How do citizens respond to their government's decision to accept or reject foreign assistance in ... more How do citizens respond to their government's decision to accept or reject foreign assistance in the face of a natural disaster? While the increased frequency and intensity of natural disasters necessitate international cooperation for effective response, there have been numerous instances where states have declined foreign assistance offers due to reputation concerns. In this article, we focus on the domestic audience dynamics of such behavior. Drawing on experimental survey data from Turkey and India, two middle-income countries with geopolitical ambitions and recent experience in refusing foreign assistance, we find that accepting foreign assistance during natural disasters leads to higher evaluations of government performance, though this positive effect is driven by opposition voters only. Incumbent voters, conversely, solidify their support for the government regardless of its decision toward foreign assistance. The domestic political effects of government decisions in response to aid offers are largely independent of the identity of the country offering assistance.
This research note investigates whether external military crises, short of war, in the neighbourh... more This research note investigates whether external military crises, short of war, in the neighbourhood of the European Union (EU) affects attitudes toward the EU. Specifically, I explore whether the Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014 fostered higher levels of trust in the EU and support for deeper integration among European citizens. Methodologically, I exploit the coincidental timing of the Russian annexation of Crimea on 18 March, 2014 with the fieldwork of the Eurobarometer survey (81.2) conducted in the spring of that year. The quasi-experimental evidence establishes that European citizens who were surveyed after the Russian annexation became more trusting of the EU and presented a greater willingness for further European integration, particularly so among EU-15 members. Moreover, the treatment effects were strongly moderated by individuals' education levels, with the intervention exerting its greatest effect among the higher educated.
What effect does populism have on public attitudes toward International Organizations (IOs)? In t... more What effect does populism have on public attitudes toward International Organizations (IOs)? In this article, we differentiate for the first time between populist communication-understood as IO criticism in line with populist core ideas-and populist voting as political behavior among citizens. We argue, first, that populist voters-that is, citizens voting for a populist party-are more critical of IOs. Second, IOcritical communication based on the democratic deficit of global governance and the loss of national sovereignty that populist parties often adopt have a substantially damaging impact on public IO attitudes. Third, we propose that the negative effect of IO-critical communication should be stronger among populist voters, and, fourth, considerably vary among groups of different educational levels. To test our theoretical expectations, we first turn to World Values Survey data (7th wave) and demonstrate that populist voters are significantly more skeptical of IOs than non-populist voters, while the effect of populist voting is strongest for more educated citizens. Second, we use a preregistered survey experiment to explore the effect of IO-critical communication on IO favorability and determine if populist voting and educational levels moderate these communication effects. Our findings reveal that IO-critical communication substantially decreases confidence in IOs. Populist and non-populist voters do not differ in their susceptibility, yet IO-critical communication exerts its greatest effects among the higher educated.
This paper scrutinizes the effect of social media use on institutional trust in the European Unio... more This paper scrutinizes the effect of social media use on institutional trust in the European Union (EU) among European citizens. Fixed-effects regression models on data from the Eurobarometer survey conducted in 2019, the year of the most recent European Parliament (EP) elections, demonstrate that higher social media use is associated with lower trust in the EU. More importantly, social media usage habits exert particularly detrimental effects in regions with wider and faster internet connections. In such high-information environments, those who more frequently use online social networks, tend to trust those networks, and receive information on EU affairs from these networks have less faith in the EU compared to those in regions with lower-quality internet access. In contrast, in regions with lower broadband access, receiving EU information from social media fosters political trust.
This paper scrutinizes the effect of social media use on institutional trust in the European Unio... more This paper scrutinizes the effect of social media use on institutional trust in the European Union (EU) among European citizens. Fixed-effects regression models on data from the Eurobarometer survey conducted in 2019, the year of the most recent European Parliament (EP) elections, demonstrate that higher social media use is associated with lower trust in the EU. More importantly, social media usage habits exert particularly detrimental effects in regions with wider and faster internet connections. In such high-information environments, those who more frequently use online social networks, tend to trust those networks, and receive information on EU affairs from these networks have less faith in the EU compared to those in regions with lower-quality internet access. In contrast, in regions with lower broadband access, receiving EU information from social media fosters political trust.
This paper scrutinizes the role of the principal policy objective of military intervention in con... more This paper scrutinizes the role of the principal policy objective of military intervention in conditioning citizen attitudes for the use of force. Extending the scope of analysis beyond the independent effects, it next assesses how the effects of two core variables of intervention, namely international organizations' approval of the operation and the regime type of the target country, vary for interventions with differing mandates. The results of the conjoint experiment in two dissimilar cases, the US and Turkey, show that despite substantial changes in relative support for different types of operations, policy objective is still a highly potent determinant of individual attitudes. The results also concur that compared to foreign policy restraint and humanitarian missions, individuals are more sensitive to international organizations' endorsements of the use of force for peace and internal political change operations. Finally, individuals are significantly disapproving of operations that seek internal political changes in democratic targets, though in contrast to the democratic peace theory, for other types of interventions, they are indifferent to the regime type of the opponent.
This paper scrutinizes the role of the principal policy objective of military intervention in con... more This paper scrutinizes the role of the principal policy objective of military intervention in conditioning citizen attitudes for the use of force. Extending the scope of analysis beyond the independent effects, it next assesses how the effects of two core variables of intervention, namely international organizations' approval of the operation and the regime type of the target country, vary for interventions with differing mandates. The results of the conjoint experiment in two dissimilar cases, the US and Turkey, show that despite substantial changes in relative support for different types of operations, policy objective is still a highly potent determinant of individual attitudes. The results also concur that compared to foreign policy restraint and humanitarian missions, individuals are more sensitive to international organizations' endorsements of the use of force for peace and internal political change operations. Finally, individuals are significantly disapproving of operations that seek internal political changes in democratic targets, though in contrast to the democratic peace theory, for other types of interventions, they are indifferent to the regime type of the opponent.
This paper investigates if individuals’ negative assessments of the future drive micro-level relu... more This paper investigates if individuals’ negative assessments of the future drive micro-level reluctance for international cooperation and reciprocal behavior, a core principle of multilateralism. To test our theoretical expectations, we field online survey experiments on a sample of over 3000 respondents in the US and Turkey in October–November 2020. The experimental results show that on average, individuals are fairly sensitive to target countries’ policy actions and are inclined to reciprocate when contemplating whether to increase contributions to UN or consent to bilateral trade liberalization. Yet, further analyses concur that individual inclinations to reciprocate are substantially moderated by their future expectations. Specifically, individuals who are more pessimistic about their material prospects remain fairly indifferent to the positive actions of other countries, but are more likely to penalize negative foreign policy actions by reciprocating in kind.
This paper investigates if individuals' negative assessments of the future drive micro-level relu... more This paper investigates if individuals' negative assessments of the future drive micro-level reluctance for international cooperation and reciprocal behavior, a core principle of multilateralism. To test our theoretical expectations, we field online survey experiments on a sample of over 3000 respondents in the US and Turkey in October-November 2020. The experimental results show that on average, individuals are fairly sensitive to target countries' policy actions and are inclined to reciprocate when contemplating whether to increase contributions to UN or consent to bilateral trade liberalization. Yet, further analyses concur that individual inclinations to reciprocate are substantially moderated by their future expectations. Specifically, individuals who are more pessimistic about their material prospects remain fairly indifferent to the positive actions of other countries, but are more likely to penalize negative foreign policy actions by reciprocating in kind.
Building upon the "new" new trade theory, this article proposes that the regional business demogr... more Building upon the "new" new trade theory, this article proposes that the regional business demography plays a prominent role in shaping Europeans' preferences on globalization. Specifically, I argue, regional populations of high-growth enterprises that take advantage of internationalization and export opportunities drive positive attitudes on globalization, especially among the "losers" of import competition. Regression models on cross-sectional survey data from Eurobarometer surveys covering ten waves between 2015 and 2019 supplemented by a series of macro-level covariates establish that residents in regions with higher shares of high-growth enterprises are more likely to view globalization as an opportunity. More importantly, the positive association between regional high-growth enterprise shares and support for globalization is particularly pronounced among lower-educated and lower-skilled individuals.
A scenario about research in which blood is drawn from patients with dementia who cannot understa... more A scenario about research in which blood is drawn from patients with dementia who cannot understand the reason why.
Supplemental Material, sj-pdf-1-ppq-10.1177_1354068820939777 for Where do hawks and doves fly whe... more Supplemental Material, sj-pdf-1-ppq-10.1177_1354068820939777 for Where do hawks and doves fly when shots are fired? by Osman Sabri Kiratli in Party Politics
This study investigates the driving forces of public endorsement of two major intergovernmental o... more This study investigates the driving forces of public endorsement of two major intergovernmental organizations—the UN and NATO. More specifically, I scrutinize the effects of two sets of independent...
This paper examines the effect of popular identification with Europe and the European Union on th... more This paper examines the effect of popular identification with Europe and the European Union on the level of governments’ willingness to consent to supranational reforms of foreign and security policies. Applying ordinary least squares (OLS) regression on a series of statistical analyses based on data provided by Eurobarometer and state positions prior to the three major EU treaties (the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty and the 2004 Constitutional Treaty), this paper concludes that higher levels of European identification by citizens greatly increase domestic support for joint decision-making in foreign and defence policies which in turn pushes governments to adopt more integrationist positions during negotiations.
This paper explores the diverging electoral impact of instigating high-hostility militarized inte... more This paper explores the diverging electoral impact of instigating high-hostility militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) on the votes shares of hawkish, right-wing and dovish, left-wing incumbents, respectively. More specifically, I propose that deploying troops electorally harms doves and benefits hawks. I test this hypothesis via two studies. Study-1 presents a macro-level analysis of an incumbent’s electoral performance in a dataset covering 389 elections in 27 democratic countries between 1950 and 2010. With the objective of capturing heterogeneity of individual voting behavior at the appropriate level, Study-2 scrutinizes cross-national survey results from Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) covering 19 elections in 6 democracies. Multilevel models across both studies concur that in times of conflict, voters become significantly less supportive of dovish, left-wing incumbents and slightly more so of hawkish, right-wing ones compared to times of peace. The results also ...
How do citizens respond to their government's decision to accept or reject foreign assistance in ... more How do citizens respond to their government's decision to accept or reject foreign assistance in the face of a natural disaster? While the increased frequency and intensity of natural disasters necessitate international cooperation for effective response, there have been numerous instances where states have declined foreign assistance offers due to reputation concerns. In this article, we focus on the domestic audience dynamics of such behavior. Drawing on experimental survey data from Turkey and India, two middle-income countries with geopolitical ambitions and recent experience in refusing foreign assistance, we find that accepting foreign assistance during natural disasters leads to higher evaluations of government performance, though this positive effect is driven by opposition voters only. Incumbent voters, conversely, solidify their support for the government regardless of its decision toward foreign assistance. The domestic political effects of government decisions in response to aid offers are largely independent of the identity of the country offering assistance.
This research note investigates whether external military crises, short of war, in the neighbourh... more This research note investigates whether external military crises, short of war, in the neighbourhood of the European Union (EU) affects attitudes toward the EU. Specifically, I explore whether the Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014 fostered higher levels of trust in the EU and support for deeper integration among European citizens. Methodologically, I exploit the coincidental timing of the Russian annexation of Crimea on 18 March, 2014 with the fieldwork of the Eurobarometer survey (81.2) conducted in the spring of that year. The quasi-experimental evidence establishes that European citizens who were surveyed after the Russian annexation became more trusting of the EU and presented a greater willingness for further European integration, particularly so among EU-15 members. Moreover, the treatment effects were strongly moderated by individuals' education levels, with the intervention exerting its greatest effect among the higher educated.
What effect does populism have on public attitudes toward International Organizations (IOs)? In t... more What effect does populism have on public attitudes toward International Organizations (IOs)? In this article, we differentiate for the first time between populist communication-understood as IO criticism in line with populist core ideas-and populist voting as political behavior among citizens. We argue, first, that populist voters-that is, citizens voting for a populist party-are more critical of IOs. Second, IOcritical communication based on the democratic deficit of global governance and the loss of national sovereignty that populist parties often adopt have a substantially damaging impact on public IO attitudes. Third, we propose that the negative effect of IO-critical communication should be stronger among populist voters, and, fourth, considerably vary among groups of different educational levels. To test our theoretical expectations, we first turn to World Values Survey data (7th wave) and demonstrate that populist voters are significantly more skeptical of IOs than non-populist voters, while the effect of populist voting is strongest for more educated citizens. Second, we use a preregistered survey experiment to explore the effect of IO-critical communication on IO favorability and determine if populist voting and educational levels moderate these communication effects. Our findings reveal that IO-critical communication substantially decreases confidence in IOs. Populist and non-populist voters do not differ in their susceptibility, yet IO-critical communication exerts its greatest effects among the higher educated.
This paper scrutinizes the effect of social media use on institutional trust in the European Unio... more This paper scrutinizes the effect of social media use on institutional trust in the European Union (EU) among European citizens. Fixed-effects regression models on data from the Eurobarometer survey conducted in 2019, the year of the most recent European Parliament (EP) elections, demonstrate that higher social media use is associated with lower trust in the EU. More importantly, social media usage habits exert particularly detrimental effects in regions with wider and faster internet connections. In such high-information environments, those who more frequently use online social networks, tend to trust those networks, and receive information on EU affairs from these networks have less faith in the EU compared to those in regions with lower-quality internet access. In contrast, in regions with lower broadband access, receiving EU information from social media fosters political trust.
This paper scrutinizes the effect of social media use on institutional trust in the European Unio... more This paper scrutinizes the effect of social media use on institutional trust in the European Union (EU) among European citizens. Fixed-effects regression models on data from the Eurobarometer survey conducted in 2019, the year of the most recent European Parliament (EP) elections, demonstrate that higher social media use is associated with lower trust in the EU. More importantly, social media usage habits exert particularly detrimental effects in regions with wider and faster internet connections. In such high-information environments, those who more frequently use online social networks, tend to trust those networks, and receive information on EU affairs from these networks have less faith in the EU compared to those in regions with lower-quality internet access. In contrast, in regions with lower broadband access, receiving EU information from social media fosters political trust.
This paper scrutinizes the role of the principal policy objective of military intervention in con... more This paper scrutinizes the role of the principal policy objective of military intervention in conditioning citizen attitudes for the use of force. Extending the scope of analysis beyond the independent effects, it next assesses how the effects of two core variables of intervention, namely international organizations' approval of the operation and the regime type of the target country, vary for interventions with differing mandates. The results of the conjoint experiment in two dissimilar cases, the US and Turkey, show that despite substantial changes in relative support for different types of operations, policy objective is still a highly potent determinant of individual attitudes. The results also concur that compared to foreign policy restraint and humanitarian missions, individuals are more sensitive to international organizations' endorsements of the use of force for peace and internal political change operations. Finally, individuals are significantly disapproving of operations that seek internal political changes in democratic targets, though in contrast to the democratic peace theory, for other types of interventions, they are indifferent to the regime type of the opponent.
This paper scrutinizes the role of the principal policy objective of military intervention in con... more This paper scrutinizes the role of the principal policy objective of military intervention in conditioning citizen attitudes for the use of force. Extending the scope of analysis beyond the independent effects, it next assesses how the effects of two core variables of intervention, namely international organizations' approval of the operation and the regime type of the target country, vary for interventions with differing mandates. The results of the conjoint experiment in two dissimilar cases, the US and Turkey, show that despite substantial changes in relative support for different types of operations, policy objective is still a highly potent determinant of individual attitudes. The results also concur that compared to foreign policy restraint and humanitarian missions, individuals are more sensitive to international organizations' endorsements of the use of force for peace and internal political change operations. Finally, individuals are significantly disapproving of operations that seek internal political changes in democratic targets, though in contrast to the democratic peace theory, for other types of interventions, they are indifferent to the regime type of the opponent.
This paper investigates if individuals’ negative assessments of the future drive micro-level relu... more This paper investigates if individuals’ negative assessments of the future drive micro-level reluctance for international cooperation and reciprocal behavior, a core principle of multilateralism. To test our theoretical expectations, we field online survey experiments on a sample of over 3000 respondents in the US and Turkey in October–November 2020. The experimental results show that on average, individuals are fairly sensitive to target countries’ policy actions and are inclined to reciprocate when contemplating whether to increase contributions to UN or consent to bilateral trade liberalization. Yet, further analyses concur that individual inclinations to reciprocate are substantially moderated by their future expectations. Specifically, individuals who are more pessimistic about their material prospects remain fairly indifferent to the positive actions of other countries, but are more likely to penalize negative foreign policy actions by reciprocating in kind.
This paper investigates if individuals' negative assessments of the future drive micro-level relu... more This paper investigates if individuals' negative assessments of the future drive micro-level reluctance for international cooperation and reciprocal behavior, a core principle of multilateralism. To test our theoretical expectations, we field online survey experiments on a sample of over 3000 respondents in the US and Turkey in October-November 2020. The experimental results show that on average, individuals are fairly sensitive to target countries' policy actions and are inclined to reciprocate when contemplating whether to increase contributions to UN or consent to bilateral trade liberalization. Yet, further analyses concur that individual inclinations to reciprocate are substantially moderated by their future expectations. Specifically, individuals who are more pessimistic about their material prospects remain fairly indifferent to the positive actions of other countries, but are more likely to penalize negative foreign policy actions by reciprocating in kind.
Building upon the "new" new trade theory, this article proposes that the regional business demogr... more Building upon the "new" new trade theory, this article proposes that the regional business demography plays a prominent role in shaping Europeans' preferences on globalization. Specifically, I argue, regional populations of high-growth enterprises that take advantage of internationalization and export opportunities drive positive attitudes on globalization, especially among the "losers" of import competition. Regression models on cross-sectional survey data from Eurobarometer surveys covering ten waves between 2015 and 2019 supplemented by a series of macro-level covariates establish that residents in regions with higher shares of high-growth enterprises are more likely to view globalization as an opportunity. More importantly, the positive association between regional high-growth enterprise shares and support for globalization is particularly pronounced among lower-educated and lower-skilled individuals.
A scenario about research in which blood is drawn from patients with dementia who cannot understa... more A scenario about research in which blood is drawn from patients with dementia who cannot understand the reason why.
Supplemental Material, sj-pdf-1-ppq-10.1177_1354068820939777 for Where do hawks and doves fly whe... more Supplemental Material, sj-pdf-1-ppq-10.1177_1354068820939777 for Where do hawks and doves fly when shots are fired? by Osman Sabri Kiratli in Party Politics
This study investigates the driving forces of public endorsement of two major intergovernmental o... more This study investigates the driving forces of public endorsement of two major intergovernmental organizations—the UN and NATO. More specifically, I scrutinize the effects of two sets of independent...
This paper examines the effect of popular identification with Europe and the European Union on th... more This paper examines the effect of popular identification with Europe and the European Union on the level of governments’ willingness to consent to supranational reforms of foreign and security policies. Applying ordinary least squares (OLS) regression on a series of statistical analyses based on data provided by Eurobarometer and state positions prior to the three major EU treaties (the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty and the 2004 Constitutional Treaty), this paper concludes that higher levels of European identification by citizens greatly increase domestic support for joint decision-making in foreign and defence policies which in turn pushes governments to adopt more integrationist positions during negotiations.
This paper explores the diverging electoral impact of instigating high-hostility militarized inte... more This paper explores the diverging electoral impact of instigating high-hostility militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) on the votes shares of hawkish, right-wing and dovish, left-wing incumbents, respectively. More specifically, I propose that deploying troops electorally harms doves and benefits hawks. I test this hypothesis via two studies. Study-1 presents a macro-level analysis of an incumbent’s electoral performance in a dataset covering 389 elections in 27 democratic countries between 1950 and 2010. With the objective of capturing heterogeneity of individual voting behavior at the appropriate level, Study-2 scrutinizes cross-national survey results from Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) covering 19 elections in 6 democracies. Multilevel models across both studies concur that in times of conflict, voters become significantly less supportive of dovish, left-wing incumbents and slightly more so of hawkish, right-wing ones compared to times of peace. The results also ...
This paper scrutinizes the effect of social media use on institutional trust in the European Unio... more This paper scrutinizes the effect of social media use on institutional trust in the European Union (EU) among European citizens. Fixed-effects regression models on data from the Eurobarometer survey conducted in 2019, the year of the most recent European Parliament (EP) elections, demonstrate that higher social media use is associated with lower trust in the EU. More importantly, social media usage habits exert particularly detrimental effects in regions with wider and faster internet connections. In such high-information environments, those who more frequently use online social networks, tend to trust those networks, and receive information on EU affairs from these networks, have less faith in the EU compared to those in regions with lower-quality internet access. In contrast, in regions with lower broadband access, receiving EU information from social media fosters political trust.
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH, 2019
This study investigates the degree to which the political regime of the aid recipient country exe... more This study investigates the degree to which the political regime of the aid recipient country exerts an influence on shaping voters’ aid preferences in high middle-income donors. Based on a survey experiment that manipulates the regime type of the aid recipient on nationally representative samples of Turkey and Greece, this paper finds that respondents are significantly more likely to support the delivery of aid to a democratic country than an authoritarian one. A sub-group analysis based on Inglehart’s post-materialism index suggests that different mechanisms apply to different countries. While functional reasons condition Turkish preference for democratic aid recipients, both normative and functional reasons appear to operate in the Greek sample.
This paper explores the determinants of individual support for common aid policy in the European ... more This paper explores the determinants of individual support for common aid policy in the European Union, the largest multilateral contributor of foreign aid. Using the 2016 Eurobarometer survey data, I first investigate the influence of individuals' assessments of aid objectives on support for multilateral disbursements, and second, explore the effect of country-level factors, population and economic power. Multi-level regression models reveal that those who prioritize economic infrastructural projects in developing countries are highly negative of the utilization of EU channels. Conversely, individual preferences for the promotion of democratic reforms and provision of basic necessities are strongly and positively associated with the dependent variable. The results also demonstrate that individuals living in lower income and less populated polities are more positively disposed towards common aid policy.
Uploads