To effectively manage, empathize with and respond to the implications and impact of the so-called... more To effectively manage, empathize with and respond to the implications and impact of the so-called 'Manosphere,' this paper is centered on the premise that researchers require an understanding of the draw factors that lead individuals to engage, affiliate with, and contribute to the various groups that constitute this wider movement. This paper seeks to contribute to the growing body of knowledge around the Manosphere by exploring how thought leaders propagate symbiotic cycles of ontological security and insecurity through YouTube in a manner that resembles a protection racket. It argues that these constructed ontological security cycles provide a powerful impetus to not only draw individuals into the Manosphere, but also to extract material and social resources out of them that can be reinvited to retain them within the movement.
Since the 2015 ascension of King
Salman bin Abdulaziz, the Saudi
state has displayed growing
disc... more Since the 2015 ascension of King Salman bin Abdulaziz, the Saudi state has displayed growing discontinuity with trends in its pursuit of national security. Over the past four years, the kingdom has shifted from being a source of comparative stability and continuity in the Persian Gulf security equation to a disposition that is disruptive to that system. Having initiated a series of destabilizing crises throughout the Middle East, the Saudi pursuit of external security appears no longer defined by the predictability that has been its hallmark since its inception. Instead, it appears increasingly characterized by unpredictable aggressiveness. As one veteran Saudi analyst has argued, anticipating the kingdom’s next foreign-policy move has become more challenging than Soviet watching during the height of the Cold War. In interpreting paradigm shifts such as these, it is often prudent to return to a discipline’s basic assumptions, to ascertain whether they offer analytical value. In this regard, I ask whether different strands of realism help explain recent developments in Saudi international behavior. I argue that the transformation of the past four years can best be understood as an abandonment of defensive precepts in favor of offensive realism — particularly applicable to the kingdom, where a zero-sum, nonideological mentality has always been seen as key to regime survival. At the same time, liberal ideals such as regional integration and international institutionalization, as well as the promotion of human rights, economic freedom and political participation, have been eschewed when they have not served an instrumental purpose.1 While these factors are often acknowledged in passing, the vast majority of discussions concerning Saudi behavior beyond its own borders avoid significant theory-guided analysis, opting for more historical and materialist approaches,2 while only touching on selective components of international relations theory.
Saudi Arabia’s commitment to the Vision 2030 initiative in 2015 signalled the intent of the new a... more Saudi Arabia’s commitment to the Vision 2030 initiative in 2015 signalled the intent of the new administration of King Salman to initiate substantial macroeconomic and social transformation and break the system of intense rentierism that has defined its civil-state relations for generations (Krimly, 1993). Drivers for such reforms are numerous, but at their core is safeguarding the monarchy’s authoritarian hold on power against domestic challenges as it declines as a welfare provider. This is a formidable challenge for any regime in the best of times.
Foreign fighters have become inextricably linked to perceptions of human rights abuses in the Syr... more Foreign fighters have become inextricably linked to perceptions of human rights abuses in the Syria and Iraq wars, particularly since the Islamic State group founded its caliphate. This paper explores the human rights impact of foreign fighters in the conflicts, noting that while foreign fighters have been involved in grave human rights abuses, such behavior has not been uniform and must be differentiated by group and role. In this regard, it is argued that while foreign fighters have overwhelmingly had a negative impact on most human rights indicators, fighters in some groups have positively impacted the Right to Self-Determination. Further, the paper notes that while foreign fighters have been large-scale perpetrators of human rights abuses, one must also consider the propaganda value of such acts because foreign fighter-led violence is more newsworthy globally than local-led violence.
Although substantial research has examined the Saudi state’s symbiosis with the Islamic revivalis... more Although substantial research has examined the Saudi state’s symbiosis with the Islamic revivalist movement commonly known as ‘Wahhabism’, few studies have considered how the dynamics of state formation underpin this relationship. This article argues that a continuous and circular political logic has sat behind the Saudi state’s patronage of the revivalist movement since 1744 and proposes a four-stage model that explains how and why the regime has maintained this support over this prolonged period. This article first outlines this model, then presents a detailed analysis of its persistent presence in the development of Saudi state authority in order to highlight the recurrent manner by which the state often has constructed the spiritual concerns of revivalists to counter challenges to its authority, a pattern demonstrated most recently during the Arab Spring and the war in Yemen. The effects of this model will continue to shape the decisions, policies and perceptions of the Saudi political elite for the foreseeable future.
Ediacarans make up the oldest known truly diverse metazoan assemblages and are known globally. Ho... more Ediacarans make up the oldest known truly diverse metazoan assemblages and are known globally. However, few sites have produced abundant fossils, and until recently such fossils were unknown in Arabia. Generally restricted to the late Neoproterozoic, the best known assemblages occur in China, Newfoundland, the White Sea in northern Russia, the Flinders Ranges of South Australia and southern Namibia in Africa. Less diverse assemblages are known from Siberia, Ukraine, UK, and a few sites in Asia, and North and South America. Ediacarans occur primarily in shallow marine derived sands and clays with the exception of Newfoundland forms that may have inhabited light free depths in a volcanically active terrane. They are known in rock sequences dating from 630 Ma to 540 Ma, the Ediacaran or Vendian period, the youngest division of Precambrian time. New discoveries in Saudi Arabia over the past 5 years have brought to light the presence of Ediacarans, both traces and body fossils, suggesting that further investigation most likely will yield a much more diverse assemblage, and one that may well have inhabited less saline environs that is typical for other Ediacarans. Fossils similar to Harlaniella, known elsewhere from the late Precambrian and Cambrian, and megascopic frond-like forms have been discovered in a single layer that is overtopped by a volcanic ash, dated at 569 ± 3 Ma, thus giving both good preservation and precision dating of the Dhaiqa formation in the Dhaiqa basin and its enclosed Ediacarans. In addition, the discovery of Horodyskia-like fossils in the Jif ’n basin is a first occurrence for Saudi Arabia. They have a similar Neoproterozoic age to forms found in China, both of which are significantly younger than the more than 1 billion year old forms found in North America and Australia.
Although the close link between the Saudi state and the religious revivalist movement commonly kn... more Although the close link between the Saudi state and the religious revivalist movement commonly known as “Wahhabism” is well known, little scholarly effort has been made to apply social or political theory to better interpret this relationship. This thesis seeks to begin to fill this gap, asking the question “how has the Saudi regime employed revivalist Islam as a system state of legitimation?” and seeking to answer it through a synthesis of sociological and political theories proposed by Catarina Kinnvall and Charles Tilly.
In adopting this approach, the thesis outlines a broad system of state “identity racketeering,” in which the Saudi state seeks to shape and stoke an exclusivist, Islamic identity in many of its citizens and then exploit the metaphysical insecurities intrinsic to this identity towards its own political ends. It demonstrates that this behaviour is not modern and has existed across the eighteenth, nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first centuries, over three distinct periods of Saudi rule, under increasingly consolidated conditions of statehood. Throughout these periods, the system has displayed remarkable consistency, tarnishing political rivals of the regime as enemies of Islam, while emphasising the state’s necessity in ensuring the religious purity of the revivalist community.
The findings of the thesis are far from historical curiosities and continue to have important ramifications in contemporary times. Despite the advent of the oil era and the powerful welfare state this produced, efforts to maintain and expand racketeering efforts where possible remain a central tenet of the House of Saud’s governing strategy, most recently evident in its response to the Arab Spring. From the Islamic State, to women’s right to drive, to the subordinate status of the Kingdom’s Shi’a, the effects of such identity racketeering remains pervasive and profound at many levels of Saudi politics, society and security today.
Saudi Arabia’s execution of 47 people on Saturday, January 2 – its largest mass execution since 1... more Saudi Arabia’s execution of 47 people on Saturday, January 2 – its largest mass execution since 1980 – has sparked global shock and outrage. The executions are notable for the sheer number of people killed. However, they maintain a policy of political crackdown that was reinvigorated in Saudi Arabia during the Arab Spring protests of 2011.
Saudi citizens supporting IS’s activities in Iraq and Syria are not the result of a coherent plan... more Saudi citizens supporting IS’s activities in Iraq and Syria are not the result of a coherent plan directed by the kingdom’s rulers, but the overflow of a long-standing system used to maintain its domestic legitimacy.
As the dust settles on a series of terrorist attacks in France, people will now look to understan... more As the dust settles on a series of terrorist attacks in France, people will now look to understand the broader players of this grim drama. From their own statements and from external sources, it appears that the Kouachi brothers – the perpetrators of the attacks on the Charlie Hebdo offices – were affiliated with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
Jihadist foreign fighters have become common in civil conflicts in Muslim countries. While resear... more Jihadist foreign fighters have become common in civil conflicts in Muslim countries. While research exists on the impact they have upon returning home, less attention has been given to their influence on the opposition cause that they mobilize in support of. This paper looks at the impact that jihadist foreign fighters have had on the Chechen and Syrian opposition, evaluating their influence on opposition cohesion, ideology, domestic and international perceptions, and on government narratives. It is concluded that foreign fighters have overwhelmingly damaged the Chechen and Syrian opposition movements, making the likelihood of opposition success more remote.
Journal of Islam and Muslim-Christian Relations, Sep 2012
As the effects of the Arab Spring continue to reverberate across the Middle East, the world now l... more As the effects of the Arab Spring continue to reverberate across the Middle East, the world now looks for new ways to assess the implications of this momentous event, in the process often forgetting many of the cataclysmic forces still underlying tensions in the region. Drawing upon historical precedent, theory and current events, this article argues that the events of the Arab Spring have served to obscure, and distract attention away from, the increasing likelihood of a conventional war arising between Iran and an Arab coalition in the Persian Gulf. The article highlights a range of factors contributing to this latent potential: the ever expanding arms race between these two power blocs, the ambiguity of Iran’s nuclear goals and the unprecedented level of uncertainty in the region associated with the roiling unrest on the Arab street. All have added to an increasingly uncertain atmosphere that is now punctuated with interventionism, opportunism and growing military might. In such a volatile regional environment, where force appears to be becoming the tool of choice, the probability for a broader crisis and a new Gulf War is at levels unseen in over two decades.
Why has the relationship between the state and the Islamic revivalist movement known commonly as ... more Why has the relationship between the state and the Islamic revivalist movement known commonly as 'Wahhabism' persisted under Saudi rule since 1744? In Securitising Identity Ben Rich traces the symbiosis between these two entities across three distinct periods of Saudi rule over the past four centuries, showcasing the consistent conditions, patterns of behaviour and political logics that surround their interplay. Collectively, these reveal a recurrent tendency in which the state paradoxically offers protections to the preservation of revivalism while generating threats against this same religious identity in order to ensure its hold on power. Such a pattern, he argues, not only transcends all discrete periods of Saudi rule, but also manifests regardless of the conservative or progressive nature of a particular administration. Understanding such a pattern not only helps to explain why Saudi Arabia today remains a source of regional sectarianism, but also how such an idiomatic ideology has endured…
Among the major Middle Eastern states, Saudi Arabia’s management of the 2011 Arab protests produc... more Among the major Middle Eastern states, Saudi Arabia’s management of the 2011 Arab protests produced one of the most politically stable outcomes witnessed. This paper argues that the strategy of domestic crisis management employed by the Saudi state during the 2011 Arab protests was primarily defined by three constitutive and symbiotic elements: the use of rentier largesse to induce compliance; hard power crackdowns internally and externally; and a renewed securitisation of Islamic identity. In describing each of these, it seeks to place them within their historical context – identifying both their consistencies with the past, as well as innovations within the context of the crisis. It finds that, although each were proven – indeed, predictable - tactics applied in prior crises in Saudi history, they nevertheless displayed their own unique evolutionary and notable qualities reflecting the period and shifting attitudes in elites.
The past decade’s democratic landscape has seen an undeniable trend towards political polarisatio... more The past decade’s democratic landscape has seen an undeniable trend towards political polarisation and radicalisation across the globe. This has produced a willingness in growing populations in liberal democracies to engage in mass acts of political extremism, including protests, riots, insurrectionism, and terrorism. Individual cases of such groups and activities have generally been addressed in scholarship discretely: resurgent white nationalists, Qanon, ANTIFA, the Yellow Vests, the Azov battalion, MAGA, Hinduvata, the list goes on. Each of these case studies present their own myriad of material and ideological causes and unique features. However, in aggregate they represent an expanding challenge to global democracy and liberal ideals driven by a common force: a widespread loss of ontological security. This brief argues that this loss of ontological security is crucial in accounting for the growing environment of political, social and cultural tension roiling across the liberal democratic world. It posits that the drive to alleviate this existential angst has produced a myriad of ‘fighting identities’ where violence, unrest, struggle and other forms of political extremism come to be seen as central to identity, rather than just a means of achieving it.
To effectively manage, empathize with and respond to the implications and impact of the so-called... more To effectively manage, empathize with and respond to the implications and impact of the so-called 'Manosphere,' this paper is centered on the premise that researchers require an understanding of the draw factors that lead individuals to engage, affiliate with, and contribute to the various groups that constitute this wider movement. This paper seeks to contribute to the growing body of knowledge around the Manosphere by exploring how thought leaders propagate symbiotic cycles of ontological security and insecurity through YouTube in a manner that resembles a protection racket. It argues that these constructed ontological security cycles provide a powerful impetus to not only draw individuals into the Manosphere, but also to extract material and social resources out of them that can be reinvited to retain them within the movement.
Since the 2015 ascension of King
Salman bin Abdulaziz, the Saudi
state has displayed growing
disc... more Since the 2015 ascension of King Salman bin Abdulaziz, the Saudi state has displayed growing discontinuity with trends in its pursuit of national security. Over the past four years, the kingdom has shifted from being a source of comparative stability and continuity in the Persian Gulf security equation to a disposition that is disruptive to that system. Having initiated a series of destabilizing crises throughout the Middle East, the Saudi pursuit of external security appears no longer defined by the predictability that has been its hallmark since its inception. Instead, it appears increasingly characterized by unpredictable aggressiveness. As one veteran Saudi analyst has argued, anticipating the kingdom’s next foreign-policy move has become more challenging than Soviet watching during the height of the Cold War. In interpreting paradigm shifts such as these, it is often prudent to return to a discipline’s basic assumptions, to ascertain whether they offer analytical value. In this regard, I ask whether different strands of realism help explain recent developments in Saudi international behavior. I argue that the transformation of the past four years can best be understood as an abandonment of defensive precepts in favor of offensive realism — particularly applicable to the kingdom, where a zero-sum, nonideological mentality has always been seen as key to regime survival. At the same time, liberal ideals such as regional integration and international institutionalization, as well as the promotion of human rights, economic freedom and political participation, have been eschewed when they have not served an instrumental purpose.1 While these factors are often acknowledged in passing, the vast majority of discussions concerning Saudi behavior beyond its own borders avoid significant theory-guided analysis, opting for more historical and materialist approaches,2 while only touching on selective components of international relations theory.
Saudi Arabia’s commitment to the Vision 2030 initiative in 2015 signalled the intent of the new a... more Saudi Arabia’s commitment to the Vision 2030 initiative in 2015 signalled the intent of the new administration of King Salman to initiate substantial macroeconomic and social transformation and break the system of intense rentierism that has defined its civil-state relations for generations (Krimly, 1993). Drivers for such reforms are numerous, but at their core is safeguarding the monarchy’s authoritarian hold on power against domestic challenges as it declines as a welfare provider. This is a formidable challenge for any regime in the best of times.
Foreign fighters have become inextricably linked to perceptions of human rights abuses in the Syr... more Foreign fighters have become inextricably linked to perceptions of human rights abuses in the Syria and Iraq wars, particularly since the Islamic State group founded its caliphate. This paper explores the human rights impact of foreign fighters in the conflicts, noting that while foreign fighters have been involved in grave human rights abuses, such behavior has not been uniform and must be differentiated by group and role. In this regard, it is argued that while foreign fighters have overwhelmingly had a negative impact on most human rights indicators, fighters in some groups have positively impacted the Right to Self-Determination. Further, the paper notes that while foreign fighters have been large-scale perpetrators of human rights abuses, one must also consider the propaganda value of such acts because foreign fighter-led violence is more newsworthy globally than local-led violence.
Although substantial research has examined the Saudi state’s symbiosis with the Islamic revivalis... more Although substantial research has examined the Saudi state’s symbiosis with the Islamic revivalist movement commonly known as ‘Wahhabism’, few studies have considered how the dynamics of state formation underpin this relationship. This article argues that a continuous and circular political logic has sat behind the Saudi state’s patronage of the revivalist movement since 1744 and proposes a four-stage model that explains how and why the regime has maintained this support over this prolonged period. This article first outlines this model, then presents a detailed analysis of its persistent presence in the development of Saudi state authority in order to highlight the recurrent manner by which the state often has constructed the spiritual concerns of revivalists to counter challenges to its authority, a pattern demonstrated most recently during the Arab Spring and the war in Yemen. The effects of this model will continue to shape the decisions, policies and perceptions of the Saudi political elite for the foreseeable future.
Ediacarans make up the oldest known truly diverse metazoan assemblages and are known globally. Ho... more Ediacarans make up the oldest known truly diverse metazoan assemblages and are known globally. However, few sites have produced abundant fossils, and until recently such fossils were unknown in Arabia. Generally restricted to the late Neoproterozoic, the best known assemblages occur in China, Newfoundland, the White Sea in northern Russia, the Flinders Ranges of South Australia and southern Namibia in Africa. Less diverse assemblages are known from Siberia, Ukraine, UK, and a few sites in Asia, and North and South America. Ediacarans occur primarily in shallow marine derived sands and clays with the exception of Newfoundland forms that may have inhabited light free depths in a volcanically active terrane. They are known in rock sequences dating from 630 Ma to 540 Ma, the Ediacaran or Vendian period, the youngest division of Precambrian time. New discoveries in Saudi Arabia over the past 5 years have brought to light the presence of Ediacarans, both traces and body fossils, suggesting that further investigation most likely will yield a much more diverse assemblage, and one that may well have inhabited less saline environs that is typical for other Ediacarans. Fossils similar to Harlaniella, known elsewhere from the late Precambrian and Cambrian, and megascopic frond-like forms have been discovered in a single layer that is overtopped by a volcanic ash, dated at 569 ± 3 Ma, thus giving both good preservation and precision dating of the Dhaiqa formation in the Dhaiqa basin and its enclosed Ediacarans. In addition, the discovery of Horodyskia-like fossils in the Jif ’n basin is a first occurrence for Saudi Arabia. They have a similar Neoproterozoic age to forms found in China, both of which are significantly younger than the more than 1 billion year old forms found in North America and Australia.
Although the close link between the Saudi state and the religious revivalist movement commonly kn... more Although the close link between the Saudi state and the religious revivalist movement commonly known as “Wahhabism” is well known, little scholarly effort has been made to apply social or political theory to better interpret this relationship. This thesis seeks to begin to fill this gap, asking the question “how has the Saudi regime employed revivalist Islam as a system state of legitimation?” and seeking to answer it through a synthesis of sociological and political theories proposed by Catarina Kinnvall and Charles Tilly.
In adopting this approach, the thesis outlines a broad system of state “identity racketeering,” in which the Saudi state seeks to shape and stoke an exclusivist, Islamic identity in many of its citizens and then exploit the metaphysical insecurities intrinsic to this identity towards its own political ends. It demonstrates that this behaviour is not modern and has existed across the eighteenth, nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first centuries, over three distinct periods of Saudi rule, under increasingly consolidated conditions of statehood. Throughout these periods, the system has displayed remarkable consistency, tarnishing political rivals of the regime as enemies of Islam, while emphasising the state’s necessity in ensuring the religious purity of the revivalist community.
The findings of the thesis are far from historical curiosities and continue to have important ramifications in contemporary times. Despite the advent of the oil era and the powerful welfare state this produced, efforts to maintain and expand racketeering efforts where possible remain a central tenet of the House of Saud’s governing strategy, most recently evident in its response to the Arab Spring. From the Islamic State, to women’s right to drive, to the subordinate status of the Kingdom’s Shi’a, the effects of such identity racketeering remains pervasive and profound at many levels of Saudi politics, society and security today.
Saudi Arabia’s execution of 47 people on Saturday, January 2 – its largest mass execution since 1... more Saudi Arabia’s execution of 47 people on Saturday, January 2 – its largest mass execution since 1980 – has sparked global shock and outrage. The executions are notable for the sheer number of people killed. However, they maintain a policy of political crackdown that was reinvigorated in Saudi Arabia during the Arab Spring protests of 2011.
Saudi citizens supporting IS’s activities in Iraq and Syria are not the result of a coherent plan... more Saudi citizens supporting IS’s activities in Iraq and Syria are not the result of a coherent plan directed by the kingdom’s rulers, but the overflow of a long-standing system used to maintain its domestic legitimacy.
As the dust settles on a series of terrorist attacks in France, people will now look to understan... more As the dust settles on a series of terrorist attacks in France, people will now look to understand the broader players of this grim drama. From their own statements and from external sources, it appears that the Kouachi brothers – the perpetrators of the attacks on the Charlie Hebdo offices – were affiliated with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
Jihadist foreign fighters have become common in civil conflicts in Muslim countries. While resear... more Jihadist foreign fighters have become common in civil conflicts in Muslim countries. While research exists on the impact they have upon returning home, less attention has been given to their influence on the opposition cause that they mobilize in support of. This paper looks at the impact that jihadist foreign fighters have had on the Chechen and Syrian opposition, evaluating their influence on opposition cohesion, ideology, domestic and international perceptions, and on government narratives. It is concluded that foreign fighters have overwhelmingly damaged the Chechen and Syrian opposition movements, making the likelihood of opposition success more remote.
Journal of Islam and Muslim-Christian Relations, Sep 2012
As the effects of the Arab Spring continue to reverberate across the Middle East, the world now l... more As the effects of the Arab Spring continue to reverberate across the Middle East, the world now looks for new ways to assess the implications of this momentous event, in the process often forgetting many of the cataclysmic forces still underlying tensions in the region. Drawing upon historical precedent, theory and current events, this article argues that the events of the Arab Spring have served to obscure, and distract attention away from, the increasing likelihood of a conventional war arising between Iran and an Arab coalition in the Persian Gulf. The article highlights a range of factors contributing to this latent potential: the ever expanding arms race between these two power blocs, the ambiguity of Iran’s nuclear goals and the unprecedented level of uncertainty in the region associated with the roiling unrest on the Arab street. All have added to an increasingly uncertain atmosphere that is now punctuated with interventionism, opportunism and growing military might. In such a volatile regional environment, where force appears to be becoming the tool of choice, the probability for a broader crisis and a new Gulf War is at levels unseen in over two decades.
Why has the relationship between the state and the Islamic revivalist movement known commonly as ... more Why has the relationship between the state and the Islamic revivalist movement known commonly as 'Wahhabism' persisted under Saudi rule since 1744? In Securitising Identity Ben Rich traces the symbiosis between these two entities across three distinct periods of Saudi rule over the past four centuries, showcasing the consistent conditions, patterns of behaviour and political logics that surround their interplay. Collectively, these reveal a recurrent tendency in which the state paradoxically offers protections to the preservation of revivalism while generating threats against this same religious identity in order to ensure its hold on power. Such a pattern, he argues, not only transcends all discrete periods of Saudi rule, but also manifests regardless of the conservative or progressive nature of a particular administration. Understanding such a pattern not only helps to explain why Saudi Arabia today remains a source of regional sectarianism, but also how such an idiomatic ideology has endured…
Among the major Middle Eastern states, Saudi Arabia’s management of the 2011 Arab protests produc... more Among the major Middle Eastern states, Saudi Arabia’s management of the 2011 Arab protests produced one of the most politically stable outcomes witnessed. This paper argues that the strategy of domestic crisis management employed by the Saudi state during the 2011 Arab protests was primarily defined by three constitutive and symbiotic elements: the use of rentier largesse to induce compliance; hard power crackdowns internally and externally; and a renewed securitisation of Islamic identity. In describing each of these, it seeks to place them within their historical context – identifying both their consistencies with the past, as well as innovations within the context of the crisis. It finds that, although each were proven – indeed, predictable - tactics applied in prior crises in Saudi history, they nevertheless displayed their own unique evolutionary and notable qualities reflecting the period and shifting attitudes in elites.
The past decade’s democratic landscape has seen an undeniable trend towards political polarisatio... more The past decade’s democratic landscape has seen an undeniable trend towards political polarisation and radicalisation across the globe. This has produced a willingness in growing populations in liberal democracies to engage in mass acts of political extremism, including protests, riots, insurrectionism, and terrorism. Individual cases of such groups and activities have generally been addressed in scholarship discretely: resurgent white nationalists, Qanon, ANTIFA, the Yellow Vests, the Azov battalion, MAGA, Hinduvata, the list goes on. Each of these case studies present their own myriad of material and ideological causes and unique features. However, in aggregate they represent an expanding challenge to global democracy and liberal ideals driven by a common force: a widespread loss of ontological security. This brief argues that this loss of ontological security is crucial in accounting for the growing environment of political, social and cultural tension roiling across the liberal democratic world. It posits that the drive to alleviate this existential angst has produced a myriad of ‘fighting identities’ where violence, unrest, struggle and other forms of political extremism come to be seen as central to identity, rather than just a means of achieving it.
Uploads
Papers by Ben Rich
Salman bin Abdulaziz, the Saudi
state has displayed growing
discontinuity with trends in its
pursuit of national security. Over the past
four years, the kingdom has shifted from
being a source of comparative stability
and continuity in the Persian Gulf security
equation to a disposition that is disruptive
to that system. Having initiated a series of
destabilizing crises throughout the Middle
East, the Saudi pursuit of external security
appears no longer defined by the predictability
that has been its hallmark since its
inception. Instead, it appears increasingly
characterized by unpredictable aggressiveness.
As one veteran Saudi analyst has
argued, anticipating the kingdom’s next
foreign-policy move has become more
challenging than Soviet watching during
the height of the Cold War.
In interpreting paradigm shifts such
as these, it is often prudent to return to a
discipline’s basic assumptions, to ascertain
whether they offer analytical value. In this
regard, I ask whether different strands of
realism help explain recent developments
in Saudi international behavior. I argue that
the transformation of the past four years
can best be understood as an abandonment
of defensive precepts in favor of offensive
realism — particularly applicable to the
kingdom, where a zero-sum, nonideological
mentality has always been seen as key
to regime survival. At the same time, liberal
ideals such as regional integration and
international institutionalization, as well as
the promotion of human rights, economic
freedom and political participation, have
been eschewed when they have not served
an instrumental purpose.1 While these factors
are often acknowledged in passing, the
vast majority of discussions concerning
Saudi behavior beyond its own borders
avoid significant theory-guided analysis,
opting for more historical and materialist
approaches,2 while only touching on selective
components of international relations
theory.
few sites have produced abundant fossils, and until recently such fossils were unknown in Arabia. Generally
restricted to the late Neoproterozoic, the best known assemblages occur in China, Newfoundland, the White
Sea in northern Russia, the Flinders Ranges of South Australia and southern Namibia in Africa. Less diverse
assemblages are known from Siberia, Ukraine, UK, and a few sites in Asia, and North and South America.
Ediacarans occur primarily in shallow marine derived sands and clays with the exception of
Newfoundland forms that may have inhabited light free depths in a volcanically active terrane. They
are known in rock sequences dating from 630 Ma to 540 Ma, the Ediacaran or Vendian period, the youngest
division of Precambrian time. New discoveries in Saudi Arabia over the past 5 years have brought to light the
presence of Ediacarans, both traces and body fossils, suggesting that further investigation most likely will yield
a much more diverse assemblage, and one that may well have inhabited less saline environs that is typical for
other Ediacarans. Fossils similar to Harlaniella, known elsewhere from the late Precambrian and Cambrian, and
megascopic frond-like forms have been discovered in a single layer that is overtopped by a volcanic ash, dated
at 569 ± 3 Ma, thus giving both good preservation and precision dating of the Dhaiqa formation in the Dhaiqa
basin and its enclosed Ediacarans. In addition, the discovery of Horodyskia-like fossils in the Jif ’n basin is a first
occurrence for Saudi Arabia. They have a similar Neoproterozoic age to forms found in China, both of which
are significantly younger than the more than 1 billion year old forms found in North America and Australia.
In adopting this approach, the thesis outlines a broad system of state “identity racketeering,” in which the Saudi state seeks to shape and stoke an exclusivist, Islamic identity in many of its citizens and then exploit the metaphysical insecurities intrinsic to this identity towards its own political ends. It demonstrates that this behaviour is not modern and has existed across the eighteenth, nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first centuries, over three distinct periods of Saudi rule, under increasingly consolidated conditions of statehood. Throughout these periods, the system has displayed remarkable consistency, tarnishing political rivals of the regime as enemies of Islam, while emphasising the state’s necessity in ensuring the religious purity of the revivalist community.
The findings of the thesis are far from historical curiosities and continue to have important ramifications in contemporary times. Despite the advent of the oil era and the powerful welfare state this produced, efforts to maintain and expand racketeering efforts where possible remain a central tenet of the House of Saud’s governing strategy, most recently evident in its response to the Arab Spring. From the Islamic State, to women’s right to drive, to the subordinate status of the Kingdom’s Shi’a, the effects of such identity racketeering remains pervasive and profound at many levels of Saudi politics, society and security today.
Available at: https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-al-qaeda-in-the-arabian-peninsula-36103
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2014.979605#.VGA0Hcmn9Nk
Books by Ben Rich
Drafts by Ben Rich
Salman bin Abdulaziz, the Saudi
state has displayed growing
discontinuity with trends in its
pursuit of national security. Over the past
four years, the kingdom has shifted from
being a source of comparative stability
and continuity in the Persian Gulf security
equation to a disposition that is disruptive
to that system. Having initiated a series of
destabilizing crises throughout the Middle
East, the Saudi pursuit of external security
appears no longer defined by the predictability
that has been its hallmark since its
inception. Instead, it appears increasingly
characterized by unpredictable aggressiveness.
As one veteran Saudi analyst has
argued, anticipating the kingdom’s next
foreign-policy move has become more
challenging than Soviet watching during
the height of the Cold War.
In interpreting paradigm shifts such
as these, it is often prudent to return to a
discipline’s basic assumptions, to ascertain
whether they offer analytical value. In this
regard, I ask whether different strands of
realism help explain recent developments
in Saudi international behavior. I argue that
the transformation of the past four years
can best be understood as an abandonment
of defensive precepts in favor of offensive
realism — particularly applicable to the
kingdom, where a zero-sum, nonideological
mentality has always been seen as key
to regime survival. At the same time, liberal
ideals such as regional integration and
international institutionalization, as well as
the promotion of human rights, economic
freedom and political participation, have
been eschewed when they have not served
an instrumental purpose.1 While these factors
are often acknowledged in passing, the
vast majority of discussions concerning
Saudi behavior beyond its own borders
avoid significant theory-guided analysis,
opting for more historical and materialist
approaches,2 while only touching on selective
components of international relations
theory.
few sites have produced abundant fossils, and until recently such fossils were unknown in Arabia. Generally
restricted to the late Neoproterozoic, the best known assemblages occur in China, Newfoundland, the White
Sea in northern Russia, the Flinders Ranges of South Australia and southern Namibia in Africa. Less diverse
assemblages are known from Siberia, Ukraine, UK, and a few sites in Asia, and North and South America.
Ediacarans occur primarily in shallow marine derived sands and clays with the exception of
Newfoundland forms that may have inhabited light free depths in a volcanically active terrane. They
are known in rock sequences dating from 630 Ma to 540 Ma, the Ediacaran or Vendian period, the youngest
division of Precambrian time. New discoveries in Saudi Arabia over the past 5 years have brought to light the
presence of Ediacarans, both traces and body fossils, suggesting that further investigation most likely will yield
a much more diverse assemblage, and one that may well have inhabited less saline environs that is typical for
other Ediacarans. Fossils similar to Harlaniella, known elsewhere from the late Precambrian and Cambrian, and
megascopic frond-like forms have been discovered in a single layer that is overtopped by a volcanic ash, dated
at 569 ± 3 Ma, thus giving both good preservation and precision dating of the Dhaiqa formation in the Dhaiqa
basin and its enclosed Ediacarans. In addition, the discovery of Horodyskia-like fossils in the Jif ’n basin is a first
occurrence for Saudi Arabia. They have a similar Neoproterozoic age to forms found in China, both of which
are significantly younger than the more than 1 billion year old forms found in North America and Australia.
In adopting this approach, the thesis outlines a broad system of state “identity racketeering,” in which the Saudi state seeks to shape and stoke an exclusivist, Islamic identity in many of its citizens and then exploit the metaphysical insecurities intrinsic to this identity towards its own political ends. It demonstrates that this behaviour is not modern and has existed across the eighteenth, nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first centuries, over three distinct periods of Saudi rule, under increasingly consolidated conditions of statehood. Throughout these periods, the system has displayed remarkable consistency, tarnishing political rivals of the regime as enemies of Islam, while emphasising the state’s necessity in ensuring the religious purity of the revivalist community.
The findings of the thesis are far from historical curiosities and continue to have important ramifications in contemporary times. Despite the advent of the oil era and the powerful welfare state this produced, efforts to maintain and expand racketeering efforts where possible remain a central tenet of the House of Saud’s governing strategy, most recently evident in its response to the Arab Spring. From the Islamic State, to women’s right to drive, to the subordinate status of the Kingdom’s Shi’a, the effects of such identity racketeering remains pervasive and profound at many levels of Saudi politics, society and security today.
Available at: https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-al-qaeda-in-the-arabian-peninsula-36103
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2014.979605#.VGA0Hcmn9Nk