petitioner's counsel to notify him on time of the

adverse judgment to enable him to appeal therefrom is negligence which is not excusable. Notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face.

 Similarly inexcusable was the failure of his former counsel to inform the

trial court of petitioner's confinement and medical treatment as the reason for his non-appearance at the scheduled hearings. Petitioner has not given any reason why his former counsel, intentionally or unintentionally, did not inform the court of this fact. This led the trial court to order the case deemed submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence presented by the private respondent alone. To compound the negligence of petitioner's counsel, the order of the trial court was never assailed via a motion for reconsideration. process. He may have lost his right to present evidence but he was not denied his day in court. As the record show, petitioner, through counsel, actively participated in the proceedings below. He filed his answer to the petition, cross-examined private respondent's witnesses and even submitted his opposition to private respondent's motion for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains. the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence; otherwise the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which had been lost thru inexcusable negligence.

Clearly, petitioner cannot now claim that he was deprived of due

Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from

BERGONIA vs. MERRERA, AC 5204 [2003]

A motion for extension to file an appellants brief

carries with it the presumption that the applicantlawyer will file the pleading within the period granted. Failure to so file the brief without any reasonable excuse is a violation of the Canons of Professional Responsibility. For such violation, a lawyer may be administratively sanctioned, especially if it results in damage to the client.

 From time to time, a request for extension becomes necessary

when an advocate needs more time to study the clients position. Generally, such request is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Lawyers who, for one reason or another, decide to dispense with the filing of the required pleading, should promptly manifest this intent to the court. It is necessary for them to do so in order to prevent delay in the disposition of the case. Those who file motions for extension in bad faith misuse the legal process, obstruct justice, and thus become liable to disciplinary action and with a genuine intent to file the required pleading within the extended period. In granting the request, the court acts on the presumption that the applicant has a justifiable reason for failing to comply with the period allowed. Without this implied trust, the motion for extension will be deemed to be a mere ruse to delay or thwart the appealed decision. The motion will thus be regarded as a means of preventing the judgment from attaining finality and execution and of enabling the movant to trifle with procedure and mock the administration of justice.

A lawyer who requests an extension must do so in good faith

VILLAFLORES vs. LIMOS (AC 7504)[2007])

Respondents conduct in failing to file the appellants

brief for complainant before the Court of Appeals falls below the standards exacted upon lawyers on dedication and commitment to their clients cause.
The relation of attorney and client begins from the

time an attorney is retained.To establish the professional relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney are sought and received in any manner pertinent to his profession

 It must be noted that as early as 8 September 2004, respondent already

agreed to take on complainants case, receiving from the latter partial payment of her acceptance fee and the entire records of complainants case. The very next day, 9 September 2004, complainant paid the balance of respondents acceptance fee. Respondent admitted her receipt of P20,000.00 as acceptance fee for the legal services she is to render to complainant and P2,000.00 for the miscellaneous expenses she is to incur in handling the case, and the subsequent execution of the employment contract between her and complainant. Hence, it can be said that as early as 8 September 2004, respondents rendition of legal services to complainant had commenced, and from then on, she should start protecting the complainants interests. become his client, but once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its termination, that is, until the case becomes final and executory.

No lawyer is obliged to advocate for every person who may wish to

 A lawyer should serve his client in a conscientious,

diligent and efficient manner; and he should provide a quality of service at least equal to that which lawyers generally would expect of a competent lawyer in a like situation. By agreeing to be his clients counsel, he represents that he will exercise ordinary diligence or that reasonable degree of care and skill having reference to the character of the business he undertakes to do, to protect the clients interests and take all steps or do all acts necessary therefor, and his client may reasonably expect him to discharge his obligations diligently.
Respondent has obviously failed to measure up to

the foregoing standards.

BAUTISTA vs. REBUENO, 81 SCRA 535 [1978]

This mandamus proceeding seeks to compel respondent

Judge Alfredo S. Rebueno to continue trying a civil case assigned to his sala.
[respondent Judge] is a townmate and distant relative of

plaintiff
The Court knows from reliable sources that the defendant has

been doubting the actuations of this Court as biased on the belief that the Presiding Judge is related to the plaintiff.
the Court also knows that the plaintiff is doubting his

actuations because of the defendant's alleged utterances that he will surely win this case.

 either way he acts in this case, whether in favor or against the

plaintiff or vice-versa, his actuation will always be tainted and beset with doubt and misgivings
mandamus does not lie. What was done by respondent Judge

is five from the taint of any infirmity.

Respondent Judge, inhibiting himself lived up to the Ideal of a

judiciary striving ever to preserve public faith in its fairness and objectivity.
second only to the duty of rendering a just decision, is the duty

of doing it in a manner that win not arouse any suspicion as to its fairness and the integrity of the Judge.

 The lack of awareness on the part of counsel of controlling

doctrines is thus evident. There is reference to decisions of this Tribunal none of which is applicable and one of which, Joaquin v. Baretto was promulgated way back in 1913, almost 65 years ago. the law, it is not to be forgotten, is a progressive science. There is then less than full compliance with the demands of professional competence, if a member of a bar does not keep himself abreast of the trend of authoritative pronouncements. There is need in this particular case, it would seem, to impress on counsel of record
the complexities of modern society and the changing values

regarding matters of "delicadeza which nowadays seemingly place more reliance on the personal sense of justice and obvious integrity of a judge as reflected in the tenor and substance of his decision than on possible circumstances that could breed suspicion as to his motivations, make it a vain luxury to insist on any kind of meticulous insulation against such possible suspicion.

Villaluz, Jr. vs. Armenta, 285 SCRA 1 [1998]

an action for the vindication of their easement of right of way

over property belonging to the spouses, Deogracias Villaluz and Belma M. Villaluz.
No appeal was ever taken or attempted to be taken from the

decision which, in consequence, became final and executory.

On January 5, 1995 an administrative complaint, drawn up by

Atty. Pio L. Villaluz, was filed in behalf of his above named clients against Judge Wenifredo Armenta,
Atty. Villaluz also filed with the Provincial Prosecution Office at

Daet, Camarines Norte a criminal complaint, in behalf of his clients, accusing Judge Armenta of a "violation of Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code," based on substantially the same grounds as his administrative complaint.

 that the remedy was lost to them by the unexplained

and unjustified failure of their counsel, Atty. Pio L. Villaluz, to take an appeal from the Trial Court's judgment within the time and in the manner prescribed by law; and that . . the administrative complaint in this case is being used as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal
Atty. Villaluz failed to comply with the Resolution

despite his receipt of notice thereof on October 2, 1995, by registered mail.

Villaluz eventually submitted his Compliance under

date of March 30, 1996 some six months late.

 He ignored this Court's first directive (Resolution of September

6, 1995) for him to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with (for filing a supposedly unmeritorious complaint against a Judge), obeying it only when admonished to comply therewith some five or six months later, when the normal reaction of the innocent lawyer that he portrays himself to be would have been a quick exposition of the facts e.g., his services had been suddenly and unjustifiably terminated, etc. The same curious dilatoriness is observed in Atty. Villaluz's compliance with the Resolutions of July 1, 1996 and September 23, 1996: all of five (5) months expired before he responded thereto, by filing his "Comment with Prayer to Dismiss" dated February 17, 1997.
In sum, the Court finds that the administrative complaint

against Judge Armenta was instituted by Atty. Villaluz as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. The Court considers Atty. Villaluz's avowed explanation for failing to appeal unworthy of belief.

 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to

him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable." Respondent lawyer in this proceeding merits no less.

The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. He shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation. Nor shall he neglect a legal matter entrusted to him; his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Respondent is bound by the representations he made in his Memorandum in Support of the Petition for Probation, i.e., that a timely petition for probation was not filed due to the fact that he was out of town and that complainants were laboring under the misapprehension that the civil liability must be paid in full before probation could be availed of. Either of his two explanations is enough ground to tender him liable for negligence under the Code of Professional Conduct.

The lawyer should serve his client in a conscientious, diligent and efficient manner and he should provide a quality of services at least equal to that which lawyers generally would expect of a competent lawyer in the like situation. Bu agreeing to be his clients counsel, he represents that he will exercise ordinary diligence or that reasonable degree of care and skill having reference to the character of the business he undertakes to do, to protect the clients interests and take all steps or do all acts necessary therefor, and his client may reasonably expect him to discharge his obligations diligently. Respondent has failed to measure up to his oath.

A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence and never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Indeed, it is his sworn duty not to delay no man for money or malice; and to conduct himself in a proper manner not only to his client, but also to the court, the legal profession and society at large.

When respondent accepted the amount of P17,000.00 from complainant, it was understood that he agreed to take up the latters case and that an attorney-client relationship between them was established. From then on, it was expected of him to serve his client, herein complainant, with competence and attend to his cause with fidelity, care and devotion. The act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in handling complainants case and subsequently failing to render such services is a clear violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

A member of the legal profession owes his client entire devotion to his genuine interest, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights. An attorney is expected to exert his best efforts and ability to preserve his clients cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his client likewise serves the ends of justice. Verily, the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the corresponding duties, not only to the client, but also to the court, to the bar and to the public.

Significantly, respondent also violated his oath as a lawyer, which declares in part, that he will not delay any man for money or malice and will conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his client.

Under Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to represent his client within the bounds of the law. The Code enjoins a lawyer to employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client. (Rule 19.01) and warns him not to allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the case (Rule 19.03). In short, a lawyer is not a gun for hire.

Advocacy within the bounds of the law, permits the attorney to use any arguable construction of the law or rules which is favorable to his client. But the lawyer is not allowed to knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law. He cannot prosecute patently frivolous and meritless appeals or institute clearly groundless actions (Annotated Code of Professional Responsibility 310 [1979]). Professional rules impose limits on a lawyers zeal and hedge it with necessary restrictions and qualifications (Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 579-582 [1986]).

It is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or wrongfully use the judicial process, like the filing of dilatory motions, repetitious litigation and frivolous appeals for the sole purpose of frustrating and delaying the execution of a judgment. Respondent filed a total of six appeals, complaints or petitions to frustrate the execution of the MTC judgment in Civil Case No. 844.

By having willfully and knowingly abused his rights of recourse in his efforts to get a favorable judgment, which efforts were all rebuffed, respondent violated the duty of a member of the Bar to institute actions only which are just and put up such defenses as he perceives to be truly contestable under the laws .

In filing a number of pleadings, actions and petitions, respondent has made a mockery of the judicial processes and disregarded canons of professional ethics in intentionally frustrating the rights of a litigant in whose favor a judgment in the case was rendered, thus, abused procedural rules to defeat ends of substantial justice.

Samala v. Valencia (AC No. 5439 [2007]) Respondent lawyer represented contending parties on 2 occasions, despite warning. He was also charged for initiating numerous cases in exchange for rentals on the apartment he was occupying. Counsel entered into a retainer agreement with the complainant, his client who owned the premises. As payment for his legal services, he was allowed to occupy the property for free and utilize the same as his office pursuant to the retainer agreement. The act of respondent-lawyer of filing the afore-cited cases to protect the interest of his client, on one hand, and his own interest, on the other, cannot be made the basis of an administrative charge unless it can be clearly shown that the same was being done to abuse judicial processes to commit injustice. The filing of an administrative case against respondent for protecting the interest of his client and his own right would be putting a burden on a practicing lawyer who is obligated to defend and prosecute the right of his client.

Uy v. Gonzales (AC 5280 [2004]) Complainant engaged services of counsel to prepare a petition for issuance of new certificate of title. He confided circumstances surrounding loss of the title and they discussed fees. Counsel demanded a higher fee subsequently. Instead of filing the petition, counsel filed a complaint against his client for falsification of public documents based on the information he confided regarding the lost title. With the execution of the letter-complaint, respondent violated his oath as a lawyer and grossly disregarded his duty to preserve the secrets of his client. Respondent unceremoniously turned against him just because he refused to grant respondents request for additional compensation.

A scrutiny of the records reveals that the relationship between complainant and respondent stemmed from a personal transaction or dealings between them rather than the practice of law by respondent. Respondent dealt with complainant only because he redeemed a property which complainant had earlier purchased from his son. It is not refuted that respondent paid complainant P340,000 and gave him ample time to produce its title and execute the Deed of Redemption. However, despite the period given him, complainant failed to fulfill his end of the bargain because of the alleged loss of the title which he had admitted to respondent as having prematurely transferred to his children, thus prompting respondent to offer assistance so as to secure the issuance of a new title in lieu of the lost one Whatever facts alleged by respondent against complainant were not obtained by respondent in his professional capacity but as a redemptioner of a property and therefore when he filed the complaint for estafa, respondent was not violating Canon 21. To hold otherwise would be precluding a lawyer from instituting a case against anyone to protect his personal or proprietary interests.

CANON 22- A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

Ferrer vs. Atty. Tebelin (461 SCRA 207 [June 27, 2005])

Complainant approached respondent-lawyer for legal services in connection with his claim for damages arising from a vehicular accident. Agreeing to render services for complainant, respondent-lawyer charged and received P5,000.00 from complainant as acceptance fee. Complainant accused respondent-lawyer of thereafter abandoning his case and hiding from him when he sought him out after. He then sent letters to respondent-lawyer but he did not receive any reply.

In his answer, respondent-lawyer alleged he did render services for complainant by making demands on the company responsible for the damages claimed. He also undertook to return the sum of P5,000.00, as well as the pertinent documents, to complainant. In imposing the penalty of suspension of 2 months on the lawyer, the Supreme Court faulted respondent for welching on his manifestation-undertaking to return the P5,000.00, not to mention the documents hearing on the case, to complainant or his heirs. Such is reflective of his reckless disregard of the duty imposed on him by Rule 22.02 of the code of Professional Responsibility.

Orcino v. Gaspar (AC 3773 [1997]) The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relation at any time with or without cause. The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is, however, considerably restricted. Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause. A lawyers right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the clients written consent or from a good cause complainant did not give her written consent to respondents withdrawal. The court thus ordered respondent to secure his consent. Respondent allegedly informed the court that complainant had become hostile and refused to sign his motion. He, however, did not file an application with the court for it to determine whether he should be allowed to withdraw.

A lawyer may withdraw his services from his client only in the following instances: (a) when a client insists upon an unjust or immoral conduct of his case; (b) when the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of the CPR; (c ) when the client has two or more retained lawyers and the lawyers could not get along to the detriment of the case; (d) when the mental or physical condition of the lawyer makes him incapable of handling the case effectively; (e) when the client deliberately fails to pay the attorneys fees agreed upon; (f) when the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; (g) other similar cases. The instant case does not fall under any of these grounds Respondent expressly bound himself to bring the criminal case to its termination. He was in fact paid in full for his services.