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1. (Dis)honesty and the Value of Transparency for Campaign Promises. (2023). Lang, Matthias ; Schudy, Simeon.
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2. (Dis)honesty and the value of transparency for campaign promises. (2023). Schudy, Simeon ; Lang, Matthias.
   In: European Economic Review.
   RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:159:y:2023:i:c:s0014292123001885.

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3. Monotone comparative statics in the Calvert–Wittman model. (2022). Rodríguez, Francisco ; Zambrano, Eduardo ; Rodriguez, Francisco.
   In: Economic Theory Bulletin.
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4. Rational inattention and politics: how parties use fiscal policies to manipulate voters. (2022). Sacchi, Agnese ; Murtinu, Samuele ; Piccirilli, Giulio.
   In: Public Choice.
   RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:190:y:2022:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-021-00940-8.

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5. Formalizing clientelism in Kenya: From Harambee to the Constituency Development Fund. (2022). Ochieng, Ken.
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   RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:152:y:2022:i:c:s0305750x21004095.

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6. Does a district mandate matter for the behavior of politicians? An analysis of roll-call votes and parliamentary speeches. (2022). Janssen, Aljoscha ; Born, Andreas.
   In: European Journal of Political Economy.
   RePEc:eee:poleco:v:71:y:2022:i:c:s017626802100063x.

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7. Formalizing clientelism in Kenya: From Harambee to the Constituency Development Fund. (2021). Ochieng, Ken.
   In: WIDER Working Paper Series.
   RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp-2021-147.

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8. Are gender quotas on candidates bound to be ineffective?. (2021). Lippmann, Quentin.
   In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
   RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:191:y:2021:i:c:p:661-678.

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9. Monotone Comparative Statics in the Calvert-Wittman Model. (2021). Zambrano, Eduardo.
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10. Monotone Comparative Statics in the Calvert-Wittman Model. (2021). Zambrano, Eduardo ; Rodr, Francisco.
    In: Papers.
    RePEc:arx:papers:2107.07910.

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11. Campaign contributions and policy convergence: asymmetric agents and donations constraints. (2020). Munoz-Garcia, Felix ; Dunaway, Eric.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:184:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-019-00732-1.

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12. (Dis)honest Politicians and the Value of Transparency for Campaign Promises. (2020). Schudy, Simeon ; Lang, Matthias ; Dermot, Simeon Andreas.
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13. Coalition preclusion contracts and moderate policies. (2019). Gersbach, Hans ; Tejada, Oriol ; Schneider, Maik T.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:114:y:2019:i:c:p:28-46.

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14. Equal Performance of Minority and Majority Coalitions? Pledge Fulfilment in the German State of NRW. (2018). Matthiess, Theres.
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    RePEc:zbw:espost:183218.

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15. False claims in politics: Evidence from the US. (2018). Bucciol, Alessandro.
    In: Research in Economics.
    RePEc:eee:reecon:v:72:y:2018:i:2:p:196-210.

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16. Tactical Extremism. (2018). Giovannoni, Francesco ; Eguia, Jon.
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17. “Read my lips! (but only if I was elected)!” Experimental evidence on the effects of electoral competition on promises, shirking and trust. (2017). Walkowitz, Gari ; Weiss, Arne R.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
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18. Estimating Dynamic Games of Electoral Competition to Evaluate Term Limits in US Gubernatorial Elections. (2017). Yoon, Chamna ; Sieg, Holger.
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    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:107:y:2017:i:7:p:1824-57.

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19. Private agenda and re-election incentives. (2016). Rivas, Javier.
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20. Fiscal Policy, Government Polarization, and the Economic Literacy of Voters. (2016). Sacchi, Agnese ; Murtinu, Samuele ; Piccirilli, Giulio .
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21. Fiscal Policy, Government Polarization, and the Economic Literacy of Voters. (2016). Sacchi, Agnese ; Murtinu, Samuele ; Piccirilli, Giulio .
    In: Working papers.
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22. Coalition Preclusion Contracts and Moderate Policies. (2016). Schneider, Maik ; Gersbach, Hans ; Tejada, Oriol.
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23. CENTRIST’S CURSE? AN ELECTORAL COMPETITION MODEL WITH CREDIBILITY CONSTRAINTS. (2015). Ergun, Selim.
    In: The Singapore Economic Review (SER).
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24. The welfare implications of electoral polarization. (2015). Van Weelden, Richard.
    In: Social Choice and Welfare.
    RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:45:y:2015:i:4:p:653-686.

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25. Campaign promises as an imperfect signal: How does an extreme candidate win against a moderate candidate?. (2015). Asako, Yasushi.
    In: Journal of Theoretical Politics.
    RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:27:y:2015:i:4:p:613-649.

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26. The Political Economy of Dynamic Elections: A Survey and Some New Results. (2015). Martinelli, Cesar ; Duggan, John.
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27. Vote suppression and insecure property rights. (2015). Pfutze, Tobias ; Castañeda Dower, Paul.
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    RePEc:eee:deveco:v:114:y:2015:i:c:p:1-19.

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28. Campaign Promises as an Imperfect Signal: How does an Extreme Candidate Win against a Moderate Candidate?. (2014). Asako, Yasushi.
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29. Markovian Elections. (2014). Forand, Jean Guillaume ; Duggan, John.
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30. Coalition-Preclusion Contracts and Moderate Policies. (2014). Schneider, Maik ; Gersbach, Hans ; Tejada, Oriol.
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31. The Political Economy of Dynamic Elections: A Survey and Some New Results. (2014). Martinelli, Cesar ; Duggan, John.
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32. Read my Lips! Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Electoral Competition on Shirking and Trust. (2014). Weiss, Arne R. ; Walkowitz, Gari.
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33. Markovian Elections. (2013). Forand, Jean Guillaume ; Duggan, John.
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34. Policy Choices by an Incumbent - A Case with Down-Up Problem, Bias Beliefs and Retrospective Voting. (2013). Seixas, Carlos ; Brandao, Antonio ; Brando, Antonio ; Costa, Manuel Luis.
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35. Biased beliefs and retrospective voting: why democracies choose mediocre policies. (2013). Siemers, Lars-Hinrich ; Bischoff, Ivo ; Lars-H. Siemers, .
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36. Tax contracts and elections. (2012). Schneider, Maik ; Gersbach, Hans.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:56:y:2012:i:7:p:1461-1479.

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37. Tax Contracts and Elections. (2012). Schneider, Maik ; Gersbach, Hans.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
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38. Contractual Democracy. (2012). Gersbach, Hans ; Hans, Gersbach .
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    RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:8:y:2012:i:3:p:823-851:n:8.

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39. Punching above Ones Weight: The Case against Election Campaigns. (2010). Riyanto, Yohanes ; Onderstal, Sander ; Los, Bart ; Haan, Marco.
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40. Partially Binding Platforms and the Advantages of Being an Extreme Candidate. (2010). Asako, Yasushi.
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41. Essays on Incentives in Public and Private Institutions. (2008). Bohm, Tobias .
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42. Centrists Curse? An Electoral Competition Model with Credibility Constraints. (2008). Ergun, Selim.
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43. Contractual Democracy. (2008). Gersbach, Hans.
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44. The pronouncements of paranoid politicians. (2007). Cataife, Guido ; Guido, Cataife.
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