I’m a part-time PhD student at the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies at the Australian National University. My research focus is al-Khatt al-Sadri (the Sadrist Line) in Iraq from a social movement perspective. I have a particular interest in the ethical and methodological aspects of social movement studies. I also keep an eye on contentious politics elsewhere in the Middle East. Supervisors: James Pisctori, Tristan Dunning, and Jeffrey Malone Address: Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies
The Australian National University
The rollback of Daesh’s territorial control during 2017 has (re-)established an area of limited s... more The rollback of Daesh’s territorial control during 2017 has (re-)established an area of limited statehood in large parts of Iraq that may endure for many years. The government of Iraq projects its authority into a large geographical and political space that it shares with a multitude of other state, non-state and hybrid actors, competing and collaborating to achieve advantageous security and political outcomes. This paper examines the heterarchy of actors in post-Daesh Iraq to develop a typology and start a critical discussion about post-Westphalian alternatives for security governance in Iraq during the coming period of reconstruction and reconciliation.
The symbolic infiltration of Baghdad’s Green Zone by thousands of protesters in April 2016 was a ... more The symbolic infiltration of Baghdad’s Green Zone by thousands of protesters in April 2016 was a peak moment in Iraq’s contentious politics and demonstrated the mobilising capacity of the Sadrist Line, the civil society constituency of the Sadrist network. The protesters’ grievances—poor government service delivery, corruption, insecurity, and the ethnosectarian quota system that is criticised for entrenching these problems—had been expressed through contentious action since 2003, yet the events in April 2016 were unprecedented. The Sadrist Line is the largest and most powerful participant in an instrumental coalition that includes diverse civil society groups. This chapter conceptualises the Sadrist Line as a tolerated opposition group, which, in collaboration with its coalition, deploys an adaptable and evolving repertoire of contention to test the boundaries of toleration, make claims on the state, and portray the Sadrist Line as a credible, nonviolent participant in Iraqi civil society.
Islam: global issues, challenges and perspectives of the 21st century, 2016
See ResearchGate if this doesn't load here. PDF Password = 369297
Many mainstream discourses c... more See ResearchGate if this doesn't load here. PDF Password = 369297
Many mainstream discourses currently have a tendency to portray the ongoing civil conflict(s) in Iraq as a throwback to disagreements regarding the legitimate successor to the Prophet Muhammed in the 7th Century. These disagreements resulted in a split within the umma (‘community of believers’) that led to the formation of two distinct brands of Islam: Sunni, or orthodox Islam, and Shi’ism. In the eyes of Orientalists, and, indeed, salafi jihadist ideologues, the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Syria are merely a manifestation of this nearly 1400 year old schism. Ironically enough, Orientalists, who tend to define modernity, rationality and civilisation in exclusively Western terms, and salafi ideologues, who hark back to a putative “Golden Age” of Islam, subscribe to remarkably similar views when explaining these conflicts. In essence, both have a tendency to anchor contemporary socio-political phenomena in antiquity.
In contrast, this chapter focuses on recent history and contemporary political contestation to explain the ongoing conflicts in Iraq. In doing so, it seeks to problematise the binary Sunni-Shi’a divide. Ascribing Sunni or Shi’a labels, in itself, is problematic as group identities are not homogenous. This is despite persistent reductionism among mainstream analyses, and especially the international media. As such, we investigate both inter-group and intra-group conflict in Iraq framed by historical, political, and social context, and supported by empirical facts. While we do briefly interrogate pre-2003 dynamics, the chapter predominantly focuses on post-2003 Iraq, including the impact of external interventions, de-Ba’athification, and the imposition of a sectarian quota system, as well as the corruption, sectarianism, and incompetence of post-2003 Iraqi regimes which gave rise to the group that calls itself the Islamic State.
We are neither suggesting that Sunni-Shi’a antagonism does not exist in Iraq, nor that it is unimportant, but, rather, we examine a variety of alternative explanations that have contributed to the ongoing pandemonium engulfing the Iraqi state. The chapter argues that relying on sectarian conflict as an explanatory framework distorts understanding and shifts analytical attention away from more concrete issues and the urgent responses that they demand.
As they seek legitimacy, and the political and economic influence that it allows them to access, ... more As they seek legitimacy, and the political and economic influence that it allows them to access, the PMF groups are evolving in three main ways: as a network of paramilitary groups, as a hybrid political class with growing access to the institutions of the state, and as a (legal and illegal) economic force in diverse sectors of society.
The results of Iraq’s parliamentary election have surprised many observers, with a coalition domi... more The results of Iraq’s parliamentary election have surprised many observers, with a coalition dominated by Muqtada al-Sadr securing the largest number of seats. Speculation of the role the Sadrists are likely to play in forming a new Iraqi government requires first a grasp of their evolution.
Fifteen years ago today, a United States-led ‘Coalition of the Willing’ invaded Iraq on spurious ... more Fifteen years ago today, a United States-led ‘Coalition of the Willing’ invaded Iraq on spurious pretexts, toppled the Ba’athist regime of Saddam Hussein, and unleashed violent forces that have ravaged the country ever since.
The tragedy of Mosul is that while Islamic State's territorial project in Iraq is coming to an en... more The tragedy of Mosul is that while Islamic State's territorial project in Iraq is coming to an end, it is creating new problems that exacerbate the country's existing challenges.
While Mosul’s liberation from the Islamic State terrorist group appears closer than ever, Iraq’s ... more While Mosul’s liberation from the Islamic State terrorist group appears closer than ever, Iraq’s challenges are far from over. The Iraqi government must work to address the conditions that enabled the rise of Islamic State and manage the political tensions that may escalate without a common enemy.
The military offensive to liberate Mosul may be the defining event in Iraq for 2016. But there ha... more The military offensive to liberate Mosul may be the defining event in Iraq for 2016. But there have been others—from dramatic street politics to horrific terrorist bombings—that have shaped the country and revealed issues and actors destined for important roles in its future.
The Iraqi government has brought overwhelming force and is expected to take control of Mosul, yet... more The Iraqi government has brought overwhelming force and is expected to take control of Mosul, yet it acknowledges that the fight will continue for some time after the city’s liberation. The situation presents short-term humanitarian and security risks and longer-term political challenges that the international community is already preparing for.
While the West remains disconnected from the reality of life and death in Iraq, ordinary citizens... more While the West remains disconnected from the reality of life and death in Iraq, ordinary citizens continue their fight for an alternative future.
Iraq's destitute population continues to suffer the depredations of war and terrorism, but is det... more Iraq's destitute population continues to suffer the depredations of war and terrorism, but is determined to rectify the damage of the 2003 invasion.
Iraq’s political class has survived the Islamic State group, but can it survive the political ren... more Iraq’s political class has survived the Islamic State group, but can it survive the political renaissance of Muqtada al-Sadr?
The interests and demands of the Syrian government, rebel groups, terrorists, regional actors, su... more The interests and demands of the Syrian government, rebel groups, terrorists, regional actors, superpowers and not least the Syrian people diverge so greatly that there is little room for compromise in the Syrian civil war. Yet pragmatic compromise is precisely what Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull suggested recently.
Turnbull called for a power-sharing government modelled on nearby Lebanon’s post-civil war political settlement. What exactly is the Lebanese model? Does it work and is it feasible in Syria?
While global attention focuses on Islamic State (IS), recent mass protests throughout Iraq have p... more While global attention focuses on Islamic State (IS), recent mass protests throughout Iraq have prompted Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi to promise what many long believed impossible: tackling the systemic corruption endemic to the Iraqi political system.
But why are these protests occurring and why now? What is al-Abadi trying to achieve by such reforms? Are these measures genuine or merely designed to placate the masses? If genuine, is serious reform even possible given inevitable opposition from those with a vested interest in the status quo?
It is almost six years since the world media first fixed its attention on frustrated Arabs mobili... more It is almost six years since the world media first fixed its attention on frustrated Arabs mobilising from Tunis to Sana’a as they occupied city squares, staged mass demonstrations, and chanted “the people want the fall of the regime”. Observers continue to seek to understand how protest movements that promised so much have degenerated into repression, extremism, war, and mass displacement. Following an earlier book and numerous other writings, Gilbert Achcar, of the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London, has made a significant contribution to this discussion.
The rollback of Daesh’s territorial control during 2017 has (re-)established an area of limited s... more The rollback of Daesh’s territorial control during 2017 has (re-)established an area of limited statehood in large parts of Iraq that may endure for many years. The government of Iraq projects its authority into a large geographical and political space that it shares with a multitude of other state, non-state and hybrid actors, competing and collaborating to achieve advantageous security and political outcomes. This paper examines the heterarchy of actors in post-Daesh Iraq to develop a typology and start a critical discussion about post-Westphalian alternatives for security governance in Iraq during the coming period of reconstruction and reconciliation.
The symbolic infiltration of Baghdad’s Green Zone by thousands of protesters in April 2016 was a ... more The symbolic infiltration of Baghdad’s Green Zone by thousands of protesters in April 2016 was a peak moment in Iraq’s contentious politics and demonstrated the mobilising capacity of the Sadrist Line, the civil society constituency of the Sadrist network. The protesters’ grievances—poor government service delivery, corruption, insecurity, and the ethnosectarian quota system that is criticised for entrenching these problems—had been expressed through contentious action since 2003, yet the events in April 2016 were unprecedented. The Sadrist Line is the largest and most powerful participant in an instrumental coalition that includes diverse civil society groups. This chapter conceptualises the Sadrist Line as a tolerated opposition group, which, in collaboration with its coalition, deploys an adaptable and evolving repertoire of contention to test the boundaries of toleration, make claims on the state, and portray the Sadrist Line as a credible, nonviolent participant in Iraqi civil society.
Islam: global issues, challenges and perspectives of the 21st century, 2016
See ResearchGate if this doesn't load here. PDF Password = 369297
Many mainstream discourses c... more See ResearchGate if this doesn't load here. PDF Password = 369297
Many mainstream discourses currently have a tendency to portray the ongoing civil conflict(s) in Iraq as a throwback to disagreements regarding the legitimate successor to the Prophet Muhammed in the 7th Century. These disagreements resulted in a split within the umma (‘community of believers’) that led to the formation of two distinct brands of Islam: Sunni, or orthodox Islam, and Shi’ism. In the eyes of Orientalists, and, indeed, salafi jihadist ideologues, the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Syria are merely a manifestation of this nearly 1400 year old schism. Ironically enough, Orientalists, who tend to define modernity, rationality and civilisation in exclusively Western terms, and salafi ideologues, who hark back to a putative “Golden Age” of Islam, subscribe to remarkably similar views when explaining these conflicts. In essence, both have a tendency to anchor contemporary socio-political phenomena in antiquity.
In contrast, this chapter focuses on recent history and contemporary political contestation to explain the ongoing conflicts in Iraq. In doing so, it seeks to problematise the binary Sunni-Shi’a divide. Ascribing Sunni or Shi’a labels, in itself, is problematic as group identities are not homogenous. This is despite persistent reductionism among mainstream analyses, and especially the international media. As such, we investigate both inter-group and intra-group conflict in Iraq framed by historical, political, and social context, and supported by empirical facts. While we do briefly interrogate pre-2003 dynamics, the chapter predominantly focuses on post-2003 Iraq, including the impact of external interventions, de-Ba’athification, and the imposition of a sectarian quota system, as well as the corruption, sectarianism, and incompetence of post-2003 Iraqi regimes which gave rise to the group that calls itself the Islamic State.
We are neither suggesting that Sunni-Shi’a antagonism does not exist in Iraq, nor that it is unimportant, but, rather, we examine a variety of alternative explanations that have contributed to the ongoing pandemonium engulfing the Iraqi state. The chapter argues that relying on sectarian conflict as an explanatory framework distorts understanding and shifts analytical attention away from more concrete issues and the urgent responses that they demand.
As they seek legitimacy, and the political and economic influence that it allows them to access, ... more As they seek legitimacy, and the political and economic influence that it allows them to access, the PMF groups are evolving in three main ways: as a network of paramilitary groups, as a hybrid political class with growing access to the institutions of the state, and as a (legal and illegal) economic force in diverse sectors of society.
The results of Iraq’s parliamentary election have surprised many observers, with a coalition domi... more The results of Iraq’s parliamentary election have surprised many observers, with a coalition dominated by Muqtada al-Sadr securing the largest number of seats. Speculation of the role the Sadrists are likely to play in forming a new Iraqi government requires first a grasp of their evolution.
Fifteen years ago today, a United States-led ‘Coalition of the Willing’ invaded Iraq on spurious ... more Fifteen years ago today, a United States-led ‘Coalition of the Willing’ invaded Iraq on spurious pretexts, toppled the Ba’athist regime of Saddam Hussein, and unleashed violent forces that have ravaged the country ever since.
The tragedy of Mosul is that while Islamic State's territorial project in Iraq is coming to an en... more The tragedy of Mosul is that while Islamic State's territorial project in Iraq is coming to an end, it is creating new problems that exacerbate the country's existing challenges.
While Mosul’s liberation from the Islamic State terrorist group appears closer than ever, Iraq’s ... more While Mosul’s liberation from the Islamic State terrorist group appears closer than ever, Iraq’s challenges are far from over. The Iraqi government must work to address the conditions that enabled the rise of Islamic State and manage the political tensions that may escalate without a common enemy.
The military offensive to liberate Mosul may be the defining event in Iraq for 2016. But there ha... more The military offensive to liberate Mosul may be the defining event in Iraq for 2016. But there have been others—from dramatic street politics to horrific terrorist bombings—that have shaped the country and revealed issues and actors destined for important roles in its future.
The Iraqi government has brought overwhelming force and is expected to take control of Mosul, yet... more The Iraqi government has brought overwhelming force and is expected to take control of Mosul, yet it acknowledges that the fight will continue for some time after the city’s liberation. The situation presents short-term humanitarian and security risks and longer-term political challenges that the international community is already preparing for.
While the West remains disconnected from the reality of life and death in Iraq, ordinary citizens... more While the West remains disconnected from the reality of life and death in Iraq, ordinary citizens continue their fight for an alternative future.
Iraq's destitute population continues to suffer the depredations of war and terrorism, but is det... more Iraq's destitute population continues to suffer the depredations of war and terrorism, but is determined to rectify the damage of the 2003 invasion.
Iraq’s political class has survived the Islamic State group, but can it survive the political ren... more Iraq’s political class has survived the Islamic State group, but can it survive the political renaissance of Muqtada al-Sadr?
The interests and demands of the Syrian government, rebel groups, terrorists, regional actors, su... more The interests and demands of the Syrian government, rebel groups, terrorists, regional actors, superpowers and not least the Syrian people diverge so greatly that there is little room for compromise in the Syrian civil war. Yet pragmatic compromise is precisely what Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull suggested recently.
Turnbull called for a power-sharing government modelled on nearby Lebanon’s post-civil war political settlement. What exactly is the Lebanese model? Does it work and is it feasible in Syria?
While global attention focuses on Islamic State (IS), recent mass protests throughout Iraq have p... more While global attention focuses on Islamic State (IS), recent mass protests throughout Iraq have prompted Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi to promise what many long believed impossible: tackling the systemic corruption endemic to the Iraqi political system.
But why are these protests occurring and why now? What is al-Abadi trying to achieve by such reforms? Are these measures genuine or merely designed to placate the masses? If genuine, is serious reform even possible given inevitable opposition from those with a vested interest in the status quo?
It is almost six years since the world media first fixed its attention on frustrated Arabs mobili... more It is almost six years since the world media first fixed its attention on frustrated Arabs mobilising from Tunis to Sana’a as they occupied city squares, staged mass demonstrations, and chanted “the people want the fall of the regime”. Observers continue to seek to understand how protest movements that promised so much have degenerated into repression, extremism, war, and mass displacement. Following an earlier book and numerous other writings, Gilbert Achcar, of the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London, has made a significant contribution to this discussion.
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Many mainstream discourses currently have a tendency to portray the ongoing civil conflict(s) in Iraq as a throwback to disagreements regarding the legitimate successor to the Prophet Muhammed in the 7th Century. These disagreements resulted in a split within the umma (‘community of believers’) that led to the formation of two distinct brands of Islam: Sunni, or orthodox Islam, and Shi’ism. In the eyes of Orientalists, and, indeed, salafi jihadist ideologues, the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Syria are merely a manifestation of this nearly 1400 year old schism. Ironically enough, Orientalists, who tend to define modernity, rationality and civilisation in exclusively Western terms, and salafi ideologues, who hark back to a putative “Golden Age” of Islam, subscribe to remarkably similar views when explaining these conflicts. In essence, both have a tendency to anchor contemporary socio-political phenomena in antiquity.
In contrast, this chapter focuses on recent history and contemporary political contestation to explain the ongoing conflicts in Iraq. In doing so, it seeks to problematise the binary Sunni-Shi’a divide. Ascribing Sunni or Shi’a labels, in itself, is problematic as group identities are not homogenous. This is despite persistent reductionism among mainstream analyses, and especially the international media. As such, we investigate both inter-group and intra-group conflict in Iraq framed by historical, political, and social context, and supported by empirical facts. While we do briefly interrogate pre-2003 dynamics, the chapter predominantly focuses on post-2003 Iraq, including the impact of external interventions, de-Ba’athification, and the imposition of a sectarian quota system, as well as the corruption, sectarianism, and incompetence of post-2003 Iraqi regimes which gave rise to the group that calls itself the Islamic State.
We are neither suggesting that Sunni-Shi’a antagonism does not exist in Iraq, nor that it is unimportant, but, rather, we examine a variety of alternative explanations that have contributed to the ongoing pandemonium engulfing the Iraqi state. The chapter argues that relying on sectarian conflict as an explanatory framework distorts understanding and shifts analytical attention away from more concrete issues and the urgent responses that they demand.
Available Online at: http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/tragic-anniversary-costs-iraq-invasion/
Turnbull called for a power-sharing government modelled on nearby Lebanon’s post-civil war political settlement. What exactly is the Lebanese model? Does it work and is it feasible in Syria?
But why are these protests occurring and why now? What is al-Abadi trying to achieve by such reforms? Are these measures genuine or merely designed to placate the masses? If genuine, is serious reform even possible given inevitable opposition from those with a vested interest in the status quo?
Many mainstream discourses currently have a tendency to portray the ongoing civil conflict(s) in Iraq as a throwback to disagreements regarding the legitimate successor to the Prophet Muhammed in the 7th Century. These disagreements resulted in a split within the umma (‘community of believers’) that led to the formation of two distinct brands of Islam: Sunni, or orthodox Islam, and Shi’ism. In the eyes of Orientalists, and, indeed, salafi jihadist ideologues, the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Syria are merely a manifestation of this nearly 1400 year old schism. Ironically enough, Orientalists, who tend to define modernity, rationality and civilisation in exclusively Western terms, and salafi ideologues, who hark back to a putative “Golden Age” of Islam, subscribe to remarkably similar views when explaining these conflicts. In essence, both have a tendency to anchor contemporary socio-political phenomena in antiquity.
In contrast, this chapter focuses on recent history and contemporary political contestation to explain the ongoing conflicts in Iraq. In doing so, it seeks to problematise the binary Sunni-Shi’a divide. Ascribing Sunni or Shi’a labels, in itself, is problematic as group identities are not homogenous. This is despite persistent reductionism among mainstream analyses, and especially the international media. As such, we investigate both inter-group and intra-group conflict in Iraq framed by historical, political, and social context, and supported by empirical facts. While we do briefly interrogate pre-2003 dynamics, the chapter predominantly focuses on post-2003 Iraq, including the impact of external interventions, de-Ba’athification, and the imposition of a sectarian quota system, as well as the corruption, sectarianism, and incompetence of post-2003 Iraqi regimes which gave rise to the group that calls itself the Islamic State.
We are neither suggesting that Sunni-Shi’a antagonism does not exist in Iraq, nor that it is unimportant, but, rather, we examine a variety of alternative explanations that have contributed to the ongoing pandemonium engulfing the Iraqi state. The chapter argues that relying on sectarian conflict as an explanatory framework distorts understanding and shifts analytical attention away from more concrete issues and the urgent responses that they demand.
Available Online at: http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/tragic-anniversary-costs-iraq-invasion/
Turnbull called for a power-sharing government modelled on nearby Lebanon’s post-civil war political settlement. What exactly is the Lebanese model? Does it work and is it feasible in Syria?
But why are these protests occurring and why now? What is al-Abadi trying to achieve by such reforms? Are these measures genuine or merely designed to placate the masses? If genuine, is serious reform even possible given inevitable opposition from those with a vested interest in the status quo?