Bahrain and the Arab Spring

Bahrain’s Royal Family, the Al Khalifa, has long pursued a strategy of divide and rule in order to prevent the emergence of cross-opposition coalitions, while exacerbating the country’s sectarian divide has become a critical means of ensuring regime survival. This article examines the country’s twentieth century imperial and post-independence history through the framework of divide and rule theory, providing crucial context for current events in Bahrain. It demonstrates how a divide and rule strategy is structurally embedded within the ruling family’s mode of governance, and reveals how it continues to be employed as an effective means of maintaining absolute monarchy in Bahrain.

Keywords: Bahrain, Arab Spring, Gulf Cooperation Council, divide and rule, sectarianism

The Gulf Cooperation Council is an active organization in the Arabian Peninsula also in the Persian Gulf which seeks cooperation with the member states. The two examples of Bahrain and Yemen are evaluated in the framework which was suggested by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, " Regional Security Complex Theory ". In this theory, the regional complexes are seen in the lens of securitization which can be an explanation in order to understand what happens in the Persian Gulf, what is the GCC's and Iran's motivations in these cases and what was the importance of these cases as the GCC states intervened both of these two examples which are to be evaluated. The article first explains the framework that will be dealt with and explain the GCC's aims to achieve. Then the examples of Bahrain and Yemen would be explained in order to understand the theory and also the developments that happen in Persian Gulf.

Overview of media laws, penal codes, and other regulations and their applications in the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates. Includes comparisons to international approaches. Research supported by Doha Centre for Media Education. Research finds several areas in which GCC laws differ from international standards that allow for a vibrant press. These factors incude: criminal defamation charges instead of civil lawsuits, licensing of journalists, broad prohibitions on types of coverage, banning of "false news," and truth as an absolute defense for libel.

The Baharna people, at the hands of Al Khalifa, have had their lands taken, their title as to Bahrain erased, and their jobs limited. This paper explores the hidden history of the slavery (sukhra) of the Baharna, the discriminatory taxes enforced against them, and how security apparatus then and now monitor and never hesitate to use physical force to enforce the law. The women’s movement is also crucial to the understanding of the status of the Baharna, as Bahraini women are also lower-class citizens, especially in terms of inheritance, divorce and marriage laws and practices.

On the morning of 18 March 2011, Bahrain's state television broadcast the razing of the Pearl Roundabout and its iconic sculpture. This event, unsurprisingly, failed to quell the struggle between activists and the ruling elite. Rather, the destruction of the Pearl Monument (Luʾluʾ) and Bahrain's 'Pearl Square' offered demonstrators a ready-made symbol embodying the traumatic and violent days of the 2011 demonstrations and the ongoing government suppression of reform movements. Rematerializations of the Luʾluʾ through photographs, graffiti, digital art, sculptural maquettes and even costumes echo the physical structure in miniature and continue to regenerate and multiply the monument like a viral meme. Through such manifestations and reanima-tions the now-vanished monument continues to occupy Bahrain's public spaces and civic memory, enduringly resisting the state's efforts to erase it and all it represents. In examining the 'lifecycle' of the Luʾluʾ, this article explores how an act of iconoclasm can result in an outpouring of new creative activities.

Keywords: Pearl Roundabout – Bahrain – monument – protest – occupy – iconoclasm – Shiʿism

Resumen

Aunque la crisis política que experimenta Bahréin se ha percibido dentro de los sucesos de la “Primavera Árabe” de 2011, sus causas estructurales difieren marcadamente de los acontecimientos de Egipto, Libia, o Túnez. La crisis en Bahréin es producto del monopolio político ejercido por el tipo específico de “monarquía dinástica” de los Al Khalifa, que cierra todos los espacios para una verdadera participación política de la población. Asimismo, el Estado bahreiní tiene una estructura rentista “dual”, que a través del uso de los recursos petroleros y mineros del país, y de la explotación de su importancia geopolítica, provee de recursos a la dinastía gobernante para la preservación de su monopolio político mientras disfruta de la “cobertura” diplomática de potencias regionales y extra-regionales (Arabia Saudita y Estados Unidos). El uso del sectarismo en tanto que discurso y práctica permite a los Al Khalifa dividir a la oposición de acuerdo a sus filiaciones sectarias, pero también a cada una de las comunidades religiosas en pugna (suníes y chiíes).

Palabras clave: Bahréin, Monarquía Dinástica, Estado  Rentista, Sectarismo, Primavera Árabe.

Abstract

Even though the political crisis in Bahrain has been perceived as part of the “Arab Spring” of 2011, its structural causes differ sharply from the events in Egypt, Libya or Tunisia. The crisis in Bahrain is an effect of the political monopoly of the specific kind of “dynastic monarchy” exercised by the Al Khalifa family, which closes all venues for significant political participation by the population. Besides, the Bahraini state has a “dual” rentier nature, which through the use of the oil and mineral resources of the country, and the exploitation of its geopolitical importance, provides resources to the ruling dynasty for the preservation of its political monopoly in the country while enjoying the political and diplomatic “cover” of regional and extra-regional powers (Saudi Arabia and the United States). The use of the practice and discourse of sectarianism allows the Al Khalifa to divide the opposition through sectarian lines, but also inside each of the religious communities involved in the struggle (Shia and Sunni).

Key words: Bahrain, Dynastic Monarchy, Rentier State, Sectarianism, Arab Spring.

Revolts did not knock on the door, they just sneaked in the Arab region, toppling some regimes while shaking the thrones of others. Analyses began to heap in an attempt to examine this state of affairs; some choose to factor in this context a new foreign conspiracy, aiming at dividing of what is left from the region. Others suggest that the revolts are a long awaited revolution of pride and dignity and were ignited by plain domestic forces. As a prelude to this analysis, in today's article we wish to address the common views, widespread not only among academics and politicians, but also amongst the Arab masses which started to question, doubt and lose confidence in the current spate of Arab revolts. in order to keep readers abreast of the latest developments, this article espouses a nuanced approach in addressing a third view which considers the events mere scientific material that can serve as a platform to examine existing theories of International politics in a region, described for long time as idle and sluggish towards transformations.

The "Evolving Ruling Bargain in the Middle East" Summary Report details the CIRS research initiative on “The Evolving Ruling Bargain in the Middle East" to scrutinize the ways in which domestic political arrangements in the Middle East are evolving, and how the authoritarian bargains are being challenged. This project brings together a number of distinguished scholars to examine a variety of relevant topics and to contribute original chapters to the CIRS book titled, Beyond the Arab Spring: The Evolving Ruling Bargain in the Middle East (link is external) (Hurst, 2014), edited by Mehran Kamrava).

"The quantitative analysis of the Arab Spring events is a rather difficult task. Respective difficulties are related to the variety of factors affecting social instability, and to individual peculiarities of historical, cultural, socio-economic, and political processes in the region. As a result of the research, we found out that the processes of social and political destabilization in the countries of Arab Spring were caused by a complex set of factors. The most significant factors that tended to reduce the scale of sociopolitical destabilization during the Arab Spring have turned out to be the following: the ability of the government to reduce social tensions and the presence of “immunity” to internal conflicts. However, such indicators as structural and demographical characteristics and external influences turned out to be less significant in
the context of the Arab Spring. It should be mentioned that the significance of the external influences indicator notably increases when the model is used to account for the death toll resultant from anti-government protests. We also discuss the possibility of applying the developed model of sociopolitical destabilization to forecast sociopolitical upheavals in future."

Secular arabic traditions have emphasized the potential of dreams to foretell the future.  Sometimes the prediction is seen as obvious and on other occasions elaborate systems of symbolic translations were consulted such as the tenth century Oneirocriticon of Achmet.
    In Islam, many of the foundations of the Koran were revealed to Muhammad in dreams. Muhammad ordered the practice of adhanthe daily call to prayer from the minarets and a central ritual of Islam to this day after one of his followers dreamed of it. The split of Islam into the conflicting factions of Sunni and Shi'ite was based partly on a dream of Mohammed, which the Sunnis used to justify their rights as his successors.
    The autobiographies of Muslim rulers often contain extensive dream diaries and examples of decisions obstensibly based on dreams.  When the Shah of Iran was deciding whether to seek a loan from Russia, he dreamed that a famous theological figure dressed in primitive Muslim garb approached the Shah and threw at his feet a sack containing gold and silver.  The interpretation of this dream was that the Shah shouldn't make any new loans with unbelievers but should trust that fellow servants of the faith would restore his finances. Sadam Hussein reported dreaming that Allah told him to enter and take back Kuwait just before the first Gulf War. Before the second Gulf War, he reported a dream that a snake came upon his path but he chopped off it’s head with a sword which he interpreted to mean western invaders would be vanquished.
    Because of this emphasis on dreams as foretelling the future rather than arising from the past, Arabs who are having PTSD nightmares of an event occurring each night--such as Kuwiati survivors of the Iraqi invasion or Iraqi survivors of the American invasion--experience even more anxiety over whether this will indeed occur again than dreamers in other cultures.
    The positive side to this emphasis on dreams foretelling the future happens when oppressed people dream of positive outcomes.  These are a source of much inspiration in arab society, while in western traditions they would be dismissed as "wish fulfillment" without the beneficial impact.
    We  collected dreams associated with events of the Arab Spring and discuss how they inspired and guided those taking part, and what dreams right now may have to offer the reshaping of the Arab world.

The article’s aim is to help to understand the recently discussed notion of the New Arab Cold War and how it provides us a new understanding about the developments about the “New Middle East. These emerging divisions give us the chance to try out new ways to evaluate which is also aim of this article. We can also say that this unorthodox view of the Middle East by the notion of “New Arab Cold War” may not be the best way to understand what happens but anyway, enhances our vision.

Mid-2017, Bahrain’s population was estimated at 1,501,116, of whom 823,610 (55 per cent) were foreign nationals. Most were from Asia (85 per cent) and especially from India (half of all foreign residents). Seventy-four per cent of expatriates were employed in 2018. They accounted for 79 per cent of the employed population and 83 per cent of the private sector’s workforce. Asians were overwhelmingly involved in services and blue-collar occupations, while Arabs more often filled managerial posts.
Immigration flows to the Kingdom expanded significantly over the 2000s, fuelled by high oil prices and the ensuing boom in the construction and services sectors. During the 2010s, the foreign resident
population increased again. In order to accelerate the Bahrainisation of the workforce, while maximising economic productivity and flexibility of the labour market, a string of reforms were enacted starting 2004, among which were a partial loosening of the kafala system, measures to protect domestic workers and the introduction of a “flexi-permit” designed to incorporate some foreign workers in irregular situation
in the labour market.

رواد النادي .. وسيرة الماضي

دراسة في ضوء السيرة الذاتية للكابتن إبراهيم علي الصديقي

إصدار جديد نُشر في بيروت
من تأيف الدكتور علي فيصل الصديقي
وهو كتاب يسجل تفاعل المكان والزمان والانسان، ليؤرخ لقرية البسيتين وشيء من تراثها الانساني، ويؤرخ لناديها ,ابرز الذين عملوا فيه من الأعلام والمؤسسين، وظروف الكفاح التي مر بها النادي منذ بداياته تحت مسمى (نادي الكوكب) وصولاً إلى تحوله إلى نادٍ يتمتع بخصائص الأندية النموذجية من مرافق رياضية.
وكل ذلك في ضوء استعراض للسيرة الذاتية للمرحوم الكابتن إبراهيم علي أحد أعمدة النادي ومن البارزين في مجال الإدارة والرياضة والعمل الاجتماعي في المنطقة.

الكتاب قدم له افتتاحيته ابن البسيتين ومؤرخها الشاعر والأديب الأستاذ عبدالرحمن بن شاهين المضحكي
ويقع مجمل الكتاب الجديد في 512 صفحة ضمن تسعة فصول، شاملاً الصور والوثائق.

وقد كتب الباحث والمؤرخ الأستاذ راشد بن عيسى الجاسم
قراءة متميزة لمضمون الكتاب، مستعرضاً أبرز ما جاء فيه من موضوعات
ويمكنكم الإطلاع عليها على الرابط

English Abstract
This anthropological study departs from the political unrests which took place, in its extreme phase, in the Kingdom of Bahrain during the year 2011. That is to say in the year which what then became known as "Arab Spring", begins its sail in some countries of the Arab World. The first part of this study provides a critique of some of academic writings belonging to a social and human science perspective on Bahrain's society, culture and politics. By examining those kind of writings, it is believed that the article was able enough to show the degree of the adverse consequences of such studies on the academic morality of those disciplines. In its second part, this article went further by providing its anthropological reading of the social roots of the Shiʿa fundamentalism in Bahrain, that is to say the main political force which stood behind the unrest events in the kingdom. The article elucidates that by showing the major social transformations experienced by the social constituents to which the Shiʿa fundamentalism belongs. Later, it continues to examine the impact the of those forces and activities on the problem of identity and citizenship among the members of the Shiʿa sect in an Arab Gulf country such as Bahrain, which experienced a national reform plan leading toward establishing a constitutional monarchy grounded on democracy. To substantiate such argument, the article illustrates that by showing how Shiʿa fundamentalism, and  its affiliated political groups, played their destructive role in essential fields such as identity and citizenship among some of the major social constituents. On the other hand, it also provides details on the form and substance of the resistance which has been carried out by those constituents, and their experience in confronting the  hegemonic attempts of the fundamentalists to dominate their everyday life.

While President Obama’s Middle East speech on May 19, 2011 was a welcome change of course, it was delivered long after the United States should have started backing its rhetoric with action and trying to stop the gross human rights violations occurring in Bahrain. His administration must take advantage of the shrinking window of opportunity to implement the ideals envisioned in his historic 2009 Cairo speech, for the United States’ standing is now at risk in a pivotal region in the world – one that is at the center of its entire national security strategy. Washington has continued to defer to Manama based on the pretext that the ongoing conflict is more about sectarianism than democracy. But to dismiss the demonstrations as merely the latest iteration of a centuries-old sectarian conflict ignores the complex social, political, and economic factors that far surpass mere sectarian rivalries.

Bahrain suffers from the same ills plaguing other Arab countries: a shortage of professional jobs for the growing number of its college graduates, increasing prices in the face of stagnating wages, and little political space for citizens to call upon their government to address existing social and economic challenges. As with other Arab regimes, the government diverts its citizens’ attention to external forces and actors to avoid assuming any responsibility for solving its domestic problems. Specifically, allegations of an Iranian conquest via the Bahraini Shi’a are simply another iteration of the royal family’s traditional manufacturing of sectarian conflict for its own benefit. Although Iran’s goals of regional dominance are no secret, the threat of an Iranian-style Shi’a takeover is a government assertion put forward and then exaggerated to persuade its Gulf neighbors, western allies, and the Sunni political elite that there is no acceptable alternative to the monarchy’s absolute control and consequent suppression of its citizens.

Strikingly absent from the discourse about the country’s ongoing pro-democracy movement are the non-sectarian grounds upon which the calls for democracy are based. A closer look at the recent demonstrations indicates that the movement’s impetus is the Bahrainis’ desire for universal social, economic, and political rights irrespective of religious sect. A growing sense of political disenfranchisement is spreading among both Sunni and Shi’a citizens who have been excluded from political and business opportunities. Bahrain’s culture of nepotism and cronyism benefits a select few. As the quality of life for the majority declines among all sectarian affiliations, the government leverages the beneficiaries of its patronage system to counter all calls for an equitable distribution of wealth, political freedom, and equal employment opportunity based on merit. As tempting as it may be to reduce all of these factors to mere strategic interests in Bahrain and the wider Middle East.

This report counters the false assumption that Bahrain’s pro-democracy movement is merely another round in the longstanding sectarian strife that destabilizes the country and the Gulf writ large. Rather, the ongoing demonstrations are a cooperative effort between the country’s Sunni and Shi’a citizens to call for meaningful democratic processes and institutions. Whatever animosity exists within the Bahraini population is directed at a government and members of a ruling family that have broken their promises for more economic opportunity and political freedom, and less corruption and authoritarianism. Upon witnessing the remarkable display of people power in Egypt and Tunisia, Bahrainis are no longer satisfied with being treated as subjects; rather, they are demanding to be treated as citizens with twenty-first-century political, social, and economic rights and the power to shape their nation’s destiny.

This pro-democracy movement faces significant obstacles, given the backdrop of regional power struggles for control of this strategically located island coupled with a ruling family desperate to retain its relevancy. Trapped within the broader Saudi-Iranian geostrategic struggle for power, it can expect unrelenting opposition from oil-rich Saudi Arabia. Indeed, Saudi Arabia’s desire to maintain the status quo, supplanted with financial incentives, has apparently become a greater challenge to Bahrainis’ reform efforts than any opposition from the Bahraini ruling family. Meanwhile, despite calls for universal human rights, the Obama administration has been disappointingly reticent. In stark contrast to its response to the Egyptian, Tunisian, and Libyan protests, Washington’s (until recently) timid response has been interpreted as a green light by the royal family to brutally crackdown on anyone involved, be they middle-class professionals, blue-collar workers, or unsupportive of the official narrative of sectarian conflict. Nurses and doctors are tried in military courts,5 school-aged girls are beaten to extract false confessions against their families, Shi’a mosques are destroyed for supporting the demonstrations, and political prisoners are beaten to death. The Arab people have spoken loud and clear – they will no longer tolerate either the authoritarian regimes or the double standards of their western allies. Based on the foregoing analysis, this report recommends steps that would both promote democracy in Bahrain and preserve American interests in the Gulf and the wider Middle East.

تقريظ  لكتاب: البروتوكولات والمراسم في عهد صحاب العظمة الشيخ حمد بن عيسى بن علي آل خليفة لمؤلفه المؤرخ راشد الجاسم
التقريظ بقلم: د. علي الصديقي


Book review: Protocols during the reign of His Excellency Sheikh Hamad
bin Isa bin Ali Al Khalifa (Ruler of Bahrain: 1932-1942)
Written by the historian: Rashid Al-Jasem
Presentation by: Dr. Ali alSeddiqi - Bahrain

Bahrain faces a long-running local dispute about the sharing of power and wealth. While there has never been a simple division between Sunni and Shia, politics have become increasingly polarized along sectarian lines, a trend exacerbated by outside actors.
Since the report of the royally established Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (the ‘Bassiouni report’) in November 2011, the government has taken some steps to address human rights abuses and to create new mechanisms for the oversight of the security services. However, the effect of these potentially important mechanisms will depend on the political will invested in them. So far the indications are negative.

There is still scope to find common ground between the different elements of Bahraini society in support of a constitutional monarchy, based on a revitalized social contract, not on sect-based power-sharing.

There may now be an opportunity to develop a fresh GCC mediation effort in the context of discussions on greater GCC unity. Conversely, the failure to reach a political solution to the problems in Bahrain may undermine the drive towards GCC unity by contributing to both political and sectarian tensions within the GCC.

The repression in Bahrain, a Western ally, complicates and hinders the efforts of the US and UK to sketch out a new policy towards a Middle East where demands for democracy have become increasingly vocal.

Until 1968, Bahrain was a protectorate of the British government during its days of imperial glory, and home to its political agent in the region.  Research shows that the first TV programme covering events in Bahrain dates back to the 1950’s  making, the British Broadcasting Company ‘BBC,’ the very first international television station that presented news of Bahrain to the world. This work focuses on what vocabulary was being used by the BBC then, and how it developed over time to the narrative we find today. Terminologies being used just under a decade ago have been carried on to this day and have in some cases expanded. The aim of this work is to study how the BBC has set the stage for stereotyping the country in the international media in order to create a strategy, of joint effort, that would overcome this challenge going forward.
This study was peer reviewed and published by the Central European Journal for International and Security Studies

The topic of international legitimacy has returned to centre stage during the Arab Spring, in which the Arab League has apparently assumed a prominent legitimation role. Although some scholarship has studied how international organizations are decisive in legitimizing actors and their actions during conflicts, relatively scant attention has been focused at constructing a comprehensive analytical framework for this kind of assessment that could be also applied to regional organizations (ROs). This paper proposes that when actors are involved in battles over international legitimation, analysing their access to the socially identified brokers of three legitimation functions (appropriateness, consensus, and empathy) is key to assess their success. Particularly, we argue that relevant identity-based ROs may have a crucial legitimizing role by operating as brokers of regional consensus. For this purpose, two case studies – Bahrain and Libya – illustrate how the Arab League’s brokerage influenced the legitimation of the actors involved and their outcomes. The findings suggest novel implications about the decisive legitimizing impact of regionalism on conflict resolution.

Les révoltes n’ont pas frappé à la porte avant d’entrer, elles se sont glissées furtivement dans le monde arabe, renversant certains régimes tout en secouant le trône des autres.
Les analyses ont commencé à pleuvoir dans la tentative d'examiner cet état des choses : certains penchent, dans ce contexte, pour la théorie d’un nouveau complot étranger, visant à diviser ce qui restait de la région. D'autres suggèrent que ces révoltes sont une révolution longuement attendue, teintée de fierté et de dignité, déclenchée par des forces populaires internes.
En prélude à cette analyse, nous souhaitons dans cet article aborder le point de vue commun, non seulement répandu parmi les universitaires et les politiciens, mais aussi parmi les peuples arabes qui ont commencé à remettre en question, douter et perdre confiance dans la vague des révoltes arabes.
Afin de tenir les lecteurs au courant des derniers développements, cet article prône une approche nuancée en ouvrant un troisième point de vue, qui considère les événements comme simple matériel scientifique pouvant servir de plateforme pour examiner les théories existantes de la politique internationale, dans une région décrite depuis longtemps comme léthargique et peu encline à se transformer.

Influenced by the waves of the Arab Awakening, the Gulf region has been witnessing some major tremors since the year 2011. The claims for more democratic systems in Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, UAE, and even Qatar have been increasingly raised not only by activists and democracy fighters, but even by intellectuals and officials who are known for their loyalty to existing regimes.  The idea of having a more democratic Gulf is becoming more popular in the region; however, democratic transition seems to remain a remote possibility. Challenges for the transition to democracy arise from the concentration of absolute monarchies and wide range of entrenched, interest-based networks in the region. Nonetheless, the emerging Gulf youth movements, especially the one which began in Bahrain in early 2011, are starting to break the rules in this region which has been politically stuck for decades. The most surprising result of the Bahraini movement for many in the West was the unforeseen activism of its Gulf neighbors, above all Saudi Arabia. Many believed that the Arab awakening movements had somehow bypassed the Gulf, but the sustained movement in Bahrain, as well as other organized efforts across the region proved the Gulf is not immune to change. In fact, democratic transition in the Gulf region is an old goal; people in the Gulf have been demanding more rights from the state and organizing themselves since the beginning of the last century. What they have always been lacking is a long-term strategy which takes into account the challenging factors in their environment and provides a new vision for the future in this part of the world.

This paper examines, in 2010,  the growth of media as a fourth power within the Kingdom of
Bahrain. The paper investigates the government’s efforts, accomplishments, objectives
and challenges
The study suggests that the media is being empowered through government backing and
support, which has lead to a changing face of media within the Kingdom of Bahrain.
In the process of this exploration a new concept is introduced to challenge the existing
scholarship on theories of the press and presents a communication model specific for
Bahrain that takes into account dimensions of Arab Middle Eastern culture and norms
that have changed since the emergence of democratic rule within the Middle East.

In 2012, the government of Bahrain systematically persecuted the Shia majority, which acts as the main opposition against the Sunni government.
This 38-page report, “Bahrain; victim of National Interest” documents human rights violations carried out against the Shia Muslims in Bahrain.

This article contextualises current sectarian tensions in Bahrain by demonstrating that they are a product of the country’s lengthy history of divide and rule politics, and suggests that the 2011 uprising marks a dangerous development in this strategy, which could ultimately entrench political instability for years to come.

The social and political uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, designated the “Arab Spring” because the most visible ruptures appeared in the spring of 2011, drew global attention not only because they presented broad-based political protest against regimes which were long- entrenched, whether authoritarian or monarchical. They were landmark events because they led to the removal of several heads of state, and prompted discussions of institutional reform. Notably, they also entailed a broad range of human rights claims, both those related to abuses by prior regimes of civil and political rights and bodily integrity, but also of socio-economic rights. In short, they not only put transitional justice on the political agenda in a region of the world where it was seldom discussed (despite limited experiments in Morocco), but also put forward a broader view of transitional justice than that which has traditionally been implemented. However, many of these transition...

Following the ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa, many had high hopes not only for democratisation but also for transitional justice to address the myriad abuses that had taken place in the region, both during the uprisings and for decades prior to them. Despite these hopes, most of the transitions in the region have stalled, along with the possibility of transitional justice. This volume is the first to look at this process and brings together leading experts in the fields of human rights and transitional justice, and in the history, politics and justice systems of countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, Bahrain and Morocco. While these countries have diverse histories, political institutions, and experiences with accountability, most have experienced non-transition, stalled transition, or political manipulation of transitional justice measures, highlighting the limits of such mechanisms. These studies should inform reflection not only on the role...

Özet
İslam Peygamberi Hz. Muhammed (s.a.v.) Medine'de 632 senesinde vefat ettikten sonra Müslümanlar arasında yaşanan siyasi çekişmeler ve akabinde ortaya çıkan dini yorumlama farklılıkları ile ortaya çıkan mezhepler, zaman içerisinde yine aynı sebepler doğrultusunda daha net şekilde ayrışmış, 1979 senesinde İran'da yaşanan İslam Devrimi ile de Müslüman coğrafyada siyasi manada çok fazla ön plana çıkmış bir kavramdır. İslam dini ekseninde bütünleşmesi gereken Müslümanların, mezhep farklılıkları yüzünden birbirlerini 'kafir' olarak yorumlama noktasına gelmesi, günümüz Ortadoğu bölgesinin en önemli sorunları arasında yer almaktadır. Bu ayrışmanın bölgedeki siyasi otoriteler tarafından Makyavelist bir yaklaşımla kullanılması, iktidarların korunması veya etki alanı oluşturulması için makul bir gerekçe olarak da yorumlanabilmektedir.
Sünni mezhebine tabi güçler arasında öne çıkan devletlerden birisi olan
Suudi Arabistan Krallığı ve 1979 Devrimi sonrasında Şii yayılmacılığı
ekseninde dış politikasını şekillendiren İran İslam Cumhuriyeti arasında kalan Bahreyn Krallığı, nüfusun çoğu Şii olmasına rağmen, siyasi, ekonomik ve sosyal olarak Sünnilerin kontrolündedir. Bu süreçte el-Halife ailesinin bu kontrolü yitirmemek adına iç ve dış politikada uygulamakta olduğu politik hamleler incelenerek, siyasette mezhep faktörünün etki alanı ortaya konulmaya çalışılmıştır. İran İslam Cumhuriyeti ve Suudi Arabistan Krallığı'nın bölgeye ve özellikle Bahreyn Krallığı'na yönelik politikaları da araştırıldığı,  yakın tarihimizde yaşanmış gelişmelerin ve akademik eserlerin incelenerek değerlendirildiği bu çalışmada, mezhep faktörünün öne çıktığı ve karar sürecini etkilediği durumlar  örneklendirilerek siyaset-mezhep ilişkisi hakkında teorik
bir çerçeve oluşturmak amaçlanmıştır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Siyaset, Mezhep, Ortadoğu, Bahreyn

Abstract
Islamic sects emerged becouse of some political conflicts and construal
differences after Muhammed the prophet of Islam was dead in Madinah in 632. In the course of time this disintegration became deeper and rised to prominence after 1979 Iran Islamic Revolution. Since 1979 Revolution sectarian tension has been rising and Muslim socities can accuse each other to be "heretic". This situation is interpreted as "one of the biggest problem of Middle East Region" by lots of experts. According to Machiavelist approach, to use this disintegration as a 'political tool' can be seen acceptable by some regional governments to protect power or create a sphere of influence. 
 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia comes to the forefront through Sunni origined
governments. Also Iran Islamic Republic centered Shia sect about it's foreign expansionist policies. Bahrain Kingdom's Sunni miniority hold the political, economic and social power although countries population mostly composes of  Shia people. Kingdom remains in between two regional forces for a long time but after the revolution this crisis has been getting deeper. In this process, the domestic and foreign policies of al-Khalifa dynasty was examined and the influences of sect on policies was tried to be revealed. In this study, the policies of Iran and Saudi Arabia's policies towards the Middle East region and Bahrain
Kingdom were investigated. It is aimed to reveal a theoretical framework about politics-sect relations by evaluating the recent political developments and academic works.
  Key Words: Policy, Sect, Middle East, Bahrain

Questa ricerca si muove con l'intento di valutare le relazioni che il Bahrain intrattiene ormai da secoli con l'Europa e di analizzarle in relazione all'importanza strategica che questa piccola entità possiede. Come vedremo, comunque, proprio la rilevanza internazionale del Bahrain, rende impossibile attenersi staticamente al contesto geografico della trattazione: di volta in volta infatti sono paesi come Arabia Saudita, Iran o Stati Uniti a fare le veci del piccolo arcipelago, rendendo la situazione più intricata e complessa. Infine, sarà rivolto un piccolo focus sulle strategie interne degli Al-Khalifa che, oltre ad esser state in qualche modo patrocinate per secoli dalla Gran Bretagna, sono di grande attualità in relazione ai recenti sollevamenti dei paesi arabi, coinvolgendo e ristrutturando le relazioni tra questi paesi e l'Europa stessa.

Even during the 1990s intifada in Bahrain, I do not remember witnessing much trouble. I heard the odd skirmish, and the occasional siren, but as a child you tend to think that the police are the good guys and anyone giving them trouble are "the bad guys." Sometimes people would discuss "trouble in the villages," but other than that, my ignorance of the situation was the result of youthful indifference cultivated by an informal apartheid.
Fast forward to 2013, and my youthful ignorance serves as a useful metaphor for the alarming extent of apparent Western indifference to the ongoing political crisis in Bahrain.