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Research Institute
                                                     for Secure Systems



Security on cloud storage and IaaS
          at Taiwan-Japan Workshop 2012/Nov/22
         http://www.jst.go.jp/sicp/ws2012_nsc.html


                       Kuniyasu Suzaki

          Research Institute for Secure Systems (RISEC)
National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology
                               (AIST)
Overview of Security on
                                                                                              Research Institute
                  IaaS Cloud Computing                                                        for Secure Systems



                                                                           Internet
                               App1       App2        App3
                                                                        (Secure communication)
                               OS1        OS2         OS3               man in the middle attack
Formal Verification
To take high level EAL
(Evaluation Assurance                                                                  Client User
Level)                         Mem      Mem              Mem                           • ID, Password, Secret Key
                                                                                          management
                               CPU      CPU              CPU                           •Software vulnerability
Software Vulnerability
                                                                                         Security update
 ・Hypervisor                 Virtual Machine Monitor (hypervisor)
 ・Management Host OS
                                         Memory
                                         CPU
                                                                                            Vulnerable       safe
                                                                                            (un-mature)


                                                                               Security Guideline
                                                                               • CSA (Cloud Security Alliance)
                                                                               • Open Cloud Manifesto

                                                                               Auditing Standard
               Data Management                                                 • SAS70
               •Information Leak                    Auditing                   • HIPAA
               •Information Loss                    •Digital Forensic
               •Information Erasure                 •Log
My interests                         Research Institute
                                                            for Secure Systems



• Sharing technologies (virtualization technologies)
  on IaaS are good for security?
   •   Based on my papers [HotSec10], [EuroSec11], [EuroSec12]



• Information leak / erase / loss on cloud storage
   •   Funded by Strategic Information and Communications R&D Promotion
       Programme(SCOPE), Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications
       (MIC).
Sharing Technology            Research Institute
                                       for Secure Systems



• Sharing is a key technology on Cloud
  computing, because it can reduce costs. It
  offers pseudo physical devices and shares
  same parts of devices.
  • Virtual Machine
     • VMware, Xen, KVM, etc.
  • Storage deduplication
     • Dropbox, EMC products, etc.
  • Memory deduplication
Memory Deduplication                            Research Institute
                                                                for Secure Systems

• Memory deduplication is a technique to share same
  contents page.
     •   Mainly used for virtual machines.
     •   Very effective when same guest OS runs on many virtual machines.
•   Most memory deduplication are included in virtual machine
    monitors with different implementations.
     • VMware, Xen, and KVM have own memory deduplication

                                Guest Pseudo Memory
                          VM1         VM2               VM(n)




                                 Real Physical Memory
Is Memory Deduplication
                                               Research Institute
           good or bad for security?           for Secure Systems



(1) Good
  • From logical sharing to physical sharing [HotSec10]
(2) Bad
  • Cross-VM Side Channel Attack [EuroSec11]
     • Cause Information leak
(3) Good or Bad
  • Affects to current security functions (Address
    Space Layout Randomization, Memory
    Sanitization, Page Cache Flushing) [EuroSec11]
(1) Logical Sharing              Research Institute
                                               for Secure Systems



• Current OSes use logical sharing technique to
  reduce consumption of memory.
   • “Dynamic-Link Shared Library”
• Unfortunately, it includes vulnerabilities caused
  by dynamic management.
   •   Search Path Replacement Attack
   •   GOT (Global Offset Table) overwrite attack
   •   Dependency Hell
   •   Etc.
(1) Solution, and further
                                                     Research Institute
                    problem                          for Secure Systems



• These vulnerabilities are solved by static-link in
  general, but it increase consumption of memory.
   • Fortunately, the increased consumption is mitigated by
     memory deduplication on IaaS.
   • It looks easy to solve the problem, but …
• Current applications assume dynamic-link and
  are not re-compiled as static-link easily.
   • Dynamic-link is used for avoiding license contamination
     problems. The programs includes “dlopen()” to call
     dynamic link explicitly.
(1) From Logical sharing
                                             Research Institute
            to physical sharing              for Secure Systems



• Instead of static link, we proposed to use
  “self-contained binary translator” which
  integrates shared libraries into an ELF
  binary file. [HotSec’10]
   • The ELF binaries become fatter than static link,
     but the redundancy is shared by physical
     sharing (memory deduplication).


• OSes on a cloud can increase security.
(2) VM Side Channel Attack         Research Institute
                                         for Secure Systems



• Memory deduplication is vulnerable for side
  channel attack.
  • The vulnerable is caused by Copy-On-Write of
    memory deduplication.
  • Copy-On-Write is a common technique to
    manage shared contents, but it became a
    Covert Channel for Information Leak.
(2) Copy-On-Write (COW)                                             Research Institute
                                                                                 for Secure Systems


• When a write access is issued to a deduplicated page,
  a same contents page is created and accepts write
  access. This action is logically valid, but …
• Write access time difference between deduplicated
  and non-deduplicated pages due to copying.

   Guest Pseudo Memory                                                         Attacker can guess
       VM1          VM2          Write Access   VM1        VM2                  existence of same
       (victim)     (attacker)                  (victim)   (attacker)         contents on other VM.




    Real Physical Memory                                           Re-created page
                                                                  cases access time
                                                                      difference
(2) Attacking problem                         Research Institute
                                                              for Secure Systems


• Cross VM side channel attack looks simple, but
  there are some problems.
     ① 4KB Alignment problem
         •   Attacker must prepare exact same pages in order to
             guess victim’s contents.
     ② Self-reflection problem
         •   Caused by redundant memory management on cache
             and heap. Attacker has a false-positive result.
     ③ Run time modification problem
         •   Caused by swap-out, etc. Attacker has a false-
             negative result.
•   The attacking methods and countermeasure are mentioned in [EuroSec11].
(3) Affects of OS Security functions
                                             Research Institute
              on memory deduplication        for Secure Systems



• Modern OSes have security functions that
  modify memory contents dynamically.
  1. Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)
  2. Memory Sanitization
     •    Pages are zero-cleared. Increase deduplication.
  3. Page Cache Flushing
     •    Useful to remove redundant pages.
• These security functions are affected by
  memory deduplication.
(3) Affects on Security
                                             Research Institute
                Functions                    for Secure Systems



• ASLR looks to be independent of memory
  deduplication because the contents are not changed
  on memory. However it increased consumption of
  memory, because It made different page tables.
• Memory Sanitization and Page Cache Flushing
  increase zero-cleared pages and help memory
  deduplication. However, the costs are heavy and
  they decreased performance severely.

 The detail is written in my paper [EuroSec’12]
Summary:
                                                     Research Institute
         OS on sharing technology                    for Secure Systems



• Memory deduplication on cloud computing
  have a potential to change the structure of OS
  from the view of secuirty.
   • It will differ from OSes on devices (PC, Smartphone, etc),
     because OSes interact each other on IaaS.
• The OS on IaaS should take care of security and
  performance on the environment which shares
  resources with others.
Data management Problem
               Information Leak                              Research Institute
                                                             for Secure Systems



• Information leak does not occur on network.
   • Secure communication (ssh, SSL/TLS, etc) is established
     between client and server, and it is not easy to attack.
• Most information leaks on cloud storage occur on both
  edge machines (servers and clients)
   • On server
       • Gmail Administrator read use’s contents (2010)                 Admin

       • Dropbox had a bug to allow access with no                 Secure
         pass word (2011)                                          Comm
   • On Client
       • P2P File sharing
                                                                   Mis-config
       • (Japanese “Winny”) (2003 ~ )
                                                      User
                                           Uploader
Our proposal                                Research Institute
                                                                   for Secure Systems

• Virtual Jail Storage System (VJSS)
  • On Server:
     • Data are encrypted and cut a split tally.
     • It mean that whole content of file are not upload. Even if the all
       uploaded data are gathered, the full contents are not reconstructed.
     • Data are also coded by Reed-Solomon and uploaded on some
       servers. It works for fault tolerance.

   • On Client:
     •   Original file is reconstructed with the split
         tally.
                                                                      ×       Admin



     •   Files are under access-control. Files are


                                                                       ×
         prohibited copying, printing, and screen
         cut&paste.
                                                                         Mis-config
                                                            User
                                                 Uploader
Overview of VJSS                                                     Research Institute
                                                                                                     for Secure Systems

                 Original
                                 Sever Side


         Encryption              ×          Provider A   Provider B           Provider C     Provider D
                                                                                                   Crash
                                                                                                ×
         AONT: All or Nothing
         Transform


                      Tally
                                 Encoding
                                 Read Solomon
Split tally                      (3:4)
Small part of
encrypted file is cut            Client Side                                                      Network
and stored in a client.                                                            Printer

                                                              Decoding
                                                                                                            Cut&Paste
                                                Tally    +
                                                Decryption               NonCopy
                                                             VJSS (Jail Storage)




                                                                                                    Storage
Deploying Plan
                                                 Research Institute
                  (Against Disaster)             for Secure Systems


                                                Hokkaido
• Japan had a heavy natural disaster last       (Sapporo)
  year. The deploying plan considers
  location against disaster.
• Collaborate with Japanese providers.                Tsukuba
   • Hokkaido Telecommunication Network
       • Tokyo - Hokkaido(Sapporo) 1,000km
   • Dream Arts Okinawa
       • Tokyo - Okinawa 1,500km
• Severs for VJSS will be located at the
  southern and northern edges of Japan
  in order to prevent natural disasters.
                                      Okinawa
                   Taiwan
Information Erase
                                             Research Institute
                 (Planned)                   for Secure Systems



• Most users want to erase uploaded data
  completely, after the service is terminated.
• Unfortunately most provider cannot guarantee
  that all uploaded data are removed.
   • Even if uploaded data are encrypted, the data
     may be decrypted by brute-force attack.
• Our VJSS is a little bit advanced, because it
  keeps split tally in a client. Even if all uploaded
  data are decrypted, all contents are not
  disclosed.
Information loss
                                                                Research Institute
                      (Planned)                                 for Secure Systems



• Hosting services have to prevent data loss, but
  some incidents occurred.
   •   T-Mobile Sidekick lost user’s data (2009).
   •   Japanese provider FirstServer lost user’s data (2012).
• Most information loss incidents were caused by
  operation mistake.
• VJSS has data redundancy by Reed-Solomon error
  correction, but it is not enough.
• We propose to use append-only file system on
  Cloud Storage.
   • Most data will be shared by deduplication technology.
Conclusion                  Research Institute
                                              for Secure Systems



• Sharing technology (deduplication) on IaaS has
  a potential to change the structure of OS on it.
• Many people want to use cloud storage, but
  they are afraid of information leak/erase/loss.
   • Virtual Jail Storage System (VJSS) prevents
     information leak from a server and a client. VJSS
     plans to treat information erase and loss.

More Related Content

Security on cloud storage and IaaS (NSC: Taiwan - JST: Japan workshop)

  • 1. Research Institute for Secure Systems Security on cloud storage and IaaS at Taiwan-Japan Workshop 2012/Nov/22 http://www.jst.go.jp/sicp/ws2012_nsc.html Kuniyasu Suzaki Research Institute for Secure Systems (RISEC) National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST)
  • 2. Overview of Security on Research Institute IaaS Cloud Computing for Secure Systems Internet App1 App2 App3 (Secure communication) OS1 OS2 OS3 man in the middle attack Formal Verification To take high level EAL (Evaluation Assurance Client User Level) Mem Mem Mem • ID, Password, Secret Key management CPU CPU CPU •Software vulnerability Software Vulnerability Security update ・Hypervisor Virtual Machine Monitor (hypervisor) ・Management Host OS Memory CPU Vulnerable safe (un-mature) Security Guideline • CSA (Cloud Security Alliance) • Open Cloud Manifesto Auditing Standard Data Management • SAS70 •Information Leak Auditing • HIPAA •Information Loss •Digital Forensic •Information Erasure •Log
  • 3. My interests Research Institute for Secure Systems • Sharing technologies (virtualization technologies) on IaaS are good for security? • Based on my papers [HotSec10], [EuroSec11], [EuroSec12] • Information leak / erase / loss on cloud storage • Funded by Strategic Information and Communications R&D Promotion Programme(SCOPE), Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC).
  • 4. Sharing Technology Research Institute for Secure Systems • Sharing is a key technology on Cloud computing, because it can reduce costs. It offers pseudo physical devices and shares same parts of devices. • Virtual Machine • VMware, Xen, KVM, etc. • Storage deduplication • Dropbox, EMC products, etc. • Memory deduplication
  • 5. Memory Deduplication Research Institute for Secure Systems • Memory deduplication is a technique to share same contents page. • Mainly used for virtual machines. • Very effective when same guest OS runs on many virtual machines. • Most memory deduplication are included in virtual machine monitors with different implementations. • VMware, Xen, and KVM have own memory deduplication Guest Pseudo Memory VM1 VM2 VM(n) Real Physical Memory
  • 6. Is Memory Deduplication Research Institute good or bad for security? for Secure Systems (1) Good • From logical sharing to physical sharing [HotSec10] (2) Bad • Cross-VM Side Channel Attack [EuroSec11] • Cause Information leak (3) Good or Bad • Affects to current security functions (Address Space Layout Randomization, Memory Sanitization, Page Cache Flushing) [EuroSec11]
  • 7. (1) Logical Sharing Research Institute for Secure Systems • Current OSes use logical sharing technique to reduce consumption of memory. • “Dynamic-Link Shared Library” • Unfortunately, it includes vulnerabilities caused by dynamic management. • Search Path Replacement Attack • GOT (Global Offset Table) overwrite attack • Dependency Hell • Etc.
  • 8. (1) Solution, and further Research Institute problem for Secure Systems • These vulnerabilities are solved by static-link in general, but it increase consumption of memory. • Fortunately, the increased consumption is mitigated by memory deduplication on IaaS. • It looks easy to solve the problem, but … • Current applications assume dynamic-link and are not re-compiled as static-link easily. • Dynamic-link is used for avoiding license contamination problems. The programs includes “dlopen()” to call dynamic link explicitly.
  • 9. (1) From Logical sharing Research Institute to physical sharing for Secure Systems • Instead of static link, we proposed to use “self-contained binary translator” which integrates shared libraries into an ELF binary file. [HotSec’10] • The ELF binaries become fatter than static link, but the redundancy is shared by physical sharing (memory deduplication). • OSes on a cloud can increase security.
  • 10. (2) VM Side Channel Attack Research Institute for Secure Systems • Memory deduplication is vulnerable for side channel attack. • The vulnerable is caused by Copy-On-Write of memory deduplication. • Copy-On-Write is a common technique to manage shared contents, but it became a Covert Channel for Information Leak.
  • 11. (2) Copy-On-Write (COW) Research Institute for Secure Systems • When a write access is issued to a deduplicated page, a same contents page is created and accepts write access. This action is logically valid, but … • Write access time difference between deduplicated and non-deduplicated pages due to copying. Guest Pseudo Memory Attacker can guess VM1 VM2 Write Access VM1 VM2 existence of same (victim) (attacker) (victim) (attacker) contents on other VM. Real Physical Memory Re-created page cases access time difference
  • 12. (2) Attacking problem Research Institute for Secure Systems • Cross VM side channel attack looks simple, but there are some problems. ① 4KB Alignment problem • Attacker must prepare exact same pages in order to guess victim’s contents. ② Self-reflection problem • Caused by redundant memory management on cache and heap. Attacker has a false-positive result. ③ Run time modification problem • Caused by swap-out, etc. Attacker has a false- negative result. • The attacking methods and countermeasure are mentioned in [EuroSec11].
  • 13. (3) Affects of OS Security functions Research Institute on memory deduplication for Secure Systems • Modern OSes have security functions that modify memory contents dynamically. 1. Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) 2. Memory Sanitization • Pages are zero-cleared. Increase deduplication. 3. Page Cache Flushing • Useful to remove redundant pages. • These security functions are affected by memory deduplication.
  • 14. (3) Affects on Security Research Institute Functions for Secure Systems • ASLR looks to be independent of memory deduplication because the contents are not changed on memory. However it increased consumption of memory, because It made different page tables. • Memory Sanitization and Page Cache Flushing increase zero-cleared pages and help memory deduplication. However, the costs are heavy and they decreased performance severely. The detail is written in my paper [EuroSec’12]
  • 15. Summary: Research Institute OS on sharing technology for Secure Systems • Memory deduplication on cloud computing have a potential to change the structure of OS from the view of secuirty. • It will differ from OSes on devices (PC, Smartphone, etc), because OSes interact each other on IaaS. • The OS on IaaS should take care of security and performance on the environment which shares resources with others.
  • 16. Data management Problem Information Leak Research Institute for Secure Systems • Information leak does not occur on network. • Secure communication (ssh, SSL/TLS, etc) is established between client and server, and it is not easy to attack. • Most information leaks on cloud storage occur on both edge machines (servers and clients) • On server • Gmail Administrator read use’s contents (2010) Admin • Dropbox had a bug to allow access with no Secure pass word (2011) Comm • On Client • P2P File sharing Mis-config • (Japanese “Winny”) (2003 ~ ) User Uploader
  • 17. Our proposal Research Institute for Secure Systems • Virtual Jail Storage System (VJSS) • On Server: • Data are encrypted and cut a split tally. • It mean that whole content of file are not upload. Even if the all uploaded data are gathered, the full contents are not reconstructed. • Data are also coded by Reed-Solomon and uploaded on some servers. It works for fault tolerance. • On Client: • Original file is reconstructed with the split tally. × Admin • Files are under access-control. Files are × prohibited copying, printing, and screen cut&paste. Mis-config User Uploader
  • 18. Overview of VJSS Research Institute for Secure Systems Original Sever Side Encryption × Provider A Provider B Provider C Provider D Crash × AONT: All or Nothing Transform Tally Encoding Read Solomon Split tally (3:4) Small part of encrypted file is cut Client Side Network and stored in a client. Printer Decoding Cut&Paste Tally + Decryption NonCopy VJSS (Jail Storage) Storage
  • 19. Deploying Plan Research Institute (Against Disaster) for Secure Systems Hokkaido • Japan had a heavy natural disaster last (Sapporo) year. The deploying plan considers location against disaster. • Collaborate with Japanese providers. Tsukuba • Hokkaido Telecommunication Network • Tokyo - Hokkaido(Sapporo) 1,000km • Dream Arts Okinawa • Tokyo - Okinawa 1,500km • Severs for VJSS will be located at the southern and northern edges of Japan in order to prevent natural disasters. Okinawa Taiwan
  • 20. Information Erase Research Institute (Planned) for Secure Systems • Most users want to erase uploaded data completely, after the service is terminated. • Unfortunately most provider cannot guarantee that all uploaded data are removed. • Even if uploaded data are encrypted, the data may be decrypted by brute-force attack. • Our VJSS is a little bit advanced, because it keeps split tally in a client. Even if all uploaded data are decrypted, all contents are not disclosed.
  • 21. Information loss Research Institute (Planned) for Secure Systems • Hosting services have to prevent data loss, but some incidents occurred. • T-Mobile Sidekick lost user’s data (2009). • Japanese provider FirstServer lost user’s data (2012). • Most information loss incidents were caused by operation mistake. • VJSS has data redundancy by Reed-Solomon error correction, but it is not enough. • We propose to use append-only file system on Cloud Storage. • Most data will be shared by deduplication technology.
  • 22. Conclusion Research Institute for Secure Systems • Sharing technology (deduplication) on IaaS has a potential to change the structure of OS on it. • Many people want to use cloud storage, but they are afraid of information leak/erase/loss. • Virtual Jail Storage System (VJSS) prevents information leak from a server and a client. VJSS plans to treat information erase and loss.