The Mind-Body Problem 1

The Mind-Body
Problem
SCOTT STURGEON
PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY LECTURE 1
FA L L 2 0 1 9
1
False Assumption
There is no such thing as the mind-body problem. There are really a bunch of related problems,
all of which fall under the standard label.
We’ll start by getting clear on three of these closely-related problems. Then we’ll focus on the
positions to take on those problems.
2
Ontology
This is the study of what exists in the broadest sense. Ontology is a part of the more general
part of philosophy known as “metaphysics”.
We’ll dip our toe into ontology simply by mentioning three common-sense categories of being.
The categories are common-sense, but the labels for them are not so much: substance, event,
property.
Each of these categories goes with a signature role its members of the category play in reality.
Let’s look at those roles.
3
The Three Roles
Substances exist across time and through change. So you are a substance and so is your body.
The Eifel Tower is a substance, in the relevant sense of ontology, and so is the Earth. For
anything whatsoever: it’s a substance if it is the sort of thing that exists across time and through
change.
Events happen or occur. So the 2nd World War is an event and so is this lecture. The last
Wimbledon final is an event, in the relevant sense of ontology, and so is your decision to eat
breakfast. For anything whatsoever: it’s an event if it is the sort of thing that happens.
Properties are (potentially) manifested (or “instantiated”) by other things. So blueness is a

property and so is being square. For anything whatsoever: it’s a property if it is the sort of thing
that can be manifested or instantiated by something else.
4
Three Mind-Body Problems
What is the relation between mental and physical substances?
What is the relation between mental and physical events?
What is the relation between mental and physical properties?
5
The Substance Mind-Body Problem
There are mental substances as well as physical substances. As mentioned you are one of the
former and your body is one of the latter. But what is the relation between these substances?
Are they identical or not?
The view that they are identical—the view that you are literally your body—is a version of
substance physicalism. This is the view that you are your body in the same way that Clark Kent
is Superman, or Stefani Germanotta is Lady Ga-Ga.
The view that you are not identical to your body is a version of substance dualism. This view
entails that you are no more your body than that you are your car, or your shirt, or any other
physical substance.
6
The Event Mind-Body Problem
There are mental events as well as physical events. When I clap my hands, for example, one
thing that occurs is your hearing my clap. This an auditory event (in your mind, so to say). But all
kinds of physical events occur in your brain at the same time. What is the relation between your
mental event and those physical events? Is the former identical to one of the latter?
The view that your hearing of my clap is identical to an event in your brain is a version of event
physicalism. This is the view that there is just one event in the case: something which occurs in
your brain.
The view that your hearing of my clap is not identical to an event in your brain is a version of
event dualism. The view entails that there are multiple events in the case: some physical events
occur in your brain, a distinct mental event occurs too. (And it’s a good question where it
occurs, on this view!)
7
The Property Mind-Body Problem
There are mental properties as well as physical properties. Pain is one of the former and various
neural configurations are some of the latter. What is the relation between these properties? Are
pain and other mental properties identical to physical properties?
The view that they are identical is type physicalism. This is the view that mental properties are
identical to physical properties in the way that the property of being water is putatively identical
to the property of being H2O, the property of being salt is putatively identical to the property
sodium chloride, and so on.
The view that mental properties are not identical to physical properties is type dualism. This is
the view that the property of being in pain, for instance, is no more identical to a physical
property than it is to a mathematical property such (like being prime or being inaccessible).
8
Three Mind-Body Problems
What is the relation between mental and physical substances?
What is the relation between mental and physical events?
What is the relation between mental and physical properties?
9
The Theoretical Space
There are four claims about mind and body which help to shape the entire theoretical area.
Each of the claims is plausible on its own, but together they lead to conflict.
So at least one of must be false.
Those who take a stand on the mind-body problem are very often well understood by appeal to
the three claims they which to accept.
This situation can be run for properties, events, or substances. We’ll focus on events, to keep
things simple.
10

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The Mind-Body

Properties are (potentially) manifested (or “instantiated”) by other things. So blueness is a

What is the relation between mental and physical events?

What is the relation between mental and physical properties?

What is the relation between mental and physical events?

What is the relation between mental and physical properties?

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