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Comparing economic incentives in peer-to-peer networks

Published: 16 September 2004 Publication History
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  • Abstract

    Users who join a peer-to-peer network have, in general, suboptimal incentives to contribute to the network, because of the externalities that exist between them. The result is an inefficient network where the overall levels of contribution are less than would be the case if each peer acted in the interests of the entire network of peers. Incentives provided in the form of prices or contribution rules that require no money transfers can play an important role in reducing these inefficiency effects. The problem in designing such incentive schemes is information: Designing an optimal incentive scheme requires complete knowledge of the types and preferences of the individual peers and their identities. In this paper we discuss the above issues in terms of a simple but representative example by introducing the basic economic concepts and models. We then investigate the practical issue of designing several simpler incentive schemes requiring less information and compare their efficiency loss to the optimal. We show using numerical analysis that these schemes converge to a fixed proportion of the full information optimal as the number of peers in the network becomes large. This result means that it is not necessary to collect large amounts of information, or to undertake complicated calculations, in order to implement the correct incentives in a large peer-to-peer network.

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    Published In

    cover image Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
    Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking  Volume 46, Issue 1
    Special issue: Internet economics: Pricing and policies
    16 September 2004
    142 pages

    Publisher

    Elsevier North-Holland, Inc.

    United States

    Publication History

    Published: 16 September 2004

    Author Tags

    1. economics
    2. incentives
    3. incomplete information
    4. mechanism design
    5. p2p networks
    6. public goods

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    • (2020)Distributed double auctions for large-scale device-to-device resource tradingProceedings of the Twenty-First International Symposium on Theory, Algorithmic Foundations, and Protocol Design for Mobile Networks and Mobile Computing10.1145/3397166.3409145(281-290)Online publication date: 11-Oct-2020
    • (2018)Optimal pricing for a peer-to-peer sharing platform under network externalitiesProceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation10.1145/3230654.3230660(1-6)Online publication date: 18-Jun-2018
    • (2016)A mechanism for resource pricing and fairness in peer-to-peer networksElectronic Commerce Research10.1007/s10660-016-9211-116:4(425-451)Online publication date: 1-Dec-2016
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