Ethics by Christian Piller
two plausible claims seem to be inconsistent with each other. One is the idea that if one reasona... more two plausible claims seem to be inconsistent with each other. One is the idea that if one reasonably believes that one ought to fi, then indeed, on pain of acting irrationally, one ought to fi. The other is the view that we are fallible with respect to our beliefs about what we ought to do. Ewing's Problem is how to react to this apparent inconsistency. I reject two easy ways out. One is Ewing's own solution to his problem, which is to introduce two different notions of ought. The other is the view that Ewing's Problem rests on a simple confusion regarding the scope of the ought-operator. Then, I discuss two hard ways out, which I label objectivism and subjectivism, and for which GE Moore and bishop butler are introduced as historical witnesses. These are hard ways out because both of these views have strong counterintuitive consequences. After explaining why Ewing's Problem is so difficult, I show that there is conceptual room in-between Moore and butler, but I remain sceptical whether Ewing's Problem is solvable within a realist framework of normative facts.
In this paper I investigate the idea that evaluative talk in terms of good and bad needs to be re... more In this paper I investigate the idea that evaluative talk in terms of good and bad needs to be replaced by talk about the particular ways in which something can be good or bad. Starting from Peter Geach's claim that nothing can be good or bad, something can only be a good or bad so-and-so,
Aim of this paper is to look at Søren Kierkegaard's defence of an ethical way of life in the ligh... more Aim of this paper is to look at Søren Kierkegaard's defence of an ethical way of life in the light of Harry Frankfurt's work. There are salient general similarities connecting Kierkegaard and Frankfurt: Both are sceptical towards the Kantian idea of founding morality in the laws of practical reason. They both deny that the concerns, which shape our lives, could simply be validated by subject-independent values. Furthermore, and most importantly, they both emphasize the importance of reflective endorsement of one's way of life. This endorsement is understood by both not as an exercise of reason but as an exercise of our will without which boredom, anxiety and, ultimately, the dissolution of the self threatens. We can, the author of the paper argues, directly impose Frankfurt's hierarchical account of psychological attitudes on Kierkegaard in the sense that Frankfurt clearly helps us to elucidate Kierkegaard. But the interpretation, inspired by Kierkegaard, also shows the limits of any attempt to justify moral rules without appealing to a religious foundation of morality.
Reasons and Rationality by Christian Piller
two plausible claims seem to be inconsistent with each other. One is the idea that if one reasona... more two plausible claims seem to be inconsistent with each other. One is the idea that if one reasonably believes that one ought to fi, then indeed, on pain of acting irrationally, one ought to fi. The other is the view that we are fallible with respect to our beliefs about what we ought to do. Ewing's Problem is how to react to this apparent inconsistency. I reject two easy ways out. One is Ewing's own solution to his problem, which is to introduce two different notions of ought. The other is the view that Ewing's Problem rests on a simple confusion regarding the scope of the ought-operator. Then, I discuss two hard ways out, which I label objectivism and subjectivism, and for which GE Moore and bishop butler are introduced as historical witnesses. These are hard ways out because both of these views have strong counterintuitive consequences. After explaining why Ewing's Problem is so difficult, I show that there is conceptual room in-between Moore and butler, but I remain sceptical whether Ewing's Problem is solvable within a realist framework of normative facts.
I start by explaining what attitude-related reasons are and why it is plausible to assume that, a... more I start by explaining what attitude-related reasons are and why it is plausible to assume that, at least in the domain of practical reason, there are such reasons. Then I turn to Raz's idea that the practice of practical reasoning commits us to what he calls exclusionary reasons. Being excluded would be a third way, additional to being outweighed and being undermined, in which a reason can be defeated. I try to show that attitude-related reasons can explain the phenomena Raz appeals to equally well. Attitude-related reasons, however, are weighted against other reasons and, thus, don't determine a third relation of defeat. On this basis, I voice some doubts about Raz's conception of exclusionary reasons.
Other Papers by Christian Piller
Grazer Philosophische Studien, 2006
Philosophy, 2003
... Oxford University Press 2000. pp. xii + 187. Christian Piller, ... Oxford University Press 20... more ... Oxford University Press 2000. pp. xii + 187. Christian Piller, ... Oxford University Press 2000. pp. xii + 187. Christian Piller (2003) Philosophy, Volume 78, Issue 03, July 2003 pp 414-425 http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0031819103420391. Christian Piller (2003). ...
Philosophical Studies, 1996
Grazer Philosophische Studien, 1987
Grazer Philosophische Studien, 1991
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Ethics by Christian Piller
Reasons and Rationality by Christian Piller
Other Papers by Christian Piller