Yemen politics

The following text is a response sent to an email dispatched to me by the Chairman of the exiled Oromo Parliamentarians who struggle for the Independence and Self-determination of the 5 millennia long Kushitic Ethiopian Nation of the Oromos.
The Hamitic - Kushitic Oromo Nation - due to criminal, inhuman and evil persecution conceived by the colonial powers (France, England and America) and executed by the colonially promoted barbaric and incestuous pseudo-Christian Abyssinians - lost their kingdoms and were engulfed within the Cemetery of Nations Fake Ethiopia, which consists in the world's most tyrannical realm and the location of the world's more abhorrent, more enduring, and more multifaceted genocides. There are more than 45 million Oromos in Abyssinia (Fake Ethiopia) and Kenya today, despite the notorious and pathetic falsehood propagated by Wikipedia.
The present text enumerates all the major points of historical distortion and falsification carried out and diffused by the colonial academia, mass media, and diplomats, as well as by their local agents and criminal executioners, i.e. the barbaric, incestuous and Anti-Christian tribes of Amhara and Tigray (: the Abyssinians), who usurped the fair name of Ethiopia, which historically denotes the land of North Sudan and the Kushitic Nation that prospered there either in the Antiquity or in the Christian Era. Both, the Oromos and the Arabic-speaking (but not Arab) populations of Northern-Central Sudan are the descendants of Ancient Sudan's (i.e. Ancient Ethiopia's) Kushitic populations.
Representative photographic documentation was herewith added to the text in order to better illustrate the topic.

Refutation of historical forgeries propagated by European colonials and incestuous Abyssinians
First published here:
https://megalommatiscomments.wordpress.com/2017/07/26/kushitic-oromos-ancestry-in-ethiopia-ancient-sudan-semitic-amharas-tigrays-abyssinians-ancestry-in-yemen/

Pharmacoeconomics constitutes an area of health care research that assesses and compares the costs and outcomes related to drug therapy. The article's main aim is to stress the importance of the use of pharmacoeconomic research and pharmacoeconomics education in Yemen and in the curriculum carried out in Yemeni pharmacy schools. The article talks about the concept, the importance of pharmacoeconomics in low-income countries, the contributions made by pharmacoeconomics to pharmacy practice, pharmacy education in Yemen and the need to have proper pharmacoeconomics in Yemen. Conclusively, the Pharmacoeconomic research if implemented in Yemen, it will play an increasingly important role in making critical decisions concerning options that can be made regarding drug therapies and pharmaceutical services. Also, Pharmacists and future pharmacists should have a fundamental understanding of pharmacoeconomic concepts and the research methods employed to use the information gained from this rapidly growing field most effectively. To cite this review article

Tujuan penelitian ini adalah untuk menelaah pemerintahan Presiden Ali Abdullah Saleh dan orientasinya terhadap kebijakan luar negeri pasca bergabungnya Yaman Utara dan Yaman Selatan. Jenis penelitian adalah deskriptif dengan pendekatan kualitatif. Data penelitian dikumpulkan menggunakan studi literatur dengan mencari informasi yang menjelaskan mengenai kepemimpinan dan orientasi kebijakan luar negeri Presiden Ali Abdullah Saleh selama memimpin Yaman. Kesimpulan yang diperoleh dari penelitian ini menyatakan bahwa Presiden Ali Abdullah Saleh pada dasarnya memiliki keinginan kuat untuk menyatukan Yaman, namun demikian, metode yang digunakan dalam memerintah Yaman masih belum mampu mewujudkan hal tersebut dan cenderung hanya berorientasi pada pemenuhan atas kepentingan pribadi dan golongan pendukungnya saja. Orientasi kebijakan luar negeri dari Presiden Ali Abdullah Saleh utamanya dalam bidang ekonomi dan politik. Kebijakan dalam bidang ekonomi berkaitan dengan kerjasama antara Yaman dan China, sedangkan kebijakan dalam bidang politik berkaitan dengan kerjasama antara Yaman dengan Arab Saudi dan Amerika Serikat untuk menumpas pemberontak Houthi.
Kata Kunci: Ali Abdullah Saleh, Yaman, Kebijakan Luar Negeri

The Yemen, is the birth place and hub for a number of monotheistic religious convictions . In its North West region, just 243 kilometers away from San'aa, the official capital of the Republic of Yemen , lies a spiritual center, a holy metropolis known as Saa'da  .
It is to Zaidi Islam as Qum is to Shia Islam and Mecca is to Sunni Islam. It is where the scholars dwell, to read, learn and teach their disciples to carry on the doctrine and preserve the faith throughout history.
It is here that the Houthi phenomenon first appeared.
This study focuses on the very beginnings of Houthism as a phenomenon, it's source and affiliations. It is but the first part of a series of papers that will delve into the movement as it expands over time.

تستهدف هذه الدراسة فهم وتقييم حالات الحوار التي جرت – أو حاولت بعض الأطراف إجرائها– في أعقاب الثورات من أجل الديمقراطية في كل من تونس واليمن ومصر وليبيا، وذلك في جميع مراحلها بدءًا من السياق العام الذي تمت فيه عمليات الحوار، مرورًا بتصميم عمليات الحوار ومخرجاتها، وانتهاءً بالتحديات التي تقف أمام تنفيذ مخرجات الحوار أو إجراء حوارات مستقبلية. وذلك كله وصولا إلى تقديم بعض المقترحات لدعم وتنفيذ مبادرات مستقبلية لتحويل النزاعات، وإحلال السلام، وتعزيز عمليات التحول الديمقراطي في الدول محل الدراسة. 

وتستند منهجية هذه الدراسة على مدخل الانتقال إلى الديمقراطية الذي يهتم بتحليل اختيارات ومواقف الفاعلين الأساسيين خلال عملية الانتقال إلى الديمقراطية مع التركيز على طرق التغيير الثوري، ودراسة أثر هذه الاختيارات والمواقف على عملية التغيير، مع عدم تجاوز تأثير محددات السياق العام قبل وبعد الثورات على تلك الاختيارات والمواقف، وذلك بهدف الوصول إلى تقييم موضوعي لعمليات الحوار. ولا شك أن اختيارات الفاعلين السياسيين لا تعمل  في فراغ، كما أن المحددات السياسية والاقتصادية والاجتماعية ليست محددات حتمية لا أثر لعامل الإرادة فيها. وتعتمد أدوات هذه المنهجية على الإطلاع المعمق على عمليات وتجارب ومحاولات الحوار التي تمت في الدول محل الدراسة عبر الأدبيات والتقارير والأعمال التحضيرية واللقاءات والتصريحات ذات الصلة وأعمال الخبراء والمطلعين على شؤون هذه الدول.

وتضم هيكلية الدراسة أربعة أقسام وخاتمة، ونتاول في كل قسم حالة من حالات الدراسة من محاور أربعة،  هي: 

أولا: السياق العام واستكشاف إمكانية الحوار: وهنا ستتم الإجابة عن عدة أسئلة، منها: ما السياق العام الذي تمت فيه عملية الحوار أو تمت الدعوة إليه؟ وما سمات المرحلة التي تلت إسقاط النظم التسلطية في الدول محل الدراسة؟ وما طبيعية العلاقات التي كانت قائمة بين الأطراف الرئيسة؟ وما مدى قابلية هذه الأطراف للمشاركة في حوار حقيقي؟ ولماذا ظهرت الحاجة إلى الحوار؟ وهل سبق عملية التصميم تقييم شامل للسياق والقضايا والأطراف الرئيسة؟

ثانيا: تصميم عملية الحوار: وهنا تعالج الدراسة أسئلة متعددة، منها: هل تم وضع استراتيجية للحوار بأهداف واضحة ووسائل محددة؟ وهل تم تحديد القضايا المحورية والمصالح المختلفة لكل طرف؟ وهل تم تحديد اجراءات لبناء الثقة بين الأطراف؟ وهل تم وضع هيكلية واضحة لعملية الحوار؟ وهل تم تحديد الموارد اللازمة للحوار، ووسائل الإتصال، والأطر الزمنية؟ وهل تم تحديد إجراءات حوكمة فعّالة للحوار؟ وهل من دور لطرف ثالث محلي أو إقليمي أو دولي؟ وهل تمت الإستعانة بخبراء؟

ثالثا: تنفيذ عملية الحوار ومخرجاتها: وفي هذا المحور تعالج الدراسة تقييم عملية الحوار بعد التنفيذ وتحاول الإجابة عن أسئلة مثل: هل كان الحوار شاملا؟ وكيف دارت جلسات الحوار وفعالياته ومداولاته؟ وهل تم التقيد بمنهجية الحوار التي صُممت مسبقا؟ وكيف كانت تتم معالجة المواقف الصعبة؟ وما مواقف كل طرف تجاه القضايا الرئيسة؟ وماذا كان دور الطرف الثالث؟ وهل اتسم هذا الدور بالحياد؟ وكيف كانت مخرجات الحوار؟ هل ظهرت وثائق مكتوبة؟ وكيف يمكن تقييم فعّالية عملية الحوار؟ وما الآثار التي ترتبت على عملية الحوار فيما يتصل بعلاقات أطراف الحوار؟ هل أثمر الحوار نقاطًا أو مصالح مشتركة بين هذه الأطراف أم أن الحوار كشف عن مصالح أكثر تضاربًا؟ وهل أدى الحوار إلى إحداث تغيير ما على المستويات الشخصية والمؤسسية للأطراف المختلفة؟ وهل ساهم الحوار في تحويل النزاع القائم؟ وهل ترتب على الحوار البدء في مسار سياسي لتعزيز عملية الانتقال إلى الديمقراطية؟

رابعا: تحديات عملية الحوار: وهنا ينصب اهتمام الورقة على عدة أسئلة، منها ما العقبات التي ظهرت أثناء وبعد عملية الحوار؟ وهل من عقبات من أطراف لم تشارك في الحوار؟ وهل أظهرت عملية الحوار عقبات جديدة لم تكن في حسبان مصممي منهجية الحوار؟ وهل شكلت الموارد عقبة أمام الحوار؟ وإلى مدى يمكن القول أن محددات السياق العام تمثل عقبة كبيرة أمام الحوار؟ وهل من ضغوط داخلية أو خارجية لإفشال أو انجاح الحوار؟

خاتمة: وفيها نقدم خلاصات مقارنة عن أبرز نتائج الدراسة وأهم الدروس المستفادة من كل عملية حوارية، فضلا عن أهم النقاط المحورية التي يمكن البناء عليها واقتراح مبادرات جديدة لتحويل النزاعات وتعزيز عملية التحول الديمقراطي.

وتجدر الإشارة أخيرا أن الحالتين التونسية واليمنية شهدتا عمليات حوار منظمة وأثمرتا مخرجات محددة، وجدت طريقها إلى التنفيذ في تونس، بينما تعذر تطبيقها في اليمن إلى حد كبير. أما مصر وليبيا فلم تشهدا عمليات حوار شاملة وإنما تجارب حوارية محدودة للغاية لم يترتب عليها نتائج تذكر لتحويل النزاعات وتعزيز مسار الانتقال إلى الديمقراطية. وترتيبا على هذا فإننا سنعالج الحالتين التونسية واليمنية ارتباطا بالمحاور الأربعة السابق الإشارة إليها، أما الحالتان المصرية والليبية فسيتم فيها عرض السياق العام، ومحاولات الحوار، وبعض المقترحات لتأسيس حالة حوار شامل في كل منهما.

The Ḥouthī conflict is one with many facets, ranging from tensions around Yemen’s resources, religious and military disputes to political quarrels between elites and the populations, all in the framework of tribal and more contemporary social networks.

Определены и проанализированы три основных обвинения, которые йеменское правительство и радикальные сунниты выдвигали в 2000-х годах против хуситов: стремление
к восстановлению имамата, получение помощи от Ирана и обращение в двенадцатеричный шиизм (джаафаризм). Установлено, что все они не соответствуют действительности
и во многом представляют собой проявление проводившейся йеменскими властями на
протяжении длительного времени политики дискриминации в отношении практикующих зейдитов, особенно сейидов  — представителей зейдитской религиозной «аристократии». Показано, что реставрация в Йемене имамата не была частью реальной политической повестки движения в силу отрицательного отношения к подобной идее большинства населения страны. Утверждения о связях хуситов с иранцами использовались
йеменским политическим истеблишментом в целях получения дополнительного финансирования от США и  Саудовской Аравии. Х.аль-Хуси не только не являлся шиитомдвунадесятником, но и критически отзывался об одной из основных идей этого религиозного течения — возвращении из сокрытия двенадцатого имама в качестве мессииМахди. Выдвинуто предположение, что правдоподобность этих обвинений и  их принятие многими йеменцами и некоторыми российскими и западными исследователями
были обусловлены доминированием в йеменском информационном пространстве антизейдитского дискурса и  их квазилогичной взаимодополняемостью: чтобы установить
имамат хуситам нужна поддержка, которую логичнее всего искать в оплоте мирового
шиизма — Иране, а переход в джаафаризм гарантирует получение такой помощи.

The article identifies and analyzes three main accusations leveled in the 2000s by the Yemeni
Government against Houthis: a desire to restore the Imamate, gaining support from Iran and
conversion to Twelver Shiism. It is shown that these accusations are incorrect and are consequences of the Yemeni authorities’ discrimination policy against practicing Zaydis and especially sayyids — Zaydi religious “aristocracy”. It is demonstrated that reestablishment of theocratic rule was not part of the Houthi political agenda since a majority of Yemenis were against
it; the goal of allegations about Houthi connections with Tehran, made by the Yemeni political
establishment, was to secure additional financial aid from Washington and Riyadh; Al-Houthi
was not a Twelver Shiite and was critical of the main ideas of this denomination. The author of
the article suggests that many Yemenis and several Russian and Western scholars believed the
accusations due to the dominance of anti-Zaydi sentiment in the Yemeni information space
and the fact that these accusations complement each other in a quasi-logical way: to reestablish the Imamate, Houthis need support, which can be gained from Iran, while conversion to
Twelver Shiism guarantees such support

The Gulf Cooperation Council is an active organization in the Arabian Peninsula also in the Persian Gulf which seeks cooperation with the member states. The two examples of Bahrain and Yemen are evaluated in the framework which was suggested by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, " Regional Security Complex Theory ". In this theory, the regional complexes are seen in the lens of securitization which can be an explanation in order to understand what happens in the Persian Gulf, what is the GCC's and Iran's motivations in these cases and what was the importance of these cases as the GCC states intervened both of these two examples which are to be evaluated. The article first explains the framework that will be dealt with and explain the GCC's aims to achieve. Then the examples of Bahrain and Yemen would be explained in order to understand the theory and also the developments that happen in Persian Gulf.

«Arab spring» in Yemen and Syria took place in 2011 year. Revolutionary events grew into revolution, which has continiued now days. This article analyses consequences of revolutionary events in Yemen ana Syria. Consequances of events «arab spring» have a direct impact on political, economic, social development not only of countries of the Middle East and North Africa, but also of European countries.
The main conclusions of the paper are the following. First, events of «arab spring» lead to political destabilization. Second, after «arab spring» in this countries is observed critical humanitarian situation. Third, revolutionary events didn’t promote developing democratic development.

Commonly described by Western media as a Shi’i Zaydi revivalist movement, a rebel group and an Iranian proxy, the Huthis (or Ansar Allah) exist marginally in the Western consciousness. The little knowledge that is recycled about the movement is typically misleading, and conducive to stereotypes and an underestimation of the group’s military and strategic capabilities. The reality of today’s Ansar Allah is both a skilled paramilitary force that has internalized the lessons of a decade and a half of war, as well as a political organization with the veneer of a social justice movement, which excels in the production of propaganda on the local and regional stages. The Huthis may, in fact, be the band of slogan-chanting tribesmen occasionally seen on major news networks, but they are also a remarkably resilient and dynamic entity that adapts to Yemen’s ever-changing political landscape.

Through examining the Houthi movement of Yemen using the social movement theory analysis approach I will investigate the identity, beliefs, and background of the Houthi’s of Yemen as a social movement. This approach will provide the opportunity to apply historical analysis to see into the roots of the Yemeni Houthi movement and the historical factors that lead to the group’s creation and popularity and offer perspective on the probable direction of a Houthi lead Yemeni government in the future.  Beginning with the formation of an armed movement ten years ago this Shia group has been fighting government forces in the north of Yemen and the recent occupation of the Yemeni capital Sana by this group undoubtedly reshapes the power structure in Yemen or the foreseeable future.  The rebels capitalized on widespread disillusionment with the previous government of Yemen that was viewed by the majority of the populous as  ineffective and corrupt.  The Houthi's have solidified their position of power following government violence against protesters leading to many deaths and strengthening support for the rebels.  The recent flight of President Hadi in the face of Houthi  advances and the launching of a  Saudi lead air campaign targeting the  Houthis has further  complicated the  situation in Yemen. The question I will explore further is the long-term viability of the group as a social movement and as a political power when considering identify, beliefs, and background of the group as a whole and the different regional and tribal factions that form the Houthi movement.

The Arab-Governance -Report III/2017 is a periodical report published by UNESCWA.
I contributed to writing the part dedicated to Yemen, PP139-171.  It focuses on the building of the State institutions in Yemen in case of the hostilities are brought to an end.
It contains historical background, explanations, and proposals related to the rebuilding of the Financial, Security, Administrative, Judicial, and Political Institutions, as well as the Private Sector and NGO's.
The study has been written in 2017. Some of its recommendations are actually applied to the current situation after the Agreement of Stockholm, concluded  in the end of 2018.

يتناول الكتاب مبادرات التسوية والاتفاقيات التي أعقبت جولات الصراع، والتي هدفت إلى بناء السلام في اليمن خلال التاريخ المعاصر، ونقاط الضعف والقصور التي صاحبتها، كما يتناول الارتباطات الخارجيَّة لقوى الصِّراع الدَّاخليَّة: الأيديولوجيَّة والسِّياسيَّة، والعسكريَّة، والإستراتيجيَّة وتأثيرها في الصراع الحالي و"صنع السَّلام"، ويستعرض جهود إنهاء الحرب وبناء السلام في اليمن، وموقف الفاعلين المحليين والإقليميين من حيث التوجهات والاشكالات، ومستوى اهتمام وحضور المجتمع الدولي، ومحددات بناء السلام، والفرص التي يمتلكها المسار السياسي، والتحديات التي تعترضه، وأخيراً مستقبل جهود السلام ومساراته المحتملة

The conflict in Yemen has been labelled the 'worst humanitarian crisis in the world' by the EU and characterised by the UN as 'entirely man-made'. The UN has warned that Yemen, already one of the poorest countries in the Arab world prior to the conflict, is now on the brink of widespread famine, which could lead to further massive loss of life. Yemen is also suffering from one of the largest cholera outbreaks in recorded history, with over one million suspected cases. The conflict has been variously portrayed as a civil war, a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and a supposedly ancient schism between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims. The diversity and sheer number of actors involved in the conflict, however, demonstrates that these characterisations are far too simplistic and that the conflict defies neat categorisation. As such, the paper attempts to unpack and provide an up-to-date account of the conflict, both from a humanitarian and a political perspective. To this end, the paper explores some of the underlying causes of the conflict and the actions of the plethora of actors involved, notably the internationally-recognised Hadi government, the Houthi movement, the Saudi-led coalition, Iran, al-Qa’ida, and the West. The paper also examines Australia’s position vis-à-vis the conflict and some of the implications of the presence of foreign personnel serving as both fighters and high-ranking officers in the UAE armed forces.

Yemen is a typically non-Arab country. However, due to colonial presence dating back to 1830s, the Orientalist fallacy of Pan-Arabism has been gradually diffused and prevailed when the supposed “revolutionaries”, imitating the Middle East’s worst failure, the idiosyncratic Nasserism, rose to power and plunged Yemen into underdevelopment, poverty, marginalization, starvation, tyranny, fratricide conflicts, and total disintegration.
First published in: http://www.fravahr.org/spip.php?article464
Sunday 31 May 2009

Due to the 2015 civil war, Yemen’s national order has vanished. Whatever viable attempt of conflict resolution must take into account a variety of existing micro-orders on a local basis. Deconstructing Yemen’s layers of conflict, this essay traces post-2015 internal transformations of power, arguing that Yemen has started a process of gradual feudalisation, based on militias and warlords, thus shifting from a multiple geographies scheme to an archipelago-like system of connected but rival feuds.

Governments, de facto authorities and rebel-governed areas aspiring to “counterstate sovereignty” all have to cope with the pandemic threat posed by COVID-19. Both official militaries and armed non-state groups find themselves at the centre of emergency plans in response to the pandemic, declaring and enforcing social distancing measures such as lockdowns and curfews. The case of Yemen shows how in conflict-torn or fragmented countries, governments, de facto authorities and rebels may show a convergent, although not coordinated, response to COVID-19.

This article investigates the evolution of political systems in North-Eastern Yemen in the course of the last two millennia. By examining the main shifts of political power and their structural elements, it describes a typology of socio-political and economic formation that was particular to the Yemeni Highlands and that has been designated as ‘multi-polity’. The study concludes that a North Yemeni type of tribe is a non-primitive and highly developed political structure, which may be considered in some respects as an alternative to state organization.

Ancient Yemen was inhabited by a Semitic nation whose descendants are the modern Yemenites, and the modern Abyssinians, the ruling minority of the Tigray and Amhara tribes, whose ancestors had left Yemen and settled on the Red Sea African coastland in the 1st millennium BCE. The affinities between Ancient Yemenite and Gueze (Ancient Abyssinian) are such (in both levels, linguistic and scriptural) that thanks to the latter (language of the Axumite Abyssinian Christian Liturgy) we deciphered the former.

The Arabs were located in Hedjaz, between Yemen’s northernmost confines and the southern boundaries of the Aramaean Nabataean state of Rekem (Petra) in today’s southern Jordan and NW Saudi Arabia. At the times of the Periplus of the Red Sea (second half of the 1st century CE) we know that the Arabs were nomadic, barbaric and uncivilized, if compared with the settled, cultured and highly civilized Yemenites. Under any circumstances, any element of civilization, culture, scripture and language, art and religion among the Arabs has always been diffused under Aramaean impact.
First published in: http://www.fravahr.org/spip.php?article464
Sunday 31 May 2009
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To read and download the article, go here:
https://hats21t.gumroad.com/l/slyfu
and
https://www.patreon.com/posts/yemenis-are-not-77547802

A variety of local conflicts and grievances with central government throughout Yemen are being increasingly framed in religious and sectarian terms, particularly since the 2011 youth uprisings toppled a 30-year old regime, writes Thanos Petouris

This paper sheds some light on the Southern Issue with reference to 2015 war in Yemen and shift of power. It has briefly surveyed the history of Southern Issue and the conflict relating to this issue, passing by 2015 war and shift of power. It has presented the history of this period impartially and neutrally and then reflected on the possible political scenarios in South Yemen in the light of the present war. It concluded with some recommendations that may help the concerned politicians involved in the Yemeni crisis to bring peace and stability to Southern Yemen particularly and Yemen generally.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331556665_YEMENI_WAR_AND_SHIFT_OF_POWER_A_REFLECTION_ON_THE_HISTORY_OF_SOUTHERN_ISSUE_AND_POSSIBLE_SCENARIOS_IN_SOUTH_YEMEN

The Western countries view Abyssinia transvestite into Ethiopia as a marginal, poor, and starving state, abandoned to permanent underdevelopment. Despite all the self-humiliating tactics, Westerners did not offer Abyssinia any guarantee that they would help the country build its dam in the Nile (nearby lake Tana). The country, plunged into terrible civil war as the oppressed Oromos, Ogadenis, Afars and Sidamas, is impotent and fearful even of Egypt, one of the weakest and poorest countries of the Middle East. They anticipate that if they build a dam, the Egyptians will bring it down.

Yet, the Western advisors of Haile Selassie, who convinced him to change the country’s name, aimed at the Sudan mostly. I will help illuminate a story that has not been widely known. The key person in influencing Haile Selassie to rename his country was Jean Leclant, currently Permanent Secretary of the French Academie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres. Leclant was asked personally by Haile Selassie in 1952 to found the Service des Antiquites de l' Ethiopie, which he did at the same time another French Egyptologist, Jean Vercoutter, founded the Service of Antiquities of Sudan.

Jean Leclant was my professor for the period 1978 - 1981 in Sorbonne, Ecole Pratique, and College de France. There was another influential Semitologist with Leclant in Abyssinia at those days; he was specialized in Ge'ez, Syriac, and Aramaic, and became later Professor at the College de France and academician: Andre Caquot. Leclant and Caquot explained to Haile Selassie the political benefits ensuing from the generalization of the use of the name Ethiopia by Abyssinia. I would like to report herewith that all Amharas working in the INALCO, like Argaw Mekonnen revered and venerated Leclant in extremis, because of his personal friendship with Haile Selassie. My great consideration for my former professor is still valid, limited exclusively in the academic sphere.
First published on 21th April 2007
http://www.afroarticles.com/article-dashboard/Article/Abyssinia--Ethiopia--Axum--Meroe--Yemen--History-and-current-Politics/20078

After the First World War, Yemen, which left the Ottoman Empire and declared its independence, witnessed a civil war between 1962-1968. A new civil war has been going on in the country since 2011. In the past Yemen, known as "happy Arabia" (Arabia Felix), where its people lived in prosperity and peace; today, continues to exist in chaos and far from these long-forgotten adjectives. The interventions of different states in Yemen, which is in a strategic geography that controls the Gulf of Aden, the Babülmandeb Strait, the Red Sea and the south of the Suez Canal, caused the country to have a fragile structure and the state administration to remain weak. Although the northern and southern regions of the country were united, the internal conflicts that came with the weakness of the government led the Houthis to capture Sana'a. Internal actors, who follow different agendas within themselves and play both political and social roles in Yemen, receive the support of external actors in line with their goals and interests in these wars. For instance, while Iran apparently resorts to soft power elements during these struggles, behind the scenes Iran resorts to hard power through the Houthis. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia, made an unprecedented move in the traditional foreign policy understanding in this power struggle and took its place on the stage by directly using the elements of hard power with the "Storm of Decisiveness" held in 2015. In this study, it is discussed that how external actors (United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Iran), which involved to Yemen's internal conflicts, change the course of conflicts and what effect they have on internal actors.

Birinci Dünya Savaşı’ndan sonra Osmanlı Devleti’nden ayrılıp bağımsızlığını ilan eden Yemen, 1962-1968 yılları arasında bir iç savaşa sahne olmuştur. Ülkede 2011’den itibaren devam eden yeni bir iç savaş yaşanmaktadır. Geçmişte halkının refah ve huzur içinde yaşadığı, “mutlu Arabistan” (Arabia Felix) olarak anılan Yemen, günümüzde bu sıfatlardan çok uzak, kaos içinde varlığını sürdürmektedir. Aden Körfezi’ni, Babülmendeb Boğazı’nı, Kızıldeniz’i ve Süveyş Kanalı’nın güneyini control eden stratejik bir coğrafyada bulunan Yemen’e farklı devletlerin kendi çıkarları için yapmış oldukları müdahaleler, ülkenin kırılgan bir yapıya sahip olmasına ve devlet yönetiminin zayıf kalmasına sebep olmuştur. Her ne kadar ülkenin kuzey ve güney bölgeleri birleşmiş olsa da hükümet zayıflığı ile gelen iç çatışmalar Husiler’in Sana’yı ele geçirmesine yol açmıştır. Yemen’de kendi içinde farklı gündemler takip eden ve gerek siyasi gerekse toplumsal rol oynayan iç aktörler, bu savaşlarda hedef ve çıkar ortaklığı doğrultusunda dış aktörlerin desteğini almaktadırlar. Örneğin, İran bu mücadeleler sırasında görünürde yumuşak güç unsurlarına başvururken, perde gerisinden Husiler vasıtasıyla sert güce başvurmaktadır. Suudi Arabistan ise bu güç mücadelesinde geleneksel dış politika anlayışında görülmemiş bir hamle yaparak 2015 yılında düzenlenen “Kararlılık Fırtınası” ile doğrudan sert güç unsurlarını kullanarak sahnede yerini almıştır. Bu çalışmada, Yemen’deki iç çatışmalara müdahil olan dış aktörlerin, (Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri, Suudi Arabistan ve İran) çatışmaların seyrini nasıl değiştirdiği ve iç aktörler üzerinde nasıl bir tesire sebep olduğu ele alınmıştır.

Yemen is known for being one of the worst countries in the world for women (Harb, 2019). Despite their visibility in public spaces including politics, especially compared to women in the Gulf region, Yemeni women still lack behind when it comes to the social structures and norms that control women’s access to opportunities. The fact that Yemeni women have had suffrage and the right to political association and assembly legally at the same time as men, does not fit well with the general situation in which women live in, including their enjoyment of the very rights they technically possess. Similarly, although Yemen as a country has ratified most international conventions regarding women’s political and civil rights, yet, women’s influence in politics and their ascension to positions of power within the political parties and senior positions in government continues to be undermined by many barriers.
The contrast between granted rights in written texts and Yemeni women’s exercise of those rights requires a deeper look into the socio-cultural structures that prevent Yemeni women from access to positions of power and having influence in formal politics. This paper aims at doing this in a way that provides practical measures to be included in any future political deals and political transitions.
Findings from this paper indicate that although they are necessary, legal regulations and political agreements granting women’s right to political affiliation are not sufficient to bring about their equal representation nor influence in parties and the political system in general. Enabling structures and environments in the social institutions need to be created in order to promote Yemeni women’s influence and ascension in political entities, because those who do join political parties are often side-lined into women’s departments and/or remain at non-decision-making levels. Therefore, a range of measures are necessary to bring about systemic change; in addition to affirmative measures to increase women’s representation within both political parties and elected office such as quotas and reforms of the electoral system, policies need to be put in place to change the structures, policies and practices within the political parties and institutions in order to create a more enabling environment for women’s advancement and increased influence.
Furthermore, findings from this research indicate that representation should not be conflated with influence. Political parties can advance women’s political representation across their parties’ ranks and into leadership positions, as well as in elected office by adopting a proportional representation system with special affirmative measures and sanctions against violators. Additionally policies and programmes to promote social behavioural-change and a shift in the political culture of parties are also required to prevent, reduce and eliminate discrimination and backlash. Such measures include designing and committing to an internal women’s advancement action plan, creating safe spaces and efficient measures to address discriminatory practices without fearing backlash, promoting role models and champions of gender equality and so on. Furthermore, political entities should strive to promote their female members beyond the party through presenting them as role models in public and formal politics, adopting national campaigns to influence the socio-cultural perceptions of women, and strengthening the women’s movement at large.
Finally, this paper draws attention to existing opportunities to strengthen women’s roles and advancement in party structures and in elections and elected office. Policy recommendations of provisions to be included in the peace agreement and its consequent arrangements in the transition period are presented at the end of the paper.

Abstract
If political activities (demonstration, revolution, war) can be understood as forms of ritual performance in which temporary social hegemonic inversions typically are followed by competing efforts to restore structure or define a new structure, then under what conditions would they offer potential for changes in family dynamics and gender roles? The past few years in Yemen have witnessed extraordinary political and socioeconomic turbulence, from the 2011 Arab Spring revolution to the 2015 brutal war. Yemeni families have been significantly impacted in myriad ways, including displacement, family separation, poverty, violence, unemployment, sectarian strife, disruption of education, and mental illness. Men and women have demonstrated a high level of public activism during the Arab Spring and the war, further altering family dynamics and the gendered social tapestry, in a highly patriarchal country. Social “disorder,” including modification of gender roles, is often challenged by those desiring to restore “order,” the “traditional” family structure, and patriarchy. This study analyzes gendered dimensions of the “Yemen Spring” and the subsequent war, with a particular focus on the link between gendered family dynamics and the sociopolitical landscape, also considering the role religion and religious groups play.

Yemen Civil War is one of the conflicts labeled as the "Worst Humanitarian Crisis" by the United Nations at 2018. 1 This Civil War has claimed more than 70,000 inhabitants and more than 3 million Yemenis have to evacuate. 2 The war situation in Yemen involving airstrikes and a blockade made it increasingly difficult to make a living in the areas where refugees come from. Divided into two blocks, Houthi which is the rebel forces that hold the ideology of Shia. Meanwhile Hadi, the government that holds the ideology of Sunni. Hadi was backed up by the Saudi-led military coalition with the support of the United Arab Emirates and the United States by providing them military assistance fought against the Houti rebels who are allegedly supported by Iran. Based on the explanation above, it can be seen that the conflict in Yemen Civil War is an Intrastate conflict. Hadi and Houthi tried to uphold their own interests, but by assassinating Ali Abdullah Saleh, the former Yemeni president who has led Yemen for more than three decades, the opposition party is using the wrong path to serve their interests. 3 This conflict is considered strategic for the interests of the countries

This lengthy events timeline of 132,183 words (219 pages) traces the developments in Yemen between and including 2011-2015, or over the duration of the five years that immediately followed the Yemeni Uprising of 2011.

I put together this document during the 2018-2019 academic year, or during the second year of my PhD studies at the department of Politics and International Studies of the University of Warwick in Coventry, United Kingdom. I relied heavily on the archives of the daily, Yemeni news website of https://marebpress.com and all translations from Arabic - English are my own.

I wrote this timeline for the sole purpose of my PhD thesis on 'International Law and the Territorial Controls of Non-State Armed Groups in Yemen and Libya (2011-2015),' which was funded through the University of Warwick. You can read the full thesis here:

https://figshare.com/articles/thesis/PhD_Thesis_Abdou_15_05_2022_pdf/19768471

Also see:

Libya Events Timeline (2011-2015):

https://figshare.com/articles/thesis/Libya_Events_Timeline_2011-2015_/14706141

"The Tribal-Military-Commercial Complex and the Challenges to Security Sector Reform in Yemen" in Addressing Security Sector Reform in Yemen (2017)

Chapter in a report entitled Addressing Security Sector Reform in Yemen Challenges and Opportunities for Intervention During and Post-Conflict. The report was edited by Marie-Christine Heinze and published by the Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient (CARPO) in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) on 20 December 2017.

This report is the result of a conference with the same name, which was jointly organized by CARPO and the Regional Office Gulf States of the KAS at the Dead Sea in April 2017. The papers by prolific experts on Yemen included in this publication discuss the changes, obstacles and limits for successful security sector reform in Yemen during and after the conflict and offer respective recommendations for national and international policy-makers in the field.