icrc-002-4237

JANUARY 2012 TO DECEMBER 2014
HEALTH CARE
IN DANGER
VIOLENT INCIDENTS AFFECTING
THE DELIVERY OF HEALTH CARE
R E P O R T

International Committee of the Red Cross
19, avenue de la Paix
1202 Geneva, Switzerland
T +41 22 734 60 01 F +41 22 733 20 57
E-mail: shop@icrc.org www.icrc.org
© ICRC, April 2015

JANUARY 2012 TO DECEMBER 2014
HEALTH CARE
IN DANGER
VIOLENT INCIDENTS AFFECTING
THE DELIVERY OF HEALTH CARE
* This third interim report, part of the Health Care in Danger project,
was prepared by Marica Tamanini.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Within the framework of the Health Care in Danger project, the ICRC has engaged in an exercise to collect data
on violent incidents against health care in situations of armed conflict and other emergencies. The information
collected is used by the ICRC, National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and relevant stakeholders to raise
awareness about violence against health care at a global level. The aim of this report is to provide data that can
inform operational strategies and encourage decision-makers to take action to prevent violence against health care.
The ICRC also uses contextual data about violent incidents against health care to develop field strategies at its
delegations and to tackle issues of concern.
Between January 2012 and December 2014, the ICRC collected data on incidents of violence against health care
in selected operational contexts in which its field teams are present. The objective was to study and identify the
main types of acts and threats of violence against health care in armed conflicts and other emergencies and their
effects on people, health-care facilities and medical transports. The analysis contained in this report (2012-2014)
is based on data on 2,398 incidents collected from various sources of information in 11 countries. The findings are
based on aggregated information and highlight the main patterns of violence against the wounded and the sick,
health-care personnel, health-care facilities and medical transports apparent in the contexts under analysis. In
comparison with the previous two reports,1
in which the analysis was based on 22 and 23 countries respectively,
this third report is based on the analysis of data collected from 11 countries (a) from at least three different sources
of information and (b) for which monthly reports covering the entire period under review had been received.
Despite the different number of countries, the report confirms the patterns of violence affecting health care that
were detected in the previous reports. Moreover, it adds details regarding the analysis of contextual information,
such as incidents occurring during clashes or demonstrations, and focuses on identifying the dynamics of violence
in different types of location where the incidents took place.
The most important findings in this report include the following:
a) Most of the incidents on which data were collected occurred against, inside or within the perimeter of
health-care facilities. The following observations were made:
• Patients were killed, wounded and/or beaten, as were their relatives and other bystanders;
• Health-care personnel were subjected to threats and coerced to act against health-care ethics and/or
to provide free treatment;
• Health-care personnel were also subjected to threats and physical assaults by patients and relatives;
• Facilities were directly fired at, bombed and/or burnt or indirectly harmed during the conduct of
hostilities;
• The use of explosives and/or bombing operations caused a consistent proportion of the victims in
documented incidents against, inside or within the perimeter of health-care facilities;
• Disruptive armed entries took, in particular, the form of break-ins and forced entry for the purpose of
perpetrating violence against people inside health-care facilities, including forced removal of patients
from the facilities and arrest operations;
• Health-care facilities were subject to several acts of looting and pillage, often accompanying a break-in
into the facility, and people inside were often subject to robberies;
• Health-care facilities were occupied and subject to misuse, especially forced use of the services and use
for military purposes;
• Violence against, inside or within the perimeter of health-care facilities caused loss of resources and
severe damage, often leading to the suspension of health-care services.
b) Many documented incidents occurred on the way to and from health-care facilities, at checkpoints and in
public spaces.2
In particular:
1
ICRC, Violent incidents affecting health care – January to December 2012, ICRC, Geneva, 2013; ICRC, Violent incidents
affecting the delivery of health care – January 2012 to December 2013, ICRC, Geneva, 2014.
2
Public space: any space in a town, village or rural area to which people from the community have access and would go for
purposes other than health care, such as a market; this includes public and private offices used for professional activities other
than providing health care.
- 1 -

• Obstruction of passage for ambulances, health-care personnel, drivers of medical transports and patients;
• Health-care personnel and patients were often subject to threats, physical assault and deprivation of
their liberty;
• Violence against medical transports involved direct or indirect attacks and obstruction, which also
occurred during demonstrations.
In addition, follow-up attacks3
targeting medical transports were observed.
c) The documented incidents that took place in other areas4
or at unidentified types of location5
revealed the
following:
• Several involved coercing health-care personnel to act in a manner contrary to health-care ethics, to
provide free treatment or to deliver health care in insecure settings;
• Health-care personnel were particularly affected by threats and by deprivation of liberty.
The analysis contained in this report reflects the results of reporting on violence against health care. This is a
recently established exercise that started in 2012; the results were presented in a first report on incidents affecting
the delivery of health care published in 2013 and in a second published in 2014.6
The exercise does not draw on
previous baselines for comparison and cannot be deemed representative owing to the challenges of gaining access
to information. Therefore, the data-collection method does not allow trends to be determined or the real number
of incidents occurring in the contexts under analysis to be assessed. For the same reason, comparison between
reports is not advisable for the purpose of identifying changes in the level of violence. The figures contained in
this report represent only those incidents recorded, which should be considered as the “tip of the iceberg.” The
primary value of this report is to describe the main patterns of violence against the delivery of health care.
3
For the purpose of the project, “follow-up attacks” are defined as explosions intended to cause as many injuries and deaths as
possible, including among people assisting the victims of a previous explosion. Follow-up attacks usually directly target first
responders approaching the scene of an earlier attack to provide assistance or to secure the area.
4
Other areas: a civilian residence, a non-medical compound, a refugee or IDP camp, a police station, an airstrip, on board a
ship and non-physical areas such as incidents occurring as a result of communication or administrative decisions.
5
Unidentified types of location: incidents for which it was not possible to determine the type of location (health-care facility,
checkpoint, road, etc.). It is important to note that the type of location is different from the geographical location where an
incident occurred, which must be determined for the incident to be included in the collection.
6
See footnote 1.
- 2 -

A. INTRODUCTION
This document is the third in a series of reports published
by the ICRC on violent incidents affecting provision of and
access to health care in situations of armed conflict and
other emergencies; the data were collected by ICRC field
teams. These reports build on a study that was launched in
2008 and was based on the collection of data from media
sources on incidents affecting health care. The study
documented incidents from 16 countries over a three-year
period. The 16-country study was presented at the 31st
International Conference of the Red Cross and Red
Crescent in 2011 and was the catalyst for a Resolution
which gave the ICRC a mandate7
to work on the issue. In
the same year the ICRC initiated the Health Care in Danger
project in collaboration with the National Societies and
their Federation and with other global partners concerned
with the safe delivery of health care. Since 2012 the ICRC
has been collecting data on incidents in more than 20
contexts in which the institution has an operational presence
and has issued a yearly report based on aggregated
information.8
Other health-care organizations, academic
institutes and other stakeholders have studied the issue in
specific contexts, publishing analytical and qualitative
reports. The ICRC reports seek to complement such studies
and to inspire possible future research.
1. Objectives of the report
This report presents the results of the analysis of the data on
violent incidents against health care that were collected in
11 countries in which the ICRC has a field presence.9
The
main objective of the analysis was to investigate the types
of violence perpetrated against health-care personnel,
infrastructure, medical transports and health-care
programmes in areas affected by armed conflicts and other
emergencies. In particular, the report focuses on violent
behaviour against health-care personnel, the wounded and
the sick, health-care facilities and medical transports in
different types of location where incidents took place. The
purpose of selecting this angle for analysis was to explore
the issue from a different perspective than in the previous
reports and to try to identify how the main categories of
perpetrators, the most recurrent types of violence and the
primary consequences of such violence change in
accordance with the type of location in which the
documented incidents took place. The ultimate goal of the
report is to raise awareness and to build understanding
about the humanitarian concerns for the safe delivery of
health care. By providing insight into the issue, it is hoped
7
31st International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Geneva, 2011, Resolution 5.
8
The data-gathering exercise was first established in 22 operational contexts in which the ICRC is present. The second study
on violent incidents against health care, published in 2013, produced information based on the data collected on incidents in
those countries. The third report, published in 2014, presented the results in an analysis of the data on the incidents collected
in 23 operational contexts over a two-year period (an additional country had been included in the data-collection exercise).
9
See section B.1 for an explanation.
Focus 1 – The Health Care in Danger project
The Health Care in Danger (HCiD) project is a
project of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement that was launched in 2011 and is
based on the mandate received at the 31st
International Conference to tackle the issue of
violence against health care.
For the first two years, the Movement
concentrated on raising awareness of the issue
and, building on the findings contained in the 16-
country study and in the subsequent reports, on
the expert consultations organized to tackle the
main issues of violence against health care.
Twelve workshops took place around the world,
convening experts on topics such as military
practice, national legislation, the safety of
health-care facilities, ambulance and pre-
hospital services, health-care ethics, the rights
and responsibilities of health-care personnel, the
role of civil society and the role of the National
Societies. Consultations with non-State armed
groups were also conducted. Thanks to these
workshops and consultations, recommendations
for specific interlocutors and/or on specific
issues were identified. These recommendations
are included in all reports published after each
consultation process.
In 2014, the project entered a new phase, during
which all stakeholders, and especially
diplomatic representatives, took part in regional
and international fora in order to assume
ownership of the issue in their own contexts.
The project, which was initially meant to run
until the end of 2015, has been extended until
2017 with the purpose of focusing on the
practical implementation of the
recommendations made and of encouraging
greater practical involvement by the diplomatic
community.
The reports containing the recommendations can
be consulted here:
www.healthcareindanger.org
- 3 -

that the report’s findings will lead to the adoption of preventive measures conducive to ensuring a safer
environment for the delivery of health care.
2. Preliminary definitions
For the purposes of this document, the following general definitions apply:
Health care
Prevention, diagnosis, treatment or control of diseases, injuries or disabilities, as well as measures to safeguard
the health of mothers and young children. The term encompasses all activities that ensure, or provide support
for, access for the wounded and sick to these health-care services, including searching for, collecting or
transporting the wounded and sick, or the management of health-care facilities.
Health-care personnel
All people with professional health-care qualifications, e.g. doctors, nurses, paramedics, physiotherapists,
pharmacists; people working in hospitals, clinics and first-aid posts; ambulance drivers; administrators at
hospitals; personnel working in the community in their professional capacity; staff and volunteers of the
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement involved in delivering health care; medical personnel of
armed forces; medical personnel of armed groups; and personnel of health-oriented international and non-
governmental organizations.
Health-care facilities
Hospitals, laboratories, clinics, first-aid posts, blood transfusion centres and the medical and pharmaceutical
stores of those facilities. The term includes but goes beyond the different categories of “medical units” that are
specifically protected under IHL and entitled to use the red cross, red crescent or red crystal emblems for
protective purposes.
Medical transports
Ambulances, medical ships or aircraft, whether civilian or military, and generally any means of transport,
including private means of transport, conveying the wounded and sick, health-care personnel and medical
supplies or equipment. The term includes but goes beyond the different categories of “medical transports” that
are specifically protected under IHL and entitled to use the red cross, red crescent or red crystal emblems for
protective purposes.
Violence
Intentional or accidental use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, against another
person or against a group or community that results in or is likely to result in injury or death, psychological
harm or deprivation. Forceful obstruction of health care is also included.
Violent incident against health care
A violent incident against health care may consist of one or several acts or threats of violence that hinder or
adversely affect the provision of and/or access to health care.
Relevant definitions of the categories used in the analysis will be introduced in the report as required.
- 4 -

B. METHODS
1. From incident collection to incident analysis
Following the launch of the Health Care in Danger project in August 2011 and building on the 16-country study,
the ICRC identified the need to establish an exercise to collect data on violent incidents against health care. The
ICRC took advantage of its wide network of delegations to launch this exercise. It encouraged operational field
teams to collect data on incidents at the country level. Each ICRC delegation that took part in the data-collection
exercise was asked to select the relevant10
sources of information in its context, to collect information and to verify
it. A start was made on collecting information and the exercise has been in place since then. The information
collected is consolidated in a semi-narrative monthly report that is sent to the information analyst at ICRC
headquarters in Geneva, where it is then processed and turned it into quantitative information that can be fed into
a database, thus allowing it to be cross-tabulated for different analytical purposes.
In the period from January 2012 to December 2014, a
total of 24 ICRC delegations participated in the data-
collection exercise. The number changed over time as
new operational contexts were added and as others
withdrew for operational reasons. The list of countries
where the information is collected is confidential. For this
reason, the analysis presented in the first (2013) and
second (2014) reports was based on a sample of incidents
collected by all ICRC field teams participating in the
project. For the purpose of this third report, the sample
chosen for analysis is different.11
It was identified
according to the following criteria: a) Incidents in
countries where the ICRC field teams regularly
documented incidents from January 2012 to December
2014; and b) Incidents collected by ICRC field teams
which had been relying regularly on at least three
different and satisfactory sources of information. The
purpose of selecting incidents meeting the above criteria
was to identify a more reliable sample, constituted by
information continuously collected over three years. The
sample was thus reduced to 11 countries with a total of
2,398 incidents. It is important to point out that the
incidents documented do not represent all incidents
occurring in the 11 countries chosen, but only those on
which the ICRC was able to collect data, meaning that the
real number of incidents occurring is higher. Moreover,
although the criteria used to select the contexts under
analysis did not aim to achieve geographical or contextual
representation, it is worth noting that the 11 countries
selected are from different geographical regions and are
facing either an armed conflict or another emergency.12
10
Delegations consider relevant sources of information to be those interlocutors or media sources which they can trust for the
credibility of the information provided, to which they have regular access and which have or are very likely to have information
pertinent to violence against health care.
11
For this reason, the findings may appear inconsistent with those of the previous reports. Although the patterns of violence
against health care have generally been confirmed, some results might not be fully comparable with those obtained for the 22
and 23 countries.
12
The term “other emergencies” refers to situations that fall short of the threshold for “armed conflict,” in which security
measures or incidents related to security can result in serious consequences for people in need of effective and impartial health
care: death, aggravation of injuries, worsening of illnesses or diseases, obstruction of preventive health-care programmes, and
so on. These measures or incidents might take a number of forms: violence against people in need of health care; violence
against health-care personnel and facilities or medical transports; entry into health-care facilities by armed forces or security
forces with the intent or effect of interrupting the delivery of health-care services; arbitrary denial of or delays in the passage
Focus 2 – Processing information and criteria
for the inclusion of an incident
The information collected is structured by ICRC
field teams into a semi-narrative report and then
processed in Geneva. The information is turned
into quantitative information, meaning that an
incident is registered in a database and the relative
information is entered into a codified category for
analysis. For an incident to be recorded, the source
report must always indicate at least when it
happened, where it took place, what type of
violence occurred, who and what was affected and
the type of the source of information.
In order to be included in the collection, incidents
must contain information concerning an act or
threat of violence affecting the provision of health
care. Violence perpetrated for purely private
matters is excluded. Moreover, all cases linked to
a situation of general violence and not specifically
linked to health care, such as precautions taken by
health-care personnel against widespread violence
in the area, are also excluded. If it is not clear
whether an incident is to be taken into account, a
decision is taken by a review committee made up
of members of the Health Care in Danger project
team at the ICRC.
- 5 -

2. Interpreting results and sampling bias
This report aims to identify the main patterns of violence against health care reported in the incidents on which the
ICRC was able to collect data. Its ultimate goal is not only to raise awareness about the impact of violence, but
also to trigger qualitative contextual analysis as well as to help the ICRC, National Societies, NGOs, international
and regional organizations, authorities, hospital managers, health representatives and other global and national
stakeholders to identify the most important issues so that they can structure their work accordingly, for example
operational strategies, policies, national legislation and security measures.
As with previous reports, this report does not aim to establish the existence of general trends at a global level.
Indeed, although the sample has changed and collection practices have been strengthened, bias in the collection of
information and in the amount of information received by context does not allow general conclusions to be drawn.
In complex security environments such as those that are the subject of this incident-collection exercise, access to
information depends on access to sources of information and territory. The absence of operational activities for
ICRC field teams in certain areas often tallies with a lack of information about incidents occurring in that particular
area, whether for a limited period or on a permanent basis. Moreover, the quality of dialogue of ICRC field teams
with the different sources of information is also a determining factor, especially when information cannot be
verified by another source. In addition, the number of incidents taking place varies from one context to another
and it is difficult to assess the actual level of violence that the sample should represent. Furthermore, the level of
detail reported for each incident varies considerably as it was not always possible to document additional
information regarding, for example, the context in which the incident occurred, the weapons used, short-term
impact and so on. Finally, globally aggregated information may be biased by specific high-impact incidents or
highly recurrent context-specific dynamics, making it difficult to identify global trends that hold true for all
contexts. While the results presented in this report should be read with those challenges in mind, the analysis does
provide insight into the effects of violence against health care and the fundamental importance of data collection
to better understand such violence.
3. Sources of information
Information was gathered by ICRC field teams from a broad range of sources, including people directly affected
by or involved in the incident (victims and witnesses), National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the media,
other humanitarian organizations and local health-care providers. For the countries covered by this report, field
teams used at least three of the sources listed in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Distribution of incidents by main source of information
Sources Description Proportion
ICRC-related
sources
Information was directly gathered by ICRC field teams through dialogue
with victims, health-care personnel and administrative and support staff
considered to be pertinent and reliable sources of information.
53%
Authorities ICRC field teams received the information from law enforcement officers,
members of military forces, parties to the conflict or government actors,
including the Ministry of Health.
14%
Media Information was documented through local and global newspapers, radio, TV
news, social networks and other mass information tools.
14%
National
Societies
Information was passed on to the ICRC field teams by National Red Cross
and Red Crescent Societies which documented it directly or were themselves
the victims of violence.
9%
Other
organizations
Information was passed on to the ICRC field teams by other organizations
which documented it directly or were themselves the victims of violence.
9%
of medical transports at checkpoints; or simply the general insecurity prevailing in an area affected by an emergency situation.
In these circumstances, and depending on the urgency of humanitarian needs, health-care personnel – including but not limited
to staff or volunteers from the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement – may be called upon to prevent and
alleviate human suffering.
- 6 -

C. RESULTS
1. Aggregated information: an overview of the issue
1.1.Total number of incidents and overall impact
The ICRC recorded 2,398
incidents of violence against
health care in the 11 selected
countries from the beginning of
January 2012 to the end of
December 2014. In total, at
least13
4,275 people were
victims of violence against
health care in 4,770 acts or
threats of violence.14
Moreover,
728 medical transports15
were
affected in 785 acts or threats of
violence.16
In addition, it was
found that 1,222 of the incidents
took place against, inside or
within the perimeter of health-
care facilities. Finally, a matter
that is consistent with previous
reports, the findings confirm that
violence mostly concerned local health-care providers, national NGOs and National Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies (overall, 91% of recorded incidents) rather than international providers (Figure 2), which are probably
also proportionally less present in the areas affected.
1.2.Main categories of perpetrators
The incidents documented are broken down by perpetrator as shown in Figure 3. The ICRC collected data on 943
incidents allegedly perpetrated by State military, security and police forces (State armed forces and law
enforcement bodies); 717 incidents attributable to armed non-State actors; and 86 incidents reportedly committed
by organized criminal groups. 261 incidents were attributed to individuals. Most of the incidents attributed to
individuals concerned obstruction during demonstrations and dissatisfaction by patients’ relatives with medical
treatment, delays, medical triage, doctor’s decisions about treatment, the results of treatment and the conditions or
the death of one of their relatives. It is important to emphasize that the proportion of incidents collected may not
reflect the general distribution of incidents per perpetrator in all contexts of armed conflict or other emergencies.
Indeed, the difference between the incidents collected per category of perpetrator might be attributable to limited
access to information about incidents perpetrated by one actor rather than another and by the specific aspects of
contexts chosen for this analysis. For this reason, the analysis that follows in this publication will avoid comparing
accountability per perpetrator and will rather focus on describing the perpetrators’ behaviour in specific
circumstances.
13
When the incident report indicates that more than one person was affected by violence, but without mentioning the exact
number of people, the number of people affected by the incident is systematically registered as 2. This means that the number
of people affected by the incidents documented is necessarily higher than the number assessed.
14
One person might be affected by one or more acts or threats of violence in the same incident, such as being threatened and
robbed by the same perpetrator.
15
As indicated under “Preliminary definitions” (section A.2), medical transports include not only ambulances, but also any
other vehicles used for the delivery of health care, such as private cars used to transport the wounded and the sick, vehicles
used to transport medical supplies and people-carriers transporting medical staff to places of work.
16
A medical transport might be affected by one or more acts or threats of violence in the same incident, such as an ambulance
being denied access and attacked by the same perpetrator.
Figure 2. Distribution of incidents by type of provider affected
* No information: Information not available or not applicable (when a provider
was not subject to violence in the incident).
1933
262
18
121 64
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
Local health-
care providers
and national
NGOs
National Red
Cross and Red
Crescent
Societies
ICRC and
Federation
International
NGOs and UN
agencies
No information
- 7 -

1.3.Types of location
The distribution of incidents by type of location (Figure 4) shows that 1,222 of the incidents recorded occurred
against, inside or within the perimeter of health-care facilities. This suggests that the potential consequences of
such violence are huge: health-care personnel may not feel safe at their workplace and may flee or ask to be
relocated; the wounded and sick
may be afraid to go to these
facilities for health care because
they fear becoming victims of such
violence; health-care facilities
themselves that are not used for
military purposes at the outset can
be put at risk of being the direct
objects of attacks when violent acts
are committed by armed actors
against, inside or within their
perimeter; loss of supplies or other
material, damage to the
infrastructures and equipment, and
the disruption of health-care may
cause the service to function badly.
However, violence in other areas
should not be underestimated. As
shown in Figure 4, violence against
health-care services and the
wounded and the sick also often
takes place on the way to and from
Figure 3. Distribution of incidents by category of perpetrator
* Armed non-State actors include organized non-State armed groups that are party to a conflict (which are not State
organs or do not belong to a State party to the conflict) and non-State actors that do not necessarily fulfil the
organizational requirement to be considered party to the conflict, such as other opposition movements or unspecified
groups of armed people.
** Other: Administrative measures, international military/police forces, peacekeepers.
*** Several perpetrators: More than one perpetrator involved/shared responsibility.
283
68
40
261
86
717
153
790
0 200 400 600 800 1000
No information
Several perpetrators***
Other**
Individuals
Organized criminal groups
Armed non-State actors*
Law enforcement
State armed forces
Figure 4. Distribution of incidents by type of location
* Public space: Any space in a town, village or rural area to which people from
the community have access and would go for purposes other than health care,
such as a market; this includes public and private offices used for professional
activities other than providing health care.
**Other: A civilian residence, a non-medical compound, a refugee or IDP
camp, a police station, an airstrip, on board a ship and non-physical areas
such as incidents occurring as a result of communication or administrative
decisions.
1222
364
179 183
108
342
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
Health-care
facility
Road Checkpoint Public space* Other** No
information
- 8 -

health-care facilities (364), at official and unofficial checkpoints (179), in public spaces (183) and at other types
of location (108). It was not possible to determine the location type for 342 incidents.17
The analysis contained in the following sections is based on three different sets of information, each of which
comprises all incidents that occurred at different types of location. The final section presents the analysis of those
incidents that occurred in underrepresented locations (“Other”) or for which it was not possible to determine the
exact type of location (“No information”).
2. Incidents taking place against, inside or within the
perimeter of health-care facilities
2.1.Aggregated information
The analysis in this section refers to the total number of incidents (1,222) against, inside or within the perimeter
of health-care facilities, including hospitals, health-care centres, clinics, first-aid posts, pharmacies and any other
facilities involved in the delivery of health care. Of the total number of health-care facilities affected, at least 1,121
were open at the time of the incident.
The analysis of perpetrators found that State armed forces and armed non-State actors were responsible for most
of the incidents documented (839). Law enforcement bodies perpetrated 65 of the incidents collected, while
individuals were responsible for 106 incidents, mostly against people. Responsibility for 55 of the incidents was
shared between two or more perpetrators. The analysis has shown that of the 55 incidents caused by several
perpetrators, at least 46 incidents occurred during active clashes and 37 of them were deemed incidental, meaning
that they were caused by a lack of adequate planning to avoid, or at least minimize, harm of this kind.
For example, the report of an incident stated that a clinic was hit by small arms fire during crossfire
between an armed group and a passing convoy of military security forces.
Overall, the ICRC documented at least 120 incidents against, inside or within the perimeter of health-care facilities
that were described as occurring during clashes, of which at least 68 were considered of an incidental nature18
and
30 involved misuse of facilities.
2.2.Perpetration of violence
Types of violence and their effects on people
In the documented incidents against, inside or within the perimeter of health-care facilities, the overall number of
people affected was at least 2,19519
in 2,400 acts or threats of violence.20
Unsurprisingly, the people most affected
were patients (1,069),21
followed by health-care personnel (760) and relatives of patients and other bystanders
(279). At least 892 people22
were subjected to violence in incidents involving the use of explosives and/or bombing
operations inside or against health-care facilities. Figure 5 shows the distribution of types of violence by category
of people.
17
As stated in footnote 5 above, while the type of location might not be recorded, the geographical location (town, department,
region, etc.) must be known for an incident to be included in the collection.
18
These incidents include indirect attacks as well as incidents in which the facilities were at risk of being attacked because
active fighting or because a military objective was located nearby.
19
See footnote 13.
20
See footnote 14.
21
Different numbers of people in the various categories are, of course, present at a health-care facility: there are likely to be
patients than health-care personnel. Therefore, this is not an indication that patients were targeted more than other categories.
22
See footnote 13.
- 9 -

Figure 5. Types of violence affecting people by category
Killed
Wounded
and/or
beaten
Threat-
ened
Coerced Robbed
Deprived
of their
liberty
Passage
denied
and/or
delayed
Sexual
violence
Other
types of
violence**
Patients 678 204 45 0 29 67 69 2 20
Bystanders
and
relatives
96 151 5 0 0 7 3 1 19
Health-
care
personnel
87 202 303 121 47 58 25 5 61
Drivers 2 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0
Others* 16 47 9 2 1 10 0 1 4
Total 879 604 362 123 77 143 99 9 104
* Others: Aid workers not directly involved in the provision of health care, relatives of health-care personnel, security
guards at health-care facilities, administrative and maintenance staff.
** Other types of violence: Torture, forced disappearance, general harassment.
Patients were mostly killed (678) and wounded and/or beaten (204) together with their relatives and other
bystanders (151). Patients were also deprived of their liberty (67), which means that they were arrested or abducted
inside the health-care facility while undergoing medical treatment. Armed non-State actors and State armed forces
were mostly responsible for such incidents, and especially for the arrest of wounded fighters from the opposition.
For example, one incident report stated that an air-strike on a hospital caused the destruction of part of
the building, including the paediatric and premature babies section. At least five babies and three
accompanying mothers were among those killed. In another incident, it was reported that a police agent
arrested a patient who was receiving treatment in the emergency department.
Health-care personnel were especially affected by threats (303 people) and by coercion to act against ethical
principles in health care23
and/or to provide free medical treatment (121). Many of them were also wounded and/or
beaten (202).
For example, a doctor working in a hospital was intimidated by death threats made by an armed group
which demanded that two patients from another armed group be handed over and that injured combatants
of that group be denied health care.
Individuals were responsible for 64 of the threats and for 45 of the acts of wounding/beating. As previously
explained, this was mostly attributable to violent reactions to the death of a relative, the nature of the treatment
and dissatisfaction with having to wait one’s turn for treatment.
For example, an incident report stated that the head of the orthopaedic department at a hospital was
beaten and threatened verbally by members of a patient’s family, who claimed that the doctor had treated
their relative improperly.
Of the total threats in each perpetrator category, threats by individuals and armed non-State actors against people
inside health-care facilities were directed almost exclusively against health-care personnel (94% of threats by
individuals and 87% of threats by armed non-State actors).
23
Health-care ethics is the branch of ethics that deals with moral issues in the practice of health care. Principles for ethical
decision-making in health-care practice include impartiality; confidentiality; respect for the dignity of the patient; acting in the
patient’s best interests; avoiding inflicting harm on patients; fair treatment of individuals and groups.
- 10 -

Attacks against or inside health-care facilities24
Among the 1,222 incidents against, inside or within the perimeter of health-care facilities, 403 facilities were fired
at, bombed and/or burnt. 108 of these attacks were deemed incidental.
For example, a mortar hit a health-care facility located in the vicinity of public administration offices
that were subjected to targeting.
In addition, 87 facilities were subject to other types of attacks, including the use of gas inside health-care facilities,
acts of vandalism, raiding and unspecified types of attacks, while 55 received a direct or indirect threat of attack.25
At least 254 incidents involved the use of explosives and/or bombing operations against or within the perimeter of
health-care facilities. State armed forces accounted for 144 incidents involving the use of explosives and/or
bombing operations. Overall, the ICRC documented 200 attacks carried out by State armed forces (the distribution
percentage per country varies significantly).
24
A facility might be subject to different acts or threats of violence, for example it might be bombed and fired at the same time,
as well as being subject to another type of violence.
25
The perpetrator threatened to attack them or acted in a manner that put the facility at severe risk of being attacked, for example
positioning a military objective next to it.
Focus 3 – Recommendations for the safety of health-care facilities
The ICRC will soon make available a publication on issues relevant to the security of health-care facilities in
contexts of armed conflict and other emergencies: Ensuring the safety of health-care facilities (2015). The
publication is the result of two experts’ workshops held in Ottawa (2013) and Pretoria (2014) and addresses
managers and administrators of health-care facilities, architects and civil engineers working on health-care
infrastructure, health-care personnel, and national and international health-care providers.
It contains recommendations of measures to enhance the preparedness and security of health-care facilities in
order to mitigate the risk of disruption to the delivery of health care. For example, it is recommended that
measures be adopted to manage access and entry to health-care facilities to avoid unwanted disruptions and
control flows into and within the health-care facility. It also suggests instituting procedures for reception and
triage to help manage the flow of entries. A third example of recommendations is for managers of health-care
facilities to ensure that environments for patients’ relatives are welcoming and cooperative.
Focus 4 – Recommendations for State armed forces: precautions during attack
The ICRC published a report on practical measures for State armed forces following the expert consultations
on military practice held in Canberra in 2014: Promoting military operational practice that ensures safe access
to and delivery of health care (2014). The report compiles a complete set of practical measures to be adopted
when planning and conducting military operations, with a view to avoiding the negative impact of such
operations on the delivery of health care in armed conflict.
The recommendations contained in the report focus particularly on delays in or denial of passage of medical
transports, affecting the ground evacuation of the sick and wounded; the negative impact of military search
operations in hospitals and other health-care facilities; harm to health-care personnel, medical transports and
facilities or their patients caused by deploying military objectives inside or in close vicinity to health-care
facilities, or when attacking enemy military objectives located within or in close vicinity to health-care
facilities.
With regard to precautions during attacks, the recommendations are that specific measures be adopted in the
event of an attack on a military objective in the vicinity of a health-care facility or a health-care facility that has
lost its protection, in particular to guarantee the exceptional character of such an attack, to enhance
understanding of the operational environment, to coordinate with health-care professionals and relevant
authorities providing health-care assistance for the wounded and sick in order to minimize the impact of attacks
and to guide the planning and conduct of such an attack.
- 11 -

Armed entry
Armed entry affected 522
health-care facilities.
Disruptive armed entry is
defined as any incursion of
an armed actor into a health-
care facility that disrupts the
functioning of the facility
and/or prevents delivery of
or access to health care.
Such acts are often
accompanied by violence
against health-care
personnel, pillaging and
damage to the facility. Four
types of armed entry could
be identified depending on
their purpose and
consequences.26
Figure 6
shows that the most
disruptive types of armed
entry were break-in and
forceful entries (229), which
usually accompanied acts of
looting (168).
For example, one incident report stated that unknown armed men threw grenades into a hospital’s
compound, made their way inside shooting indiscriminately and, once inside, prohibited the medical staff
from providing health care and looted medical equipment.
Severe disruption was also caused by entry into facilities with the purpose of subjecting people to violence and/or
threats, including the arrest of patients, health-care personnel or other people inside the facility (244). 30 incidents
involving disruption to services caused by search operations were also recorded, 27 of whom were carried out by
State armed and security forces (State armed forces and law enforcement).
It was reported that in one incident, for example, large numbers of armed military security forces entered
a hospital and arrested a wanted person who was receiving care at that health-care facility. Allegedly,
the arrested patient received no further health care.
26
These types are not mutually exclusive; for example, a facility could be entered by use of force with the purpose of
perpetrating violence against a patient inside.
Focus 5 – Recommendations for State armed forces: search operations
The report Promoting military operational practice that ensures safe access to and delivery of health care
(2014) also contains recommendations with regard to search operations by State armed forces (see Focus 4).
The recommendations include, in particular, adopting measures to guarantee the exceptional nature of searches
of health-care facilities and the removal of patients. When an operation is carried out, coordination with health-
care providers should be ensured and measures undertaken to regulate the behaviour of military personnel
during search operations.
Figure 6. Forms of armed entry into health-care facilities
* Simple: The facility was entered by one or more armed actors and, although violence
was not used, health services were disrupted.
** Break-in and use of force: The facility was entered against the will of the health-
care provider by breaking through the entrance or by using violence.
*** Violence/threat against people: The facility was entered by one or more armed
actors with the main purpose of subjecting people to violence.
**** Search operation: Armed entry into a health-care facility for purposes such as
arresting a criminal suspect, conducting an interrogation, looking for members of the
opposition and so on.
***** Massive armed entry: The facility was entered by a large number of armed
actors who disrupted the health service (regardless of whether violence was used or
not); search operations are excluded.
84
229
244
30 27
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Simple* Break-in and use
of force**
Violence/threat
on people***
Search
operation****
Massive*****
- 12 -

Health-care facilities taken over
Takeover and misuse of health-care facilities27
disrupt health-care services and discourage patients from seeking
care at such facilities if they are still functional. It can also result in the facility losing its protection, putting it at
risk of being attacked. The ICRC documented 222 incidents in which a health-care facility was taken over in
different ways.28
In 16 incidents the perpetrators took the health service over but maintained its exclusive medical
function, while in 114 incidents it was forcibly used, for example, to obtain free treatment or for parties to the
conflict to treat their own wounded.
The report of an incident stated, for example, that after a security incident, because there was no military
hospital in the area, armed military forces entered the civilian hospital, insisted that their injured be
given immediate treatment and threatened staff to force them to disregard triage procedures.29
Furthermore, several forms of misuse
were documented (Figure 7). In 60
incidents, the health-care facility was
occupied and military control was
established, causing obstructions to the
delivery of health care and to access by
patients to the facilities. In 41 incidents
the perpetrators were State armed
forces. In 24 incidents, facilities were
also used by one party to the fighting as
shelter from the other party’s attack (in
17 incidents the context was identified
as one of active fighting). In 39
incidents, the facilities were used to
install weapons and/or to launch
attacks.
For example, it was reported that a health-care centre was occupied by security forces for several days;
during that period, patients had no access to medical treatment.
Looting of health-care facilities
One of the most common types of violence against health-care facilities is looting and pillage of medical supplies
and equipment. Overall, 219 facilities were looted, of which 111 by armed non-State actors.
Other types of violence and other incidents inside health-care facilities
Other forms of violence documented are the hampering of access to health-care facilities by beneficiaries and/or
health-care personnel (39), in some cases also on a discriminatory basis (impeding, for example, access by
members of a specific origin or ethnicity). In 75 incidents, the incident involved violence against people inside the
health-care facility, without amounting to disruptive armed entry or a takeover. These incidents were caused by
individuals (37), most of whom were relatives of patients and/or angry patients (30).
27
Misuse of health-care facilities includes any use for purposes other than the exclusive function of providing health care, i.e.
prevention, diagnosis, treatment or control of diseases, injuries or disabilities and measures to safeguard the health of mothers
and young children. Takeover of a health-care facility occurs when an armed actor establishes control – often by means of force
– over a facility that was previously under the control by another actor. This may occur for the purpose of taking over the
running of its health-care function while maintaining that function or for military purposes, such as for using it as a base for
launching weapons, for storing weapons, or for establishing a military command and control centre. If it is taken over for
military purposes, this takeover would transform a health-care facility into an object serving other purposes than those
exclusively associated with health care.
28
The different forms of takeover are not mutually exclusive; for example, a facility could be occupied and health-care
providers forced to deliver treatment.
29
Triage is the procedure applied at health-care facilities to prioritize health care on the basis of patients’ medical needs.
Figure 7. Forms of misuse of health-care facilities
*Other forms of misuse: Camping in the facility for a limited of time,
guarding the facility in order to conduct interrogations and identify the
opposition, keeping hostages and exercising ill-treatment, stocking drugs.
60
24 23
16 16
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Occupation
and/or
military basis
established
Used for
shelter
Installation of
weapons
Launch of
attacks
Others forms
of misuse*
- 13 -

Damage to health-care facilities and loss of resources
The primary consequences of violence against, inside or within the perimeter of health-care facilities is damage to
infrastructure and the loss of medical supplies, equipment, information, financial revenues and basic utilities
required for the facilities to function properly, such as water and electricity. 375 facilities were damaged as a direct
consequence of violence. In 71 incidents, the entire facility was destroyed. The damage was estimated to be partial
in 97 incidents and superficial in 104. In 103 incidents, it was not possible to determine its extent. Full and partial
damage was a consequence of direct attacks in 121 incidents causing damage.
For example, an incident report stated that a field hospital was raided and burnt down; as a consequence,
the hospital was completely destroyed.
Moreover, 310 facilities experienced a loss of material resources, such as medical supplies, equipment,
information, financial revenue and/or basic utilities, 218 of them because of looting. Overall, for 133 facilities the
loss of resources was considered to be a decisive obstacle to the provision of health care and 46 were described as
not functional at all after looting.
2.3.Impact on health delivery and access
In 109 reports, the sources referred to a change in security measures following the incident, meaning that measures
were taken by the health-care provider or local authorities to avoid more violence of the same type at the health-
care facility affected. As a consequence of the incidents, patients were evacuated, staff relocated or dismissed and
movement outside the facility was restricted. In 65 of the 109 incidents the security measure applied consisted of
the suspension of the health-care service.
For example, due to a
security incident in front of a
hospital, the health service
was suspended for three
days.
However, preventive
suspension for security
reasons was not the only
reason why services in
health-care facilities were
suspended. Overall, the
sources mentioned that for
280 facilities the service had
to be suspended, the majority
of them due to the damage
suffered (127); services were suspended permanently at 97 of the 127 damaged facilities. In at least 73 incidents,
the facility was closed due to damage for more than one week. In other incidents, services were interrupted because
of the absence of staff, who fled or went on strike, because closure was forced by an external actor (23) or due to
misuse of the facility (15). Services were preventively suspended (voluntary suspension) as a consequence of 61
incidents, although the suspension lasted less than a week for at least 34 of them.
Focus 6 – Recommendations on the domestic normative framework
The ICRC published the report of the legal experts’ workshop held in Brussels in 2014: Domestic normative
frameworks for the protection of health care (2015). The objective of the workshop was to identify practical
domestic measures and procedures, in particular legislative and regulatory ones, that could be established by
State authorities in order to implement the existing international framework for protection of the provision and
access to health care in armed conflict and other emergencies. The recommendations presented in the report
revolve around three main types of measures: legislative measures for the implementation of the existing
international legal framework; dissemination and training; and coordination between the stakeholders
concerned. Recommendations also include specific measures to effectively repress and sanction all forms of
violence against health care. It is important that State authorities identify which of the recommendations are
relevant in their own contexts and choose appropriate means to implement them.
Figure 8. Suspension of health-care services or programmes by cause and
extent of the suspension
97
12
31
19
51
11
25
3
9
2
10
1
5
0 2 2 0 0
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Due to
damage
Due to misuse Due to no
staff
Forced Voluntary Unclear
Fully Partly No information
- 14 -

3. Incidents taking place on the way to and from the health-
care facility, at checkpoints and in public spaces
The analysis presented in this section refers to the total number of incidents collected that took place on the way
to and from health-care facilities (364), at checkpoints (179) and in public spaces (183), meaning any space in a
town, village or rural area to which people from the community have access to and go for purposes other than
health care, such as a market, a neighbourhood, etc.; this includes public and private offices used for professional
activities other than delivering health care.
As an example of incidents perpetrated in a public space, one incident recorded involved the misuse of a
clearly marked ambulance for the purpose of an arrest operation during a raid in an urban
neighbourhood.
The ICRC collected data on 173 incidents allegedly perpetrated by armed non-State actors and 130 incidents
attributable to individuals, of which 106 and 98 respectively occurred on the way to and from the health-care
facility. State armed forces were deemed responsible for 252 incidents and law enforcement for 66, of which 120
and 29 respectively took place at checkpoints. This is probably linked to the relative ease of collecting data on
incidents involving official checkpoints staffed by State armed and security forces (State armed forces and law
enforcement bodies) in comparison to unofficial checkpoints staffed by other actors. 106 incidents occurred during
demonstrations and protests, mostly on the way to or from the health-care facility (82); individuals were the alleged
perpetrators in 90 incidents occurring during demonstrations, blocking access to health services in transit or
expressing violent reaction against them.
For example, an incident report stated that a policeman injured during demonstrations was on board an
ambulance on its way to the hospital when protesters attacked the ambulance with the intention of
removing the policeman. The ambulance was partly damaged.
The analysis also reveals that explosives and/or bombing operations were used in at least 68 incidents and that in
22 incidents the incident was a follow-up attack.30
In another report it was stated, for example, that two bombs exploded in a busy market. The second bomb
exploded as first responders were rushing to the site to help the victims of the first explosion.
Types of violence and their effects on people
1,426 victims were registered in incidents taking place on the way to and from health-care facilities, at checkpoints
and in public spaces. Of the victims, 580 were health-care personnel, 177 were drivers31
and 503 were patients.
Overall, people were subjected to 1,620 acts or threats of violence. Their distribution by type and by category of
people affected can be observed in the table below (Figure 9).
30
See footnote 3.
31
At checkpoints, drivers are not counted as victims when they have a patient on board; the primary target of the violence of
denying/delaying passage is considered to the patient.
- 15 -

Figure 9. Types of violence on the way to and/or from the health-care facility, at checkpoints and in public spaces
Killed
Wounded
and/or
beaten
Threat-
ened
Coerced Robbed
Deprived
of their
liberty
Passage
denied
and/or
delayed
Sexual
violence
Other
types of
violence**
Patients 74 138 21 0 0 28 291 0 14
Bystanders
and
relatives
15 15 2 0 0 9 18 0 1
Health-
care
personnel
53 130 109 16 57 104 179 2 12
Drivers 18 38 24 6 5 34 81 3 8
Others* 11 12 3 3 0 80 5 1 0
Total 171 333 159 25 62 255 574 6 35
Health-care personnel and drivers were mostly denied or delayed passage (260) and were often wounded and/or
beaten (168) or threatened (133). 138 were also deprived of their liberty and 62 robbed.
Similarly, patients were often denied passage or their access to health-care services delayed (291); they were
sometimes killed (74) or wounded and/or beaten as well (138).
In one incident, for example, two paramedics from the National Society and one patient were denied
passage while on their way to the hospital for medical treatment.
For 130 people, passage was denied or delayed by individuals. This was generally linked to situations of protest
or demonstration in which community members did not allow health-care personnel and patients to pass through
quickly (120 of 130 people affected during demonstrations). Overall, the analysis shows that 130 people of 574
who were denied passage were subject to this type of violence in the context of demonstrations.
For example, in one of the incidents recorded, an ambulance was stopped by protesters at an informal
checkpoint during a demonstration; the officials at the checkpoint did not authorize the passage of the
ambulance and forced it to turn back, threatening to remove the patient from the ambulance.
At checkpoints, 377 people were affected. Of these, 293 were subjected to denial or delay of access.
For example, one incident report stated that the passage of an ambulance transporting a three-year-old
child and a relative was delayed for one hour because of lack of coordination at the checkpoint.
Focus 7 – Recommendations for State armed forces: safe passage at checkpoints
The ICRC report Promoting military operational practice that ensures safe access to and delivery of health
care (2014) also contains recommendations for checkpoint management by State armed forces. For example,
it recommends striking a balance between security requirements and the necessity for patients to access health-
care facilities as quickly as possible. To that end, measures to regulate checkpoints need to be pre-defined and
training on them provided.
- 16 -

Violence against medical transports
543 medical transports, 426 of
which were ambulances, were
affected by violence while
travelling to or from health-care
facilities, at checkpoints or in
public spaces. Figure 10 shows the
types of violence affecting medical
transports. 195 medical transports
were attacked, while 296 were
affected by denial or delay of
passage. 136 were denied or
delayed access at checkpoints.
Overall, 112 transports were
affected by passage being
obstructed during demonstrations;
individuals were responsible for 94
of those incidents.
Damage to transports
Violence caused damage to 130 medical transports, 103 of which were ambulances.
4. Incidents taking place in other or unidentified location
types
The final section of this report analyses 450 documented incidents that occurred in types of locations other than
those analysed above or for which it was not possible to identify the type of location. It is important to note that
66 of these incidents took place through means of communication32
(mostly for threatening purposes) and for 342
of them information about the type of location at which they took place was not specified by the sources.
For example, in one documented incident it was reported that the health-care provider received a
telephone call from an armed group requesting the names of the wounded who had been treated. In
another incident, it was stated that a health-care provider received a telephone call threatening to bomb
the hospital.
The distribution of incidents by perpetrator category shows that 189 of the incidents were carried out by armed
non-State actors and 90 incidents were perpetrated by State armed forces. A link can be made here between
32
“Means of communication” includes telephone calls, letters, messages and so on.
Focus 8 – Recommendations for ambulance services in risk situations
Within the framework of the HCiD project, a report on ambulance service was also published: Ambulance and
pre-hospital services in risk situations (2013). It serves as a practical tool, articulating a range of
recommendations aimed at making the delivery of health care services and access to them safe. The
recommendations focus on three areas: legal initiatives; coordination with stakeholders including State armed
forces; and best practices for ambulance and pre-hospital services. With respect to the recommendations on
best practices, implementing the Safer Access Framework is of specific relevance for National Societies. This
framework is a tool for National Societies and identifies a series of measures and actions that they can take to
improve the security of and access to those in need.
Figure 10. Types of violence against medical transports from/to health
care facilities, at checkpoints or in public spaces
41
35
22
296
3
195
0 100 200 300 400
Taken over
Stolen
Robbed
Access denied/delayed
Threatened
Attacked
- 17 -

incidents perpetrated by armed non-State actors and for which no information on the type of location was available.
Indeed, it may be more difficult to determine where armed non-State actors operate.
Types and effects of violence on people
Overall, 654 people were affected by violence in 750 acts or threats of violence in other or unidentified location
types. 539 of the people affected were health-care personnel and 61 were patients.
Figure 11. Types of violence in public spaces affecting people by category
Killed
Wounded
and/or
beaten
Threat-
ened
Coerced Robbed
Deprived
of their
liberty
Passage
denied
and/or
delayed
Sexual
violence
Other
types of
violence**
Patients 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bystanders
and
relatives
5 4 9 5 1 8 5 0 1
Health-
care
personnel
47 79 284 32 8 128 13 2 16
Drivers 4 3 6 0 2 11 2 0 0
Others* 19 3 5 0 0 7 38 0 0
Total 77 90 304 37 11 154 58 2 17
Figure 11 gives an idea of the types of violence suffered by health-care personnel, including killing, wounding
and/or beating. In particular, 284 were subjected to threats and 154 were deprived of their liberty.
Armed non-State actors were allegedly responsible for threatening 150 of 284 health-care professionals and for
the abduction of 65 health-care personnel. 32 health-care personnel were allegedly coerced to act in a manner
contrary to health-care ethics, to provide free treatment or to deliver health care in unsafe settings. The findings
reveal that armed non-State actors coerced 24 of 32 health-care personnel.
For example, one incident report stated that an armed group forced a member of the health-care
personnel to leave the health-care centre and go with them to an unidentified location type; the group
forced the staff member to provide health care for their own wounded and sick without adequate medical
equipment.
Focus 9 – Practices and relevant law concerning non-State armed groups
The most recent thematic publication in the HCiD project pertains to armed groups: Safeguarding the
provision of health care – Operational practices and relevant international humanitarian law concerning
non-state armed groups (2015). It is based on consultations carried out with 36 armed groups in 10 contexts.
The report examines armed groups’ understanding of access to health care, presents armed groups’ legal
obligations and provides practical measures that can be adopted by armed groups to improve the safety and
delivery of impartial and efficient health care. In particular, the report tackles the issues of respect for and
protection of health-care personnel, respect for health-care facilities and respect for the wounded and sick
and medical transports.
- 18 -

Violence against medical transports
The findings about violence
against medical transports in other
or unidentified location types
(Figure 16) show that overall, 108
medical transports were affected,
of which 87 were ambulances. 49
medical transports were attacked,
34 of which by State armed forces.
Other medical transports were
subject to obstructions (12) or
takeover (22) or were stolen (20).
Figure 12. Types of violence against medical transports in other or
unidentified location types
49
2
12
7
20
22
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Attacked
Threatened
Access denied/delayed
Robbed
Stolen
Taken over
- 19 -

D. CONCLUSIONS
As demonstrated in the previous reports, the findings in this report confirm that violence against health care is a
serious humanitarian concern with devastating short and long-term consequences:
• Patients are killed, wounded, beaten and arrested;
• Health-care personnel are threatened, physically assaulted and subjected to arrest – they are also
subjected to coercion and forced treatment;
• Incidents against health care most often take place against, inside or within the perimeter of health-
care facilities and these facilities are often subject to attack, armed entry, takeover or looting;
• Obstructions and attacks against medical transports take place on the way to and from a health-care
facility, at checkpoints and in public spaces.
In particular, this third report shows that the types and effects of violence change according to the location at which
it is perpetrated. Regarding health-care facilities, State armed forces were especially responsible for attacks and
takeover, while many acts of break-in and looting were attributed to armed non-State actors. On the way to and
from health-care facilities, at checkpoints and in public spaces, obstructions played a decisive role in delaying
access for patients and health-care personnel. Ambulances were also subject to attacks; among these, follow-up
attacks were also documented. In other or unidentified location types, health-care personnel were threatened by
telephone or were kidnapped and forced to provide health care at unidentified location types.
The analysis also drew particular attention to the fact that a link can often be made between active fighting and
incidental damage. This is particularly the case with regard to incidents against, inside or within the perimeter of
health-care facilities where damage is often due to a lack of adequate planning to avoid, or at least minimize, such
damage by the parties to the clashes.
Furthermore, the analysis pointed out the issue of violence perpetrated by individuals, who mainly addressed their
violence against health-care personnel through threats and beatings in connection with complaints relating to the
nature of the treatment received. A lack of efficient service can be the result of the violence to which the health-
care facility and personnel were subjected. Moreover, individuals were also responsible for the obstruction of
ambulances on the road and in public spaces, often during demonstrations. Several reasons were given for this,
such as lack of coordination for safe transit of ambulances or lack of understanding of the issue by the community
itself.
These findings are helpful when seeking to tackle the problem. The issues identified can promote the
implementation of relevant measures. However, such findings can only raise awareness about the main patterns of
violence and be used to identify general issues. Policy-makers, NGOs, humanitarian agencies and other
stakeholders willing to act at the national level are encouraged to undertake a more comprehensive and context
specific analysis, including an analysis of the root causes of violence against health-care providers, if they are to
be fully able to address the problem. It is hoped that the results presented in this report can contribute to that
endeavour.
Local stakeholders, including State authorities, might wish to undertake further data collection in their country in
order to observe the dynamics of violence against health care in their own context and to tackle the issue. This
could result in setting up a national system for collecting data on the occurrence of violence against health-care
personnel, health-care facilities and medical transports as well as against patients, which includes all types of
interference with the provision of health care.
- 20 -

MISSION
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is an
impartial, neutral and independent organization whose exclusively
humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims
of armed conflict and other situations of violence and to provide
them with assistance. The ICRC also endeavours to prevent
suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian law and
universal humanitarian principles. Established in 1863, the ICRC
is at the origin of the Geneva Conventions and the International
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. It directs and coordinates
the international activities conducted by the Movement in armed
conflicts and other situations of violence.

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