Subject: Gas Turbine Engine (Ald 30203) Lecturer: Sir Roslan Bin Basit Class: 5 AEM 1
Subject: Gas Turbine Engine (Ald 30203) Lecturer: Sir Roslan Bin Basit Class: 5 AEM 1
Subject: Gas Turbine Engine (Ald 30203) Lecturer: Sir Roslan Bin Basit Class: 5 AEM 1
GROUP ASSIGNMENT ON
TURBOJET AIRCRAFT
( CONCORDE)
Mounted in pairs under the wings, each engine could provide more than 38,000 lbs of thrust,
accelerating the plane from 0 to 225 mph in only 30 seconds.
This afterburner system was similar to technology used today by fighter jets and the Space
Shuttle. It gave Concorde's engines a fiery glow (and also made them extremely loud).
It was initially a joint project between Bristol Siddeley Engines Limited (BSEL) and Snecma.
Concorde Engine Operation
The engines on the Concorde provided the thrust necessary for takeoff,
cruising and landing. The Concorde had four Rolls Royce/Snecma Olympus
593 turbo jet engine. Each engine generated 18.7 tons(180 kN) of thrust.
Together, the four engines burned 6,771 gallons (25,629 liters) of fuel per hour
TAKE OFF
Noise abatement
Once Concorde has taken off, it enters a period of flight known as the noise
abatement procedure, this sees the afterburners turned off and power
reduced. The secondary nozzles remain in their take-off position when the
engines are throttled for noise abatement.
As the aircraft accelerates the angle reduces such that by M=1.1 the
secondary nozzles are fully open forming the divergent part of the back of
the power plant
TURBOJET ENGINE LUBRICATION
SYSTEM
FUNCTION TURBOJET LUBRICATION SYSTEM
TYPES OF LUBRICATION SYSTEM ON TURBOJET ENGINE
Takeoff at 1442hrs
A few sec later, the tyre no.2 (front) left landing gear destroyed
Engine 1 & 2 lost thrust
ATC informed presence of flames behind the aircraft
FE announced failure of engine 2 , fire alarm( Shutdown Engine 2)
Pilot called for engine fire procedure
Fire alarm sounded for the third time
The aircraft crashed onto a Hotel La Patte D'oie
THE INVESTIGATION OF
CONCORDE 4590
INCIDENT
Tests and Research
Preparation for the flight starts around h - 5 hours , h being the time planned for departure.
The agent responsible for the plan draws up a flight dossier, parts of which are required by regulations
to be archived for one month.
He uses a computer program (AOGE) which includes the characteristics of each aircraft and, among
other things, informs of NOTAMs, danger areas, aircraft limitations in relation to the prevailing conditions
and generates the flight plan. Certain elements, particularly the forecast takeoff weight and the fuel
required for the flight, are calculated manually.
Once the preparation is finished, the computer-processed part of the flight dossier is sent on
automatically to the flight departure section while the manual part is passed on by the
agent.
B.) Flight Departure
The crew come to "Flight Departure" to collect and study their flight dossier.
The latest meteorological information available is generally added to this
dossier one or two hours F-BTSC - 25 july 2000 - 89 - before departure. Once
he has studied the dossier, the Captain signs the fuel loading sheet. This sheet
is archived for one month.
C.) Ramp
The personnel preparing the aircraft on the ramp is as follows:
A supervisor responsible for checking and loading baggage (C2). This agent
signs the load sheet handed over to the dispatcher after the baggage loading has
been completed.
Traffic
drawing up a forecast for the weight of freight and passengers
drawing up a forecast for the final weight of baggage according to the number
of passengers planned, using the GAETAN system to determine the baggage already
registered, calculation of the CG forecast from the basic weight of the aircraft, the
basic index, possible tolerances, etc.
2.) Aircraft Loading
On the day of the accident, a certain number of items of baggage present on the aircraft
(twenty-nine in all) were declared to be unidentified by the the Baggage Reconciliation
System (BRS), , which permits checks to ensure security regulations are respected
During loading:
If the number is not present in the database, the response will be "tag unknown".
3.) Observation and Pictures of the Event
The following information comes from examination of the pictures available of the
accident flight and from reports from various people who were at the airport or saw the
aircraft flying.
Reported seeing pieces fall on the runway immediately after the first noise of explosion. The
noises of explosion were immediately interpreted as being from engine surges by mechanics in the
technical and freight areas.
Reported the conflagration as being in two phases, describing a small flame or a blowtorch-
like flame which suddenly appeared before growing much wider (it enveloped the left engines)
and longer (about the length of the fuselage).
This flame was accompanied by thick black smoke.
Reported the noise of the aircraft was perhaps different than usual. Several people noticed a
slight swerve to the left, with the track being stabilised slightly off centreline, according to some
observers.
4.) Previous Events
Research was undertaken to find incidents which had involved tyres or landing gear on
the Concorde since its entry into service.
The information collected to establish the list of events came from the archives of EADS, Air France,
British Airways, BEA, AAIB, DGAC, CAA and Dunlop.
The tyres were installed on the side of a trolley towed by a truck. The load spread out on the
trolley allowed each tyre to bear a load of about twenty-five tons, equivalent to that on each
main landing gear tyre on Concorde. Taking into account the test equipment and the load, the
speed of the truck was around 10 km/h. The sample strips were stood on edge on a concrete
surface.
The root cause of the incident of
th
concorde on 25 july 2000
SUMMARY
The front right tyre (2) of the left landing gear run over a strip of metal.
The Debris was against the wing structure( rupture to tank no 5 ).
Fuel leaking under the left wing
Problem appeared on Engine 2 and for a brief period on engine no 1
The aircraft took off
Engine no 2 is shut down n operating at near idle power
Engine fire alarm sounded.
The aircraft flew for around a minute (speed 200 kt & altitude 200 ft) but
unable to increase height or speed.
Engine no 1 loss of thrust , The AoA and bank increased sharply
The aircraft crashed onto a hotel
HISTORY OF MAINTENANCE
Between 17 and 21 July 2000, the aircraft had undergone a scheduled A01
check in accordance with the approved maintenance programme. During
the check, the left main landing gear bogie had been replaced in order to
correct an acceptable deferred defect related to the under-inflation
detection system.
Since the A check, the aircraft had undertaken four flights, on July 21, 22, 23
and 24. On the 24th, several maintenance operations had been carried out.
The aircraft was originally planned as a reserve for 25 July, F-BVFA was
planned to carry out scheduled flight 002 in the morning and F-BVFC to
undertake Flight 4590. For maintenance reasons, there was an allocation
change between F-BVFA and F-BVFC. F-BVFA was finally declared
unavailable during the night and the reserve aircraft, F-BTSC, was
programmed in its place to carry out Flight 4590.
Tests had been carried out and they revealed no anomalies.
A STRIP OF METAL ABOUT 43 CENTIMETRES LONG, BENT AT ONE OF ITS ENDS,
WAS FOUND ON THE RUNWAY SHOULDER AT SLAB 152 LEVEL. ITS WIDTH
VARIES FROM 29 TO 34 MM AND IT HAS DRILLED HOLES, SOME CONTAINING
RIVETS, SIMILAR TO THE CHERRY AERONAUTICAL TYPE.
THIS PIECE WAS NOT IDENTIFIED AS PART OF THE CONCORDE.
INVESTIGATION ON ENGINE NO 1
The first lost of thrust (surged short time after the tyre destruction)
The ingestion of foreign bodies which is linked to the tyre destruction.
The second loss of thrust (surged)
The lost of thrust much greater than the lost of thrust in the past during ingestion
of tyre debris.
Caused by ingestion of kerosene / hot gas mixture facilitated by the change in
the aircraft altitude
The third loss of thrust ( due to mechanical damage compressor )
resulted from the ingestion of tyre debris
engine is surged and decelerated rapidly
Suffered final surge (pieces of aluminium / glass fibre / honeycomb structure and
also quantity of fuel )
ENGINE NO 2
The loss of thrust caused by surged( at the same time to engine no 1)
The tyre was burning before the engine surge
The internal damage to the engine was not sufficient to cause surge
Lead to the great loss of thrust due to the ingestion of hot gasses.
The second Surged occur
Ingestion of hot gasses through the auxiliary air intake
Engine fire alarm actuated (engine is shut down)
ENGINE NO 3 & 4
Operated normally until 14H 44M 17.5S.
The engine parameters show a rapid decrease
The engine lost of thrust to sudden ( caused surged )
Due to the distortion of airflow caused by the roll and high angle of attack.
Internal damage resulted from impact with the ground
Engines 1 and 2 showed signs of damage (FOD) by a soft object on the LP
compressor rotor blades. Engine 1 also showed signs of FOD by a hard
object. The damage found on engines 3 and 4 showed that they hit the
ground with an N1 much higher than that of engine 1.
CONCLUSION