The Columbia space shuttle disaster occurred on February 1, 2003 when the shuttle broke apart upon reentry into the Earth's atmosphere, killing all seven crew members. An investigation found that a piece of foam insulation broke off during launch and damaged the shuttle's heat shield, allowing hot gases to penetrate during reentry and cause the breakup. The disaster was caused by both physical defects and organizational issues at NASA such as a lack of oversight and safety culture. The investigation made recommendations to improve safety practices and risk assessment.
4. Background
Constructed in1975
First flight STS-1, April 12, 1981.
Successfully completed the orbital flight test
program - missions STS-1 through STS-4
First mission STS-5 in November, 1982
Flew 28 missions in its lifetime
7. Mission Specialist David BrownCommander Rick HusbandPilot William MccoolIsraeli Payload Specialist Ilan RamonMission Specialist Laurel ClarkMission Specialist Kalpana ChawlaMission Specialist Michael Anderson
8. Take Off
Launch seemed successful
NASA officials, engineers
& the public were relieved
& happy
9. Crowds along State Road Florida, watching the space
shuttle as it lifts off from its launch pad
14. CAIB
13 board members
120 staff members
400 NASA engineers
25,000 researchers
7-8 months
Examination of 30,000 documents
200+ formal interviews
3,000 general public reviews
17. NASA security officers lower the American flag at Kennedy Space Center after
the shuttle's breakup.
18. Organizational Causes
The space shuttle program’s history and
culture
– Resource and budgetary constraints
– Fluctuating priorities
19. Harmful cultural traits and organizational
practices
– Reliance on past success as a substitute for
sound engineering practices
– Informal chain of command and decision-
making processes
– Barriers to effective communication
21. Possibilities
Repairing the damage on-orbit
Rescuing the crew with another shuttle
mission
Rescue option was considered
challenging but feasible
23. Reliability on past experiences
Failure of foresight
Weak risk assessment
“NASA’s problems cannot be
solved simply by retirements,
resignations, or transferring
personnel.”
25. Eliminate External Tank foam shedding
Improved imaging of the Space Shuttle
from liftoff through separation of ET
Orbiter's sustainability to minor debris
damage
Assessment of structural integrity
Shuttle flight schedule consistent with
available resources
Independent technical engineering
authority
27. History of Columbia Space Shuttle
The disaster
Causes of disaster
How it could have been avoided
Weak risk assessment
Recommendations
Editor's Notes
,,,,,, And
Columbia Accident Investigation Board
Lack of integrated management across program elements