3. MMoottiivvaattiioonn
The large and growing use of antidumping
throughout the world: an interesting phenomenon,
theoretically and empirically.
Do antidumping duties amount to trade protection
for domestic producers?
• Unambiguously yes, when all foreign firms would be
restricted access to the domestic market, but Unclear
when only certain firms/countries singled out
• Antidumping - by its nature discriminatory among exporters
Also relevant from a policy point of view: AD duties -
higher prices: penalize industries that use these
protected goods and hurt final consumers.
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4. IImmppoorrttaannccee
A significant amount of work, theoretical and
empirical, to study effectiveness and ramifications
of AD investigations for an importing country:
• There have been quite a few empirical studies carried
out analyzing the trade effect of ANTIDUMPING
investigations for various countries: US, EU, Mexico and
more recently for a few other developing countries.
However, the results are not consistent across
these studies for the various countries; thus one
can not infer the effect of AD in Canada from
these studies
Research on the use or the effect of the Canadian
AD law is quite scarce.
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7. Proportion of AD cases initiated by the countries
0.3
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
India United States Canada China European Community
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8. Percentage of AD cases initiated in each
sector
11
16
8
0 3 0 0
7
1 3 0
3 0
4 2
67
2 0 2
9
2
13
8
13
0 1 1 2 0 1
58
5
2 0 2 1
1 1
34
13
2 4
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Agri
Mineral
Chem
Plast/rub
VIII
wood
X
Textile
XII
XIII
Base Metal
Transp.equip
Mach/Appliances
XX
Sectors
Canada United States European Community Video.edhole.com
11. Difference iinn AANNTTIIDDUUMMPPIINNGG
lleeggiissllaattiioonn
WTO ADA: harmonization of ground principles (normal
values, need to prove injury etc.), still allows for
national/regional regulatory variation
1. ‘two-track’ AD determination, like the US, unlike the EU
prospective system, unlike the US (retrospective)
1. no lesser duty rule: “full duty rule” - unlike the EU regime,
but similar the US (more protectionist?)
1. the cumulation principle repeatedly maintained (pool
exporters to determine injury)
1. the 2% de minimis principle rarely used, at country level
(expect lower diversion if C.A. national)
1. Some results may be interpreted from the perspective of
these institutional and procedural differences in AD
legislation.
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12. QQuueessttiioonn
Trade effects of AD policy in the
manufacturing Industry in Canada.
• Are antidumping duties effective in
restricting trade from Countries named
in the ANTIDUMPING petition?
• Is there any trade diversion to other
non-named countries thus making AD
ineffective as a protectionist tool.
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15. DDAATTAA
Data : 1990 - 2000
• Level of Imports: Detailed 10-digit HS-level
import data was obtained from Statistics
Canada.
• Antidumping Data: Canadian antidumping
measures was constructed using the report
from the Canadian Border Services Agency’s
Historical Listing of Antidumping Cases.
• confirmed from WTO Antidumping Gateway
and complemented from Statistics Canada’s
directory of HS codes
(The ANTIDUMPING data is available from the authors.
Video.neisdhah@oinlete.rcchoamnge.ubc.ca/ horatiu@interchange.ubc.ca)
17. RReessuullttss
Sizeable trade restriction effects: strong evidence of
substantial (76%) trade restriction from named countries,
one period after the imposition of duties
a time-effective protectionist tool: initial drop not followed
by subsequent import decreases in later periods
no strong indication of an “investigation”/“harassment”
effect of Canadian AD: a negative dumping determination
has no significant trade effects for both named and non-named
sources (transparency, prospective AD?)
Canadian Antidumping - timely and effective as a
protectionist instrument
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19. CCoommppaarriinngg tthhee rreessuullttss
Prusa(2001):
substantial (50%) import drop from
the named sources in the first period
Vandenbussche et al.(2001):
comparable imports restrictions of
67% determination
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21. CCoonncclluussiioonn
Canadian AD = timely and effective as
protectionist tool:
significant reduction in imports from
named sources, concentrated in the period
immediately after the imposition of duties
little to no evidence of imports being
diverted toward non-named countries or
firms
Possible refinements: does product
homogeneity/heterogeneity matter? Why
no effect for undertakings?
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Editor's Notes
In my presentation today, I will talk a little about why some countries might undertake dumping and the Antimdumping legislation in the US
I he main aim of this presentation is to consider, the impact that restricting imports might have on domestic competition
I am not here to discuss whether AD legislation is just or not.
But to look at some cases in the chemical industry and see the impact of import restriction on domestic competition.
Dumping:
Surplus Shock or Demand shock
Strategic behaviour: Entry; Predatory pricing behavior
Price competition between markets
The process takes about seven months from when the CBSA starts an investigation until the Tribunal makes a final decision on the injury matter.
The process takes about seven months from when the CBSA starts an investigation until the Tribunal makes a final decision on the injury matter.
The process takes about seven months from when the CBSA starts an investigation until the Tribunal makes a final decision on the injury matter.
The process takes about seven months from when the CBSA starts an investigation until the Tribunal makes a final decision on the injury matter.
Antidumping an important trade policy that affects a large proportion of imports in Canada, and requires better understanding of its use and its effect on trade.
Chemical industry-Is the second largest user of Antidumping duty after the steel industry
An important feature of the chemical industry is that the optimum scale of production is rather large.
Implying that one would observe fewer and larger producers in an industry.
In this industry the impact of AD legislation on competition is relatively strong.
Since, the domestic producers are few in number.
Between 1990 and 1999, there were 55 petitions for import restriction
Out of which 73% of the cases were filed by single firms.
(IN other industries you would observe a few firms getting together to file a petition)
And, in most of these cases single firms were the sole producers of the product.
(statistics-can’t say because the reports where I go the data tend to mention the larger producers)
Here is a list of the cases for which I was able to get complete data.
These cases account for 22 of the 55 cases
Let me explain this table-
Take polyvinyl alcohol, 4 petitions, or cases were filed against 4 countries.
3 of these cases were given an affirmative decision and 1 was given a negative decision
So imports from 3 countries were imposed with ADD
Most of these products are produces by a very few firms and this is where one has to be concerned about reducing competition.
Sulfanilic acid also has only one large producers, an affirmative decision in this case also somewhat eliminates the domestic competition.
Rhone-Poulenc.
Facing competition from imports coming in from china.
The petitioner not only filed a case under the US AD ligislation but also under the EU AD legislation. Thus restricting imports from china in both it’s market.
The Antidumping legislation in the US is designed to protect the domestic industry from unfair imports.
In case imports are being dumped in the country,
AD authorities would impose restrictions on the imports
This would protect domestic industries from unfair trade but at the same time this would reduce competition in the domestic markets
This shouldn’t be of concern if the domestic market had a large number of producers but for industries consisting of a few producers this can drastically impact the domestic competition. Chemical industry-one important feature of chemical industry is that the optimum scale of production are rather large. Which would imply that one would observe fewer producers in an industry.
And, of course, the benefits or gains from competition would be adversly affected. There might be lesser of an incentive to innovate and grow.