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Visual Cryptography: Secret Sharing Without A Computer: Ricardo Martin GWU Cryptography Group September 2005

[1] Visual cryptography allows secrets such as images or text to be encrypted and shared among participants as transparencies or printed images. When the proper transparencies are overlaid, the secret is revealed to the human eye without requiring a computer. [2] Early schemes such as (2,2) secret sharing split a secret bit among two shares such that either share reveals no information alone but together reveal the secret bit. [3] Later work extended these schemes to allow sharing of color or greyscale images and among more than two participants while maintaining security properties.

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136 views

Visual Cryptography: Secret Sharing Without A Computer: Ricardo Martin GWU Cryptography Group September 2005

[1] Visual cryptography allows secrets such as images or text to be encrypted and shared among participants as transparencies or printed images. When the proper transparencies are overlaid, the secret is revealed to the human eye without requiring a computer. [2] Early schemes such as (2,2) secret sharing split a secret bit among two shares such that either share reveals no information alone but together reveal the secret bit. [3] Later work extended these schemes to allow sharing of color or greyscale images and among more than two participants while maintaining security properties.

Uploaded by

santhanm143
Copyright
© Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
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Download as PPT, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
You are on page 1/ 22

Visual Cryptography:

Secret Sharing without a


Computer

Ricardo Martin
GWU Cryptography Group
September 2005
1
Secret Sharing
• (2,2)-Secret Sharing: Any share by itself
does not provide any information, but
together they reveal the secret.

• An example:
One-time pad: the secret binary string
k = k1 k2k3... kn can be shared as
{x = x1x2 ...xn ; y = y1y2 ...yn }, where xi is
random and yi = ki XOR xi

2
Visual Secret Sharing
• Shares are images printed on transparencies.
The secret is reconstructed by the eye not a
computer.
• Decryption by superimposing the proper
transparencies
– bits of the shares are combined as xi OR yi.

Since ({0,1},OR) is not a group we


need to introduce redundancy.

3
An example
• To share one secret bit we need at least 2 bits.
secret S1 = 1 1 1 1
• The stacked shares must be “darker” if the
secret bit isS2“1”
= than if 1it is1 “0”. 1 1

{0} → (s
S1i,sOR
j) εR S2
{{00,00},{00,01},{00,10},
= 1 1 {01,101},1 {10,10}}1 1
{1} → (si,sj) εR {{01,10}, {11,00}, {00,11}}
we can recover
S1 the
= secret:
1 1 1 1
{0} → s1 OR s2 = 00, 01 or 10, and {0} → s1 OR s2 = 11
1 S2 = 1 1 1 1

S1 OR S2 = 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

But is this secure?


4
secret S1 = 1 1 1 1

S2 = 1 1 1 1

S1 OR S2 = 1 1 1 1 1 1

S1 = 1 1 1 1

1 S2 = 1 1 1 1

S1 OR S2 = 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Now it passes Shannon test: Pr(k/si)=Pr(k) as


Prob(si=’10’/0) = Prob(si=’10’/1)=.5 and Prob(si=’01’/0) =
Prob(si=’01’/1)=.5 5
Sharing Matrix representation

• S=[Sij] a boolen matrix with:


• a row for each share, a column for each subpixels
• Sij=1 iff the jth subpixel of the ith share is dark.
• one set of matrices for “0” and one for “1” (or one for
each grey-level in secret image)
“normally” each set is the column permutations of base matrix
• for each pixel, choose a random matrix in the
corresponding set (“normally” with equal probabilities) 6
Properties of Sharing Matrices

For Contrast: sum of the sum of rows for


shares in a decrypting group should be
bigger for darker pixels.

For Secrecy: sums of rows in any non-


decrypting group should have same
probability distribution for the number of
1’s in s0 and in S1.

7
Another 2-of-2 example (m=3)

• Each matrix selected with equal probability (0.25)


• the set of different column permutations of the first two
matrices in each set. each with prob=1/6, would work as
well,.
• Sum of sum of rows is 1 or 2 in S0, while it is 3 in S1
• Each share has one or two dark subpixels with equal
probabilities (0.5) in both sets. 8
Naor-Shamir, 1994
(k,n) secret sharing: an N-bits secret shared among n
participants, using m subpixels per secret bit (n strings of
mN), so that any k can decrypt the secret:
Contrast: There are d<m and 0<α<1:
• If pi=1 at least d of the corresp. m subpixels are dark (“1”).
• If pi=0 no more than (d-αm) of the m subpixels are dark

Security: Any subset of less than k shares does not provide any
information about the secret x.
• All shares code “0” and “1” with the same number of dark subpixels in
average.

9
Stefan’s construct
One share can decrypt two images...

+
+ =

+ =

... but with less than perfect secrecy. 10


A (2,m) Secret Sharing Scheme

[Naor & Shamir] All shares receive 1


dark and (m-1) clear subpixels.
For a ‘0’, all m shares have the same
dark (random) subpixels.
For a ‘1”, all m shares have a different
dark subpixels.
Thus all shares are indistinguishable, but any two
have 1 dark subpixels for “0” and 2 for a “1”.
How can we exclude a coalition, say (1,2)?
11
Two (2,6) sharing schemes
Previous scheme (α=1/4)

More efficient sharing


matrices (α=1/2)

12
A (4,4) Visual Sharing Scheme

Any subgroupof 3 or less shares have the same


number of dark subpixels for 0 (S0) and for 1 (S1),
but the 4 together have one clear subpixel for 0 and
are all dark for 1.
Contrast is low: α=1/9 13
General Results from Naor-Shamir

1. There is a (k,k) scheme with m=2k-1,


α=2-k+1 and r=(2k-1!).
We can construct a (5,5) sharing, with 16 subpixels
per secret pixel and 1 pixel contrast, using the
permutaions of 16 sharing matrices.
2. In any (k,k) scheme, m≥2k-1 and α≤21-k.
3. For any n and k, there is a (k,n) VS
scheme with m=log n 2O(klog k), α=2Ώ(k).

14
Example 1: Lena B&W

Original

Shares

Superposition of Shares 1
and 2, perfectly aligned

15
Extensions: Beyond (K,M)
General Share Structures [Ateniense et.el. 1996]:
• Define arbitrary sets Qual and Forb as
subsets of partitipants.
– Any set in Qual can recover the secret by
stacking their transparencies
– Any set in Forb has no information on the
shared image.
• They show constructions satisfying these
requirements, with mild restrictions on the
sets.
16
Extended VSS – Grey Scale
• Naor & Shamir sugested using partially
filled circles to represent grey values.
• The actual implementation (vck,
transparencies) is less than
overwhelming.

17
Example 2: Lena Grey Scale

18
Another Grey Scale VSS system
• Use more subpixels to represent grey levels
(Nakajima & Yamaguchi).
• Use g sets of sharing matrices (one for each
grey levels, g ≥2)

19
Extended VSS- Multiple Images
[Nakajima and Yamaguchi, Stoleru] Adding more
redundancy, shares can be a pre-specified image,
instead of random noice.

No Perfect Secrecy for all images (need to adjust


ranges of grey levels in cover pictures) 20
Concluding Thoughts
• Not just a cute toy. Proposed applications:
– paper trail on electronic voting (Chaum).
– encryption of financial documents (Hawkes)
– tickets sale?
• Shares can be difficult to align (it helps to
have fat pixels, but that reduces quality),
• Contrasts declines rapidly with the number
of shares and grey levels.
• Can it be make to work with color?
21
References
• Moni Naor and Adi Shamir (1994) Visual Criptography,
Eurocrypt 94
• G. Ateniense, C. Blundo, A. de Santis and D.R.Stinson
(1996) Visual Cryptography for General Access
Structures.
• N. Nakajima nd Y. Yamaguchi (n.d.), Extended Visual
Cryptography for Natural Images
• D. Stoleru (2005), Extended Visual Cryptography
Schemes, Dr. Dobb’s, 377, October 2005
• D. Stinson (2002), Visual Cryptography or Seeing is
Believing, pp presentation in pdf.
22

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