research-article

VeriTrust: Verification for Hardware Trust

Authors:

Qiang XuAuthors Info & Claims

IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems, Volume 34, Issue 7

Pages 1148 - 1161

https://doi.org/10.1109/TCAD.2015.2422836

Published: 01 July 2015 Publication History

Abstract

Today's integrated circuit designs are vulnerable to a wide range of malicious alterations, namely hardware Trojans (HTs). HTs serve as backdoors to subvert or augment the normal operation of infected devices, which may lead to functionality changes, sensitive information leakages, or denial of service attacks. To tackle such threats, this paper proposes a novel verification technique for hardware trust, namely VeriTrust, which facilitates to detect HTs inserted at design stage. Based on the observation that HTs are usually activated by dedicated trigger inputs that are not sensitized with verification test cases, VeriTrust automatically identifies such potential HT trigger inputs by examining verification corners. The key difference between VeriTrust and existing HT detection techniques based on “unused circuit identification” is that VeriTrust is insensitive to the implementation style of HTs. Experimental results show that VeriTrust is able to detect all HTs evaluated in this paper (constructed based on various HT design methodologies shown in this paper) at the cost of moderate extra verification time.

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VeriTrust: Verification for Hardware Trust
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cover image IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems

IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems Volume 34, Issue 7

July 2015

161 pages

ISSN:0278-0070

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Copyright © 2015.

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IEEE Press

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Published: 01 July 2015

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Cited By

Dai RYavuz T(2024)Detecting Hardware Trojans using Model Guided Symbolic ExecutionProceedings of the Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI 202410.1145/3649476.3658782(569-573)Online publication date: 12-Jun-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3649476.3658782
Albartus* NEnder* MMöller* JFyrbiak MPaar CTessier R(2024)On the Malicious Potential of Xilinx’s Internal Configuration Access Port (ICAP)ACM Transactions on Reconfigurable Technology and Systems10.1145/363320417:2(1-28)Online publication date: 30-Apr-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3633204
Dharsee KCriswell JCalandrino JTroncoso C(2023)JinnProceedings of the 32nd USENIX Conference on Security Symposium10.5555/3620237.3620627(6965-6982)Online publication date: 9-Aug-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3620237.3620627
Gaikwad PCruz JChakraborty PBhunia SHoque T(2023)Hardware IP Assurance against Trojan Attacks with Machine Learning and Post-processingACM Journal on Emerging Technologies in Computing Systems10.1145/359279519:3(1-23)Online publication date: 21-Jun-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3592795
Wang HZhou QCai YTakahashi A(2023)Static Probability Analysis Guided RTL Hardware Trojan Test GenerationProceedings of the 28th Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference10.1145/3566097.3567921(510-515)Online publication date: 16-Jan-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3566097.3567921
Chen HZhang XHuang KKoushanfar F(2023)AdaTest: Reinforcement Learning and Adaptive Sampling for On-chip Hardware Trojan DetectionACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems10.1145/354401522:2(1-23)Online publication date: 24-Jan-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3544015
Outkin ASchulz PSchulz TTarman TPinar A(2023)Defender Policy Evaluation and Resource Allocation With MITRE ATT&CK Evaluations DataIEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing10.1109/TDSC.2022.316562420:3(1909-1926)Online publication date: 1-May-2023
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Jayasena AMishra P(2023)Scalable Detection of Hardware Trojans Using ATPG-Based Activation of Rare EventsIEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems10.1109/TCAD.2023.329053742:12(4450-4462)Online publication date: 1-Dec-2023
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Cheng JFeng QLi CYang W(2023)Securing FPGAs in IoT: a new run-time monitoring technique against hardware TrojanWireless Networks10.1007/s11276-023-03305-930:6(5455-5463)Online publication date: 11-Mar-2023
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Roy AKokila JRamasubramanian NBegum B(2023)Device-specific security challenges and solution in IoT edge computing: a reviewThe Journal of Supercomputing10.1007/s11227-023-05450-679:18(20790-20825)Online publication date: 17-Jun-2023
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