100 lessons learned for project managers

100 Lessons Learned for Project Managers
Jerry Madden
Goddard Space Flight Center (Retired)

None of these are original -- It's just that we don't know where
they were stolen from!

1. There is no such thing as previously flown hardware,
i.e., the people who build the next unit probably
never saw the previous unit; there are probably
minor changes; the operational environment has
probably changed; and the people who check the
unit out will in most cases not understand the unit or
the test equipment.
2. Most equipment works "as built," i.e., not as the
designer planned. This is due to layout of the design,
poor understanding on the designer's part, or poor
understanding of component specifications.
3. The source of most problems is people but damned if
they will admit it. Know the people working on your
project, so you know what the real weak spots are.
4. Most managers succeed on the strength and skill of
their staff.
5. A manager who is his own systems engineer or
financial manager is one who will probably try to do
open heart surgery on himself.
6. One must pay attention to workaholics -- if they get
going in the wrong direction, they can do a lot of
damage in a short time -- it is possible to overload
them, causing premature burnout, but hard to
determine if the load is too much, since much of it is
self-generated. It is important to make sure such
people take enough time off and that the workload
does not exceed 1-1/4 to 1-1/2 times what is normal.
7. NASA programs compete for budget funds -- they do
not compete with each other, i.e., you never attack
any other program or NASA work with the idea you
should get their funding. Sell what you have on its
own merit.
8. Contractors respond well to the customer who pays
attention to what they are doing, but not too well to
the customer that continually second-guesses their
activity. The basic rule is: a customer is always right,
but the cost will escalate if a customer always has
things done his way, instead of the way the
contractor had planned. The ground rule is never
change a contractor's plans unless they are flawed
or too costly, i.e., the old saying, "better is the enemy
of good."
9. Never undercut your staff in public, i.e. don't make
decisions on work that you have given them to do in
public meetings. Even if you direct a change, never
take the responsibility for implementing away from
your staff.
10. The project has many resources within itself. There
probably are five-to-ten system engineers
considering all the contractors and instrument
developers. This is a powerful resource that can be
used to attack problems.
11. Know who the decision makers on the program are.
It may be someone on the outside who has the ear of
Congress, or the Administrator, or the Associate
Administrator, or one of the scientists -- or someone
in the chain of command -- whoever they are, try to
get a line of communication to them on a formal or

informal basis.
12. You and the program manager should work as a
team. The program manager is your advocate at
NASA HQ and must be tied in to the decision-making
and should aid your efforts to be tied in too.
13. A project manager should visit everyone who is
building anything for his project at least once, should
know all the managers on his project (both
government and contractor), and know the
integration team members. People like to know that
the project manager is interested in their work, and
the best proof is for the manager to visit them and
see first hand what they are doing.
14. Never ask management to make a decision that you
can make. Assume you have the authority to make
decisions unless you know there is a document that
states unequivocally that you cannot.
15. Wrong decisions made early can be salvaged, but
"right" decisions made late cannot.
16. Never make excuses; instead, present plans of
actions to be taken.
17. Never try to get even for some slight by another
project. It is not good form -- it puts you on the same
level as the other person--and often ends up
hindering the project getting done.
18. If you cultivate too much egotism, you may find it
difficult to change your position -- especially if your
personnel tell you that you are wrong. You should
instill an attitude on the project whereby your
personnel know they can tell you of wrong decisions.
19. One of the advantages of NASA in the early days
was the fact that everyone knew that the facts that
we were absolutely sure of could be wrong.
20. Managers who rely on the paperwork to do the
reporting of activities are known failures.
21. Not all successful managers are competent and not
all failed managers are incompetent. Luck still plays
a part in success or failure, but luck favors the
competent, hard-working manager.
22. If you have a problem that requires the addition of
people to solve, you should approach recruiting
people like a cook who has under-salted, i.e., a little
at a time.
23. A project manager must know what motivates the
project contractors, i.e., their award system, their
fiscal system, their policies, and their company
culture.
24. Other than original budget information prior to the
President's submittal to Congress, there is probably
no secret information on the project -- so don't treat
anything like it is secret. Everyone does better if they
can see the whole picture, so don't hide any of it
from anyone.
25. Know the resources of your center and if possible
other centers. Other centers, if they have the
resources, are normally happy to help. It is always
surprising how much good help one can get by just
asking.
26. Contractors tend to size up their government
counterparts, and staff their part of the project
accordingly. If they think yours are clunkers, they will
take their poorer people to put on your project.
27. Documentation does not take the place of
knowledge. There is a great difference in what is
supposed to be, what is thought to have been, and
what the reality is. Documents are normally a static
picture in time which is outdated rapidly.

28. Remember who the customer is and what his
objectives are, i.e., check with him when you go to
change anything of significance.
29. In case of a failure:
Make a timeline of events and include
everything that is known;
Put down known facts -- check every theory
against them;
Don't beat the data until it confesses, i.e.,
know when to stop trying to force-fit a
scenario;
Do not arrive at a conclusion too rapidly.
Make sure any deviation from the norm is
explained--remember the wrong conclusion
is prologue to the next failure;
Know when to stop.
30. Remember the boss has the right to make decisions,
even if you think they are wrong. Tell the boss what
you think but, if he still wants it done his way, do your
best to make sure the outcome is successful.
31. Redundancy in hardware can be a fiction. We are
adept at building things to be identical so that if one
fails, the other will also fail. Make sure all hardware is
treated in a build as if it were one of a kind and
needed for mission success.
32. Don't be afraid to fail or you will not succeed, but
always work at your skill to recover. Part of that skill
is knowing who can help.
33. Experience may be fine but testing is better. Knowing
something will work never takes the place of proving
that it will.
34. People have reasons for doing things the way they
do them. Most people want to do a good job, and if
they don't, the problem is they probably don't know
how or exactly what is expected.
35. The boss may not know how to do the work, but he
has to know what he wants. The boss had better find
out what he expects and wants, if he doesn't know. A
blind leader tends to go in circles.
36. A puzzle is hard to discern from just one piece, so
don't be surprised if team members deprived of
information reach the wrong conclusion.
37. Reviews are for the reviewed and not the reviewer.
The review is a failure if the reviewed learn nothing
from it.
38. The amount of reviews and reports are proportional
to management's understanding, i.e., the less
management knows or understands the activities,
the more it requires reviews and reports. It is
necessary in this type of environment to make sure
the data is presented so that the average person,
slightly familiar with activities, can understand it.
Keeping the data simple and clear never insults
anyone's intelligence.
39. In olden times, engineers had hands-on experience,
technicians understood how the electronics worked
and what it was supposed to do, and layout
technicians knew too-but today only the computer
knows for sure, and it's not talking.
40. Not using modern techniques like computer systems
is a great mistake, but forgetting the computer
simulates thinking is still greater.
41. Management principles are still the same. It is just
the tools that have changed. You still should find the
right people to do the work and get out of the way so
they can do it.

42. It is mainly the incompetent that don't like to show off
their work.
43. Whoever you deal with, deal fairly. Space is not a big
playing field. You may be surprised how often you
have to work with the same people. Better they
respect you than carry a grudge.
44. Mistakes are all right, but failure is not. Failure is just
a mistake you can't recover from; therefore, try to
create contingency plans and alternate approaches
for the items or plans that have high risk.
45. You cannot be ignorant of the language of the area
you manage or with that of areas with which you
interface. Education is a must for the modern
manager. There are simple courses available to
learn computerese, communicationese, and all the
rest of the modern ese's of the world. You can't
manage if you don't understand what is being said or
written.
46. Most international meetings are held in English. This
is a foreign language to most participants such as
Americans, Germans, Italians, etc. It is important to
have adequate discussions so that there are no
misinterpretations of what is said.
47. NASA Management Instructions (NMIs) are written
by another NASA employee like yourself; therefore,
challenge them if they don't make sense. It is
possible another NASA employee will rewrite them or
waive them for you.
48. A working meeting has about six people attending.
Meetings larger than this are for information transfer.
49. Being friendly with a contractor is fine -- being a
friend of a contractor is dangerous to your objectivity.
50. The old NASA pushed the limits of technology and
science; therefore, it did not worry about
"requirements creep" or over-runs. The new NASA
has to work as if all are fixed price; therefore,
"requirements creep" has become a deadly sin.
51. Many managers, just because they have the
scientists under contract on their project, forget that
the scientists are their customers and many times
have easier access to top management than the
managers do.
52. Most scientists are rational unless you endanger
their chance to do their experiment. They will work
with you if they believe you are telling them the truth.
This includes reducing their own plans.
53. Cooperative efforts require good communications
and early warning systems. A project manager
should try to keep his partners aware of what is
going on and should be the one who tells them first
of any rumor or actual changes in plan. The partners
should be consulted before things are put in final
form, even if they only have a small piece of the
action. A project manager who blindsides his
partners will be treated in kind and will be considered
a person of no integrity.
54. All problems are solvable in time, so make sure you
have enough schedule contingency -- if you don't,
the next project manager that takes your place will.
55. The number of reviews is increasing but the
knowledge transfer remains the same; therefore, all
your charts and presentation material should be
constructed with this fact in mind. This means you
should be able to construct a set of slides that only
needs to be shuffled from presentation to
presentation.
56. Just because you give monthly reports, don't think

that you can abbreviate anything in a yearly report. If
management understood the monthlies, they
wouldn't need a yearly.
57. Abbreviations are getting to be a pain. Each project
now has a few thousand. This calls on senior
management to know a couple hundred thousand.
Use them sparingly in presentations unless your
objective is to confuse.
58. Occasionally things go right--the lesson learned here
is: Try to duplicate that which works.
59. Running does not take the place of thinking. For
yourself, you must take time to smell the roses. For
your work, you must take time to understand the
consequences of your actions.
60. Sometimes the best thing to do is nothing. It is also
occasionally the best help you can give. Just
listening is all that is needed on many occasions.
You may be the boss but, if you constantly have to
solve someone's problems, you are working for him.
61. We have developed a set of people whose self
interest is more paramount than the work or at least
it appears so to older managers. It appears to the
older managers that the newer ones are more
interested in form than in substance. The question is
are old managers right or just old.
62. One problem new managers face is that everyone
wants to solve their problems. Old managers were
told by senior management -- "solve your damn
problems; that is what we hired you to do."
63. Remember, it is often easier to do foolish paperwork
than to fight the need for it. Fight only if it is a global
issue which will save much future work.
64. Know your management -- some like a good joke;
others only like a joke if they tell it.
65. Integrity means your subordinates trust you.
66. You cannot watch everything. What you can watch is
the people. They have to know you will not accept a
poor job.
67. Next year is always the year with adequate funding
and schedule -- next year arrives on the 50th year of
your career.
68. The first sign of trouble comes from the schedule or
the cost curve. Engineers are the last to know they
are in trouble. Engineers are born optimists.
69. External reviews are scheduled at the worst possible
time: therefore, keep an up-to-date set of technical
data so that you can rapidly respond. Having to
update business data should be cause for dismissal.
70. Hide nothing from the reviewers. Their reputation
and yours is on the line. Expose all the warts and
pimples. Don't offer excuses -- just state facts.
71. NASA is establishing a set of reviewers and a set of
reviews. Once firmly established, the system will fight
to stay alive, so make the most of it. Try to find a way
for the reviews to work for you.
72. Knowledge is often confounded by test. Computer
models have hidden flaws, not the least of which is
poor input data.
73. Today one must push the state of the art: be within
budget, take risks, not fail, and be on time. Strangely,
all these are consistent as long, as the ground rules,
such as funding profile and schedule, are established
up front and maintained.
74. Most of yesteryear's projects overran because of
poor estimates and not because of mistakes. Getting
better estimates may not lower cost but will improve
NASA's business reputation. Actually, there is a high

probability that the cost of getting better estimates
will increase cost and assure a higher profit to
industry, unless the fee is reduced to reflect lower
risk on the part of industry. A better reputation is
necessary in the present environment.
75. A scientific proposal takes about 9 months to put
together. It takes NASA HQ about 9 months to a year
to select the winning proposals. Then, it takes 3 to 4
years to sell the program. This means 5 to 6 years
after the initial thoughts, the real work starts.
Managers, for some strange reason, do not
understand why a scientist wants to build something
different than proposed. Managers are strange
people.
76. There are rare times when only one man can do the
job. These are in technical areas that are more art
and skill than normal. Cherish these people and
employ their services when necessary as soon as
possible. Getting the work done by someone else
takes two to three times longer, and the product is
normally below standard.
77. Software now has taken on all the parameters of
hardware, i.e., requirement creep, high percent-age
of flight mission cost, need for quality control, need
for validation procedures, etc. It has the added
feature that it is hard as hell to determine it is not
flawed. Get the basic system working and then add
the bells and whistles. Never throw away a version
that works even if you have all the confidence in the
world the newer version works. It is necessary to
have contingency plans for software.
78. History is prologue. There has not been a project yet
that has not had a parts problem despite all the
qualification and testing done on parts. Time and
being prepared to react are the only safeguards.
79. Award fee is a good tool that puts discipline both on
the contractor and the government. The score given
represents the status of the project as well as the
management skills of both parties. The Performance
Measurement System (PMS) should be used to
verify the scores. Consistent poor scores require
senior management intervention to determine the
reason. Consistent good scores, which are
consistent with PMS, reflect a well-run project, but if
these scores are not consistent with the PMS, senior
management must take action to find out why.
80. A project manager is not the monitor of the work but
is to be the driver. In award fee situations, the
government personnel should be making every effort
possible to make sure the contractor gets a high
score, i.e., be on schedule and produce good work.
Contractors don't fail, NASA does, and that is why
one must be proactive in support. This is also why a
low score damages the government project manager
as much as the contractor's manager because it
means he is not doing his job.
81. There is no greater motivation than giving a-good
person his piece of the puzzle to control but a pat on
the back or an award helps.
82. Morale of the contractor's personnel is important to a
government manager. Just as you don't want to buy
a car built by disgruntled employees, you don't want
to buy flight hardware built by them. You should take
an active role in motivating all personnel on the
project.
83. People who monitor work and don't help get it done,
never seem to know exactly what is going on.

84. Never assume someone knows something or has
done something unless you have asked them. Even
the obvious is overlooked or ignored on occasion --
especially in a high-stress activity.
85. Don't assume you know why senior management
has done something. If you feel you need to know,
ask. You get some amazing answers that will
dumbfound you.
86. If you have someone who doesn't look, ask, and
analyze, ask them to transfer.
87. Bastards, gentlemen, and ladies can be project
manager. Lost souls, procrastinators, and wishy-
washers cannot.
88. A person's time is very important. You must be
careful as a manager that you realize the value of
other people's time, i.e., work you hand out and
meetings should be necessary. You must, where
possible, shield your staff from unnecessary work,
i.e., some requests should be ignored or a refusal
sent to the requester.
89. A good technician, quality inspector, and straw boss
are more important in obtaining a good product than
all the paper and reviews.
90. The seeds of problems are laid down early. Initial
planning is the most vital part of a project. Review of
most failed projects or of project problems indicates
that the disasters were well planned to happen from
the start.
91. A comfortable project manager is one waiting for his
next assignment or one on the verge of failure.
Security is not normal to project management.
92. Remember, the President, Congress, OMB, NASA
HQ, senior center management, and your customers
all have jobs to do. All you have to do is keep them
all happy.
93. Always try to negotiate your internal support at the
lowest level. What you want is the support of the
person doing the work, and the closer you can get to
him in negotiations the better.
94. Whoever said beggars can't be choosers doesn't
understand project management. Many times it is
better to trust to luck than to get known poor support.
95. Remember your contractor has a tendency to have a
one-to-one interface with your staff; so every
member of your staff costs you at least one person
(about a 1/4 of million) on the contract per year.
96. There is only one solution to a weak project manager
in industry -- get rid of him fast. The main job of a
project manager in industry is to keep the customer
happy. Make sure the one working with you knows
that "on schedule, on cost, and a good product" --
not flattery -- is all that makes you happy.
97. Talk is not cheap. The best way to understand a
personnel or technical problem is to talk to the right
people. Lack of talk at the right levels is deadly.
98. Projects require teamwork to succeed. Remember
most teams have a coach and not a boss, but the
coach still has to call some of the plays.
99. In the rush to get things done, it is always important
to remember who you work for. Blindsiding the boss
will not be to your benefit in the long run. Over-
engineering is common. Engineers like puzzles and
mazes -- try to make them keep their designs simple.
100. Never make a decision from a cartoon. Look at the
actual hardware or what real information is available,
such as layouts. Too much time is wasted by people
trying to cure a cartoon whose function is to explain

the principle.
101. An Agency's age can be estimated by the number of
reports and meetings it has. The older it gets, the
more the paperwork increases and the less product
is delivered per dollar. Many people have suggested
that an Agency self-destruct every 25 years and be
reborn starting from scratch.
102. False starts are normal in today's environment. More
than ever, in this type of environment, one must keep
an ear open for the starting gun and be prepared to
move out in quick and orderly fashion once it is
sounded. In the past, too many false starts have
resulted in the project not hearing the real starting
gun or jumping off and falling on its face.
103. The pioneering phase of NASA is mostly done, if not
actually by fiat. This means the difficult and more
important work has started. This work requires more
discipline, but there should still be room for
innovation.
104. There are still some individuals who think important
decisions are made in meetings. This is rarely the
case. Normally, the decision-makers meet over lunch
or have a brief meeting to decide the issue and than
(at a meeting called to discuss the issue) make it
appear that the decision is made as a result of this
discussion.
105. In political decisions, do not look for logic -- look for
politics.
106. Interagency agreements are hard to make even if
there is no conflict in the responsibilities and the
requirements do satisfy both parties. Conflict in these
areas normally leads to failure no matter how hard
the people involved try to make an agreement.
107. In dealing with international partners, the usual
strategy is to go 1 day early, meet with your
counterpart, discuss all issues to be brought up at a
meeting, arrive at an agreeable response (or a
decision to table the issue for later discussion), and
agree not to take any firm positions on any new
issues brought up at the meeting. This makes it
appear to the rest of the world that you and your
counterpart are of one mind and that the work is in
good hands. All disputes are held behind closed
doors with the minimum number of participants.
108. Gentlemen and ladies can get things done just as
well as bastards. What is needed is a strong will and
respect -- not "strong arm" tactics. It must be
admitted that the latter does work but leaves a
residue that has to be cleaned up.
109. Though most of us in our youth have heard the poem
that states "for want of a nail the race was lost," few
of us realize that most space failures have a similar
origin. It is the commonplace items that tend to be
overlooked and thus do us in. The tough and difficult
tasks are normally done well. The simple and easy
tasks seem to be the ones done sloppily.
110. In the "old NASA," a job done within schedule and
cost was deemed to be simple. The present NASA
wants to push the start of the art, be innovative, and
be a risk taker but stay on schedule and cost. One
gets the feeling that either the new jobs will be
simple or that the reign of saints has finally occurred.
111. Meetings, meetings -- A Projects Manager's staff
meeting should last 5 minutes minimum -- 1 hour
max -- less than 5 minutes and you probably didn't
need the meeting -- longer than 1 hour, it becomes a
bull session.

112. Taking too many people to visit a contractor or other
government agency puts them in the entertainment
business -- not the space hardware or software
business.
113. Too many engineers get in the habit of supporting
support contractors and of using them as a crutch. In
many cases it is getting to the point where one has to
wonder who is who.
114. Reviews, meetings, and reality have little in common.
115. You should always check to see how long a change
or action takes to get to the implementer -- this time
should be measured in hours and not days.
116. Let your staff argue you into doing something even if
you intended to do it anyway. It gives them the
feeling that they won one! There are a lot of
advantages to gamesmanship as long as no one
detects the game.
117. Some contractors are good, some are bad, but they
seem to change places over time, making the past
no guarantee of the future; thus, constant vigilance is
a project requirement.
118. It is rare that a contractor or instrumentor does not
know your budget and does not intend to get every
bit of it from you. This is why you have to constantly
pay attention to the manpower they use and to judge
their activities in order to assure that they are not
overloading the system.
119. People tend to ask for what they think they can get
and not what they need. On GRO the specs for
photomultiplier tubes were based on the engineering
units performance on all parameters. One parameter,
though made in the engineering tubes, was difficult
to obtain in the flight tubes.
120. It was a meaningless parameter put in only because
the engineering tubes met it. Finally, after about 9
months of sweat and tears, this was recognized and
deleted so we could get the flight tubes.
121. Today one must get an honest bid -- one which is
accurate to 15 percent. On GRO, with TRW the only
bidder and with them knowing it, we all got what we
believed to be an honest bid that was off by about 18
to 20 percent at the finish. The main area of overrun
was the structure. TRW had never built one this large
or heavy before. We estimated that the structure
would require 600 drawings, multiplied this by 1.25 to
get 750 and rounded to 800 to estimate the cost. It
took 1,186 drawings. It is normally not the complex
systems that get you, so beware when you estimate
the cost -- especially if there is no experience base.
122. Too much cost data on a proposal can blind you to
the real risks or forgotten items. On a project we
thoroughly knew, we spent 6 months of government
and contractor time validating the cost, had rooms
full of data, and presented our findings to
Headquarters. Two weeks later, the contractor found
an "Oh I forgot" that costs $30 million. One should
look at how past programs spent their money to try to
avoid these traps.
123. On GRO we sort of estimated we needed about 20
percent contingency on previously flown subsystems
and about 40 percent to 50 percent on new ones.
The ratio was about right except the order was
reversed.
124. There are some small companies that make the
same subsystem correctly every time because the
same people do it. There are some large companies
that can never make the same unit correctly every

time because different people do the work each time.
Heritage should be questioned when the people
doing the work all have peach fuzz on their faces.
125. Too many project managers think a spoken
agreement carries the same weight as one put in
writing. It doesn't. People vanish and change
positions. Important decisions must be documented.
126. Make sure everyone knows what the requirements
are and understands them. Much easier to say than
do. On GRO we stated quite clearly that the scientific
instruments had to take 18g in a specific axis.
Everyone understood the requirement but until the
mechanical test on EGRET no one stood up and said
it was impossible to meet it. The thermal
specification for the momentum wheels required that
they run 5 degrees colder than normal limits to make
the spacecraft thermal engineers life easier. No one
stood up until after 9 months of failure in the test
program to say that the grease used changes state if
taken that cold, and would not recover when brought
back to higher temperature. You have to have the
right people look at requirements. A bunch of
managers and salesmen nodding agreement to
requirements should not make you feel safe.
127. Too many people at Headquarters believe the myth
that you can reduce the food to the horse every day
till you get a horse that requires no food. They try to
do the same with projects, which eventually end up
as dead as the horse.
128. The project manager who is the smartest man on his
project has done a lousy job of recruitment.

100 lessons learned for project managers

More Related Content

100 lessons learned for project managers