research-article

Televisions, video privacy, and powerline electromagnetic interference

Authors:

Tadayoshi Kohno,

Shwetak N. PatelAuthors Info & Claims

CCS '11: Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security

Pages 537 - 550

https://doi.org/10.1145/2046707.2046770

Published: 17 October 2011 Publication History

Abstract

We conduct an extensive study of information leakage over the powerline infrastructure from eight televisions (TVs) spanning multiple makes, models, and underlying technologies. In addition to being of scientific interest, our findings contribute to the overall debate of whether or not measurements of residential powerlines reveal significant information about the activities within a home. We find that the power supplies of modern TVs produce discernible electromagnetic interference (EMI) signatures that are indicative of the video content being displayed. We measure the stability of these signatures over time and across multiple instances of the same TV model, as well as the robustness of these signatures in the presence of other noisy electronic devices connected to the same powerline.

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Cited By

Shang KHe WZhang S(2024)Review on Security Defense Technology Research in Edge Computing EnvironmentChinese Journal of Electronics10.23919/cje.2022.00.17033:1(1-18)Online publication date: Jan-2024
https://doi.org/10.23919/cje.2022.00.170
Yang LChen XJian XYang LLi YRen QChen YXue GJi XCalandrino JTroncoso C(2023)Remote attacks on speech recognition systems using sound from power supplyProceedings of the 32nd USENIX Conference on Security Symposium10.5555/3620237.3620493(4571-4588)Online publication date: 9-Aug-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3620237.3620493
Majors JBarsallo Yi EMaji AWu DBagchi SMachiry A(2023)Security Properties of Virtual Remotes and SPOOKing their violationsProceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security10.1145/3579856.3582834(841-854)Online publication date: 10-Jul-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3579856.3582834
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Index Terms

Televisions, video privacy, and powerline electromagnetic interference

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Published In

cover image ACM Conferences

CCS '11: Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security

October 2011

742 pages

ISBN:9781450309486

DOI:10.1145/2046707

General Chair:
Yan Chen
Northwestern University, USA
,
Program Chairs:
George Danezis
Microsoft Research Cambridge, UK
,
Vitaly Shmatikov
University of Texas at Austin, USA

Copyright © 2011 ACM.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 17 October 2011

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CCS'11

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SIGSAC

CCS'11: the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security

October 17 - 21, 2011

Illinois, Chicago, USA

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CCS '11 Paper Acceptance Rate 60 of 429 submissions, 14%;

Overall Acceptance Rate 1,261 of 6,999 submissions, 18%

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CCS '25

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ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

October 13 - 17, 2025

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Cited By

Shang KHe WZhang S(2024)Review on Security Defense Technology Research in Edge Computing EnvironmentChinese Journal of Electronics10.23919/cje.2022.00.17033:1(1-18)Online publication date: Jan-2024
https://doi.org/10.23919/cje.2022.00.170
Yang LChen XJian XYang LLi YRen QChen YXue GJi XCalandrino JTroncoso C(2023)Remote attacks on speech recognition systems using sound from power supplyProceedings of the 32nd USENIX Conference on Security Symposium10.5555/3620237.3620493(4571-4588)Online publication date: 9-Aug-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3620237.3620493
Majors JBarsallo Yi EMaji AWu DBagchi SMachiry A(2023)Security Properties of Virtual Remotes and SPOOKing their violationsProceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security10.1145/3579856.3582834(841-854)Online publication date: 10-Jul-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3579856.3582834
Ding DChen YJi XXue G(2023)LeakThief: Stealing the Behavior Information of Laptop via Leakage Current2023 20th Annual IEEE International Conference on Sensing, Communication, and Networking (SECON)10.1109/SECON58729.2023.10287495(186-194)Online publication date: 11-Sep-2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/SECON58729.2023.10287495
Lee KYang YPrabhune OChithra AWest JFawaz KKlingensmith NBanerjee SKim Y(2022)AEROKEYProceedings of the ACM on Interactive, Mobile, Wearable and Ubiquitous Technologies10.1145/35172546:1(1-29)Online publication date: 29-Mar-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3517254
Liang SZhan ZYao FCheng LZhang Z(2022)Clairvoyance: Exploiting Far-field EM Emanations of GPU to "See" Your DNN Models through Obstacles at a Distance2022 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW)10.1109/SPW54247.2022.9833894(312-322)Online publication date: May-2022
https://doi.org/10.1109/SPW54247.2022.9833894
Zhan ZZhang ZLiang SYao FKoutsoukos X(2022)Graphics Peeping Unit: Exploiting EM Side-Channel Information of GPUs to Eavesdrop on Your Neighbors2022 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)10.1109/SP46214.2022.9833773(1440-1457)Online publication date: May-2022
https://doi.org/10.1109/SP46214.2022.9833773
Wen JYan CJi XXu W(2022)Power IoT System Security Monitoring Based On Power Consumption Side Channel Information2022 5th International Conference on Electronics and Electrical Engineering Technology (EEET)10.1109/EEET58130.2022.00019(59-65)Online publication date: Dec-2022
https://doi.org/10.1109/EEET58130.2022.00019
Pothukuchi RPothukuchi SVoulgaris PSchwing ATorrellas JMartínez JDuato JJohn L(2021)MayaProceedings of the 48th Annual International Symposium on Computer Architecture10.1109/ISCA52012.2021.00074(888-901)Online publication date: 14-Jun-2021
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1109/ISCA52012.2021.00074
Zhang ZZhan ZBalasubramanian DLi BVolgyesi PKoutsoukos X(2020)Leveraging EM Side-Channel Information to Detect Rowhammer Attacks2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)10.1109/SP40000.2020.00060(729-746)Online publication date: May-2020
https://doi.org/10.1109/SP40000.2020.00060
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