1. Optimal self-financing microfinance contracts when borrowers have risk aversion and limited commitment. (2020). Fujimoto, Junichi ; Lee, Junsang.
   In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
   RePEc:eee:mateco:v:91:y:2020:i:c:p:60-79.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

2. Balancing flexibility and discipline in microfinance: Innovative financial products that benefit clients and service providers. (2011). Laureti, Carolina ; Hamp, Michael .
   In: Working Papers CEB.
   RePEc:sol:wpaper:2013/98728.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

3. Insurance for the Poor?. (2007). Dercon, Stefan ; Bold, Tessa.
   In: Economics Series Working Papers.
   RePEc:oxf:wpaper:gprg-wps-073.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

4. Insurance for the Poor?. (). Dercon, Stefan ; Calvo, Cesar ; Bold, Tessa.
   In: QEH Working Papers.
   RePEc:qeh:qehwps:qehwps125.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

1. Ackerberg, D.A. and M. Botticini [1998]. Endogenous Matching and the Empirical Determinants of Contract Form, mimeo, Boston University

2. Alderman, H. and C. Paxson [1994]. Do the Poor Insure? A Synthesis of the Literature on Risk and Consumption in Developing Countries, in Bacha (ed.) Economics in a Changing World: Volume ~: Development, Trade and the Environment. London: MacMillan Press

3. Alexander, G. [2001]. An Empirical Analysis of Microfinance: Who are the Clients, working paper, Fordham University
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   

4. Armend

5. Banerjee, A, T. Besley, and T. Guinnane [1994]. Thy Neighbor's Keeper: The Design of a Credit Cooperative with Theory and a Test, Quarterly Journal of Economics; 109(2), pp. 491-515

6. Besley, T. [1995]. Nonmarket Institutions for Credit and Risk Sharing in Low-Income Countries, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 9 (3), pp. 115-127

7. Besley, T. and S. Coate [1995]. Group Lending, Repayment Incentives and Social Collateral , Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 46, pp. 1-18

8. Boot, A., S. Greenbaum, and A. Thakor [1993]. Reputation and Discretion in Financial Contracting, American Economic Review, 83(5), pp. 1165-1183

9. Brown, W. and C. Churchill [1999]. Insurance Provision in Low-Income Communities. Part I: A Primer on Insurance Principles and Products, Microentreprise Best Practices, USAID's Microentreprise Innovation Project
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   
10. Brown, W. and C. Churchill [2000]. Insurance Provision in Low-Income Communities. Part II: Initial Lessons from Micro-Insurance Experiments for the Poor, Microentreprise Best Practices, USAID's Microentreprise Innovation Project
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

11. Coate, S. and M. Ravallion [1993]. Reciprocity without Commitment: Characterization and Performance of Informal Insurance Arrangements, Journal of Development Economics, 40(1), February 1993, pp. 1-24

12. de la Bri
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

13. Deaton, A. [1988]. Quantity, Quality, and the Spatial Variation of Price, American Economic Review, 78, pp. 418-430.

14. Del Conte, A. [2000]. Roundtable on Microinsurance Services in the Informal Economy: The Role of Microfinance Institutions, The Ford Foundation, New York
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

15. Dercon, 5. [2000]. Income Risk, Coping Strategies and Safety Nets, background paper for World Development Report 2000/01

16. Dercon, S. and P. Krishnan [2000]. In Sickness and Health: Risk Sharing within Households in Rural Ethiopia, Journal of Political Economy, 108(4), pp. 688-727

17. Diamond, D. [1989]. Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets, Journal of Political Economy, 97(4)

18. Eswaran, M. and A. Kotwal [1990]. Implications of Credit Constraints for Risk Behaviour in Less Developed Economies, Oxford Economic Papers, 42, pp. 473-482

19. Ghatak, M. and T. Guinnane [1999] The economics of lending with joint liability: theory and practice, Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 60, pp. 195-228

20. Goldstein, M., A. de Janvry, and E. Sadoulet [2001]. You can't always get what you want: Inclusion and Exclusion in Mutual Insurance Networks in Southern Ghana, working paper, London School of Economics, June 2001
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

21. Grimard, F. [1997]. Household Consumption Smoothing through Ethnic Ties: Evidence from Cote D'Ivoire, Journal of Development Economics, 53(2), pp 391-422

22. Jacoby, H. and E. Skoufias [1997]. Risk, Financial Markets, and Human Capital in a Developing Country, Review of Economic Studies, 64(3), pp. 311-336

23. Jalan, J. and M. Ravallion [1999]. Are the Poor Less Well-insured? Evidence on Vulnerability to Income Risk in Rural China, Journal of Development Economics, 58, pp. 61-81

24. Jam, S. and G. Mansuri [2001]. A little at a Time: The Use of Regularly Scheduled Repayments in Microfinance Programs, working paper, University of Virginia, August

25. Jensen, R. [1998]. Public transfers, private transfers and the crowding out hypothesis: evidence from South Africa, working paper
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

26. Ligon, E., J. Thomas, and T. Worrall [2000]. Mutual Insurance, Individual Savings and Limited Commitment, Review of Economic Dynamics, 3(2), April 2000, pages 216-46

27. Lund and Fafchamps [1997]. Risk-sharing Networks in Rural Philippines, working paper

28. McCord, M. J. [2001]. Microlnsurance Center Policy Statement, Microsave Africa
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
29. Microcredit Summit Campaign Report [2000]. Empowering Women with Microcredit, available from http: / /www.microcreditsummit .org/campaigns/reportOO .html
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

30. Morduch, J. [1999a]. Between the State and the Market: Can Informal Insurance Patch the Safety Net? World Bank Research Observer, 14(2), August 1999, pp. 187-207

31. Morduch, J. [1999b]. The Microfinance Promise, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 37, pp. 1569-1614
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
32. Navajas, S., C. Gonzalez-Vega, and A. Gonzalez [2001]. Do Lending Technologies Exclude the Poor? The Case of Rural El Salvador, working paper, Ohio State University, May 2001
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

33. Paxson, C. [1993]. Consumption and Income Seasonality in Thailand, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 101, No. 1, pp. 39-72

34. Platteau, J.-Ph. [2000]. Institutions, Social Norms, and Economic Development, Harwood Academic Publishers
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
35. Reardon, T., A.A. Fall, V. Kelly, C. Delgado, P. Matlon, J. Hopkins, 0. Badiane [1994]. Is Income Diversification Agriculture-led in the West African Semi-Arid Tropics? The Nature, Causes, Effects, Distribution and Production of Off-farm Activities. , in Economic Policy Experience in Africa: What Have We Learned? edited by A. Atsain, S. Wangwe, and A. G. Drabek, Nairobi: African Economic Research Consortium, December
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
36. Rice, J.A. [1988]. Mathematical Statistics and Data Analysis, Wadsworth & Brooks
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

37. Rosenzweig, M. and H. Binswanger [1993]. Wealth, Weather Risk, and the Consumption and Profitability of Agricultural Investments, Economic Journal, 103, pp 56-78

38. Sadoulet, L. [1999a]. The Role of Mutual Insurance in Group Lending, chapter 1 of Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University; submitted for publication (available from http://www.ecares.org)
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
39. Sadoulet, L. [1999b]. Non-monotone Matching in Group Lending, chapter 2 of Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University; submitted for publication (available from http://www.ecares.org)
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
40. Sadoulet, L. and S. Carpenter [2000]. Endogenous Matching and Risk Heterogeneity: Evidence on microcredit group formation in Guatemala, submitted for publication (available from http://www.ecares.org)
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

41. Townsend, R. [1982]. Optimal Multiperiod Contracts and the Gain from Enduring Relationships under Private Information, Journal of Political Economy, 90(6), pp. 11661186

42. Udry, C. [1990]. Credit Markets in Northern Nigeria: Credit as Insurance in a Rural Economy, The World Bank Economic Review, Volume 4, Number 3, September 1990

43. Varian, H. [1990]. Monitoring agents with other agents, Zeitschrift f
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
44. Wydick, W.B. [1995]. Group Lending as a Credit Delivery Mechanism in Guatemala, mimeo
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

1. Unfair Incentives: A Behavioral Note on Sharecropping. (2015). Schumacher, Heiner ; Kemper, Niels.
   In: Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy.
   RePEc:zbw:vfsc15:112860.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

2. Fresh Vegetable Growers Risk Perception, Risk Preference and Choice of Marketing Contracts: A Choice Experiment. (2013). Woods, Timothy ; Hu, Wuyang ; Dillon, Carl R. ; Vassalos, Michael ; Schieffer, Jack.
   In: 2013 Annual Meeting, February 2-5, 2013, Orlando, Florida.
   RePEc:ags:saea13:142506.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

3. Selecting public goods institutions: who likes to punish and reward?. (2012). Drouvelis, Michalis ; Jamison, Julian C..
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:fip:fedbwp:12-5.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

4. Matching Firms, Managers, and Incentives. (2012). Sadun, Raffaella ; Prat, Andrea ; Guiso, Luigi ; bandiera, oriana.
   In: CEP Discussion Papers.
   RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp1144.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

5. An Empirical Analysis of Risk, Incentives and The Delegation of Worker Authority. (2011). Kurtulus, Fidan ; DeVaro, Jed ; de Varo, Jed .
   In: UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers.
   RePEc:ums:papers:2011-13.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

6. Using opposing responses and relative performance to distinguish empirically among alternative models of promotions. (2011). DeVaro, Jed ; de Varo, Jed .
   In: MPRA Paper.
   RePEc:pra:mprapa:35175.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

7. Matching Firms, Managers and Incentives. (2011). Sadun, Raffaella ; Prat, Andrea ; Guiso, Luigi ; bandiera, oriana.
   In: NBER Working Papers.
   RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16691.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

8. Field Experiments with Firms. (2011). Rasul, Imran ; Barankay, Iwan ; bandiera, oriana.
   In: IZA Discussion Papers.
   RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5723.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

9. Contractual Structure and Endogenous Matching in Partnershipso. (2011). Karaivanov, Alexander ; Ghatak, Maitreesh.
   In: STICERD - Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers Series.
   RePEc:cep:stieop:024.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

10. Incomplete Contracts and Industrial Organization: A Survey. (2011). Newman, Andrew ; Legros, Patrick.
    In: Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series.
    RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2011-036.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

11. Moral Hazard in Leasing Contracts: Evidence from the New York City Taxi Industry. (2010). Schneider, Henry.
    In: Journal of Law and Economics.
    RePEc:ucp:jlawec:doi:10.1086/652423.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

12. Agricultural Extension and Imperfect Supervision in Contract Farming: Evidence from Madagascar. (2010). Bellemare, Marc.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:23788.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

13. An Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of Marketing Contract Structures for Corn and Soybeans. (2010). Paulson, Nicholas ; Lence, Sergio ; Katchova, Ani.
    In: Staff General Research Papers Archive.
    RePEc:isu:genres:31525.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

14. An Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of Marketing Contract Structures for Corn and Soybeans. (2010). Paulson, Nicholas.
    In: Staff General Research Papers Archive.
    RePEc:isu:genres:31523.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

15. The Structural Estimation of Principal-Agent Models by Least Squares: Evidence from Land Tenancy in Madagascar. (2009). Brown, Zachary ; Bellemare, Marc.
    In: 2009 Annual Meeting, July 26-28, 2009, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
    RePEc:ags:aaea09:49368.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

16. Ethnic diversity market structure and risk sharing in developing countries. (2006). Zenou, Yves ; Jellal, Mohamed.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:38435.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

17. Two-Sided Matching and Spread Determinants in the Loan Market. (2006). Chen, Jiawei.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:irv:wpaper:060702.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

18. The Principal-Agent Matching Market. (2003). Perez-Castrillo, David ; Dam, Kaniska.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_945.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

19. Equilibrium Limited Liability Contracts in a Landlord-Tenant Market. (2003). Perez-Castrillo, David ; Dam, Kaniska .
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bge:wpaper:99.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

20. TIME SERIES ANALYSIS OF A PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL TO ASSESS RISK SHIFTING AND BARGAINING POWER IN COMMODITY MARKETING CHANNELS. (2003). Pennings, Joost ; Kuwornu, John ; Pennings, Joost M. E., ; Pennings, Joost M. E., ; Kuwornu, John K. M., ; Kuiper, Erno W..
    In: 2003 Annual meeting, July 27-30, Montreal, Canada.
    RePEc:ags:aaea03:22046.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

21. Incorporating Insurance Provisions in Microfinance Contracts: Learning from Visa®?. (2002). Sadoulet, Loic .
    In: WIDER Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:unu:wpaper:dp2002-56.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

22. Moral hazard, land fertility and sharecropping in a rural area of the Philippines. (2002). Dubois, Pierre.
    In: Journal of Development Economics.
    RePEc:eee:deveco:v:68:y:2002:i:1:p:35-64.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

23. Assortative Matching in a Non-transferable World. (2002). Newman, Andrew ; Legros, Patrick.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3469.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

24. Testing Contract Theory: A Survey of Some Recent Work. (2002). Salanié, Bernard ; Chiappori, Pierre ; Salanie, Bernard.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_738.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

25. Insecurity of Property Rights and Matching in the Tenancy Market. (2002). Macours, Karen.
    In: 2002 International Congress, August 28-31, 2002, Zaragoza, Spain.
    RePEc:ags:eaae02:24931.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

26. INSECURITY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AND MATCHING IN THE TENANCY MARKET. (2002). Macours, Karen.
    In: 2002 Annual meeting, July 28-31, Long Beach, CA.
    RePEc:ags:aaea02:19603.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

27. On the Structure of Tenancy Contracts: Theory and Evidence from 19th Century Rural Sicily. (2001). bandiera, oriana.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3032.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

28. Risk-Matching in Credit Groups: Evidence from Guatemala. (2000). Sadoulet, Loic ; Carpenter, Seth .
    In: Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers.
    RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1310.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

29. Why Dowries?. (2000). Siow, Aloysius ; Botticini, Maristella.
    In: Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers.
    RePEc:ecm:wc2000:0200.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

30. Contractual Constraints on Firm Performance in Developing Countries. (1999). Mookherjee, Dilip.
    In: Boston University - Institute for Economic Development.
    RePEc:fth:bosecd:98.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Report date: 2025-02-21 03:47:55 || Missing content? Let us know