1. Many-to-One Stable Matching: Geometry and Fairness. (2006). Sethuraman, Jay ; Qian, Liwen ; Teo, Chung-Piaw .
   In: Mathematics of Operations Research.
   RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:31:y:2006:i:3:p:581-596.

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2. Paths to Stability for Matching Markets with Couples. (2005). Klijn, Flip ; Klaus, Bettina.
   In: UFAE and IAE Working Papers.
   RePEc:aub:autbar:604.04.

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3. Matching Markets: the Particular Case of Couples. (2004). Cantala, David .
   In: Economics Bulletin.
   RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2004:i:45:p:1-11.

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4. Incomplete Information and Small Cores in Matching Markets. (2004). Masso, Jordi ; Ehlers, Lars.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:bge:wpaper:147.

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5. Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples. (2004). Klijn, Flip ; Klaus, Bettina.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:bge:wpaper:117.

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6. Incomplete Information and Small Cores in Matching Markets. (2004). Masso, Jordi ; Ehlers, Lars.
   In: UFAE and IAE Working Papers.
   RePEc:aub:autbar:637.04.

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1. Checker, A. (1973) âThe National Intern and Resident Matching Program, 1966-1972,â Journal of Medical Education, 48, 107-109.
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2. Gale, D. and Shapley, L.S. (1962) âCollege Admissions and the Stability of Marriage,â American Mathematical Monthly, 69, 9-15.
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3. Klaus, B. and Klijn, F. (2005a) âStable Matchings and Preferences of Couples,â Journal of Economic Theory, 121, 75-106.
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4. Klaus, B. and Klijn, F. (2005b) âCorrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples,â UFAE and IAE Working Paper 653-05, Universitat Aut`onoma de Barcelona.

5. Ronn, E. (1990) âNP-Complete Stable Matching Problems,â Journal of Algorithms, 11, 285304.
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6. Roth, A.E. (1984) âThe Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: a Case Study in Game Theory,â Journal of Political Economy, 92, 991-1016.

7. Roth, A.E. (2002) âThe Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics,â Econometrica, 70, 1341-1378.

8. Roth, A.E. and Peranson, E. (1999) âThe Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design,â American Economic Review, 89, 748-780.

9. Roth, A.E. and Sotomayor, M.A.O. (1990) Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. Econometric Society Monograph Series. New York: Cambridge University Press.

10. Roth, A.E. and Vande Vate, J.H. (1990) âRandom Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching,â Econometrica, 58, 1475-1480.

1. Stability in Matching with Couples having Non-Responsive Preferences. (2017). roy, souvik ; Khare, Shashwat .
   In: Research Memorandum.
   RePEc:unm:umagsb:2017007.

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2. An invitation to market design. (2017). Kominers, Scott ; Crawford, Vincent ; Teytelboym, Alexander.
   In: Oxford Review of Economic Policy.
   RePEc:oup:oxford:v:33:y:2017:i:4:p:541-571..

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3. An Invitation to Market Design. (2017). Teytelboym, Alexander ; Kominers, Scott ; Crawford, Vincent.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:hka:wpaper:2017-069.

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4. Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching. (2017). Kominers, Scott ; Hatfield, John William .
   In: Games and Economic Behavior.
   RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:101:y:2017:i:c:p:78-97.

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5. Matching with slot-specific priorities: theory. (2016). Sönmez, Tayfun ; Kominers, Scott ; Sonmez, Tayfun.
   In: Theoretical Economics.
   RePEc:the:publsh:1839.

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6. Matching with aggregate externalities. (2016). Hafalir, Isa ; James, .
   In: Mathematical Social Sciences.
   RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:81:y:2016:i:c:p:1-7.

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7. Matching with contracts, substitutes and two-unit demand. (2016). Tello, Benjamin .
   In: Economics Letters.
   RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:146:y:2016:i:c:p:85-88.

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8. Near Feasible Stable Matchings with Complementarities. (2014). Vohra, Rakesh ; Nguyen, Thanh .
   In: PIER Working Paper Archive.
   RePEc:pen:papers:14-028.

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9. Matching with Slot-Specific Priorities: Theory. (2014). Sönmez, Tayfun ; Kominers, Scott.
   In: Boston College Working Papers in Economics.
   RePEc:boc:bocoec:872.

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10. Matching Couples with Scarfs Algorithm. (2013). Biró, Péter ; Biro, Peter ; Fleiner, Tamas ; Irving, Rob .
    In: IEHAS Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:has:discpr:1330.

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11. Conditional Stable Matchings. (2012). Viauroux, Christelle ; Komornik, Vilmos .
    In: UMBC Economics Department Working Papers.
    RePEc:umb:econwp:1203.

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12. Entrepreneurship and organization design. (2012). Roessler, Christian ; Koellinger, Philipp.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:56:y:2012:i:4:p:888-902.

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13. A simple decentralized matching mechanism in markets with couples. (2012). Salgado-Torres, Alfredo.
    In: Economics Bulletin.
    RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-12-00128.

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14. Matching with Couples: a Multidisciplinary Survey. (2011). Klijn, Flip ; Biró, Péter ; Biro, Peter.
    In: IEHAS Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:has:discpr:1139.

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15. Two-sided coalitional matchings. (2011). Lazarova, Emiliya ; Dimitrov, Dinko.
    In: Mathematical Social Sciences.
    RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:62:y:2011:i:1:p:46-54.

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16. Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples. (2011). Klaus, Bettina ; Haake, Claus-Jochen.
    In: Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:bie:wpaper:399.

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17. Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples. (2010). Klaus, Bettina ; Haake, Claus-Jochen.
    In: Theory and Decision.
    RePEc:kap:theord:v:69:y:2010:i:4:p:537-554.

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18. Stable one-to-one matchings with externalities. (2010). Saglam, Ismail ; Mumcu, AyÅŸe.
    In: Mathematical Social Sciences.
    RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:60:y:2010:i:2:p:154-159.

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19. Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts. (2010). Kojima, Fuhito ; Hatfield, John William .
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:145:y:2010:i:5:p:1704-1723.

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20. Matching Networks with Bilateral Contracts. (2010). Kominers, Scott ; Hatfield, John William .
    In: Research Papers.
    RePEc:ecl:stabus:2050.

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21. Coalitional Matchings. (2009). Lazarova, Emiliya ; Dimitrov, Dinko.
    In: Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:qub:wpaper:0905.

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22. Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts. (2009). Walzl, Markus ; Klaus, Bettina.
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
    RePEc:eee:mateco:v:45:y:2009:i:7-8:p:422-434.

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23. Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets. (2009). Pathak, Parag ; Kojima, Fuhito.
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:99:y:2009:i:3:p:608-27.

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24. Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions. (2008). Roth, Alvin.
    In: International Journal of Game Theory.
    RePEc:spr:jogath:v:36:y:2008:i:3:p:537-569.

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25. Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions. (2008). Roth, Alvin.
    In: Scholarly Articles.
    RePEc:hrv:faseco:2579651.

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26. Stable Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts. (2008). Walzl, Markus ; Klaus, Bettina.
    In: Harvard Business School Working Papers.
    RePEc:hbs:wpaper:09-046.

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27. Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples. (2008). Klaus, Bettina ; Haake, Claus-Jochen.
    In: Harvard Business School Working Papers.
    RePEc:hbs:wpaper:09-017.

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28. Coalitional Matchings. (2008). Lazarova, Emiliya ; Dimitrov, Dinko.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fem:femwpa:2008.45.

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29. Coalitional Matchings. (2008). Dimitrov, Dinko ; Lazarova, Emiliya A.
    In: Coalition Theory Network Working Papers.
    RePEc:ags:feemct:37523.

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30. Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples. (2007). Klijn, Flip ; Klaus, Bettina ; Nakamura, Toshifumi .
    In: Research Memorandum.
    RePEc:unm:umamet:2007025.

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31. Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask). (2007). Masso, Jordi ; Klijn, Flip ; Klaus, Bettina.
    In: Review of Economic Design.
    RePEc:spr:reecde:v:11:y:2007:i:3:p:175-184.

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32. Fair and efficient student placement with couples. (2007). Klijn, Flip ; Klaus, Bettina.
    In: International Journal of Game Theory.
    RePEc:spr:jogath:v:36:y:2007:i:2:p:177-207.

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33. Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions. (2007). Roth, Alvin.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13225.

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34. Many-to-One Matching when Colleagues Matter. (2007). Revilla, Pablo.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fem:femwpa:2007.87.

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35. A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues. (2007). Yenmez, M. Bumin ; Echenique, Federico.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:59:y:2007:i:1:p:46-71.

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36. Paths to stability for matching markets with couples. (2007). Klijn, Flip ; Klaus, Bettina.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:58:y:2007:i:1:p:154-171.

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37. The core of a housing market with externalities. (2007). .
    In: Economics Bulletin.
    RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2007:i:57:p:1-5.

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38. The core of a housing market with externalities. (2007). Saglam, Ismail ; Mumcu, AyÅŸe.
    In: Economics Bulletin.
    RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-07c70026.

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39. Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions. (2007). Roth, Alvin.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:843644000000000283.

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40. Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples. (2007). Klijn, Flip ; Klaus, Bettina ; Nakamura, Toshifumi .
    In: UFAE and IAE Working Papers.
    RePEc:aub:autbar:708.07.

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41. One-to-One Matching with Interdependent Preferences. (2006). Saglam, Ismail ; Mumcu, AyÅŸe.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:1908.

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42. Fair and Efficient Student Placement with Couples. (2006). Klijn, Flip ; Klaus, Bettina.
    In: UFAE and IAE Working Papers.
    RePEc:aub:autbar:616.04.

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43. A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues. (2005). Echenique, Federico.
    In: Game Theory and Information.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0506005.

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44. Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples. (2005). Klijn, Flip ; Klaus, Bettina ; Nakamura, Toshifumi .
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bge:wpaper:261.

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45. Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples. (2005). Klijn, Flip ; Klaus, Bettina.
    In: UFAE and IAE Working Papers.
    RePEc:aub:autbar:653.05.

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46. Paths to Stability for Matching Markets with Couples. (2005). Klijn, Flip ; Klaus, Bettina.
    In: UFAE and IAE Working Papers.
    RePEc:aub:autbar:604.04.

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47. Paths to Stability for Matching Markets with Couples. (2004). Klijn, Flip ; Klaus, Bettina.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bge:wpaper:156.

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48. Fair and Efficient Student Placement with Couples. (2004). Klijn, Flip ; Klaus, Bettina.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bge:wpaper:145.

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49. Some Things Couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask). (2003). Masso, Jordi ; Klijn, Flip ; Klaus, Bettina.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bge:wpaper:78.

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50. Matching with Aggregate Externalities. (). Hafalir, Isa ; James, Fisher .
    In: GSIA Working Papers.
    RePEc:cmu:gsiawp:-1326939098.

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