acquisition, Technology, Innovation and Great Power Competition,TIGPC, Gordian knot Center, DIME-FIL, INDOPACOM, department of defense, dod, hacking for defense, intlpol 340, joe felter, ms&e296, raj shah, stanford, Steve blank, China, stanford
1. Distributed Maritime Logistics in a Contested Environment:
A Case Study on EABO
All information contained herein is unclassified
2. The Project Agrippa Team
Project Sponsor
Dr. Jason Stack
Professor
Steve Blank
Professor
Dr. Joe Felter,
DASD South and
Southeast Asia
(Fmr.)
David Hoyt
Education
- JDStanford Law‘20
- MBAStanford GSB‘20
- BAInternational Relations ‘13,
Stanford
Work Experience
- Venture Capital Investing
- Technology &Start-ups
- Law
- Consulting
- Automotive Industry
dhoyt@stanford.edu
Jonathan Deemer
Education
- JDStanford Law‘23
- MAInternational Policy ‘23
- BAInternational Relations, Union
College, NE
- BS Business Administration,
Union College, NE
Work Experience
- DIU-funded cUAS start-up
- Think tanks (Hoover, AEI,
Hudson)
jdeemer@stanford.edu
Jack Carney
Education
- BAEconomics ‘21, Stanford
Work Experience
- Management Consulting
- AviationConsulting
- FintechStart-up
jcarney@stanford.edu
William Healzer
Education
- BAHPolitical Science and
History ‘22, Stanford
Work Experience
- Defense Technology
- Think tanks (CSIS, IST, Hoover
Institution)
whealzer@stanford.edu
Kyle Duchynski
Education
- MS Management Science &
Engineering ‘22, Stanford
- BAEconomics and International
Security Studies ‘21, Stanford
Work Experience
- OSD-Policy
- Private Equity
- House of Representatives
(Rep.
ColleenHanabusa)
kyleduke@stanford.edu
3. Project Agrippa’s Origin Story
Stanford’s Technology, Innovation, and
Modern War Fall ‘20 emphasized
competition isn’t just technology—it is how
you employ it
Our group sought to pioneer a novel
Hacking for Strategy course model
(forthcoming), using the Lean methodology
for future Concepts of Operations
8 weeks later U.S. Pacific Fleet requested we redact portions of our brief
This is Project Agrippa’s story
4. The United States Navy needs new operational concepts
to incorporate emerging technologies in order to
successfully compete and deter aggression in the Indo-
Pacific.
Original Sponsor (ONR) Problem Statement
5. Agrippa’s Starting Point
Decent foundation on China
Working understanding of
SE Asia
No naval know-how
No knowledge of how the
DoD functions
Political Scientists’
understanding of tech
Novel problem set & unclear problem
statement but a lot of gumption
6. Our Journey Over the Last 15 Weeks
Link to Appendixes
Conducted 350+ Interviews & Outbriefs Reviewed 20+ reports Read 50+ books
“The process you used is more important than the product” - ADM Scott Swift [during an Agrippa interview]
Process 1: Problem & Customer Discovery
Process 3: Deployment Strategy
Process 2: Solution Iteration
10 weeks of H4D Lean Methodology 10 weeks of Post-Course Work
7. In order to retain credible conventional deterrence
against the PRC in the Indo-Pacific, U.S. joint forces
must develop, acquire, and employ a distributed,
survivable force to impose increased costs for the PRC.
This strategy depends on distributed, discrete, low-
cost logistics systems that can survive within the WEZ.
Project Agrippa Problem Statement
8. Project Agrippa’s Starting Point—the library
Original Hypothesis to test: Exquisite, legacy U.S. maritime platforms cannot survive
within the weapons engagement zone (“WEZ”), eroding conventional U.S. deterrence
WEEK 1 MVP: Is Naval warfare is going undersea?
1
“Whenever you face a new problem, it is time to crack open an old book” - Submarine Captain
The team read over 50 books to understand the problem
9. Interview Strategy
Interview Introductions
At the end of each
interview, the team
would ask the
interviewee for 2-3 new
contacts and built the
flywheel for more
interviews
Teaching Team / Mentors
The teaching team and
our mentors gave
Agrippa its initial set of
interview
introductions.
Read A Book,
Email the Author
The team read multiple
books and think tank
reports, and then cold
emailed the authors to
talk about their
research.
11. Understanding the PRC Challenge in the Indo-Pacific
A2/AD Research Sprint
Created open-source satellite
imagery maps of A2/AD ecosystem
WEEK 2 MVP takeaway: A2/AD threat is real and credible
2
12. U.S. Grand Strategy: A free and open maritime trade environment in the Indo-Pacific supports both global &
U.S. economies and creates prosperity. This strategy follows Mahanian logic and benefits regional powers.
U.S. Strategy: U.S. Grand Strategy is underpinned by U.S. regional power projection as regional peace is not
self-sustaining. Thus, the United States must actively maintain credible conventional deterrence and/or seek
partners to share the burden of policing the region. Currently, U.S. power projection is based on large,
exquisite, expensive legacy platforms.
PRC Challenge: The PRC is a revisionist power and seeks to exert regional influence and revise both the
regional and international orders for its benefit. These ambitions run counter to both U.S. interests and the
interests of other regional actors.
Bottom Line: U.S. Strategy towards the PRC can be summarized as “Not today, Xi”
U.S. Regional Strategic Interests
13. The PRC has and continues to invest in asymmetric capabilities and platforms matched specifically to erode U.S. capabilities.
The bundle of PRC capabilities is referred to as Anti-Access / Area Denial or A2/AD
1. A2/AD fuses the concepts of “Sea Denial,” the “Fortress Fleet,”and Maoist “Active Defense” with 21st century
technology to combine land-to-surface, surface-to-surface, subsea-to-surface, air-to-surface with cyber, anti-sat, and
EW.
2. The strategy’s core is long-range anti-ship ballistic missiles that outrange U.S. conventional kinetic power projection.
3. A2/AD is both a conventional threat and a psychological competition; the PRC seeks to frame the A2/AD discussion as a
fait accompli of inevitable PRC achievement of its desired outcomes in order to erode U.S. resolve to deter.
Defining the A2/AD Problem
14. ● A2/AD fuses “Sea
Denial,” the “Fortress
Fleet,”and Maoist
“Active Defense” with
asymmetric
capabilities
● A2/AD is both a
conventional threat
and a psychological
competition
Open Source A2/AD Map
15. Vietnam:
The Four No’s strategic
defense policy is not
conducive to U.S. basing
Philippines:
Cooperation is increasingly
uncertain under Duterte, but
the PHL Navy remains
committed
Japan:
Japan is one of the United
States’ strongest regional
allies
Regional Partner
Assumptions
Countries operate on
continuum of
cooperation
Basing may differ
based on lethality of
U.S. mission
ROK:
Unless threatened,
unlikely to support U.S.
basing as Seoul becomes
increasingly caught in a
bind by the PRC.
Australia:
Australia is one of the
United States’ strongest
regional allies
Indonesia and
Malaysia:
Sovereignty concerns yield
hedging strategy that
balances the United States
and the PRC
Singapore:
Singapore has historically
supported logistics basing
?
Taiwan:
Potentially committed to U.S.
basing if greater threatened and
feasible.
?
16. Project Agrippa Selects the Marine Corps’ Expeditionary
Advanced Base Operations (EABO) Concept for Further Study
EABO Counters A2/AD
EABO provides U.S. maritime forces with a
distributed and survivable force able to
impose costs on the PRC within the A2/AD
threat environment
Agrippa crafts its own EABO implementation
map
Agrippa followed Gen.
Berger’s EABO remarks
3
REDACTED
18. Sustainment is an unsolved pain point
III MEF
(Marine Expeditionary Force stationed in Okinawa)
19. Project Agrippa rapidly pivoted to focus on EABO
logistics
Logistics is the Achilles Heel for America in the Indo-Pacific
3
20. Team morale plummeted as the scope
of logistical problems increased
But our resolve hardened
21. Distributed lethality meets logistics
Logistics must also become decentralized, attritible, and discrete to increase
survivability of U.S. assets, impose costs on the PRC, paralyze the PRC’s OODA
loop, and ultimately decrease PRC lethality
Distributed logistics is a tactical enabler that supports strategic deterrence
25. Establishing Stakeholder Buy-in in a 350,000+ Person Org
7
INDOPACOM,
Pacific Fleet, and
Marine Forces
Pacific are key
end beneficiaries
26. Establishing Stakeholder Buy-in in a 350,000+ Person Org
7
The acquisition arm
of the Department
of the Navy is also
essential
27. To convince our stakeholders, we
chose to get out of the building
Jack Carney untangled the DoD
bureaucracy, cold calling 100+ officials
and inviting them for outbriefs
29. What did we learn “getting outside the building”?
● We knew nothing to start
● Our value lay in breaking down information barriers
○ Interviewees rarely knew about process or system beyond the limited purview of their job
(frequently due to design of the overall system)
● Often, right conversations with right stakeholders not happening
○ Agrippa as external shock to system being outside formal chain of command
● Vastly underestimated experts’ willingness to talk and engage
○ Never be afraid to ask the simple or obvious question - helps both you and interviewee
● Created networks that continue to yield value for Agrippa and each of us
personally
30. Final MVP - Brief Designed for Identified Stakeholders
[1] The A2/AD Problem [2] REDACTED [3] REDACTED
[4] REDACTED [5] REDACTED [6] REDACTED [7] Stakeholder Deployment
REDACTED REDACTED
REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED
“This is the best brief we have seen in 3 years. … Lockheed Martin, Raytheon,
Northrop Grumman come and pitch us but your presentation was better.”
U.S. Pacific Fleet
31. It is imperative America gets
competition with the PRC right.
The stakes could not be higher.
32. The Way Forward
● Project Agrippa has continued its work far beyond the
class, with further outbriefs to stakeholders in person
and virtually in Washington, D.C., MCB Quantico, San
Diego, Hawaii, and Japan.
● We continue to build stakeholder buy in and support for
our project.
● The Lean Methodology continues to be our guiding core
principles, which enables our continued success.
● We are excited to share our lessons learned with you
and your team as we continue our work!