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Non-interference in Partial Order Models

Published: 19 December 2016 Publication History

Abstract

Non-interference (NI) is a property of systems stating that confidential actions should not cause effects observable by unauthorized users. Several variants of NI have been studied for many types of models but rarely for true concurrency or unbounded models. This work investigates NI for High-level Message Sequence Charts (HMSCs), a scenario language for the description of distributed systems, based on composition of partial orders. We first propose a general definition of security properties in terms of equivalence among observations of behaviors. Observations are naturally captured by partial order automata, a formalism that generalizes HMSCs and permits assembling partial orders. We show that equivalence or inclusion properties for HMSCs (and hence for partial order automata) are undecidable, which means in particular that NI is undecidable for HMSCs. We hence consider decidable subclasses of partial order automata and HMSCs. Finally, we define weaker local properties, describing situations where a system is attacked by a single agent, and show that local NI is decidable. We then refine local NI to a finer notion of causal NI that emphasizes causal dependencies between confidential actions and observations and extend it to causal NI with (selective) declassification of confidential events. Checking whether a system satisfies local and causal NI and their declassified variants are PSPACE-complete problems.

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Published In

cover image ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems
ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems  Volume 16, Issue 2
Special Issue on LCETES 2015, Special Issue on ACSD 2015 and Special Issue on Embedded Devise Forensics and Security
May 2017
705 pages
ISSN:1539-9087
EISSN:1558-3465
DOI:10.1145/3025020
Issue’s Table of Contents
© 2016 Association for Computing Machinery. ACM acknowledges that this contribution was authored or co-authored by an employee, contractor or affiliate of a national government. As such, the Government retains a nonexclusive, royalty-free right to publish or reproduce this article, or to allow others to do so, for Government purposes only.

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Publication History

Published: 19 December 2016
Accepted: 01 August 2016
Received: 01 February 2016
Published in TECS Volume 16, Issue 2

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Author Tags

  1. Security
  2. non-interference
  3. partial orders
  4. verification

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