1. The Central Bank Governor and Interest Rate Setting by Committee. (2019). Piccillo, Giulia ; van Ommeren, Emile.
   In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
   RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7822.

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2. The political economy of the impossible trinity. (2017). Schweickert, Rainer ; Beckmann, Joscha ; Belke, Ansgar ; Ademmer, Esther.
   In: European Journal of Political Economy.
   RePEc:eee:poleco:v:47:y:2017:i:c:p:103-123.

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3. The politics of central bank independence. (2016). Eijffinger, Sylvester ; de Haan, Jakob.
   In: DNB Working Papers.
   RePEc:dnb:dnbwpp:539.

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4. .

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5. .

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6. .

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7. Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union—Comments on a Roadmap. (2013). Belke, Ansgar.
   In: Politics and Governance.
   RePEc:cog:poango:v:1:y:2013:i:1:p:48-65.

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8. Political business cycles and monetary policy revisited–an application of a two-dimensional asymmetric Taylor reaction function. (2012). Klose, Jens.
   In: International Economics and Economic Policy.
   RePEc:kap:iecepo:v:9:y:2012:i:3:p:265-295.

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9. Political Business Cycles and Monetary Policy Revisited – An Application of a Two-Dimensional Asymmetric Taylor Reaction Function. (2011). Klose, Jens.
   In: Ruhr Economic Papers.
   RePEc:zbw:rwirep:286.

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10. Political cycles under external economic constraints: Evidence from Cyprus. (2011). Efthyvoulou, Georgios.
    In: Journal of Economics and Business.
    RePEc:eee:jebusi:v:63:y:2011:i:6:p:638-662.

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11. How are Inflation Targets Set?. (2011). Matějů, Jakub ; Horvath, Roman.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:cnb:wpaper:2011/06.

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12. Finanzkrise, globale Liquidität und makroökonomischer Exit. (2010). Schnabl, Gunther ; Belke, Ansgar.
    In: IBES Diskussionsbeiträge.
    RePEc:zbw:udewwd:184.

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13. How Much Fiscal Backing Must the ECB Have? – The Euro Area is not the Philippines. (2010). Belke, Ansgar.
    In: Ruhr Economic Papers.
    RePEc:zbw:rwirep:184.

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14. Financial Crisis, Global Liquidity and Monetary Exit Strategies. (2010). Belke, Ansgar.
    In: Ruhr Economic Papers.
    RePEc:zbw:rwirep:183.

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15. Europäischer geldpolitischer Exit im Zeichen von QE2 und Staatsanleihekäufen der EZB. (2010). Schnabl, Gunther ; Belke, Ansgar.
    In: Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research.
    RePEc:diw:diwvjh:79-4-11.

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16. How much fiscal backing must the ECB have? The euro area is not (yet) the Philippines. (2010). Belke, Ansgar ; Polleit, Thorsten .
    In: Economie Internationale.
    RePEc:cii:cepiei:2010-4ta.

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17. How Are Inflation Targets Set?. (2010). Matějů, Jakub ; Horvath, Roman ; Mateju, Jakub .
    In: CERGE-EI Working Papers.
    RePEc:cer:papers:wp426.

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1. -22Berger, H., Woitek, U. (1997), How Opportunistic Are Partisan German Central Bankers? Evidence on the Vaubel Hypothesis, European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 13(3), pp. 503-516.

2. -24Friedrich, R. J. (1982), In Defence of Multiplicative Terms in Multiple Regression Equations. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 26, pp. 797-833.
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3. -26Sieg, G. (1997), A Model of Partisan Central Banks and Opportunistic Political Business Cycles, European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 13, pp. 503-516.

4. -33Other • Efthyvoulou (2008) • Growth rates of M1 and M2, and two short-term interest rates (retail bank marginal lending rate) and 3-month treasury bill rate) • Cyprus/19782006 /quarterly • Taylor rule specification • Maximum Likelihood - ARCH (errors normally distributed) • Test for significance of temporary and permanent partisan dummies • Left wing governments follow more expansionary monetary policies than right wing governments • Monetary growth aggregates and, to a lesser extent nominal interest rates, are systematically higher during left administrations +
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5. -9McGregor 1993); 2) direct signalling of desired monetary policies from the administration to the central bank7 (Havrilesky 1988, 1991, Sieg, 1997), 3) bashing and coercion by the administration (García de Paso 2000, Lohmann 1998, Waller 1991).
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6. • Bearce (2003) • Indicator of monetary policy autonomy measured in terms of an interest rate differential vis-à-vis the rest of the world • 22 OECD countries/19751992 /annual • Panel estimation • Beck/Katz (1996) estimation technique correcting for both panel heteroskedasticity and spatial (contemporaneous) autocorrelation. • Prais-Winsten coefficients with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) • Leftist (rightist) governments, representing the domestically oriented (internationally oriented) groups in society, should be associated with more (less) monetary autonomy. • Leftist-led govemments opt for greater monetary autonomy, as demanded by their domestically oriented societal principals, than would be expected given current business cycle conditions. • Sectoral and factoral monetary policy preferences'" do matter for monetary and exchangerate policy outcomes +
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7. • Berger and Woitek (1997) • Annualized M1 growth rate/ Bundesbank discount rate • Germany/19501989 /monthly, seasonally adjusted • Policy instrument regressed on its own lagged value and a dummy variable active in certain periods before federal elections multiplied by the partisan position of the majority of ‘political’ members of the Bundesbank council towards the government • Time series analysis: results run counter to the Vaubel (2007) hypothesis. • Central bank council minutes: results point in the same direction. • Opportunistic government is better off facing an • OLS • Robustness checks using M2, M3 changes ideologically opposing Bundesbank council majority than a supportive one before elections. +
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8. • Berger and Woitek (2001) • Short-term (day-today) interest rate • Germany/1950– 1996/daily • Test for PBC in Bundesbank monetary policy reaction function plus controls for the effects of fixed exchange rate regimes • Indirect test: changes in money demand prior to elections occurred because, when political parties have different inflation preferences and election results are uncertain, rational investors avoid entering long-term financial contracts before elections • Vaubel’s (1997a) observation of central bank independence and political business cycles in German monetary aggregates • But no sign of a systematic decline of short-term interest rates before the election • Cycles originated from partisan and electoral uncertainty induced shifts in money demand that were tolerated by the Bundesbank, because the bank followed an interest rate policy rule.14 +
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9. • Boix (2000) • Short-term real interest rate (government bond yields) • 19 OECD countries/19601993 /annual • Pooled cross-sectional time-series model through the Beck-Katz (1996) method of ordinary least squares, adjusting the standard errors for unequal variation within panels • Introducing a lagged endogenous variable and correcting for autocorrelation. • Socialist control of government is calculated as SC*(l-CBl) • The interactive term SOC*LABORG measures the presence of social democratic corporatist regimes, that is, socialist governments • Monetary policy did not vary as a result of partisanship alone but it required the presence of some kind of coordination with trade unions +
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10. • Clark (2003) • Interest rate • 14 OECD countries if conditioning is on degree of trade openness or capital market openness, 12 • OLS panel estimation according to Beck and Katz (1996) without Prais-Winsten correction, since no evidence of serial correlation • Regression equation includes additional control variables expected to influence monetary • Left-labor power coefficients conditional on degree of trade and on capital market openness significant with the expected negative sign. +
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11. • Corder (2006) • Federal funds rate • Real-time or “vintage” data for output and inflation measures • U.S./19652005 /quarterly • Taylor reaction function • If adjustment parameters do not vary as the identity of elected officials changes, then the assumption of incumbent control is, at best, suspect.
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12. • Cusack (2001) • Discount rate • 14 OECD countries/19611994 /annual • Taylor rule specification • OLS with panel-corrected standard errors • Checking for the role of partisanship as contingent on the independence of the central bank and of political non-neutrality of central bank decision makers • Pooled cross-section time-series design • Little support for the view that central bank independence inhibits partisan influences • Support for the thesis that central banks are “politically non-neutral” -
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13. • Falaschetti (2002) • Continuous dependent variable Voting score: the percentage of times an FOMC member dissented for tighter or looser policy in a given year and a polychotomous dependent variable Group • U.S./Panel of FOMC votes 1973-1997/intrayear • Conventional least-squares dummy variable model if dependent variable is Voting score • Multinomial logit model if dependent variable is Group • Hypothesis 1: FRB governors who were nominated and confirmed by the same party prefer significantly looser monetary policy • Hypothesis 2: monetary policy is significantly looser when either party controls the oversight mechanism (i.e., the Presient and the Senate) than when control is fixed • Political agents from both parties prefer loose money • They face lower costs to act on this common preference when their parties are aligned + -
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14. • Faust and Irons (1999) • Three-month Treasury bill rate, M2(M1) • U.S./ 19531995 /quarterly • Assessment of the importance of political variables in traditional macro models and to assess the role of the monetary policy channel in accounting for any political effects • Identified 4-variable VAR in order to avoid simultaneity bias and omitted variable bias • Check whether partisan variables (intercept and slope dummies) need to be included in the VAR, i.e. in monetary policy equation • Controlling for credit control and Bretton Woods • Strong associations between party and aggregate measures of economic activity, but … • Little evidence that the causal explanation of any political effects on the economy operates through changes in monetary policy • Little support for the view that empirical monetary models should include political variables -
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15. • Ferris (2008) • Logarithm of the BoC bank rate/difference between the logarithm of the bank rate and the logarithm of the five-year yield on government bonds • Canada/ 1935– 2006/annual • Error correction model • Taylor reaction function with interest rate smoothing • Set of political variables to test for the partisan distinctiveness of electoral outcomes, PT and RPT dummies • Election of a Liberal party government positively influences the expansiveness of Canadian monetary policy + Note: Pluses (“+”) indicate that the cited studies found supporting evidence of ideological impacts on monetary policy while minuses (“−”) imply the opposite. Ambiguous results are marked by “+/−”.
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16. • Gamber and Hakes (1997) • Change in the Federal Funds rate • U.S./1955.101992. 12/monthly • Reaction function of Fed Funds rate including aggregate supply and demand shocks • Intercept and slope partisan dummies • During Democratic presidential regimes The Fed responds to aggregate shocks more vigorously in pre-election periods than in post-election ones • During Republican administrations monetary policy is more responsive to aggregate shocks in postelection periods • Monetary policy is more counter-cyclically activist under a Democrat administration than under a Republican one during preelection periods +
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17. • Investigates whether the Fed responds more aggressively to inflation under a Republican President or if a Republican majority controls Congress and to a recession sooner and with lower interest rates if the President is a Democrat • Changes in the pivotal legislator (Morris, 2000) rather than the President alone, appointment to the Board, or the Board chairman influence monetary policy choices • Congress and the President jointly influence the policy choices of the Fed in ways that benefit the core constituencies of the major parties • Fed is systematically more responsive to inflation when a Republican controls the White House and the Congress +
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18. • McGregor (1996) • Federal funds rate • U.S./1960-1987/349 regular meetings of the FOMC • Interest rate reaction function • Model explains the votes of 11 members and the interest rate selected at each FOMC rneeting • Structural parameters of the model are estimated by maximum likelihood • Hypotheses tested using conventional statistics based on the likelihood function • Impact of Democratic Governors voting under Democratic Presidents, Republican Governors voting under Republican Presidents, Democratic Governors voting under Republican Presidents and Republican Governors voting under Democratic Presidents • Democratic Governors prefer lower interest rates than traditional Republican Governors and supply-side (i.e., Reagan-appointed) Governors prefer even lower interest rates than democratic Governors.
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19. • More conservative Council majorities reacted more aggressively to inflationary pressure than nonconservative majorities. + 14 Interest-rate forecasts ranging far into post-election periods imply a weighted average of the inflation rates over all possible election results. Hence, financial investors cope with this uncertainty by trading longer-term assets for shorter-term assets and, thus, enlarging monetary aggregate just before election dates which looks like a political business cycle à la Nordhaus (1975).
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20. • Mukherjee and Singer (2008) • Inflation target: dichotomous measure that takes the value of 1 if a country has formally adopted a numerical target for inflation, and 0 otherwise • 78 countries/19872003 /annual • Spatial AR probit model on entire sample of countries • Divide global sample into OECD and non-OECD subsamples and test hypotheses within each group • Drop all twelve Eurozone countries from sample from 1999 onward • Likelihood that an inflation targeting regime is adopted will increase under a right-leaning government if the central bank does not have bank regulatory responsibilities • Combined effect of a rightwing incumbent and a nonregulatory central bank increases the likelihood of adopting and maintaining an inflation target. +
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21. • Other conditional left-labor -28OECD countries else/1966-1990/annual policy. • Effect of left-labor power on macroeconomic policy conditioned upon the degree of trade, capital market openness, the degree of capital-market liberalization and the exchange rate regime power coefficients insignificant • Pure left-labor power, however, significant with a positive sign. -
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22. • Politically appointed Governors, taken as a group, prefer lower interest rates than the non-politically appointed Reserve Bank presidents • Controlling for the state of the economy and for the prevailing stance of monetary policy, both partisan ideologies and partisan -11The total number of 24 studies in the field implies that quantitative analyses of the effects of partisanship on monetary instruments have been relatively scarce (Boix 2000, p. 44).
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23. • Serletis and Afxentiou (1998) • Monetary base • Canada/19261994 /annual • Pre-testing with integration and cointegration tests • Examination of dynamic comovements of the cyclical components of key target and instrument variables • Regressing the cyclical components of instrument variables against a list of partisan dummies • Check of robustness to alternative stationarity-inducing transformations of variables • Party political dummies do not affect monetary policy variables -
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24. • Tempelman (2007) • Actual changes in the fed funds rate along with the FOMC’s economic assessment • U.S./Volcker– Greenspan era (1979– 2004) • Narrative with permanent reference to Abrams and Iossifov (2006) • Long sample period used by Abrams and Iossifov (2006) obscures changes in trends during the period stemming from advances in macroeconomic theory and the implementation of monetary policy.
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25. • When one considers only the Volcker–Greenspan era (1979–2004), there is insufficient evidence to accept the notion of a political business cycle effect. -
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26. Abrams, B., A., Iossifov, P. (2006), Does the Fed Contribute to a Political Business Cycle?, Public Choice, Vol. 129, p. 249-262.

27. Accumulated evidence that the Fed reacts to inflation and unemployment considerations is hardly surprising, but the consistency over time of the apparent implicit or explicit adherence to a Taylor rule over a wide range of targeting procedures (e.g., monetary aggregates or interest rates) is striking (Orphanides 2003). Orphanides (2003), p. 984, notes that this historical consistency makes the Taylor rule a “useful organizing device for interpreting past policy decisions and mistakes…”. -12credible empirical set-ups are required in order to examine whether leftist governments have implemented expansionary monetary policies in OECD countries.
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28. Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Querubin, P., Robinson, J. (2008), When Does Policy Reform Work? The Case of Central Bank Independence, NBER Working Paper 14033, Cambridge Mass.

29. Alesina, A. (1987), Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-party System as a Repeated Game. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 102(3), pp. 651-678.

30. Alesina, A. (1988), Macroeconomics and Politics, NBER Macroeconomics Annual, Vol. 3, pp. 13-52.

31. Alesina, A., Roubini, N., Cohen, G. D. (1997), Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy, Cambridge: The MIT Press.

32. Alesina, A., Summers, L. (1993), Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Vol. 25, 151-162.

33. Amato, J. D., Laubach, T. (1999), The Value of Interest-rate Smoothing: How the Private Sector Helps the Federal Reserve, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review, Vol. 84, pp. 47–64.

34. Arnone, M., Laurens, B., Segalotto, J., Sommer, M. (2007), Central Bank Autonomy: Lessons from Global Trends, IMF Working Paper 07/88.

35. Bearce, D.H. (2003), Societal Preferences, Partisan Agents, and Monetary Policy Outcomes, International Organization, Vol. 57, pp. 373-410.

36. Beck, N., Katz, J. N. (1996), Nuisance vs. Substance: Specifying and Estimating Time-series Cross Section Models, Political Analysis, Vol. 6, pp. 1-36.
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37. Belke, A. (1996), Politische Konjunkturzyklen in Theorie und Empirie. (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck Verlag).
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38. Belke, A. (2000), Political Business Cycles in the German Labour Market? Empirical Tests in the Light of the Lucas-Critique, Public Choice, Vol. 104, pp. 225-283.

39. Berger, H., Woitek, U. (1997a), Searching for Political Business Cycles in Germany, Public Choice, Vol. 91(2), pp. 179-197.

40. Berger, H., Woitek, U. (2001), The German Political Business Cycle: Money Demand Rather than Monetary Policy, European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 17, pp. 609-631.

41. Berger, H., Woitek, U. (2005), Does Conservatism Matter? A Time-series Approach to Central Bank Behaviour , Economic Journal, Vol. 115, pp. 745–766.

42. Berlemann, M., Markwardt, G. (2007), Unemployment and Inflation Consequences of Unexpected Election Results, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 39(8), pp. 19191945.

43. Bernanke, B., Woodford, M. (1997), Inflation Forecasts and Monetary Policy, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Vol. 24, pp. 653-684.

44. Bernhard, W. (2002), Banking on Reform: Political Parties and Central Bank Independence in the Industrial Democracies, Ann Arbour, MI: University of Michigan Press.
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45. BGFRS (1994), The Federal Reserve System: Purposes and Functions, 8th ed., www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/frspurp.pdf, (Washington, D.C.: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
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46. Blyth, M., Katz, R. (2005), From Catch-all politics to Cartelisation: The Political Economy of the Cartel Party, West European Politics, Vol. 28(1), pp. 33-60.
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47. Boix, C. (2000), Partisan Governments, the International Economy, and Macroeconomic Policies in Advanced Nations, 1960-93. World Politics, Vol. 53, pp. 38-73.
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48. Budge, I., Keman, H., Woldendorp, J. (1993), Political Data 1945-1990 - Party Government in 20 Democracies, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 24, pp. 1-119.
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49. But referring to the well-known quantity equation, this must not necessarily be the case, especially if the growth rate of the income velocity of money is not equal to zero or if there is positive real growth. Second, the traditional studies focusing on money growth implicitly assume that money aggregates can be exactly steered by the monetary authority. Hence, as opposed to the view taken in the mainstream partisan theory literature, the adequate specification of an ideologically driven money growth cycle is still open to debate (Belke 1996, pp. 98-104, and García de Paso 1996).
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50. Caporale, T., Grier, K. B. (1998), A Political Model of Monetary Policy with Application to the Real Fed Funds Rate, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 41, pp. 409-428 Castelnuovo, E. (2003), Describing the Fed’s Conduct with Taylor Rules: Is Interest Rate Smoothing Important?, ECB Working Paper, No. 232, European Central Bank, Frankfurt/Main.

51. Chappell, H. W., Havrilesky, T. M., McGregor, R. R. (1993), Partisan Monetary Policies: Presidential Influence Through the Power of Appointment, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 108(1), pp. 185-218.

52. Clarida, R., Galí, J., Gertler, M. (1998), Monetary Policy Rules in Practise: Some International Evidence, European Economic Review, Vol. 42, pp. 1033 - 1067.

53. Clarida, R., Galí, J., Gertler, M. (2000), Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic Stability: Evidence and Some Theory, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 115, pp. 147–80.

54. Clark, W. R. (2003), Capitalism, Not Globalism – Capital Mobility, Central Bank Independence, and the Political Control of the Economy, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. -19particular countries. The marginal effect of government ideology at a maximum level of central bank dependence turns to be negative but still statistically insignificant when Iceland, New Zealand and Sweden are excluded. Hence leftist governments did not appear to have pursued expansionary monetary policies in these countries. In contrast, the marginal effect appears to be positive but still statically insignificant in specification (2) when Ireland and Japan are excluded. Furthermore, the overall positive impact of leftist governments on the short-term nominal interest rate in the model without lagged dependent variable is not sensitive to the inclusion/exclusion of particular countries.
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55. Corder, K. (2006), Partisan Politics and Fed Policy Choices: A Taylor Rule Approach, Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, April.
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56. Crowe, C. (2008), Goal independent Central Banks: Why Politicians Decide to Delegate, European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 24, pp. 748-762.

57. Cusack, T.R. (2001), Partisanship in the Setting and Coordination of Fiscal and Monetary Policies, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 40, pp. 93-115.
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58. De Haan, J. (2008), The Effect of ECB Communication on Interest Rates: An Assessment, Review of International Organizations, Vol. 3, pp. 375-398.

59. De Haan, J., Eijffinger, S. C. W., Rybinsky, K. (2007), Central Bank Transparency and Central Bank Communication: Editorial Introduction, European Journal of Political Economy 23, pp. 1-8.

60. De Haan, J., Masciandaro, D., Quintyn, M., (2008), Does Central Bank Independence still matter?, European Journal of Political Economy 24, pp. 717-721.
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61. Downs, A. (1957), An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York: Harper and Row.

62. Drazen, A. (2000), The Political Business Cycle after 25 Years, NBER Macroeconomics Annual, Vol. 15, pp. 75-117.
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63. Dreher, A., Gassebner, M. (2007), Greasing the Wheels of Entrepreneurship? The Impact of Regulations and Corruption on Firm Entry, CESifo Working Paper No 2013, Munich.

64. Dreher, A., Sturm, J.-E., De Haan, J. (2008), Does High Inflation Cause Central Bankers to Lose their Job? Evidence Based on a New Data Set, European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 24, pp. 778-787.

65. Efthyvoulou, G. (2008), Political Cycles in a Small Open Economy and the Effect of Economic Integration: Evidence from Cyprus, Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics, No. 0808, Birkbeck, University of London.

66. Eijffinger, S. C. W., De Haan, J. (1996), The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence. Princeton Special Papers in International Economics, No. 19.

67. Eijffinger, S. C. W., Hoeberichts, M. M. (2008), The Trade-off between Central Bank Independence and Conservatism in a New Keynesian Framework, European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 24, pp. 742-747.

68. Empirical tests based on the old-fashioned Philips-curve partisan monetary policy models typically assume that the inflation rate is almost exclusively driven by monetary policy, notably money growth. These traditional tests, however, suffer from technical deficiencies in different regards. First, the proponents of the traditional partisan theory such as Alesina (1988) and Havrilesky (1994), p. 117, for simplicity start from the assumption that the time pattern of the inflation rate and the money growth rate are identical at each point in time (Belke, 1996, p. 104).
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69. Falaschetti, D. (2002), Does Partisan Heritage Matter? The Case of the Federal Reserve, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 18, pp. 488-510.

70. Faust, J., Irons, J. S. (1999), Money, Politics and the Post-war Business Cycle, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 43, pp. 61-89.

71. Ferris, J. S. (2008), Electoral Politics and Monetary Policy: Does the Bank of Canada Contribute to a Political Business Cycle?, Public Choice, Vol. 135, pp. 449-468.

72. For an encompassing survey on the political economy of central bank independence see, for example, Eijffinger and De Haan (1996) and for recent contributions the survey by De Haan et al. (2008).
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73. Franzese, R. J., Jr. (1999), Partially Independent Central Banks, Politically Responsive Governments, and Inflation, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 43, pp. 681-706.
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74. Frieden, J. A. (2002), Real Sources of European Currency Policy: Sectoral Interests and European Monetary Integration, International Organization, Vol. 56, pp. 831-60.

75. Gaertner, M. (1994), Democracy, Elections and Macroeconomic Policy: Two Decades of Progress, European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 10, pp. 85-100.

76. Galbraith, J.K., Giovannoni, O., Russo, A. J. (2007), The Fed’s Real Reaction Function -Monetary Policy, Inflation, Unemployment, Inequality and Presidential Politics, The Levy Economics Institute Working Paper, no. 511, Bard College, Annandale-on-Hudson, NY, August.

77. Gamber, E. N., Hakes, D. R. (1997), The Federal Reserve's Response to Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply Shocks: Evidence of a Partisan Political Cycle, Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 63(3) pp. 680-691.
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78. García de Paso (1996) shows in a game-theoretic framework that one should expect higher average money growth rates under leftwing governments. However, a lot more studies examine the validity of the opportunistic Nordhaustype political business cycle theory instead of the partisan theory. As early examples, Meiselman (1986) and Grier (1989) find election-cycle patterns in money-growth data for the US. -62.
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79. García de Paso, J. (1996), A Partisan Model of Monetary Cycles, Investigaciones Economicas, Vol. 20, pp. 243-262.
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80. García de Paso, J. (2000), Partisan Appointments to the Central Bank: Policy Uncertainty and the Democratic Deficit, Journal of Macroeconomics, Vol. 22, pp. 471-489.

81. Germany • Berger and Woitek (1997a) • M1 and the Bundesbank discount rate • Germany/19501989 /monthly • Multi-equation VAR models with and without an additional trend component to cope with nonstationarity • Dummy for exogenous changes in government ideology • Separate estimation for right-wing and leftwing periods • Almost no support for the predictions of the partisan school, neither in its nonrational (Hibbs) nor rational expectations versions (Alesina). • It appears that to reproduce the evidence reported by literature, in some cases the implications of nonstationarity have to be ignored. -
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82. Gildea, J. (1990), Explaining FOMC Members' Votes, in: Mayer, T. (ed.), The Political Economy of American Monetary Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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83. Goehlmann, S., Vaubel, R. (2007), The Educational and Occupational Background of Central Bankers and Its Effect on Inflation: An Empirical Analysis, European Economic Review, Vol. 51, pp. 925–941.

84. Grier, K. (1989), On the Existence of a Political Monetary Cycle, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 33, pp. 376-389.
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85. Havrilesky, T. M. (1988), Monetary Policy Signaling from the Administration to the Federal Reserve, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 20, pp. 82-101.

86. Havrilesky, T. M. (1990), Distributive Conflict and Monetary Policy, Contemporary Policy Issues, Vol. 8, pp. 50-61.

87. Havrilesky, T. M. (1991), The Frequency of Monetary Policy Signaling from the Administration to the Federal Reserve, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Vol. 23, pp. 423-28.

88. Havrilesky, T. M. (1993), The Pressures on American Monetary Policy, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, Dordrecht, and London.
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89. Havrilesky, T. M. (1994), The Political Economy of Monetary Policy, European Journal of Political Economy , Vol. 10, pp. 111-134.

90. Havrilesky, T. M., Gildea, J. (1992), Reliable and Unreliable Partisan Appointments to the Board of Governors, Public Choice, Vol. 73, pp. 397-417.

91. Havrilesky, T. M., Schweitzer, R. (1990), A Theory of FOMC Dissent Voting with Evidence from the Time Series, in: Mayer, T. (ed.), The Political Economy of American Monetary Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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92. Hayo, B., Hefeker, C. (2002), Reconsidering Central Bank Independence, European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 18, pp. 653-674.

93. Hence, the main character of partisan theory is often described as a “political-macroeconomic outcomes theory of monetary policy” which works via a Phillips curve tradeoff (Havrilesky 1990, p. 50, and Way 2000).
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94. Heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) Newey-West type standard errors. (1) (2) FGLS FGLS Ideology 0.3696*** 0.0423 [5.86] [1.29] Inflation 1.8721*** 0.5786*** [8.33] [4.10] Output gap 0.0460* 0.0456*** [1.70] [2.79] Lagged dependent variable 0.8213*** [18.68] Constant 9.9678*** 1.3992** [9.10] [2.09] Fixed Country Effects No No Fixed Period Effects Yes Yes Observations 1459 1459 Number of N 15 15 Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% -7cause a significantly higher (trend in) inflation and a significantly lower (trend in) unemployment (Berlemann and Markwardt 2007, Drazen 2000, Gaertner 1994). The rational partisan theory (RPT), however, claims upward (downward) post-election blips in unemployment for rightwing (leftwing) regimes due to wage rigidities combined with electoral uncertainty. Following the more recent literature, we do not differentiate between PT and RPT any further.
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95. Hibbs, D. A. Jr. (1977), Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy, American Political Science Review, Vol. 71, 1467-1487.

96. In order to make the concept of ‘independence’ operational we have to identify the channels through which partisan influence from a specific administration and/or government may be transmitted to the central bank and affect monetary policy. Scholars have concentrated on three main transmission channels: 1) central bank appointments (Falaschetti 2002, pp. 492f., Galbraith, Giovannoni and Russo 2007, p. 18, Gildea 1990, Havrilesky and Gildea, 1992, Havrilesky and Schweitzer 1990, Lohmann 1998, Waller 1989, 1992, Chappell, Havrilesky and 6
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97. In the following, we briefly discuss the findings of three important studies on partisan monetary policy in OECD countries. Clark (2003) examines the impact of left-labor power on interest rates in a panel of (a maximum of) 14 OECD countries and finds that left-labor power was associated with higher, not lower, interest rates. Boix (2000) evaluates the impact of socialist control of government and organizational power of labor on short-term real interest rates in advanced nations in the period 1961-1994. The evidence he gains is mixed and depends on the sample and the specification chosen. Some of his results suggest that central banks under leftist governments increased short-term real interest rates compared to rightwing governments.
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98. Kane, E.J. (1980), Politics and Fed Policymaking - The More Things Change the More They Remain the Same, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 8, pp. 199-211.

99. Katz, R. S., Mair, P. (1995), Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party, Party Politics, Vol. 1(1), pp. 5-28.
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100. Klomp, J., De Haan, J. (2008), Central Bank Independence and Inflation revisited, University of Groningen, mimeo.
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101. Lohmann, S. (1998), Federalism and Central Bank Independence: The Politics of German Monetary Policy, 1957-9, World Politics, Vol. 50, pp. 401-446 Luckett, D. G. Potts, G. T. (1980), Monetary Policy and Partisan Politics, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Vol. 12, pp. 540-546.
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102. McGregor, R. R. (1996), FOMC Voting Behavior and Electoral Cycles: Partisan Ideology and Partisan Loyalty, Economics and Politics, Vol. 8, pp. 17-32.

103. Meiselman, D. (1986), Is there a Political Monetary Cycle? Cato Journal, Vol. 6, pp. 563–586.

104. Mixon, F. G., Gibson, M. T. (2002), The Timing of Partisan and Nonpartisan Appointments to the Central Bank: Some New Evidence, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Vol. 34, pp. 361-375.

105. Morris, I. (2000), Congress, President, and the Federal Reserve: The Politics of American Monetary PolicyMaking, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
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106. Mueller, D. C. (2003), Public Choice III, 3rd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

107. Nevertheless, several studies - mainly originating from the late 1980s and the early 1990s -test for ideological impacts on monetary policy and employ money growth as the dependent variable.5 In these studies money growth is typically used as the dependent variable, while no importance is attached to the degree of central bank independence as a moderating variable. An encompassing survey of the empirical results for the partisan theory till the mid 1990s is 5
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108. Newey, W. K., West, K. D. (1987), A Simple, Positive Semi-definite, Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix, Econometrica, Vol. 55, pp. 703-708.

109. Nordhaus, W. D. (1975), The Political Business Cycle, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 42, pp. 169190.

110. Orphanides, A. (2003), Historical Monetary Policy Analysis and the Taylor Rule, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 50, pp. 983-1022.

111. Other recent research has begun to rectify this oversight. Particularly notable are Alesina and Summers (1993), Clark and Reichert (1998) and Franzese (1999). -31loyalties appear to play an important role in the Governors’ voting calculus +
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112. Persson, T., Tabellini, G. (2000), Political Economics - Explaining Economic Policy, MIT Press.
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113. Potrafke, N. (2009), Did Globalization Restrict Partisan Politics? An Empirical Evaluation of Social Expenditures in a Panel of OECD Countries, Public Choice. forthcoming.

114. Rogoff, K., Sibert, A. (1988). Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 55, pp. 1-16.

115. Rudebusch, G. D. (2002) Term Structure Evidence on Interest-rate Smoothing and Monetary Policy Inertia, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 49, pp. 1161-1187.

116. Sakamoto, T. (2008), Economic Policy and Performance in Industrial Democracies – Party Governments, Central Banks and the Fiscal-monetary Policy Mix, Routledge, London and New York.
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117. See e.g. Mueller (2003): Chapters 11-13 and Persson and Tabellini (2000): Chapters 3 and 5 for a survey of the respective fundamental literature on party competition. 4
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118. Serletis, A., Afxentiou, P. C. (1998), Electoral and Partisan Cycle Regularities in Canada, Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 31, pp. 28-46.

119. Siklos, P. L. (2008), No Single Definition of Central Bank Independence Is Right for All Countries, European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 24, pp. 802-817.

120. Table 2. Descriptive statistics and data sources Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max Source Short term nominal interest rate 1399 7.69 4.84 0.03 37.67 OECD Main Economic Indicatiors (2008) Ideology 1399 2.85 0.93 1 4 Potrafke (2009) Central bank dependence 1399 0.45 0.23 0.06 0.81 Klomp and de Haan (2008) Inflation (CPI growth) 1399 0.92 0.98-1.93 8.54 OECD Main Economic Indicators (2008) Output gap 1399-0.65 2.61-12.31 7.97 OECD Main Economic Indicators (2008) -34Table 3. Regression results. Basic Taylor Rule. Dependent Variable: Short-term nominal interest rate.
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121. Taylor, J. B. (1993a), Macroeconomic Policy in a World Economy, Norton, New York.
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122. Taylor, J. B. (1993b), Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Vol. 39, pp. 195-214.
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123. Taylor, J. B. (1999), The Robustness and Efficiency of Monetary Policy Rules as Guidelines for Interest Rate Setting by the European Central Bank, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 43, pp. 655-679.

124. Tempelman, J. H. (2007), A Commentary on “Does the Fed Contribute to a Political Business cycle?”, Public Choice, Vol. 132, pp. 433-436.

125. The control variables display the expected sign and their impact is robust across the different econometric specifications in columns (1) and (2), and (3) and (4), respectively. The positive impact of the inflation rate and the output gap are in line with the theoretical predictions of the Taylor rule. Our results in columns (1) and (2) suggest that the short term interest rate increases by about two points when the inflation rate increases by one point and the short term interest rate -25Jaccard, J., Turrisi, R. (2003), Interaction Effects in Multiple Regression, 2nd ed., Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences Series, Sage University Paper, Thousand Oaks et al.
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126. The old-fashioned Philips-curve models, however, imply that the inflation rate is almost exclusively driven by monetary policy, notably money growth. Several studies – mainly originating from the late 1980s and the early 1990s – have investigated whether government ideology has had an influence on monetary policy and employed money growth as the dependent variable. The derivation of an ideologically driven money growth cycle, however, is not at all trivial and unambiguous as assumed by the mainstream partisan theory literature (see, for example, Belke 1996, pp. 98-104). Moreover, there is no consensus how parties affect monetary policy, but monetary surprises appear as an unconvincing driving force for traditional partisan political cycles (Drazen 2000).
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127. The partisan approach, on the other hand, focuses on the role of party ideology and shows to what extent leftwing and rightwing politicians will provide policies that reflect the preferences of their partisans. The leftist party appeals more to the labor base and promotes expansionary policies, whereas the rightwing party appeals more to capital owners, and is therefore more concerned with reducing inflation. This holds for both branches of the partisan theory - the classical approach (Hibbs 1977) and the rational approach (Alesina 1987).4 The traditional partisan theory (PT) is generally regarded as empirically valid if leftist governments 3
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128. These three studies, however, employ annual data. This is a serious shortcoming because central bank interest rates are volatile and can change remarkably per year. For this reason, more 10 His dependent monetary policy variable is calculated as “discount rates minus Taylor-rule implied discount rates” See Sakamoto (2008), p. 90.
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129. This signaling is apparently opposed to the signals send from the central banks which are discussed extensively in the literature. For surveys of the literature on central bank communication and monetary policy see, for example, Blinder et al. (2008), De Haan (2008), De Haan et al. (2007). 8
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130. This so-called Taylor principle implies that the coefficient φ has to be larger than one (Taylor 1999, and Clarida, Galí and Gertler 1998). If not, self-fulfilling bursts of inflation may be possible (see e.g., Bernanke and Woodford 1997, Clarida, Galí and Gertler 1998, 2000, Woodford 2001). For monetary policy to have a stabilising impact on output, a less restrictive condition has to be fulfilled, i.e. ϕ is expected to be positive. -16of the interaction term between ideology and central bank dependence is also expected to be negative.
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131. Vaubel, R. (1993), Eine Public-Choice-Analyse der Deutschen Bundesbank und ihre Implikationen für die Europäische Währungsunion, in: Duwendag, D., Siebke, J. (Eds.), Europa vor dem Eintritt in die Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion, Duncker und Humblot, Berlin, pp. 23-79.
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132. Vaubel, R. (1997a), The Bureaucratic and Partisan Behavior of Independent Central Banks: German and International Evidence, European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 13, pp. 201224.

133. Vaubel, R. (1997b), Reply to Berger and Woitek, European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 13, pp. 823-827.

134. Waller, C. J. (1989), Monetary Policy Games and Central Bank Politics, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 21, pp. 422-431.

135. Waller, C. J. (1991), The Politics of Monetary Policy: A Game Theory Model of Coercion and Bashing by the Administration, Economic Inquiry, Vol. 24, pp. 1-13.

136. Waller, C. J. (1992), A Bargaining Model of Partisan Appointments to the Central Bank, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 29, pp. 411-428.

137. Way, C. (2000), Central Banks, Partisan Politics, and Macroeconomic Outcomes, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 33, pp. 196-224.
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138. We have examined the robustness of our results in several ways. For example, the reported effects could be driven or mitigated by idiosyncratic circumstances in the individual countries. We have therefore tested whether the results are sensitive to the inclusion/exclusion of -23Clark, W. R., Reichert, U. N. (with Lomas, S. L., Parker, K. L.) (1998), International and Domestic Constraints on Political Business Cycles in OECD Economies, International Organization, Vol. 52, pp. 87-120.

139. Woldendorp, J., Keman, H., Budge, I. (1998), Party Government in 20 Democracies: An Update (1990-1995), European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 33, pp. 125-164.
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140. Woldendorp, J., Keman, H., Budge, I. (2000), Party Government in 48 Democracies (1945-1998): Composition, Duration, Personnel, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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141. Woodford, M. (2001), The Taylor Rule and Optimal Monetary Policy, American Economic Review, Vol. 91, pp. 232–237.

142. Woodford, M. (2003), Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy, Princeton University Press, Princeton.] Wooldridge, J. M. (2002), Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, Cambridge: MIT Press. -15the government that was in office for a longer period. It is important to note that our way of coding of the ideology variable gives rise to the expectation that short term interest rates vary negatively with the ideology index. Hence, we expect the estimated coefficient α in eq. (1) to display a negative sign.
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1. Do central bankers characteristics matter for Africa? Ethnic favoritism, fractionalization, and inflation. (2024). Yayi, Constant L ; Strong, Christine.
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2. Sharks and minnows in a shoal of words: Measuring latent ideological positions based on text mining techniques. (2022). Rockenbach, Ida ; Fritsche, Ulrich ; Dopke, Jorg ; Diaf, Sami.
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3. Sharks and minnows in a shoal of words: Measuring latent ideological positions of German economic research institutes based on text mining techniques. (2020). DIAF, Sami ; Dopke, Jorg ; Rockenbach, Ida ; Fritsche, Ulrich.
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6. Government ideology and monetary policy in OECD countries. (2019). Potrafke, Niklas ; Dörr, Luisa ; Dorr, Luisa ; Cahan, Dodge.
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7. Government ideology and monetary policy in OECD countries. (2019). Potrafke, Niklas ; Dörr, Luisa ; Dorr, Luisa ; Cahan, Dodge.
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8. The political economy of the impossible trinity. (2017). Schweickert, Rainer ; Beckmann, Joscha ; Belke, Ansgar ; Ademmer, Esther.
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9. The role of sovereign credit ratings in fiscal discipline. (2016). Ozturk, Huseyin ; Duygun, Meryem ; Shaban, Mohamed.
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10. Monetary policy decision making: the role of ideology, institutions and central bank independence. (2016). Vieira, Flavio ; da Silva, Cleomar Gomes.
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11. Dissecting the brains of central bankers: the case of the ECBs Governing Council members on reforms. (2015). Bennani, Hamza.
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12. .

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13. Minority positions in the German Council of Economic Experts: A political economic analysis. (2013). Potrafke, Niklas.
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14. Minority positions in the German Council of Economic Experts: A political economic analysis. (2013). Potrafke, Niklas.
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15. Minority Positions in the German Council of Economic Experts: A Political Economic Analysis. (2013). Potrafke, Niklas.
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16. Is German domestic social policy politically controversial?. (2012). Potrafke, Niklas.
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17. Does government ideology matter in monetary policy? A panel data analysis for OECD countries. (2012). Potrafke, Niklas ; Belke, Ansgar.
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18. Zum Einfluss von Regierungsideologie und Zentralbankunabhängigkeit auf die Geldpolitik. (2012). Potrafke, Niklas.
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19. Economic Freedom and Government Ideology Across the German States. (2011). Potrafke, Niklas.
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20. Does Government Ideology Matter in Monetary Policy?: A Panel Data Analysis for OECD Countries. (2011). Potrafke, Niklas ; Belke, Ansgar.
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23. The Bundesbanks Communications Strategy and Policy Conflicts with the Federal Government. (2005). Siklos, Pierre ; Bohl, Martin T.
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24. Bashing and supporting central banks: the Bundesbank and the European Central Bank. (2004). Maier, Philipp ; Bezoen, Saskia.
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25. Central bank bashing: The case of the European Central Bank. (2002). Maier, Philipp ; Bezoen, Saskia.
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26. Reconsidering central bank independence. (2002). Hefeker, Carsten ; Hayo, Bernd.
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27. Do We Really Need Central Bank Independence? A Critical Re- examination. (2001). Hefeker, Carsten ; Hayo, Bernd ; BADRAN, rema.
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28. The German political business cycle: money demand rather than monetary policy. (2001). Woitek, Ulrich ; Berger, Helge.
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29. A political business cycle with boundedly rational agents. (2001). Sieg, Gernot.
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31. Long-term appointment of central bankers: costs and benefits. (2000). Lindner, Axel.
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32. News Management in Monetary Policy: When Central Banks Should Talk to the Government. (2000). Thum, Marcel ; Berger, Helge.
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34. Does Conservatism Matter? A Time Series Approach to Central Banking. (1999). Woitek, Ulrich ; Berger, Helge.
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36. Inflation culture, central bank independence and price stability. (1998). Hayo, Bernd.
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37. A Non-normative Theory of Inflation and Central Bank Independence. (1998). Herrendorf, Berthold.
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38. Reply to Berger and Woitek. (1997). Vaubel, Roland.
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39. A model of partisan central banks and opportunistic political business cycles. (1997). Sieg, Gernot.
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