Kylie Moore-Gilbert

While considerable scholarly attention has focused on analysing the role and impact of new media during the Arab Spring uprisings of 2010–2011, comparatively little research has been devoted to examining how online activism has changed in response to the regime stabilisation measures undertaken by the governments which survived the unrest. Characterising the de-liberalisation policies of post–Arab Spring states as ‘authoritarian downgrading’, this article considers how the growing involvement of authoritarian regimes in online spaces is impacting activists’ use of new media technologies. Adopting Bahrain as a case study, we present the results of a survey of Bahraini political activists conducted in 2017 and consider whether activists’ perceptions of their online safety and security are impacting their use of new media through behaviours such as self-censorship, the adoption of pseudonyms and the preferencing of direct messaging apps over Arab Spring-era social media platforms.

This chapter examines the cycle of contention that began with Bahrain’s decade of political liberalisation prior to the 2011 Arab Spring uprising and ended with measures to dissolve the country’s last remaining legal political societies in 2017. In seeking to explain why Bahrain has abandoned its ‘National Action Charter’ reform process in favour of a return to full authoritarianism, this chapter analyses the fate of the al-Wefaq Society, Bahrain’s largest opposition group and the most popular political organisation within the country’s Shi’a community. In examining the government's post-2011 crackdown on moderate, ‘tolerated’ opposition groups such as al-Wefaq, this chapter asserts that Bahrain’s liberalising reforms were never intended to situate the country on a path to democratisation and rather should be viewed as an attempt to secure the Al Khalifa’s grip on power. This chapter argues that the National Action Charter’s failure to inoculate the regime against Arab Spring-in...

Abstract:This article examines Bahrain's February 14 Coalition, an anonymous and decentralized youth movement that was formed during the small Gulf state's 2011 Arab Spring–inspired uprising. Drawing on fieldwork interviews and a content analysis study of the group's Facebook page, this article explores how the group uses its opaque organizational structure and strong social media presence to promote its off-line activities. In providing empirical data on the ideology, aims, and approach to activism of this important yet understudied group, this article questions prevailing sectarian narratives and makes the case for a more nuanced understanding of Bahrain's ongoing civil unrest.

ABSTRACT Drawing on fieldwork interviews and analysis of opposition social media posts, this article investigates how online forms of activism have been utilised by opposition groups during Bahrain's post-Arab Spring crackdown. Arguing that the antisystem opposition in particular has embraced ‘mediated mobilisation’ techniques, this article highlights the popularity of hybrid campaigns as drivers of online and offline activism. Contrasting the then-legal opposition society al-Wefaq with the banned, underground youth movement known as the February 14 Coalition, this article asserts that Bahrain's decentralised and anonymous antisystem opposition enjoys a structural advantage over regime-tolerated groups in their use of online activism. This article makes the case that mediated forms of mobilisation have fundamentally altered inter-opposition dynamics in post-Arab Spring Bahrain, and have strengthened the ability of antisystem groups such as the February 14 Coalition to challenge both the government and Bahrain's more established opposition societies.

Drawing on content analysis and framing theory, this article examines the use of images in the social media activism of three Bahraini Shiʿi opposition groups throughout 2015: Al-Wefaq, a moderate political society in favour of constitutional monarchy; Haqq, an underground pro-republic political society; and the February 14 Coalition, a decentralized umbrella group of youth activists dedicated to overthrowing Bahrain’s Al Khalifa monarchy. The differing ideologies, objectives and approaches to activism within Bahrain’s Shiʿi opposition are investigated through an analysis of each group’s framing of themes including religion, violence, nationalism and sectarianism. The first empirical study of social media image activism in post-Arab Spring Bahrain, this article reveals the increasing fragmentation of the Shiʿi opposition following the 2011 uprising, and makes a valuable contribution to the broader debate surrounding the changing nature of activism in an increasingly visual digital age.

GROUP CONFLICT AND POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN BAHRAIN AND THE ARAB GULF: RETHINKING THE RENTIER STATE Justin Gengler Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015 (226 pages, bibliography, index, illustrations, maps) $30.00 (paper), $75.00 (cloth)While certainly not the first work to challenge the rentier state thesis, the prevailing theory explaining the Gulf's unique combination of material wealth and authoritarian stability, Justin Gengler's Group Conflict and Political Mobilization in Bahrain and the Arab Gulf is one of the most comprehensive. Using Bahrain as a case study, Gengler exposes the numerous shortcomings of rentierism as a theoretical framework through which to understand the region. He successfully argues that in spite of Bahrain's distinction as the only Shi'i-majority Gulf state, his conclusions can be extended to Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf because Bahrain is influenced by similar social, economic, and structural factors, including the unequal distribution of resource wealth and the proclivity of ruling elites to adopt divide-and-rule tactics. More broadly, Gengler's book is also a critique of Gulf exceptionalism, joining work by other scholars of the region, including F. Gregory Gause, Christopher Davidson, and Morten Valbjorn and Andre Bank, who argue that Gulf Arab societies are capable of adopting democratic values and that the perceived structural stability of the authoritarian Gulf monarchies is a myth.The book begins with a detailed critique of the primary assumptions underpinning the rentier thesis, in particular the widely held belief that Gulf citizens' political quiescence can be bought in exchange for a cradle-tograve welfare state funded by oil revenues. Gengler shows that this concept, rooted in the idea that citizens apportion political support on the sole basis of their economic situation, is an oversimplification that fails to account for the mobilizing potential of the ethnic, religious, and tribal affinities that exist throughout the Gulf and are arguably most pronounced in Shi'imajority Bahrain. In contrast to classic rentier theorists such as Hazem Beblawi, who argue that resource-rich distributive states are able to bypass identity-based politics, Gengler demonstrates that in the case of Bahrain, political orientation is more reliably predicted by sectarian affiliation than personal wealth (or lack thereof).Rentierism relies on the assumption that hydrocarbon rents are distributed relatively evenly among the populace by the Gulf's benevolent rulers, and that every citizen has a fair share of their country's wealth. Gengler demonstrates, however, that oil revenues are utilized disproportionately to patronize sectarian and tribal "in-groups" at the expense of the country's distrusted Shi'i majority. Gengler shows that this phenomenon is not exclusive to Bahrain: the nature of the various "in-groups" may differ in most other Gulf states, but the tactic, essentially a form of divide and rule, remains the same. Similarly, in contrast to the traditional rentier model, in Bahrain, Gengler shows, "it is not public-sector employment that secures political allegiance; rather it is political allegiance that tends to secure public-sector employment" (59). Because Bahraini Shi'a are barred from gaining employment in key ministries and the military due to suspicions of disloyalty, the government is unable to make use of what is typically a powerful means of purchasing support. As such, repression has become an indispensable method of asserting control, arguably of at least equal importance to financial incentives. Repressive measures dramatically increased following the 2011 uprising, which was brutally suppressed by the Saudi-dominated Peninsula Shield Force. This period has also seen an alarming rise in human rights violations, including the widespread use of torture, collective punishment, and extrajudicial imprisonment.Gengler proposes an alternative model for explaining political behavior in the Gulf, "a theory of group-based political mobilization," which asserts that the Gulf states have developed a structural tendency toward political segmentation along ethnic, tribal, and/or religious lines. …

1. Introduction PART I: CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN THE GULF 2. The Changing Dynamic of American-GCC Relations 3. The Gulf Cooperation Council: from cooperation to unity? 4. Defense cooperation in the GCC Part II: THE GULF STATES AND IRAN 5. Saudi Arabia 6. Kuwait 7. Qatar 8. The United Arab Emirates 9. Bahrain 10. Oman 11. The other 'Gulf' state: Yemen Part III: STABILITY AND THE 'ARAB SPRING' Part IV: IS THE ENEMY OF MY ENEMY MY FRIEND? ISRAEL AND THE GULF STATES 12. Conclusion: The Rising Gulf Appendix: Major Events in the history of the Gulf states

This article examines Bahrain’s February 14 Coalition, an anonymous and decentralized youth movement that was formed during the small Gulf state’s 2011 Arab Spring–inspired uprising. Drawing on fieldwork interviews and a content analysis study of the group’s Facebook page, this article explores how the group uses its opaque organizational structure and strong social media presence to promote its off-line activities. In providing empirical data on the ideology, aims, and approach to activism of this important yet understudied group, this article questions prevailing sectarian narratives and makes the case for a more nuanced understanding of Bahrain’s ongoing civil unrest.

This chapter examines the cycle of contention that began with Bahrain’s decade of political liberalisation prior to the 2011 Arab Spring uprising and ended with measures to dissolve the country’s last remaining legal political societies in 2017. In seeking to explain why Bahrain has abandoned its ‘National Action Charter’ reform process in favour of a return to full authoritarianism, this chapter analyses the fate of the al-Wefaq Society, Bahrain’s largest opposition group and the most popular political organisation within the country’s Shi’a community. In examining the government's post-2011 crackdown on moderate, ‘tolerated’ opposition groups such as al-Wefaq, this chapter asserts that Bahrain’s liberalising reforms were never intended to situate the country on a path to democratisation and rather should be viewed as an attempt to secure the Al Khalifa’s grip on power. This chapter argues that the National Action Charter’s failure to inoculate the regime against Arab Spring-inspired unrest led to its abandonment in favour of tried-and-tested authoritarian strategies such as repression and military intervention.

Drawing on fieldwork interviews and analysis of opposition social
media posts, this article investigates how online forms of activism
have been utilised by opposition groups during Bahrain’s post-
Arab Spring crackdown. Arguing that the antisystem opposition in
particular has embraced ‘mediated mobilisation’ techniques, this
article highlights the popularity of hybrid campaigns as drivers of
online and offline activism. Contrasting the then-legal opposition
society al-Wefaq with the banned, underground youth movement
known as the February 14 Coalition, this article asserts that
Bahrain’s decentralised and anonymous antisystem opposition
enjoys a structural advantage over regime-tolerated groups in
their use of online activism. This article makes the case that
mediated forms of mobilisation have fundamentally altered interopposition dynamics in post-Arab Spring Bahrain, and have
strengthened the ability of antisystem groups such as the
February 14 Coalition to challenge both the government and
Bahrain’s more established opposition societies.

Drawing on content analysis and framing theory, this article examines the use of images in the social media activism of three Bahraini Shiʿi opposition groups throughout 2015: Al-Wefaq, a moderate political society in favour of constitutional monarchy; Haqq, an underground pro-republic political society; and the February 14 Coalition, a decentralized umbrella group of youth activists dedicated to overthrowing Bahrain’s Al Khalifa monarchy. The differing ideologies, objectives and approaches to activism within Bahrain’s Shiʿi opposition are investigated through an analysis of each group’s framing of themes including religion, violence, nationalism and sectarianism. The first empirical study of social media image activism in post-Arab Spring Bahrain, this article reveals the increasing fragmentation of the Shiʿi opposition following the 2011 uprising, and makes a valuable contribution to the broader debate surrounding the changing nature of activism in an increasingly visual digital age.

Bahrain appears to be the only country in the Arab world whose
branch of the Muslim Brotherhood is loyal to the government, and has not been conceived of as a threat to regime stability. This stands in stark contrast to the Saudi and Emirati approach, whose aggressive campaign against the Brotherhood in Egypt and elsewhere stems from fears that the Brotherhood’s grassroots Islamism could pose a substantive threat to monarchical legitimacy back home. What explains Bahrain’s contradictory position, and can Manama maintain it as the Qatar crisis
enters its third month?

Bahrain’s Royal Family, the Al Khalifa, has long pursued a strategy of divide and rule in order to prevent the emergence of cross-opposition coalitions, while exacerbating the country’s sectarian divide has become a critical means of ensuring regime survival. This article examines the country’s twentieth century imperial and post-independence history through the framework of divide and rule theory, providing crucial context for current events in Bahrain. It demonstrates how a divide and rule strategy is structurally embedded within the ruling family’s mode of governance, and reveals how it continues to be employed as an effective means of maintaining absolute monarchy in Bahrain.

Keywords: Bahrain, Arab Spring, Gulf Cooperation Council, divide and rule, sectarianism

This article contextualises current sectarian tensions in Bahrain by demonstrating that they are a product of the country’s lengthy history of divide and rule politics, and suggests that the 2011 uprising marks a dangerous development in this strategy, which could ultimately entrench political instability for years to come.