Kriszta Kovács
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung - WZB, Center for Global Constitutionalism, Senior Research Fellow
Kriszta Kovács is a Senior Research Fellow at WZB Berlin Social Science Center and an Associate Professor at ELTE University Faculty of Social Sciences, Budapest. She is a former Research Fellow of the Cluster of Excellence "Contestations of the Liberal Script (SCRIPTS)", a former Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellow and a former managing editor of Global Constitutionalism (CUP). She is also a former senior adviser of the Hungarian Constitutional Court and former co-president of the Joint Council on Constitutional Justice (Venice Commission, Council of Europe). She has held fellowships at the Human Rights Institute of the Columbia Law School, New York, at the University of Trento, Italy, at the University of Birmingham, and from the UK Foreign Office, the Zeit Stiftung and the European Commission. Her primary research interests are comparative constitutional law and international human rights. She has published books and several articles on these topics in English, German, Polish, Romanian and Hungarian. Recently, she has presented papers on constitutional matters at the University of Oxford, Yale University, Princeton University, Academia Sinica Taipei, University of Hong Kong, Queens University, Sapienza University of Rome and Humboldt University.
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Papers by Kriszta Kovács
Can and should someone who lives in an “illiberal democracy” (at 16) and has been adversely affected by this regime (at 308) adopt a neutral-observer perspective to describe and analyze the constitutional order of this very regime? Should he take Mark Tushnet’s advice to avoid using evaluative or pejorative terms in his scholarly analysis? The book’s title says it all about the author’s approach.
citizenship.
Can and should someone who lives in an “illiberal democracy” (at 16) and has been adversely affected by this regime (at 308) adopt a neutral-observer perspective to describe and analyze the constitutional order of this very regime? Should he take Mark Tushnet’s advice to avoid using evaluative or pejorative terms in his scholarly analysis? The book’s title says it all about the author’s approach.
citizenship.
https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/book/the-jurisprudence-of-particularism-national-identity-claims-in-central-europe/
The chapter is in support of a third view, according to which the 2010-2011 constitutional amendments together with the Fundamental Law and its subsequent amendments mean a rupture in the constitutional history of Hungary by substantially reshaping the previously existing constitutional framework and by launching a new identity. The commitment to the rule of law, parliamentary democracy built upon the respect and protection of human rights and the social market economy was constitutive of the Hungarian regime between 1990 and 2010. The new regime is built upon the “rule by law” instead of the principle of the rule of law. Its main feature is the unity of powers instead of limited government based upon parliamentary democracy, and the system lacks the market economy guarantees.
alkotmányelméletben az országok monolit etnikai, kulturális meghatározottságával szemben jött létre. Az alkotmány szövegéhez, az abban megjelenő elvekhez és értékekhez kapcsolódik: azt fejezi ki, hogy a sokféle identitású országlakosok az alkotmányos értékekben megegyezhetnek, az alkotmány szövegében megtestesülő identitást magukénak vallhatják.
https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/book/the-jurisprudence-of-particularism-national-identity-claims-in-central-europe/ch8-constitutionalism-today-the-prospects-of-the-european-constitutional-community
https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/book/the-jurisprudence-of-particularism-national-identity-claims-in-central-europe/ch6-reconceptualising-constitutional-identity-the-case-of-hungary
https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/book/the-jurisprudence-of-particularism-national-identity-claims-in-central-europe/introduction
Dezbaterile dintre diferiţi filosofi susţinători şi sceptici cu privire la justificarea drepturilor omului ca norme morale universale obligatorii, care au prioritate faţă de normele juridice ordinare, nu s‑au încheiat; dimpotrivă, continuă neabătut, iar conceptul de drepturi ale omului provoacă în mod constant idei şi îndoieli normative noi. În mod indubitabil, respingerea ideii de drepturi ale omului nu se manifestă neapărat împreună cu acceptarea puterii publice autocratice. De la Jeremy Bentham până la András Sajó, mulţi susţinători ai autonomiei individuale consideră că libertatea de exprimare, separaţia dintre biserică şi stat, abolirea pedepsei cu moartea sau acordarea aceloraşi drepturi pentru minorităţile vulnerabile pot fi asigurate mai bine prin legi reale, adică prin acte legislative şi prin precedente judiciare rezonabile şi care se autolimitează, decât prin intermediul drepturilor fictive şi pline de zel ale omului.[3] Totuşi, de vreme ce ascensiunea mondială a autoritarismului ne pune în gardă, drepturile omului reprezintă un ultim refugiu împotriva abuzurilor puterii politice, sociale şi juridice, chiar dacă sunt comise în numele unui Dumnezeu sau al unei majorităţi relative a cetăţenilor.
Contemporary authoritarianism, while not having entirely abandoned the aims and methods of its ancestors, has been undergoing a reinvention in recent years. It no longer attacks democracy and the rule of law upfront but instead tries to adopt the language and even (at least nominally) the institutions of democratic constitutionalism to promote its autocratic aims from within. The two EU Member States where this new-school authoritarianism is most advanced are Hungary and Poland: Popular elections are being held; frantic law-making is taking place; constitutional and other courts keep handing down judgments – but each of these democratic and rule of law institutions have been successfully turned into tools of a self-proclaimed, rawly majoritarian “will of the people“. Populist authoritarian leaders claim exclusive moral representation of the people to undercut the role of the legislature, judiciary and other democratic institutions. Therefore, rejecting political pluralism and anti-constitutionalism differentiate populist authoritarians from democrats.
many countries all over the world. Where academic freedom is contested, we often also observe rejection of scientific evidence and expertise, alongside open attacks on (scientific) facts and findings.
Why and how is academic freedom contested? Who contests it and how do different contestants and contestations relate to each other? Which arguments are employed? The panel invites contributions from various disciplines.