Vasilis Gkatzelis

I am an associate professor of computer science at the College of Computing & Informatics of Drexel University and a member of the Drexel EconCS research group. I also hold a part-time position at Google Research in NYC and I am an affiliate researcher at Archimedes/Athena RC, Greece. Previous Appointments: Jan.-Jun. 2024 [sabbatical]: faculty research visitor at Google Research in New York Spring 2016: postdoc at UC Berkeley hosted by Christos Papadimitriou and Eric Friedman Fall 2015: research fellow at the Simons Institute for the Theory of Computing at UC Berkeley 2013-2015: postdoc at Stanford University hosted by Tim Roughgarden Education: PhD (2013): Courant Institute of New York University (advised by Richard Cole) Diploma (2007): Computer Engineering and Informatics of University of Patras

Recent Publications

• Clock Auctions Augmented with Unreliable Advice (with D. Schoepflin and X. Tan) SODA 2025
• Randomized Strategic Facility Location with Predictions (with E. Balkanski and G. Shahkarami) NeurIPS 2024
• Learning-Augmented Metric Distortion via (p,q)-Veto Core (with B. Berger, M. Feldman, and X. Tan) EC 2024
• Online Mechanism Design with Predictions (with E. Balkanski, X. Tan, and C. Zhu) EC 2024
• Getting More by Knowing Less: Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Fair Division (with A. Psomas, X. Tan, and P. Verma) IJCAI 2024
• EFx Budget-Feasible Allocations with High Nash Welfare (with M. Garbea and X. Tan) ECAI 2023
• Best of Both Distortion Worlds (with M. Latifian and N. Shah) EC 2023
• Proportionally Fair Online Allocation of Public Goods with Predictions (with S. Banerjee, S. Hossain, B. Jin, E. Micha, and N. Shah) IJCAI 2023
• Optimal Data Acquisition with Privacy-Aware Agents (with R. Cummings, H. Elzayn, E. Pountourakis, and J. Ziani) SaTML 2023
• Strategyproof Scheduling with Predictions (with E. Balkanski and X. Tan) ITCS 2023
• Learning-Augmented Mechanism Design (with P. Agrawal, E. Balkanski, T. Ou, and X. Tan) EC 2022
• Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions (with M. Feldman, N. Gravin, and D. Schoepflin) EC 2022
• Improved Price of Anarchy via Predictions (with K. Kollias, A. Sgouritsa, and X. Tan) EC 2022
• Beyond Cake Cutting: Allocating Homogeneous Divisible Goods (with I. Caragiannis, A. Psomas, and D. Schoepflin) AAMAS 2022
• Optimal Deterministic Clock Auctions and Beyond (with G. Christodoulou and D. Schoepflin) at ITCS 2022
• Online Nash Social Welfare Maximization with Predictions (with S. Banerjee, A. Gorokh, and B. Jin) at SODA 2022
• Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions (with E. Balkanski, P. Garimidi, D. Schoepflin, and X. Tan) at SODA 2022
• Prior-Free Clock Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values (with R. Patel, E. Pountourakis, and D. Schoepflin) at SAGT 2021
• Resource-Aware Cost-Sharing Mechanisms with Priors (with E. Pountourakis and A. Sgouritsa) at EC 2021
• PROPm Allocations of Indivisible Goods to Multiple Agents (with A. Baklanov, P. Garimidi, and D. Schoepflin) at IJCAI 2021
• Fair and Efficient Online Allocations with Normalized Valuations (with A. Psomas and X. Tan) at AAAI 2021
• Achieving Proportionality up to the Maximin Item with Indivisible Goods (with A. Baklanov, P. Garimidi, and D. Schoepflin) at AAAI 2021
• Resolving the Optimal Metric Distortion Conjecture (with D. Halpern and N. Shah) at FOCS 2020
• Resource-Aware Protocols for Network Cost-Sharing Games (with G. Christodoulou, A. Sgouritsa, and M. Latifian) at EC 2020
• A Truthful Cardinal Mechanism for One-Sided Matching (with R. Abebe, R. Cole, and J. Hartline) at SODA 2020

Service

• Games and Economic Behavior (GEB)
• ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)

• ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA: 2022)
• ACM Conference on Economics & Computation (EC: 2024, 2023, 2022, 2021, 2020, 2019, 2018, 2017, 2016, 2015)
• Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE: 2024, 2023, 2021, 2020, 2019, 2018, 2017, 2016, 2015, 2014)
• Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI: 2025, 2024, 2022, 2021, 2020, 2018, 2017)
• International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI: 2024, 2023, 2022, 2021, 2020, 2018, 2017, 2016)
• International World Wide Web Conference (WWW: 2019, 2018, 2017)
• International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT: 2018)
• International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems (AAMAS: 2025, 2017)
• AAAI/ACM Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Ethics, and Society (AEIS: 2019)
• Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon: 2019)

Teaching

• Drexel Computer Science Theory reading group (since 2018)
• CS621 "Approximation Algorithms" (Spring 2020)
• CS618 "Algorithmic Game Theory" (Spring 2019)
• CS457 "Data Structures and Algorithms I" (every Fall from 2016 to 2024, except 2022)
• CS525 "Theory of Computation" (Spring 2018 and Winter 2023)
• CST680 "Economics and Computation" (Spring 2017)

PhD Students

• Daniel Schoepflin (graduated in 2023, currently a postdoctoral fellow at DIMACS)
• Xizhi Tan
• Josh Ascher
• Emma Rewinski
• Maziar Shamsipour

NSF Funding (CCF-AF)

• CAREER: "Optimal Mechanism Design without Monetary Transfers" (2/2021-1/2026)
• SMALL: "Mechanisms with Predictions" (10/2022-10/2025)
• SMALL: "The Efficiency of Clock Auctions" (7/2020-7/2023)
• CRII: "Practical Auction Design Using the Deferred-Acceptance Framework" (2/2018-1/2020)

Contact