Vasco Correia

La pensée irrationnelle dans ses diverses formes constitue à la fois un problème pratique et un dilemme théorique auxquels il faut pouvoir répondre. Du point de vue pratique, les illusions de l’esprit sont à l’origine de décisions irrationnelles, jugements biaisés, rationalisations, préjugés, voire même de troubles mentaux. Du point de vue théorique, elles nous placent devant une énigme digne du sphinx : est-ce de manière volontaire et intentionnelle que les sujets irrationnels se dupent eux-mêmes et prennent leurs désirs pour des réalités, ou bien sont-ils les victimes de leurs illusions ? La conception qui domine parmi les philosophes, dite « intentionnaliste », soutient que les illusions de l’esprit sont des actes intentionnels dont les agents sont entièrement responsables. Cet ouvrage s’efforce de montrer, au contraire, que la pensée irrationnelle prend racine dans des illusions cognitives qui tendent à se produire de façon à la fois involontaire et inconsciente. Il devrait intéresser non seulement les étudiants, mais aussi les chercheurs en philosophie de l’esprit et en sciences cognitives.

Si la duperie de soi a toujours fasciné les philosophes et les psychologues, c’est vraisemblablement parce qu’il y a quelque chose de profondément énigmatique dans la possibilité même de vouloir croire ce que l’on sait être faux. Mais peut-on réellement croire ce que l’on souhaite simplement parce qu’on le souhaite? C’est en tout cas ce que prétend la tradition « intentionnaliste » qui domine parmi les philosophes (Sartre, Davidson, Pears, Talbott, Scott-Kakures, Bermudez), qui tend à décrire la duperie de soi comme un acte intentionnel dont l’agent serait entièrement responsable. Vasco Correia soutient au contraire une conception « émotionnaliste » qui s’inspire de la tradition philosophique et de la psychologie contemporaine pour essayer de montrer que la duperie de soi est un phénomène à la fois inconscient et involontaire d’illusion cognitive qui trouve son explication dans l’influence des émotions sur notre faculté de juger. Cette analyse l’amène à développer une théorie « cognitivo-hédonique » des émotions qui vise à rendre compte du rôle que jouent ces dernières non seulement dans la naissance des croyances irrationnelles, mais aussi des actions irrationnelles (acrasia).

This paper focuses on the effects of motivational biases on the way people reason and debate in everyday life. Unlike heuristics and cognitive biases, motivational biases are typically caused by the influence of a desire or an emotion on the cognitive processes involved in judgmental and inferential reasoning. In line with the ‘motivational’ account of irrationality, I argue that these biases are the cause of a number of fallacies that ordinary arguers commit unintentionally, particularly when the commitment to a given viewpoint is very strong. Drawing on recent work in argumentation theory and psychology, I show that there are privileged links between specific types of biases and specific types of fallacies. This analysis provides further support to the idea that people’s tendency to arrive at desired conclusions hinges on their ability to construct plausible justifications for those conclusions. I suggest that this effort to rationalize biased views is the reason why unintentional fallacies tend to be persuasive.

In this article I argue that most biases in argumentation and decision-making can and should be counteracted. Although biases can prove beneficial in certain contexts, I contend that they are generally maladaptive and need correction. Yet critical thinking alone seems insufficient to mitigate biases in everyday contexts. I develop a contextualist approach, according to which cognitive debiasing strategies need to be supplemented by extra-psychic devices that rely on social and environmental constraints in order to promote rational reasoning. Finally, I examine several examples of contextual debiasing strategies and show how they can contribute to enhance critical thinking at a cognitive level.

Cet article examine les effets des illusions cognitives sur nos jugements et nos inférences, aussi bien sur le plan épistémique que sur le plan pratique. Prenant appui sur la recherche empirique sur les biais motivationnels et cognitifs, je montre d’abord de quelle manière ces phénomènes irrationnels tendent à compromettre la rationalité de nos croyances et de nos décisions. Bien que les biais de jugement tendent à se produire de manière non intentionnelle, je soutiens que nous sommes en partie responsables des attitudes irrationnelles qui en découlent, dans la mesure où nous avons la possibilité de les contrecarrer moyennant des stratégies de contrôle épistémique conçues pour assurer de façon indirecte la rationalité des processus cognitifs. Je décris succinctement un ensemble de stratégies de ce type.

Si le phénomène de « duperie de soi » (self-deception) continue de fasciner les philosophes, c’est peut-être parce qu’il renferme une énigme aux allures de paradoxe : comment peut-on adopter la croyance que p tout en sachant que p est faux ou invraisemblable ? Et, pour commencer, est-il possible de croire ce que l’on souhaite « à dessein », par un acte de volonté ? C’est en tout cas ce que prétend la tradition « intentionnaliste », dominante parmi les philosophes, qui tend à décrire la duperie de soi comme un acte intentionnel dont l’agent serait moralement responsable. Il existe cependant une conception alternative, dite « motivationnelle », selon laquelle la duperie de soi est un phénomène involontaire d’illusion cognitive qui trouve son explication dans l’influence des affects sur le jugement. Dans un cas comme dans l’autre, ce sont les présupposés fondamentaux de la philosophie de l’esprit qu’il faut pouvoir justifier.

Normative theories of argumentation tend to assume that logical and dialectical rules suffice to ensure the rationality of argumentative discourse. Yet, in everyday debates people use arguments that seem valid in light of such rules but nonetheless biased and tendentious. This article seeks to show that the rationality of argumentation can only be fully promoted if we take into account its ethical dimension. To substantiate this claim, I review some of the empirical evidence indicating that people’s inferential reasoning is systematically affected by a variety of biases and heuristics. Insofar as these cognitive illusions are typically unintentional, it appears that arguers may be biased despite their well-intended efforts to follow the rules of critical argumentation. Nevertheless, I argue that people remain responsible for the rationality of their arguments, given that there are a number of measures that they can (and ought to) take to avoid such distortions. I highlight the importance of argumentational virtues and critical thinking to rational debates, and describe a set of indirect strategies of “argumentative self-control”.

In this paper I argue that the hypothesis of mental partinioning is not necessary to account for ordinary cases of cognitive and practical irrationality. I review some of the most influential "divisionist" accounts - namely Freud's, Fingarette's, Pears' and Davidson's - and show that they lead to a set of paradoxes. Finally, I show that irrational phenomena can be fully explained in the light of unitary accounts which contend that delusional beliefs and akratic actions stem from the impact of emotions on cognitive processes.

This article argues that debiasing techniques meant to reduce
biases in argumentation and decision-making are more
effective if they rely on environmental constraints, rather than
on cognitive improvements. I identify the four main factors
that account for the inefficiency of critical thinking with regard
to debiasing and claim that extra-psychic strategies are more
reliable tools for counteracting biases in contexts of
uncertainty. Finally, I examine several examples of debiasing
strategies that involve contextual change.

In this paper I argue that ordinary cases of self-deception and akrasia derive from the phenomenon of motivated irrationality. According to the “motivational” account, self-deception is typically induced by the influence that desires and emotions exert upon our cognitive faculties, and thereby upon the process of belief formation. Crucially, I show that this hypothesis is consistent with the empirical research carried out by social psychologists, and that it avoids a number of paradoxes which undermine the “intentionalist” account. But motivated irrationality also seems to account for most cases of akrasia, insofar as desires are equally liable to affect the evaluative judgments through which we assess feasible options. This analysis thus set the premises for a unified account of irrationality.

‘Intentionalist’ approaches portray self-deceivers as “akratic believers”, subjects who deliberately choose to believe p despite knowing that p is false. In this paper I argue that the intentionalist model leads to a number of paradoxes that seem to undermine it. I claim that these paradoxes can nevertheless be overcome in light of the rival hypothesis that self-deception is a non-intentional process that stems from the influence of emotions upon cognitive processes. Furthermore, I propose a motivational interpretation of the phenomenon of ‘hyperbolic discounting bias’ which highlights the role of emotional biases in akratic behavior. Finally, I argue that we are not the helpless victims of our irrational attitudes, insofar as we have the ability – and arguably the epistemic obligation – to counteract motivational biases.

Abstract: This article critically examines the claim that illusional beliefs may be beneficial for people’s well-being. Although some studies indicate that positive illusions can promote happiness and adaptive behavior in certain contexts, I argue that such benefits tend to be short-lived and that misbeliefs are generally not adaptive from a long-term perspective. While unrealistic assessments of the available evidence may initially provide a rewarding vision of the self and the world, and even improve the subject’s mood and motivation, I show that they tend to undermine the process of deliberation itself and are ultimately detrimental to the maximization of people’s preferences.

... | Ayuda. Une conception émotionnaliste de la self-deception. Autores: Vasco Correia; Localización: Teorema: Revista internacional de filosofía, ISSN 0210-1602, Vol. 26, Nº. 3, 2007 , pags. 31-44. © 2001-2010 Universidad de La Rioja · Todos los derechos reservados. ...

Neste artigo mostro que a concepção da intuição matemática proposta por Jean Cavaillès permite superar a clivagem entre “formalismo” e “intuicionaismo” relativamente ao problema dos fundamentos, mas também a clivagem entre “platonismo” e “construtivismo” relativamente à questão da objectividade matemática. Cavaillès concebe os objectos matemáticos como conceitos que subsistem na imanência das teorias, e não num mundo inteligível ou sequer na consciência dos sujeitos. Precisamente por isso, a chamada “filosofia do conceito” pressupõe uma teoria radicalmente inovadora da intuição, capaz de justificar a imanência dos objectos, o progresso conceptual das teorias e o próprio carácter evolutivo daquilo que, a determinado momento, os matemáticos consideram ou não como “evidente”.