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Copyright © 2015, Cigital
Cyber War, Cyber Peace, Stones,
and Glass Houses
…those who live in glass houses should not throw stones
@cigitalgem
Gary McGraw, Ph.D.
Chief Technology Officer
Copyright © 2015, Cigital
Cigital
• Providing software security professional services since
1992
• World’s premiere software security consulting firm
o 500 professional consultants
o Washington DC, New York, Santa Clara, Bloomington, Boston,
Chicago, Atlanta, Austin, Amsterdam, and London
• Recognized experts in software security
o Widely published in books, white papers, and articles
o Industry thought leaders
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Real Cyber Defense as Deterrence
• Defining “cyber”
whatever
• The offense problem
• “Active defense”
• Attribution
• Many vulnerabilities
• Payloads are easy
• Economics
• The NASCAR effect
• The defense solution
• Proactive defense vs.
cardboard defense
• Deterrence through
defense
• Build security in
Copyright © 2015, Cigital
CYBER CLARITY IS ELUSIVE
Separating the Threat from the Hype: What Washington Needs to Know
About Cyber Security, Nate Fick & Gary McGraw
http://www.cigital.com/papers/download/mcgraw-fick-CNAS.pdf
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Cyber Security
• How much of the cyber war talk is hype?
• What is real and what is cyber chimera?
Help policymakers find their
way through the fog and set
guidelines to protect the best of
the Internet and cyberspace,
both from those who seek to
harm it, and from those who
seek to protect it but risk doing
more harm than good.
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Disentangling War, Espionage, and Crime
• Cyber espionage
• Much more common than
war
• Wikileaks
• Anonymous
• Operation Aurora
• NY Times hack
• Bad compartmentalization
makes easy targets
• Cyber crime
• Even more common
• 1 trillion dollars per year?!
(just ask Ross Anderson)
Building systems properly
from a security
perspective will address
the cyber crime problem
just as well as it will
address cyber espionage
and cyber war. We can kill
all three birds with one
stone.
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Kinetic Impact as Decisive Criteria to be War
REALITY
• To qualify as cyber war, the
means may be virtual, but
the impact should be real.
• 1982 Soviet gas pipeline
explosion
• 2007 Israeli attack on Syrian
reactor
• 2008 Russia attacks Georgia two
ways
• 2008 USB drive infection in Iraq
(meh)
• 2010 Stuxnet attack on Iranian
centrifuges
HYPE
• Estonia dDoS attacks
• 2007 statue removal kerfuffle
• What would Google do?
• Brazilian blackout
• 2009 60 minutes story
• 100% hype
• China “hijacks” the Internet
• BGP mistake
• Bad design
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
US: National Security Dominates
The real and perceived
dominance of the U.S.
national security
establishment in setting
cyber security policy is
problematic
• Cyber security is not only a
military problem
• Cyber security recognizes no
geographic boundaries
• Snowden revelations did not
help this situation
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Offense and Defense
defense means building
secure software, designing
and engineering systems to
be secure in the first place
and creating incentives and
rewards for systems that are
built to be secure
offense involves exploiting
systems, penetrating
systems with cyber attacks
and generally leveraging
broken software to
compromise entire systems
and systems of systems
Copyright © 2015, Cigital
THE OFFENSE PROBLEM
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
“Active Defense”
Having a good offense is NOT
the same as a good defense.
Panetta on cyber security, “We
need to have the option to take
action against those who would
attack us.”
Grandma on security, “People
who live in glass houses should
not throw rocks.”
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Attribution Remains Unsolved (Ask Gandalf)
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Olympic Games & Stuxnet
• The PAYLOAD is what
matters
• Inject code into a running
control system
• Siemens SIMATIC PLC (step
7)
• Cyberwar!!
• Natanz in Iran
• Sophisticated, targeted
collection of malware
• Delivery
• 1 0day (not 4)
• Stolen private keys
• USB injection
• Network C&C
How to p0wn a Control System with Stuxnet (9/23/10)
http://bit.ly/RmbrNG
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Thread Hijacking in Online Games
• Used in early online game botting programs (circa
2004) but no longer
• Used successfully in Stuxnet in 2009
WoW.EXE
MAIN
THREAD
INJECTED
DLL
Loops hundreds of times per second
RenderWorld(..)
DETOUR PATCH
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
INJECTED
CODE PAGE
complete
MAIN
THREAD
MAIN
THREAD
HARDWARE BP
RenderWorld(..)
uncloak
MSG
super
branch
RenderWorld(..)
recloak
restore
CastSpellByID( .. )
ScriptExecute( .. )
ClearTarget( .. )
MAIN
THREAD
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Vulnerabilities Are Pervasive
Copyright © 2015, Cigital
Disguise
Process Control
Process Disruption
deterministic
non-deterministic
(hacking)
Capability
atypical
Attack Complexity (From Ralph Langner)
http://bit.ly/TvWnuG
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Economics (From Ralph Langner)
Nuclear sub fleet
Stealth fighter jet fleet
Eurofighter fleet, Leopard II tank fleet
Cyber weapons program / MIL targets
Cyber weapons program / CI targets
$90B
$40B
$10B
$1B
$100M
Non-state thresholdhttp://bit.ly/TvWnuG
Singular cyber attack against
national critical infrastructure
$5M
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Offense is Sexy: The NASCAR Effect
Bad news
• The world would rather
not focus on how to build
stuff that does not break
• It’s harder to build good
stuff than to break junky
stuff
Good news
• The world loves to talk
about how stuff breaks
• This kind of work sparks
lots of interest in computer
security
Copyright © 2015, Cigital
THE DEFENSE SOLUTION
Copyright © 2015, Cigital
Cardboard Shield Defense
Today’s computer and
network security
mechanisms are like the
walls, moats, and
drawbridges of medieval
times. At one point, effective
for defending against isolated
attacks, mounted on
horseback. Unfortunately,
today’s attackers have
access to predator drones
and laser-guided missiles!
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Poor Security Engineering
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Proactive Defense
Secretary Panetta is mistaken:
“Through the innovative efforts
of our cyber-operators, we are
enhancing the department's
cyber-defense programs.
These systems rely on
sensors and software to hunt
down malicious code before it
harms our systems. We
actively share our own
experience defending our
systems with those running
the nation's critical private-
sector networks.”
• Security Engineering
• Software Security
• Build Security In
Copyright © 2015, Cigital
HOW TO BUILD SECURITY IN
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Software Security Touchpoints
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
BSIMM: Software Security Measurement
• 104 firms measured (data freshness)
• BSIMM6 = data from 78 real initiatives
• 202 distinct measurements
• 26 over time (one firm 5 times)
• McGraw, Migues, and West
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
78 Firms in BSIMM6 Community
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
A Software Security Framework
See informIT article on BSIMM website http://bsimm.com
4 Domains 12 Practices
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
BSIMM6 as a Measuring Stick
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
BSIMM6
Results
Top 12
activities
• purple =
good?
• red = bad?
“Blue shift” =
practices to
emphasize
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
BSIMM By the Numbers
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Defense as Deterrent
“the U.S. is in a good
position to outspend its
adversaries on proactive
defense. Proactive
defense can be our
differentiator and a
serious deterrent to war.”
Proactive Defense
Prudent Alternative to
Cyberwarfare
http://t.co/2901DHVh
• A first strike in a cyber
war is unlikely to be
decisive
• No matter how much is
spent on cyber-offense,
cyber-defense must be
addressed anyway
• Proactive defense is a
very good differentiator
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Guidance for Policy Makers
• Focus on defense by
building security in
• Re-orient public private
partnerships
• Focus on information
users instead of
plumbing
• Let civilian agencies
lead
FIX THE BROKEN STUFF
Copyright © 2015, Cigital
WHERE TO LEARN MORE
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
SearchSecurity + Cigital’s Security Blog
• No-nonsense monthly security
column by Gary McGraw:
www.searchsecurity.com
• In-depth thought-leadership blog from
the Cigital Principals:
• Gary McGraw
• Sammy Migues
• John Steven
• Paco Hope
• Jim DelGrosso
https://www.cigital.com/blog/
• Gary McGraw’s writings:
www.cigital.com/~gem/writing
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Silver Bullet + IEEE Security & Privacy
• Monthly Silver Bullet podcast with
Gary McGraw:
www.cigital.com/silverbullet
• IEEE Security & Privacy magazine
(Building Security In)
www.computer.org/security/bsisub/
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
The Book
• How to DO software security
• Best practices
• Tools
• Knowledge
• Cornerstone of the Addison-
Wesley Software Security Series:
www.swsec.com
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Build Security In
• Join the BSIMM Community
http://bsimm.com
• Send e-mail: gem@cigital.com
• @cigitalgem

More Related Content

Cyber War, Cyber Peace, Stones and Glass Houses

  • 1. Copyright © 2015, Cigital Cyber War, Cyber Peace, Stones, and Glass Houses …those who live in glass houses should not throw stones @cigitalgem Gary McGraw, Ph.D. Chief Technology Officer
  • 2. Copyright © 2015, Cigital Cigital • Providing software security professional services since 1992 • World’s premiere software security consulting firm o 500 professional consultants o Washington DC, New York, Santa Clara, Bloomington, Boston, Chicago, Atlanta, Austin, Amsterdam, and London • Recognized experts in software security o Widely published in books, white papers, and articles o Industry thought leaders
  • 3. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Real Cyber Defense as Deterrence • Defining “cyber” whatever • The offense problem • “Active defense” • Attribution • Many vulnerabilities • Payloads are easy • Economics • The NASCAR effect • The defense solution • Proactive defense vs. cardboard defense • Deterrence through defense • Build security in
  • 4. Copyright © 2015, Cigital CYBER CLARITY IS ELUSIVE Separating the Threat from the Hype: What Washington Needs to Know About Cyber Security, Nate Fick & Gary McGraw http://www.cigital.com/papers/download/mcgraw-fick-CNAS.pdf
  • 5. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Cyber Security • How much of the cyber war talk is hype? • What is real and what is cyber chimera? Help policymakers find their way through the fog and set guidelines to protect the best of the Internet and cyberspace, both from those who seek to harm it, and from those who seek to protect it but risk doing more harm than good.
  • 6. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Disentangling War, Espionage, and Crime • Cyber espionage • Much more common than war • Wikileaks • Anonymous • Operation Aurora • NY Times hack • Bad compartmentalization makes easy targets • Cyber crime • Even more common • 1 trillion dollars per year?! (just ask Ross Anderson) Building systems properly from a security perspective will address the cyber crime problem just as well as it will address cyber espionage and cyber war. We can kill all three birds with one stone.
  • 7. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Kinetic Impact as Decisive Criteria to be War REALITY • To qualify as cyber war, the means may be virtual, but the impact should be real. • 1982 Soviet gas pipeline explosion • 2007 Israeli attack on Syrian reactor • 2008 Russia attacks Georgia two ways • 2008 USB drive infection in Iraq (meh) • 2010 Stuxnet attack on Iranian centrifuges HYPE • Estonia dDoS attacks • 2007 statue removal kerfuffle • What would Google do? • Brazilian blackout • 2009 60 minutes story • 100% hype • China “hijacks” the Internet • BGP mistake • Bad design
  • 8. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital US: National Security Dominates The real and perceived dominance of the U.S. national security establishment in setting cyber security policy is problematic • Cyber security is not only a military problem • Cyber security recognizes no geographic boundaries • Snowden revelations did not help this situation
  • 9. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Offense and Defense defense means building secure software, designing and engineering systems to be secure in the first place and creating incentives and rewards for systems that are built to be secure offense involves exploiting systems, penetrating systems with cyber attacks and generally leveraging broken software to compromise entire systems and systems of systems
  • 10. Copyright © 2015, Cigital THE OFFENSE PROBLEM
  • 11. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital “Active Defense” Having a good offense is NOT the same as a good defense. Panetta on cyber security, “We need to have the option to take action against those who would attack us.” Grandma on security, “People who live in glass houses should not throw rocks.”
  • 12. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Attribution Remains Unsolved (Ask Gandalf)
  • 13. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Olympic Games & Stuxnet • The PAYLOAD is what matters • Inject code into a running control system • Siemens SIMATIC PLC (step 7) • Cyberwar!! • Natanz in Iran • Sophisticated, targeted collection of malware • Delivery • 1 0day (not 4) • Stolen private keys • USB injection • Network C&C How to p0wn a Control System with Stuxnet (9/23/10) http://bit.ly/RmbrNG
  • 14. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Thread Hijacking in Online Games • Used in early online game botting programs (circa 2004) but no longer • Used successfully in Stuxnet in 2009 WoW.EXE MAIN THREAD INJECTED DLL Loops hundreds of times per second RenderWorld(..) DETOUR PATCH
  • 15. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital INJECTED CODE PAGE complete MAIN THREAD MAIN THREAD HARDWARE BP RenderWorld(..) uncloak MSG super branch RenderWorld(..) recloak restore CastSpellByID( .. ) ScriptExecute( .. ) ClearTarget( .. ) MAIN THREAD
  • 16. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Vulnerabilities Are Pervasive
  • 17. Copyright © 2015, Cigital Disguise Process Control Process Disruption deterministic non-deterministic (hacking) Capability atypical Attack Complexity (From Ralph Langner) http://bit.ly/TvWnuG
  • 18. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Economics (From Ralph Langner) Nuclear sub fleet Stealth fighter jet fleet Eurofighter fleet, Leopard II tank fleet Cyber weapons program / MIL targets Cyber weapons program / CI targets $90B $40B $10B $1B $100M Non-state thresholdhttp://bit.ly/TvWnuG Singular cyber attack against national critical infrastructure $5M
  • 19. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Offense is Sexy: The NASCAR Effect Bad news • The world would rather not focus on how to build stuff that does not break • It’s harder to build good stuff than to break junky stuff Good news • The world loves to talk about how stuff breaks • This kind of work sparks lots of interest in computer security
  • 20. Copyright © 2015, Cigital THE DEFENSE SOLUTION
  • 21. Copyright © 2015, Cigital Cardboard Shield Defense Today’s computer and network security mechanisms are like the walls, moats, and drawbridges of medieval times. At one point, effective for defending against isolated attacks, mounted on horseback. Unfortunately, today’s attackers have access to predator drones and laser-guided missiles!
  • 22. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Poor Security Engineering
  • 23. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Proactive Defense Secretary Panetta is mistaken: “Through the innovative efforts of our cyber-operators, we are enhancing the department's cyber-defense programs. These systems rely on sensors and software to hunt down malicious code before it harms our systems. We actively share our own experience defending our systems with those running the nation's critical private- sector networks.” • Security Engineering • Software Security • Build Security In
  • 24. Copyright © 2015, Cigital HOW TO BUILD SECURITY IN
  • 25. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Software Security Touchpoints
  • 26. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital BSIMM: Software Security Measurement • 104 firms measured (data freshness) • BSIMM6 = data from 78 real initiatives • 202 distinct measurements • 26 over time (one firm 5 times) • McGraw, Migues, and West
  • 27. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital 78 Firms in BSIMM6 Community
  • 28. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital A Software Security Framework See informIT article on BSIMM website http://bsimm.com 4 Domains 12 Practices
  • 29. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital BSIMM6 as a Measuring Stick
  • 30. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
  • 31. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital BSIMM6 Results Top 12 activities • purple = good? • red = bad? “Blue shift” = practices to emphasize
  • 32. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital BSIMM By the Numbers
  • 33. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Defense as Deterrent “the U.S. is in a good position to outspend its adversaries on proactive defense. Proactive defense can be our differentiator and a serious deterrent to war.” Proactive Defense Prudent Alternative to Cyberwarfare http://t.co/2901DHVh • A first strike in a cyber war is unlikely to be decisive • No matter how much is spent on cyber-offense, cyber-defense must be addressed anyway • Proactive defense is a very good differentiator
  • 34. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Guidance for Policy Makers • Focus on defense by building security in • Re-orient public private partnerships • Focus on information users instead of plumbing • Let civilian agencies lead FIX THE BROKEN STUFF
  • 35. Copyright © 2015, Cigital WHERE TO LEARN MORE
  • 36. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital SearchSecurity + Cigital’s Security Blog • No-nonsense monthly security column by Gary McGraw: www.searchsecurity.com • In-depth thought-leadership blog from the Cigital Principals: • Gary McGraw • Sammy Migues • John Steven • Paco Hope • Jim DelGrosso https://www.cigital.com/blog/ • Gary McGraw’s writings: www.cigital.com/~gem/writing
  • 37. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Silver Bullet + IEEE Security & Privacy • Monthly Silver Bullet podcast with Gary McGraw: www.cigital.com/silverbullet • IEEE Security & Privacy magazine (Building Security In) www.computer.org/security/bsisub/
  • 38. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital The Book • How to DO software security • Best practices • Tools • Knowledge • Cornerstone of the Addison- Wesley Software Security Series: www.swsec.com
  • 39. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Build Security In • Join the BSIMM Community http://bsimm.com • Send e-mail: gem@cigital.com • @cigitalgem