Hakan Yılmaz is Professor Emeritus at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Bogazici University, Istanbul. His research areas include (1) external-internal linkages in democratization; (2) democratization in Turkey; (3) ideology, culture and identity in Turkey; (3) EU-Turkish Relations. Phone: Tel Office: (+90) (212) 359 65 04 Address: Bogazici University Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences Department of Political Science and International Relations Bebek 34342 – ISTANBUL TURKEY Email: hakanyilmaz@caa.columbia.edu
Yilmaz, Hakan. 1999. “Business Notions of Democracy: The Turkish Experience in the 1990s”. In CEMOTI (Les Cahiers d'études sur la Méditerranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien, Janvier-Juin 1999, No. 27, pp.183-194.
This article examines three basic factors that motivated big business groups in Turkey to give th... more This article examines three basic factors that motivated big business groups in Turkey to give their support to the cause of democratization since the end of the 1980s: democratization as a means of facilitating Turkey’s membership in the European Union, as a method of putting the bureaucracy under bourgeois discipline, and as a way of subordinating the political class to the will of the bourgeoisie. Parallel to this, some important differences between the Turkish bourgeoisie’s conceptions of democracy in the Cold War and post-Cold War periods are explored. Hence, it is argued that during the Cold War, corresponding to the influences coming from the USA, the Turkish bourgeoisie’s conception of democracy did not go beyond the basics of political democracy: a relatively unfettered party competition, regular elections, and a limited freedom of speech. By the end of the 1980s, however, mobilized by the goal of integrating Turkey with the European Union, big business groups have come forward with loudly expressed demands for the expansion of political liberalization and for the deepening of democratization, including primarily the incorporation of the Islamic and Kurdish political movements into the political system. In the final part of the article, it is claimed that the chances for the Turkish state to get transformed into a bourgeois democratic state are still very low.
Hakan Yılmaz. 2008. “Secularism: Turkish Practices, Comparisons with European Cases, and Policy Recommendations”. In Türkiye’nin Vizyonu - Temel Sorunlar ve Çözüm Önerileri, ed. Atilla Sandıklı, İstanbul: Bilgesam Yayınları, pp.163-180 (English Translation of the original text).
This article was composed to contribute to the diagnosis and resolution of Turkey's unique secula... more This article was composed to contribute to the diagnosis and resolution of Turkey's unique secularism-related problems. In the first section of this article, the constitutional and legal frameworks of secularism in several European countries and Turkey are compared, and policy recommendations are developed to liberalize secularism in Turkey. In the second section, the concept of secularism as a civil right is defined, and a "secularism ombudsman" is proposed as a remedy for violations of the right to secularism in the micro-social domain. In the final section, the concept of "favorite citizen" is utilized to analyze the issue of religious discrimination among citizens.
Liberalizm, sosyalizm, muhafazarlık ve diğer ideolojilerin geçmişten bugüne gelişimleri üzerine b... more Liberalizm, sosyalizm, muhafazarlık ve diğer ideolojilerin geçmişten bugüne gelişimleri üzerine bir ders.
İnsan ideoloji olmadan hayatını sürdüremez, hayatına anlam veremez, başkalarıyla olan ilişkilerini anlamlandıramaz.
İdeoloji nedir, nereden gelir, hangi işlevleri vardır? Liberalizm ve Sosyalizm nedir, nasıl doğmuştur? Modernizm bu iki ideolojiyi nasıl kapsar? Modernizm neden tarihin gördüğü en güçlü ideolojik sistemlerden biridir? Siyaset Bilimci ve Akademisyen Hakan Yılmaz, incelikle hazırladığı İdeolojiler eğitiminde modern tarih boyunca ortaya çıkmış temel ideolojileri tartışıyor. Hakan Yılmaz, derinlemesine bir bakışla ideolojilerin bıraktığı izi ve bu ideolojiler etrafında dönen tartışmaları anlatıyor.
DERSLER ve BÖLÜMLER
İdeolojinin Tanımı
1 Bölüm
Modernitenin İki Ana İdeolojik Ekseni: Liberalizm ve Sosyalizm
Hakan Yilmaz. 2007. "Islam, Sovereignty, and Democracy". In Middle East Journal, Vol. 61, No. 3, Summer 2007, pp. 477-493., 2007
In this article, some conceptual and empirical relations between Islam, sovereignty , and democra... more In this article, some conceptual and empirical relations between Islam, sovereignty , and democracy will be examined, with comparisons to Christianity. In the first part of the article, the historical conditions of the formation of the dualist (Christianity) and monist (Islam) political theories of the two religions will be examined. This will be followed by a conceptualization of the beginning and end of their respective " middle ages. " It will be argued that the end of the Islamic middle ages was marked, in some Islamic countries, by the following phenomena: the building of a secular state apparatus; the replacement of " religion " by " nation " as the basis of the sovereignty of the new state; the deportation of Islam from the state to society; and the rebirth of Islam in the hands of the social actors as a political ideology aiming at recapturing the state it had lost. In the final sections , the problematic relationship between secularization and democratization in the Islamic world will be examined, and the experiments with secularization in the Islamic world will be compared with those of France. It will be observed that what made secularization and democracy compatible in France was a combination of historical factors (the existence of the Church that controlled the social manifestations of religion; the state's success in nation-building; the efficiency of the secular judicial system; and the state's satisfactory performance in the area of socioeconomic development), which were largely absent in the Islamic contexts, with the possible exception of Turkey.
Hakan Yilmaz. 2018. "The International Context". In Democratization (2nd Edition), ed. Christian W. Haerpfer, Patrick Bernhagen, Christian Welzel, and Ronald F. Inglehart, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, pp.103-118., 2018
This is a revised and updated version of my article in the second edition of the volume "Democrat... more This is a revised and updated version of my article in the second edition of the volume "Democratization", edited by Christian W. Haerpfer, Patrick Bernhagen, Christian Welzel, and Ronald F. Inglehart. The first edition had been published in 2009.
This chapter examines the major theoretical approaches to the issue of the international context of democratization. In particular, it considers democratization by means of ‘convergence’, ‘system penetration’, ‘internationalization of domestic politics’, and ‘diffusion’. It also discusses the principal dimensions of the international context, namely, the democracy promotion strategies of the United States and the European Union. The term ‘conditionality’ is used to describe the democracy promotion strategy of the EU. In the case of the United States, its leverage with respect to democracy promotion has been undermined by its military intervention and violation of human rights. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the effects of globalization and the formation of a global civil society on democratization.
Hakan Yilmaz. 2002. "External‑Internal Linkages in Democratization: Developing an Open Model of Democratic Change". In Democratization, Vol 9, No.2, pp.67-84., 2002
This article presents an open model of democratization in the context of discussing some well-kno... more This article presents an open model of democratization in the context of discussing some well-known approaches to the role of international factors in democratic transitions. The open model is applied to semi-peripheral states of the international system, more specifically the cases of political change in Spain, Portugal and Turkey in the aftermath of the Second World War. Starting from Dahl's conditions for democratic change, it is argued that the impact of external factors on democratization should be examined closely where the regime expects the internal costs of suppression to be lower than the internal costs of toleration, in other words where the internal balance of forces is unlikely to impel a willingness to democratize. Two new external variables are introduced to open Dahl's closed model: the expected external costs of suppression and toleration. It is shown that, in a democracy-promoting international environment, the leaders of an authoritarian state would base their decisions about whether to democratize on their expectations of both the internal costs of toleration and the external costs of suppression.
Hakan Yilmaz. 2016. "Açık Demokratikleşme Kuramı". Yayınlanmamış Makale. Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü., 2016
Bu yazıda demokrasiye geçiş süreçlerinde uluslararası faktörlerin rolünü konu alan yaklaşımlar ta... more Bu yazıda demokrasiye geçiş süreçlerinde uluslararası faktörlerin rolünü konu alan yaklaşımlar tartışılacak ve demokratikleşmenin açık bir modeli sunulacaktır. Bu açık modelin tatbik alanında, uluslararası sistemin yarı-çevresel ülkeleri yer alacaktır. Ardından, bu açık model, İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında İspanya, Portekiz ve Türkiye’deki siyasal değişimi açıklamak için kullanılacaktır. Robert Dahl’ın “demokratik değişimin klasik koşulu” teorisini temel alarak, dış faktörlerin demokratikleşme üzerindeki özgül etkisinin, ancak, iç güç ilişkilerinin kendi başlarına demokrasi yönünde bir değişim üretemeyecekleri, yani bastırmanın iç bedelinin, hoş görmenin iç bedelinden düşük olduğu durumlarda anlaşılabileceği tartışılacaktır. Dahl’ın kapalı modelini açmak için ise, iki yeni dış değişken tanıtılacaktır: Bastırmanın ve hoş görmenin dış bedelleri. Sonuç olarak, demokrasiyi teşvik eden uluslararası bir düzende, otoriter rejimlerin başında bulunan liderlerin, rejimi demokratikleştirme ya da demokratikleştirmeme konusundaki karar alırken, hoş görmenin ve bastırmanın hem iç hem de dış bedelleri hesaba kattıkları gösterilecektir.
Hakan Yilmaz. 2001. "Siyaset Biliminde Teori, Kavram, Açıklama ve Yorumlama". Yayınlanmamış Makale. Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü.
Bu yazıda siyaset biliminde ve genel olarak sosyal bilimde, akademik pratikte kullanıldığı şekliy... more Bu yazıda siyaset biliminde ve genel olarak sosyal bilimde, akademik pratikte kullanıldığı şekliyle, “teori”, “kavramsallaştırma”, “açıklama” ve “yorumlama” konuları tartışılacaktır. Tartışma akademik pratikle sınırlı tutulacak, felsefi ve metodolojik derinliklere girilmeyecektir. Bu yazıda geliştirilen tanımların özellikle uluslararası ilişkiler ve karşılaştırmalı siyaset alanlarında makale ve tez yazan yüksek lisans ve doktora seviyesindeki öğrencilere yardımcı olabileceği düşünülmüştür.
Hakan Yılmaz. 1993. "Sovyetler Birliği ve Doğu Avrupa'da Sosyalizm Neden Çöktü? Sovyet ve Amerikan Görüşleri Üzerine Eleştirel Bir İnceleme". In Eski Dünyadan Yeni Dünyaya - Amerikalı Sosyal Bilimcilerin Gözüyle Sovyetler Birliği ve Doğu Avrupa'da Leninizmin Çözülüşü, İstanbul: Hil Yayın, 1993
Sosyalizmin çöküşe geçmesinin ABD'de toplumsal teori alanında farklı yansımaları oldu. Herşeyden... more Sosyalizmin çöküşe geçmesinin ABD'de toplumsal teori alanında farklı yansımaları oldu. Herşeyden önce, Sovyet sisteminin işleyişini anlatma iddiasındaki hiçbir teorik model, sistemin geçirdiği değişimleri ölçek, kapsam, ve zamanlama bakımından öngöremedi. Ben, basit bir istatistiksel öngörü hatasından nitelikçe çok farklı bu toptan öngörü iflasının, en azından siyaset bilimi alanında, o da olmazsa sovyetoloji alanında, hemen temel varsayımların radikal bir sorgulanışına, ve bunun da ötesinde bir bilimsel devrime yolaçacağını düşünüyor, her derste, katıldığım her toplantıda birinin bu iş burda bitmiştir demesini bekliyordum. Oysa, olaylar tam tersine gelişti. Bilimin, gerçeği kavramadaki bu apaçık başarısızlığı karşısında, bilimcilerin ilk tepkisi, bilimlerini terketmek değil, ona daha sıkı sarılmak oldu. Hatta, nisbeten mazur görülebilir bir mesleki muhafazakârlıkla da yetinmeyip, işi, gerçeğin bilinemeyeceğine, dahası, ünlü bir sovyetoloğun deyimiyle, "Sovyet halısı sovyetolojinin ayakları altından hızla çekilirken", gerçeğin inkârına götürenler oldu. "Z" takma ismini kullanan yazar, bu ilk muhafazakâr tepkinin, "Güneşin altında değişen hiçbir şey yok!" yaklaşımının sözcülüğünü üstlendi. Devlet, akademik camianın bu muhazakar tepkisini paylaşmayarak, olan biteni "Allahın belası komilerin" Amerika karşısında Soğuk Savaş'ı kaybetmeleri mealinde yorumladı, ve Başkan Bush eski dünyanın tarihe karıştığını ve yeni bir dünya düzeninin başladığını ilan etti. Fukuyama'nın tezi, Amerikan değerlerinin bütün dünyaya hakim olacağı ve Amerika'nın ilelebet payidar kalacağı şeklindeki devlet görüşünün en yetkin dışavurumuydu. Bu muhafazakâr ve muzafferane görüşlerin sınırlarını çizdiği spektrum içinde, bazen bir uca bazen ötekine yakın düşen görüşler ortaya atıldı. Örneğin, sayıca pek fazla olmayan bir grup sosyal bilimci, başta Brzezinski olmak üzere, devlet görüşüne yakın durup, "Ben zaten söylemiştim!" tavrını takındılar; böylece, sovyetolojinin yıllardır boşa nefes tükettiği şeklindeki sinik iddiaları da kendilerince yanıtlamış oldular. Bir başka grup sosyal bilimci, Jowitt'in de aralarında bulunduğu, değişimi kabul ettiler, ancak, onu, dinozorların yokoluşu türünden, ani, beklenmedik, neredeyse esrarlı bir olay olarak yorumladılar; dolaylı olarak da, esrarlı olayları tahmin edemedi diye sovyetolojinin kınanamayacağını söylemiş oldular. Przeworski, Motyl ve Bates gibi sosyal bilimciler ise, hem değişimi ve hem de sovyetolojinin iflasını kabul ederek, olayları daha farklı çerçevelerde ele aldılar. Wallerstein'in, varolan yorum gruplarından birine dahil edilemeyecek tezi ise, bir yanıyla, tarih (Wallerstein için görece, Fukuyama için mutlak olarak) bitti ve dünya yeni bir düzene girdi şeklindeki Fukuyamacı tezle çakışırken, öbür yanıyla da, girilen yeni düzenin dinamiğini Amerikan değerlerinin yükselişinde değil tam tersine düşüşünde bulmasıyla, Fukuyamacı tezle çelişiyordu. Bu kitapta, yukarıda sözü edilen düşünce spektrumunun hemen bütün temel renkleri bulunuyor.
Hakan Yılmaz. 2008. "The Kemalist Revolution and the Foundation of the One-Party Regime in Turkey: A Political Analysis". In Prof. Dr. Ergun Özbudun’a Armağan, Cilt I, Siyaset Bilimi, ed. Serap Yazıcı, Kemal Gözler, Fuat Keyman, Ankara: Yetkin Yayınevi, pp.535-564)
The Turkish ideological scene has seen a strong comeback of Kemalism in the form of neo-nationali... more The Turkish ideological scene has seen a strong comeback of Kemalism in the form of neo-nationalism, defending the nation-state against ethnic separatism, European integration, and globalization, and defending the secular order against Islamic conservatism. This is the third revision of Kemalism since the 1960s, with each revision being based on a different ideology. The article analyzes the political actors and strategies during the Kemalist revolution and the linkages between domestic political developments and events in Turkey's international environment.
Carmen Rodriguez, Antonio Avalos, Hakan Yilmaz, Ana I. Planet (eds). 2013. Turkey's Democratization Process. London: Routledge., Oct 2013
Since the end of the 1980 coup d’état Turkey has been in the midst of a complex process of democr... more Since the end of the 1980 coup d’état Turkey has been in the midst of a complex process of democratization. Applying methodological pluralism in order to provide a comprehensive analysis of this process in a Turkish context, this book brings together contributions from prominent, Turkish, English, French, and Spanish scholars.
Turkey’s Democratization Process utilises the theoretical framework of J.J. Linz and A.C. Stepan in order to assess the complex process of democratization in Turkey. This framework takes into account five interacting features of Turkey’s polity when making this assessment, namely: whether the underlying legal and socioeconomic conditions are conducive for the development of a free and participant society; if a relatively autonomous political society exists; whether there are legal guarantees for citizens’ freedoms; if there exists a state bureaucracy which can be used by a democratic government; and whether the type and pace of Turkish economic development contributes to this process.
Examining the Turkish case in light of this framework, this book seeks to combine analyses that will help assess the process of democratization in Turkey to date and will be of interest to scholars and researchers interested in Turkish Politics, Democratization and Middle Eastern Studies more broadly.
Table of Contents
Introduction 1 Democratization processes in defective democracies: the case of Turkey-Carmen Rodríguez, Antonio Avalos, Hakan Yılmaz and Ana I. Planet 2 The Formation of Citizenship in Turkey-Ibrahim Saylan 3 Two Steps Forward One Step Back: Turkey's Democratic Transformation-İlter Turan 4 The International Context of Democratic Reform in Turkey-William Hale Part I:Political Society 5 Party System and Democratic Consolidation in Turkey: Problems and Prospects-Sabri Sayarı 6What did They Promise for Democracy and What Did They Deliver?-Işık Gürleyen Part II:Civil Society 7 Democratic Consolidation and Civil Society in Turkey-Fuat Keyman and Tuba Kancı 8 Democratization in Turkey from a Gender Perspective-Pınar İlkaracan 9 The Istanbul Art Scene – A Social System?-Marcus Graf Part III: Economic Arena 10 Deepening Neo-liberalisation and the Changing Welfare Regime in Turkey: Mutations of a Populist “Sub-Optimal” Democracy-Mine Eder Part IV: State Apparatus 11 New Public Administration in Turkey-Süleyman Sözen 12 Determinants of Tax Evasion by Households: Evidence from Turkey-Ali Çarkoğlu and Fikret Adaman 13 From Tutelary Powers & Interventions to Civilian Control: an Overview of Turkish Civil-Military Relations since the 1920s-Yaprak Gürsoy 14 The Judiciary-Ergun Özbudun Part V: Rule of Law 15 Democracy, Tutelarism and the Search for a New Constitution-Ergun Özbudun 16 Human Rights in Turkey-Senem Aydın 17 The Paradox of Equality: Subjective Attitudes Towards basic Rights in Turkey-Ayşen Candaş Bilgen and Hakan Yılmaz 18 The Kurdish Question: Law, Politics and the Limits of Recognition-Dilek Kurban 19 Non- Muslim Minorities in the Democratization Process of Turkey-Samim Akgönül 20 Democratization in Turkey? Insights from the Alevi Issue-Elise Massicard 21 The Political Economy of the media and its impact on the freedom of expression in Turkey-Ceren Sözeri Conclusion Some Observations on Turkey's Democratization Process-Carmen Rodríguez, Antonio Avalos, Hakan Yılmaz and Ana I. Planet.
Hakan Yılmaz and Ayşen Candaş. 2014. “The Paradox of Equality: Subjective Attitudes Towards basic Rights in Turkey”. In Turkey's Democratization Process, ed. Carmen Rodriguez, Antonio Avalos, Hakan Yılmaz, Ana I. Planet, London: Routledge, pp.330-344.
Our aim in this article is to focus on two paradoxes that emerge from a survey that was conducted... more Our aim in this article is to focus on two paradoxes that emerge from a survey that was conducted by Hakan Yilmaz (2006) concerning the attitudes of Turkey’s constituency with regards to basic rights. The first paradox is as follows. On the one hand, Turkey’s inhabitants, by a rate of 51 per cent, think that ‘equality before the law’ is by far the most important right they want to keep, compared to freedom of faith and religion (20 per cent), electoral rights (10 per cent), freedom of assocation (6 per cent), and property rights (5 per cent). On the other hand, though, most do not seem ready to recognize the inviolability of others’ rights. Hence, a cluster analysis over a series of questions regarding the inviolability of rights, which are perceived to be ‘others’ rights’, show that a great majority of the respondents, close to 65 per cent, reported that those rights can be totally suppressed by the state, if the state deems that it is required to do so. Only 35 per cent of the respondents declared that the state should in no way violate ‘others’ rights’.
How come in Turkey the regularly stated ‘strong preference’ for – some notion of – equality’s significance does not shape the political agenda and prepare the grounds for a societal consensus on equal rights? Can we interpret the existence of this strong preference for equality as the existence of a fertile ground for instituting an indivisible set of basic rights (with their civil, political, social, cultural and economic components) in Turkey?
The second paradox that emerged from the survey and we want to focus on in this article involves regional aspects of equal basic right internalization of Turkey’s inhabitants. Marmara region (which excludes Istanbul in this study) and Southeastern Anatolia’s attitudes toward basic rights are calling for revisiting generally accepted beliefs with regards to Western and Eastern regions’ liberal/illiberal attitudes toward basic rights. Southeastern Anatolia scores much better and is more liberal compared with Marmara region on the recognition of others’ rights or right to difference and political dissent, while predominantly illiberal Marmara region on the same account shows more liberal attitudes in recognition of differences in sexual identity and orientation.
The study that was conducted in 2006 by Yilmaz was covering a nation-wide sample of 2,000 people. Unlike similar studies of its kind that focus on political attitudes and values in general, the study under consideration specifically sought to assess the attitudes of the public towards a variety of sets of basic rights and aimed to evaluate the causes of variation in those attitudes. In order to analyze the meaning of the data there is need for further research, as it is the case with most opinion surveys, but the data nevertheless provides some interesting and politically significant tendencies, some of which are paradoxical enough to call for – if not readily deliver – explanation. In this paper we would like to highlight a few of the findings that emerged within the context of this study and assess their plausible explanations. While examining the data on basic rights and the discrepancies of attitudes towards rights of difference and dissent, we will specifically focus on what emerges as the paradox of strong preference for equality that reappears in this study as a strong preference for equality before the law (see figures below). Furthermore, we will focus on the paradoxical outcome that emerges when we analyze the data on a regional basis. Southeastern Anatolia appears to be the most ardent advocate of certain sets of basic rights and their inviolability compared with the Western Anatolia, which reveals much less liberal and even illiberal attitudes towards the rights to difference and dissent. Region-based finding only reverses itself on the attitudes towards the rights of difference and dissent on the basis of sexual orientation, and on that count only, Western Anatolia scores better than the Southeastern Anatolia.
In the first part we will give an outline of the study and lay out its relevant findings. In the second part we will explain what emerges as the two paradoxical outcomes that emerge out of the data. Finally, in the third section, we propose some plausible explanations and evaluate these to uncover the direction of further research that this study must lead on the internalization of basic rights among of the inhabitants of Turkey.
Hakan Yilmaz. 2016. "Kemalism, Marxism, and Islamism: Interpretive Frameworks, Historicisms, Cosmopolitanisms in Turkey”. In Many Voices of Oral History, ed. Carles Santacana and Mercedes Vilanova. Barcelona: Icaria Editorial, pp.64-70
We can discern three dominant “interpretive frameworks” in Turkish politics since the foundation ... more We can discern three dominant “interpretive frameworks” in Turkish politics since the foundation of the republic in 1923: the Kemalist framework, the Marxist framework, and the Islamist framework. The Kemalist framework has been most influential in the early years of the republic, namely the 1920s through the 1950s. The leftist-Marxist framework’s heydays were the 1960s and the 1970s. The Islamist framework passed through its formative stages in the 1970s and 1980s, it has ascended to prominence by the 1990s, and it has become the governing framework since the early 2000s.
Although one interpretive framework succeeded another in terms of influence and prominence, this succession does not mean that the previous framework simply passed away and was totally replaced by the upcoming one. On the contrary, the coming framework usually blended with the old one, borrowing from its predecessor ideas, symbols, models, and sometimes cadres. The Kemalist framework has been by far the most important and the most powerful among the four frameworks we are set to examine. Kemalism, for one, although lost its unquestioned authority by the end of the 1950s, did keep its prominence in the later decades due to its status as the official ideology of the state. Being the founding ideology of the republic, Kemalism did lend many of its ideas, notions, reflexes, syndromes, symbols and attitudes to the succeeding frameworks, giving rise to such hybrid formations as left-wing Kemalism and Kemalist Islamism.
Hakan Yılmaz. 2012. Orta Sınıflar Neyi Temsil Ediyor? In Tüsiad Görüş, No. 76, s. 29-35
Aristo’dan bu yana, genel olarak siyasal istikrarın, özel olarak da demokratik rejimin toplumsal ... more Aristo’dan bu yana, genel olarak siyasal istikrarın, özel olarak da demokratik rejimin toplumsal tabanı olarak, ne yoksul, ne de zengin olan bir orta sınıfın gerekliliğinden bahsedilir. Aristo, orta sınıfın toplumsal düzenin istikrarı konusunda oynadığı role ilişkin olarak, Politika adlı eserinde, mealen, şunu söylüyor: "Bir siyasi toplulukdaki en iyi ortaklık, ortadaki kişiler aracılığıyla kurulmuş ortaklıkdır; ortadaki unsurların geniş ve diğer (alltaki ve üstteki) unsurlardan daha güçlü olduğu siyasi toplulukların iyi işleyen bir rejime sahip olma şansı yüksektir ." A.B.D.’nin dördüncü başkanı ve siyaset teorisyeni James Madison da 1792’de yazdığı bir denemede orta sınıfların merkeze çekici ve uzlaştırıcı rolünden bahsediyor . 1950’li ve 1960’lı yıllarda sosyal bilime damgasını vuran modernleşme okulunun önemli kuramcılarından Seymour Martin Lipset, 1959’da yazdığı bir makalesinde istikrarlı bir demokrasinin sosyal önkoşullarından ve bunların içinde bir orta sınıfın varlığının öneminden sözediyor . Orta sınıfların, baskıcı üst sınıflar ve teslimiyetçi alt sınıflar karşısında yeni demokrasilerin sağlamlaşmasında oynadıkları rolü anlatan daha yeni bir eser de, Daron Acemoğlu ve James A. Robinson’ın birlikte yazdıkları "Diktatörlük ve Demokrasinin Ekonomik Kökenleri"dir .
Sorulması gereken soru, sosyoekonomik konum (gelir ve statü) bakımından “orta sınıf” özelliği taşıyan, kültürel tutum bakımından ise “medeni değerler”e (“civic values”) sahip bir “medeni sınıf”ın olup olmadığıdır. Böyle bir “merkezi ve medeni” topluluğun, hem Aristo’nun siyaset teorisinde, hem de 2. Dünya Savaşı sonrasında ortaya çıkan gelişme ve modernleşme teorilerinde, demokratik bir rejimin sosyokültürel altyapısını veya önkoşulunu oluşturduğunun iddia edildiğine yukarıda değinmiştik. Peki, orta sınıfın hangi değerlerinin sistemsel istikrara ve demokratik rejime katkı yapabileceği düşünülmüştür?
Hakan Yılmaz. 2008. “Laiklik: Türkiye’deki Uygulamalar, Avrupa ile Kıyaslamalar, Politika Önerileri”. In Türkiye’nin Vizyonu - Temel Sorunlar ve Çözüm Önerileri, ed. Atilla Sandıklı, İstanbul: Bilgesam Yayınları, pp.163-180
Bu yazı, Türkiye’nin laiklik konusundaki özgün sorunlarının teşhisine ve çözümüne katkıda bulunma... more Bu yazı, Türkiye’nin laiklik konusundaki özgün sorunlarının teşhisine ve çözümüne katkıda bulunmak amacıyla yazılmıştır. Avrupa Birliği’ne üye olma sürecindeki Türkiye’de, hem devlette, hem sivil toplumda, hem de akademideki en büyük eksiklik yaratıcı düşüncedir. Avrupalılığın esası ise, şu veya bu hazır AB kriterini kitaplardan alıp kendine uygulamaktan (çoğu kez de uygular gibi yapmaktan) çok, bir toplumun, kendi özgün sorunlarıyla yüzleşme cesaretine, sorunlara yaratıcı çözümler bulacak zihinsel özgürlük ve olgunluktaki entellektüellere, ve bu çözümleri hayata geçirecek siyasi kurumlara sahip olmasıdır.
Bu yazının ilk bölümünde, laiklik kavramının bazı Avrupa ülkeleri ve Türkiye’deki anayasal ve yasal çerçeveleri karşılaştırılmakta, Türkiye’deki laikliğin liberal çizgide reforme edilmesi için politika önerileri geliştirilmektedir. İkinci bölümde, bir yurttaşlık hakkı olarak laiklik kavramı tanımlanarak, mikro-sosyal alandaki laiklik hakkı ihlallerine bir çözüm olması amacıyla “laiklik ombudsmanlığı” kurumunun hayata geçirilmesi önerilmektedir. Son bölümde ise, vatandaşlar arasındaki dinsel ayrımcılık konusu “makbul vatandaş” kavramı altında irdelenmektedir.
Hakan Yilmaz. 1997. "Democratization from Above in Response to the International Context". In New Perspectives on Turkey, Fall 1997, No: 17, pp.1-38., 1997
The main concern of this paper has been to elucidate the following three hypotheses concerning th... more The main concern of this paper has been to elucidate the following three hypotheses concerning the postwar transition from a one party to a multi party regime in Turkey: first, the postwar regime change was a reform from above led by the state; second, the state undertook the democratic reform in response to the international context; and third, the final outcome of the democratic transition was a reallocation of political power among the state actors.
I have argued that in the immediate postwar years the internal relations of force in Turkey were not by themselves conducive to a democratic regime change. In other words, the expected internal costs of suppression remained consistently lower than the expected internal costs of toleration until very late in the transition process, when finally the opposition party organized a widespread civilian network and found supporters within the military. Although the expected internal costs of suppression were well below the expected internal costs of toleration, the Kemalist ruling bloc did indulge in liberalization and democratization under the influence of the expected external benefits of democratization: what motivated the Kemalist ruling bloc to inaugurate, maintain, and complete the democratic transition was their foreign policy strategy of integrating Turkey with the international system of the democratic victors of the war. The need to put up a stronger resistance to the Soviet plans of isolating Turkey from the West and taking it in the Soviet sphere of influence was one additional factor that further enhanced the value of American friendship in the eyes of the Kemalist leaders of Turkey. One way of winning the hearts and minds of the Americans was perceived to pass through dismantling Turkey's authoritarian regime, which was diametrically opposed to the ideals of democracy and freedom for which the Americans fought a war. On the other hand, what protected the opposition during much of the transition process was the expected external costs of suppression; that is to say, the apprehension on the part of the government that suppressing the strongly pro American opposition and tilting back to authoritarianism would inflict serious harm on the relations with the US.
Within the framework of the open model of regime change outlined above, I have also argued that the process of democratization was initiated and controlled by the state actors and that at the end of the transition political power was transferred from one set of state actors - the Civilianized Kemalist Leadership of the RPP -- to another - the Civilian Kemalist Leaders that left the RPP and founded the DP. Although it was no doubt true that the DP stood closer to the social groups and classes in comparison to the RPP, this in no way meant that it was the political representative of any social class, including the bourgeoisie. I have based this last contention on some recent studies on the historical development of the Turkish bourgeoisie, which have unequivocally maintained that in the 1940s (nor for that matter in the later decades) the bourgeois class in Turkey had not yet reached the "hegemonic political" stage (in the sense of Gramsci) or the level of a "class for itself" (in the sense of Marx). In other words, neither the bourgeoisie, nor any other social class, possessed the organizational and institutional capacity that would have compelled the Kemalist ruling bloc to a power-sharing formula. The main impulse for change, therefore, could not, and did not, come from below. On the other hand, once the change began and the Civilian Kemalists went outside of the ruling bloc for support, the support of the social classes alone, precisely because of the their organizational institutional incapacity, could not, and did not, deter the government from suppressing the opposition. The main deterrent against suppression came, not from below, but from the outside. Therefore, we can make the counterfactual statement that if there had not been any expectation on the part of the Kemalist ruling bloc that launching liberalization and democratization would bring them the much needed US support, they would not have contemplated a democratic change, and the Turkish regime would have remained an authoritarian one-party regime like Mexico's.
Hakan Yilmaz. 2001. American Perspectives on Turkey: An Evaluation of the Declassified U.S. Documents between 1947 and 1960. In New Perspectives on Turkey, No. 25, Fall 2001, pp.77-101. , 2001
During the Cold War, the leading component of Turkey’s value in the eyes of the United States was... more During the Cold War, the leading component of Turkey’s value in the eyes of the United States was its role in the regional and global security networks that were put in place to deter Soviet aggression. “Security” and “geopolitics” were the key terms of the official American discourse regarding Turkey. “The principal reason for Turkey’s international significance,” says a State Department research paper, “is its geographic location athwart the strategically important Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus” (U.S. Department of State 1949, p. 45). A CIA intelligence report, dated 1951, stated: “The alignment of Turkey with the West is of primary strategic importance to the U.S. because of Turkey’s political and military strength and its geographical position . . . . The Turkish army would be a major obstacle to Soviet advances in the Middle East through Turkey . . . . Turkey is the only country in the Near East capable of offering substantial resistance to Soviet aggression” (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 1951, pp. 3-4). Turkey’s geopolitical value, however, was a derivative one—derived from its proximity to and its capacity to defend the Middle East and its oil resources. And just as Turkey’s geopolitical value was derived from that of the Middle East, Greece’s geopolitical value, in turn, was derived from that of Turkey: “If Greece should fall to the Communists, the USSR would outflank the [Turkish] Straits and acquire natural harbors and more convenient airfields to threaten the oil resources of the Middle East and the sea routes through the Suez Canal.” (U.S. Department of State 1949, p. 1).
This security-based American outlook on Turkey left a lasting imprint on Turkish perceptions of themselves and of the outside world. This influence can be summarized by what can be called the “geopoliticization” of Turkish ideologies and discourses—military as well as civilian, right-wing as well as left-wing—all through the Cold War and beyond. Hence, Turkish political élites have perceived and presented Turkey’s global importance only in geopolitical terms, disregarding or mistrusting the country’s economic, political, cultural, and historical assets and other possible contributions to the outside world. “Our geopolitical value” has become the main argument, used by the Turkish élites against Western governments, to extract “geopolitical rents” from them. A related notion, “our sensitive geopolitical position,” was brought into play by the successive Turkish governments as an excuse to ignore or suppress domestic demands for political liberalization. Geopoliticization infiltrated into such deep layers of Turkish political thinking that long after the end of the Cold War, in response to the European Union’s insistence that Turkey liberalize its political regime in line with the Copenhagen Criteria, many Turkish political leaders continued to maintain that the EU could not possibly exclude Turkey because of “our geopolitical value.”
The deep impact of geopoliticization on Turkish political thinking manifested itself once again after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001, the subsequent U.S. bombardment of Afghanistan, and Turkey’s decision to participate in the U.S.-led coalition in the war against terrorism. Many commentators in the Turkish media and among the political élites immediately started to think that Turkey’s geopolitical value had now increased, especially for serving as the model of secular Islam as opposed to fundamentalist Islam. This geopolitical value, according to these commentators, could be used as leverage to extract more economic aid from the Western governments and international organizations without undertaking all of the required structural reforms in the economy, and to drive back some of the democratizing and liberalizing demands of the European Union. According to this line of thinking, democratization is not valuable in and of itself; it has only a geopolitical value. If democratization brings Turkey international prestige, if it serves a foreign-policy purpose such as accession to the European Union, then it may be cherished and promoted. However, whenever another factor emerges that serves the purpose just as well, then democratization can easily be brought to a standstill.
From the Truman Doctrine onward, and all through the 1950s, the geopolitical identities of Greece and Turkey, in the eyes of the Americans as well as the Western Europeans, were ambiguous. On the one hand, Turkey and Greece were seen, by the Americans and the Western Europeans alike, as part of the Near East and Eastern Mediterranean. As such, neither the Americans nor the Western Europeans thought of these two countries as belonging to Europe proper. In fact, in 1948, Turkey and Greece, together with Iran, were categorized as the GTI (Greece, Turkey, Iran) division within the newly created NEA (Near East and African Affairs) office of the U.S. Department of State (Kuniholm 1980, pp. 423-25). On the other hand, though, Greece and Turkey were members of such European and Western organizations as the Council of Europe, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC, which later became OECD), and NATO. When Western European economies began to recover from the destruction and hardships of World War II, and particularly after European integration—a process that had been started, sponsored, and supported by the United States—culminated in the foundation of the European Economic Community (EEC), both Greece and Turkey began to express their desires to clarify their ambiguous geopolitical identities, to be accepted as European states, and to join the EEC.
The United States turned out to be the prime backer of the European aspirations of Greece and Turkey. This U.S. backing was motivated by two factors. First, the United States wanted to share the financial burden of Greece and Turkey with the Western European states. And second, the United States aimed to stabilize the Greek and Turkish economies and political regimes, and to consolidate the Western orientations of these states, by linking them firmly with the process of European integration. A 1960 U.S. National Security Council paper on U.S. policy towards Turkey stated: “Successful association of Turkey with the EEC would be in the U.S. interest since Turkey’s trading position would be strengthened, thereby lessening the danger of Turkey’s ever becoming excessively reliant upon Soviet bloc markets for disposing of its exports. Furthermore, association would probably lead to additional development funds for Turkey and generally to the acceptance by the EEC countries of greater responsibility for Turkey’s economic and political fortunes” (U.S. National Security Council 1960, p. 5).
Both Greece and Turkey applied to the EEC for full membership in 1959. Both countries concluded very similar association treaties with the EEC in the early years of the 1960s. However, both countries had significant political forces—such as the supporters of the nationalist right, religious right, socialism, nonalignment, and the noncapitalist path—that were vehemently opposed to integration with the EEC, which they commonly perceived as an imperialist club. Nor did the political regimes of the two countries in the 1960s and early 1970s—tainted as they were with occasional military interventions and authoritarian rules—fit with the European pattern of liberal democracy. Hence, it is worth remembering that, let alone being admitted to the EEC, Greece was ousted even from the Council of Europe during the Colonels’ junta. The paths of the two countries toward Europe, which proceeded almost in tandem up until the mid-1970s, began to diverge significantly from that point onward. Hence, while Greece, after the fall of the junta and the restoration of democracy in 1974-75, underwent a rapid process of Europeanization, Turkey lagged behind, oscillating between the three worlds.
It seems that this indecision and oscillation of Turkey had to do more with its domestic political forces than with the foreign policies of the European states or the United States. Hence, during the 1970s, Turkey’s pro-European center-right (represented by the Justice Party) was electorally weakened and, in terms of its ideology, cadres, and foreign and domestic policy, came under the domination of the anti-Western nationalist and Islamicist radical-right parties (the Nationalist Action Party and the National Salvation Party). The center-left side of the political spectrum, on the other hand, was occupied by the Republican People’s Party, which was itself advancing a left-wing populism with strong Third Worldist overtones. Needless to say, the radical left, which exerted a significant degree of influence on the center-left and on Turkish politics in general, was altogether opposed to any idea of Turkey’s integration with capitalist Europe. Turkey’s indecision toward Europe continues even today, after Turkey has finally become a candidate state “destined to join” the European Union. There still exist in today’s Turkey significant political forces defending various non-European options, ranging from Turkey being a regional power to Turkey being the leader of a Turkic union or of an Islamic union. The decision is Turkey’s to make, caught as it is between the opposing tides of the European and non-European options, upbeat with the upward stirrings of its geopolitical value and downbeat with its downturns.
Hakan Yilmaz. 2008. "Conservatism in Turkey". In Turkish Policy Quarterly, Volume 7, No. 1, Spring 2008, pp.57-65.
Based on data collected in research, the author analyzes the trends of conservatism in Turkey obs... more Based on data collected in research, the author analyzes the trends of conservatism in Turkey observing that conservatism is higher among rural and provincial residents, among people with lower education and income, and of more rightwing orientation. The author remarks that as a segment of society rises in socioeconomic status while being politicized through religious parties, there may be a trend of reinterpreting Islam to be more congruent with the modern city realities. Another possibility is that religion will be taken as an unchanging realm and instead a stark division will come about in cities, between those of different lifestyle and worldviews.
Hakan Yilmaz. 1997. "Kamu, Kamu Otoritesi ve Devlet: Habermas’ın Işığında Türkiye’yi Düşünmek". In Cogito, No. 15, 1998, s.159- 170
Habermas’ın teorisi çerçevesinde yürüttüğümüz kamusal alan tartışmalarının ışığında Türkiye'nin b... more Habermas’ın teorisi çerçevesinde yürüttüğümüz kamusal alan tartışmalarının ışığında Türkiye'nin baktığımızda, şu tespitleri yapabiliriz. Birincisi, Türkiye'de, Onsekizinci yüzyılın sonundan başlıyan ve Cumhuriyet'le birlikte yoğunlaşarak devam eden bir modern devlet kurulması ya da devletin Weberyen bir devlete dönüştürülmesi süreci yaşandı. Bu dönüştürümün ana yöntemi de, Batı'daki modern devletin bir bürokratik aygıt olarak Türkiye'ye transfer edilmesiydi. Ancak, Rusya ve Osmanlı imparatorlukları, Batı ile başedebilmek için, Batının "siyasal teknolojisi"ni ülkelerine aktardıkları halde, bu siyasal teknolojinin tarihsel-toplumsal-kültürel bağlamını, pek doğal olarak, transfer edememişlerdi. Bu şekilde, Batı'da kendisini zapteden, gemleyen, dengeleyen devlet-dışı oluşumlardan (piyasa ekonomisi, sivil toplum, kilise, burjuva siyasal kamusu gibi) azade kalan bu bürokratik aygıt, aşılandığı yabancı ortamda tutunabilmek için otoriter rejimlere meyletti (Badie ve Birnbaum 1983, s.93-101).
Türkiye'ye ilişkin ikinci tespit ise, devletin, Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e dek kesintili, Cumhuriyet boyunca da kesintisiz bir süreçte bir anayasal devlet karakteri kazanmasına rağmen, bu anayasal devletin bir hukuk devletine dönüşememiş olmasıdır. Habermas'ın kamusallık teorisi ışığında, anayasal devletin burjuva hukuk devletine dönüşememesinin ana nedeni, onu böyle bir dönüşüme sevkedecek devlet dışı faktörlerin, yani burjuva siyasal kamusunun, gelişememiş olmasıydı diyebiliriz . Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndaki gayrimüslim burjuvazi, Batı'daki burjuvazilerden farklı olarak, devleti denetimi altına almak için iç güçlere değil dış güçlere dayanan bir strateji benimsedi. Osmanlı gayrimüslim burjuvazisi, bir iç politik mücadeleyle, diğer sınıf ve katmanları kendi önderliğinde seferber ederek devlet üzerinde denetim kurma projesinden uzak durdu; bu iç strateji yerine, devleti (işbirliği halinde olduğu Batı burjuvazilerinin denetimindeki) Batılı devletlerin ve devletlerarası örgütlerin siyasal ve ekonomik disiplinine sokmaya çalışmayı yeğledi (Keyder 1987, s.192-198).
Kamusallık teorisi çerçevesinden Türkiye'ye bakıldığında görülen üçüncü ilginç gelişme ise, 1946'dan sonra, özellikle dış şartların sevk ve teşvikiyle , tek parti rejiminden çok partili bir rejime geçilmesi oldu. Böylece, Batı'da demokrasinin tarihsel gelişme çizgisi açısından değerlendirildiğinde ortaya aykırı bir durum çıkmış oldu: bir burjuva siyasal kamusunu ve bu kamuya hayat verecek bir sivil toplumu barındırmayan bir toplumda demokratik bir siyasal sisteme geçildi. Habermas'ın tarihsel analizinin söylediği üzre, Batı'da siyasal partiler ve partilerarası müzakerenin zemini olan parlamento, genel olarak, siyasal kamunun burjuva olan ve olmayan kanatlarını temsil eder. O zaman, böyle bir siyasal kamunun oluşmadığı Türkiye gibi bir ülkede, partiler kimi temsil eder? Metin Heper, Türkiye'de 1946 sonrası ortaya çıkan siyasal rejimi "parti-merkezli siyasal sistem" diye adlandırıyor. Parti-merkezli siyasal sistem, Heper'e göre, sosyal gruplardan bağımsız bir parti sistemidir; bu şekilde oluşan parti sistemi, partilerin burjuvazinin çeşitli kanatlarını ve diğer sosyal sınıfları temsil ettiği klasik burjuva siyasetinin yerine geçer (Heper 1985, s.99-101). Türkiye'de partiler, sosyal grupları temsil etmezler; sosyal gruplar önünde partinin hükmi şahsiyetinde ve liderinde toplaştığını iddia ettikleri kerameti kendinden menkul iktidar olma hakkını temsil ve teşhir ederler. Türkiye'de partiler ve sosyal gruplar arasındaki temsil ilişkisi, bu haliyle, Habermas'ın feodal hükümdarlar için ortaya koyduğu "temsili kamu" modeline benzer. Herhangi bir yurttaş açısından ise, bir parti kendisini doğrudan temsil etmese de, partinin bazı politikaları kendi beklentileri doğrultusunda olabilir, iktidar olanaklarını kullanarak kendisine kişisel rant sağlayabilir ve bu haliyle bile çok partili bir rejim, üzerinde hiç bir kontrolünün olamayacağı otoriter bir rejime yeğdir.
Hakan Yilmaz. 1997. "Democracy and Freedom: The Redefinition of the Ideology of the Turkish Regime in the Postwar Period" In Elites and Change in the Mediterranean, ed. Antonio Marquina, Madrid: FMES, 1997, pp.27-44
The modern Turkish state had been built in the aftermath of the First World War, during the 1920s... more The modern Turkish state had been built in the aftermath of the First World War, during the 1920s and 1930s. The political, economic, and ideological foundations of the current Turkish regime, however, were laid down after the Second World War, particularly during the transition from a one party to a multi party regime between 1945 1950 and the first experiment in multiparty politics between 1950 1960. Turkey's first democratic decade was closed with a military coup in 1960, again the first of its kind since the inauguration of the Republic in 1923. What happened between 1945 1960 transition, democratic experimentation, and military intervention does in fact constitute a pattern that repeated itself twice after 1960 (in 1960 1971 and 1973 1980). For a better understanding of the later evolution of the postwar Turkish regime it is therefore essential to have a closer look at this formative period. In this paper I will examine the ideological dimensions of the developments in 1945 1960. The basic ideological themes and debates of this period, as well as the actors who carried them out, have continued to shape Turkish politics long after 1960 and they keep exerting their effect even today.
Yilmaz, Hakan. 1999. “Business Notions of Democracy: The Turkish Experience in the 1990s”. In CEMOTI (Les Cahiers d'études sur la Méditerranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien, Janvier-Juin 1999, No. 27, pp.183-194.
This article examines three basic factors that motivated big business groups in Turkey to give th... more This article examines three basic factors that motivated big business groups in Turkey to give their support to the cause of democratization since the end of the 1980s: democratization as a means of facilitating Turkey’s membership in the European Union, as a method of putting the bureaucracy under bourgeois discipline, and as a way of subordinating the political class to the will of the bourgeoisie. Parallel to this, some important differences between the Turkish bourgeoisie’s conceptions of democracy in the Cold War and post-Cold War periods are explored. Hence, it is argued that during the Cold War, corresponding to the influences coming from the USA, the Turkish bourgeoisie’s conception of democracy did not go beyond the basics of political democracy: a relatively unfettered party competition, regular elections, and a limited freedom of speech. By the end of the 1980s, however, mobilized by the goal of integrating Turkey with the European Union, big business groups have come forward with loudly expressed demands for the expansion of political liberalization and for the deepening of democratization, including primarily the incorporation of the Islamic and Kurdish political movements into the political system. In the final part of the article, it is claimed that the chances for the Turkish state to get transformed into a bourgeois democratic state are still very low.
Hakan Yılmaz. 2008. “Secularism: Turkish Practices, Comparisons with European Cases, and Policy Recommendations”. In Türkiye’nin Vizyonu - Temel Sorunlar ve Çözüm Önerileri, ed. Atilla Sandıklı, İstanbul: Bilgesam Yayınları, pp.163-180 (English Translation of the original text).
This article was composed to contribute to the diagnosis and resolution of Turkey's unique secula... more This article was composed to contribute to the diagnosis and resolution of Turkey's unique secularism-related problems. In the first section of this article, the constitutional and legal frameworks of secularism in several European countries and Turkey are compared, and policy recommendations are developed to liberalize secularism in Turkey. In the second section, the concept of secularism as a civil right is defined, and a "secularism ombudsman" is proposed as a remedy for violations of the right to secularism in the micro-social domain. In the final section, the concept of "favorite citizen" is utilized to analyze the issue of religious discrimination among citizens.
Liberalizm, sosyalizm, muhafazarlık ve diğer ideolojilerin geçmişten bugüne gelişimleri üzerine b... more Liberalizm, sosyalizm, muhafazarlık ve diğer ideolojilerin geçmişten bugüne gelişimleri üzerine bir ders.
İnsan ideoloji olmadan hayatını sürdüremez, hayatına anlam veremez, başkalarıyla olan ilişkilerini anlamlandıramaz.
İdeoloji nedir, nereden gelir, hangi işlevleri vardır? Liberalizm ve Sosyalizm nedir, nasıl doğmuştur? Modernizm bu iki ideolojiyi nasıl kapsar? Modernizm neden tarihin gördüğü en güçlü ideolojik sistemlerden biridir? Siyaset Bilimci ve Akademisyen Hakan Yılmaz, incelikle hazırladığı İdeolojiler eğitiminde modern tarih boyunca ortaya çıkmış temel ideolojileri tartışıyor. Hakan Yılmaz, derinlemesine bir bakışla ideolojilerin bıraktığı izi ve bu ideolojiler etrafında dönen tartışmaları anlatıyor.
DERSLER ve BÖLÜMLER
İdeolojinin Tanımı
1 Bölüm
Modernitenin İki Ana İdeolojik Ekseni: Liberalizm ve Sosyalizm
Hakan Yilmaz. 2007. "Islam, Sovereignty, and Democracy". In Middle East Journal, Vol. 61, No. 3, Summer 2007, pp. 477-493., 2007
In this article, some conceptual and empirical relations between Islam, sovereignty , and democra... more In this article, some conceptual and empirical relations between Islam, sovereignty , and democracy will be examined, with comparisons to Christianity. In the first part of the article, the historical conditions of the formation of the dualist (Christianity) and monist (Islam) political theories of the two religions will be examined. This will be followed by a conceptualization of the beginning and end of their respective " middle ages. " It will be argued that the end of the Islamic middle ages was marked, in some Islamic countries, by the following phenomena: the building of a secular state apparatus; the replacement of " religion " by " nation " as the basis of the sovereignty of the new state; the deportation of Islam from the state to society; and the rebirth of Islam in the hands of the social actors as a political ideology aiming at recapturing the state it had lost. In the final sections , the problematic relationship between secularization and democratization in the Islamic world will be examined, and the experiments with secularization in the Islamic world will be compared with those of France. It will be observed that what made secularization and democracy compatible in France was a combination of historical factors (the existence of the Church that controlled the social manifestations of religion; the state's success in nation-building; the efficiency of the secular judicial system; and the state's satisfactory performance in the area of socioeconomic development), which were largely absent in the Islamic contexts, with the possible exception of Turkey.
Hakan Yilmaz. 2018. "The International Context". In Democratization (2nd Edition), ed. Christian W. Haerpfer, Patrick Bernhagen, Christian Welzel, and Ronald F. Inglehart, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, pp.103-118., 2018
This is a revised and updated version of my article in the second edition of the volume "Democrat... more This is a revised and updated version of my article in the second edition of the volume "Democratization", edited by Christian W. Haerpfer, Patrick Bernhagen, Christian Welzel, and Ronald F. Inglehart. The first edition had been published in 2009.
This chapter examines the major theoretical approaches to the issue of the international context of democratization. In particular, it considers democratization by means of ‘convergence’, ‘system penetration’, ‘internationalization of domestic politics’, and ‘diffusion’. It also discusses the principal dimensions of the international context, namely, the democracy promotion strategies of the United States and the European Union. The term ‘conditionality’ is used to describe the democracy promotion strategy of the EU. In the case of the United States, its leverage with respect to democracy promotion has been undermined by its military intervention and violation of human rights. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the effects of globalization and the formation of a global civil society on democratization.
Hakan Yilmaz. 2002. "External‑Internal Linkages in Democratization: Developing an Open Model of Democratic Change". In Democratization, Vol 9, No.2, pp.67-84., 2002
This article presents an open model of democratization in the context of discussing some well-kno... more This article presents an open model of democratization in the context of discussing some well-known approaches to the role of international factors in democratic transitions. The open model is applied to semi-peripheral states of the international system, more specifically the cases of political change in Spain, Portugal and Turkey in the aftermath of the Second World War. Starting from Dahl's conditions for democratic change, it is argued that the impact of external factors on democratization should be examined closely where the regime expects the internal costs of suppression to be lower than the internal costs of toleration, in other words where the internal balance of forces is unlikely to impel a willingness to democratize. Two new external variables are introduced to open Dahl's closed model: the expected external costs of suppression and toleration. It is shown that, in a democracy-promoting international environment, the leaders of an authoritarian state would base their decisions about whether to democratize on their expectations of both the internal costs of toleration and the external costs of suppression.
Hakan Yilmaz. 2016. "Açık Demokratikleşme Kuramı". Yayınlanmamış Makale. Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü., 2016
Bu yazıda demokrasiye geçiş süreçlerinde uluslararası faktörlerin rolünü konu alan yaklaşımlar ta... more Bu yazıda demokrasiye geçiş süreçlerinde uluslararası faktörlerin rolünü konu alan yaklaşımlar tartışılacak ve demokratikleşmenin açık bir modeli sunulacaktır. Bu açık modelin tatbik alanında, uluslararası sistemin yarı-çevresel ülkeleri yer alacaktır. Ardından, bu açık model, İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında İspanya, Portekiz ve Türkiye’deki siyasal değişimi açıklamak için kullanılacaktır. Robert Dahl’ın “demokratik değişimin klasik koşulu” teorisini temel alarak, dış faktörlerin demokratikleşme üzerindeki özgül etkisinin, ancak, iç güç ilişkilerinin kendi başlarına demokrasi yönünde bir değişim üretemeyecekleri, yani bastırmanın iç bedelinin, hoş görmenin iç bedelinden düşük olduğu durumlarda anlaşılabileceği tartışılacaktır. Dahl’ın kapalı modelini açmak için ise, iki yeni dış değişken tanıtılacaktır: Bastırmanın ve hoş görmenin dış bedelleri. Sonuç olarak, demokrasiyi teşvik eden uluslararası bir düzende, otoriter rejimlerin başında bulunan liderlerin, rejimi demokratikleştirme ya da demokratikleştirmeme konusundaki karar alırken, hoş görmenin ve bastırmanın hem iç hem de dış bedelleri hesaba kattıkları gösterilecektir.
Hakan Yilmaz. 2001. "Siyaset Biliminde Teori, Kavram, Açıklama ve Yorumlama". Yayınlanmamış Makale. Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü.
Bu yazıda siyaset biliminde ve genel olarak sosyal bilimde, akademik pratikte kullanıldığı şekliy... more Bu yazıda siyaset biliminde ve genel olarak sosyal bilimde, akademik pratikte kullanıldığı şekliyle, “teori”, “kavramsallaştırma”, “açıklama” ve “yorumlama” konuları tartışılacaktır. Tartışma akademik pratikle sınırlı tutulacak, felsefi ve metodolojik derinliklere girilmeyecektir. Bu yazıda geliştirilen tanımların özellikle uluslararası ilişkiler ve karşılaştırmalı siyaset alanlarında makale ve tez yazan yüksek lisans ve doktora seviyesindeki öğrencilere yardımcı olabileceği düşünülmüştür.
Hakan Yılmaz. 1993. "Sovyetler Birliği ve Doğu Avrupa'da Sosyalizm Neden Çöktü? Sovyet ve Amerikan Görüşleri Üzerine Eleştirel Bir İnceleme". In Eski Dünyadan Yeni Dünyaya - Amerikalı Sosyal Bilimcilerin Gözüyle Sovyetler Birliği ve Doğu Avrupa'da Leninizmin Çözülüşü, İstanbul: Hil Yayın, 1993
Sosyalizmin çöküşe geçmesinin ABD'de toplumsal teori alanında farklı yansımaları oldu. Herşeyden... more Sosyalizmin çöküşe geçmesinin ABD'de toplumsal teori alanında farklı yansımaları oldu. Herşeyden önce, Sovyet sisteminin işleyişini anlatma iddiasındaki hiçbir teorik model, sistemin geçirdiği değişimleri ölçek, kapsam, ve zamanlama bakımından öngöremedi. Ben, basit bir istatistiksel öngörü hatasından nitelikçe çok farklı bu toptan öngörü iflasının, en azından siyaset bilimi alanında, o da olmazsa sovyetoloji alanında, hemen temel varsayımların radikal bir sorgulanışına, ve bunun da ötesinde bir bilimsel devrime yolaçacağını düşünüyor, her derste, katıldığım her toplantıda birinin bu iş burda bitmiştir demesini bekliyordum. Oysa, olaylar tam tersine gelişti. Bilimin, gerçeği kavramadaki bu apaçık başarısızlığı karşısında, bilimcilerin ilk tepkisi, bilimlerini terketmek değil, ona daha sıkı sarılmak oldu. Hatta, nisbeten mazur görülebilir bir mesleki muhafazakârlıkla da yetinmeyip, işi, gerçeğin bilinemeyeceğine, dahası, ünlü bir sovyetoloğun deyimiyle, "Sovyet halısı sovyetolojinin ayakları altından hızla çekilirken", gerçeğin inkârına götürenler oldu. "Z" takma ismini kullanan yazar, bu ilk muhafazakâr tepkinin, "Güneşin altında değişen hiçbir şey yok!" yaklaşımının sözcülüğünü üstlendi. Devlet, akademik camianın bu muhazakar tepkisini paylaşmayarak, olan biteni "Allahın belası komilerin" Amerika karşısında Soğuk Savaş'ı kaybetmeleri mealinde yorumladı, ve Başkan Bush eski dünyanın tarihe karıştığını ve yeni bir dünya düzeninin başladığını ilan etti. Fukuyama'nın tezi, Amerikan değerlerinin bütün dünyaya hakim olacağı ve Amerika'nın ilelebet payidar kalacağı şeklindeki devlet görüşünün en yetkin dışavurumuydu. Bu muhafazakâr ve muzafferane görüşlerin sınırlarını çizdiği spektrum içinde, bazen bir uca bazen ötekine yakın düşen görüşler ortaya atıldı. Örneğin, sayıca pek fazla olmayan bir grup sosyal bilimci, başta Brzezinski olmak üzere, devlet görüşüne yakın durup, "Ben zaten söylemiştim!" tavrını takındılar; böylece, sovyetolojinin yıllardır boşa nefes tükettiği şeklindeki sinik iddiaları da kendilerince yanıtlamış oldular. Bir başka grup sosyal bilimci, Jowitt'in de aralarında bulunduğu, değişimi kabul ettiler, ancak, onu, dinozorların yokoluşu türünden, ani, beklenmedik, neredeyse esrarlı bir olay olarak yorumladılar; dolaylı olarak da, esrarlı olayları tahmin edemedi diye sovyetolojinin kınanamayacağını söylemiş oldular. Przeworski, Motyl ve Bates gibi sosyal bilimciler ise, hem değişimi ve hem de sovyetolojinin iflasını kabul ederek, olayları daha farklı çerçevelerde ele aldılar. Wallerstein'in, varolan yorum gruplarından birine dahil edilemeyecek tezi ise, bir yanıyla, tarih (Wallerstein için görece, Fukuyama için mutlak olarak) bitti ve dünya yeni bir düzene girdi şeklindeki Fukuyamacı tezle çakışırken, öbür yanıyla da, girilen yeni düzenin dinamiğini Amerikan değerlerinin yükselişinde değil tam tersine düşüşünde bulmasıyla, Fukuyamacı tezle çelişiyordu. Bu kitapta, yukarıda sözü edilen düşünce spektrumunun hemen bütün temel renkleri bulunuyor.
Hakan Yılmaz. 2008. "The Kemalist Revolution and the Foundation of the One-Party Regime in Turkey: A Political Analysis". In Prof. Dr. Ergun Özbudun’a Armağan, Cilt I, Siyaset Bilimi, ed. Serap Yazıcı, Kemal Gözler, Fuat Keyman, Ankara: Yetkin Yayınevi, pp.535-564)
The Turkish ideological scene has seen a strong comeback of Kemalism in the form of neo-nationali... more The Turkish ideological scene has seen a strong comeback of Kemalism in the form of neo-nationalism, defending the nation-state against ethnic separatism, European integration, and globalization, and defending the secular order against Islamic conservatism. This is the third revision of Kemalism since the 1960s, with each revision being based on a different ideology. The article analyzes the political actors and strategies during the Kemalist revolution and the linkages between domestic political developments and events in Turkey's international environment.
Carmen Rodriguez, Antonio Avalos, Hakan Yilmaz, Ana I. Planet (eds). 2013. Turkey's Democratization Process. London: Routledge., Oct 2013
Since the end of the 1980 coup d’état Turkey has been in the midst of a complex process of democr... more Since the end of the 1980 coup d’état Turkey has been in the midst of a complex process of democratization. Applying methodological pluralism in order to provide a comprehensive analysis of this process in a Turkish context, this book brings together contributions from prominent, Turkish, English, French, and Spanish scholars.
Turkey’s Democratization Process utilises the theoretical framework of J.J. Linz and A.C. Stepan in order to assess the complex process of democratization in Turkey. This framework takes into account five interacting features of Turkey’s polity when making this assessment, namely: whether the underlying legal and socioeconomic conditions are conducive for the development of a free and participant society; if a relatively autonomous political society exists; whether there are legal guarantees for citizens’ freedoms; if there exists a state bureaucracy which can be used by a democratic government; and whether the type and pace of Turkish economic development contributes to this process.
Examining the Turkish case in light of this framework, this book seeks to combine analyses that will help assess the process of democratization in Turkey to date and will be of interest to scholars and researchers interested in Turkish Politics, Democratization and Middle Eastern Studies more broadly.
Table of Contents
Introduction 1 Democratization processes in defective democracies: the case of Turkey-Carmen Rodríguez, Antonio Avalos, Hakan Yılmaz and Ana I. Planet 2 The Formation of Citizenship in Turkey-Ibrahim Saylan 3 Two Steps Forward One Step Back: Turkey's Democratic Transformation-İlter Turan 4 The International Context of Democratic Reform in Turkey-William Hale Part I:Political Society 5 Party System and Democratic Consolidation in Turkey: Problems and Prospects-Sabri Sayarı 6What did They Promise for Democracy and What Did They Deliver?-Işık Gürleyen Part II:Civil Society 7 Democratic Consolidation and Civil Society in Turkey-Fuat Keyman and Tuba Kancı 8 Democratization in Turkey from a Gender Perspective-Pınar İlkaracan 9 The Istanbul Art Scene – A Social System?-Marcus Graf Part III: Economic Arena 10 Deepening Neo-liberalisation and the Changing Welfare Regime in Turkey: Mutations of a Populist “Sub-Optimal” Democracy-Mine Eder Part IV: State Apparatus 11 New Public Administration in Turkey-Süleyman Sözen 12 Determinants of Tax Evasion by Households: Evidence from Turkey-Ali Çarkoğlu and Fikret Adaman 13 From Tutelary Powers & Interventions to Civilian Control: an Overview of Turkish Civil-Military Relations since the 1920s-Yaprak Gürsoy 14 The Judiciary-Ergun Özbudun Part V: Rule of Law 15 Democracy, Tutelarism and the Search for a New Constitution-Ergun Özbudun 16 Human Rights in Turkey-Senem Aydın 17 The Paradox of Equality: Subjective Attitudes Towards basic Rights in Turkey-Ayşen Candaş Bilgen and Hakan Yılmaz 18 The Kurdish Question: Law, Politics and the Limits of Recognition-Dilek Kurban 19 Non- Muslim Minorities in the Democratization Process of Turkey-Samim Akgönül 20 Democratization in Turkey? Insights from the Alevi Issue-Elise Massicard 21 The Political Economy of the media and its impact on the freedom of expression in Turkey-Ceren Sözeri Conclusion Some Observations on Turkey's Democratization Process-Carmen Rodríguez, Antonio Avalos, Hakan Yılmaz and Ana I. Planet.
Hakan Yılmaz and Ayşen Candaş. 2014. “The Paradox of Equality: Subjective Attitudes Towards basic Rights in Turkey”. In Turkey's Democratization Process, ed. Carmen Rodriguez, Antonio Avalos, Hakan Yılmaz, Ana I. Planet, London: Routledge, pp.330-344.
Our aim in this article is to focus on two paradoxes that emerge from a survey that was conducted... more Our aim in this article is to focus on two paradoxes that emerge from a survey that was conducted by Hakan Yilmaz (2006) concerning the attitudes of Turkey’s constituency with regards to basic rights. The first paradox is as follows. On the one hand, Turkey’s inhabitants, by a rate of 51 per cent, think that ‘equality before the law’ is by far the most important right they want to keep, compared to freedom of faith and religion (20 per cent), electoral rights (10 per cent), freedom of assocation (6 per cent), and property rights (5 per cent). On the other hand, though, most do not seem ready to recognize the inviolability of others’ rights. Hence, a cluster analysis over a series of questions regarding the inviolability of rights, which are perceived to be ‘others’ rights’, show that a great majority of the respondents, close to 65 per cent, reported that those rights can be totally suppressed by the state, if the state deems that it is required to do so. Only 35 per cent of the respondents declared that the state should in no way violate ‘others’ rights’.
How come in Turkey the regularly stated ‘strong preference’ for – some notion of – equality’s significance does not shape the political agenda and prepare the grounds for a societal consensus on equal rights? Can we interpret the existence of this strong preference for equality as the existence of a fertile ground for instituting an indivisible set of basic rights (with their civil, political, social, cultural and economic components) in Turkey?
The second paradox that emerged from the survey and we want to focus on in this article involves regional aspects of equal basic right internalization of Turkey’s inhabitants. Marmara region (which excludes Istanbul in this study) and Southeastern Anatolia’s attitudes toward basic rights are calling for revisiting generally accepted beliefs with regards to Western and Eastern regions’ liberal/illiberal attitudes toward basic rights. Southeastern Anatolia scores much better and is more liberal compared with Marmara region on the recognition of others’ rights or right to difference and political dissent, while predominantly illiberal Marmara region on the same account shows more liberal attitudes in recognition of differences in sexual identity and orientation.
The study that was conducted in 2006 by Yilmaz was covering a nation-wide sample of 2,000 people. Unlike similar studies of its kind that focus on political attitudes and values in general, the study under consideration specifically sought to assess the attitudes of the public towards a variety of sets of basic rights and aimed to evaluate the causes of variation in those attitudes. In order to analyze the meaning of the data there is need for further research, as it is the case with most opinion surveys, but the data nevertheless provides some interesting and politically significant tendencies, some of which are paradoxical enough to call for – if not readily deliver – explanation. In this paper we would like to highlight a few of the findings that emerged within the context of this study and assess their plausible explanations. While examining the data on basic rights and the discrepancies of attitudes towards rights of difference and dissent, we will specifically focus on what emerges as the paradox of strong preference for equality that reappears in this study as a strong preference for equality before the law (see figures below). Furthermore, we will focus on the paradoxical outcome that emerges when we analyze the data on a regional basis. Southeastern Anatolia appears to be the most ardent advocate of certain sets of basic rights and their inviolability compared with the Western Anatolia, which reveals much less liberal and even illiberal attitudes towards the rights to difference and dissent. Region-based finding only reverses itself on the attitudes towards the rights of difference and dissent on the basis of sexual orientation, and on that count only, Western Anatolia scores better than the Southeastern Anatolia.
In the first part we will give an outline of the study and lay out its relevant findings. In the second part we will explain what emerges as the two paradoxical outcomes that emerge out of the data. Finally, in the third section, we propose some plausible explanations and evaluate these to uncover the direction of further research that this study must lead on the internalization of basic rights among of the inhabitants of Turkey.
Hakan Yilmaz. 2016. "Kemalism, Marxism, and Islamism: Interpretive Frameworks, Historicisms, Cosmopolitanisms in Turkey”. In Many Voices of Oral History, ed. Carles Santacana and Mercedes Vilanova. Barcelona: Icaria Editorial, pp.64-70
We can discern three dominant “interpretive frameworks” in Turkish politics since the foundation ... more We can discern three dominant “interpretive frameworks” in Turkish politics since the foundation of the republic in 1923: the Kemalist framework, the Marxist framework, and the Islamist framework. The Kemalist framework has been most influential in the early years of the republic, namely the 1920s through the 1950s. The leftist-Marxist framework’s heydays were the 1960s and the 1970s. The Islamist framework passed through its formative stages in the 1970s and 1980s, it has ascended to prominence by the 1990s, and it has become the governing framework since the early 2000s.
Although one interpretive framework succeeded another in terms of influence and prominence, this succession does not mean that the previous framework simply passed away and was totally replaced by the upcoming one. On the contrary, the coming framework usually blended with the old one, borrowing from its predecessor ideas, symbols, models, and sometimes cadres. The Kemalist framework has been by far the most important and the most powerful among the four frameworks we are set to examine. Kemalism, for one, although lost its unquestioned authority by the end of the 1950s, did keep its prominence in the later decades due to its status as the official ideology of the state. Being the founding ideology of the republic, Kemalism did lend many of its ideas, notions, reflexes, syndromes, symbols and attitudes to the succeeding frameworks, giving rise to such hybrid formations as left-wing Kemalism and Kemalist Islamism.
Hakan Yılmaz. 2012. Orta Sınıflar Neyi Temsil Ediyor? In Tüsiad Görüş, No. 76, s. 29-35
Aristo’dan bu yana, genel olarak siyasal istikrarın, özel olarak da demokratik rejimin toplumsal ... more Aristo’dan bu yana, genel olarak siyasal istikrarın, özel olarak da demokratik rejimin toplumsal tabanı olarak, ne yoksul, ne de zengin olan bir orta sınıfın gerekliliğinden bahsedilir. Aristo, orta sınıfın toplumsal düzenin istikrarı konusunda oynadığı role ilişkin olarak, Politika adlı eserinde, mealen, şunu söylüyor: "Bir siyasi toplulukdaki en iyi ortaklık, ortadaki kişiler aracılığıyla kurulmuş ortaklıkdır; ortadaki unsurların geniş ve diğer (alltaki ve üstteki) unsurlardan daha güçlü olduğu siyasi toplulukların iyi işleyen bir rejime sahip olma şansı yüksektir ." A.B.D.’nin dördüncü başkanı ve siyaset teorisyeni James Madison da 1792’de yazdığı bir denemede orta sınıfların merkeze çekici ve uzlaştırıcı rolünden bahsediyor . 1950’li ve 1960’lı yıllarda sosyal bilime damgasını vuran modernleşme okulunun önemli kuramcılarından Seymour Martin Lipset, 1959’da yazdığı bir makalesinde istikrarlı bir demokrasinin sosyal önkoşullarından ve bunların içinde bir orta sınıfın varlığının öneminden sözediyor . Orta sınıfların, baskıcı üst sınıflar ve teslimiyetçi alt sınıflar karşısında yeni demokrasilerin sağlamlaşmasında oynadıkları rolü anlatan daha yeni bir eser de, Daron Acemoğlu ve James A. Robinson’ın birlikte yazdıkları "Diktatörlük ve Demokrasinin Ekonomik Kökenleri"dir .
Sorulması gereken soru, sosyoekonomik konum (gelir ve statü) bakımından “orta sınıf” özelliği taşıyan, kültürel tutum bakımından ise “medeni değerler”e (“civic values”) sahip bir “medeni sınıf”ın olup olmadığıdır. Böyle bir “merkezi ve medeni” topluluğun, hem Aristo’nun siyaset teorisinde, hem de 2. Dünya Savaşı sonrasında ortaya çıkan gelişme ve modernleşme teorilerinde, demokratik bir rejimin sosyokültürel altyapısını veya önkoşulunu oluşturduğunun iddia edildiğine yukarıda değinmiştik. Peki, orta sınıfın hangi değerlerinin sistemsel istikrara ve demokratik rejime katkı yapabileceği düşünülmüştür?
Hakan Yılmaz. 2008. “Laiklik: Türkiye’deki Uygulamalar, Avrupa ile Kıyaslamalar, Politika Önerileri”. In Türkiye’nin Vizyonu - Temel Sorunlar ve Çözüm Önerileri, ed. Atilla Sandıklı, İstanbul: Bilgesam Yayınları, pp.163-180
Bu yazı, Türkiye’nin laiklik konusundaki özgün sorunlarının teşhisine ve çözümüne katkıda bulunma... more Bu yazı, Türkiye’nin laiklik konusundaki özgün sorunlarının teşhisine ve çözümüne katkıda bulunmak amacıyla yazılmıştır. Avrupa Birliği’ne üye olma sürecindeki Türkiye’de, hem devlette, hem sivil toplumda, hem de akademideki en büyük eksiklik yaratıcı düşüncedir. Avrupalılığın esası ise, şu veya bu hazır AB kriterini kitaplardan alıp kendine uygulamaktan (çoğu kez de uygular gibi yapmaktan) çok, bir toplumun, kendi özgün sorunlarıyla yüzleşme cesaretine, sorunlara yaratıcı çözümler bulacak zihinsel özgürlük ve olgunluktaki entellektüellere, ve bu çözümleri hayata geçirecek siyasi kurumlara sahip olmasıdır.
Bu yazının ilk bölümünde, laiklik kavramının bazı Avrupa ülkeleri ve Türkiye’deki anayasal ve yasal çerçeveleri karşılaştırılmakta, Türkiye’deki laikliğin liberal çizgide reforme edilmesi için politika önerileri geliştirilmektedir. İkinci bölümde, bir yurttaşlık hakkı olarak laiklik kavramı tanımlanarak, mikro-sosyal alandaki laiklik hakkı ihlallerine bir çözüm olması amacıyla “laiklik ombudsmanlığı” kurumunun hayata geçirilmesi önerilmektedir. Son bölümde ise, vatandaşlar arasındaki dinsel ayrımcılık konusu “makbul vatandaş” kavramı altında irdelenmektedir.
Hakan Yilmaz. 1997. "Democratization from Above in Response to the International Context". In New Perspectives on Turkey, Fall 1997, No: 17, pp.1-38., 1997
The main concern of this paper has been to elucidate the following three hypotheses concerning th... more The main concern of this paper has been to elucidate the following three hypotheses concerning the postwar transition from a one party to a multi party regime in Turkey: first, the postwar regime change was a reform from above led by the state; second, the state undertook the democratic reform in response to the international context; and third, the final outcome of the democratic transition was a reallocation of political power among the state actors.
I have argued that in the immediate postwar years the internal relations of force in Turkey were not by themselves conducive to a democratic regime change. In other words, the expected internal costs of suppression remained consistently lower than the expected internal costs of toleration until very late in the transition process, when finally the opposition party organized a widespread civilian network and found supporters within the military. Although the expected internal costs of suppression were well below the expected internal costs of toleration, the Kemalist ruling bloc did indulge in liberalization and democratization under the influence of the expected external benefits of democratization: what motivated the Kemalist ruling bloc to inaugurate, maintain, and complete the democratic transition was their foreign policy strategy of integrating Turkey with the international system of the democratic victors of the war. The need to put up a stronger resistance to the Soviet plans of isolating Turkey from the West and taking it in the Soviet sphere of influence was one additional factor that further enhanced the value of American friendship in the eyes of the Kemalist leaders of Turkey. One way of winning the hearts and minds of the Americans was perceived to pass through dismantling Turkey's authoritarian regime, which was diametrically opposed to the ideals of democracy and freedom for which the Americans fought a war. On the other hand, what protected the opposition during much of the transition process was the expected external costs of suppression; that is to say, the apprehension on the part of the government that suppressing the strongly pro American opposition and tilting back to authoritarianism would inflict serious harm on the relations with the US.
Within the framework of the open model of regime change outlined above, I have also argued that the process of democratization was initiated and controlled by the state actors and that at the end of the transition political power was transferred from one set of state actors - the Civilianized Kemalist Leadership of the RPP -- to another - the Civilian Kemalist Leaders that left the RPP and founded the DP. Although it was no doubt true that the DP stood closer to the social groups and classes in comparison to the RPP, this in no way meant that it was the political representative of any social class, including the bourgeoisie. I have based this last contention on some recent studies on the historical development of the Turkish bourgeoisie, which have unequivocally maintained that in the 1940s (nor for that matter in the later decades) the bourgeois class in Turkey had not yet reached the "hegemonic political" stage (in the sense of Gramsci) or the level of a "class for itself" (in the sense of Marx). In other words, neither the bourgeoisie, nor any other social class, possessed the organizational and institutional capacity that would have compelled the Kemalist ruling bloc to a power-sharing formula. The main impulse for change, therefore, could not, and did not, come from below. On the other hand, once the change began and the Civilian Kemalists went outside of the ruling bloc for support, the support of the social classes alone, precisely because of the their organizational institutional incapacity, could not, and did not, deter the government from suppressing the opposition. The main deterrent against suppression came, not from below, but from the outside. Therefore, we can make the counterfactual statement that if there had not been any expectation on the part of the Kemalist ruling bloc that launching liberalization and democratization would bring them the much needed US support, they would not have contemplated a democratic change, and the Turkish regime would have remained an authoritarian one-party regime like Mexico's.
Hakan Yilmaz. 2001. American Perspectives on Turkey: An Evaluation of the Declassified U.S. Documents between 1947 and 1960. In New Perspectives on Turkey, No. 25, Fall 2001, pp.77-101. , 2001
During the Cold War, the leading component of Turkey’s value in the eyes of the United States was... more During the Cold War, the leading component of Turkey’s value in the eyes of the United States was its role in the regional and global security networks that were put in place to deter Soviet aggression. “Security” and “geopolitics” were the key terms of the official American discourse regarding Turkey. “The principal reason for Turkey’s international significance,” says a State Department research paper, “is its geographic location athwart the strategically important Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus” (U.S. Department of State 1949, p. 45). A CIA intelligence report, dated 1951, stated: “The alignment of Turkey with the West is of primary strategic importance to the U.S. because of Turkey’s political and military strength and its geographical position . . . . The Turkish army would be a major obstacle to Soviet advances in the Middle East through Turkey . . . . Turkey is the only country in the Near East capable of offering substantial resistance to Soviet aggression” (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 1951, pp. 3-4). Turkey’s geopolitical value, however, was a derivative one—derived from its proximity to and its capacity to defend the Middle East and its oil resources. And just as Turkey’s geopolitical value was derived from that of the Middle East, Greece’s geopolitical value, in turn, was derived from that of Turkey: “If Greece should fall to the Communists, the USSR would outflank the [Turkish] Straits and acquire natural harbors and more convenient airfields to threaten the oil resources of the Middle East and the sea routes through the Suez Canal.” (U.S. Department of State 1949, p. 1).
This security-based American outlook on Turkey left a lasting imprint on Turkish perceptions of themselves and of the outside world. This influence can be summarized by what can be called the “geopoliticization” of Turkish ideologies and discourses—military as well as civilian, right-wing as well as left-wing—all through the Cold War and beyond. Hence, Turkish political élites have perceived and presented Turkey’s global importance only in geopolitical terms, disregarding or mistrusting the country’s economic, political, cultural, and historical assets and other possible contributions to the outside world. “Our geopolitical value” has become the main argument, used by the Turkish élites against Western governments, to extract “geopolitical rents” from them. A related notion, “our sensitive geopolitical position,” was brought into play by the successive Turkish governments as an excuse to ignore or suppress domestic demands for political liberalization. Geopoliticization infiltrated into such deep layers of Turkish political thinking that long after the end of the Cold War, in response to the European Union’s insistence that Turkey liberalize its political regime in line with the Copenhagen Criteria, many Turkish political leaders continued to maintain that the EU could not possibly exclude Turkey because of “our geopolitical value.”
The deep impact of geopoliticization on Turkish political thinking manifested itself once again after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001, the subsequent U.S. bombardment of Afghanistan, and Turkey’s decision to participate in the U.S.-led coalition in the war against terrorism. Many commentators in the Turkish media and among the political élites immediately started to think that Turkey’s geopolitical value had now increased, especially for serving as the model of secular Islam as opposed to fundamentalist Islam. This geopolitical value, according to these commentators, could be used as leverage to extract more economic aid from the Western governments and international organizations without undertaking all of the required structural reforms in the economy, and to drive back some of the democratizing and liberalizing demands of the European Union. According to this line of thinking, democratization is not valuable in and of itself; it has only a geopolitical value. If democratization brings Turkey international prestige, if it serves a foreign-policy purpose such as accession to the European Union, then it may be cherished and promoted. However, whenever another factor emerges that serves the purpose just as well, then democratization can easily be brought to a standstill.
From the Truman Doctrine onward, and all through the 1950s, the geopolitical identities of Greece and Turkey, in the eyes of the Americans as well as the Western Europeans, were ambiguous. On the one hand, Turkey and Greece were seen, by the Americans and the Western Europeans alike, as part of the Near East and Eastern Mediterranean. As such, neither the Americans nor the Western Europeans thought of these two countries as belonging to Europe proper. In fact, in 1948, Turkey and Greece, together with Iran, were categorized as the GTI (Greece, Turkey, Iran) division within the newly created NEA (Near East and African Affairs) office of the U.S. Department of State (Kuniholm 1980, pp. 423-25). On the other hand, though, Greece and Turkey were members of such European and Western organizations as the Council of Europe, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC, which later became OECD), and NATO. When Western European economies began to recover from the destruction and hardships of World War II, and particularly after European integration—a process that had been started, sponsored, and supported by the United States—culminated in the foundation of the European Economic Community (EEC), both Greece and Turkey began to express their desires to clarify their ambiguous geopolitical identities, to be accepted as European states, and to join the EEC.
The United States turned out to be the prime backer of the European aspirations of Greece and Turkey. This U.S. backing was motivated by two factors. First, the United States wanted to share the financial burden of Greece and Turkey with the Western European states. And second, the United States aimed to stabilize the Greek and Turkish economies and political regimes, and to consolidate the Western orientations of these states, by linking them firmly with the process of European integration. A 1960 U.S. National Security Council paper on U.S. policy towards Turkey stated: “Successful association of Turkey with the EEC would be in the U.S. interest since Turkey’s trading position would be strengthened, thereby lessening the danger of Turkey’s ever becoming excessively reliant upon Soviet bloc markets for disposing of its exports. Furthermore, association would probably lead to additional development funds for Turkey and generally to the acceptance by the EEC countries of greater responsibility for Turkey’s economic and political fortunes” (U.S. National Security Council 1960, p. 5).
Both Greece and Turkey applied to the EEC for full membership in 1959. Both countries concluded very similar association treaties with the EEC in the early years of the 1960s. However, both countries had significant political forces—such as the supporters of the nationalist right, religious right, socialism, nonalignment, and the noncapitalist path—that were vehemently opposed to integration with the EEC, which they commonly perceived as an imperialist club. Nor did the political regimes of the two countries in the 1960s and early 1970s—tainted as they were with occasional military interventions and authoritarian rules—fit with the European pattern of liberal democracy. Hence, it is worth remembering that, let alone being admitted to the EEC, Greece was ousted even from the Council of Europe during the Colonels’ junta. The paths of the two countries toward Europe, which proceeded almost in tandem up until the mid-1970s, began to diverge significantly from that point onward. Hence, while Greece, after the fall of the junta and the restoration of democracy in 1974-75, underwent a rapid process of Europeanization, Turkey lagged behind, oscillating between the three worlds.
It seems that this indecision and oscillation of Turkey had to do more with its domestic political forces than with the foreign policies of the European states or the United States. Hence, during the 1970s, Turkey’s pro-European center-right (represented by the Justice Party) was electorally weakened and, in terms of its ideology, cadres, and foreign and domestic policy, came under the domination of the anti-Western nationalist and Islamicist radical-right parties (the Nationalist Action Party and the National Salvation Party). The center-left side of the political spectrum, on the other hand, was occupied by the Republican People’s Party, which was itself advancing a left-wing populism with strong Third Worldist overtones. Needless to say, the radical left, which exerted a significant degree of influence on the center-left and on Turkish politics in general, was altogether opposed to any idea of Turkey’s integration with capitalist Europe. Turkey’s indecision toward Europe continues even today, after Turkey has finally become a candidate state “destined to join” the European Union. There still exist in today’s Turkey significant political forces defending various non-European options, ranging from Turkey being a regional power to Turkey being the leader of a Turkic union or of an Islamic union. The decision is Turkey’s to make, caught as it is between the opposing tides of the European and non-European options, upbeat with the upward stirrings of its geopolitical value and downbeat with its downturns.
Hakan Yilmaz. 2008. "Conservatism in Turkey". In Turkish Policy Quarterly, Volume 7, No. 1, Spring 2008, pp.57-65.
Based on data collected in research, the author analyzes the trends of conservatism in Turkey obs... more Based on data collected in research, the author analyzes the trends of conservatism in Turkey observing that conservatism is higher among rural and provincial residents, among people with lower education and income, and of more rightwing orientation. The author remarks that as a segment of society rises in socioeconomic status while being politicized through religious parties, there may be a trend of reinterpreting Islam to be more congruent with the modern city realities. Another possibility is that religion will be taken as an unchanging realm and instead a stark division will come about in cities, between those of different lifestyle and worldviews.
Hakan Yilmaz. 1997. "Kamu, Kamu Otoritesi ve Devlet: Habermas’ın Işığında Türkiye’yi Düşünmek". In Cogito, No. 15, 1998, s.159- 170
Habermas’ın teorisi çerçevesinde yürüttüğümüz kamusal alan tartışmalarının ışığında Türkiye'nin b... more Habermas’ın teorisi çerçevesinde yürüttüğümüz kamusal alan tartışmalarının ışığında Türkiye'nin baktığımızda, şu tespitleri yapabiliriz. Birincisi, Türkiye'de, Onsekizinci yüzyılın sonundan başlıyan ve Cumhuriyet'le birlikte yoğunlaşarak devam eden bir modern devlet kurulması ya da devletin Weberyen bir devlete dönüştürülmesi süreci yaşandı. Bu dönüştürümün ana yöntemi de, Batı'daki modern devletin bir bürokratik aygıt olarak Türkiye'ye transfer edilmesiydi. Ancak, Rusya ve Osmanlı imparatorlukları, Batı ile başedebilmek için, Batının "siyasal teknolojisi"ni ülkelerine aktardıkları halde, bu siyasal teknolojinin tarihsel-toplumsal-kültürel bağlamını, pek doğal olarak, transfer edememişlerdi. Bu şekilde, Batı'da kendisini zapteden, gemleyen, dengeleyen devlet-dışı oluşumlardan (piyasa ekonomisi, sivil toplum, kilise, burjuva siyasal kamusu gibi) azade kalan bu bürokratik aygıt, aşılandığı yabancı ortamda tutunabilmek için otoriter rejimlere meyletti (Badie ve Birnbaum 1983, s.93-101).
Türkiye'ye ilişkin ikinci tespit ise, devletin, Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e dek kesintili, Cumhuriyet boyunca da kesintisiz bir süreçte bir anayasal devlet karakteri kazanmasına rağmen, bu anayasal devletin bir hukuk devletine dönüşememiş olmasıdır. Habermas'ın kamusallık teorisi ışığında, anayasal devletin burjuva hukuk devletine dönüşememesinin ana nedeni, onu böyle bir dönüşüme sevkedecek devlet dışı faktörlerin, yani burjuva siyasal kamusunun, gelişememiş olmasıydı diyebiliriz . Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndaki gayrimüslim burjuvazi, Batı'daki burjuvazilerden farklı olarak, devleti denetimi altına almak için iç güçlere değil dış güçlere dayanan bir strateji benimsedi. Osmanlı gayrimüslim burjuvazisi, bir iç politik mücadeleyle, diğer sınıf ve katmanları kendi önderliğinde seferber ederek devlet üzerinde denetim kurma projesinden uzak durdu; bu iç strateji yerine, devleti (işbirliği halinde olduğu Batı burjuvazilerinin denetimindeki) Batılı devletlerin ve devletlerarası örgütlerin siyasal ve ekonomik disiplinine sokmaya çalışmayı yeğledi (Keyder 1987, s.192-198).
Kamusallık teorisi çerçevesinden Türkiye'ye bakıldığında görülen üçüncü ilginç gelişme ise, 1946'dan sonra, özellikle dış şartların sevk ve teşvikiyle , tek parti rejiminden çok partili bir rejime geçilmesi oldu. Böylece, Batı'da demokrasinin tarihsel gelişme çizgisi açısından değerlendirildiğinde ortaya aykırı bir durum çıkmış oldu: bir burjuva siyasal kamusunu ve bu kamuya hayat verecek bir sivil toplumu barındırmayan bir toplumda demokratik bir siyasal sisteme geçildi. Habermas'ın tarihsel analizinin söylediği üzre, Batı'da siyasal partiler ve partilerarası müzakerenin zemini olan parlamento, genel olarak, siyasal kamunun burjuva olan ve olmayan kanatlarını temsil eder. O zaman, böyle bir siyasal kamunun oluşmadığı Türkiye gibi bir ülkede, partiler kimi temsil eder? Metin Heper, Türkiye'de 1946 sonrası ortaya çıkan siyasal rejimi "parti-merkezli siyasal sistem" diye adlandırıyor. Parti-merkezli siyasal sistem, Heper'e göre, sosyal gruplardan bağımsız bir parti sistemidir; bu şekilde oluşan parti sistemi, partilerin burjuvazinin çeşitli kanatlarını ve diğer sosyal sınıfları temsil ettiği klasik burjuva siyasetinin yerine geçer (Heper 1985, s.99-101). Türkiye'de partiler, sosyal grupları temsil etmezler; sosyal gruplar önünde partinin hükmi şahsiyetinde ve liderinde toplaştığını iddia ettikleri kerameti kendinden menkul iktidar olma hakkını temsil ve teşhir ederler. Türkiye'de partiler ve sosyal gruplar arasındaki temsil ilişkisi, bu haliyle, Habermas'ın feodal hükümdarlar için ortaya koyduğu "temsili kamu" modeline benzer. Herhangi bir yurttaş açısından ise, bir parti kendisini doğrudan temsil etmese de, partinin bazı politikaları kendi beklentileri doğrultusunda olabilir, iktidar olanaklarını kullanarak kendisine kişisel rant sağlayabilir ve bu haliyle bile çok partili bir rejim, üzerinde hiç bir kontrolünün olamayacağı otoriter bir rejime yeğdir.
Hakan Yilmaz. 1997. "Democracy and Freedom: The Redefinition of the Ideology of the Turkish Regime in the Postwar Period" In Elites and Change in the Mediterranean, ed. Antonio Marquina, Madrid: FMES, 1997, pp.27-44
The modern Turkish state had been built in the aftermath of the First World War, during the 1920s... more The modern Turkish state had been built in the aftermath of the First World War, during the 1920s and 1930s. The political, economic, and ideological foundations of the current Turkish regime, however, were laid down after the Second World War, particularly during the transition from a one party to a multi party regime between 1945 1950 and the first experiment in multiparty politics between 1950 1960. Turkey's first democratic decade was closed with a military coup in 1960, again the first of its kind since the inauguration of the Republic in 1923. What happened between 1945 1960 transition, democratic experimentation, and military intervention does in fact constitute a pattern that repeated itself twice after 1960 (in 1960 1971 and 1973 1980). For a better understanding of the later evolution of the postwar Turkish regime it is therefore essential to have a closer look at this formative period. In this paper I will examine the ideological dimensions of the developments in 1945 1960. The basic ideological themes and debates of this period, as well as the actors who carried them out, have continued to shape Turkish politics long after 1960 and they keep exerting their effect even today.
Hakan Yilmaz. 2010. « La Reformation Bourgeoise En Turquie : Opportunités Et Menaces » In Institut Du Bosphore, Paris, Note No. 04, 26/11/2010.
La Turquie au 21ème siècle: Réformation bourgeoise, les gagnants et les perdants;
La rupture... more La Turquie au 21ème siècle: Réformation bourgeoise, les gagnants et les perdants;
La rupture des tabous identitaires : pluralisme démocratique ou majoritarisme néo-féodal ?
Du référendum de septembre 2010 sur la Constitution aux élections générales de juin 2011; Problèmes et Développements possibles.
Hakan Yılmaz. 2006. “Benim İçin Ecevit”. In Boğaziçi Dergisi, Sayı 113, Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Mezunlar Derneği Yayını, İstanbul, s. 8-11
1973 yılının Eylül ayının sonlarıydı ve on yaşımı dolduralı birkaç ay olmuştu. İstanbul'da, dut b... more 1973 yılının Eylül ayının sonlarıydı ve on yaşımı dolduralı birkaç ay olmuştu. İstanbul'da, dut bahçelerinin ve bahçe içindeki ahşap köşklerin tamamen ortadan kalkmadığı Erenköy'de, dayımın evindeydim. İlkokulu henüz bitirmiş, çok uzaklardaki ailemden (annemden, demem daha doğru olur) ilk defa ayrılmış, Galatasaray Lisesi'nde okumak üzere İstanbul'a gelmiştim. Akşamları ağırlaşan mahzunlukla baş etmenin bir yolu, o yıllarda günde birkaç saat yayın yapan siyah-beyaz televizyonu başından sonuna dek seyretmekti. Bir akşam, haberlerde, Meclis konuşmaları veriliyordu. Zayıf, bıyıklı bir adam kürsüye çıktı. Heyecanla, yüksek sesle, derslerde öğrendiğimiz güzel Türkçeye uygun cümleler kurarak, diğerleri gibi zorlama bir nezaketle değil ama insanı söylediklerine inanmaya çağıran bir samimiyetle konuşuyordu. Konuşmasını, "Barış getireceğiz, barış!" diye haykırarak bitirdi. Ben, çocuk aklımla, "neden barış getireceğiz diyor bu adam, savaşta mıyız ki?" diye düşündüğümü hatırlıyorum.
Hakan Yılmaz. 2016. Türkiye'de Siyasal ve Sosyal Göstergeler, 2006-2016: Kamuoyundaki Eğilimler. Saha Araştırmalarının Bulguları. İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü
Hakan Yılmaz. 2016. Türkiye'de Sağ ve Sol Değerler, Tutumlar, Tercihler: Kamuoyundaki Eğilimler. Saha Araştırmalarının Bulguları. İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü
Hakan Yılmaz. 2006-2012. Türkiye'de Muhafazakarlık: Kamuoyundaki Eğilimler. Saha Araştırmalarının Bulguları. İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü
Hakan Yılmaz. 2007-2012. Türkiye'de Kentsel Sınıflar: Yapılar, Değerler, Tutumlar. Saha Araştırmalarının Bulguları. İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü
Hakan Yılmaz. 2003-2012. Türkiye'de Batı Karşıtlığı ve Avrupa Şüpheciligi: Kamuoyundaki Eğilimler. Saha Araştırmalarının Bulguları. İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü
Hakan Yılmaz. 2010. Türkiye'de Ötekilestirme ve Ayrımcılık: Kamoyundaki Eğilimler. Saha Araştırmasının Bulguları. İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü
Hakan Yılmaz. 2010. Türkiye'de Ötekilestirme ve Ayrımcılık: Kamoyundaki Eğilimlere Dair Kısa Bir Değerlendirme. İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü
Hakan Yılmaz. 2012. Türkiye'de Dış Politika ve Dış İlişkiler Konusunda Kamuoyundaki Eğilimler. Saha Araştırmalarının Bulguları. İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü
Hakan Yilmaz. 2016. Ideologies and Identities in Turkey: Changing Trends in the Public Opinion Surveys from 2006 to 2016. Unpublished Research Report. İstanbul: Boğaziçi University, Department of Political Science and International Relations
Hakan Yilmaz. 2012. Euroscepticism in Turkey. Findings of Opinion Surveys in 2003 and 2012. Unpublished Research Report. İstanbul: Boğaziçi University, Department of Political Science and International Relations
Hakan Yilmaz. 2010. Othering and Discrimination in Turkey. Findings of an Opinion Survey. Unpublished Research Report. İstanbul: Boğaziçi University, Department of Political Science and International Relations
Hakan Yilmaz. 2007. Urban Social Classes in Turkey. Findings of an Opinion Survey. Unpublished Research Report. İstanbul: Boğaziçi University, Department of Political Science and International Relations
Hakan Yilmaz. 2006. Public Perceptions of Rights and Freedoms in Turkey. Findings of an Opinion Survey. Unpublished Research Report. İstanbul: Boğaziçi University, Department of Political Science and International Relations
Hakan Yilmaz. 2006. Conservatism in Turkey. Findings of an Opinion Survey. Unpublished Research Report. İstanbul: Boğaziçi University, Department of Political Science and International Relations
Hakan Yilmaz. 2022. "Turkey and Europe: Historical Asynchronicities and Perceptual Asymmetries". In The Oxford Handbook of Turkish Politics, ed. Güneş Murat Tezcür, Oxford University Press, pp.545-562, 2022
The establishment of a modern state in Turkey began in the late 18th century and intensified with... more The establishment of a modern state in Turkey began in the late 18th century and intensified with the establishment of the republic in 1923. The primary method of this process was the transfer of the Western modern state to Turkey as a bureaucratic apparatus. However, the Russian and Ottoman Empires were unable to transplant the historical, social, and cultural context of this political technology, leading to the development of authoritarian bureaucratic apparatuses without nongovernmental entities. The constitutional state has never fully enshrined the rule of law. The main reason for the failure to convert the constitutional state into a rule-of-law state appears to be the underdevelopment of nonstate factors, such as the political public of the bourgeoisie.
The non-Muslim bourgeoisie in the Ottoman Empire adopted a strategy based on external powers, rather than internal ones, to keep the state in check. This foreign-based strategy stemmed from the weakness of the bourgeoisie against the state, rather than its non-Muslim identity. The Muslim-Turkish bourgeoisie emerging in the republican era encouraged the participation of the state in Western organizations, such as NATO and the European Union, to discipline its political power.
The contemporary Turkish bourgeoisie continues to rely on external powers and modernize the state by pursuing membership in Western organizations, primarily the European Union. It also tries to develop an internal hegemonic strategy, building lasting connections with political elites, establishing bridges with the state bureaucracy, and guiding the media and curricula of educational institutions.
Turkey's unique historical asynchronicities with Europe present a complex and hybrid historical material that could prevent the West's history from becoming Turkey's future. During the republican period, many social classes and groups, particularly women, found places in public educational institutions, businesses, and political life. In the 1980s, claims based on identities, primarily gender-based, religious, and ethnic, became central to political struggles. This historical asynchronicity has hindered Turkey's development of a liberal and democratic regime. The "Europeanization" momentum gained since 1999 under positive EU conditionality has been reversed in the 2010s, with the deterioration in EU-Turkish relations hitting a historically low level, characterized by "ultra-instrumentalism." The new, postmodern European space is a competitive arena with continually changing boundaries, making Turkey's integration with Europe a part of an emerging global space.
By the end of World War II, Turkish governments made a strategic choice to join the political, military, economic, and cultural institutions of the Western international system. This decision created political tensions within Turkey, as the government sought to strengthen the Turkish state's international capacity and domestic capability. However, they also put up resistance when Turkey's integration with the West meant the empowerment of Turkish society, providing individual rights and liberties, and democratizing the regime. This fundamental choice has shaped Turkey's foreign policy, domestic institutions, and ideologies.
The post-World War II integration with Western states and societies, coupled with the century-long modernization of the Tanzimat, Young Turk, and Kemalist eras, has converted Turkey into an integral and inseparable part of Europe and the Western world. Turkey's choice to become a member of the European Union has been a natural continuation of the long modernization and comprehensive integration with the Western world. However, there is no short-term basis for replacing the ultrainstrumentalist nature of EU-Turkish relations with a new set of relations based on moral norms, mutual trust, political principles, and a meaningful path leading to institutional integration.
Turkey's relinquishing the perspective of EU membership and acquiescing to a "special status" may seem like a realistic alternative, but it will downgrade Turkey's place in the Western world, disrupt its power and prestige in its region and the global order, and inflict lasting damage to its democratic institutions. The best way for Turkey to revert back to the road of democratization and enhance its international and regional standing is to pursue its strategy of EU membership. The membership process will provide Turkey with the necessary tools, ideas, projects, and disciplinary norms and values to get out of the two historical traps that have been blocking its political and economic development: the middle-income trap and the middle-democratic trap.
Even if the membership goal is not reached in the medium term, Turkish-EU relations can advance to the next level, and the Europeanization process can restart. However, this development is contingent upon the following conditions: relationships with the European Union should not be limited to control over the flow of refugees, negotiation chapters should continue, the Cyprus problem should be resolved, regular consultations between Turkey and EU authorities on joint summits and other platforms should continue, and visa requirements should be lifted.
Turkey has two unique external advantages that can push it toward becoming a more advanced democracy. First, it has membership in important international institutions of the Western world, such as the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Second, Turkey is a candidate for the European Union, which remains a global center of democracy in an era of right-wing populism. However, Turkey's momentum toward Europeanization has declined under adverse conditions, leading internal actors who have guarded EU reforms to lose their enthusiasm. As the goal of EU membership has become less reachable, these actors' energy for advocacy of the European Union has lessened.
Hakan Yilmaz and Cagla Aykac (eds). 2012. Perceptions of Islam in Europe. London: I.B. Tauris, 2012
“Perceptions of Islam in Europe: Culture, Identity and the Muslim 'Other'” is the product of the ... more “Perceptions of Islam in Europe: Culture, Identity and the Muslim 'Other'” is the product of the collective work of fourteen European scholars working on the processes and modes of encounters between Europe and Islam. It brings together theoretical essays of a more general nature as well as analyses of specific cases, including the institutions of the European Union, Britain, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and Turkey. By publishing this volume, we aim to explore the ways in which Europeans have come to re-think who they are, their historical origins and their future destinations by way of re-thinking their experiences with Muslims and Islams (in the plural), both inside and outside Europe. Our book is a social scientific study of Islam in Europe. It aims to go beyond a descriptive account of the problems of Muslim communities in Europe and it will bring strong theoretical essays and in-depth case studies together in the same volume. Secondly, the articles in the book do not limit themselves to either the modernist “integration” model or the post-modernist “multiculturalism” model of the study of Islam in the West. Instead, our authors examine how in the practice of European daily life Muslim and European understandings of the sacred and the profane, sensitivities, rituals, cuisines, musical traditions, dances, superstitions, patterns of solidarity, work habits, political attitudes, sexual tendencies and the like interact and give birth to hybrid forms and contents. Thirdly, our book brings together cases that have not been sufficiently covered elsewhere, such as Italy, Greece, Poland, Turkey and the European Union itself. Given the social scientific character of the contributions and contributors of the book, we can expect the book to reach to the general educated public who want to read not conspiracy theories but genuine and realistic analyses about the perceptions of Islam in Europe.
Enjoy top-of-the-line theoretical essays and case studies on culture, identity, and the "Muslim other" in Europe today. Contributions by Hakan Yilmaz, Cagla Aykac, Deniz Kandiyoti, Gerard Delanty, Gerdien Jonker, Jeffrey Haynes, Katarzyna G. Sosnowska, Kenan Cayir, Sara Silvestri, Sia Anagnostopoulou, Stephanos Pesmazoglou, and Welmoet Boender.
Table of Contents
Preface
Introduction
THEORETICAL ESSAYS
Islam and European Modernity in Historical Perspective: Towards a Cosmopolitan Perspective
Gerard Delanty
Rethinking Gender Roles in Europe through Encounters with Islam
Deniz Kandiyoti
Islam: Western Modes of Use and Abuse
Stephanos Pesmazoglou
Constructions of European Identity in Relation to the Muslim 'Oher'during the Age of Globalisation
Jeffrey Haynes
Europeanization and de-Europeanization of Islam
Sia Anagnostopoulou
CASE STUDIES
Islam and the European Union: Exploring the Issue of Discrimination
Çagla E. Aykaç
From Polish Muslims to Muslims in Poland: There and Back
Katarzyna Górak-Sosnowska
Imagining Islam: European Encounters with the Muslim World through the Lens of German Textbooks
Gerdien Jonker
Teaching Integration: Shifting Notions of the Place of Religion in the Public Sphere in the Netherlands
Welmoet Boender
Institutionalization of Islam in France: the Case of the French Council of Muslim Worship
Amel Boubekeur
Institutionalizing British and Italian Islam: Attitudes and Policies
Sara Silvestri
Transformations of Islamism and Changing Perceptions of Europe in Turkey
Kenan Cayir
Hakan Yılmaz ve Emre Erdoğan. 2012. Bizi Yanlış Tanıyorlar! Avrupalıların Türkiye ve Türkler Hakkındaki Algıları, İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2012
Emre Erdogan ile birlikte yazdığımız "Bizi Yanlış Tanıyorlar! Avrupalıların Türkiye ve Türkler Ha... more Emre Erdogan ile birlikte yazdığımız "Bizi Yanlış Tanıyorlar! Avrupalıların Türkiye ve Türkler Hakkındaki Algıları" adlı kitabımız İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları'ndan çıktı.
Avrupa kamuoylarının Avrupa kimliği hakkındaki görüşlerini; Türkiye hakkındaki bilgilerini, algılarını, imgelerini; Türkiye'nin AB üyeliği karşısındaki tutumlarını; bütün bu algı ve tutumların gerek ülkelere, gerekse de gelir, yaş, parti, din gibi sosyoekonomik, politik, demografik alt gruplara göre nasıl farklılaştığını merak edenlere hararetle tavsiye olunur!
Kitapta, 2009 sonbaharında Almanya, Fransa, İngiltere, İspanya ve Polonya'da toplam 5000 kişi ile görüşerek yürüttüğümüz, ve bu alanda tek olan, kapsamlı ve derinlikli saha araştırmamızın bulgularını kimlik, genişleme, derinleşme, bütünleşme kuramları çerçevesinde analiz ediyoruz.
Hakan Yılmaz (ed.). 2005. Placing Turkey on the Map of Europe. Istanbul: Bogazici University Press, 2005
In the present work, the way ordinary Europeans view Turkey in relation to the following areas of... more In the present work, the way ordinary Europeans view Turkey in relation to the following areas of cultural encounters (everyday life, folklore, archaeology, literature, and the plastic arts) are examined. Contrary to some contentions, European culture is not a structure that is completed and done with. Issues such as where the boundaries of Europe begin and end, the historical sources of European culture, the new forms this culture will assume in the near future, are presently being hotly debated by European bureaucrats, politicians, intellectuals, artists and ordinary citizens as well, both within and outside of the European Union. If Turkey wishes to be a part of the European Union, then it is a must for Turkish scholars to participate in debates concerning the sources, boundaries, and future of the European culture, and bring their own perspectives and perceptions to the discussion. Unless this is properly and seriously done, the place of Turkish culture within European culture will be discussed and decided by others. It is our belief that this book will contribute to efforts pertaining to understanding the true nature of cultural perceptions between Turkey and Europe.
Hakan Yılmaz (ed.). 2005. Avrupa Haritasında Türkiye. İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2005
Bu çalışmada, kültürel karşılaşmanın beş alanında (gündelik hayat, turizm, arkeoloji, edebiyat, p... more Bu çalışmada, kültürel karşılaşmanın beş alanında (gündelik hayat, turizm, arkeoloji, edebiyat, plastik sanatlar) Avrupalıların Türkiye’ye bakışları eleştirel bir gözle incelenmiştir. Beş makaleden ve bir giriş yazısından oluşan bu çalışma ile, Türkiye ve Avrupa Birliği arasındaki kültürel algılamalar gibi zor, karmaşık, kökleri uzak geçmişe uzanan, yüklü bir alana giriş yapmış bulunmaktayız. Bazı iddiaların aksine, Avrupa kültürü, tamamlanmış, bitmiş bir yapı değildir. Avrupa’nın coğrafi sınırlarının nerede başlayıp, nerede bittiği, Avrupa kültürü’nün tarihsel kaynaklarının ne olduğu, bu kültürün yakın gelecekte ve Avrupa Birliği çatısı altında hangi yeni biçimlere bürüneceği gibi konular bugün, Avrupa Birliği içinde ve dışında Avrupalı bürokratlar, politikacılar, entellektüeller, sanatçılar ve sokaktaki insanlar tarafından sıkça tartışılan konulardır. Avrupa Birliği’ne girme arzusunda olan Türkiye’nin düşün insanlarının da Avrupa kültürünün kaynakları, sınırları ve geleceğine ilişkin tartışmaya katılmaları, tartışma gündemine kendi perspektiflerini, kendi bakış açılarını sokmaları şarttır. Bu yapılmadığı takdirde, Türkiye kültürünün Avrupa kültürü içindeki yeri başkaları tarafından tartışılacak ve kararlaştırılacaktır. Bu kitabın, Türkiye ve Avrupa Birliği arasındaki kültürel algılamaların gerçek doğasının anlaşılmasına katkıda bulunacağına inanıyoruz.
Hakan Yilmaz. 2011. "Euroscepticism in Turkey: Parties, Elites, and Public Opinion". In South European Society and Politics, Volume 16, Number 1, March 2011 , pp. 185-208
After reviewing the emergence of Turkish Euroscepticism in the context of the evolution of Turkey... more After reviewing the emergence of Turkish Euroscepticism in the context of the evolution of Turkey–European-Union relations between 1963 and 1999, the paper analyses party and popular Euroscepticism after 1999. The Turkish case appears to confirm the Taggart– Sitter thesis concerning the strategic Euroscepticism of opposition parties. The exception of the Kurdish nationalists suggests that strategic Euroscepticism does not apply to ethnic minority parties. In Turkey there is both ‘soft’ Euroscepticism (centre-left parties) and ‘hard’ Euroscepticism (nationalist and Islamist parties), the latter usually based on identity. At the popular level, identity Euroscepticism revolves around four key issues: national sovereignty; morality; negative discrimination; and Europe’s alleged hidden agenda to divide and rule Turkey (the so-called ‘Sevres Syndrome’).
Hakan Yilmaz. 2007. "Turkish Identity on the Road to the EU: Basic Elements of French and German Oppositional Discourses". In Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, Volume 9, Issue 3, pp.293-305
This paper is the first product of a long-term research project on the identity
dimensions of Fr... more This paper is the first product of a long-term research project on the identity
dimensions of French and German attitudes towards EU–Turkey relations.
The project reviewed recently published popular and scholarly books, journal
articles, newspaper commentaries and other printed material on Turkey,
including the transcripts of the parliamentary debates devoted to the issue of
EU–Turkey relations. In addition to the printed material, some 11 websites and
Internet discussion groups, partly or wholly devoted to the issue of Turkey, were
examined. Finally, in autumn and winter 2005, 25 interviews were conducted
with political and intellectual elites in France and Germany, who were asked to
give both their own opinions and their evaluations of the intellectual milieu in
their countries regarding the cultural dimensions of Turkey’s integration with
the EU.
Hakan Yilmaz. 2012. Turkey on Historical European Maps. Unpublished Research Report. İstanbul: Boğaziçi University, Department of Political Science and International Relations
Hakan Yılmaz. 2009. "Türkiye’de Avrupa Şüpheciliği: Siyasi Seçkinlerdeki ve Kamuoyundaki Eğilimler". In Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye İlişkileri, Beklentiler ve Kaygılar, ed. Oğuz Esen ve Filiz Başkan, Ankara: Eflatun Yayınevi, s.61-74
Türkiye’de Avrupa Şüpheciliği Araştırması’na 2003 Temmuz’unda başladık. Araştırmanın üç ayağı var... more Türkiye’de Avrupa Şüpheciliği Araştırması’na 2003 Temmuz’unda başladık. Araştırmanın üç ayağı vardı, esas olarak. Birincisi, Türkiye’de Avrupa’ya şüpheyle bakan, bu konuda yazılar yazmış seçkinlerle ve halktan kişilerle yapılmış derinlemesine görüşmelerdi. Aşağı yukarı altmış kişiyle görüşüldü. İkincisi, bu konuda yazılmış kitap, makale ve gazete yazılarının ve haberlerin derlenip, toparlanmasıydı. Araştırmanın üçüncü ayağını da kamuoyu yoklaması teşkil etti. Bu kamuoyu yoklaması, tüm Türkiye'yi temsil eden 2500 civarında kişiyle yüz yüze konuşularak gerçekleştirildi. Çoğu sorusu yeniydi ve ilk kez soruluyordu; bazı soruları ise bizim (ben, Ali Çarkoğlu, Kemal Kirişçi ve Refik Erzan) 2002 Mayıs ve Haziran aylarında TESEV için yaptığımız araştırmada sorduğumuz soruların içinden seçilmişti. Bu soruları tekrarladık, çünkü bu konulardaki değişimi ölçmek istedik. Bu tekrar soruların yanına, sadece bu araştırmaya özgü, Avrupa-şüpheciliğini ölçmeyi amaçlayan bir dizi yeni soru koyduk. Dolayısıyla elimizde ciddi bir veri birikimi var. Okuduğumuz kitaplardan ve makalelerden, elitler ve halk seviyesinde yaptığımız görüşmelerden ortaya çıkan bir takım Avrupa-şüphecisi düşünceler var Türkiye'de. Bu yazıda, hem elit seviyesindeki şüphecilikten, hem de bu şüpheciliğin halk tarafından, kamuoyu tarafından nasıl algılandığından, nasıl yorumlandığından bahsedeceğiz. Bunların ikisini aynı anda görmek bizim için daha aydınlatıcı olur. Çünkü ikisi arasında çakışmalar olmakla birlikte, yer yer ciddi ayrışmalar da görülüyor. Dolayısıyla, bu kısa yazıda ele alacağımız sorular şunlar olacaktır: Kitaplarda ve gazete yazılarında beliren en önemli Avrupa-şüphecisi kavramlar nelerdir? Derinlemesine görüşmelerden ortaya çıkan Avrupa-şüphecisi konular nelerdir? Son olarak da kamuoyu yoklamasından ortaya çıkanlar nelerdir? Bunların üçünden de, birleştikleri ve ayrıldıkları noktalara değinerek, bahsedeceğim.
Hakan Yilmaz. 2006. "Two Pillars of Nationalist Euroscepticism in Turkey, The Tanzimat Syndrome and the Sevres Syndrome". In Turkey, Sweden and the European Union, Experiences and Expectations, ed. Ingmar Karlsson and Annika Strom Melin, Stockholm, SIEPS, pp.29-40
In this paper we are going to define and focus on two discursive patterns of elite-level Euroskep... more In this paper we are going to define and focus on two discursive patterns of elite-level Euroskepticism in Turkey, namely the Tanzimat and Sèvres syndromes, which, we believe, constitute the core of the Turkish nationalist discourse on Europe. We will argue that while the “deep policy” imperative of the Tanzimat syndrome is a delegitimation of collective and individual rights, that of the Sèvres syndrome is isolationism in the area of foreign policy and “westernization without the west” in the domestic arena. These two syndromes, we will argue, may help us understand the strategic shift of the nationalist conservatism away from Europe and the generally disapproving attitude of the nationalist conservative political parties and intellectuals to Turkey’s integration with the European Union.
Hakan Yılmaz. 2006. "Türkiye'de Milliyetçi Avrupa Şüpheciliğinin İki Dayanağı: Tanzimat Sendromu ve Sevr Sendromu". In Türkiye, İsveç ve Avrupa Birliği - Deneyimler ve Beklentiler, ed. Ingmar Karlsson ve Annika Strom Melin, İstanbul, İsveç Araştırma Enstitüsü, Papers 2, 2006, s.25-45
Bu kısa yazıda, bizce Türkiye’deki Avrupa hakkındaki milliyetçi söylemin çekirdeğini oluşturan ve... more Bu kısa yazıda, bizce Türkiye’deki Avrupa hakkındaki milliyetçi söylemin çekirdeğini oluşturan ve seçkinler düzeyindeki Avrupa-şüpheciliğinin iki söylemsel modeli olan Tanzimat ve Sèvres sendromları üzerinde durarak, bunları tanımlayacağız. Tanzimat sendromunun “derin siyaset” imperatifinin kollektif ve bireysel hakların gayrımeşru görülmesi olduğunu, Sèvres sendromunun “derin siyaset” imperatifinin ise dış politikada izolasyonizm ile iç politikada “Batısız Batılılaşma” anlamına geldiğini ileri süreceğiz. Milliyetçi muhafazakârlığın Avrupa’dan stratejik olarak neden uzaklaştığını ve milliyetçi muhafazakâr siyasi partilerle entelektüellerin Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliği ile entegrasyonuna neden karşı çıktıklarını anlamamızın bu iki argüman sayesinde kolaylaştığını öne süreceğiz.
Hakan Yilmaz and Emre Erdogan. 2013. "Turkey’s ‘Culturalization’ in the European Public Opinion, the Prospects of a Cosmopolitan Europe and the Challenges Facing Turkey". In Institut du Bosphore, DEBATS DU BOSPHORE, AVENIR DE L’EUROPE, III AVRIL 2013-2., 2013
In 2009, having won a research grant in the context of the “EU-Turkey Civil Society Dialogue” pro... more In 2009, having won a research grant in the context of the “EU-Turkey Civil Society Dialogue” program, we decided to earmark a large portion of it to a public opinion survey geared to reveal the perceptions, images, and knowledge of the European public regarding Turkey. The survey was part of a project entitled “Problems of Europeanization and European Perceptions of Turkey as a Future Member State” . Due to limited funds, we decided to administer the survey not in all EU member states, but five countries that were highly representative of the whole (France, Germany, Poland, Spain, and the U.K.). In Fall 2009, the survey was administered to some 1,000 respondents in each country, and a total of 5,000 people were reached. We prepared all the survey questions ourselves. This public opinion survey was a first in terms of both its geographical scope and its complete focus on Turkey, and to our knowledge, has remained the only one of its kind. The purpose of this extensive public opinion survey was not only to uncover how the public in these countries viewed Turkey’s EU membership, but also to discover the image and knowledge of Turks and Turkey Europeans have, and the sources from which they learned or formed their images about Turkey and Turks. Thus, we sought to find answers to these critical questions:
a) What do European people understand from the term European identity?
b) Which sources do they use to access information on Turkey?
c) What image do they have of Turkey and Turks?
d) What are the reasons they support or oppose Turkey’s EU membership?
e) How do images related to Turkey and attitudes towards Turkey-EU relations differ according to various sub-criteria, such as geographical region, age group, political outlook, gender, income group, education level, and religiosity level?
Hakan Yilmaz. 2014. "Europe in a Globalizing World: A Matter of Survival". In The Future of European Integration: A Reform Call, ed. Günter Verheugen, İstanbul: TÜSİAD, pp. 50-63.
Yilmaz, Hakan. 2014. “Europe in a Globalizing World: A Matter of Survival”. In The Future Of Euro... more Yilmaz, Hakan. 2014. “Europe in a Globalizing World: A Matter of Survival”. In The Future Of European Integration: A Reform Call, ed. Günter Verheugen, İstanbul: TÜSİAD, pp. 50-63. A joint study project of Avenir Suisse - Zurich, Boğaziçi University - TÜSİAD Foreign Policy Forum - Istanbul and THINKTANK Centre – Warsaw. Supported by Economiesuisse (Business Federation of Switzerland), LEWIATAN (Polish Business Confederation) and TÜSİAD (Turkish Industry and Business Association).
Hakan Yilmaz. 2003. "Comment les Turcs perçoivent l'Europe et l'Union européenne". In La pensée de midi, Vol. 2, No. 10, pp.66-79., 2003
L’Etat et le peuple turcs soutiennent massivement l’adhesion a l’Union europeenne. Si elle se rea... more L’Etat et le peuple turcs soutiennent massivement l’adhesion a l’Union europeenne. Si elle se realisait, l’opinion generale actuelle, malgre de nombreuses nuances, espere tres nettement en recueillir plus de benefices que d’inconvenients, y compris dans des domaines inattendus touchant a la souverainete nationale. Mais ils ressentent aussi l’attitude de l’Union europeenne comme de plus en plus negative a leur egard...
Hakan Yilmaz. 2005. "Placing Turkey on the Map of Europe". In Placing Turkey on the Map of Europe, ed. Hakan Yılmaz, İstanbul: Boğaziçi University Press, pp.3-24
Hakan Yilmaz. 2005. "European Narratives on Everyday Turkey - Interviews with Europeans Living in Turkey". In Placing Turkey on the Map of Europe, İstanbul: Boğaziçi University Press, pp.25-45.
Hakan Yılmaz. 2005. "Giriş: Türkiye’yi Avrupa Haritasına Sokmak". In Avrupa Haritasında Türkiye, ed. Hakan Yılmaz, İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, s.1-19
Hakan Yılmaz. 2005. "Avrupalıların Türkiye’nin Gündelik Hayatı Hakkındaki Anlatıları - Türkiye’de Yaşayan Avrupalılarla Yapılan Görüşmeler". In Avrupa Haritasında Türkiye, ed. Hakan Yılmaz, İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, s.20-39.
Hakan Yılmaz, Emre Erdoğan et al. 2006 . Building a Deliberative Dialogue between Turkish and French Youth - Final Report. Project supported by a grant from the European Commission.
Turkey and France: Divergent Perspectives on Turkey's EU Membership". Research project supported ... more Turkey and France: Divergent Perspectives on Turkey's EU Membership". Research project supported by a grant from the European Union, Small Projects Programme: Strengthening Civil Society Dialogue (Contract No: Deltur/2005/113909). Date of completion: October 2006. Data sources: Two deliberative dialogue meetings were held, each bringing together approximately one hundred university students, one at Boğaziçi University and another at Sciences Po Paris; literature review, and examination of newspapers and magazines.
Hakan Yılmaz, Emre Erdoğan et al. 2009. Avrupalıların Türkiye, Türkler ve AB-Türkiye İlişkileri Hakkındaki Algıları. AB tarafından desteklenen araştırma projesinin bulguları.
“European Perceptions of Turkey” Research project supported by a grant from the European Union, P... more “European Perceptions of Turkey” Research project supported by a grant from the European Union, Promotion of the Civil Society Dialogue between European Union and Turkey, Universities Grant Scheme (Contract No: TR0604.01-03/070). Date of completion: December 2009. The study was conducted in collaboration with colleagues from the Autonomous University of Madrid. Data sources: Five nationwide statistical surveys in France, Germany, Italy, UK, and Poland; literature review, and examination of newspapers and magazines.
Marmara Üniversitesi-MURCIR, Çarşamba Toplantıları, 14 Şubat 2024, 2024
Marmara Uni.
MURCIR
Çarşamba Toplantıları
14 Şubat 2024
Müziğin "sembolik düzen" kurmadaki rolü.... more Marmara Uni. MURCIR Çarşamba Toplantıları 14 Şubat 2024
Müziğin "sembolik düzen" kurmadaki rolü. Türkiye'de "düzen müziği" ve "muhalif müzik" türleri. Ezginin Günlüğü müziğinin siyasi anlamı.
Marmara Üniversitesi Uluslararası İlişkiler Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi'nin (MURCIR) düzenlediği "Çarşamba Konuşmaları" kapsamında, 14 Şubat 2024'de Müzik ve Siyaset başlıklı bir konuşma yaptım. Konuşmamda, Türkiye'de 1950'li yıllardan itibaren "düzenin müziği" ve "düzene muhalif müzik" sayılabilecek türlerin neler olabileceğini tartıştım. Muhalif müziğin sol kanadı üzerinde dururken, bu müzik türü içerisinde sol siyasetin müzik üzerinde biçimsel bir hegemonya kurmasını ele aldım. Bu çerçevede Ezginin Günlüğü'nün kuruluş yıllarının kısa bir hikayesini anlatarak, bir yandan grubun neden sol muhalif müzik evreninin bir parçası olduğuna ve öte yandan da sol siyasetin sol müzik üzerindeki egemenliğini kırarak kendi özgün sesini nasıl bulduğuna değindim.
Hakan Yılmaz. 2019. Müzik Tarihimiz Bize Ne Söylüyor? (What Does Our History of Musical Modernization Tell Us?). In Fikir Turu, 29 Kasım 2019, available online at: https://fikirturu.com/toplum/muzik-tarihimiz-bize-ne-soyluyor/
Cumhuriyetin müzik zevkimizi düzenleme çabasının sonuçları ne oldu? Hangi müzikleri benimsedik, h... more Cumhuriyetin müzik zevkimizi düzenleme çabasının sonuçları ne oldu? Hangi müzikleri benimsedik, hangileri ruhumuza uymadı? Arabesk, Batı müziğini halka nasıl götürdü? Özgün Müzik, kültür emperyalizmine karşı olan sol kitlenin müzik evrenine Batı müziğini nasıl soktu?
Hakan Yılmaz. 2020. “Söyleşi: Zaman Adaları. Dünya nereye gidiyor? İnsanı nasıl bir gelecek bekliyor? Spordan hangi kadim değerleri öğrenebiliriz? Prof. Dr. Hakan Yılmaz'la farklı duraklarda dolaştık.” In Sokrates Dergi, Sayı 65, Ağustos 2020.
Ezginin Günlüğü'nün kurucularından olan, aynı zamanda Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Siyaset Bilimi ve Ulu... more Ezginin Günlüğü'nün kurucularından olan, aynı zamanda Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü'nde öğretim üyeliği yapan Hakan Yılmaz, farklı alanlardaki uğraşlarını tanımlarken bu benzetmeyi yapıyor. Zaten ona göre akademi, hayat, sanat ve spor aslında birbirinden bu kadar uzak tutulmaması gereken uğraşlar, hepsinin cevap verdiği bazı başka sorular var; hepsi aynı insanın parçaları. O insanı ve yaşadığımız dünyayı daha iyi tanıyabilmek için bizim de sormak istediğimiz bazı sorular var.
Hakan Yılmaz. September 2023. Discussion Note: “Economics or Political Economy?”
Political economy, which emerged in the late eighteenth century, has a long history of integratin... more Political economy, which emerged in the late eighteenth century, has a long history of integrating political and moral concerns. In the late 19th century, a technical, objective science of economics replaced political economy. From roughly 1875 until the end of the 1920s, this scientific economics was the dominant school of thought. As the scientific economics of the late 1920s remained ineffective in the face of the Great Depression, it was abandoned. JM Keynes reintroduced political economy, incorporating moral and political concerns. In the late 1970s, Keynesianism was abandoned and a new version of technical economics regained prominence. This period, known as the golden age of neoliberalism, was characterized by the dominance of technical economics in the academia and institutions such as banks, governments, and international economic organizations. The financial crises of early 2010s necessitated a return to political-moral dimensions in economic analyses. Today, new versions of political economy coexist with old neoliberal forms of technical economics.
Hakan Yılmaz. September 2023. Discussion Note: “The Post-Truth Condition is an Epistemological Demodernization, a Reversion from Modernity to the Middle Ages”.
Hakan Yilmaz. 2023. Discussion Note 01 - Liberal Democracy in the 21st Century? September., 2023
Is liberal democracy an appropriate regime to respond to the specific challenges of the twenty-fi... more Is liberal democracy an appropriate regime to respond to the specific challenges of the twenty-first century? What form of democracy should be built to react to the twenty-first century's distinctive diversities and conflicts?
CARMEN RODRIGUEZ, ANTONIO AVALOS, HAKAN YILMAZ and ANA I. PLANET, eds., Turkey's Democratizat... more CARMEN RODRIGUEZ, ANTONIO AVALOS, HAKAN YILMAZ and ANA I. PLANET, eds., Turkey's Democratization Process (Routledge, 2014). Pp. 444. $ 160.00 cloth.The seeds of this book were first planted in a research seminar "Democracy and Democratization in Turkey" held in November 2008 at the Autonoma University of Madrid. The points raised there by fourteen academic experts were elaborated in follow-up seminars and laid the foundations of this timely and comprehensive book on the democratization problem in Turkey as a defective democracy. I believe that the collection of articles in this volume will provide invaluable theoretical and empirical insights for the understanding of the democratization problem in Turkey, which is best exemplified by the persistence of authoritarian forms after the 2010 Referendum.This book first borrows the term defective democracies from Merkel (2004) and Puhle (2005) to describe regimes that hold elections with a series of democratic requisites but at the same time lack one or more of the characteristics shared by "embedded democracies." There are four types of defective democracies: exclusive, tutelary, delegative and illiberal. Turkey as a defective democracy is argued to combine elements of tutelary democracy, in which non-elected actors (the military establishment) maintain reserved domains and act as veto players, and those of illiberal democracy, in which there are several limitations on the exercise of public freedoms and fundamental rights and the effective rule of law. The authors also recognize important transformations have taken place in this defective democracy especially in the recent years.The organization of the book is in line with the two sets of theoretical premises made by the authors. First, the editors of the book consider two macro variables that affect democratic transitions and democratic consolidation, the question of "stateness" (the state in which the process is taking place) and the nature of the prior regimes, along with one contextual variable, international influence. Three articles in the first part deal with the issues related to the nature of the prior regime and the variable of international influence, specifically the EU membership process after 1999. Second, the editors revisit the five arenas defined by Linz and Stepan (1996) which can be used to examine the dynamics of democratic consolidation: political society, civil society, economic society, state apparatus, and the rule of law. These are also the titles of the following five parts, in which seventeen authors analyze various aspects of the five arenas.In the second part, "Political Society," the authors deal with the discourses and practices of the ruling AKP, the opposition party CHP, the ultranationalist MHP and the BDP, pro-Kurdish party. While in the early 2000s, the AKP tried to position itself as the "unique agent of democratization," the CHP largely remained a pro-status-quo party. However, since 2010, the CHP under Kilicdaroglu is giving signs of adopting a pro-EU and pro-democratic stance, and the AKP has regressed from the democratization agenda to a considerable extent. …
Page 1. 57 Based on data collected in research, the author analyzes the trends of conserva-tism i... more Page 1. 57 Based on data collected in research, the author analyzes the trends of conserva-tism in Turkey observing that conservatism is higher among rural and provincial residents, among people with lower education and income, and of more right-wing orientation. ...
Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınevi tarafından yayımlanmıştır. Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Kuzey Kampüs Eta ... more Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınevi tarafından yayımlanmıştır. Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Kuzey Kampüs Eta B Blok Zemin Kat Etiler/İstanbul TÜRKİYE bupress@buvak.org.trbupress@boun.edu.trwww.bupress.com Telephone and fax: (90) 212 257 87 27 ... Boğaziçi Üniversitesi ...
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İnsan ideoloji olmadan hayatını sürdüremez, hayatına anlam veremez, başkalarıyla olan ilişkilerini anlamlandıramaz.
İdeoloji nedir, nereden gelir, hangi işlevleri vardır? Liberalizm ve Sosyalizm nedir, nasıl doğmuştur? Modernizm bu iki ideolojiyi nasıl kapsar? Modernizm neden tarihin gördüğü en güçlü ideolojik sistemlerden biridir? Siyaset Bilimci ve Akademisyen Hakan Yılmaz, incelikle hazırladığı İdeolojiler eğitiminde modern tarih boyunca ortaya çıkmış temel ideolojileri tartışıyor. Hakan Yılmaz, derinlemesine bir bakışla ideolojilerin bıraktığı izi ve bu ideolojiler etrafında dönen tartışmaları anlatıyor.
DERSLER ve BÖLÜMLER
İdeolojinin Tanımı
1 Bölüm
Modernitenin İki Ana İdeolojik Ekseni: Liberalizm ve Sosyalizm
5 Bölüm
Liberalizm ve Sosyalizmin 20. Yüzyıl Varyantları
1 Bölüm
Muhafazakârlık ve Varyantları
2 Bölüm
20. Yüzyıl Sonu: Yeni Sağ Hakimiyet ve Popülizm
3 Bölüm
This chapter examines the major theoretical approaches to the issue of the international context of democratization. In particular, it considers democratization by means of ‘convergence’, ‘system penetration’, ‘internationalization of domestic politics’, and ‘diffusion’. It also discusses the principal dimensions of the international context, namely, the democracy promotion strategies of the United States and the European Union. The term ‘conditionality’ is used to describe the democracy promotion strategy of the EU. In the case of the United States, its leverage with respect to democracy promotion has been undermined by its military intervention and violation of human rights. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the effects of globalization and the formation of a global civil society on democratization.
Turkey’s Democratization Process utilises the theoretical framework of J.J. Linz and A.C. Stepan in order to assess the complex process of democratization in Turkey. This framework takes into account five interacting features of Turkey’s polity when making this assessment, namely: whether the underlying legal and socioeconomic conditions are conducive for the development of a free and participant society; if a relatively autonomous political society exists; whether there are legal guarantees for citizens’ freedoms; if there exists a state bureaucracy which can be used by a democratic government; and whether the type and pace of Turkish economic development contributes to this process.
Examining the Turkish case in light of this framework, this book seeks to combine analyses that will help assess the process of democratization in Turkey to date and will be of interest to scholars and researchers interested in Turkish Politics, Democratization and Middle Eastern Studies more broadly.
Table of Contents
Introduction 1 Democratization processes in defective democracies: the case of Turkey-Carmen Rodríguez, Antonio Avalos, Hakan Yılmaz and Ana I. Planet 2 The Formation of Citizenship in Turkey-Ibrahim Saylan 3 Two Steps Forward One Step Back: Turkey's Democratic Transformation-İlter Turan 4 The International Context of Democratic Reform in Turkey-William Hale Part I:Political Society 5 Party System and Democratic Consolidation in Turkey: Problems and Prospects-Sabri Sayarı 6What did They Promise for Democracy and What Did They Deliver?-Işık Gürleyen Part II:Civil Society 7 Democratic Consolidation and Civil Society in Turkey-Fuat Keyman and Tuba Kancı 8 Democratization in Turkey from a Gender Perspective-Pınar İlkaracan 9 The Istanbul Art Scene – A Social System?-Marcus Graf Part III: Economic Arena 10 Deepening Neo-liberalisation and the Changing Welfare Regime in Turkey: Mutations of a Populist “Sub-Optimal” Democracy-Mine Eder Part IV: State Apparatus 11 New Public Administration in Turkey-Süleyman Sözen 12 Determinants of Tax Evasion by Households: Evidence from Turkey-Ali Çarkoğlu and Fikret Adaman 13 From Tutelary Powers & Interventions to Civilian Control: an Overview of Turkish Civil-Military Relations since the 1920s-Yaprak Gürsoy 14 The Judiciary-Ergun Özbudun Part V: Rule of Law 15 Democracy, Tutelarism and the Search for a New Constitution-Ergun Özbudun 16 Human Rights in Turkey-Senem Aydın 17 The Paradox of Equality: Subjective Attitudes Towards basic Rights in Turkey-Ayşen Candaş Bilgen and Hakan Yılmaz 18 The Kurdish Question: Law, Politics and the Limits of Recognition-Dilek Kurban 19 Non- Muslim Minorities in the Democratization Process of Turkey-Samim Akgönül 20 Democratization in Turkey? Insights from the Alevi Issue-Elise Massicard 21 The Political Economy of the media and its impact on the freedom of expression in Turkey-Ceren Sözeri Conclusion Some Observations on Turkey's Democratization Process-Carmen Rodríguez, Antonio Avalos, Hakan Yılmaz and Ana I. Planet.
How come in Turkey the regularly stated ‘strong preference’ for – some notion of – equality’s significance does not shape the political agenda and prepare the grounds for a societal consensus on equal rights? Can we interpret the existence of this strong preference for equality as the existence of a fertile ground for instituting an indivisible set of basic rights (with their civil, political, social, cultural and economic components) in Turkey?
The second paradox that emerged from the survey and we want to focus on in this article involves regional aspects of equal basic right internalization of Turkey’s inhabitants. Marmara region (which excludes Istanbul in this study) and Southeastern Anatolia’s attitudes toward basic rights are calling for revisiting generally accepted beliefs with regards to Western and Eastern regions’ liberal/illiberal attitudes toward basic rights. Southeastern Anatolia scores much better and is more liberal compared with Marmara region on the recognition of others’ rights or right to difference and political dissent, while predominantly illiberal Marmara region on the same account shows more liberal attitudes in recognition of differences in sexual identity and orientation.
The study that was conducted in 2006 by Yilmaz was covering a nation-wide sample of 2,000 people. Unlike similar studies of its kind that focus on political attitudes and values in general, the study under consideration specifically sought to assess the attitudes of the public towards a variety of sets of basic rights and aimed to evaluate the causes of variation in those attitudes. In order to analyze the meaning of the data there is need for further research, as it is the case with most opinion surveys, but the data nevertheless provides some interesting and politically significant tendencies, some of which are paradoxical enough to call for – if not readily deliver – explanation. In this paper we would like to highlight a few of the findings that emerged within the context of this study and assess their plausible explanations. While examining the data on basic rights and the discrepancies of attitudes towards rights of difference and dissent, we will specifically focus on what emerges as the paradox of strong preference for equality that reappears in this study as a strong preference for equality before the law (see figures below). Furthermore, we will focus on the paradoxical outcome that emerges when we analyze the data on a regional basis. Southeastern Anatolia appears to be the most ardent advocate of certain sets of basic rights and their inviolability compared with the Western Anatolia, which reveals much less liberal and even illiberal attitudes towards the rights to difference and dissent. Region-based finding only reverses itself on the attitudes towards the rights of difference and dissent on the basis of sexual orientation, and on that count only, Western Anatolia scores better than the Southeastern Anatolia.
In the first part we will give an outline of the study and lay out its relevant findings. In the second part we will explain what emerges as the two paradoxical outcomes that emerge out of the data. Finally, in the third section, we propose some plausible explanations and evaluate these to uncover the direction of further research that this study must lead on the internalization of basic rights among of the inhabitants of Turkey.
Although one interpretive framework succeeded another in terms of influence and prominence, this succession does not mean that the previous framework simply passed away and was totally replaced by the upcoming one. On the contrary, the coming framework usually blended with the old one, borrowing from its predecessor ideas, symbols, models, and sometimes cadres. The Kemalist framework has been by far the most important and the most powerful among the four frameworks we are set to examine. Kemalism, for one, although lost its unquestioned authority by the end of the 1950s, did keep its prominence in the later decades due to its status as the official ideology of the state. Being the founding ideology of the republic, Kemalism did lend many of its ideas, notions, reflexes, syndromes, symbols and attitudes to the succeeding frameworks, giving rise to such hybrid formations as left-wing Kemalism and Kemalist Islamism.
Sorulması gereken soru, sosyoekonomik konum (gelir ve statü) bakımından “orta sınıf” özelliği taşıyan, kültürel tutum bakımından ise “medeni değerler”e (“civic values”) sahip bir “medeni sınıf”ın olup olmadığıdır. Böyle bir “merkezi ve medeni” topluluğun, hem Aristo’nun siyaset teorisinde, hem de 2. Dünya Savaşı sonrasında ortaya çıkan gelişme ve modernleşme teorilerinde, demokratik bir rejimin sosyokültürel altyapısını veya önkoşulunu oluşturduğunun iddia edildiğine yukarıda değinmiştik. Peki, orta sınıfın hangi değerlerinin sistemsel istikrara ve demokratik rejime katkı yapabileceği düşünülmüştür?
Bu yazının ilk bölümünde, laiklik kavramının bazı Avrupa ülkeleri ve Türkiye’deki anayasal ve yasal çerçeveleri karşılaştırılmakta, Türkiye’deki laikliğin liberal çizgide reforme edilmesi için politika önerileri geliştirilmektedir. İkinci bölümde, bir yurttaşlık hakkı olarak laiklik kavramı tanımlanarak, mikro-sosyal alandaki laiklik hakkı ihlallerine bir çözüm olması amacıyla “laiklik ombudsmanlığı” kurumunun hayata geçirilmesi önerilmektedir. Son bölümde ise, vatandaşlar arasındaki dinsel ayrımcılık konusu “makbul vatandaş” kavramı altında irdelenmektedir.
I have argued that in the immediate postwar years the internal relations of force in Turkey were not by themselves conducive to a democratic regime change. In other words, the expected internal costs of suppression remained consistently lower than the expected internal costs of toleration until very late in the transition process, when finally the opposition party organized a widespread civilian network and found supporters within the military. Although the expected internal costs of suppression were well below the expected internal costs of toleration, the Kemalist ruling bloc did indulge in liberalization and democratization under the influence of the expected external benefits of democratization: what motivated the Kemalist ruling bloc to inaugurate, maintain, and complete the democratic transition was their foreign policy strategy of integrating Turkey with the international system of the democratic victors of the war. The need to put up a stronger resistance to the Soviet plans of isolating Turkey from the West and taking it in the Soviet sphere of influence was one additional factor that further enhanced the value of American friendship in the eyes of the Kemalist leaders of Turkey. One way of winning the hearts and minds of the Americans was perceived to pass through dismantling Turkey's authoritarian regime, which was diametrically opposed to the ideals of democracy and freedom for which the Americans fought a war. On the other hand, what protected the opposition during much of the transition process was the expected external costs of suppression; that is to say, the apprehension on the part of the government that suppressing the strongly pro American opposition and tilting back to authoritarianism would inflict serious harm on the relations with the US.
Within the framework of the open model of regime change outlined above, I have also argued that the process of democratization was initiated and controlled by the state actors and that at the end of the transition political power was transferred from one set of state actors - the Civilianized Kemalist Leadership of the RPP -- to another - the Civilian Kemalist Leaders that left the RPP and founded the DP. Although it was no doubt true that the DP stood closer to the social groups and classes in comparison to the RPP, this in no way meant that it was the political representative of any social class, including the bourgeoisie. I have based this last contention on some recent studies on the historical development of the Turkish bourgeoisie, which have unequivocally maintained that in the 1940s (nor for that matter in the later decades) the bourgeois class in Turkey had not yet reached the "hegemonic political" stage (in the sense of Gramsci) or the level of a "class for itself" (in the sense of Marx). In other words, neither the bourgeoisie, nor any other social class, possessed the organizational and institutional capacity that would have compelled the Kemalist ruling bloc to a power-sharing formula. The main impulse for change, therefore, could not, and did not, come from below. On the other hand, once the change began and the Civilian Kemalists went outside of the ruling bloc for support, the support of the social classes alone, precisely because of the their organizational institutional incapacity, could not, and did not, deter the government from suppressing the opposition. The main deterrent against suppression came, not from below, but from the outside. Therefore, we can make the counterfactual statement that if there had not been any expectation on the part of the Kemalist ruling bloc that launching liberalization and democratization would bring them the much needed US support, they would not have contemplated a democratic change, and the Turkish regime would have remained an authoritarian one-party regime like Mexico's.
This security-based American outlook on Turkey left a lasting imprint on Turkish perceptions of themselves and of the outside world. This influence can be summarized by what can be called the “geopoliticization” of Turkish ideologies and discourses—military as well as civilian, right-wing as well as left-wing—all through the Cold War and beyond. Hence, Turkish political élites have perceived and presented Turkey’s global importance only in geopolitical terms, disregarding or mistrusting the country’s economic, political, cultural, and historical assets and other possible contributions to the outside world. “Our geopolitical value” has become the main argument, used by the Turkish élites against Western governments, to extract “geopolitical rents” from them. A related notion, “our sensitive geopolitical position,” was brought into play by the successive Turkish governments as an excuse to ignore or suppress domestic demands for political liberalization. Geopoliticization infiltrated into such deep layers of Turkish political thinking that long after the end of the Cold War, in response to the European Union’s insistence that Turkey liberalize its political regime in line with the Copenhagen Criteria, many Turkish political leaders continued to maintain that the EU could not possibly exclude Turkey because of “our geopolitical value.”
The deep impact of geopoliticization on Turkish political thinking manifested itself once again after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001, the subsequent U.S. bombardment of Afghanistan, and Turkey’s decision to participate in the U.S.-led coalition in the war against terrorism. Many commentators in the Turkish media and among the political élites immediately started to think that Turkey’s geopolitical value had now increased, especially for serving as the model of secular Islam as opposed to fundamentalist Islam. This geopolitical value, according to these commentators, could be used as leverage to extract more economic aid from the Western governments and international organizations without undertaking all of the required structural reforms in the economy, and to drive back some of the democratizing and liberalizing demands of the European Union. According to this line of thinking, democratization is not valuable in and of itself; it has only a geopolitical value. If democratization brings Turkey international prestige, if it serves a foreign-policy purpose such as accession to the European Union, then it may be cherished and promoted. However, whenever another factor emerges that serves the purpose just as well, then democratization can easily be brought to a standstill.
From the Truman Doctrine onward, and all through the 1950s, the geopolitical identities of Greece and Turkey, in the eyes of the Americans as well as the Western Europeans, were ambiguous. On the one hand, Turkey and Greece were seen, by the Americans and the Western Europeans alike, as part of the Near East and Eastern Mediterranean. As such, neither the Americans nor the Western Europeans thought of these two countries as belonging to Europe proper. In fact, in 1948, Turkey and Greece, together with Iran, were categorized as the GTI (Greece, Turkey, Iran) division within the newly created NEA (Near East and African Affairs) office of the U.S. Department of State (Kuniholm 1980, pp. 423-25). On the other hand, though, Greece and Turkey were members of such European and Western organizations as the Council of Europe, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC, which later became OECD), and NATO. When Western European economies began to recover from the destruction and hardships of World War II, and particularly after European integration—a process that had been started, sponsored, and supported by the United States—culminated in the foundation of the European Economic Community (EEC), both Greece and Turkey began to express their desires to clarify their ambiguous geopolitical identities, to be accepted as European states, and to join the EEC.
The United States turned out to be the prime backer of the European aspirations of Greece and Turkey. This U.S. backing was motivated by two factors. First, the United States wanted to share the financial burden of Greece and Turkey with the Western European states. And second, the United States aimed to stabilize the Greek and Turkish economies and political regimes, and to consolidate the Western orientations of these states, by linking them firmly with the process of European integration. A 1960 U.S. National Security Council paper on U.S. policy towards Turkey stated: “Successful association of Turkey with the EEC would be in the U.S. interest since Turkey’s trading position would be strengthened, thereby lessening the danger of Turkey’s ever becoming excessively reliant upon Soviet bloc markets for disposing of its exports. Furthermore, association would probably lead to additional development funds for Turkey and generally to the acceptance by the EEC countries of greater responsibility for Turkey’s economic and political fortunes” (U.S. National Security Council 1960, p. 5).
Both Greece and Turkey applied to the EEC for full membership in 1959. Both countries concluded very similar association treaties with the EEC in the early years of the 1960s. However, both countries had significant political forces—such as the supporters of the nationalist right, religious right, socialism, nonalignment, and the noncapitalist path—that were vehemently opposed to integration with the EEC, which they commonly perceived as an imperialist club. Nor did the political regimes of the two countries in the 1960s and early 1970s—tainted as they were with occasional military interventions and authoritarian rules—fit with the European pattern of liberal democracy. Hence, it is worth remembering that, let alone being admitted to the EEC, Greece was ousted even from the Council of Europe during the Colonels’ junta. The paths of the two countries toward Europe, which proceeded almost in tandem up until the mid-1970s, began to diverge significantly from that point onward. Hence, while Greece, after the fall of the junta and the restoration of democracy in 1974-75, underwent a rapid process of Europeanization, Turkey lagged behind, oscillating between the three worlds.
It seems that this indecision and oscillation of Turkey had to do more with its domestic political forces than with the foreign policies of the European states or the United States. Hence, during the 1970s, Turkey’s pro-European center-right (represented by the Justice Party) was electorally weakened and, in terms of its ideology, cadres, and foreign and domestic policy, came under the domination of the anti-Western nationalist and Islamicist radical-right parties (the Nationalist Action Party and the National Salvation Party). The center-left side of the political spectrum, on the other hand, was occupied by the Republican People’s Party, which was itself advancing a left-wing populism with strong Third Worldist overtones. Needless to say, the radical left, which exerted a significant degree of influence on the center-left and on Turkish politics in general, was altogether opposed to any idea of Turkey’s integration with capitalist Europe. Turkey’s indecision toward Europe continues even today, after Turkey has finally become a candidate state “destined to join” the European Union. There still exist in today’s Turkey significant political forces defending various non-European options, ranging from Turkey being a regional power to Turkey being the leader of a Turkic union or of an Islamic union. The decision is Turkey’s to make, caught as it is between the opposing tides of the European and non-European options, upbeat with the upward stirrings of its geopolitical value and downbeat with its downturns.
Türkiye'ye ilişkin ikinci tespit ise, devletin, Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e dek kesintili, Cumhuriyet boyunca da kesintisiz bir süreçte bir anayasal devlet karakteri kazanmasına rağmen, bu anayasal devletin bir hukuk devletine dönüşememiş olmasıdır. Habermas'ın kamusallık teorisi ışığında, anayasal devletin burjuva hukuk devletine dönüşememesinin ana nedeni, onu böyle bir dönüşüme sevkedecek devlet dışı faktörlerin, yani burjuva siyasal kamusunun, gelişememiş olmasıydı diyebiliriz . Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndaki gayrimüslim burjuvazi, Batı'daki burjuvazilerden farklı olarak, devleti denetimi altına almak için iç güçlere değil dış güçlere dayanan bir strateji benimsedi. Osmanlı gayrimüslim burjuvazisi, bir iç politik mücadeleyle, diğer sınıf ve katmanları kendi önderliğinde seferber ederek devlet üzerinde denetim kurma projesinden uzak durdu; bu iç strateji yerine, devleti (işbirliği halinde olduğu Batı burjuvazilerinin denetimindeki) Batılı devletlerin ve devletlerarası örgütlerin siyasal ve ekonomik disiplinine sokmaya çalışmayı yeğledi (Keyder 1987, s.192-198).
Kamusallık teorisi çerçevesinden Türkiye'ye bakıldığında görülen üçüncü ilginç gelişme ise, 1946'dan sonra, özellikle dış şartların sevk ve teşvikiyle , tek parti rejiminden çok partili bir rejime geçilmesi oldu. Böylece, Batı'da demokrasinin tarihsel gelişme çizgisi açısından değerlendirildiğinde ortaya aykırı bir durum çıkmış oldu: bir burjuva siyasal kamusunu ve bu kamuya hayat verecek bir sivil toplumu barındırmayan bir toplumda demokratik bir siyasal sisteme geçildi. Habermas'ın tarihsel analizinin söylediği üzre, Batı'da siyasal partiler ve partilerarası müzakerenin zemini olan parlamento, genel olarak, siyasal kamunun burjuva olan ve olmayan kanatlarını temsil eder. O zaman, böyle bir siyasal kamunun oluşmadığı Türkiye gibi bir ülkede, partiler kimi temsil eder? Metin Heper, Türkiye'de 1946 sonrası ortaya çıkan siyasal rejimi "parti-merkezli siyasal sistem" diye adlandırıyor. Parti-merkezli siyasal sistem, Heper'e göre, sosyal gruplardan bağımsız bir parti sistemidir; bu şekilde oluşan parti sistemi, partilerin burjuvazinin çeşitli kanatlarını ve diğer sosyal sınıfları temsil ettiği klasik burjuva siyasetinin yerine geçer (Heper 1985, s.99-101). Türkiye'de partiler, sosyal grupları temsil etmezler; sosyal gruplar önünde partinin hükmi şahsiyetinde ve liderinde toplaştığını iddia ettikleri kerameti kendinden menkul iktidar olma hakkını temsil ve teşhir ederler. Türkiye'de partiler ve sosyal gruplar arasındaki temsil ilişkisi, bu haliyle, Habermas'ın feodal hükümdarlar için ortaya koyduğu "temsili kamu" modeline benzer. Herhangi bir yurttaş açısından ise, bir parti kendisini doğrudan temsil etmese de, partinin bazı politikaları kendi beklentileri doğrultusunda olabilir, iktidar olanaklarını kullanarak kendisine kişisel rant sağlayabilir ve bu haliyle bile çok partili bir rejim, üzerinde hiç bir kontrolünün olamayacağı otoriter bir rejime yeğdir.
İnsan ideoloji olmadan hayatını sürdüremez, hayatına anlam veremez, başkalarıyla olan ilişkilerini anlamlandıramaz.
İdeoloji nedir, nereden gelir, hangi işlevleri vardır? Liberalizm ve Sosyalizm nedir, nasıl doğmuştur? Modernizm bu iki ideolojiyi nasıl kapsar? Modernizm neden tarihin gördüğü en güçlü ideolojik sistemlerden biridir? Siyaset Bilimci ve Akademisyen Hakan Yılmaz, incelikle hazırladığı İdeolojiler eğitiminde modern tarih boyunca ortaya çıkmış temel ideolojileri tartışıyor. Hakan Yılmaz, derinlemesine bir bakışla ideolojilerin bıraktığı izi ve bu ideolojiler etrafında dönen tartışmaları anlatıyor.
DERSLER ve BÖLÜMLER
İdeolojinin Tanımı
1 Bölüm
Modernitenin İki Ana İdeolojik Ekseni: Liberalizm ve Sosyalizm
5 Bölüm
Liberalizm ve Sosyalizmin 20. Yüzyıl Varyantları
1 Bölüm
Muhafazakârlık ve Varyantları
2 Bölüm
20. Yüzyıl Sonu: Yeni Sağ Hakimiyet ve Popülizm
3 Bölüm
This chapter examines the major theoretical approaches to the issue of the international context of democratization. In particular, it considers democratization by means of ‘convergence’, ‘system penetration’, ‘internationalization of domestic politics’, and ‘diffusion’. It also discusses the principal dimensions of the international context, namely, the democracy promotion strategies of the United States and the European Union. The term ‘conditionality’ is used to describe the democracy promotion strategy of the EU. In the case of the United States, its leverage with respect to democracy promotion has been undermined by its military intervention and violation of human rights. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the effects of globalization and the formation of a global civil society on democratization.
Turkey’s Democratization Process utilises the theoretical framework of J.J. Linz and A.C. Stepan in order to assess the complex process of democratization in Turkey. This framework takes into account five interacting features of Turkey’s polity when making this assessment, namely: whether the underlying legal and socioeconomic conditions are conducive for the development of a free and participant society; if a relatively autonomous political society exists; whether there are legal guarantees for citizens’ freedoms; if there exists a state bureaucracy which can be used by a democratic government; and whether the type and pace of Turkish economic development contributes to this process.
Examining the Turkish case in light of this framework, this book seeks to combine analyses that will help assess the process of democratization in Turkey to date and will be of interest to scholars and researchers interested in Turkish Politics, Democratization and Middle Eastern Studies more broadly.
Table of Contents
Introduction 1 Democratization processes in defective democracies: the case of Turkey-Carmen Rodríguez, Antonio Avalos, Hakan Yılmaz and Ana I. Planet 2 The Formation of Citizenship in Turkey-Ibrahim Saylan 3 Two Steps Forward One Step Back: Turkey's Democratic Transformation-İlter Turan 4 The International Context of Democratic Reform in Turkey-William Hale Part I:Political Society 5 Party System and Democratic Consolidation in Turkey: Problems and Prospects-Sabri Sayarı 6What did They Promise for Democracy and What Did They Deliver?-Işık Gürleyen Part II:Civil Society 7 Democratic Consolidation and Civil Society in Turkey-Fuat Keyman and Tuba Kancı 8 Democratization in Turkey from a Gender Perspective-Pınar İlkaracan 9 The Istanbul Art Scene – A Social System?-Marcus Graf Part III: Economic Arena 10 Deepening Neo-liberalisation and the Changing Welfare Regime in Turkey: Mutations of a Populist “Sub-Optimal” Democracy-Mine Eder Part IV: State Apparatus 11 New Public Administration in Turkey-Süleyman Sözen 12 Determinants of Tax Evasion by Households: Evidence from Turkey-Ali Çarkoğlu and Fikret Adaman 13 From Tutelary Powers & Interventions to Civilian Control: an Overview of Turkish Civil-Military Relations since the 1920s-Yaprak Gürsoy 14 The Judiciary-Ergun Özbudun Part V: Rule of Law 15 Democracy, Tutelarism and the Search for a New Constitution-Ergun Özbudun 16 Human Rights in Turkey-Senem Aydın 17 The Paradox of Equality: Subjective Attitudes Towards basic Rights in Turkey-Ayşen Candaş Bilgen and Hakan Yılmaz 18 The Kurdish Question: Law, Politics and the Limits of Recognition-Dilek Kurban 19 Non- Muslim Minorities in the Democratization Process of Turkey-Samim Akgönül 20 Democratization in Turkey? Insights from the Alevi Issue-Elise Massicard 21 The Political Economy of the media and its impact on the freedom of expression in Turkey-Ceren Sözeri Conclusion Some Observations on Turkey's Democratization Process-Carmen Rodríguez, Antonio Avalos, Hakan Yılmaz and Ana I. Planet.
How come in Turkey the regularly stated ‘strong preference’ for – some notion of – equality’s significance does not shape the political agenda and prepare the grounds for a societal consensus on equal rights? Can we interpret the existence of this strong preference for equality as the existence of a fertile ground for instituting an indivisible set of basic rights (with their civil, political, social, cultural and economic components) in Turkey?
The second paradox that emerged from the survey and we want to focus on in this article involves regional aspects of equal basic right internalization of Turkey’s inhabitants. Marmara region (which excludes Istanbul in this study) and Southeastern Anatolia’s attitudes toward basic rights are calling for revisiting generally accepted beliefs with regards to Western and Eastern regions’ liberal/illiberal attitudes toward basic rights. Southeastern Anatolia scores much better and is more liberal compared with Marmara region on the recognition of others’ rights or right to difference and political dissent, while predominantly illiberal Marmara region on the same account shows more liberal attitudes in recognition of differences in sexual identity and orientation.
The study that was conducted in 2006 by Yilmaz was covering a nation-wide sample of 2,000 people. Unlike similar studies of its kind that focus on political attitudes and values in general, the study under consideration specifically sought to assess the attitudes of the public towards a variety of sets of basic rights and aimed to evaluate the causes of variation in those attitudes. In order to analyze the meaning of the data there is need for further research, as it is the case with most opinion surveys, but the data nevertheless provides some interesting and politically significant tendencies, some of which are paradoxical enough to call for – if not readily deliver – explanation. In this paper we would like to highlight a few of the findings that emerged within the context of this study and assess their plausible explanations. While examining the data on basic rights and the discrepancies of attitudes towards rights of difference and dissent, we will specifically focus on what emerges as the paradox of strong preference for equality that reappears in this study as a strong preference for equality before the law (see figures below). Furthermore, we will focus on the paradoxical outcome that emerges when we analyze the data on a regional basis. Southeastern Anatolia appears to be the most ardent advocate of certain sets of basic rights and their inviolability compared with the Western Anatolia, which reveals much less liberal and even illiberal attitudes towards the rights to difference and dissent. Region-based finding only reverses itself on the attitudes towards the rights of difference and dissent on the basis of sexual orientation, and on that count only, Western Anatolia scores better than the Southeastern Anatolia.
In the first part we will give an outline of the study and lay out its relevant findings. In the second part we will explain what emerges as the two paradoxical outcomes that emerge out of the data. Finally, in the third section, we propose some plausible explanations and evaluate these to uncover the direction of further research that this study must lead on the internalization of basic rights among of the inhabitants of Turkey.
Although one interpretive framework succeeded another in terms of influence and prominence, this succession does not mean that the previous framework simply passed away and was totally replaced by the upcoming one. On the contrary, the coming framework usually blended with the old one, borrowing from its predecessor ideas, symbols, models, and sometimes cadres. The Kemalist framework has been by far the most important and the most powerful among the four frameworks we are set to examine. Kemalism, for one, although lost its unquestioned authority by the end of the 1950s, did keep its prominence in the later decades due to its status as the official ideology of the state. Being the founding ideology of the republic, Kemalism did lend many of its ideas, notions, reflexes, syndromes, symbols and attitudes to the succeeding frameworks, giving rise to such hybrid formations as left-wing Kemalism and Kemalist Islamism.
Sorulması gereken soru, sosyoekonomik konum (gelir ve statü) bakımından “orta sınıf” özelliği taşıyan, kültürel tutum bakımından ise “medeni değerler”e (“civic values”) sahip bir “medeni sınıf”ın olup olmadığıdır. Böyle bir “merkezi ve medeni” topluluğun, hem Aristo’nun siyaset teorisinde, hem de 2. Dünya Savaşı sonrasında ortaya çıkan gelişme ve modernleşme teorilerinde, demokratik bir rejimin sosyokültürel altyapısını veya önkoşulunu oluşturduğunun iddia edildiğine yukarıda değinmiştik. Peki, orta sınıfın hangi değerlerinin sistemsel istikrara ve demokratik rejime katkı yapabileceği düşünülmüştür?
Bu yazının ilk bölümünde, laiklik kavramının bazı Avrupa ülkeleri ve Türkiye’deki anayasal ve yasal çerçeveleri karşılaştırılmakta, Türkiye’deki laikliğin liberal çizgide reforme edilmesi için politika önerileri geliştirilmektedir. İkinci bölümde, bir yurttaşlık hakkı olarak laiklik kavramı tanımlanarak, mikro-sosyal alandaki laiklik hakkı ihlallerine bir çözüm olması amacıyla “laiklik ombudsmanlığı” kurumunun hayata geçirilmesi önerilmektedir. Son bölümde ise, vatandaşlar arasındaki dinsel ayrımcılık konusu “makbul vatandaş” kavramı altında irdelenmektedir.
I have argued that in the immediate postwar years the internal relations of force in Turkey were not by themselves conducive to a democratic regime change. In other words, the expected internal costs of suppression remained consistently lower than the expected internal costs of toleration until very late in the transition process, when finally the opposition party organized a widespread civilian network and found supporters within the military. Although the expected internal costs of suppression were well below the expected internal costs of toleration, the Kemalist ruling bloc did indulge in liberalization and democratization under the influence of the expected external benefits of democratization: what motivated the Kemalist ruling bloc to inaugurate, maintain, and complete the democratic transition was their foreign policy strategy of integrating Turkey with the international system of the democratic victors of the war. The need to put up a stronger resistance to the Soviet plans of isolating Turkey from the West and taking it in the Soviet sphere of influence was one additional factor that further enhanced the value of American friendship in the eyes of the Kemalist leaders of Turkey. One way of winning the hearts and minds of the Americans was perceived to pass through dismantling Turkey's authoritarian regime, which was diametrically opposed to the ideals of democracy and freedom for which the Americans fought a war. On the other hand, what protected the opposition during much of the transition process was the expected external costs of suppression; that is to say, the apprehension on the part of the government that suppressing the strongly pro American opposition and tilting back to authoritarianism would inflict serious harm on the relations with the US.
Within the framework of the open model of regime change outlined above, I have also argued that the process of democratization was initiated and controlled by the state actors and that at the end of the transition political power was transferred from one set of state actors - the Civilianized Kemalist Leadership of the RPP -- to another - the Civilian Kemalist Leaders that left the RPP and founded the DP. Although it was no doubt true that the DP stood closer to the social groups and classes in comparison to the RPP, this in no way meant that it was the political representative of any social class, including the bourgeoisie. I have based this last contention on some recent studies on the historical development of the Turkish bourgeoisie, which have unequivocally maintained that in the 1940s (nor for that matter in the later decades) the bourgeois class in Turkey had not yet reached the "hegemonic political" stage (in the sense of Gramsci) or the level of a "class for itself" (in the sense of Marx). In other words, neither the bourgeoisie, nor any other social class, possessed the organizational and institutional capacity that would have compelled the Kemalist ruling bloc to a power-sharing formula. The main impulse for change, therefore, could not, and did not, come from below. On the other hand, once the change began and the Civilian Kemalists went outside of the ruling bloc for support, the support of the social classes alone, precisely because of the their organizational institutional incapacity, could not, and did not, deter the government from suppressing the opposition. The main deterrent against suppression came, not from below, but from the outside. Therefore, we can make the counterfactual statement that if there had not been any expectation on the part of the Kemalist ruling bloc that launching liberalization and democratization would bring them the much needed US support, they would not have contemplated a democratic change, and the Turkish regime would have remained an authoritarian one-party regime like Mexico's.
This security-based American outlook on Turkey left a lasting imprint on Turkish perceptions of themselves and of the outside world. This influence can be summarized by what can be called the “geopoliticization” of Turkish ideologies and discourses—military as well as civilian, right-wing as well as left-wing—all through the Cold War and beyond. Hence, Turkish political élites have perceived and presented Turkey’s global importance only in geopolitical terms, disregarding or mistrusting the country’s economic, political, cultural, and historical assets and other possible contributions to the outside world. “Our geopolitical value” has become the main argument, used by the Turkish élites against Western governments, to extract “geopolitical rents” from them. A related notion, “our sensitive geopolitical position,” was brought into play by the successive Turkish governments as an excuse to ignore or suppress domestic demands for political liberalization. Geopoliticization infiltrated into such deep layers of Turkish political thinking that long after the end of the Cold War, in response to the European Union’s insistence that Turkey liberalize its political regime in line with the Copenhagen Criteria, many Turkish political leaders continued to maintain that the EU could not possibly exclude Turkey because of “our geopolitical value.”
The deep impact of geopoliticization on Turkish political thinking manifested itself once again after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001, the subsequent U.S. bombardment of Afghanistan, and Turkey’s decision to participate in the U.S.-led coalition in the war against terrorism. Many commentators in the Turkish media and among the political élites immediately started to think that Turkey’s geopolitical value had now increased, especially for serving as the model of secular Islam as opposed to fundamentalist Islam. This geopolitical value, according to these commentators, could be used as leverage to extract more economic aid from the Western governments and international organizations without undertaking all of the required structural reforms in the economy, and to drive back some of the democratizing and liberalizing demands of the European Union. According to this line of thinking, democratization is not valuable in and of itself; it has only a geopolitical value. If democratization brings Turkey international prestige, if it serves a foreign-policy purpose such as accession to the European Union, then it may be cherished and promoted. However, whenever another factor emerges that serves the purpose just as well, then democratization can easily be brought to a standstill.
From the Truman Doctrine onward, and all through the 1950s, the geopolitical identities of Greece and Turkey, in the eyes of the Americans as well as the Western Europeans, were ambiguous. On the one hand, Turkey and Greece were seen, by the Americans and the Western Europeans alike, as part of the Near East and Eastern Mediterranean. As such, neither the Americans nor the Western Europeans thought of these two countries as belonging to Europe proper. In fact, in 1948, Turkey and Greece, together with Iran, were categorized as the GTI (Greece, Turkey, Iran) division within the newly created NEA (Near East and African Affairs) office of the U.S. Department of State (Kuniholm 1980, pp. 423-25). On the other hand, though, Greece and Turkey were members of such European and Western organizations as the Council of Europe, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC, which later became OECD), and NATO. When Western European economies began to recover from the destruction and hardships of World War II, and particularly after European integration—a process that had been started, sponsored, and supported by the United States—culminated in the foundation of the European Economic Community (EEC), both Greece and Turkey began to express their desires to clarify their ambiguous geopolitical identities, to be accepted as European states, and to join the EEC.
The United States turned out to be the prime backer of the European aspirations of Greece and Turkey. This U.S. backing was motivated by two factors. First, the United States wanted to share the financial burden of Greece and Turkey with the Western European states. And second, the United States aimed to stabilize the Greek and Turkish economies and political regimes, and to consolidate the Western orientations of these states, by linking them firmly with the process of European integration. A 1960 U.S. National Security Council paper on U.S. policy towards Turkey stated: “Successful association of Turkey with the EEC would be in the U.S. interest since Turkey’s trading position would be strengthened, thereby lessening the danger of Turkey’s ever becoming excessively reliant upon Soviet bloc markets for disposing of its exports. Furthermore, association would probably lead to additional development funds for Turkey and generally to the acceptance by the EEC countries of greater responsibility for Turkey’s economic and political fortunes” (U.S. National Security Council 1960, p. 5).
Both Greece and Turkey applied to the EEC for full membership in 1959. Both countries concluded very similar association treaties with the EEC in the early years of the 1960s. However, both countries had significant political forces—such as the supporters of the nationalist right, religious right, socialism, nonalignment, and the noncapitalist path—that were vehemently opposed to integration with the EEC, which they commonly perceived as an imperialist club. Nor did the political regimes of the two countries in the 1960s and early 1970s—tainted as they were with occasional military interventions and authoritarian rules—fit with the European pattern of liberal democracy. Hence, it is worth remembering that, let alone being admitted to the EEC, Greece was ousted even from the Council of Europe during the Colonels’ junta. The paths of the two countries toward Europe, which proceeded almost in tandem up until the mid-1970s, began to diverge significantly from that point onward. Hence, while Greece, after the fall of the junta and the restoration of democracy in 1974-75, underwent a rapid process of Europeanization, Turkey lagged behind, oscillating between the three worlds.
It seems that this indecision and oscillation of Turkey had to do more with its domestic political forces than with the foreign policies of the European states or the United States. Hence, during the 1970s, Turkey’s pro-European center-right (represented by the Justice Party) was electorally weakened and, in terms of its ideology, cadres, and foreign and domestic policy, came under the domination of the anti-Western nationalist and Islamicist radical-right parties (the Nationalist Action Party and the National Salvation Party). The center-left side of the political spectrum, on the other hand, was occupied by the Republican People’s Party, which was itself advancing a left-wing populism with strong Third Worldist overtones. Needless to say, the radical left, which exerted a significant degree of influence on the center-left and on Turkish politics in general, was altogether opposed to any idea of Turkey’s integration with capitalist Europe. Turkey’s indecision toward Europe continues even today, after Turkey has finally become a candidate state “destined to join” the European Union. There still exist in today’s Turkey significant political forces defending various non-European options, ranging from Turkey being a regional power to Turkey being the leader of a Turkic union or of an Islamic union. The decision is Turkey’s to make, caught as it is between the opposing tides of the European and non-European options, upbeat with the upward stirrings of its geopolitical value and downbeat with its downturns.
Türkiye'ye ilişkin ikinci tespit ise, devletin, Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e dek kesintili, Cumhuriyet boyunca da kesintisiz bir süreçte bir anayasal devlet karakteri kazanmasına rağmen, bu anayasal devletin bir hukuk devletine dönüşememiş olmasıdır. Habermas'ın kamusallık teorisi ışığında, anayasal devletin burjuva hukuk devletine dönüşememesinin ana nedeni, onu böyle bir dönüşüme sevkedecek devlet dışı faktörlerin, yani burjuva siyasal kamusunun, gelişememiş olmasıydı diyebiliriz . Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndaki gayrimüslim burjuvazi, Batı'daki burjuvazilerden farklı olarak, devleti denetimi altına almak için iç güçlere değil dış güçlere dayanan bir strateji benimsedi. Osmanlı gayrimüslim burjuvazisi, bir iç politik mücadeleyle, diğer sınıf ve katmanları kendi önderliğinde seferber ederek devlet üzerinde denetim kurma projesinden uzak durdu; bu iç strateji yerine, devleti (işbirliği halinde olduğu Batı burjuvazilerinin denetimindeki) Batılı devletlerin ve devletlerarası örgütlerin siyasal ve ekonomik disiplinine sokmaya çalışmayı yeğledi (Keyder 1987, s.192-198).
Kamusallık teorisi çerçevesinden Türkiye'ye bakıldığında görülen üçüncü ilginç gelişme ise, 1946'dan sonra, özellikle dış şartların sevk ve teşvikiyle , tek parti rejiminden çok partili bir rejime geçilmesi oldu. Böylece, Batı'da demokrasinin tarihsel gelişme çizgisi açısından değerlendirildiğinde ortaya aykırı bir durum çıkmış oldu: bir burjuva siyasal kamusunu ve bu kamuya hayat verecek bir sivil toplumu barındırmayan bir toplumda demokratik bir siyasal sisteme geçildi. Habermas'ın tarihsel analizinin söylediği üzre, Batı'da siyasal partiler ve partilerarası müzakerenin zemini olan parlamento, genel olarak, siyasal kamunun burjuva olan ve olmayan kanatlarını temsil eder. O zaman, böyle bir siyasal kamunun oluşmadığı Türkiye gibi bir ülkede, partiler kimi temsil eder? Metin Heper, Türkiye'de 1946 sonrası ortaya çıkan siyasal rejimi "parti-merkezli siyasal sistem" diye adlandırıyor. Parti-merkezli siyasal sistem, Heper'e göre, sosyal gruplardan bağımsız bir parti sistemidir; bu şekilde oluşan parti sistemi, partilerin burjuvazinin çeşitli kanatlarını ve diğer sosyal sınıfları temsil ettiği klasik burjuva siyasetinin yerine geçer (Heper 1985, s.99-101). Türkiye'de partiler, sosyal grupları temsil etmezler; sosyal gruplar önünde partinin hükmi şahsiyetinde ve liderinde toplaştığını iddia ettikleri kerameti kendinden menkul iktidar olma hakkını temsil ve teşhir ederler. Türkiye'de partiler ve sosyal gruplar arasındaki temsil ilişkisi, bu haliyle, Habermas'ın feodal hükümdarlar için ortaya koyduğu "temsili kamu" modeline benzer. Herhangi bir yurttaş açısından ise, bir parti kendisini doğrudan temsil etmese de, partinin bazı politikaları kendi beklentileri doğrultusunda olabilir, iktidar olanaklarını kullanarak kendisine kişisel rant sağlayabilir ve bu haliyle bile çok partili bir rejim, üzerinde hiç bir kontrolünün olamayacağı otoriter bir rejime yeğdir.
La rupture des tabous identitaires : pluralisme démocratique ou majoritarisme néo-féodal ?
Du référendum de septembre 2010 sur la Constitution aux élections générales de juin 2011; Problèmes et Développements possibles.
The non-Muslim bourgeoisie in the Ottoman Empire adopted a strategy based on external powers, rather than internal ones, to keep the state in check. This foreign-based strategy stemmed from the weakness of the bourgeoisie against the state, rather than its non-Muslim identity. The Muslim-Turkish bourgeoisie emerging in the republican era encouraged the participation of the state in Western organizations, such as NATO and the European Union, to discipline its political power.
The contemporary Turkish bourgeoisie continues to rely on external powers and modernize the state by pursuing membership in Western organizations, primarily the European Union. It also tries to develop an internal hegemonic strategy, building lasting connections with political elites, establishing bridges with the state bureaucracy, and guiding the media and curricula of educational institutions.
Turkey's unique historical asynchronicities with Europe present a complex and hybrid historical material that could prevent the West's history from becoming Turkey's future. During the republican period, many social classes and groups, particularly women, found places in public educational institutions, businesses, and political life. In the 1980s, claims based on identities, primarily gender-based, religious, and ethnic, became central to political struggles. This historical asynchronicity has hindered Turkey's development of a liberal and democratic regime. The "Europeanization" momentum gained since 1999 under positive EU conditionality has been reversed in the 2010s, with the deterioration in EU-Turkish relations hitting a historically low level, characterized by "ultra-instrumentalism." The new, postmodern European space is a competitive arena with continually changing boundaries, making Turkey's integration with Europe a part of an emerging global space.
By the end of World War II, Turkish governments made a strategic choice to join the political, military, economic, and cultural institutions of the Western international system. This decision created political tensions within Turkey, as the government sought to strengthen the Turkish state's international capacity and domestic capability. However, they also put up resistance when Turkey's integration with the West meant the empowerment of Turkish society, providing individual rights and liberties, and democratizing the regime. This fundamental choice has shaped Turkey's foreign policy, domestic institutions, and ideologies.
The post-World War II integration with Western states and societies, coupled with the century-long modernization of the Tanzimat, Young Turk, and Kemalist eras, has converted Turkey into an integral and inseparable part of Europe and the Western world. Turkey's choice to become a member of the European Union has been a natural continuation of the long modernization and comprehensive integration with the Western world. However, there is no short-term basis for replacing the ultrainstrumentalist nature of EU-Turkish relations with a new set of relations based on moral norms, mutual trust, political principles, and a meaningful path leading to institutional integration.
Turkey's relinquishing the perspective of EU membership and acquiescing to a "special status" may seem like a realistic alternative, but it will downgrade Turkey's place in the Western world, disrupt its power and prestige in its region and the global order, and inflict lasting damage to its democratic institutions. The best way for Turkey to revert back to the road of democratization and enhance its international and regional standing is to pursue its strategy of EU membership. The membership process will provide Turkey with the necessary tools, ideas, projects, and disciplinary norms and values to get out of the two historical traps that have been blocking its political and economic development: the middle-income trap and the middle-democratic trap.
Even if the membership goal is not reached in the medium term, Turkish-EU relations can advance to the next level, and the Europeanization process can restart. However, this development is contingent upon the following conditions: relationships with the European Union should not be limited to control over the flow of refugees, negotiation chapters should continue, the Cyprus problem should be resolved, regular consultations between Turkey and EU authorities on joint summits and other platforms should continue, and visa requirements should be lifted.
Turkey has two unique external advantages that can push it toward becoming a more advanced democracy. First, it has membership in important international institutions of the Western world, such as the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Second, Turkey is a candidate for the European Union, which remains a global center of democracy in an era of right-wing populism. However, Turkey's momentum toward Europeanization has declined under adverse conditions, leading internal actors who have guarded EU reforms to lose their enthusiasm. As the goal of EU membership has become less reachable, these actors' energy for advocacy of the European Union has lessened.
Enjoy top-of-the-line theoretical essays and case studies on culture, identity, and the "Muslim other" in Europe today. Contributions by Hakan Yilmaz, Cagla Aykac, Deniz Kandiyoti, Gerard Delanty, Gerdien Jonker, Jeffrey Haynes, Katarzyna G. Sosnowska, Kenan Cayir, Sara Silvestri, Sia Anagnostopoulou, Stephanos Pesmazoglou, and Welmoet Boender.
Table of Contents
Preface
Introduction
THEORETICAL ESSAYS
Islam and European Modernity in Historical Perspective: Towards a Cosmopolitan Perspective
Gerard Delanty
Rethinking Gender Roles in Europe through Encounters with Islam
Deniz Kandiyoti
Islam: Western Modes of Use and Abuse
Stephanos Pesmazoglou
Constructions of European Identity in Relation to the Muslim 'Oher'during the Age of Globalisation
Jeffrey Haynes
Europeanization and de-Europeanization of Islam
Sia Anagnostopoulou
CASE STUDIES
Islam and the European Union: Exploring the Issue of Discrimination
Çagla E. Aykaç
From Polish Muslims to Muslims in Poland: There and Back
Katarzyna Górak-Sosnowska
Imagining Islam: European Encounters with the Muslim World through the Lens of German Textbooks
Gerdien Jonker
Teaching Integration: Shifting Notions of the Place of Religion in the Public Sphere in the Netherlands
Welmoet Boender
Institutionalization of Islam in France: the Case of the French Council of Muslim Worship
Amel Boubekeur
Institutionalizing British and Italian Islam: Attitudes and Policies
Sara Silvestri
Transformations of Islamism and Changing Perceptions of Europe in Turkey
Kenan Cayir
Avrupa kamuoylarının Avrupa kimliği hakkındaki görüşlerini; Türkiye hakkındaki bilgilerini, algılarını, imgelerini; Türkiye'nin AB üyeliği karşısındaki tutumlarını; bütün bu algı ve tutumların gerek ülkelere, gerekse de gelir, yaş, parti, din gibi sosyoekonomik, politik, demografik alt gruplara göre nasıl farklılaştığını merak edenlere hararetle tavsiye olunur!
Kitapta, 2009 sonbaharında Almanya, Fransa, İngiltere, İspanya ve Polonya'da toplam 5000 kişi ile görüşerek yürüttüğümüz, ve bu alanda tek olan, kapsamlı ve derinlikli saha araştırmamızın bulgularını kimlik, genişleme, derinleşme, bütünleşme kuramları çerçevesinde analiz ediyoruz.
dimensions of French and German attitudes towards EU–Turkey relations.
The project reviewed recently published popular and scholarly books, journal
articles, newspaper commentaries and other printed material on Turkey,
including the transcripts of the parliamentary debates devoted to the issue of
EU–Turkey relations. In addition to the printed material, some 11 websites and
Internet discussion groups, partly or wholly devoted to the issue of Turkey, were
examined. Finally, in autumn and winter 2005, 25 interviews were conducted
with political and intellectual elites in France and Germany, who were asked to
give both their own opinions and their evaluations of the intellectual milieu in
their countries regarding the cultural dimensions of Turkey’s integration with
the EU.
a) What do European people understand from the term European identity?
b) Which sources do they use to access information on Turkey?
c) What image do they have of Turkey and Turks?
d) What are the reasons they support or oppose Turkey’s EU membership?
e) How do images related to Turkey and attitudes towards Turkey-EU relations differ according to various sub-criteria, such as geographical region, age group, political outlook, gender, income group, education level, and religiosity level?
MURCIR
Çarşamba Toplantıları
14 Şubat 2024
Müziğin "sembolik düzen" kurmadaki rolü.
Türkiye'de "düzen müziği" ve "muhalif müzik" türleri.
Ezginin Günlüğü müziğinin siyasi anlamı.
Marmara Üniversitesi Uluslararası İlişkiler Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi'nin (MURCIR) düzenlediği "Çarşamba Konuşmaları" kapsamında, 14 Şubat 2024'de Müzik ve Siyaset başlıklı bir konuşma yaptım. Konuşmamda, Türkiye'de 1950'li yıllardan itibaren "düzenin müziği" ve "düzene muhalif müzik" sayılabilecek türlerin neler olabileceğini tartıştım. Muhalif müziğin sol kanadı üzerinde dururken, bu müzik türü içerisinde sol siyasetin müzik üzerinde biçimsel bir hegemonya kurmasını ele aldım. Bu çerçevede Ezginin Günlüğü'nün kuruluş yıllarının kısa bir hikayesini anlatarak, bir yandan grubun neden sol muhalif müzik evreninin bir parçası olduğuna ve öte yandan da sol siyasetin sol müzik üzerindeki egemenliğini kırarak kendi özgün sesini nasıl bulduğuna değindim.