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2. Government ideology and monetary policy in OECD countries. (2019). Potrafke, Niklas ; Dörr, Luisa ; Doerr, Luisa ; Cahan, Dodge.
   In: Public Choice.
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3. Government ideology and monetary policy in OECD countries. (2019). Potrafke, Niklas ; Dörr, Luisa ; Dorr, Luisa ; Cahan, Dodge.
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4. Government ideology and monetary policy in OECD countries. (2019). Potrafke, Niklas ; Dörr, Luisa ; Dorr, Luisa ; Cahan, Dodge.
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5. Government ideology and economic policy-making in the United States—a survey. (2018). Potrafke, Niklas.
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40. Does Government Ideology Matter in Monetary Policy? – A Panel Data Analysis for OECD Countries. (2009). Potrafke, Niklas ; Belke, Ansgar.
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41. The Impact of Central Bank Independence on Political Monetary Cycles in Advanced and Developing Nations. (2009). Honig, Adam ; Alpanda, Sami.
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43. Washington meets Wall Street: A Closer Examination of the Presidential Cycle Puzzle. (2008). van der Sluis, Pieter ; Lucas, Andre ; Kräussl, Roman ; Kraeussl, R. ; Vrugt, E. ; Rijsbergen, D..
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47. Political Monetary Cycles and a New de facto Ranking of Central Bank Independence. (2007). .
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48. The Feds Real Reaction Function: Monetary Policy, Inflation, Unemployment, Inequality-and Presidential Politics. (2007). Giovannoni, Olivier ; Russo, Ann J. ; Galbraith, James K..
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49. Political Business Cycles in the New Keynesian Model. (2007). Milani, Fabio.
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50. How Richard Nixon Pressured Arthur Burns: Evidence from the Nixon Tapes. (2006). Abrams, Burton.
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