Columbia Space Shuttle Disaster
- 3. Presented By • Zainab Raja • Nazish Khalid
- 4. Background Constructed in1975 First flight STS-1, April 12, 1981. Successfully completed the orbital flight test program - missions STS-1 through STS-4 First mission STS-5 in November, 1982 Flew 28 missions in its lifetime
- 5. Structure Three main parts Weight 2030 tons Height 56.1 m
- 6. STS-107; Columbia's Last Mission 113th mission Columbia’s 28th mission
- 7. Mission Specialist David BrownCommander Rick HusbandPilot William MccoolIsraeli Payload Specialist Ilan RamonMission Specialist Laurel ClarkMission Specialist Kalpana ChawlaMission Specialist Michael Anderson
- 8. Take Off Launch seemed successful NASA officials, engineers & the public were relieved & happy
- 9. Crowds along State Road Florida, watching the space shuttle as it lifts off from its launch pad
- 11. 16 DAYS MISSION Life sciences, Material sciences, Fluid physics
- 14. CAIB 13 board members 120 staff members 400 NASA engineers 25,000 researchers 7-8 months Examination of 30,000 documents 200+ formal interviews 3,000 general public reviews
- 17. NASA security officers lower the American flag at Kennedy Space Center after the shuttle's breakup.
- 18. Organizational Causes The space shuttle program’s history and culture – Resource and budgetary constraints – Fluctuating priorities
- 19. Harmful cultural traits and organizational practices – Reliance on past success as a substitute for sound engineering practices – Informal chain of command and decision- making processes – Barriers to effective communication
- 21. Possibilities Repairing the damage on-orbit Rescuing the crew with another shuttle mission Rescue option was considered challenging but feasible
- 23. Reliability on past experiences Failure of foresight Weak risk assessment “NASA’s problems cannot be solved simply by retirements, resignations, or transferring personnel.”
- 25. Eliminate External Tank foam shedding Improved imaging of the Space Shuttle from liftoff through separation of ET Orbiter's sustainability to minor debris damage Assessment of structural integrity Shuttle flight schedule consistent with available resources Independent technical engineering authority
- 27. History of Columbia Space Shuttle The disaster Causes of disaster How it could have been avoided Weak risk assessment Recommendations
Editor's Notes
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- Columbia Accident Investigation Board
- Lack of integrated management across program elements